" SENATE ! 113th Congress 

2d Session 

S. Report 

113–288 

REPORT 

of the 

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

COMMITTEE STUDY 

of the 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S DETENTION 

AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM 

together with 

FOREWORD BY CHAIRMAN FEINSTEIN 

and 

ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS 

December 9, 2014.—Ordered to be printed 


rmajette on DSK2TPTVN1PROD with REPORTS
RON WYDEN. OREGON BARBARA A. MUKULSKI. MARYLAND MARK UOALL COLORADO MARK WAR NCR, OTsGlMA MARTIN HClNRKH, NEW MEXICO ANGUS KiNC. MAINE 

JAMES e. B1SCH. IDAHO 0ANIE1. COATS. iMDiAMA UAfiCO HUH JO. FLORIDA SUSAN COLUNS. MAINE TOM CO&UHN, OKLAHOMA 

WITCHARRY RBD, NEVADA. EX OFFICIO H McCGNNEi.!. KENTUCKY tX OFFICIO CARL LSVIN. MICHIGAN, OPFCIO JAMES INHOFE. OKLAHOMA, EX OFFICIO Unite d State s Senat e OAVJD G R ANPJIS. S TAFF OIRECTOR MARTHA SCOTT POINOEXTER, MINORiTV SWF DiRECTOF? OES5RE6 THOMPSON SAYLE. CHIEF CLERK 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON IWElGENCtT 

WASHINGTON. DC 2G5: 0-6<f75 

December 9,2014 

The Honorable Patrick Leahy 

President Pro Tempore 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

Dear Mr. President: 

On behalf of the Select Committee on Intelligence, today I am filing with the Senate a 

classified Committee report titled, "Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's 

Detention and Interrogation Program." The report was approved by a 9-6 vote of the Committee 

at a meeting held on December 13, 2012. 

On April 3,2014,1 announced that the full classified report had been updated and that the 

Committee had voted to send the updated Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions of 

the Study to the President for declassification. The additional and minority views were also 

submitted for declassification at that time. 

I am filing today the full classified report with the Senate in its final form. The full report 

will be maintained by the Committee and is available for Senators to read in the Committee's 

secure office. In addition, I am submitting to be printed, with an official Senate report number, 

the declassified Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions, including the declassified 

additional and minority views. 

The entire classified report will be provided to the Executive Branch for dissemination to 

all relevant agencies. The full report should be used by the Central Intelligence Agency and 

other components of the Executive Branch to help make sure that the system of detention and 

interrogation described in this report is never repeated. 

Thank you very much for your support of the Committee's study of this program. 
CONTENTS 

Page 

Letter of Transmittal to Senate from Chairman Feinstein .................... i 

Foreword of Chairman Feinstein .............................................................. iii 

Findings and Conclusions .......................................................................... x 

Executive Summary ................................................................................... 1 

Additional Views of Senator Rockefeller .................................................. 500 

Additional Views of Senator Wyden ......................................................... 503 

Additional Views of Senator Udall of Colorado ....................................... 506 

Additional Views of Senator Heinrich ...................................................... 510 

Additional Views of Senator King ............................................................. 512 

Additional Views of Senator Collins ......................................................... 515 

Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss, Senators Burr, Risch, 

Coats, Rubio, and Coburn ...................................................................... 520 

Minority Views of Senator Coburn, Vice Chairman Chambliss, Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, and Rubio ..................................................... 678 

Minority Views of Senators Risch, Coats, and Rubio .............................. 682 

(ii) 


rmajette on DSK2TPTVN1PROD with REPORTS
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRKE^^^^^^^ M OFQRN 

Foreword by Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Bianne Feinstein 

Approved December 13, 2012 

Updated for Release April 3, 2014 

Declassification Revisions December 3, 2014 

TOP SECRE1 IOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

in 
UNCLASSIFIED 

Foreword 

On April 3,2014, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence voted to send the 

Findings and Conclusions and the Executive Summary of its final Study on the 

CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to the President for declassification 

and subsequent public release. 

