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i 

70–785 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–69] 

THE FUTURE OF U.S. SPECIAL 

OPERATIONS FORCES: TEN YEARS 

AFTER 9/11 AND TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 

AFTER GOLDWATER-NICHOLS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS 

AND CAPABILITIES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

SEPTEMBER 22, 2011 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

PETER VILLANO, Professional Staff Member 

MARK LEWIS, Professional Staff Member 

JEFF CULLEN, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, September 22, 2011, The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces: 

Ten Years After 9/11 and Twenty-Five Years After Goldwater-Nichols ......... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, September 22, 2011 ............................................................................... 23 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2011 

THE FUTURE OF U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES: TEN YEARS 

AFTER 9/11 AND TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER GOLDWATER-NICHOLS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ..................... 2 

Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ............................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Lumpkin, Michael D., Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict .............................................................................. 3 

McRaven, ADM William H., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command ..................................................................................................................... 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Langevin, Hon. James R. ................................................................................. 28 

Lumpkin, Michael D. ........................................................................................ 30 

McRaven, ADM William H. ............................................................................. 47 

Thornberry, Hon. Mac ...................................................................................... 27 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................ 57 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Thornberry ................................................................................................. 61 

Mr. Wittman ..................................................................................................... 63 

(1) 

THE FUTURE OF U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES: 

TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11 AND TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 

AFTER GOLDWATER-NICHOLS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, 

Washington, DC, Thursday, September 22, 2011. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. THORNBERRY. The hearing will come to order. 

Twenty-five years ago, the Congress added an amendment to 

Goldwater-Nichols legislation that created the Special Operations 

Command. That law listed 12 core mission areas for the command 

and gave SOCOM some unique authorities. 

It certainly is appropriate, it seems to me, for Congress to review 

its handiwork, especially as we look back now at a decade of fighting terrorists, a decade in which SOCOM has roughly doubled in 

personnel, tripled in budget, and quadrupled in overseas deployments. We may not be able to quantify as precisely the achievements of these last 10 years, but they are, in my opinion at least, 

undeniable. 

Looking back on the past decade, my strongest impression is of 

the incredibly talented, committed, hardworking individuals who 

serve our country in SOCOM units. As I travel to Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, I am continually impressed and inspired by 

them, just as I know other members of this subcommittee are. The 

capability that these people, with their training, their hardware, 

and their supporting organizations, bring to our country is without 

parallel anywhere in the world. 

Some of that capability was on display to the world in the Osama 

bin Laden raid. But SOCOM does much more, often with little or 

no fanfare, as it should be. It may well be that the future of the 

command will require greater emphasis on some of those other mission areas, such as unconventional warfare and foreign internal 

defense. 

Of course, we consider the future of SOCOM and our entire military within the constraints of tight budgets. But it seems to me it 

would be the height of foolishness to provide insufficient resources 

to an entity charged with fighting terrorists, preventing weapons of 
2 

mass destruction from being used and training other nations to defend themselves so that we don’t have to. 

The first job of the Federal Government is to defend the Nation, 

and SOCOM is truly the tip of the spear that does that. We are 

honored to have Admiral McRaven in his first testimony before this 

subcommittee since assuming his new position as SOCOM commander and appreciate Assistant Secretary Lumpkin, himself a 

former SEAL [U.S. Navy Sea, Air, Land teams], for being here 

today as well. 

Before turning to our witnesses, I would yield to the distinguished gentleman from Rhode Island, the ranking member, for 

any comments he would like to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the 

Appendix on page 27.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you 

for convening this hearing. 

Secretary Lumpkin and Admiral McRaven, welcome, and thank 

you very much for being here today. I look forward to your testimony. The importance of SOF [Special Operations Forces] in today’s fight, while so often in the shadows, as the chairman pointed 

out, was brought into the spotlight during the daring raid into 

Abbottabad back in May. All of us in the room, and in fact the Nation, owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to the men and women 

who serve with you in SOCOM. Raids such as the one which killed 

Osama bin Laden highlight the wisdom and the prescience of the 

authors of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. 

Today, joint operations between the services are commonplace 

and expected, and we have seen an unprecedented rise in both the 

capability of our Special Operations Forces and the prominence 

they play in our modern military. 

It wasn’t that long ago that SOF was looked upon as sort of a 

boutique force, one with niche capabilities that performed important but lesser activities around the edges of a primary conventional force effort. Because of their efforts, they were known often 

only to a few with the right clearances or keen-eyed observers. 

Some even questioned whether we needed SOF at all. 

Well, 10 years after 9/11, and due in no small part to our experience fighting Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

they are the stuff task forces are built around, oftentimes augmented by conventional forces and a very central component of our 

ongoing fights in the Middle East and elsewhere. Those legislators 

who had the vision to create SOCOM could not have envisioned exactly how SOF would evolve in the 25 years that followed. But they 

knew they had to create a framework that would enable success, 

whichever way requirements pulled the force. That remains our 

task today. 

Now, I am not suggesting that we need another massive piece of 

legislation, but we do need to think about whether the way we are 

currently training, manning, and equipping our SOF today is sufficient and appropriate for the future. We must utilize the lessons 
3 

learned from the past 10 years of warfare and ask tough questions. 

Have our SOF forces withstood the last decade—I should say how 

have our SOF forces withstood the last decade? What factors, both 

internal and external, help and hurt their growth and efficiency? 

As the defense budgets tighten in coming years, where must SOF 

grow? And which areas have the experiences that have yet to be 

explored? 

The timing of this hearing couldn’t be better, Mr. Chairman. And 

we have to consider how best to posture our forces for the future 

security challenges and contend with the prospect of austere resources. I hope we see a wide-ranging and robust discussion today 

about lessons learned and thoughts about what is to come. Are the 

acquisition authorities agile enough while still properly tailored to 

yield the specialized equipment you need when you need it, without 

duplicating other efforts and costs elsewhere in the greater DOD 

[Department of Defense] budget? Would the rest of the force benefit 

from new acquisition efforts, as appropriate? Can we train your 

people properly? Are the authorities governing your operations 

crafted so that you can do what you need to do, and yet still be 

subject to appropriate control and oversight? And how have the 

lines blurred between Title 10 and Title 50 affected the force? And 

most importantly, are you able to stay true to your core, to the SOF 

truths, which all operators know and understand in spite of the 

current operational and fiscal realities? These are the questions 

that we hope to explore today. 

And Mr. Secretary and Admiral, thank you both for your great 

service to our Nation. We are deeply in your debt, and to those 

whom serve under you. And I look forward to your discussion and 

your testimony here today. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for convening this hearing. I 

yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the Appendix on page 28.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the gentleman. 

Now we will turn to our witnesses: Mr. Michael D. Lumpkin, 

Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/LowIntensity Conflict; and Admiral William McRaven, Commander, 

U.S. Special Operations Command. 

Mr. Lumpkin and Admiral, without objection, your full statements will be made part of the record. And please feel free to summarize them and make such comments as you see fit. Mr. 

Lumpkin. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN, ACTING ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Good morning. 

Thank you, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, 

and members of the committee. Thank you for the invitation to be 

here today. 

As we approach the 25th anniversary of the founding of United 

States Special Operations Command and the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, I want to acknowledge the unique relationship we have had 
4 

with the Congress and this committee. Your support, and that of 

the American people, for our Special Operations Forces was essential in the creation of SOCOM and SO/LIC, and continues to be the 

key enablers for us today. As we reflect on the lessons learned over 

the past decade, it is crucial that we put them into a broader context. 

In 1970, American Special Operations Forces carried out one of 

the most daring raids in American military history, the attempted 

rescue of 61 American prisoners of war suspected of being held in 

a North Vietnamese prison camp at Son Tay, a mere 40 miles west 

of Hanoi. 

