NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 19a0557n.06

No. 18-3459

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TAYLOR KARAS,

Defendant - Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF 

OHIO

BEFORE: SILER, GIBBONS, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Twenty-five-year-old Taylor Karas, with her 

co-defendants, kidnapped and robbed a seventy-nine-year-old man in Ohio. After Karas lured the 

victim to her hotel room, her co-defendants arrived at the hotel, armed. Using the victim’s car, the 

defendants drove the victim to an ATM and multiple stores, used the victim’s credit card to make 

purchases, and ultimately abandoned him at a store in Indiana. Karas was charged with and 

convicted of kidnapping and sentenced to forty-two months’ incarceration, well below the U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”) range.

Karas now appeals her sentence, arguing that it is procedurally and substantively 

unreasonable. Because the district court properly calculated the Guidelines range and did not 

abuse its discretion in declining to grant Karas’s request for a two-level minor role reduction, we

find that the sentence is procedurally reasonable. Because the district court did not abuse its 
No. 18-3459, United States v. Karas

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discretion in weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, we find that the sentence is substantively 

reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

Twenty-five-year old Taylor Karas and her then-boyfriend, James Marriott, agreed to rob

a seventy-nine-year-old man, identified as J.P. Karas had previously dated J.P.’s grandson and 

had borrowed money from J.P. in the past. On October 6, 2016, Karas texted J.P. and asked to 

borrow money. J.P., expecting a sexual encounter in return, agreed and suggested they meet at a 

local restaurant. After Karas asked that they meet at the Super 8 Motel in Vandalia, Ohio, J.P. 

drove to the motel, parked his Ford Explorer in the lot, and entered Karas’s room.

Shortly thereafter, Karas texted Marriott that J.P. had arrived. Marriott, brandishing a gun,

burst into the room, along with a second man, Andrew Azzalina. Marriott and Azzalina searched

J.P. and took approximately $300 and his phone. Marriott also took J.P.’s credit and debit cards 

and demanded that J.P. tell him his personal identification number (“PIN”). When J.P. said he 

could not remember his PIN, Marriott cocked his gun and threatened to kill J.P., calling him a liar.

Despite not knowing the PIN, Marriot decided to take J.P. to an ATM to withdraw money. 

Marriott, Azzalina, and Karas found the keys to J.P.’s car and forced J.P. into the front seat. With 

Karas and Marriott in the back seat, Azzalina drove to a bank in Englewood, Ohio. When J.P. 

repeated that he could not remember his PIN, Marriott inserted the card into the ATM and 

threatened to kill him while Karas attempted to guess the PIN.

Unable to withdraw money, Marriott, Azzalina, and Karas transported J.P. to a Dollar 

General in Lewisburg, Ohio. While Marriott and Karas went inside to purchase a cell phone and 

a box of Honey Buns, totaling $97, with J.P.’s credit card, Azzalina remained in the car with J.P.
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Azzalina then drove to the Dick’s Sporting Goods store in Richmond, Indiana, crossing 

state lines. Again, Marriott and Karas went into the store while Azzalina held J.P. in the car. 

Marriott and Karas attempted to charge $1,400 worth of merchandise to J.P.’s credit card. The 

store clerk requested to see the credit card holder’s driver’s license to complete the purchase, so 

Marriott called Azzalina to bring J.P. into the store. J.P. signed for the purchase and, at some point 

during the transaction, mouthed “call the police” to the store clerk. Fearing that J.P. had 

successfully requested help from the store clerk, Karas and Marriott fled the store, leaving J.P. 

behind. Karas, Marriott, and Azzalina then drove J.P.’s car back to Ohio.

Police arrested Marriott and Azzalina a few days later. Karas turned herself in on October 

20, 2016. As relevant here, a federal grand jury indicted Karas on October 27, 2016 for aiding and 

abetting a kidnapping.1 Karas pled guilty to kidnapping on January 20, 2017.2 

The Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) recommending 

a Guidelines range of 151 to 188 months’ incarceration. Applying Guidelines § 2A4.1 for 

kidnapping, the PSR established that Karas had a base offense level of 32. The PSR also found 

two separate two-level enhancements applicable. One two-level enhancement was for the use of 

a dangerous weapon, pursuant to Guidelines § 2A4.1(b)(3). The second enhancement was a 

victim-related adjustment applicable when the defendant knew or should have known that the 

offense involved a vulnerable victim. The PSR did not adjust for Karas’s role in the offense 

because she was not the organizer of the criminal activity; nor was she a “minor participant” due 

to her “significant role” in the criminal activity. Finally, applying a three-level downward 