This action marked the culmination of a monumental effort that officially began 

with the Committee's decision to initiate the Study in March 2009, but which had 

its roots in an investigation into the CIA's destruction of videotapes of CIA 

detainee interrogations that began in December 2007. 

The full Committee Study, which totals more than 6,700 pages, remains classified 

but is now an official Senate report. The full report has been provided to the White 

House, the CIA, the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the 

Department of State, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the 

hopes that it will prevent future coercive interrogation practices and inform the 

management of other covert action programs. 

As the Chairman of the Committee since 2009,1 write to offer some additional 

views, context, and history. 

I began my service on the Senate Intelligence Committee in January 2001. I 

remember testimony that summer from George Tenet, the Director of Central 

Intelligence, that warned of a possible major terrorist event against the United 

States, but without specifics on the time, location, or method of attack. On 

September 11, 2001, the world learned the answers to those questions that had 

consumed the CIA and other parts of the U.S. Intelligence Community.1 

I recall vividly watching the horror of that day, to include the television footage of 

innocent men and women jumping out of the World Trade Center towers to escape 

the fire. The images, and the sounds as their bodies hit the pavement far below, 

will remain with me for the rest of my life. 

It is against that backdrop - the largest attack against the American homeland in 

our history - that the events described in this report were undertaken. 

1

 For information on the events at the CIA prior to September 11,2001, see the Final Report of the National 

Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission) and Office of the Inspector General 

Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks. 

Page 1 of 6 

UNCLASSIFIED 

IV 
UNCLASSIFIED 

Nearly 13 years later, the Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions of 

this report are being released. They are highly critical of the CIA's actions, and 

rightfully so. Reading them, it is easy to forget the context in which the program 

began - not that the context should serve as an excuse, but rather as a warning for 

the future. 

It is worth remembering the pervasive fear in late 2001 and how immediate the 

threat felt. Just a week after the September 11 attacks, powdered anthrax was sent 

to various news organizations and to two U.S. Senators. The American public was 

shocked by news of new terrorist plots and elevations of the color-coded threat 

level of the Homeland Security Advisory System. We expected further attacks 

against the nation. 

I have attempted throughout to remember the impact on the nation and to the CIA 

workforce from the attacks of September 11, 2001. I can understand the CIA's 

impulse to consider the use of every possible tool to gather intelligence and remove 

terrorists from the battlefield,2 and CIA was encouraged by political leaders and 

the public to do whatever it could to prevent another attack. 

The Intelligence Committee as well often pushes intelligence agencies to act 

quickly in response to threats and world events. 

Nevertheless, such pressure, fear, and expectation of further terrorist plots do not 

justify, temper, or excuse improper actions taken by individuals or organizations in 

the name of national security. The major lesson of this report is that regardless of 

the pressures and the need to act, the Intelligence Community's actions must 

always reflect who we are as a nation, and adhere to our laws and standards. It is 

precisely at these times of national crisis that our government must be guided by 

the lessons of our history and subject decisions to internal and external review. 

Instead, CIA personnel, aided by two outside contractors, decided to initiate a 

program of indefinite secret detention and the use of brutal interrogation 

techniques in violation of U.S. law, treaty obligations, and our values. 

This Committee Study documents the abuses and countless mistakes made 

between late 2001 and early 2009. The Executive Summary of the Study provides 

2

 It is worth repeating that the covert action authorities approved by the President in September 2001 did not provide 

any authorization or contemplate coercive interrogations. 

Page 2 of 6 

UNCLASSIFIED 

v 
UNCLASSIFIED 

a significant amount of new information, based on CIA and other documents, to 

what has already been made public by the Bush and Obama Administrations, as 

well as non-governmental organizations and the press. 

The Committee's full Study is more than ten times the length of the Executive 

Summary and includes comprehensive and excruciating detail. The Study 

describes the history of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program from its 

inception to its termination, including a review of each of the 119 known 

individuals who were held in CIA custody. 

The full Committee Study also provides substantially more detail than what is 

included in the Executive Summary on the CIA's justification and defense of its 

interrogation program on the basis that it was necessary and critical to the 

disruption of specific terrorist plots and the capture of specific terrorists. While the 

Executive Summary provides sufficient detail to demonstrate the inaccuracies of 

each of these claims, the information in the full Committee Study is far more 

extensive. 