Only 10 years later, in 1980, our Special Operations Forces attempted to rescue 55 American hostages held in Iran. That operation failed, resulting in the death of eight service members and 

damaging American prestige worldwide, principally due to a decrease in operational capabilities. 

Thirty-one years after the tragedy of Desert One, our Special Operations Forces have come full circle. The daring and successful 

raid at Abbottabad, approximately 40 miles north of Islamabad, led 

to the death of Osama bin Laden, showcases the superb skills of 

special operators today. 

As we enter an era of constrained defense budgets, we must not 

repeat the mistakes that led to the degraded SOF capabilities 

throughout the 1970s. Our goal must be to retain and, in fact, hone 

all of our SOF capabilities so that our Nation will have them in full 

measure in the decades to come. We must retain and sharpen our 

proven direct action capability, the tip of the spear so to speak, 

which is what most Americans think of when they hear Special Operations. 

But this is only one aspect of what SOF does. There are less obvious, but equally important SOF capabilities for indirect activities 

that enable us to persistently engage throughout the world, working with international partners to build their capabilities before 

conflicts arise so that they can defend themselves and, by extension, defend us. 

Our experiences have validated the five SOF truths. First, humans are more important than hardware. SOF is successful because we equip the man, not man the equipment. It’s all about our 

people. 

This leads us to the second SOF truth. SOF are uniquely able 

to provide a Nation with targeted and precision capabilities across 

the full spectrum of conflict, whether it is training partner military 

units, countering terrorist threats or conducting high-end direct action missions. Our return on investment is the highest among all 

U.S. forces. 

The third and fourth SOF truths are interconnected. SOF cannot 

be mass-produced, and competent SOF cannot be created after 

emergencies occur. It has taken the last decade to grow our SOF 

capability from approximately 33,000 service members to almost 

58,000 today. As we increase the number of SOF, we must ensure 

a commensurate growth in our enablers. 

This takes us to the fifth SOF truth. Most Special Operations require non-SOF support, including support from general purpose 

forces and the interagency. We know that the team approach in 
5 

DOD and the interagency and with international partners carries 

the day. 

Another key lesson over the past decade relates to the old adage 

that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. For a relatively small cost, we are able to build partner forces and gain access to better local intelligence, which can create security without 

requiring a large, expensive U.S. footprint. 

In the foreseeable future, disrupting, dismantling, and defeating 

Al Qaeda, its adherents and associated movements, will continue 

to dominate the SO/LIC and SOCOM agendas. Supporting 

SOCOM’s efforts to refine counternetwork targeting, interagency 

collaboration, and organizational structures will remain a priority. 

SO/LIC will continue to be the focal point for coordinating DOD’s 

role in the national strategic counterterrorism activities. 

Post-2014, DOD is projecting a baseline requirement of 10,500 to 

12,500 deployed special operators on any given day. SOF represents an exceptional value to our Nation, consuming just 1.6 percent of the defense budget and comprising less than 3 percent of 

U.S. military personnel. The characteristics of our Special Operation warriors guarantee that our military possesses the capability 

for facing the unknown threats of the future and general purpose 

forces downsize. 

On behalf of everyone who serves in the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, 

I thank you for your long-standing support of our Special Operations soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, and the thousands of 

civilians that support them. This concludes my opening remarks, 

and I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lumpkin can be found in the Appendix on page 30.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Admiral. 

STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM H. MCRAVEN, USN, 

COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Good morning. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished members of the committee, again, thank you for the invitation to appear before this 

committee and the opportunity to represent the men and women of 

the United States Special Operations Command. 

I am honored to command such a capable and effective organization, and privileged to appear today alongside my teammate, Secretary Michael Lumpkin, the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. 

I have positioned a few posters around the room which highlights 

SOCOM’s rich history; our authorities, those legislated by Congress 

and those directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense; 

how Special Operations has changed since 9/11; where we are 

today; and how we are preparing for tomorrow. 

As you know, SOCOM was legislatively created by Congress in 

1986. Congress’ vision and support, coupled with tremendous military leaders and exceedingly talented operators, have created the 

most capable Special Operations force the world has ever seen. I 
6 

applaud lawmakers’ foresight in legislating this command into existence. You can be very proud of the results. 

U.S. SOCOM is one of nine unified combatant commands across 

the Department of Defense. And while similar in many regards, we 

are unique in that we also exercise numerous service, military 

department, and defense agency-like responsibilities. Among 

SOCOM’s legislated responsibility is to prepare Special Operations 

Forces to carry out assigned missions, including training and 

equipping the force, and to command select Special Operations missions when directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of 

Defense. 

Additionally, U.S. SOCOM is directed by the Unified Command 

Plan to synchronize planning for global operations against terrorist 

networks. In carrying out these tasks, we work closely with the 

Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the geographic combatant 

commands, and appropriate government agencies. These authorities have effectively prepared and equipped our force to meet the 

threats of the last decade, and to be postured appropriately for future challenges. 

Since 9/11, our force has doubled in size, our budget has tripled, 

and our deployment requirements have quadrupled. However, congressional support has enabled U.S. SOCOM to continue providing 

rapid global options to meet a broad set of complex and dynamic 

challenges. Special Operations Forces currently serve in both supporting and supported roles across the battlefield. With an annual budget of $10.5 billion, U.S. SOCOM comprises 

only 1.6 percent of the Department of Defense proposed fiscal year 

2012 budget and, put simply, provides a tremendous return on the 

Nation’s investment. Our success in these roles hinges on the application of the indirect and the direct approaches, meaning that both 

approaches are required to achieve the desired results. 

The direct approach is characterized by precision, highly kinetic 

strike forces enabled by technology and linked through a digitally 

networked battlefield. Since 9/11, these largely kinetic counterterrorism operations have had great effect disrupting Al Qaeda and 

its affiliates by providing space and time for the indirect approach 

to achieve its desired effect. 

Conversely, the indirect approach is focused on advising, assisting, and training our global partners. Our persistent presence is 

enabled by a deep understanding of a local culture and context. 

These two approaches are mutually supportive and necessary elements of effective Special Operations employment. 

Currently, more than 13,000 members of Special Operations 

Command are deployed globally, with 85 percent of those forces deployed to the Central Command area of responsibility. Of these deployed forces, more than 10,000 SOF are in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

The other 3,000 Special Operations Forces are deployed to more 

than 75 countries around the world. Operating at the invitation of 

the country and the approval of the ambassador, these forces are 

performing noncombat missions in diverse, challenging environments. 

The goal of these forces deployed outside combat is to build partner nation capacity. Building this capacity is critical to enabling 

our partners to deal with their own security challenges, strength-
7 

ening their regional stability, and decreasing the demand for U.S. 

support. 

As many of you know, our total force faces challenges as well. 

With a significantly increased operational tempo and continued 

high demand for Special Operations Forces, the past decade of continuous combat has resulted in increased pressure on our forces 

and families. While SOF and their families are resilient by nature, 

the effects of 10 years of focused combat operations convinced my 

predecessor, Admiral Eric Olson, to form a task force to examine 

what he described as the fraying around the edges of the force. 

Over a period of several months, the task force conducted over 400 

focus group discussions with more than 7,000 Special Operations 

service members and more than 1,000 spouses from 55 different 

SOF units around the world, including forces deployed in combat. 

For SOF, there is no single cause responsible for the fraying. It 

is the accumulation of a multitude of stresses spread throughout 

the training and deployment cycle. While I can assure you the state 

of Special Operations Forces is strong, the pressure on our service 

members and their families requires careful attention to ensure the 

long-term health of the force. Compounding the stress on the force 

is the reality that the demand for SOF continues to exceed supply. 

