J-S27002-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.M., A 

MINOR,

APPEAL OF: T.M., A MINOR, 

THROUGH HER GUARDIAN AD LITEM

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 235 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered December 11, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County at No(s): CP-15-DP0000022-2019

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.C., A 

MINOR,

APPEAL OF: T.C., A MINOR, 

THROUGH HER GUARDIAN AD LITEM

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 236 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered December 11, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County at No(s): CP-15-DP0000027-2019

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.C., A 

MINOR,

APPEAL OF: T.C., A MINOR, 

THROUGH HIS GUARDIAN AD LITEM

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 237 EDA 2020
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Appeal from the Order Entered December 11, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County at No(s): CP-15-DP0000025-2019

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.C., A 

MINOR,

APPEAL OF: T.C., A MINOR, 

THROUGH HIS GUARDIAN AD LITEM

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 238 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered December 11, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County at No(s): CP-15-DP0000026-2019

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.C., A 

MINOR,

APPEAL OF: T.C., A MINOR, 

THROUGH HIS GUARDIAN AD LITEM

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 239 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered December 11, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County at No(s): CP-15-DP0000023-2019

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.C., A 

MINOR,

APPEAL OF: T.C., A MINOR, 

THROUGH HIS GUARDIAN AD LITEM

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 240 EDA 2020
J-S27002-20

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Appeal from the Order Entered December 11, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County at No(s): CP-15-DP0000024-2019

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JULY 31, 2020

In these consolidated appeals, six minor children, through their guardian 

ad litem (“GAL”), Shannon K. McDonald, appeal from the orders entered on 

December 11, 2019, in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, 

terminating court supervision of their dependency matters. The subject 

children are T.M., a female born in November of 2002; T.C., a female born in 

October of 2014; T.C. and T.C., twin males born in August of 2013; T.C., a 

female born in July 2009; and T.C., a male born in November of 2010

(collectively, “the Children”). Upon careful review, we affirm.

The subject orders resulted from the request of Chester County 

Department of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) and Greg Rice, the Court 

Appointed Special Advocate (“the CASA”), during a permanency hearing on 

December 9, 2019, to close the Children’s dependency cases after M.C. 

(“Mother”) and M.C. (“Father”) absconded with the Children from Chester 

County by use of a recreational vehicle (“RV”). CYF and the CASA asserted 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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that they had exhausted their efforts to track and locate the family. N.T., 

12/9/19, at 12, 18.

The background of this case is as follows. The juvenile court adjudicated 

the Children dependent on April 18, 2019,1 after providing services in the 

home for approximately nine months due to concerns regarding the Children’s 

lack of supervision, hygiene, school performance, behavioral issues, 

developmental delays, mental-health needs, and unsanitary conditions in the 

home. Order of Adjudication and Disposition-Amended, 9/27/19, at 2–3.

The court maintained Mother’s and Father’s physical and legal custody 

of the five younger children,2 Mother’s physical custody of T.M.,3 and Mother’s 

and J.M.’s shared legal custody of T.M. Order of Adjudication and DispositionAmended, 9/27/19, at 6. The court required Mother and Father to participate 

in the following permanency-plan objectives, in pertinent part:

[M]aintain safe, stable, and clean housing. 

[M]aintain stable employment.

____________________________________________

1 The court amended the orders of adjudication and disposition on September 

26, 2019, because the original orders inadvertently omitted the “Additional 

Findings/Orders.”

2 Father is the natural father of the five younger children. Dependency 

Petitions, 2/26/19. The father of seventeen-year-old T.M. is J.M., who did not 

file a notice of appeal and is not a party to this appeal.

3 The court found that T.M. should not reside with J.M. because he lives with 

his uncle, who has a criminal history of sexual assault. Order of Adjudication 

and Disposition-Amended, 9/27/19, at 2–3. The court permitted J.M. to have 

“liberal visits” with T.M. as he and Mother could agree, as long as the visits

did not occur at J.M.’s home. Id. at 7.
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[M]aintain contact with the [CYF] caseworker on a weekly basis. 

