NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT

AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS 

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

WILLIAM FRANKLIN REESE, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 13-0009 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2011-101500-003

The Honorable Kristin C. Hoffman, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Arthur Hazelton

Counsel for Respondent

William Franklin Reese, Kingman

Petitioner Pro Se
STATE v. REESE

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jon W. Thompson delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.

T H O M P S O N, Judge:

¶1 Petitioner William Franklin Reese petitions this court for 

review from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judges Jon W. Thompson and 

Peter B. Swann have considered the petition for review and, for the 

reasons stated, grant review but deny relief.

¶2 Reese pled guilty to trafficking in stolen property and the 

trial court sentenced him to a stipulated term of 9.5 years' imprisonment. 

Reese now seeks review of the dismissal of his untimely pro se petition for 

post-conviction relief. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 32.9(c). 

¶3 In his petition for review, Reese claims law enforcement 

officers tracked a vehicle in which he was a passenger through the

warrantless use of a Global Positioning System ("GPS") device. Reese 

argues his trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to discover the 

officers' use of the GPS device, inform Reese of the use of the device 

and/or move to suppress evidence obtained through the use of the device. 

Reese further contends his petition for post-conviction relief is timely 

because he only recently learned the officers' used the GPS device. 

Finally, Reese argues the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. 

Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), regarding the warrantless use of GPS tracking 

devices constitutes a significant change in the law.1 

¶4 To state a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

a defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below objectively 

reasonable standards and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To show 

 

1 While Reese presented additional issues below, he does not present those 

issues for review. 
STATE v. REESE

Decision of the Court

3

prejudice, a defendant “must show that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Id. at 694. To be entitled to relief based on 

newly discovered evidence, a defendant must establish the following: (1) 

the evidence appears on its face to have existed at the time of trial but was 

discovered after trial; (2) the petition alleges facts from which the court 

could conclude the defendant diligently discovered the facts and notified 

the court; (3) the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the 

evidence is relevant; and (5) the evidence would likely have altered the 

verdict, finding, or sentence if known at the time of trial. State v. Bilke, 162 

Ariz. 51, 52-53, 781 P.2d 28, 29-30 (1989).

¶5 We deny relief. Reese has never offered any evidence that 

law enforcement officers used a GPS device to track the vehicle. He 

identifies no documents that reference GPS tracking and does not identify 

any witnesses who would testify regarding GPS tracking. Reese merely 

makes the bald assertion that someone used GPS to track the vehicle. This 

is not sufficient to present a colorable claim on any basis based on the

alleged use of a GPS device. Further, Reese concedes his wife owned the 

vehicle and that his codefendant was driving at all relevant times while

Reese was merely a passenger. Reese offers no evidence he had a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in the movements of the vehicle. 

Therefore, he has failed to establish he would have had a basis to suppress 

any evidence allegedly obtained through the use of a GPS device. 

¶6 In further regard to the claims of ineffective assistance, Reese 

concedes he does not know if his counsel was aware of the use of a GPS 

device and does not know if the State disclosed the use of a GPS device. 

Further, as noted above, Reese has never offered any evidence that law 

enforcement officers used a GPS device to track the vehicle and he has 

never identified any evidence through which counsel could have learned 

of the use of a GPS device. Reese has, therefore, failed to state any claims 

of ineffective assistance based on the alleged use of a GPS device. We also 

note that even if counsel knew of the use of a GPS device, counsel had no 

grounds to file a motion to suppress based on the absence of a warrant. In 

United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court held for the first time that the 

government installation of a GPS device on a vehicle for the purpose of 

monitoring the vehicle's movements constitutes a "search" that ordinarily 

requires a warrant. 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). The Court, however, did 

not decide Jones until nearly three months after Reese pled guilty. See id. 

Prior to Jones, the Court held the warrantless use of an electronic device to 

track the movements of a suspect's vehicle did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983). 
STATE v. REESE

Decision of the Court

4

¶7 For the above reasons, we grant review and deny relief.