IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 16–1911

Filed February 10, 2017

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Complainant,

vs.

PAUL KEVIN WATERMAN,

Respondent.

On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Grievance commission recommends the suspension of an 

attorney’s license for a violation of ethical rules. LICENSE SUSPENDED.

Tara M. van Brederode and Elizabeth Quinlan, for complainant.

Matthew C. McDermott of Belin McCormick, P.C., Des Moines, for 

respondent.
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MANSFIELD, Justice.

An attorney had an intimate relationship with a client while 

representing the client in a dissolution proceeding. The attorney 

withdrew from representation before the case concluded and selfreported his conduct to the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary 

Board (the Board). The Board charged the attorney with violating Iowa 

Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.8(j).

The parties stipulated as to facts and as to the violation of rule 

32:1.8(j). The parties also jointly recommended a thirty-day suspension. 

Following a formal hearing, the grievance commission concluded the 

attorney had violated the rule and recommended suspending the 

attorney’s license for forty-five days and requiring him to attend therapy 

for at least two years. Upon our review, we also find the attorney violated 

rule 32:1.8(j). We suspend the attorney’s license to practice law for thirty 

days.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Paul Waterman practices law in Iowa City. After a short period of 

working in Washington, D.C., Waterman was admitted to the Iowa bar in 

2006. Since then, he has been engaged in private practice in the Iowa 

City–Cedar Rapids area, most recently as a partner in a small law firm. 

Waterman practices primarily in the area of family law.

In May 2014, Jane Doe met with Waterman for legal advice. Doe is 

a business professional with an M.B.A. and is a C.P.A. Doe had recently 

separated from her husband and sought advice from Waterman 

regarding dissolution of her marriage. After their initial May 

consultation, Waterman did not hear from Doe again until September. 

At that time, Doe wanted a protective order because her husband had 

threatened violence. Waterman explained to Doe the procedure for 
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obtaining a protective order, and the next month, he filed a dissolution 

petition on Doe’s behalf. The main contested issue in the dissolution 

case was custody of the couple’s young children.

Waterman and Doe continued to meet to discuss the case. The 

conversation during those meetings, according to Waterman, started to

“diverge from professional topics.” Waterman and Doe also began having 

lunch together and texting each other.

Waterman recognized his relationship with Doe had moved beyond 

that of an attorney and a client. He told Doe he should withdraw from 

representing her and gave her the names of two lawyers. In November, 

while Doe was still in the process of obtaining new counsel, she and her 

husband participated in a mediation without counsel present. The 

mediation appeared to have resolved many of the parties’ issues, 

including child custody.

Based on the outcome of the mediation, Waterman drafted a 

stipulation of settlement on Doe’s behalf and sent it to the husband’s 

lawyer. Because Doe believed the mediation had been successful, she

did not retain new counsel. Around this time, Waterman and Doe began

a sexual relationship.

Meanwhile, Waterman did not hear back from the husband’s 

counsel for several weeks regarding the settlement. Eventually, the 

husband’s counsel informed Waterman that the husband had changed 

his mind on custody and would not sign the stipulation. Negotiations 

between the two attorneys followed. Waterman once more discussed 

with Doe the need to engage replacement counsel. Doe agreed she would

meet with a potential new attorney upon her return from a family 

vacation over the holidays.
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On January 12, 2015, the husband’s attorney emailed Waterman 

indicating that the husband would accept the prior deal. Again believing 

settlement was imminent, Doe did not retain the substitute attorney, and 

Waterman remained her attorney of record.

In mid-February, the husband’s attorney advised Waterman that 

the husband had yet again changed his mind. Waterman told Doe that 

he did not anticipate settlement and she must retain new counsel. 

Waterman filed a motion to withdraw on February 27, and Doe hired new 

counsel.

During February, Doe’s husband became aware of a relationship 

between Doe and Waterman. On March 3, the husband’s counsel sent 

Waterman an email, stating that he intended to conduct additional 

discovery relating to custody, including discovery on Waterman’s 

relationship with Doe. Waterman responded that he would be selfreporting an ethical violation to the Board. Waterman in fact filed a 

detailed self-reporting letter with the Board on March 12.

Following Waterman’s replacement as Doe’s counsel, Doe and her 

husband participated in a second mediation in April. A stipulation of 

settlement was filed shortly thereafter. This settlement was a “tweaked” 

version of the earlier document drafted by Waterman. Waterman’s 

relationship with Doe ended in June.