As we draw down the general purpose forces in Iraq and contemplate drawdown in Afghanistan, SOF will likely be the last 

force to experience relief. As Admiral Mullen said earlier this year, 

SOF are typically the first force in and the last to leave. With 85 

percent of deployed SOF in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, 

the pent-up demand across the other geographic combatant commands continues to grow. And I do not anticipate it to decrease. 

Another challenge for SOF is our reliance on the general purpose 

forces for supporting infrastructure and enablers. SOF, by design, 

depends heavily on the service-provided capability for support. Consequently, as we look at the drawdown in Afghanistan, the potential drawdown in Afghanistan, and the potential for additional SOF 

requirements, we need to make sure the appropriate infrastructure 

and enablers remain in place to make SOF as effective as possible 

on that battlefield. 

Globally, Special Operations Forces are contributing well beyond 

their numbers, and are known for their high return on investment. 

In the future, I see great benefit in developing a global SOF network. We are working through the geographic combatant commands. And bolstering our ties with the interagency and the allied 

SOF partners, we can react even more rapidly and effectively 

against our enemies. 

My number one priority is winning the current fight, while maintaining the health of the force. But close behind that priority is expanding this global SOF and interagency network to deal with future challenges. 

I would like to conclude with two final points. First, I believe the 

Special Operations Forces have never been more valuable to our 

Nation and to our allies around the world than it is today. And the 

demand will not diminish for the foreseeable future. 

Second and lastly, I want you to know how proud I am to command the greatest Special Operations force in the world. And you 

have my promise that we will continue to fight as long and as hard 
8 

as you need us to in order to protect this great Nation and the 

principles we hold so dear. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you today, 

and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral McRaven can be found in 

the Appendix on page 47.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Admiral. And I don’t believe any 

member of this subcommittee has any doubt about that. And that 

is reassuring. 

Let me ask for you all’s brief comments for a couple of issues 

within the time I have available. One is back to the statute. As I 

mentioned, the statute lays out 12 specific areas for Special Operations Command. If you look through them, it seems to me it is a 

huge breadth of our security challenges right now, from foreign internal defense, terrorism—counterterrorism, you know, the whole 

list. Are there any of them that you would recommend Congress at 

least examine to see whether there should be changes, either additions or subtractions, to that list of 12 that were put in, in the 

original bill? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Mr. Chairman, as we look at the missions that 

were legislated within the Goldwater-Nichols, what we do is we 

have the codified process of the Quadrennial Defense Review, 

where we go through all of these missions and we scrub them to 

make sure that we indeed are doing what needs to be done for our 

Nation. So the process works very well. 

What we have identified in, for example, the 2006 QDR was that 

the missions were largely what we needed to be, but we didn’t have 

the force size to accomplish them completely. So the QDR 2006 was 

the program growth of SOF itself, of the operators. 

In 2010, we saw the shortfall of the enablers to allow SOF to do 

that, to execute their missions. So we saw that programmed in the 

growth across the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program]. And 

that is the program that we are executing right now. So I think our 

missions are accurate and effective for what our Nation needs, but 

I will defer to Admiral McRaven. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, I would agree with Secretary Lumpkin. 

The great thing about this is a lot of those missions are mutually 

supporting. So if you are training a Special Forces officer and NCO 

[noncommissioned officer] in how do counterinsurgency, that same 

skill set can apply to foreign internal defense. If you are training 

an operator in how to do counterterrorism, a lot of those same skill 

sets will apply to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction. 

So the great thing is when we look at those mission sets that we 

have, again, I think if you focus on kind of the direct and the indirect approach, and we train all of our operators to do both, the mission set, as Secretary Lumpkin said, I think is exactly what we 

need now and for the future. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. 

Second issue I would invite you all’s comments on is budget. 

Under some scenarios, there could be reductions to every account 

in the defense budget, as I understand the way that potential sequestration would operate. I also understand from reading the 

press that the Department of Defense has put out some restrictions 
9 

on how military officers can talk about consequences of defense 

budget cuts. And I certainly am not asking you to violate any orders that you received. But I would appreciate, I think we all need 

to hear somewhat about the potential for 5, 10 percent budget cuts 

to SOCOM’s budget. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Within the Department, as you are aware, Mr. 

Chairman, is that we are doing a strategy-based review as far as 

the budget reductions to make sure that we have a holistic look at 

what the requirements are of the Nation and to make sure that we 

have the forces that are prepared to respond to those future situations globally. 

So we are looking within the Department to find out where we 

can find those efficiencies. The key that we are really looking at, 

not only within the SOF portfolio, but also with the enablers, because as the services look at reductions that may impact them, 

they have a direct impact on us, for a number of reasons. 

First of all, that is where we draw a large portion of our forces 

from. They come into the general purpose forces and then will transition to SOF at some point. So we have them as a talent pool, first 

of all. 

Number two is that they provide the support that we need to 

execute our mission so we can focus on those specifically. And 

while we do have the need for organic combat support and combat 

service support, we do rely heavily on the general purpose forces. 

So we are looking very closely to see what the budget impacts are 

going to have on them, which will in turn influence and impact us. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, I just echo those comments. 

I think, within OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], within 

the Department of Defense, they understand the value that SOF 

brings to the current fight and the future fight. 

Our real concern, as Secretary Lumpkin said, is the impact on 

the services. And as the services have to potentially cut key 

enablers, that is going to affect us. And we just have to make sure 

that we are in constant dialogue with the services, which we are 

through this whole process. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. Just be in constant dialogue with us, 

too, because I am concerned about where this could lead and the 

idea that some people might have that, oh, we can keep the 

counterterrorism effort going; we will just cut the Army, Navy, Air 

Force, Marines. This enabler issue that you brought up I think may 

not be apparent to most people. 

The gentleman from Rhode Island. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again Mr. Secretary and Admiral, thank you for your testimony 

here today and your service. 

Given my roles on both the House Armed Services Committee 

and the House Intelligence Committee, and the ability to have 

transparencies into both Title 10 and Title 50 responsibilities, I 

wanted to focus on that area a bit this morning. 

I am increasingly aware of and to a degree concerned that the 

lines between those two authorities are becoming blurred as they 

relate to our military SOF capabilities. Ten years ago, the 9/11 

Commission, for example, recommended that responsibility for 

paramilitary operations should be shifted from the CIA [Central In-
10 

telligence Agency] to U.S. Special Operations Command. This recommendation was primarily based on the belief that the CIA 

doesn’t have a robust capability for conducting these types of activities. But with over a decade of warfare experience now under its 

belt, I certainly believe it goes without saying that the CIA’s capability has grown tremendously in this area. 

Without delving into classified information, and we will talk 

more about this in a classified setting later, I would like to hear 

your thoughts on the following: Has the Title 10-Title 50 divide 

taxed your force significantly? Do you agree with the 9/11 Commission that the U.S. military should take on this traditionally agencyled role? And the third question in this area, how can Congress 

best bridge the Title 10-Title 50 divide and provide the necessary 

oversight in this somewhat gray area? 

So, Mr. Secretary, do you want to start? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Thank you for the question, sir. 

We can go more in depth, of course, in the closed session after 

this. I would submit that the 10–50 divide that you speak of, we 

have a very good relationship with the interagency. We have the 

processes and memorandums, in terms of reference, in place to effectively ensure that we within the Office of Secretary of Defense’s 

Special Operations have oversight over any activities that go on between U.S. Special Operations Command and the interagency in 

that realm. 

I don’t believe that this is a mission at this point that should migrate to DOD because the relationship is very good, and it maximizes and gives us the capability to work through the different authorities that each agency has. And the rest of it I would prefer to 

defer to the closed session, if possible, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Fair enough. 

Let me ask this, and I think I can probably ask this in open session, is the agency properly resourced to do the missions that it is 

called upon to do, or is it the type of thing where they are stressed 

and it is more of an area where SOF forces would be more capable? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. I have not run into a situation yet where they 

were resource deprived to execute a mission that was uniquely 

theirs that we could not help them with. When they find that there 

is a shortage, we can work something through that to bridging the 

gap to make sure they have the capabilities that are necessary. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. 