1 Karas was only named in counts one and five of the indictment. Count one was for aiding and abetting a kidnapping, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) and (2). Count five was for aiding and abetting the knowing possession and 

transport across state lines of a stolen motor vehicle, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2313 and Pinkerton v. United States, 

328 U.S. 640 (1946). 

2 Karas also pled guilty to count one and the government agreed to dismiss count five.
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adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, the PSR calculated a total offense level of 33. The 

PSR also determined that Karas was within criminal history category II because of prior, relatively 

minor drug- and alcohol-related charges. With the adjusted offense level of 33 and the criminal 

history category of II, the Guidelines sentence range was 151 to 188 months. The PSR 

recommended a downward departure to a sentence of seventy-two months under the § 3553(a) 

factors, based in part on Karas’s commitment to a drug addiction treatment program.

At the request of both parties, Karas’s sentencing hearing was continued for over a year 

and she remained out on bond during this time. Prior to the sentencing hearing, the parties 

submitted supplemental memoranda detailing the aggravating and mitigating factors related to 

Karas’s sentencing. Karas submitted two sentencing memoranda to the district court. 

In the first memo, filed in August 2017, Karas argued that a reduced sentence was 

warranted because: (1) she acted under duress because Marriott was so controlling; (2) she was 

under the influence of opiates; (3) she had previously been the victim of an attempted kidnapping; 

(4) the victim had provoked the offense; (5) she had a history of sexual abuse and addiction; and 

(6) she was experiencing anxiety, depression, and PTSD. Without directly linking her argument 

to the facts of this case, she also discussed research showing that community-based treatment 

programs were more effective in decreasing recidivism than prison-based programs. As to the 

Guidelines role reduction, she contended that she had “a limited, though not minor role, in the 

offense” and asked the court “to permit the fully allowable reduction based upon her minimal 

role.” DE 85, Sealed Def.’s Sentencing Mem., Page ID 414. She made no other mention of the 

Guidelines’ minor role provision in her memorandum and did not dispute the PSR’s finding that 

her conduct did not warrant a minor role downward adjustment. 
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In a supplemental memorandum filed in March 2018, Karas argued that her “postconviction rehabilitation” warranted “a further departure from the U.S. Probation Officer’s 

adjustment.” DE 109, Sealed Def.’s Supp. Sentencing Mem., Page ID 512–513. She noted that 

she had completed in-patient drug treatment and had remained in recovery, excluding a relapse in 

December 2016. She also contended that a departure was warranted because she had worked at 

Red Lobster since September 2017, received good performance reviews, and been enrolled in 

community college, working toward an associate degree in counseling, since January 2017. Karas 

also argued in the supplemental memo that her conduct was aberrant. She explained this 

“misadventure” occurred and “circumstances got out of control” because of her fear of and loyalty 

to Marriott. Id. at 515. She further argued that she had diligently continued to work and attend 

school despite a pregnancy “end[ing] during its second trimester in December 2017” and 

subsequent medical treatment. Id. at 513–14.

In a motion for substantial assistance filed in May 2017 (following the close of Marriott’s 

trial), the government requested that the court grant a downward departure from the Guidelines for 

Karas’s cooperation against Marriott.

The government also filed a sentencing memorandum in May 2017, urging the district 

court to impose a term of imprisonment upon Karas but “not the lengthy sentence that the advisory 

Guidelines suggest.” DE 119, Gov’t Sentencing Mem., Page ID 556. The government noted that 

Karas had serious addiction issues, as indicated by her history of drug- and alcohol-related 

misdemeanor convictions, and that these issues contributed to her involvement in the kidnapping. 

While her generally positive performance on bond hinted that she could become a better person, 

the government explained, the high risk of her becoming unwilling or unable to deal with these 

issues in the future would “unquestionably” lead her to reoffend. Id. at 557. The government 
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contended that the risk of recidivism posed a danger to the community and her son. Although 

Karas played an “integral role,” the government found that some downward departure was 

warranted because Karas’s involvement and criminal history were less troubling than those of her 

co-defendants. Id. at 557–58.

