alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### James P. MITCHELL, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Appellant, v. HORSE-SHOE MILLS, Inc., a Corporation, et al.

No. 15136.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Sept. 30, 1954.

Stuart Rothman, Sol., U. S. Department of Labor, Bessie Margolin, Chief, Appellate Section, U. S. Department of Labor, Washington, D. C., and Earl Street, Regional Atty., U. S. Department of Labor, for Appellant.

Bridges & Young, Pine Bluff, Ark., for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal from District Court dismissed, on motion of appellant.
Gormas. Michael(Q~n, '-"

Cc:

-'--' ;

.-'~ ~i __",. ~'.;~~rmas, Michael (OST)

'-'" .. : 'Friday, April 18, 2014 1:23 PM

,0b~IJ@co.venango.pa.us; Robert W. Shaffer; Thomas C. Frungillo

:,' i;CtdM-@bradfordairport.net); Tom Reil (mayor@bradfordpa.com);

'sanctuad@co.chautauqua.ny.us'; 'jeffmcdougle@flymov.com'; dbaker@franklinpa.gov;

'tfauver@pa.gov'; 'SpanosG@co.chautauqua.ny.us'

Dave Hackett (dhackett@gosunair.com); josh@citylinkair.com; Travis Christ

(Travis.Christ@silverairways.com); Jamie Kogutek (Jamie.Kogutek@silverairways.com);

Daniel Helland (daniel@boutiqueair.com); Schlemmer, Kevin (OST); Faulk, Scott (OST);

Martin, Michael (OST); Nick_Dhimitri@schumer.senate.gov;

Gerry_Petrella@schumer.senate.gov

EASat Bradford, DuBois, Franklin, PA, Jamestown, NY and Parkersburg, WVjMarietta,

OH

Sun Air Proposal to Provide EASat Bradford Dubois Franklin-Oil City Jamestown and

Parkersburg.pdf; Boutique Air Proposals PITBidDeck (l).pdf; City Link EAS Proposal DUJ

FKL_web.pdf; City Link EASProposal PKB_web.pdf; Silver Proposals lAD EAS Bid.pdf

From:

Sent:

To: -";,

Subject:

Attachments:

Hello everyone,

I would like to update you on the Essential Air Service (EAS) situation at Bradford, DuBois, and Franklin, PA, Jamestown,

NY, and Parkersburg, WV/Marietta, OH, as well as give you an opportunity to offer any comments on the record before

we submit a recommendation to the Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs.

We issued Order 2014-3-12 (March 19,2014), requesting proposals from airlines interested in providing EASfor a new

term. In response to our request, four air carriers submitted proposals: Silver Airways (the incumbent), Boutique Air,

City Link Air, and Sun Air.

I have attached each air carrier's proposal for your review and I expect them to be uploaded on www.regulations.gov

sometime this afternoon. I request that you review the proposals and submit any comments you may have as soon as

possible, but no later than Wednesday, May 28. Please send your comments directly to me via e-mail at

michael.gormas@dot.gov. Also, please forward this to all relevant parties that I have not included on the distribution

list.

Feel free to contact me if you have any questions.

Regards,

Michael D. Gormas

United States Department of Transportation Office of Aviation Analysis

1200 New Jersey Ave SE

WaShington, DC 20590

202.366.1853

1
### §215. Omitted

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section, act June 4, 1920, ch. 223, §2, 41 Stat. 750, provided for fees of $1 for each application for a visa and $9 for each visa. It was superseded by sections 2(h) and 7(h) of the Immigration Act of 1924 (act May 26, 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 154, 157) which provided for fees in the same amounts. The 1924 Act was repealed by section 403(a)(23) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (act June 27, 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 279). See section 1351 of Title 8, Aliens and Nationality, and section 9701 of Title 31, Money and Finance.
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.

47.5.4.

 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 04-11042

_____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

 Plaintiff - Appellee

 v.