Admiral, do you care to comment? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, I am not sure there is much to add, but 

I will tell you the relationship between CIA and Special Operations 

Forces is as good as I have ever seen it. Both under Director Panetta, and now, of course, under Director Petraeus, I think we are 

going to see that relationship continue to strengthen and blossom. 

And again, great relationship. 

I think we clearly understand on the Department of Defense side 

the lanes in the road in terms of Title 10 versus Title 50. And as 

Secretary Lumpkin said, I think we can certainly address some of 

your other concerns in the closed session. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Fair enough. Let me turn to budgets in the time 

that I have left. 
11 

Mr. Secretary, in light of the budget debate here in Washington 

and the inevitable shrinking of the defense budget, I am concerned 

about the effects of this squeeze on the SOF community, as is the 

chairman. During our brief meeting yesterday, you had mentioned 

concerns about the effects of ongoing DOD budget efficiency efforts 

on SOCOM and the various forces who would enable SOF to do 

their mission so well. Can you elaborate on those concerns more 

specifically, and which enablers are absolutely vital? And are there 

any areas where some flexibility exists in those enabling forces? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Thank you, sir. 

The principal concern goes back to the issue of enablers, to making sure that those are in place to support our SOF. As we see the 

general purpose force footprint reduced, specifically in Afghanistan 

in the future, we understand there is going to be a higher reliance 

on the Special Operations community. So we are watching to see 

how those reductions will impact SOF. 

ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] in particular 

is one thing that we rely heavily upon. And so we have to make 

sure that we watch to see how that looks and how that goes to 

make sure we fully recognize the impact on our Special Operations 

community. So, again, it goes back to largely to the enablers. 

I think our Nation understands the benefit of SOF, especially in 

the environment that we anticipate in the future globally. So I 

think that we need to work with the services, make sure that we 

are focused and adaptive to what happens in the future as we look 

at the budgets in the coming years. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. 

Thank you both for your testimony. 

I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

First question, Admiral, is you talked about pent-up demand. I 

am assuming you mean Central America, South America, Philippines. Can you expand on that a little bit? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. As I mentioned in my opening statements, we have got about 85 percent of our Special Operations 

Forces currently in the CENTCOM area of operation. And frankly, 

I think at this time and place, that is probably the right percentage 

to have there. 

But clearly, there remains demand in other theaters that over 

the course of the last 10 years, we have had to draw from some 

of the other theaters in order to support the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. So as we look at the future and the potential, with the 

drawdown in Iraq and obviously, over time, the drawdown in Afghanistan, certainly what I will try to do is balance those requirements that are coming from the geographic combatant commands 

in the various theaters so we can better support them. But right 

now a lot of our lift, a lot of our personnel have come from those 

theaters in order to support the effort in CENTCOM. 

Mr. HUNTER. So when you look out the next say even 10 to 20 

years and how SOF is going to need to transition, whether it is 

being more in like Southeast Asia, what do you see as the most important thing that—because you have people like Chairman Thorn-
12 

berry, Chairman Langevin, they have been here for a long time. 

They have seen administrations come and go. They have been here 

prior to 9/11 and afterwards. So what is next, looking forward, that 

we need to make sure that we don’t take our eye off the ball as 

those of us that are here longer, through multiple administrations, 

through multiple changes, multiple wars, what do we need to keep 

focused on over the long term? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. Our strength I think is this global 

SOF network that I talked a little bit about in the opening comments. We work through the theater Special Operations commands 

[SOCs] in order to influence and support the geographic combatant 

commanders. So as I look at the future of the U.S. Special Operations Command, one of the areas where I intend to put a lot of 

emphasis is building up the theater Special Operations commands 

so that they have the entire spectrum of capability that I think 

they will need for the future. 

Now, every theater Special Operations command will be a little 

different. Clearly, as we look at someplace like PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] and SOCPAC [Special Operations Command Pacific], can they use ISR, for example, unmanned ISR? And the answer is I think in certain cases, they absolutely could for disaster 

relief. If a tsunami hit someplace, somebody may want to understand what the problem looks like. So ISR is probably applicable 

in SOCPAC as well as SOCSOUTH [Special Operations Component, U.S. Southern Command]. 

But as you look at a place like SOCEUR [Special Operations 

Command Europe], I am sure our ability to fly into European airspace with unmanned aerial vehicles is probably a nonstarter. So 

we are going to have to balance out what comes out of Afghanistan, 

as you point out, in the next—whatever that timeline looks like, 5, 

10 years—take those resources and then again balance them out 

across the various theater SOCs. But I believe that our future, 

SOCOM’s future, lies in the theater of Special Operations Forces 

and making sure that they are robust enough to handle the problems in their particular geographic areas. 

Mr. HUNTER. Going back to enablers again, you can talk conventional Navy, which is your primary enabler internationally—not 

right now in Iraq and Afghanistan, but primarily after these—we 

draw down. Do you think that they are set up in a way right now? 

Would you change anything in big Navy, conventional Navy in the 

ships that they are buying, in the way that they are going towards 

unmanned vehicles in their movement, I guess trying to get involved right now in these two wars and be somehow involved in 

these two wars and have a role to play? Would you change their 

direction, or do you think that they are doing enough to enable you 

in the future when we start moving out of Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. If I may, Mr. Hunter, we are working closely with 

the Navy as far as when it comes to their structure, especially in 

the realm of maritime ISR, to support SOF and to make sure that 

they have a capability that can meet our needs globally, especially 

in the expeditionary nature of the Navy as we move forward and 

sometimes frequently with short or little notice that if they are already in place, they can support our forces through that maritime 
13 

ISR. So that is one of the key things that we are working with the 

Navy in particular on. 

Mr. HUNTER. What about shipbuilding? Are you guys happy with 

the Littoral Combat Ship [LCS] and its capability? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Candidly, I haven’t had those discussions with the 

Navy. As we look at it, a more robust capability is always better 

for us that is out there. But I would like to take that one for the 

record, if that is okay with you, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. So SOF, just to make sure, SOF has not looked at 

then the LCS as one of their primary vehicles for the future? Especially the Navy SEALs? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. We have definitely, I know the force has looked at 

the LCS and the Navy capability at large. I don’t have the answer 

to that question right now, and I would like to take it for the 

record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 57.] 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Secretary Lumpkin and Admiral McRaven, thank you both 

for being here. 

I especially want to welcome a fellow San Diegan, as well, Mr. 

Secretary, thank you. 

I think one of the things that has become really clear is that our 

SOF members have become really the experts in the whole-of-government approach. And I wonder if you could share with us, I 

guess is there something that we really can take from your experience, from the SOF’s experience into the military as a whole as we 

train and prepare individuals on all of the—across the services? 

And also whether in fact we are able to I guess send a clear message that, working with our international partners, that it takes— 

you know, it is still, as we deal with SOF, it is still the military. 

And yet we talk about the whole of government as being something 

perhaps different and added value to the military. How do you 

work that in the field, particularly as we go into many areas where 

we are trying to prevent those conflicts? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, ma’am, thank you. 

And I am glad you asked the question. Frankly, from my previous command tour as the commander of JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command], I can tell you that not a single mission that 

we conducted did not have a heavy interagency flavor to it. And we 

learned very early on that what the interagency brought in terms 

of diversity of their cultures and their unique capabilities was a 

huge enabler for Special Operations Forces, particularly the kinetic 

side. So if you are going to go against a target, you are going to 

have intelligence support from CIA, NSA [National Security Agency], DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency]. You will have support from 

NGA [National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency] on the graphics. 