I chose not to seek declassification of the full Committee Study at this time. I 

believe that the Executive Summary includes enough information to adequately 

describe the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, and the Committee's 

Findings and Conclusions cover the entirety of the program. Seeking 

declassification of the more than six thousand page report would have significantly 

delayed the release of the Executive Summary. Decisions will be made later on the 

declassification and release of the full 6,700 page Study. 

In 2009, when this effort began, I stated (in a press release co-authored with the 

Vice Chairman of the Committee, Senator Kit Bond) that "the purpose is to review 

the program and to shape detention and interrogation policies in the future." The 

review is now done. It is my sincere and deep hope that through the release of 

these Findings and Conclusions and Executive Summary that U.S. policy will 

never again allow for secret indefinite detention and the use of coercive 

interrogations. As the Study describes, prior to the attacks of September 2001, the 

CIA itself determined from its own experience with coercive interrogations, that 

such techniques "do not produce intelligence," "will probably result in false 

answers," and had historically proven to be ineffective. Yet these conclusions 

were ignored. We cannot again allow history to be forgotten and grievous past 

mistakes to be repeated. 

Page 3 of 6 

UNCLASSIFIED 

vi 
UNCLASSIFIED 

President Obama signed Executive Order 13491 in January 2009 to prohibit the 

CIA from holding detainees other than on a "short-term, transitory basis" and to 

limit interrogation techniques to those included in the Army Field Manual. 

However, these limitations are not part of U.S. law and could be overturned by a 

future president with the stroke of a pen. They should be enshrined in legislation. 

Even so, existing U.S. law and treaty obligations should have prevented many of 

the abuses and mistakes made during this program. While the Office of Legal 

Counsel found otherwise between 2002 and 2007, it is my personal conclusion 

that, under any common meaning of the term, CIA detainees were tortured. I also 

believe that the conditions of confinement and the use of authorized and 

unauthorized interrogation and conditioning techniques were cruel, inhuman, and 

degrading. I believe the evidence of this is overwhelming and incontrovertible. 

While the Committee did not make specific recommendations, several emerge 

from the Committee's review. The CIA, in its June 2013 response to the 

Committee's Study from December 2012, has also already made and begun to 

implement its own recommendations. I intend to work with Senate colleagues to 

produce recommendations and to solicit views from the readers of the Committee 

Study. 

I would also like to take this opportunity to describe the process of this study. 

As noted previously, the Committee approved the Terms of Reference for the 

Study in March 2009 and began requesting information from the CIA and other 

federal departments. The Committee, through its staff, had already reviewed in 

2008 thousands of CIA cables describing the interrogations of the CIA detainees 

Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, whose interrogations were the 

subject of videotapes that were destroyed by the CIA in 2005. 

The 2008 review was complicated by the existence of a Department of Justice 

investigation, opened by Attorney General Michael Mukasey, into the destruction 

of the videotapes and expanded by Attorney General Holder in August 2009. In 

particular, CIA employees and contractors who would otherwise have been 

interviewed by the Committee staff were under potential legal jeopardy, and 

therefore the CIA would not compel its workforce to appear before the Committee. 

This constraint lasted until the Committee's research and documentary review 

were completed and the Committee Study had largely been finalized. 

Page 4 of 6 

UNCLASSIFIED 

vii 
UNCLASSIFIED 

Furthermore, given the volume and internal nature of relevant CIA documents, the 

CIA insisted that the Committee enter into an arrangement where our staff would 

reviewulocuments and conduct research at a CIA-leased facility ^Hfj^ H 

rathe than at the Committee's offices on Capitol Hill. 

From early 2009 to late 2012, a small group of Committee staff reviewed the more 

than six million pages of CIA materials, to include operational cables, intelligence 

reports, internal memoranda and emails, briefing materials, interview transcripts, 

contracts, and other records. Draft sections of the Study were prepared and 

distributed to the full Committee membership beginning in October 2011 and this 

process continued through to the Committee's vote to approve the full Committee 

Study on December 13, 2012. 