[Mother and Father] will participate in home visits [with the 

caseworker].

[P]articipate in a mental health evaluation and follow all 

recommendations and take medications as prescribed.

[P]articipate and work with Life Skills. [Mother and Father] will 

work to develop a set cleaning schedule including the [C]hildren’s 

clothing and bed linens.

[E]nsure that the [C]hildren are bathed regularly and in clean 

clothing.

[W]ork to develop a structured schedule that includes providing 

three nutritious meals a day as well as a structured bed time.

Order of Adjudication and Disposition-Amended, 9/27/19, at 6–7. The court 

also required Mother and Father to ensure that the Children participate in 

mental-health evaluations,4 and that Mother and Father “maintain an 

appropriate supervision plan that has been approved by CYF where [T.M.] is 

not the sole caregiver or primary caregiver of the [younger] children.” Id. at 

7.

The first permanency-review hearing occurred on June 12, 2019.5 By 

order dated June 25, 2019, the juvenile court found, “There has been 

____________________________________________

4 The only information in the record with respect to the Children’s mental 

health relates to the two youngest children, who have been diagnosed with 

Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Oppositional Defiant Disorder. 

Order of Adjudication and Disposition-Amended, 9/27/19, at 2.

5 Unless otherwise indicated, the dependency hearings in this case occurred 

before Tiffany Shoemaker, a juvenile court hearing officer, who prepared 

recommended orders to the court.
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substantial progress and compliance with [the] permanency plan” by Mother 

and Father. Order, 6/25/19, at 1–2. The court stated that the family would

be moving out of their home by July 31, 2019, because the landlord would not 

renew their lease. Further, the court stated that Father “is seeking a 

promotion in Florida and has an interview for a position there. Mother and 

the [C]hildren would be moving with Father.” Id. at 3. 

The June 25, 2019 permanency order maintained Mother’s and Father’s 

physical and legal custody of the five younger children. The order granted 

Mother and J.M. shared physical custody of T.M., and it continued their shared 

legal custody of her. Order, 6/25/19, at 4–5.

The second permanency hearing occurred on September 16, 2019. 

Mother did not appear for the hearing, and the court found, “There has been 

minimal compliance with [the] permanency plan, in that CYF cannot verify 

housing, employment, treatment.” Permanency Review Order, 9/27/19, at 1. 

With respect to Father, the court determined that he was minimally compliant

with the permanency plan for the same reasons, except that he was employed. 

Id. In addition, the juvenile court found that Mother and Father were only 

minimally compliant because they did not maintain contact with CYF after 

September 4, 2019. Id. Further, the court determined that Life Skills, the 

agency that provided support in the home, terminated its services “due to the 

family reporting that they have moved.” Id. at 1.
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During the hearing, Father revealed that the family was residing at an 

RV campground. Permanency Review Order, 9/27/19, at 3. Father confirmed 

that the family still intended to move to Florida. Id. The juvenile court 

reported that the Children “are residing in an RV which is somewhere between 

PA and Florida.” Id. at 2. 

The September 27, 2019 permanency order maintained Mother’s and 

Father’s physical and legal custody of the Children as set forth above. 

Permanency Review Order, 9/27/19, at 4. The order directed Mother and 

Father to appear at the CYF office within forty-eight hours and to make the 

RV available for CYF to determine if it provides appropriate housing. Id. at 5. 

In addition, the order directed Mother and Father to “advise CYF immediately 

of all addresses where they are residing and within 24 hours of any change of 

address.” Id. Further, the order required Mother and Father to comply, inter 

alia, with the following permanency objectives: sign releases providing CYF 

with access to school information for the Children; ensure that the Children’s 

medical and mental-health needs are met; and maintain weekly contact with 

CYF. Id. at 4.