Everybody, and of course State Department, a key player in all of 

this. FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], as we are supporting 

certain missions that the FBI may be conducting. So tremendous 
14 

interagency lash up between Special Operations and our interagency partners. 

On the indirect side, I would say it is very much the same. Those 

forces out in the field are working with USAID [U.S. Agency for 

International Development]. They are working with NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], again, trying to build host nation capacity. If they are in a noncombat area, they are sitting at the 

table with the country teams to make sure that the country team 

mission, that they are in support of that. So interagency is really 

kind of a foundation of how we are doing Special Operations today. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Is there something unique about the way you have 

been able to break down those barriers and perhaps we have had 

more difficulty in other areas? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. I think a lot of it has do with at the end of 

the day, there are results, in terms of if an interagency supports 

an operation in Afghanistan with intelligence, or graphics, or authorities, they will see a result of their support to Special Operations. 

And that tangible result really makes a difference in how much 

they want to provide support. And you see that again down range 

as well. 

I think if you would talk to ambassadors across the 75 countries 

in which we are in kind of day in and day out, they will tell you 

that the support provided by the military information support 

teams, the civil affairs teams, and then the joint training that happens with the Special Forces and the SEALs is tremendous to support U.S. policy. So they see immediate results when they invest 

in Special Operations. And I think that is what brings us together. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Is there something in particular we, though, could 

generalize to training among our forces? I know we have done cultural training. What is it that should be included more, that should 

be a higher priority perhaps than what we have today? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. In terms of Special Operations or the conventional force? 

Mrs. DAVIS. Conventional forces. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, ma’am. 

I think the conventional forces are also embracing the interagency. I can tell you from my time in Afghanistan, you saw a little 

bit of what we had developed at the Joint Special Operations Command in Afghanistan with all the way down to the brigade combat 

teams and to the battalions that were on the ground. They knew 

that the interagency support, the intelligence community, along 

with the other supporting agencies were a tremendous resource 

that they could use. And again, they got results. 

So I think the conventional force gets it. It is just that we are 

dealing with a larger scale in the conventional force; whereas the 

smaller scale of SOCOM and Special Operations Forces allows us 

to turn that information more quickly. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

If I could make an editorial comment, I greatly admire Ms. 

Davis’s relentless pursuit of making sure that the Federal Government can use all the tools available to it as effectively as possible. 
15 

And I appreciate your answers on the good things that are happening in the theater. But in my opinion, we have a ways to go in 

this government to really be effective with all the tools we have 

and to break down those barriers that still exist. 

Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Preach on, Mr. Chairman. Preach on. 

Admiral, Mr. Secretary, thank you all for being here. I appreciate 

it. Thank you for your service. 

Admiral McRaven, you walked us through a little bit of the 

things that you are doing and that Admiral Olson started with respect to making sure that the folks we ask to do the most—and 

quite frankly, we probably ask them do more than we should have, 

but we will continue to ask them because they will stand in and 

make it happen—that they and their families are treated—not 

treated well, but have the tools and resources they need to do 

whatever it is that must be done so that the next time we ask them 

to go do something, they are ready to do it. And then when they 

come back from that, that they go back to being able to live as a 

family man and taking care of their families. 

Are there things that you would like to do, or things you would 

like to have done that you can’t do at this point in time because 

you need authorities or something? I assume that the things you 

can do you are doing. But is there anything out there that needs 

to be done that this group needs to be aware of? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, I think we have all the authorities we 

need. And I think that we have the resources we need. I think, 

frankly, it is a function of focusing our resources. The Pressure on 

the Force Task Force that Admiral Olson started just recently kind 

of reported out. And I have gotten the recommendations from that 

task force. And in fact, I am sitting down with my staff at 

USSOCOM to figure out how we are going to implement those recommendations. Some of them I think are well within our ability to 

implement. And some of them are just the nature of the fight that 

we are in. You know, as long as we are continuing to fight, there 

is going to be stress on the force. 

But what I know I have an obligation to do as the commander 

of SOCOM is to make sure we are making the predictability factor 

as good as we can make it. And by that, when you talk to most 

of the families, they will tell you that if they can get more predictability in their spouse’s deployment cycle, then they can begin to 

plan things. And they may understand that their spouse will be 

gone on Christmas or on Easter or another holiday. And if they can 

plan for that, they are kind of okay with it. But it is the unpredictability that drives a lot of them—that drives a lot of the stressors 

I think around the families. And I think we can certainly deal with 

that issue and deal with it well. 

The other piece is education. They want to understand the effects 

of TBI [traumatic brain injury] and PTSD [post-traumatic stress 

disorder]. And so there is an education piece that I think we have 

got to broaden the aperture a little bit with our families. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I am sure everybody on this committee, as well 

as the broader full committee, would be keenly interested in tracking or watching those kinds of things that you do as a result of the 

report that the task force put in place. 
16 

One of the tools that you have to have is language skills. How 

are you dealing with the demand for language skills when you are 

having folks at the operational tempo that you have got them at? 

Talk to us a little bit about what the focus is there. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, we have got a magnificent language program at Fort Bragg that the U.S. Army Special Operations Command runs. And every Special Operations officer and NCO at some 

point in time in his career is expected to get a language baseline. 

So we are continuing to invest a lot of money in language because, as I pointed out in my opening comments, I mean, it is 

about us being culturally aware. And I don’t think you can become 

culturally aware of a society until you can understand their language. I think that is a big part of it at least. So we are putting 

a lot of investment in it. And I know that is going to pay huge dividends for us in the future. It is certainly one of my top priorities. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, in the time I have got left, General Clapper 

made an interesting comment the other day in a conversation in 

Intel spaces about not everything that the intel community does is 

of equal value. And I don’t need an answer this morning, but one 

of the things that kind of following on the chairman’s questions 

about those 12 things that we have asked you to do, is an honest, 

straightforward analysis at some point in time that if there are 

things that you can off-load, not that they are not super important, 

but things that you can off-load to other places or that we simply 

as a team don’t need to do, that is something that I think collectively the entire system ought to be thinking about and looking at 

as we look at shrinking resources or resources that stay flat, how 

do we manage that? And one of them has to be an opportunity to 

say this is something that we did in the past, you asked us to do 

in the past, and we don’t think that is necessary, and having an 

honest conversation. 

Your tendency, I seem to hear from all the folks in uniform, is 

that whatever it is you are asked to do, it is yes, sir, yes, ma’am, 

and we will go do it. There ought to be an opportunity for us at 

some point to have a rational conversation around that issue that 

there are just some things that you don’t need do or don’t need to 

be done. And we need to have that conversation. I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the panelists for being here today. To a degree I think 

we are all products of our own experience. I am no different. On 

this subject, I am informed by my experiences as a G3 for Multinational Division North during the surge. A lot of debate as to 

what may have gone into why the atmosphere, the environment in 

Iraq changed over time. I think it is really a combination of things. 

I think, yes, the Sunni Awakening had a part of it. There is no 

question the surge also played a part, because it was important to 

have security on the ground to allow all the Iraqis to give some 

thought as to what kind of future they wanted to have. 

But then also very important the role that the Joint Special Operations Task Force played in terms of killing and capturing highvalue individuals. I saw on a daily basis just the remarkable integration of intel and operations for effective action. And very keenly 
17 

interested in seeing us raise that level of play and focus at the national level. I am aware of, to some degree, of global pursuit and 

some of the actions and studies that have been done in the past. 

And I am trying to bring that spirit to what we are doing nationally in terms of policy. 

So in the intel authorization bill, got an amendment that looks 

at consolidating the intel community to better fuse it with operations. And I wanted to make you aware that with the chairman 

and the ranking member’s help, we did put in the mark something 

you alluded to earlier, Admiral, and that is the 1986 law that created SOCOM. And I am of the mind that we should revisit that 

and take a look at, are there changes, restructuring within the 

headquarters, that may allow us to more effectively fuse intel and 

ops and to really neutralize this threat? Even helping us work in 

concert with friends and allies as you bring this to a finer point 

and to a higher priority. 