PARIS D ST JOHN

 Defendant - Appellant

---------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Texas, Dallas

3:03-CR-442

---------------------

Before SMITH, GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

IT IS ORDERED that Appellee’s unopposed motion to vacate the

sentence is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellee’s unopposed motion to

remand case to the district court for resentencing is GRANTED.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 1, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
<PAGE>
                                                                 EXHIBIT 10.20

                            PROMISSORY NOTE (#10)


$30,000.00                                                  September 28, 1995


     FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned promises to pay to Painter Group
Corporation "PGC", at San Diego, California, or such other place as the holder
of this Note may from time to time in writing direct, the principal sum of
Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) with interest from the above date at the
rate of ten percent (10%) per annum.  Interest shall be calculated on the
basis of a three hundred sixty (360) day year and, if the principal sum is
paid earlier than the date due, on the actual number of days that such
principal was outstanding. Principal and interest will be payable in
six months.

     Principal and interest shall be payable in lawful money of the United
States of America and all or any part of the unpaid balance of principal may
be repaid at any time, without premium or penalty.

     The undersigned hereby waives presentment, protest, notice of protest,
demand for payment, notice of dishonor and any and all other notices and
demands in connection with the delivery, acceptance, performance, default or
enforcement of this Note.  No delay by the holder in exercising any power or
right hereunder shall operate as a waiver of any power or right.

     The entire sum shall become immediately due and payable without further
notice, demand or presentment, at the option of the holder of this Note, upon
the occurrence at any time of any one or more of the following events
("events of default"): (a) an assignment by the undersigned for the benefit
of its creditors; (b) the initiation of involuntary bankruptcy, proceedings
against the undersigned, which proceedings are not dismissed within 60 days
thereafter of (c) the filing by the undersigned of a petition under the
Federal Bankruptcy Code or comparable state laws for the reorganization,
arrangement or other judicial protection upon insolvency.

     The foregoing option to accelerate the indebtedness evidenced by this
Note may be exercised by PGC at any time after the occurrence of any of
the events of default.  The failure to exercise the foregoing option on the
occurrence of one or more of such events of default shall not prevent the
exercise upon the reoccurrence of such events of default or upon the
occurrence of any other event of default.

     The undersigned agrees to pay all out-of-pocket expenses (including
reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses) incurred by PGC hereunder
in connection with enforcing the obligations of the undersigned hereunder.

     This Note shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws
of the State of California.

                                                 TCS ENTERPRISES, INC.



9-28-95                                          /s/ James B. Kylstad
--------------------                             --------------------------
Date                                             James B. Kylstad
### §1179. National Drug Abuse Training Center

#### (a) Establishment; functions; general policies; transfer of supervision

The Director shall establish a National Drug Abuse Training Center (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Center") to develop, conduct, and support a full range of training programs relating to drug abuse prevention functions. The Director shall consult with the National Advisory Council for Drug Abuse Prevention regarding the general policies of the Center. The Director may supervise the operation of the Center initially, but shall transfer the supervision of the operation of the Center to the National Institute on Drug Abuse not later than December 31, 1974.

#### (b) Activities and material

The Center shall conduct or arrange for training programs, seminars, meetings, conferences, and other related activities, including the furnishing of training and educational materials for use by others.

#### (c) Persons eligible for services and facilities

The services and facilities of the Center shall, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Director, be available to (1) Federal, State, and local governmental officials, and their respective staffs, (2) medical and paramedical personnel, and educators, and (3) other persons, including drug dependent persons, requiring training or education in drug abuse prevention.

#### (d) Authorization of appropriations; fiscal year availability

(1) For the purpose of carrying out this section, there are authorized to be appropriated $1,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1972, $3,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973, $5,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and $6,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975.

(2) Sums appropriated under this subsection shall remain available for obligation or expenditure in the fiscal year for which appropriated and in the fiscal year next following.

(Pub. L. 92–255, title IV, §412, Mar. 21, 1972, 86 Stat. 84.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

The National Advisory Council for Drug Abuse Prevention, referred to in subsec. (a), was established by section 1151 of this title, which was repealed by Pub. L. 92–255, title I, §104, Mar. 21, 1972, 86 Stat. 67, eff. June 30, 1975.
### §§1801 to 1806. Omitted

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Sections were omitted in the general revision of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, titles I to IX of Pub. L. 89–10, Apr. 11, 1965, 79 Stat. 27, by Pub. L. 95–561, Nov. 1, 1978, 92 Stat. 2143.