The court held a status-review hearing one week after the September 

16, 2019 second permanency review, on September 23, 2019, which Mother, 

Father, J.M., and the Children attended. The court noted that CYF inspected 

the RV on September 18, 2019, and determined that it was clean and 

adequate for the Children. Status Review Order, 9/27/19, at 2. In addition, 
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the court stated that Mother testified the family “paid [to participate in] a 

campground membership program where they can move around to different 

campgrounds but cannot stay in one campground longer than 21 days.” Id. 

The court indicated that the family was then staying at a campground in 

Coatesville, Chester County. Id. 

With respect to the Children’s mental-health evaluations, the juvenile 

court concluded as follows:

Mother stated she has taken steps to arrange for [mental-health] 

evaluations in Pensacola, Florida. The provider is waiting on 

insurance information to schedule. The [C]hildren have not 

received any [mental-health] treatment to date. Child Guidance 

reported to [the] CASA that T.S.[, Mother’s and Father’s fourth 

child,] had a [mental-health] evaluation on 7/3/19 and was

recommended to receive [mental-health] treatment and has not

received any. None of the other children [has received] their 

[mental-health] evaluations as required under the current [o]rder. 

[T.S., Mother’s and Father’s fifth child,] was recommended for 

treatment but was unsuccessfully discharged on 8/8/19 due to 

lack of communication with the family.

Status Review Order, 9/27/19, at 2.

The juvenile court also found that the Children were enrolled in a cyber 

school, which required them to be logged on to a computer for five hours each

day. Status Review Order, 9/27/19, at 2. The court noted that Mother 

contacted the cyber school “and asked them not to share any information with 

CYF.” Id. Nevertheless, the court explained that the CASA introduced 

documentation indicating that the Children had poor attendance. Id.
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In its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the juvenile court aptly 

summarized its findings set forth in the September 27, 2019 status-review 

order, as follows:

Mother had represented that the RV had recently been purchased 

for $220,000 as the family’s residence. The family’s plan was to 

use RV campgrounds, pursuant to a campground membership, 

and move to Florida. During the hearing, the [C]hildren’s sporadic 

school attendance and uncompleted mental health evaluations or 

treatment continued to be unresolved issues. The September 

27, 2019 status review order required Mother and Father 

not to remove the [C]hildren from Chester County until 

further order of the court[,] and [it] required them to 

submit a plan for relocation to Florida.

Juvenile Court Opinion, 2/3/20, at 3 (emphasis added).

On October 2, 2019, the GAL filed a petition for an emergency hearing,

wherein she alleged that in violation of the status-review order, Mother and 

Father departed Chester County with the Children, and they could not be 

located. Petition, 10/2/19, at unnumbered 2. Further, the GAL asserted that 

the Children were not being educated, and they had not received mentalhealth evaluations. Id. The GAL requested an emergency hearing to 

determine whether the Children were safe and their needs were being met. 

Id. at unnumbered 3. In addition, the GAL requested that the hearing occur 

before the juvenile court rather than the hearing officer because, if Mother 

and Father failed to appear, “then relief can be given under the Juvenile Court 
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Rules, specifically[,] a bench warrant be issued for their arrests.” Petition, 

10/2/19, at unnumbered 3; see also Pa.R.J.C.P. 1140 (“Bench Warrants for 

Failure to Appear”).

The emergency hearing occurred on October 3, 2019, and Mother and 

Father did not appear. The following witnesses testified with respect to 

serving Mother and Father with notice of the emergency hearing via telephone, 

text message, and/or e-mail: the GAL, the CASA, and Eve Large, CYF legal 

liaison. In addition, both Father’s counsel and Mother’s counsel stated on the 

record in open court that they notified their respective clients of the 

emergency hearing via e-mail, but the parents did not respond, and neither 

counsel knew where Mother and Father currently were located. See N.T., 

10/3/19, at 21–23. Further, J.M. testified that he last had contact with T.M. 

via text message on the Sunday evening prior to the hearing, but he did not 

know where T.M. and Mother were located. Id. at 26.