And so I guess I wanted to make you aware of that, if you 

weren’t aware, that I have had conversations with your predecessor 

about this. I am particularly frustrated with the Christmas Day 

bomber and the fact that that radicalized young youth’s dad called 

our country, and we didn’t have the agility to process that information. And you know, had we had the same facility as we had in 

Iraq at the operational and tactical level, I think at the national 

level, we would have been in a better position to address that 

threat. 

So I just want you to know I am going to be supportive going forward to your efforts, and certainly welcome your dialogue at this 

point on these comments. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Well, sir, first, thank you very much. And I 

certainly appreciate your interest in those efforts, because we think 

they are exceedingly important. And as you know from your time 

in Iraq, we took those lessons learned, you know, how do you fuse 

ops and intel, and we migrated that over to Afghanistan. And I 

would contend that the reason the Special Operations Forces on 

the kinetic side have been so successful in Afghanistan is because 

of the fusion of that ops and intel. 

Having said that, I will tell you that I think our greatest success 

in Afghanistan has come from the Special Forces officers and NCOs 

who have been on the ground trying to change the landscape, if you 

will, in terms of our relationships with the Afghans. The village 

stability operations [VSO], developing the Afghan local police 

[ALP], this is, I think, the most promising effort we have in Afghanistan right now. And the fusion of the ops-intel piece, as you 

know, much like Iraq, you know, we are not going to be able to 

kind of kill our way to victory in Afghanistan. We have always understood that. Every soldier understands that you can’t do that in 

a counterinsurgency. 

So the effort that we are putting in to supporting the VSO and 

the ALP I think is going to be critical. The real question is how 

do we take that concept of fusing ops and intel, get it down to the 

ALP level, the village stability operation level, and ensure that 

those young SF officers and NCOs and SEALs that are out there 

doing this have got the same sort of situational awareness that we 

have kind of on the kinetic side. It is a different requirement. The 
18 

kinetic side, frankly, is a lot easier than understanding the human 

landscape out there in the districts and the provinces. 

Mr. GIBSON. Without question, tremendous integration of the indirect and direct approach there. And in particular, I just wanted 

to, as we close here with my time, that your predecessor had some 

ideas on how we may be able to reorganize the headquarters there 

so that we could elevate the priority, the very successful actions 

that are happening in the Central Command area of responsibility 

so that we recognize we face a global threat here. And in protecting 

our cherished way of life, we are going to have to I think step it 

up a little bit. And really it is us in the Congress I think that can 

be helpful to you, because every day, the Herculean efforts that are 

done throughout your command, there may be ways that we can 

organize more effectively. 

Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the gentleman. 

And I appreciate, Admiral, your comments on the village stability 

operations. Members of this subcommittee have been in Afghanistan walking in some of those villages, and are also incredibly impressed at the progress being made through that effort. And as you 

say, it is a complicated, different sort of mission. But incredibly 

promising. 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, it can never be said often enough how much those of 

us on this committee appreciate all of you. It is easy to say that, 

Mr. Lumpkin, Admiral McRaven, those of you that are attending, 

it is easy to say you are the best of the best. Everyone knows that. 

But oftentimes I think it is something we overlook, that those of 

you in this position don’t—aren’t motivated for glory, but you are 

committed to fight because you love what is behind you, not because you hate what is in front of you. And we just want you to 

know this committee appreciates that very deeply. And some of the 

recent discussions on the budget may not reflect that. 

And so I don’t want to ask the wrong question here. I know that 

those of you in the military and in uniform always handle some of 

the most awkward questions so well. Sometimes you get asked the 

most stupid questions on the planet, and you come back with great 

decorum and answer them like they were coming from the deepest 

intellect possible. And I am grateful. 

But at a time when there are, as you put it, Mr. Lumpkin, Special Forces warriors spending more time in a year in a deployed or 

training posture than at home, you know, there are those of us that 

are very concerned about the budget hollowing out our forces and 

doing things that put enormous pressures on all of you. So I guess 

I have to ask a little bit of a question that you can’t possibly answer. And that is, do you feel forgotten by Congress? Do you feel 

Congress doesn’t care? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Absolutely not. 

Mr. FRANKS. He had to say it that way, didn’t he? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. The Congress, especially this committee, has been 

very supportive of U.S. Special Operations Command, and my office, to make sure that we are resourced, whether it was through 
19 

QDR, the different QDRs, 06 and 10, to build us a force that can 

meet the needs of the future. The key is we have to stay and continue that growth that is already programmed to make sure that 

we are there for the Nation in the future. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I can tell you, there are a lot of us that are 

deeply committed to that. But when you talk about fraying around 

the edges, there is a conviction on our parts, many of us, that part 

of that rests with Congress. And we want to make sure that you 

have the resources and everything that you need. So let me just 

ask a general two-part question to both of you, and it will probably 

take the rest of my time for you to answer. If you had any area 

that you could point to as your front line in your agencies, in the 

Special Forces, the things that you think represent the greatest 

challenge that you have, can you elaborate on that a little bit? 

And also can you say to this committee, if you were able to speak 

as candidly as possible, what would be the greatest need that you 

have? What would be the greatest—not request, but admonition 

that you might make toward this committee as to what we might 

do, whether it is in an area of funding, or the focus of that funding, 

or in the area of policy? What is it that you need most from us to 

do the tremendous job that you do? 

And Mr. Lumpkin, I will start with you. 

And then I hope, Admiral McRaven, you will follow up. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Thank you, sir. And I will be brief here. As we 

look at the fiscal challenges that we face, the sequester in particular would be very problematic for us. 

Mr. FRANKS. Problematic. That is a nice way to put it. 

Mr. LUMPKIN. In that it doesn’t allow us to be strategic. So in 

order to make sure that we don’t go down that road would be very 

helpful to us and the Nation as a whole. And the greatest need, 

frankly, is to stay on the current program growth that we have got 

as we are moving forward. Because that will get us where we need 

to be as a Nation and to make sure that our SOF is properly 

resourced. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, if I could add to that, I think our greatest challenge in SOF right now is that we are in great demand. 

And that is a good place to be, but obviously, that demand is in 

fact taxing our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians that 

support SOCOM. I would tell you that the greatest need is to continue to have great Americans and congressional delegations come 

down range and continue to show the soldiers their support. 

I have probably done hundreds of congressional delegations that 

have come to visit me in Iraq and Afghanistan. And every one of 

them sends a signal to those young soldiers that America cares. So 

it is vitally important, I think, for the Congress to continue to come 

down range to see what is going on, to have an understanding of 

what the needs of the soldiers are, and then come back here and 

be able to put that into play. 

But I can tell you as a commander, I always welcome the congressional delegations and the staffdels. And I think you should 

continue that to show support for the effort. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you both. Thank you all for your noble 

service. Thank you. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the gentleman. 
20 

Let me ask about a specific authority. There has been talk, Admiral, about having your position have greater influence on personnel management issues. And as you know, there has been a proposal to change one of the words in Title 10, where it would give 

you—change from monitoring to coordinating. The idea would be to 

kind of strengthen the hand you have in personnel management. 