Section 1801, Pub. L. 89–10, title IV, §401, as added Pub. L. 93–380, title IV, §401, Aug. 21, 1974, 88 Stat. 535; amended Pub. L. 94–482, title III, §328, Oct. 12, 1976, 90 Stat. 2220; Pub. L. 95–112, §2(d), Sept. 24, 1977, 91 Stat. 911, authorized appropriations for making grants for libraries and library resources for fiscal years ending prior to Oct. 1, 1979.

Section 1802, Pub. L. 89–10, title IV, §402, as added Pub. L. 93–380, title IV, §401, Aug. 21, 1974, 88 Stat. 537, provided for allotments to States.

Section 1803, Pub. L. 89–10, title IV, §403, as added Pub. L. 93–380, title IV, §401, Aug. 21, 1974, 88 Stat. 538; amended Pub. L. 94–482, title III, §323(a)(3), title V, §501(e)(1), Oct. 12, 1976, 90 Stat. 2217, 2237, provided for structure and function of State plans.

Section 1804, Pub. L. 89–10, title IV, §404, as added Pub. L. 93–380, title IV, §401, Aug. 21, 1974, 88 Stat. 540, directed Commissioner to afford the State educational agency reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing prior to final disapproval of a State plan.

Section 1805, Pub. L. 89–10, title IV, §405, as added Pub. L. 93–380, title IV, §401, Aug. 21, 1974, 88 Stat. 541, related to payments to States.

Section 1806, Pub. L. 89–10, title IV, §406, as added Pub. L. 93–380, title IV, §401, Aug. 21, 1974, 88 Stat. 541; amended Pub. L. 94–482, title III, §324, title V, §501(r), Oct. 12, 1976, 90 Stat. 2220, 2238, related to participation of children enrolled in private schools.
## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02

- 14

- 00283

- CV

J ERRY V. D URANT ; J ERRY D URANT , I NC

. D / B / A D URANT T OYOTA AND
D / B / A J ERRY D URANT T OYOTA ; J ERRY D URANT H YUNDAI , LLC; D OYLE M AYNARD ; R OBERT G. C OTE S R .; G ARY M ICHAEL D EERE ; J ERRY R ASH ; A ND E LLIOT “ S COOTER ” M ICHELSON , Appellants

V

.

A NDREW A NDERSON , Appellee §

§

§

§

§ On Appeal from the 153rd District Court

of Tarrant County (153

- 257626

- 12)

March 19, 2020

Opinion by Justice Gabriel

JUDGMENT ON REMAND

This appeal is o n r e mand from the Texas Supreme Court.

This court has considered the record on ap peal in this case and holds that there

was error in part of the trial court’s defamation judgment. We reverse that portion of

the tri al court ’ s judgment finding and apportioni n g defamation liability against
appellant Doyle Maynard and render a take

- nothing judgment in his favor

. We affirm

the remainder of the defamation liability judgment. We affirm the aw arded andremanded defamation damages condition ed on our suggestion of a $584,999

remittitur
, which includes the settlem ent credit. If appell ee Andrew Anderson timely

files the suggested remittitur with the trial court clerk no later than fifteen days after

this judgment , we will modify t he amount of defamation damages and a f firm those
damages as modified. Other wise, we will reverse the trial cou rt ’ s defamation
judgment for a new trial on appell ee Andrew Anderson ’ s defamation claim against
appellants Jerry V. Durant, Robert G. Cote Sr., Gary Michael Deere, Jerry Ra sh, and

El l iot “ Scooter ” Miche lson and on those awarded defamation damages that were
supported by legally sufficient evidence.
But after considering the recor d on appeal regarding appellant And rew

Anderson ’ s fraud ulent

- inducement claim , we find no error in the tri al court ’ s
judgment. According

ly, we affi rm the tri a l court ’ s fraudulent

- inducement judgment.

The costs in this court are taxed against the party that incurred the cost

.