The breadth of documentary material on which the Study relied and which the 

Committee Study cites is unprecedented. While the Committee did not interview 

CIA officials in the context of the Committee Study, it had access to and drew 

from the interviews of numerous CIA officials conducted by the CIA's Inspector 

General and the CIA Oral History program on subjects that lie at the heart of the 

Committee Study, as well as past testimony to the Committee. 

Following the December 2012 vote, the Committee Study was sent to the President 

and appropriate parts of the Executive Branch for comments by February 15, 2013. 

The CIA responded in late June 2013 with extensive comments on the Findings 

and Conclusions, based in part on the responses of CIA officials involved in the 

program. At my direction, the Committee staff met with CIA representatives in 

order to fully understand the CIA's comments, and then incorporated suggested 

edits or comments as appropriate. 

The Committee Study, including the now-declassified Executive Summary and 

Findings and Conclusions, as updated is now final and represents the official views 

of the Committee. This and future Administrations should use this Study to guide 

future programs, correct past mistakes, increase oversight of CIA representations 

to policymakers, and ensure coercive interrogation practices are not used by our 

government again. 

Finally, I want to recognize the members of the staff who have endured years of 

long hours poring through the difficult details of one of the lowest points in our 

nation's history. They have produced the most significant and comprehensive 

oversight report in the Committee's history, and perhaps in that of the U.S. Senate, 

and their contributions should be recognized and praised. 

Page 5 of 6 

UNCLASSIFIED 

Vlll 
UNCLASSIFIED 

Daniel Jones has managed and led the Committee's review effort from its 

inception. Dan has devoted more than six years to this effort, has personally 

written thousands of its pages, and has been integrally involved in every Study 

decision. Evan Gottesman, Chad Tanner, and Alissa Starzak have also played 

integral roles in the Committee Study and have spent considerable years 

researching and drafting specific sections of the Committee Study. 

Other Committee staff members have also assisted in the review and provided 

valuable contributions at the direction of our Committee Members. They include, 

among others, Jennifer Barrett, Nick Basciano, Michael Buchwald, Jim Catella, 

Eric Chapman, John Dickas, Lorenzo Goco, Andrew Grotto, Tressa Guenov, Clete 

Johnson, Michael Noblet, Michael Pevzner, Tommy Ross, Caroline Tess, and 

James Wolfe. The Committee's Staff Director throughout the review, David 

Grannis, has played a central role in assisting me and guiding the Committee 

through this entire process. Without the expertise, patience, and work ethic of our 

able staff, our Members would not have been able to complete this most important 

work. 

Dianne Feinstein 

Chairman 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

Page 4 of 6 

UNCLASSIFIED 

ix 
UNCLASSIFIED 

MHHMI^MBM' H > I I miu' i 

Findings; and Conclusions 

Approved December 13, 2012 

Updated for Release April 3, 2014 

Declassification Revisions December 3, 2014 

TQP:SECRET/4 

Page 1 of 19 

UNCLASSIFIED 

X 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

The Committee makes the following findings and conclusions: 

#1: The CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of 

acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees. 

The Committee finds, based on a review of CIA interrogation records, that the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of obtaining accurate information 

or gaining detainee cooperation. 

For example, according to CIA records, seven of the 39 CIA detainees known to have been 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced no intelligence while in CIA 

custody.1 CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 

were usually subjected to the techniques immediately after being rendered to CIA custody. 

Other detainees provided significant accurate intelligence prior to, or without having been 

subjected to these techniques. 

While being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and afterwards, multiple 

CIA detainees fabricated information, resulting in faulty intelligence. Detainees provided 

fabricated information on critical intelligence issues, including the terrorist threats which the 

CIA identified as its highest priorities. 

At numerous times throughout the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, CIA personnel 

assessed that the most effective method for acquiring intelligence from detainees, including from 

detainees the CIA considered to be the most "high-value," was to confront the detainees with 

information already acquired by the Intelligence Community. CIA officers regularly called into 

question whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were effective, assessing that the 

use of the techniques failed to elicit detainee cooperation or produce accurate intelligence. 

#2: The CIA's justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques rested on 

inaccurate claims of their effectiveness. 