Now, as I understand it, DOD has put out kind of a new directive, 

but to date, only the Navy has reached an agreement on how to 

implement that. So it comes back to my mind saying, well, maybe 

we need to take another look at the law, if the other services are 

not able to work with SOCOM, to have some sort of arrangement 

on how the personnel issues will fit together. Tell me where we are, 

and shouldn’t we look at that issue? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, as you know, I have been in command 

about 5 weeks now. And but I can tell you from my discussions 

with Admiral Olson, this was clearly a concern of his. Having said 

that, I think the relationships between Admiral Olson and the 

service chiefs was very strong. And he made a point on a very routine basis to sit down with the service chiefs to ensure that between what the service chiefs felt was their responsibility, what the 

service responsibility was for advancement and for promotions, was 

kind of consistent with what Admiral Olson and how Admiral 

Olson wanted to kind of shape the force. So I think the dialogue 

and the discussion between the services and SOCOM has been very 

good. But that is at a very thin level, if you will, of the force. 

So, Admiral Olson, again I will defer to his wisdom on this, was 

always very strongly committed to getting the language changed 

from monitoring to coordinating, to again give SOCOM a little bit 

more strength over the advancement and the promotion of our 

service members. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, it is certainly something that I am personally very interested in, especially given the delays in having the 

other services work out an arrangement. Let me ask this, Admiral. 

I have been appalled, frankly, at the amount of public disclosure 

of, not just the Osama bin Laden raid, but a variety of Special Operations missions. Some of that is illegal leaks. Some of it comes 

from briefings by senior officials of various kinds. Has the tremendous amount of information that has gotten into the public sphere 

on operations that are carried out by Special Operations Command 

folks increased the danger that people operate under in, not just 

Iraq and Afghanistan, but around the world? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, as you know, we go to great pains to protect our operations and make sure that we maintain our operational security as best we can. But the reality of the matter is, 

you know, we live in a very media-intense environment in this day 

and age. And I think there are certain red lines, as we look at what 

we expose to the public, whereby things like the names of the operators, which obviously would bring greater risk to them and to 

their families, we are very, very conscious of that. And frankly, I 

have found that the American public understands that and the 

media understands that. And they are generally pretty good about 

ensuring they stay below that red line, that threshold of protecting 

the individual operators and their families. Clearly, certain tactics, 

techniques, and procedures are of concern to us. So if we have 
21 

something that is exceedingly sensitive, that is something we need 

to protect very, very carefully. However, having said that, a lot of 

the operations that the media gets a hold of and will tend to embellish upon, is a fairly routine operation. Again, in a 1-year period 

of time in Afghanistan, we conducted 2,000 raids. Well, those raids 

are a pretty standard kind of infantry tactic, if you will, on how 

to get to an objective. And the media tend to sensationalize it a little bit. But frankly, there is very little I think of that aspect of it 

that is compromising to Special Operations. 

Now, again, when we get into some of the much more sensitive 

operations and the areas in which we conduct them, then absolutely, sir, that is a red line, and we have to be very careful about 

the exposure of those operations. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Obviously, we kind of think about this in a 

counterterrorism sense. But if you think about counterproliferation 

and a variety of other missions in your set, then it even increases 

concern. 

Unless somebody else has a pressing question they would like to 

ask in the open session, we will adjourn and reconvene in a closed 

briefing. 

[Whereupon, at 11:07 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

SEPTEMBER 22, 2011 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

SEPTEMBER 22, 2011 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

SEPTEMBER 22, 2011 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are very pleased with the Navy 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Looking to a future in which we anticipate increased 

mission complexity for our special forces, the transformational capability of the LCS 

is well suited for operating in difficult littoral environments. The speed of the LCS 

will enable SOF to infiltrate objective areas quickly. The mission bays and the 

launch and retrieval system of the LCS provide unique and flexible mechanisms for 

supporting special operations. More specifically, the launch and retrieval system will 

allow surface or subsurface insertion of SOF. Moreover, the LCS will provide SOF 

the ability to embark with organic rotary-wing systems or to utilize Navy assets. 

In addition, the Navy’s Firescout Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) system is particularly relevant to 

SOF. Firescout recently conducted a proof of concept deployment in support of SOF 

and provided significant ISR support from the sea. This capability is designed to deploy and operate with the LCS, and it will give SOF a versatile ISR platform to 

find and fix targets. 

U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command participated in the design of the LCS in 

2003, and the command continues to be closely integrated into the ongoing training, 

testing, and doctrine development of the LCS. One example of SOF’s involvement 

is the development of the Irregular Warfare Enhancement to the Surface Warfare 

Package. This enhancement, supported by the Navy, will provide expanded medical, 

training, communications, planning, and storage capability for embarked SOF and 

expeditionary forces. 

In summary, the LCS is an important platform, which provides sea-based support 

for the full spectrum of Special Operations. It will serve as the primary vehicle for 

SOF when mission requirements dictate. [See page 13.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

SEPTEMBER 22, 2011 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Can you outline your approach to update the current outdated 

fleet of SEAL underwater delivery vehicles (SEAL SDVs)? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Our approach to updating the SEAL Delivery System (SDV) envisions a mix of dry and wet submersible vehicles. The Shallow Water Combat Submersible (SWCS) is the program of record for replacement of the SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV), Naval Special Warfare’s wet combat submersible capability. The SWCS, 

an Acquisition Category III (ACAT III) Program, achieved Milestone B on October 

1, 2010, and on June 20, 2011, Teledyne Brown was down selected to develop and 

build the Engineering Development Model. The SWCS program not only includes 

important technology improvements but also includes improved capabilities in range 

and payload. The SWCS is expected to reach Initial Operational Capability at the 

second quarter of Fiscal Year 2015. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Are you concerned that we do not have a capable long range 

mini-submarine to deliver SEALs to denied maritime environments? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Yes. We are concerned that we do not have a long-range submersible capability to deliver Special Operations Forces (SOF) into denied maritime environments. USSOCOM’s proposed solution to this challenge is to develop a dry combat submersible. The current program of record is the Dry Combat Submersible-Medium (DCS–M), which is designed to provide our forces a capable, long-range, dry 

submersible to deliver SOF into denied maritime environments. USSOCOM is procuring a technology demonstrator to refine the attributes and capabilities of the 

DCS–M. We are working together closely during the current Program Budget Review process within the Department to address this requirement. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. With the disestablishment of Joint Forces Command, who is 

now responsible for SOF joint doctrine and training? Are there any concerns in this 

area? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. USSOCOM, in coordination with the Joint Staff J7, is responsible 

for developing SOF joint doctrine and training for SOF and its assigned forces. Prior 

to the disestablishment of U.S. Joint Forces Command, Special Operations Command—Joint Forces (SOC–JF), was responsible for training Joint Task Force commanders and staffs on integration and employment of SOF capabilities. In April 

2011, SOC–JF was reassigned to USSOCOM and renamed Special Operations Command–Joint Capabilities (SOC–JC). 

SOC–JC’s mission is to train conventional and SOF commanders and their staffs, 

to support USSOCOM international engagement training requirements, and to support the implementation of capability solutions that improve strategic and operational warfighting readiness and joint interoperability. Enhancing the interoperability of conventional and SOF commanders and staffs through robust strategic and 

operational level joint training remains a core function of SOC–JC. SOC–JC—in 

conjunction with the Joint SOF University (JSOU)—will continue to provide worldclass training and education support for SOF and conventional forces worldwide. 

The Department is confident that USSOCOM and SOC–JC—like U.S. Joint 

Forces Command—will continue to maintain the high standards of joint training 

and education for SOF. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. The hearing highlighted the importance of indirect special operations. Civil Affairs (CA) and Military Information Support Operations (MISO) are 

central to indirect special operations and are being used across the globe. What is 

your view of our current CA and MISO capabilities and can you outline any chances 

you are considering to improve these important but lesser known communities within SOF? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. Our Civil Affairs (CA) and Military Information Support Operations 

(MISO) are critical special operations capabilities, and they have never been better. 