At the conclusion of the testimony, the juvenile court determined that 

Mother and Father absconded from Chester County with the Children. N.T.,
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10/3/19, at 37. Upon the GAL’s request, joined by CYF, the juvenile court 

issued bench warrants pursuant to Pa.R.J.C.P. 1140.

6, 7

 Id. at 27, 29.

The third and final permanency hearing occurred on December 9, 2019, 

at which time CYF still had not located Mother and Father. Hannah Hunsinger, 

the CYF caseworker, testified on direct examination with respect to CYF’s 

efforts to locate the family, as follows:

Q. What efforts did [CYF] make to try to track the family and find 

out where they were? 

A. So in addition to the phone calls, text messages, e-mails that 

went unanswered by [Father and Mother], with the help of [the] 

CASA, we were able to locate the family through a membership 

that they had for their RV. And we tracked them to Texas where 

____________________________________________

6 On a date unspecified in the record, the juvenile court quashed the bench 

warrant with respect to Father. The court explained that it subsequently 

accepted “the GAL’s argument during the October 3, 2019 hearing that Father 

should be available, if Mother were arrested, to prevent the [C]hildren from 

entering foster care, and to drive the [C]hildren and himself back to join 

Mother in Chester County.” Juvenile Court Opinion, 2/3/20, at 4, ¶ 2; see 

also N.T., 10/3/19, at 33 (where the GAL stated on the record, “Your Honor, 

a few specifics that [CYF has] brought up to me. It may be wise to prevent 

the youth from going to foster care in another state and creating issues, to 

just have detained [Mother] and not detain [Father]. Is that possible in your 

order?”).

7 The juvenile court explained:

Despite the GAL’s efforts, [the] non-criminal bench warrant 

[against Mother] had never been successfully lodged against her 

in the National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) database. The 

GAL had informed the court and CYF that the non-criminal nature 

of Mother’s bench warrant led the Chester County authorities 

responsible for inputting NCIC data to refuse the bench warrant’s 

inclusion.

Juvenile Court Opinion, 2/3/20, at 5, ¶ 7.
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we attempted to make a referral, but by the time the referral was 

made, the family had left Texas.

 And so then we were able to locate them in Las Vegas, 

Nevada[,] through their Netflix account with the help of [J.M.].

Q. When was it that we attempted to track them or we were able 

to locate where they were in Texas?

A. So their reservation in Texas was up until October 20th, 2019. 

So on October 15th, we made the referral down there.

Q. That was to Montgomery County CYF in Texas?

A. Yes.

Q. And they were not able to make contact with the family?

A. Correct.

Q. Then we learned that they moved on to Las Vegas, Nevada?

A. Yes.

Q. When were we able to locate them in Las Vegas?

A. We were able to locate them on October 21, 2019.

Q. What efforts were made while the family was in Las Vegas?

A. So we made a referral to Las Vegas, the Department of Children 

and Families in Nevada[,] on October 21st of October. And they 

attempted to engage the family. They went out at least four 

times, knocked on the RV door. However, the family never 

answered.

 The caseworker did report that [Mother’s] vehicle was parked 

there during one of the visits.[8] And during another one, [T.M.] 

was home, and she was there caring for the kids and said that her 

parents had gone out to get food.

____________________________________________

8 The record reveals that Mother drove a “unique Mustang.” Permanency 

Review Order, 9/27/19, at 2.
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 So the caseworker left her business card and asked for [Father

and Mother] to call, but [CYF] never heard from them.

Q. Do we know roughly when they left the Las Vegas area?

A. They left I believe it was November 13th. The caseworker said 

that she attempted to do a late night visit. When [CYF] went out, 

the family was gone.

Q. Do we know where the family went from there?

A. So through conversations with [J.M.], he was kind of monitoring 

their Netflix account. They were last logged on outside of Los 

Angeles, California. We just don’t know their exact location.