It is further ordered that to the extent the supersedeas bond ( which was filed
by ap pellants Jerry V. Durant ; Jerry Durant, Inc. d /b/a Durant Toyota and d/b/a

Jerry Durant Toyota; and Jerry Durant H yundai, LLC) was effective to supersede the

trial court ’ s judgment, appellee Andrew Anderson shall have and recover of and from

those specifi e d appellants and their surety
, Jerry ’ s GM, LLC , fr o m their supersedeas

bond, the amount s awarded against those appellants and affirmed by this court

. We
additionally render judgment against Jerry ’ s GM, LLC for the costs taxed aga inst

th ose three appellant s in this court

.SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

B y /s/ L e e Gabriel Justice Lee Gabriel
§ 362.10 Principal types of claims allowable. ( a ) In general, a claim may be allowed only for tangible personal property of a type and quantity that was, from the Board's perspective, reasonable, useful, or proper for the employee to possess under the circumstances at the time of the loss or damage. Any questions in this regard are to be resolved by the Deputy General Counsel.
( b ) Claims that will ordinarily be allowed include, but are not limited to, cases in which the loss or damage occurred: ( 1 ) In a common or natural disaster;
( 2 ) When the property was subjected to extraordinary risks in the performance of duty or efforts to save human life or property of the United States Government;
( 3 ) When the property was used for the benefit of the Board at the direction, or with the consent, of a supervisor.
(45 U.S.C. 231f(b)(5))
[45 FR 57709, Aug. 29, 1980, as amended at 48 FR 51448, Nov. 9, 1983]
§ 216.33 What is required for payment of an age or disability annuity. In addition to the eligibility requirements listed above, an employee may be required to meet other conditions before payment of his or her annuity may begin. ( a ) To receive payment of an employee annuity based on age, an eligible employee must: ( 1 ) Apply to be entitled to an annuity; and
( 2 ) Give up the right to return to service with his or her last railroad employer.
( b ) If a disability annuity is converted to an age annuity when the annuitant attains retirement age, the age annuity cannot be paid until the employee gives up the right to return to work as described in subpart C of this part. The employee may authorize the Board to relinquish any such right on his or her behalf at the time when he or she applies for the disability annuity.
( c ) To receive payment of an employee annuity based on disability, and eligible employee must apply to be entitled to an annuity.
( d ) When requested, the employee must submit evidence to support his or her application, such as proof of age or evidence of disability.
(The information collection requirements contained in this section were approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 3220-0002)
### **CHAPTER 106—CHAMPIONING AMERICAN BUSINESS THROUGH DIPLOMACY**

Sec.
9901.
Findings.
9902.
Report from each mission on matters of commercial relations.
9903.
Consolidated report on unified investment climate statement and country commercial guide.
9904.
Whole-of-government coordination and consultation to support United States economic and business interests.
9905.
Private sector consultation and coordination.
9906.
Improving awareness of United States Government tools and services to support United States businesses overseas.
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judg es Willis, El der and Bray Argued at Rich mond, Virginia

KABONJI RAHS AAN ROANE MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 2988-99-2 JUDG E JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. MAY 8, 2001 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF HANOVER COUNTY John R. Alde rman, Judge (Patrick R. Bynum, Jr., on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. (Mark L. Earley, Attorn ey General; Richard B. Smith, Senior As sistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. On appeal from his convictions of robber y, in violation of Code § 18.2-58, and use of a firearm in the commissi on of a felony, in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1, Kabonji Rahs aan Roane contends that th e trial court erre d in admitting in to evidence, at the sentencing phase of his trial, an exhibit displa ying his prior convictions. Because Roane ha s failed to pr ovide a record sufficient to al low us to determ ine the merits of his appeal, we dismiss the appeal.I. BACKGROUND During the sentencing phase of Roane's bifurcat ed trial, the Commonwealth submitted Exhibit 6, which contai ned a record of his prior convicti ons. Roane admitted that he ha d received timely notice of the Co mmonwealth's inte nt to introduce evidence of his prior conviction s as required by Code § 19.2-295.1. However, he objected to the introduction of the exhibit on th e grounds that (1) it did not include the date of each conv iction, (2) it did not contain the name and jurisdicti on of the court where each prior conviction was had, (3 ) it did not di stinguish betwee n felony and misdemeanor co nvictions, (4) it did not establis h that the prior convictions we re similar to any Virginia statutes, an d (5) it was not properly authenti cated. The tr ial court over ruled Roane's objections and admitted Commonwealth's Exhibi t 6 as evidence of his prior co nvictions.