Cultural awareness, regional knowledge, language ability, and interagency expertise 

are crucial components of the CA and MISO skills that SOF employ in irregular 

warfare and contingency operations in support of theater security cooperation objectives. One example of these critical Special Operations capabilities is the essential 

contributions they make to Village Stability Operations (VSO) for the war in Afghanistan. 
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With respect to CA, there is currently one SOF brigade composed of 1,288 personnel, of which 230 are operationally deployed to 21 locations representing each 

Geographic Combatant Command (GCC). The preponderance of CA forces—roughly 

90 percent—are Army assets. Historically, Army CA was characterized as a SOF 

asset, and U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) was the proponent 

responsible for managing and overseeing the training, education, equipping, and organization of these forces. 

We have learned through our operations since 2001 that CA is not a uniquely 

SOF capability. Accordingly, proponent responsibilities for CA were transferred from 

USASOC to the Department of the Army, and a significant effort will be made to 

improve CA effectiveness and efficiency in Fiscal Year 2012. This transfer of responsibility will meet two requirements: (1) it will allow SOF CA to focus on support 

to Special Operations; and (2) it will enable the Army leadership to develop, build, 

and maintain the Army’s CA capability directly, while working to align CA with 

Stability Operations doctrine and requirements. 

In addition to the Army, the other Services have recognized the value of developing an organic CA capability. For instance, in 2001 the Navy established a 562- 

person CA capability within its Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command (MCAST). 

MISO and persistent engagement are the primary means by which Combatant 

Commanders seek to counter al-Qaida’s ideology as well as other violent extremist 

messaging. And, although the majority of the Department’s MISO forces are part 

of a small and segmented community within the Army, major initiatives are underway to strengthen DOD’s MISO capabilities. These initiatives include USSOCOM’s 

efforts to establish a more robust MISO planning capability at the regionally focused Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC), and to reorganize its MISO 

forces to enable a global network that can better coordinate, integrate, and execute 

MISO in support of the U.S. Government and DOD’s efforts to Counter Terrorism 

(CT) and Counter Violent Extremism (CVE). 

Earlier this year, the Commander of USSOCOM submitted a Force Design Update 

requesting the establishment of a Military Information Support Operations Command (MISOC), to strengthen our Inform and Influence capabilities, and to provide 

greater capacity to meet anticipated future demand. Given the size, complexity, and 

global reach of the MISOC’s mission, he requested this command billet be a general 

officer billet. 

I recognize the asymmetric importance of CA and MISO to SOF’s Irregular Warfare portfolio of capabilities. The Department is working to refocus and hone these 

capabilities within SOF, to maximize the CA posture of Army forces, and to enhance 

the global capacity of our MISO forces. These actions are intended to position U.S. 

SOF to prevail in the uncertain security environment of the future. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. How should special operators and CIA’s paramilitary forces 

share responsibilities that interlock and overlap, given respective strengths and 

weaknesses are distinctively different? 

Mr. LUMPKIN. USSOCOM and the CIA currently coordinate, share, exchange liaison officers and operate side by side in the conduct of DOD overt and clandestine 

operations and CIA’s covert operations. Our activities are mutually supportive based 

on each organization’s strengths and weaknesses and overall capabilities. 

Whichever organization has primary authority to conduct the operation leads; 

whichever organization has the superior planning and expertise plans it; both organizations share information about intelligence, plans, and ongoing operations fully 

and completely. Whether one or both organizations participate in the execution depends on the scope of the plan and the effect that needs to be achieved. Currently 

all USSOCOM and CIA operations are coordinated and deconflicted at all levels. 

The current DOD–CIA Memorandum of Agreement allows for these activities to 

be coordinated at the lowest execution coordinating authority feasible—forward in 

the Geographic Combatant Commander’s area of operation. It also allows each organization to socialize differences up through respective leadership chains for resolution. This partnering with respect to all operations has strengthened in recent years 

and ensures the application of the correct USG capability against agreed upon 

threats. 

USSOCOM reports all of its clandestine activities quarterly through DOD to Congress for appropriate oversight. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. How may the roles of women in SOF change in the future? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. a. Because of the combat exclusion policy USSOCOM does not 

have females assigned to SEALs, Special Forces, Rangers, Air Force Special Tactics 

Teams or Marine Special Operations tactical units. SOCOM does have female information (MISO) and civil affairs specialists. 
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b. SOF are constantly adapting to an increasingly intricate and unpredictable operating environments. Because of the restricted access to the Afghan female population, females have been used to perform tasks deemed culturally inappropriate for 

male service members and to engage the local population in/around secure objective 

areas. c. As a result of the operating environment in Afghanistan, SOCOM developed 

Cultural Support Teams (CST) to support SOF. Incorporating female military personnel into our post operation activities have allowed our forces greater access and 

integration with the Afghan civilian populace which were not previously accessible. 

d. CSTs are attached to SOF units to influence a larger segment of the rural populations enhancing their ability to connect and collaborate with a critical part of Afghan society. Currently, there are (53) CST-qualified females supporting SOF operations in Afghanistan. 

e. This is a capability that we will continue to develop and use in the future global 

operations. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. What challenges remain with SOF integration with conventional or general purpose forces? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. a. 5th SOF Truth: Most special operations require Non-SOF 

Support. The integration of GPF’s and SOF has produced quantifiable success across 

Afghanistan. This force multiplication construct has enabled rapid expansion (60% 

increase) of Village Stability sites in the past 18 months; definitively improving 

GIROA legitimacy, security and stability. 

b. This adaptive organizational design combined with the resultant mission requirements of operating in geographically remote and austere locations has dramatically increased SOF dependence on GPF logistical support. GPF logistical assistance 

accounts for approximately 50% of the total support for all Village Stability sites. 

c. There has been some institutional capacity challenges associated with this integration. GPF service and support personnel familiarities with SOF unique equipment have impacted repair and sustainment efforts. Additional time has been required to train and familiarize GPF with SOF vehicles, radios, weapons and other 

equipment. 

d. SOF will become increasingly reliant on the Special Operations Forces Generation Process (SOFORGEN) to integrate SOF pre-mission training with supporting 

GPF. This process is critical to forming the Special Operations Task Forces in 

CONUS and conducting training before deployment. This construct will definitively 

expand national security options, provide opportunity for greater force employment 

and collective force capabilities. This enhanced interoperability between GPF and 

SOF units will increase their functionality and effectiveness once the force is forward deployed into the CENTCOM Theater. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Please outline for the committee any changes you are considering to SOCOM’s acquisition framework and authorities? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. USSOCOM is not considering any major changes to our overall acquisition framework. However, we have asked for a change to the threshold 

reprogramming limits within the Defense-Wide Investment Accounts (Research Development and Procurement) for USSOCOM in the FY12 conference report. By 

changing one word in the current reprogramming language; changing ‘‘lesser’’ to 

‘‘greater’’, in the language will provide USSOCOM the flexibility within the current 

Acquisition Framework to meet our expanded role in deterring, disrupting and defeating global terrorist threats. This simple change will provide us the ability to rapidly procure new capabilities and upgrade existing equipment to meet emergent 

SOF requirements. We are not requesting a change in public law, but stated in the 

FY12 Conference Report. The change would not generate any new reporting requirements, since the transparency required for congressional oversight is already in 

place within the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System 

(PPBES). 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN 

Mr. WITTMAN. The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations is currently 

conducting an investigation focused on Guantanamo Bay detainee transfers and rising reengagement rates. The Director of National Intelligence James Clapper recently testified that the recidivism rate for former detainees has risen to an estimated 27 percent demonstrating that a significant number of detainees have returned to the fight. Can you share your thoughts on this trend and its impact on 

operations? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. SOCOM does not dispute that the trend of terrorist recidivism 

has risen. Admiral Olson testified before this sub-committee last year that the re-
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cidivism rate was 20% with an expected rising trend due to several factors, but the 

most concerning reason is the repatriation of detainees to their country of birth and 

that particular country’s decision not to further detain the individual and he returns 

to the battlefield. 

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