The district court held a sentencing hearing on May 4, 2018. Karas took “full responsibility 

for [her] actions” and acknowledged that she abused the victim’s trust by putting him “into a 

situation [she] knew wasn’t the safest and that could turn out bad.” DE 154, Sentencing Hearing 

Tr., Page ID 717–18. She apologized not only to the victim, but also to her son and grandparents,

who cared for her son. She explained that her drug addiction motivated her conduct in this case, 

but that she had since “been clean for 17 months,” was caring for her son, holding down a job, and 

pursuing a certificate in chemical dependency counseling that she planned to complete by the fall 

semester of the next year. Id. at 718–21. 

The district court then turned to an analysis of the Guidelines. Largely in accordance with 

the PSR, the district court calculated a base offense level of 32 for aiding and abetting a 

kidnapping, plus two levels for use of a dangerous weapon, and a three-level downward adjustment 

for acceptance of responsibility, which resulted in a total offense level of 31. The district court 

then rejected Karas’s argument for a minor role adjustment, finding that she was “by no measure 

. . . a minor player in what happened,” because the kidnapping would not have occurred if Karas 

had not “lured the victim to the hotel” under false pretenses. Id. at 726–27. The district court also 

decided against applying the two-level vulnerable victim enhancement recommended in the PSR. 

Finally, considering Karas’s criminal history, the district court found that the advisory range was 

121 to 151 months’ imprisonment. 
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The district court next considered the § 3553(a) factors. As to mitigating factors, the 

district court considered Karas’s troubled background and current circumstances—including a 

difficult home life, experience of sexual abuse as a child, and long history of substance abuse and 

minor “drug fueled” offenses as an adult. Id. at 727–29. The district court also noted that Karas 

was under the influence of drugs during the kidnapping and felt controlled by Marriott. The district 

court considered Karas’s progress, “remorse,” and “insight” while out on bond. Id. at 725. It noted 

her devotion to her young son, recent employment, completion of in-patient treatment and ongoing 

outpatient treatment, her enrollment in a junior college’s substance abuse certificate program, and 

her goal of becoming a social worker.

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The court balanced these mitigating factors with the public interest in “punishment that 

both promotes respect for the law, while at the same time not minimizing or trivializing the 

offense.” Id. at 733. Describing the offense as “serious,” the district court explained that Karas 

took advantage of her relationship with the victim by luring him into an armed confrontation with 

young men. Id. at 732–33. The district court explained that Karas could become a danger to the 

public if she relapsed because “she is subject to being manipulated and to committing criminal 

conduct.” Id. at 733. 

Summarizing its analysis, the district court gave Karas “the benefit of the doubt” in 

concluding “that her rehabilitation was sincere.” Id. at 735–36. But the court still emphasized that

“a sentence of some length” was warranted because of the seriousness of the offense, the public’s 

interest in fair punishment, and the nature of the crime. Id. at 735–36. The district court sentenced 

3 The district court rejected Karas’s request for departures from the Guidelines based on her claims that the victim was 

culpable, her conduct was aberrant, and that she acted under coercion or duress from Marriott. But the district court 

indicated it would consider Marriott’s influence over Karas, as well as the out-of-character nature of Karas’s conduct, 

as part of its § 3553(a) analysis. In addition, the court indicated that it considered Karas’s cooperation with the 

government. On appeal, Karas does not challenge these aspects of the district court’s Guidelines or sentencing 

analysis.
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Karas to forty-two months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release and ordered 

restitution jointly and severally with her co-defendants. The court concluded by asking Karas’s 

counsel whether there were any procedural or substantive objections to the sentence, and Karas’s 

counsel replied that there were none. 

Karas timely appealed her sentence.

II.

When reviewing a sentence for procedural reasonableness, we generally utilize the abuseof-discretion standard. United States v. Coleman, 627 F.3d 205, 211 (6th Cir. 2010). We consider 

whether “the district court ‘correctly calculat[ed] the applicable Guidelines range’ which are the 

‘starting point and initial benchmark’ of its sentencing analysis.” United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 

568, 579 (6th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49

(2007)). In considering the district court’s calculation of the Guidelines range, we review the 

district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Id. While the 

district court’s ultimate decision about a person’s role is a legal conclusion, such a decision relies 

heavily “on factual nuances.” United States v. Washington, 715 F.3d 975, 983 (6th Cir. 2013). 

Thus, because “the district court is in the best position to know whether [the defendant] was a 

leader” or played a minor role, we review the district court’s conclusion about a defendant’s role 

under a “deferential” standard of review. Id. (“Accordingly, we hold that . . . review of the legal 

conclusion that a person is an organizer or leader . . . is also deferential.”).

If we determine that the “district court’s sentencing decision [is] procedurally sound, we

must ‘then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard.’” Bolds, 511 F.3d at 581 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). 
No. 18-3459, United States v. Karas

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III.