The CIA represented to the White House, the National Security Council, the Department of 

Justice, the CIA Office of Inspector General, the Congress, and the public that the best measure 

of effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was examples of specific 

terrorist plots "thwarted" and specific terrorists captured as a result of the use of the techniques. 

The CIA used these examples to claim that its enhanced interrogation techniques were not only 

effective, but also necessary to acquire "otherwise unavailable" actionable intelligence that 

"saved lives." 

The Committee reviewed 20 of the most frequent and prominent examples of purported 

counter-terrorism successes that the CIA has attributed to the use of its enhanced interrogation 

techniques, and found them to be wrong in fundamental respects. In some cases, there was no 

relationship between the cited counterterrorism success and any information provided by 

detainees during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. In the 

TOP SECRET/^ WNOFORN 

Page 2 of 19 

UNCLASSIFIED 

xxvii 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

remaining cases, the CIA inaccurately claimed that specific, otherwise unavailable information 

was acquired from a CIA detainee "as a result" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, 

when in fact the information was either: (1) corroborative of information already available to the 

CIA or other elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community from sources other than the CIA 

detainee, and was therefore not "otherwise unavailable"; or (2) acquired from the CIA detainee 

prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The examples provided by the 

CIA included numerous factual inaccuracies. 

In providing the "effectiveness" examples to policymakers, the Department of Justice, and 

others, the CIA consistently omitted the significant amount of relevant intelligence obtained 

from sources other than CIA detainees who had been subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques—leaving the false impression the CIA was acquiring unique 

information from the use of the techniques. 

Some of the plots that the CIA claimed to have "disrupted" as a result of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques were assessed by intelligence and law enforcement officials as being 

infeasible or ideas that were never operationalized. 

#3: The interrogations of CIA detainees were brutal and far worse than the CIA 

represented to policymakers and others. 

Beginning with the CIA's first detainee, Abu Zubaydah, and continuing with numerous others, 

the CIA applied its enhanced interrogation techniques with significant repetition for days or 

weeks at a time. Interrogation techniques such as slaps and "wallings" (slamming detainees 

against a wall) were used in combination, frequently concurrent with sleep deprivation and 

nudity. Records do not support CIA representations that the CIA initially used an "an open, nonthreatening approach,"2

 or that interrogations began with the "least coercive technique possible"3 

and escalated to more coercive techniques only as necessary. 

The waterboarding technique was physically harmful, inducing convulsions and vomiting. Abu 

Zubaydah, for example, became "completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, 

full mouth."4 Internal CIA records describe the waterboarding of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad as 

evolving into a "series of near drownings."5 

Sleep deprivation involved keeping detainees awake for up to 180 hours, usually standing or in 

stress positions, at times with their hands shackled above their heads. At least five detainees 

experienced disturbing hallucinations during prolonged sleep deprivation and, in at least two of 

those cases, the CIA nonetheless continued the sleep deprivation. 

Contrary to CIA representations to the Department of Justice, the CIA instructed personnel that 

the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah would take "precedence" over his medical care,6 resulting in 

the deterioration of a bullet wound Abu Zubaydah incurred during his capture. In at least two 

other cases, the CIA used its enhanced interrogation techniques despite warnings from CIA 

medical personnel that the techniques could exacerbate physical injuries. CIA medical personnel 

TOP SECRET/^ K/NOFQRN 

Page 3 of 19 

UNCLASSIFIED 

Xll 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ WOFQRN 

treated at least one detainee for swelling in order to allow the continued use of standing sleep 

deprivation. 

At least five CIA detainees were subjected to "rectal rehydration" or rectal feeding without 

documented medical necessity. The CIA placed detainees in ice water "baths." The CIA led 

several detainees to believe they would never be allowed to leave CIA custody alive, suggesting 

to one detainee that he would only leave in a coffin-shaped box.7 One interrogator told another 

detainee that he would never go to court, because "we can never let the world know what I have 

done to you."8 CIA officers also threatened at least three detainees with harm to their families— 

to include threats to harm the children of a detainee, threats to sexually abuse the mother of a 

detainee, and a threat to "cut [a detainee's] mother's throat."9 

#4: The conditions of confinement for CIA detainees were harsher than the CIA had 

represented to policymakers and others. 

