In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

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No. 07-21-00187-CR 

________________________

IN RE LONNIE KADE WELSH, RELATOR 

 

 

OPINION ON ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 

 

October 19, 2021 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., PARKER and DOSS, JJ. 

Relator Lonnie Kade Welsh has filed his pro se petition for writ of mandamus 

asking this court to direct Respondent the Honorable Felix Klein sitting as presiding judge 

of the 154th District Court of Lamb County to rule on Welsh’s petition for pretrial writ of 

habeas corpus filed on July 26, 2021, in a pending criminal matter. We deny his petition.

Background

Welsh was charged with assault upon a contractor performing a service in a civil 

commitment facility. In the trial court, he filed a pro se petition for pretrial writ of habeas 

corpus, challenging, among other things, the constitutionality of the penal code provision 

under which he was charged. Welsh provided this court a copy of his pro se petition for 
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writ of habeas corpus. Welsh represents in his petition for writ of mandamus pending 

here that he has undertaken efforts to comply with the presentment of his petition for writ 

of habeas corpus and has tried to alert Respondent directly of Welsh’s desire for a hearing 

and ruling on that petition. We have noted a copy of Welsh’s “Notice to the Court of 

Pending Motions and Request of Hearing.”

Welsh explains that he also sought permission from the trial court to represent 

himself in trial on the assault charges. Per his representations to this Court, a hearing 

was held on that matter, but we have nothing demonstrating the trial court’s ruling.

Since the time of his filing the petition for writ of mandamus, the trial court held a 

competency hearing and ostensibly found Welsh to be competent to proceed to trial. 

From what the office of the Clerk of this Court has garnered, there has not been a trial 

date set as of yet.

Applicable Law

When, as here, a relator seeks to compel the performance of a ministerial act, a 

relator must also show (1) a legal duty to perform a nondiscretionary act; (2) a demand 

for performance; and (3) a refusal to act. Stoner v. Massey, 586 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. 

1979); In re Gilbreath, No. 07-20-00244-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 979, at *10 (Tex. 

App.—Amarillo Feb. 8, 2021, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Regarding the first element,

the relator must show that the act to be compelled is ministerial as opposed to 

discretionary. See State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals at 

Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We address this element first.

Although a trial court may certainly permit hybrid representation in its discretion,

there is no absolute right to hybrid representation. See Scarbrough v. State, 777 S.W.2d 
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83, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc). Because there is no absolute right to hybrid 

representation, a trial court’s ruling on such representation is not a ministerial act; it is a 

discretionary one. See In re Lawson, No. 14-10-01060-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 9155,

at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 18, 2010, orig. proceeding) (per curiam)

(mem. op.).

If relator is represented by counsel, the trial court is free to disregard appellant’s 

pro se filings. In re Hall, No. 05-21-00641-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 7798, at *3 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas Sept. 22, 2021, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (citing Robinson v. State, 240 

S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). In other words, the trial court does not have a 

ministerial duty to rule upon appellant’s writ application. See id.; see also In re Tarkington,

No. 03-21-00194-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 3405, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin May 4, 2021)

(mem. op.) (also relying on Robinson to conclude, when faced with a petition for writ of 

mandamus seeking to compel the trial court to rule on pro se motions, that “Relator is not 

entitled to mandamus relief because the trial court has not violated any ministerial duty 

by failing to rule on those pro se motions”); In re Bledsoe, No. 06-14-00113-CR, 2014 

Tex. App. LEXIS 7878, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana July 23, 2014, orig. proceeding) 

(mem. op.) (after having been advised by the district clerk that relator was represented 

by appointed counsel, denying similar mandamus relief because relator had no right to 

hybrid representation).

Discussion

This Court has been informed that Welsh has appointed counsel. And, though 

Welsh requested leave from the trial court to represent himself, nothing in the record 

reflects that such leave was granted. Without such information, we cannot assess if the 
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trial court had any obligation to act upon the pro se habeas application of Welsh. Again,

it need not act upon pro se motions when the movant has legal counsel. 

It is incumbent upon Welsh, as relator, to provide this Court with all documentation 

to show him entitled to the extraordinary relief of mandamus. See Walker v. Packer, 827 

S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). In view of that obligation, Welsh has not 

provided a record sufficient to permit accurate consideration of his request or to illustrate 

his entitlement of mandamus relief.

The petition for writ of mandamus is denied. All pending motions are denied as 

moot.

Per Curiam

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