Q. It is not exact enough for us to figure out what agency in 

California to contact?

A. Correct.

Q. When was that last log-in on Netflix?

A. On November 26th.

Q. There’s been no contact since then?

A. Correct.

Q. You mentioned that you were in contact with [J.M.] and he was 

somewhat helpful through this process?

A. Yes.

Q. So it is his Netflix account that they were using that he was 

able to see where they were?

A. Yes.

N.T., 12/9/19, at 4–7.

Ms. Hunsinger further testified that Mother and Father have made “[n]o 

progress, no compliance” in satisfying their permanency-plan objectives due 
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to absconding with the Children. N.T., 12/9/19, at 10. Specifically, she 

testified that the Children “were unenrolled” from their cyber charter school

on October 1, 2019. Id. at 9. Ms. Hunsinger testified as follows:

Q. [W]hat has [CYF] done to try to determine whether the 

[C]hildren are in school?

A. Outside of speaking with the cyber school that they were 

previously enrolled in, we haven’t had any way of figuring out if 

they are in school.

 [J.M.] doesn’t know if [T.M.] is in school. [T.M.] made a 

statement [to J.M.] about studying the one day on the phone, but 

he couldn’t say that was because she was in school or . . . exactly 

what it was for.

Id. Moreover, Ms. Hunsinger further testified:

Q. As far as you know, [the Children’s former cyber charter school] 

has not been contacted by any other school in any other state 

regarding [school] records for the Children?

A. Correct.

Id. at 10. On cross-examination by the GAL, Ms. Hunsinger confirmed that 

she is unaware of any record request made to the cyber school, where the 

Children were last enrolled, or to their previous public school.

9

 Id. at 14.

During the third permanency-review hearing, Ms. Hunsinger requested 

that the juvenile court terminate its supervision of this family and close the 

dependency cases because “we have exhausted our efforts to locate and 

____________________________________________

9 The record reveals that the Children previously were enrolled in a public 

school district in Chester County, where they had resided at the 

commencement of the dependency cases. Permanency Review Order, 

9/27/19, at 3.
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engage the family.” N.T., 12/9/19, at 12. The CASA joined CYF’s request 

because “we exhausted our efforts to locate and track them[,] and . . . 

continuing to pursue them is causing [Mother and Father] to create more and 

more instability for the [C]hildren.” Id. at 19. In contrast, the GAL requested 

that the court “take custody of” the Children because of “[t]he concerns 

reported by the caseworker regarding [the Children’s] lack of education[.]” 

Id. at 22, 27.

By orders entered on December 11, 2019, the juvenile court terminated 

its supervision of the Children. The court reasoned: 

[M.C.], [F]ather of all [the] [C]hildren except [T.M.], and [M.C.], 

Mother, have absconded with [T.M.], [T.C.], [T.C.], [T.C.], [T.C.],

and [T.C.] and left the jurisdiction of this court for residence in 

another state. CYF and [the] CASA have made repeated and 

exhaustive efforts to ascertain the current whereabouts of the 

[C]hildren, tracking them to Texas and Nevada, and attempting 

to involve law enforcement and the local child protective agencies 

in those locations. The family has no apparent intention to return 

to Chester County or Pennsylvania.

Order, 12/11/19.

On January 3, 2020, the Children, by the GAL, timely filed notices of 

appeal and concise statements of errors complained of on appeal, which this 

Court consolidated sua sponte.

The GAL raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Did the [juvenile] [c]ourt err in closing this matter without 

resolution of the dependency issues or transfer to any other 

jurisdiction?

2. Did the [juvenile] [c]ourt err in declining to remove custody 

of the [C]hildren from the parents?
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GAL’s Brief at 6.

We review the orders terminating court supervision according to the 

following standard:

[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an 

appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the 

record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the 

lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we 

review for an abuse of discretion.

In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010) (citation omitted).