Conditions at CIA detention sites were poor, and were especially bleak early in the program. 

CIA detainees at the COBALT detention facility were kept in complete darkness and constantly 

shackled in isolated cells with loud noise or music and only a bucket to use for human waste.10 

Lack of heat at the facility likely contributed to the death of a detainee. The chief of 

interrogations described COBALT as a "dungeon."11 Another senior CIA officer stated that 

COBALT was itself an enhanced interrogation technique.1" 

At times, the detainees at COBALT were walked around naked or were shackled with their 

hands above their heads for extended periods of time. Other times, the detainees at COBALT 

were subjected to what was described as a "rough takedown," in which approximately five CIA 

officers would scream at a detainee, drag him outside of his cell, cut his clothes off, and secure 

him with Mylar tape. The detainee would then be hooded and dragged up and down a long 

corridor while being slapped and punched. 

Even after the conditions of confinement improved with the construction of new detention 

facilities, detainees were held in total isolation except when being interrogated or debriefed by 

CIA personnel. 

Throughout the program, multiple CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques and extended isolation exhibited psychological and behavioral issues, 

including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation. 

Multiple psychologists identified the lack of human contact experienced by detainees as a cause 

of psychiatric problems. 

#5: The CIA repeatedly provided inaccurate information to the Department of Justice, 

impeding a proper legal analysis of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. 

From 2002 to 2007, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) within the Department of Justice relied 

on CIA representations regarding: (1) the conditions of confinement for detainees, (2) the 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 4 of 19 

UNCLASSIFIED 

xlll 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN 

application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, (3) the physical effects of the 

techniques on detainees, and (4) the effectiveness of the techniques. Those representations were 

inaccurate in material respects. 

The Department of Justice did not conduct independent analysis or verification of the 

information it received from the CIA. The department warned, however, that if the facts 

provided by the CIA were to change, its legal conclusions might not apply. When the CIA 

determined that information it had provided to the Department of Justice was incorrect, the CIA 

rarely informed the depaitment. 

Prior to the initiation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and throughout the life 

of the program, the legal justifications for the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques relied on 

the CIA's claim that the techniques were necessary to save lives. In late 2001 and early 2002, 

senior attorneys at the CIA Office of General Counsel first examined the legal implications of 

using coercive interrogation techniques. CIA attorneys stated that "a novel application of the 

necessity defense" could be used "to avoid prosecution of U.S. officials who tortured to obtain 

information that saved many lives."13 

Having reviewed information provided by the CIA, the OLC included the "necessity defense" in 

its August 1, 2002, memorandum to the White House counsel on Standards of Conduct for 

Interrogation. The OLC determined that "under the current circumstances, necessity or selfdefense may justify interrogation methods that might violate" the criminal prohibition against 

torture. 

On the same day, a second OLC opinion approved, for the first time, the use of 10 specific 

coercive interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah—subsequently referred to as the CIA's 

"enhanced interrogation techniques." The OLC relied on inaccurate CIA representations about 

Abu Zubaydah's status in al-Qa'ida and the interrogation team's "certain|ty]" that Abu 

Zubaydah was withholding information about planned terrorist attacks. The CIA's 

representations to the OLC about the techniques were also inconsistent with how the techniques 

would later be applied. 

In March 2005, the CIA submitted to the Department of Justice various examples of the 

"effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that were inaccurate. OLC 

memoranda signed on May 30, 2005, and July 20, 2007, relied on these representations, 

determining that the techniques were legal in part because they produced "specific, actionable 

intelligence" and "substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence" that saved lives.14 

#6: The CIA has actively avoided or impeded congressional oversight of the program. 

The CIA did not brief the leadership of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques until September 2002, after the techniques had been 

approved and used. The CIA did not respond to Chairman Bob Graham's requests for additional 

information in 2002, noting in its own internal communications that he would be leaving the 

Committee in January 2003. The CIA subsequently resisted efforts by Vice Chairman John D. 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 5 of 19 

UNCLASSIFIED 

XiV 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

Rockefeller IV, to investigate the program, including by refusing in 2006 to provide requested 

documents to the full Committee. 