II. ADMISSIBILITY OF COMMONWEALTH'S EXHIBIT 6 On appeal, the judgment of the lower court is presumed to be correct and the burden is on the appellant to present to us a sufficient record from which we can determine whether the lower court has erred in the respect complained of. If the appellant fails to do this, the judgment will be affirmed. Justis v. Young , 202 Va. 631, 632, 119 S.E.2d 255, 256-57 (1961) (citations omitted). Furthermore, we "must dispose of the case upon the record and cannot base [our] decision upon appellant's petition or brief, or statements of counsel in open court. We

- 2 -may act only upon facts contained in the record." Smith v. Commonwealth , 16 Va. App. 630, 635, 432 S.E.2d 2, 6 (1993) (citation omitted). Although Commonwealth's Exhibit 6 was before the trial court, it is not contained in the record before us and the record contains no acceptable substitute. Commonwealth's Exhibit 6 is indispensable to a determination of the issues raised by Roane. Without it, we cannot review the trial court's ruling. Therefore, Roane has failed to present a record sufficient for appeal. For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed. Dismissed.

- 3 -
Electrical Conductivity, UMHOS

Day High Low Mean

1 303 213 245

2 275 202 242

3 257 177 215

4 232 169 194

5 259 172 194

6 263 186 210

7 263 198 220

8 257 197 220

9 262 190 219

10 267 176 220

11 263 116 212

12 203 101 159

13 192 95 145

14 171 96 127

15 238 104 173

16 213 103 168

17 197 105 161

18 176 110 159

19 169 111 145

20 150 103 134

21 156 101 136

22 176 104 159

23 191 110 167

24 214 129 185

25 237 133 197

26 227 129 192

27 221 135 189

28 235 134 177

29 262 141 192

30 273 142 207

31 274 146 205

COMMENT(S):

0 reading indicates that the station was out of service.

Historical Archive and Report Database

Rio Vista On The Sacramento River

Period: March 2023 Run Date: 4/7/2023
§ 404.204 Methods of computing primary insurance amounts—general. ( a ) *General.* We compute most workers' primary insurance amounts under one of two major methods. There are, in addition, several special methods of computing primary insurance amounts which we apply to some workers. Your primary insurance amount is the highest of all those computed under the methods for which you are eligible.
( b ) *Major methods.* ( 1 ) If after 1978 you reach age 62, or become disabled or die before age 62, we compute your primary insurance amount under what we call the *average-indexed-monthly-earnings* method, which is described in §§ 404.210 through 404.212. The earliest of the three dates determines the computation method we use.
( 2 ) If before 1979 you reached age 62, became disabled, or died, we compute your primary insurance amount under what we call the *average-monthly-wage* method, described in §§ 404.220 through 404.222.
( c ) *Special methods.* ( 1 ) Your primary insurance amount, computed under any of the special methods for which you are eligible as described in this paragraph, may be substituted for your primary insurance amount computed under either major method described in paragraph (b) of this section.
( 2 ) If you reach age 62 during the period 1979-1983, your primary insurance amount is guaranteed to be the highest of— ( i ) The primary insurance amount we compute for you under the average-indexed-monthly-earnings method;
( ii ) The primary insurance amount we compute for you under the average-monthly-wage method, as modified by the rules described in §§ 404.230 through 404.233; or
( iii ) The primary insurance amount computed under what we call the *old-start* method; as described in §§ 404.240 through 404.242.
( 3 ) If you had all or substantially all of your social security earnings before 1951, we will also compute your primary insurance amount under what we call the *old-start* method.
( 4 ) We compute your primary insurance amount under the rules in §§ 404.250 through 404.252, if— ( i ) You were disabled and received social security disability insurance benefits sometime in your life;
( ii ) Your disability insurance benefits were terminated because of your recovery or because you engaged in substantial gainful activity; and
( iii ) You are, after 1978, re-entitled to disability insurance benefits, or entitled to old-age insurance benefits, or have died.
( 5 ) In some situations, we use what we call a *special minimum* computation, described in §§ 404.260 through 404.261, to find your primary insurance amount. Computations under this method reflect long-term, low-wage attachment to covered work.
### §8881. Repealed. Pub. L. 107–110, title X, §1011(5)(C), Jan. 8, 2002, 115 Stat. 1986

Section, Pub. L. 89–10, title XIV, §14401, as added Pub. L. 103–382, title I, §101, Oct. 20, 1994, 108 Stat. 3899, related to waivers of statutory and regulatory requirements.
### SUBCHAPTER III—INCLUSION OF TAIWAN IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
### SUBCHAPTER I—GENERAL