Waterman’s self-reporting letter concluded,

I admit and take full responsibility for my violation of 

Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.8(j). I was aware of 

the rule when I committed the violation and did not take 

corrective action as quickly as I could have. I recognize that 

the rule forbidding attorneys from having sexual 

relationships with clients is especially important in family 

law cases as clients in those cases disclose intimate, 

personal details of their lives causing an increased likelihood 

that attorneys and clients will develop a personal bond. I am 

ashamed of my behavior, and I have engaged a professional 
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therapist . . . to assist me in developing a greater awareness 

of the need for professional boundaries in attorney-client 

relationships.

On December 18, the Board filed a complaint against Waterman 

alleging he had engaged in a sexual relationship with a client in violation 

of Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.8(j). Waterman answered the 

complaint, admitting all allegations therein. The Board and Waterman 

entered into a written stipulation. The stipulation set forth an agreedupon statement of facts, acknowledged that Waterman had violated rule 

32:1.8(j), and recommended a thirty-day suspension. The parties also 

submitted a letter from Waterman’s therapist, which stated that 

Waterman had been attending therapy since March 2015. After receiving 

the stipulation, the commission scheduled a limited-scope hearing for 

the parties to expand upon any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

At the hearing, Waterman testified that he had been diagnosed 

with a depressive disorder in 2012 and had previously sought out 

therapy, although he stopped attending in 2013. Waterman explained 

that he returned to therapy two times a week following his withdrawal 

from representing Doe.

Waterman has not been the subject of a prior ethics complaint. 

Waterman testified that he tries to take on pro bono cases regularly. Two 

witnesses testified to Waterman’s positive reputation within the legal 

community. The attorney for Doe’s husband testified that Waterman’s 

relationship with Doe had not actually given his client any leverage in the 

marriage dissolution proceedings. This attorney also testified that he 

had only been aware of a social relationship between Waterman and Doe; 

he had no intention of reporting Waterman for ethical violations prior to 

Waterman’s self-reporting.
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After the hearing, the commission found that a violation of rule 

32:1.8(j) had occurred. The commission members were divided between 

thirty and sixty days on the length of an appropriate suspension. The 

commission therefore recommended a suspension of Waterman’s license 

for forty-five days. The commission found the statement provided by 

Waterman’s therapist “uninformative.” In addition to a forty-five day 

suspension, the commission thus recommended that Waterman remain 

in therapy for at least two years and submit a report of his completion 

and growth as a result of the therapy.

II. Standard of Review.

“We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo.” Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Blessum, 861 N.W.2d 575, 582 (Iowa 

2015). While we respectfully consider the findings of the commission, we 

are not bound by them. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Moothart, 860 N.W.2d 598, 602 (Iowa 2015). The Board must prove 

attorney misconduct by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. 

Blessum, 861 N.W.2d at 582. “This standard is more demanding than 

proof by preponderance of the evidence, but less demanding than proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Ouderkirk, 845 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Iowa 2014)).

“When the parties enter into a stipulation, . . . they are bound by 

the stipulated facts, which we interpret with reference to their subject 

matter and in light of the surrounding circumstances and the whole 

record.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnson, 884 N.W.2d 

772, 777 (Iowa 2016). However, “[w]e are not bound by stipulations as to 

ethical violations or the appropriate sanction.” Id.
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III. Analysis.

A. Violation of Rule 32:1.8: Sexual Relations with a Client. 

Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.8(j) provides, “A lawyer shall not 

have sexual relations with a client, or a representative of a client, unless 

the person is the spouse of the lawyer or the sexual relationship predates 

the initiation of the client-lawyer relationship.” Iowa R. Prof’l 

Conduct 32:1.8(j). This type of relationship is prohibited by the rule

“regardless of whether the relationship is consensual and regardless of

the absence of prejudice to the client.” Id. r. 32:1.8 cmt. 17; see also

Moothart, 860 N.W.2d at 605 (recognizing that “a per se rule applies”).

There is no dispute Waterman violated rule 32:1.8(j). Waterman’s 

sexual relationship with Doe commenced shortly after the first 

mediation, while he was still her attorney. Waterman and Doe were not 

married at that time.

B. Sanction. We must now determine the appropriate sanction 

for Waterman’s violation of rule 32:1.8(j). “There is no standard sanction 

for a particular type of misconduct, and though prior cases can be 

instructive, we ultimately determine an appropriate sanction based on 

the particular circumstances of each case.” Blessum, 861 N.W.2d at 591 

(quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Morris, 847 N.W.2d 

428, 435 (Iowa 2014)). We take into account

the nature of the violations, the attorney’s fitness to continue 

in the practice of law, the protection of society from those 

unfit to practice law, the need to uphold public confidence in 

the justice system, deterrence, maintenance of the 

reputation of the bar as a whole, and any aggravating or 

mitigating circumstances.