The CIA restricted access to information about the program from members of the Committee 

beyond the chairman and vice chairman until September 6, 2006, the day the president publicly 

acknowledged the program, by which time 117 of the 119 known detainees had already entered 

CIA custody. Until then, the CIA had declined to answer questions from other Committee 

members that related to CIA interrogation activities.15 

Prior to September 6, 2006, the CIA provided inaccurate information to the leadership of the 

Committee. Briefings to the full Committee beginning on September 6, 2006, also contained 

numerous inaccuracies, including inaccurate descriptions of how interrogation techniques were 

applied and what information was obtained from CIA detainees. The CIA misrepresented the 

views of members of Congress on a number of occasions. After multiple senators had been 

critical of the program and written letters expressing concerns to CIA Director Michael Hayden, 

Director Hayden nonetheless told a meeting of foreign ambassadors to the United States that 

every Committee member was "fully briefed," and that "[t]his is not CIA's program. This is not 

the President's program. This is America's program."16 The CIA also provided inaccurate 

information describing the views of U.S. senators about the program to the Department of 

Justice. 

A year after being briefed on the program, the House and Senate Conference Committee 

considering the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization bill voted to limit the CIA to using 

only interrogation techniques authorized by the Army Field Manual. That legislation was 

approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives in February 2008, and was vetoed by 

President Bush on March 8, 2008. 

#7: The CIA impeded effective White House oversight and decision-making. 

The CIA provided extensive amounts of inaccurate and incomplete information related to the 

operation and effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to the White 

House, the National Security Council principals, and their staffs. This prevented an accurate and 

complete understanding of the program by Executive Branch officials, thereby impeding 

oversight and decision-making. 

According to CIA records, no CIA officer, up to and including CIA Directors George Tenet and 

Porter Goss, briefed the president on the specific CIA enhanced interrogation techniques before 

April 2006. By that time, 38 of the 39 detainees identified as having been subjected to the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques had already been subjected to the techniques.17 The CIA did 

not inform the president or vice president of the location of CIA detention facilities other than 

Country (, 1 8 

At the direction of the White House, the secretaries of state and defense - both principals on the 

National Security Council - were not briefed on program specifics until September 2003. An 

internal CIA email from July 2003 noted that "... the WH [White House] is extremely concerned 

TOP SECRET/^ WNOFORN 

Page 6 of 19 

UNCLASSIFIED 

xxvii 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET; 7NOFORN 

[Secretary] Powell would blow his stack if he were to be briefed on what's been going on."19 

Deputy Secretary of State Armitage complained that he and Secretary Powell were "cut out" of 

the National Security Council coordination process.20 

The CIA repeatedly provided incomplete and inaccurate information to White House personnel 

regarding the operation and effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. 

This includes the provision of inaccurate statements similar to those provided to other elements 

of the U.S. Government and later to the public, as well as instances in which specific questions 

from White House officials were not answered truthfully or fully. In briefings for the National 

Security Council principals and White House officials, the CIA advocated for the continued use 

of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, warning that "[t]ermination of this program will 

result in loss of life, possibly extensive."21 

#8: The CIA's operation and management of the program complicated, and in some cases 

impeded, the national security missions of other Executive Branch agencies. 

The CIA, in the conduct of its Detention and Interrogation Program, complicated, and in some 

cases impeded, the national security missions of other Executive Branch agencies, including the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the State Department, and the Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence (ODNI). The CIA withheld or restricted information relevant to these 

agencies' missions and responsibilities, denied access to detainees, and provided inaccurate 

information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to these agencies. 

The use of coercive interrogation techniques and covert detention facilities that did not meet 

traditional U.S. standards resulted in the FBI and the Department of Defense limiting their 

involvement in CIA interrogation and detention activities. This reduced the ability of the U.S. 