On appeal, we review the sentence imposed by the district court “for both procedural and 

substantive unreasonableness.” Coleman, 627 F.3d at 210. “Our review of sentences for 

reasonableness is not to be confused with the district court’s task to impose a sentence that is 

‘sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes’ of sentencing set forth in 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Bolds, 511 F.3d at 578. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion 

on either ground, we affirm.

A.

On appeal, Karas primarily claims that her sentence was procedurally unreasonable 

because she should have received a two-level minor role reduction under the Guidelines. We find 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant the minor role reduction. 

Guidelines § 3B1.2(b) allows for a range of adjustments for defendants who are 

“substantially less culpable than the average participant in the criminal activity.” U.S.S.G.

§ 3B1.2, Application Note 3. It therefore provides for a two-level decrease “[i]f the defendant was 

a minor participant in [the] criminal activity.” Id. § 3B1.2(b). The two-level minor role reduction 

applies to those who are “less culpable than most other participants in the criminal activity.” Id.

§ 3B1.2, Application Note 5. “Although [a] defendant may be less culpable than some of his 

coconspirators, this does not require a finding that he was substantially less culpable than the 

others.” United States v. Miller, 56 F.3d 719, 720 (6th Cir. 1995).

Before the district court, the defendant bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of 

the evidence, the factors that justify a minor role reduction. Id. The district court’s inquiry into 

the minor role reduction is “heavily dependent upon the facts of the particular case.” U.S.S.G.

§ 3B1.2, Application Note 3(C). The district court may consider a non-exhaustive list of factors, 
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including the defendant’s: (1) understanding of the “scope and structure” of the crime; 

(2) participation in the planning or organizing of the crime; (3) “exercise[]” of decision-making

authority or “influence[]” over the exercise of decision-making authority; (4) acts performed and 

responsibility or discretion over those acts; and (5) possible benefit from the crime. U.S.S.G.

§ 3B1.2, Application Note 3(C)(i)-(v).

Based on these factors and Karas’s perfunctory request for the reduction, we conclude that 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the minor role adjustment. Here, as the 

district court noted, Karas took advantage of her relationship with the victim to lure him to the 

hotel rather than the restaurant where he wished to meet. As Karas herself explained, she put the 

victim “into a situation [she] knew wasn’t the safest and that could turn out bad.” DE 154, 

Sentencing Hearing Tr., Page ID 718. While she may not have exactly predicted the “extent” of 

the criminal activity, id., she intentionally lured him to the hotel “for the purpose of robbing” him,

DE 50, Plea Agreement, Page ID 155. Karas failed to present other evidence that she did not grasp 

the goals of the criminal activity. 

In the statement of facts attached to the plea agreement, Karas admitted that she actively 

participated in each phase of the criminal activity. She “contacted [J.P.] and asked to borrow 

money from him.” Id. at 155. She notified Marriott when J.P. arrived at the hotel. She was one 

of “the three robbers [who] then moved [J.P.] from the motel to the Ford Explorer” and later 

“forced [J.P.] to accompany them various places in western Ohio and eastern Indiana.” Id. At the 

bank, she provided possible PIN numbers to access the victim’s bank account.

She also stood to profit from the criminal activity. She and Marriott entered the Dollar 

General and made purchases on the victim’s credit card. At Dick’s Sporting Goods in Indiana, she 

and her co-defendants “made [J.P.] use his credit card and purchase clothing and other items for 
No. 18-3459, United States v. Karas

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them.” Id. These facts demonstrate that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding 

that a minor role reduction was not warranted.

In her brief on appeal, Karas presents more detail about her role in the offense than she did 

in the district court. Her main argument is that “it was Marriott who developed this plan and 

executed it,” and it was Marriott who possessed the gun. CA6 R. 31, Sealed Appellant Br., at 26. 

She contends that while she “was the connection to the victim in this case, it was not her idea to 

rob him.” Id. Karas provides no citations to the record for these assertions. And even if she did 

present more support, it would not warrant a minor role reduction. “A defendant does not become 

a minor participant simply because others planned a scheme and made all the arrangements for its 

accomplishment.” Miller, 56 F.3d at 720. Here, even if Karas “may be less culpable than some 

of her coconspirators,” a finding that she was “substantially less culpable than the others” is not 

warranted. As described above, Karas admitted that she understood the plan to rob the victim and 

was an active participant in each stage of the kidnapping. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant a minor role reduction 

based on the record before it.