Initially, the GAL asserts, for the first time, that the juvenile court closed 

the Children’s dependency matters in contravention of Pa.R.J.C.P. 1631. The 

GAL suggests that Rule 1631(A)(1) was not satisfied in this case because the 

Children’s educational and mental-health needs were not met by Mother and 

Father at the time of the final permanency hearing on December 9, 2019. 

GAL’s Brief at 13. In addition, the GAL avers that Rule 1631(A)(12) and (13) 

were not satisfied because no court in another county of this Commonwealth 

or in another state has accepted jurisdiction.

In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the juvenile court explained that the 

GAL never raised Rule 1631(A) during the permanency hearing. Juvenile 

Court Opinion, 2/3/20, at 7. Our review of the record confirms this fact. 

Instead, at the hearing, the GAL focused only upon changing custody of the 

Children, as addressed infra.
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Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for

the first time on appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). In Jahanshahi v. Centura

Development Co., Inc., 816 A.2d 1179 (Pa. Super. 2003), we noted that

our Supreme Court has frequently stressed the necessity of raising claims at

the earliest opportunity to “eliminate the possibility that an appellate court

will be required to expend time and energy reviewing claims on which no trial

ruling has been made.” Id. at 1189 (emphasis in original) (citation 

omitted). More recently, we clarified:

On appeal, we will not consider assignments of error that were not 

brought to the tribunal’s attention at a time at which the error 

could have been corrected or the alleged prejudice could have 

been mitigated. Tindall v. Friedman, 970 A.2d 1159, 1174 (Pa. 

Super. 2009). “In this jurisdiction one must object to errors, 

improprieties or irregularities at the earliest possible stage of the 

adjudicatory process to afford the jurist hearing the case the first 

occasion to remedy the wrong and possibly avoid an unnecessary 

appeal to complain of the matter.” Id. (quoting Thompson v. 

Thompson, 963 A.2d 474, 475-46 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted)).

State Farm Mutual v. Dill, 108 A.3d 882, 885 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) 

(emphasis added). Thus, we conclude that this issue is waived.10

____________________________________________

10

 Even if not waived, we agree with CYF that in terminating services, the 

juvenile court sub silentio determined that court-ordered services no longer 

are needed and the Children “remain[] with the guardian and the 

circumstances which necessitated the dependency adjudication and placement 

have been alleviated,” thereby satisfying Pa.R.J.C.P. 1631(A)(1). CYF’s Brief 

at 4–11.
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In her second issue, the GAL argues that rather than terminating 

supervision and closing the dependency cases, the court should have changed 

the Children’s placement by granting CYF physical and legal custody pursuant 

to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(1)11 and Pa.R.J.C.P. 1514(A)(1).12 The GAL asserts 

that the court erred “when, without other recourse to get compliance from the 

parents, the [juvenile] [c]ourt declined to remove the [C]hildren from the 

custody of the parents in an effort to return them to” Chester County. GAL’s 

____________________________________________

11 Section 6351 of the Juvenile Act provides, in relevant part:

§ 6351. Disposition of dependent child.

* * *

(f) Matters to be determined at permanency hearing.— At 

each permanency hearing, a court shall determine all of the 

following:

(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the 

placement.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(1) (emphasis in original).

12 Rule 1514 provides, in relevant part:

Rule 1514. Dispositional Findings Before Removal From 

Home

A. Required findings. Prior to entering a dispositional order 

removing a child from the home, the court shall state on the 

record in open court the following specific findings:

(1) Continuation of the child in the home would be contrary to 

the welfare, safety, or health of the child;

Pa.R.J.C.P. 1514(A)(1) (emphasis in original).
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Brief at 15. Further, the GAL asserts that the court erred because it is in the 

Children’s best interests to remove them from Mother’s and Father’s custody 

“to ensure [they] are getting the needed educational and mental health

supports[.]” Id. 

As noted, during the third permanency-review hearing, the GAL 

requested that the court “take custody of” the Children. N.T., 12/9/19, at 22. 