Id. (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Clarity, 838 

N.W.2d 648, 660 (Iowa 2013)). “We respectfully consider the 
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commission’s recommended sanction, but we remain free to impose a 

greater or lesser sanction.” Johnson, 884 N.W.2d at 779.

Mitigating factors here include Waterman’s lack of a prior 

disciplinary record, his self-reporting and acceptance of responsibility,

and his pro bono work. See id. at 781 (discussing these factors). An 

additional mitigating factor is the lack of actual client harm. Id. at 782. 

No one contends that Waterman’s ethical violation affected the course or 

the outcome of the dissolution proceedings. And a further mitigating 

factor is Waterman’s decision to seek therapy to address certain mental 

health issues that may have contributed to his misconduct. Id. at 781–

82. On the other hand, an aggravating factor is that the relationship 

occurred during the course of a domestic relations representation. Id. at 

781.

The appropriate discipline for an attorney who engages in a sexual 

relationship with a client can range from public reprimand to a lengthy 

period of suspension from the practice of law. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Marzen, 779 N.W.2d 757, 767–68 (Iowa 2010). In 

Johnson, we recently reviewed in detail our precedents in this area. See

884 N.W.2d at 780–81.

The Board and Waterman maintain that Johnson and Iowa 

Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Monroe, 784 N.W.2d 784 

(Iowa 2010), are the most analogous decisions to the present case and 

both support a thirty-day suspension.1 We agree. The attorney in 

Johnson engaged in a sexual relationship with a client while representing 

1In its statement to us, the Board continues to recommend a thirty-day 

suspension despite the commission’s recommendation of forty-five days. See Iowa Ct. 

R. 36.21(1). We agree that the Board should recommend a less severe sanction than 

the commission has proposed when the Board believes that is appropriate.

 
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him in several criminal and family law matters. 884 N.W.2d at 775. 

Johnson eventually self-reported her conduct to the Board, but only after 

she had been confronted by federal law enforcement with evidence of the 

relationship. Id. at 775–76. It was an aggravating circumstance that 

Johnson had been representing the client in family and criminal matters. 

Id. at 781. We also noted, however, there was no evidence anyone 

suffered harm as a result of the intimate relationship. Id. at 782. As 

mitigating circumstances, we recognized that Johnson had no prior 

history of discipline, that she had performed a significant amount of pro 

bono work, and that she had also “sought counseling to address certain 

mental health issues that may have contributed to her misconduct.” Id.

at 781–82. We imposed a thirty-day suspension. Id. at 782.

In Johnson, we viewed Monroe as the “most comparable” of our 

prior ethics cases. Id. at 781. Monroe likewise involved an attorney who 

had a sexual relationship with a client while representing the client in a 

dissolution proceeding and on various criminal charges. 784 N.W.2d at 

787. We recognized that clients in dissolution proceedings are 

“particularly vulnerable[,] . . . and the possibility of harm, especially 

when child custody matters are at stake, is high.” Id. at 790. As in 

Johnson, there was no evidence that the sexual relationship in Monroe

affected the outcome of a legal proceeding. Id. n.3. The attorney 

admitted he had violated the rule, and we shared the commission’s view 

that he had “ ‘genuinely wanted to assist Ms. Doe, [but] lost sight of the 

ethical boundaries’ governing his relationship with his client.” Id. at 791 

(alteration in original). We noted that the misconduct appeared to be an 

isolated incident, that the relationship between Monroe and the client 

was “not predatory,” and that Monroe had sought counseling from a 

professional that he had previously seen for depression prior to the 
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misconduct. Id. at 791–92. We suspended Monroe’s license for thirty 

days. Id. at 792.

After considering the relevant facts of this case, the 

recommendation of the commission, the aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances, and our own precedents, we agree with the parties that a 

thirty-day suspension of Waterman’s law license is warranted. We do not

adopt the commission’s recommendation that Waterman be required to 

remain in therapy for two years. We often decline to impose conditions 

like this, in part because we do not have a mechanism for supervising 

their performance. See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Hedgecoth, 862 N.W.2d 354, 366 (Iowa 2015).

IV. Conclusion.

For the reasons stated, we suspend Waterman from the practice of 

law with no possibility of reinstatement for thirty days. This suspension 

applies to all facets of ordinary law practice. See Iowa Ct. R. 34.23(3). 

Pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 34.24, Waterman must notify his clients in 

all pending matters. See id. r. 34.24(1). Waterman is assessed the costs 

of this action. See id. r. 36.24(1). At the conclusion of this suspension, 

Waterman will be automatically reinstated if he has paid all costs and 

the Board has not filed an objection to the reinstatement. See id.

r. 34.23(2).

LICENSE SUSPENDED.