B.

A sentence is substantively reasonable when it is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, 

to comply with the purposes” of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Presley, 547 F.3d 625, 630–

31 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). “A sentence may be considered substantively 

unreasonable when the district court selects a sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on 

impermissible factors, fails to consider relevant sentencing factors, or gives an unreasonable 

amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508, 520 (6th Cir.

2008). On appeal, we consider the “totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any 
No. 18-3459, United States v. Karas

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variance from the Guidelines range.” Bolds, 511 F.3d at 581 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). Even 

if we reasonably would have imposed a different sentence, we must “afford due deference to the 

district court’s decision to determine the appropriate length of defendant’s sentence, so long as it 

is justified in light of the relevant § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 

568, 591 (6th Cir. 2009). 

The defendant bears the burden of showing substantive unreasonableness. United States 

v. Smith, 881 F.3d 954, 960 (6th Cir. 2018). A sentence within the Guidelines range is presumed

to be substantively reasonable. Herrera-Zungia ̧ 571 F.3d at 590. When a below-Guidelines 

sentence is imposed, the defendant’s burden, while not impossible to meet, is “even more 

demanding.” United States v. Curry, 536 F.3d 571, 573 (6th Cir. 2008).

Section 3553(a)(2) also directs the sentencing court to consider the need for the sentence 

imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, provide just punishment, afford adequate 

deterrence, and protect the public. A proper sentence, in other words, may not minimize the 

seriousness of the defendant’s conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 778 F.3d 515, 519 

(6th Cir. 2015) (reversing a sentence of one night for possession of child pornography because of 

the district court’s “failure to take into account the seriousness of Defendant’s particular crime 

[and] the lack of serious consideration for the need for deterrence.”).

Karas does not meet this “heavy burden.” United States v. Greco, 734 F.3d 441, 450 (6th

Cir. 2013). The district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the § 3553(a) factors when 

it imposed a sentence that fell significantly below the Guidelines range. Karas briefly claims on 

appeal that her sentence should be shortened because of several considerations, namely her postoffense rehabilitation, acceptance of responsibility, care for her son, education, and employment. 
No. 18-3459, United States v. Karas

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But the district court expressly weighed these factors and did not abuse its discretion in considering

them, so a reversal of the sentence imposed by the district court is not warranted. 

The district court explained that the “nature and circumstances” of the offense were 

egregious and counseled for “a committed sentence of some length.” DE 154, Sentencing Hearing

Tr., Page ID 736; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (“The court . . . shall consider the nature and 

circumstances of the offense . . . .”). Taking advantage of her personal relationship with the 

seventy-nine-year-old victim, Karas lured him to a hotel knowing that he would be robbed. She 

placed him in danger—kidnapping him with the help of two men, one of whom was armed. As a 

result of the kidnapping, the district court noted, the victim suffered ongoing emotional distress.

The district court also did not minimize the seriousness of the offense. See Robinson, 

778 F.3d at 519. The district court weighed “the interest of the public and the Court,” DE 154, 

Sentencing Hearing Tr., Page ID 736, “considered the interests of the public in preventing Ms. 

Karas and others similarly situated from committing similar crimes in the future,” id. at 734, and 

considered the deterrent effect of the sentence, id.

In addition to considering the nature and circumstance of the crime and the need to provide 

just punishment, the district court paid close attention to the “history and characteristics of the 

defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). In doing so, it weighed many of the allegedly mitigating 

circumstances that Karas now argues required the imposition of a shorter sentence. The district 

court noted Karas’s history of addiction and relatively minor substance-related criminal history 

but lauded her efforts to recover from addiction and her work helping others in recovery. The 

court also considered Karas’s acceptance of responsibility, assistance in her co-defendant’s case, 

family situation, employment status, and education efforts.
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The cases cited by Karas imply that a district court may reduce a sentence based upon such 

factors—including post-conduct rehabilitation and substance abuse. See, e.g., United States v. 

Hairston, 502 F.3d 378, 381–83 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Maddalena, 893 F.2d 815, 817–

818 (6th Cir. 1989). That is exactly what the district court did here. These cases do not require 

that sentencing courts reduce a sentence by a specific, proscribed amount; rather, they provide 

courts with discretion to reduce sentences when appropriate. Karas’s argument that the court did 

not adequately consider the § 3553(a) factors fails to rebut the presumption of substantive 

reasonableness.

IV.

Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence of forty-two 

months’ imprisonment, we affirm.