With respect to how the court would enforce such an order in light of the 

family’s disappearance and the inability to include the outstanding bench 

warrant against Mother in the NCIC database because of its non-criminal 

nature, the following colloquy occurred: 

THE COURT: How am I supposed to force these parents to do 

something when I can’t get my hands on them[,] and they are not 

here?

[THE GAL]: If you issue—

THE COURT: There are 3500 counties in this country. I’m only a 

judge in one.

[THE GAL]: If you issue an order revoking [Mother’s and Father’s] 

custody rights, then there are ways to enforce a custody order 

that apply differently than dependency, and . . . we know that 

there are better rules in place for custody issues than there are 

for dependency issues. That is my proposal. . . .

Id. at 25. 

Upon inquiry by the juvenile court, counsel for CYF responded as 

follows:

THE COURT: What do you think of [the GAL’s] suggestion that the 

[c]ourt terminate custody [of] the parents and give it to CYF?
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[CYF’s counsel]: We actually did look into that and discussed that 

on our end because, yes, if you were to do that, we could 

essentially turn the case over to the county detectives.

If they are charged then with a criminal offense of interfering with 

custody, obviously the D.A.’s office and detectives have far more 

superior ways to track down somebody and find them than we do, 

and also have the ability to . . . issue a criminal bench warrant 

that could be acted upon by other authorities in another state.

Our concern and the reason we did not go down that road is . . . 

the factual basis. . . . [W]hat do we actually hang our hat on to 

do that[?]

[W]e went back and forth a lot in this case. Do we really feel that 

these people are a danger[,] or the [C]hildren are in danger[,] or 

is it just that they are not getting certain services that they should 

be getting. We don’t know for a fact if [the Children] are actually 

in danger or not. I understand there are concerns about truancy 

and all that, but again, these are unknowns. And our concern is 

in order to be able to hang our hat and create a factual basis to 

change custody, we just don’t know that we have that.

* * *

And I would say [CYF] also does have the concern of . . . the 

trauma that can be inflicted upon children being taken away from 

their parents. And, in this case, you would be taking [the 

C]hildren away from their parents in California somewhere, and 

then everybody having to be transported back here across the 

country, which are some of the concerns we were voicing when 

we were discussing the bench warrant.

N.T., 12/9/19, at 32–33.

Thereafter, the GAL stated on the record: “I think that actually if you 

are really looking for facts as to why it is you can transfer custody, you can 

rely upon the educational factor here. . . . [I]n order to place a child into a 
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school, that school must do a records request from the prior school.”13 N.T., 

12/9/19, at 34. The colloquy between the GAL and the court continued:

THE COURT: Anywhere in the country?

[GAL]: Anywhere in the country. . . .

THE COURT: How do you know that?

[GAL]: Because that is how I have seen it happen in multiple 

schools from multiple states. . . .

I also know that [the C]hildren had IEPs in place, and those IEPs 

are required to be transferred with the child. And that is another 

factor that would be inquired into when enrolling in another 

school. . . .

Id. at 34–35.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the juvenile court set forth the following 

factual finding:

5. During the December 9, 2019 hearing, the CYF caseworker 

credibly testified that she had no way to determine if the 

[C]hildren were in school. Although the GAL stated that in her 

experience[,] the lack of a school records request to the 

[C]hildren’s former school necessitated a finding that they were 

not attending a school, that statement was insufficient for the 

court to find that the [C]hildren were not attending school. 

Instead, the court found as a fact that it was unknown at the 

December 9th hearing whether the [C]hildren were attending 

school. There was also no credible evidence presented to the 

____________________________________________

13

 It is important to note that the GAL did not include the lack of evaluations 

and/or treatment for the Children’s mental health as a basis for changing their 

placement. As such, we deem waived the GAL’s argument that the court 

abused its discretion in not changing the Children’s placement due to their 

mental-health needs. See Jahanshahi v. Centura Development Co., Inc., 

816 A.2d at 1189 (“Claims which have not been raised in the trial court may 

not be raised for the first time on appeal”).
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court that the [C]hildren were unsafe, or that their health, 

physical, mental or moral welfare was endangered.

Juvenile Court Opinion, 2/3/19, at 4–5. We discern no abuse of discretion by 

the court in basing its decision on credibility findings in favor of Ms. Hunsinger, 

who testified that CYF does not know whether the Children are in school. See 

N.T., 12/9/19, at 9 (“Outside of speaking with the cyber school that they were 

previously enrolled in, we haven’t had any way of figuring out if they are in 

school.”).

The juvenile court ultimately concluded that changing the Children’s 

placement is not in their best interests because the GAL’s request 

is an attempt to manipulate a remedy in criminal court, under the 

guise of ‘interference with child custody’ (12/9/2019 N.T., p. 23), 

thereby enabling law enforcement to charge Mother and Father 

with that crime and issue NCIC registered arrest warrants against 

them. (12/9/2019 N.T., p. 32). Even if this intentional use of a 

dependency court order to engineer a criminal arrest were

permitted, . . . the court did not have sufficient evidence to issue 

it, and its issuance would cause unjustifiable hardship to the 

[C]hildren.[14]

____________________________________________

14 Further, the juvenile court concluded:

[T]his scheme to elevate Mother[’s] and Father’s conduct into 

criminal behavior would ultimately fail. Interference with custody 

of children, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2904(a), requires that the charged

defendant ‘knowingly or recklessly’ takes a child from the custody 

of its lawful custodian. How could probable cause be established 

to issue an arrest warrant when the order transferring custody 

could not be prove[n] to have been received by Mother and 

Father? It could not.

Juvenile Court Opinion, 2/3/20, at 9; see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 2904(a) 

(Interference with custody of children) (providing, “A person commits an 
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Juvenile Court Opinion, 2/3/20, at 8. The court continued:

Furthermore, the intended result of the transfer, the 

arrest of Mother and Father, the forced removal of their six 

children, the [C]hildren’s transportation, likely across a continent, 

and mandated residence with strangers in an unfamiliar setting, 

would create unwarranted stress on the [C]hildren. Placing such 

foreseeable trauma on these [C]hildren is antithetical to 

dependency court’s purpose to create a disposition in a child’s best 

interests, “best suited to the . . . mental and moral welfare of the 

child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6351(a). These [C]hildren would likely never 

forgive those who knowingly caused them such hardship, nor 

forget the sudden cleaving of their lives. The GAL’s argument at 

the October 3, 2019 hearing[,] that a bench warrant should not 

be issued against Father[,] was premised, in part, to prevent this 

type of governmentally induced trauma from being inflicted. The 

court accepted the correctness of that argument. It continues to 

be correct. Trauma to these [C]hildren must be avoided if 

possible.

Although removal of the [C]hildren from Mother and 

Father would surely punish them for violating the court’s order 

requiring them not to leave Chester County without permission, 

punishment of parents is not a purpose of dependency court. 

There are occasions when an available legal remedy appears to be 

inadequate to redress wrongful conduct. It is never appropriate, 

however, for a court to manipulate the law or facts to create a 

response deemed more acceptable to the jurist or litigants. In the 

present case, the transference of custody from Mother and Father 

to CYF may appear to vindicate the authority of the court in the 

face of a blatant disregard of its underlying dependency order, but 

it would be unlawful, unwise and unjust. . . .

Juvenile Court Opinion, 2/3/20, at 10–11.

____________________________________________

offense if he knowingly or recklessly takes or entices any child under the age 

of 18 years from the custody of its parent, guardian or other lawful custodian, 

when he has no privilege to do so.”).
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Upon careful review, the record supports the juvenile court’s findings of 

fact and credibility determinations. We hold that the court’s inferences and 

conclusions of law are reasonable in light of those findings. Accordingly, we 

affirm the orders terminating court supervision.

Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/31/20