Government to deploy available resources and expert personnel to interrogate detainees and 

operate detention facilities. The CIA denied specific requests from FBI Director Robert Mueller 

III for FBI access to CIA detainees that the FBI believed was necessary to understand CIA 

detainee reporting on threats to the U.S. Homeland. Information obtained from CIA detainees 

was restricted within the Intelligence Community, leading to concerns among senior CIA 

officers that limitations on sharing information undermined government-wide counterterrorism 

analysis. 

The CIA blocked State Department leadership from access to information crucial to foreign 

policy decision-making and diplomatic activities. The CIA did not inform two secretaries of 

state of locations of CIA detention facilities, despite the significant foreign policy implications 

related to the hosting of clandestine CIA detention sites and the fact that the political leaders of 

host countries were generally informed of their existence. Moreover, CIA officers told U.S. 

ambassadors not to discuss the CIA program with State Department officials, preventing the 

ambassadors from seeking guidance on the policy implications of establishing CIA detention 

facilities in the countries in which they served. 

In two countries, U.S. ambassadors were informed of plans to establish a CIA detention site in 

the countries where they were serving after the CIA had already entered into agreements with the 

TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN 

Page 7 of 19 

UNCLASSIFIED 

XVl 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN 

countries to host the detention sites. In two other countries where negotiations on hosting new 

CIA detention facilities were taking place,22 the CIA told local government officials not to 

inform the U.S. ambassadors.23 

The ODNI was provided with inaccurate and incomplete information about the program, 

preventing the director of national intelligence from effectively carrying out the director's 

statutory responsibility to serve as the principal advisor to the president on intelligence matters. 

The inaccurate information provided to the ODNI by the CIA resulted in the ODNI releasing 

inaccurate information to the public in September 2006. 

#9: The CIA impeded oversight by the CIA's Office of Inspector General. 

The CIA avoided, resisted, and otherwise impeded oversight of the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program by the CIA's Office of Inspector General (OIG). The CIA did not brief 

the OIG on the program until after the death of a detainee, by which time the CIA had held at 

least 22 detainees at two different CIA detention sites. Once notified, the OIG reviewed the 

CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and issued several reports, including an important 

May 2004 "Special Review" of the program that identified significant concerns and deficiencies. 

During the OIG reviews, CIA personnel provided OIG with inaccurate information on the 

operation and management of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, as well as on the 

effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The inaccurate information was 

included in the final May 2004 Special Review, which was later declassified and released 

publicly, and remains uncorrected. 

In 2005, CIA Director Goss requested in writing that the inspector general not initiate further 

reviews of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program until reviews already underway were 

completed. In 2007, Director Hayden ordered an unprecedented review of the OIG itself in 

response to the OIG's inquiries into the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. 

#10: The CIA coordinated the release of classified information to the media, including 

inaccurate information concerning the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques. 

The CIA's Office of Public Affairs and senior CIA officials coordinated to share classified 

information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to select members of the media to 

counter public criticism, shape public opinion, and avoid potential congressional action to restrict 

the CIA's detention and interrogation authorities and budget. These disclosures occurred when 

the program was a classified covert action program, and before the CIA had briefed the full 

Committee membership on the program. 

The deputy director of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center wrote to a colleague in 2005, shortly 

before being interviewed by a media outlet, that "we either get out and sell, or we get hammered, 

which has implications beyond the media. [C]ongress reads it, cuts our authorities, messes up 

TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN 

Page 8 of 19 

UNCLASSIFIED 

xvll 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

our budget... we either put out our story or we get eaten. [T]here is no middle ground."24 The 

same CIA officer explained to a colleague that "when the [Washington Post]/[New York T]imes 

quotes 'senior intelligence official,' it's us... authorized and directed by opa [CIA's Office of 

Public Affairs]."25 

Much of the information the CIA provided to the media on the operation of the CIA's Detention 

and Interrogation Program and the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques was 

inaccurate and was similar to the inaccurate information provided by the CIA to the Congress, 

the Department of Justice, and the White House. 

#11: The CIA was unprepared as it began operating its Detention and Interrogation 

Program more than six months after being granted detention authorities. 

On September 17, 2001, the President signed a covert action Memorandum of Notification 

(MON) granting the CIA unprecedented counterterrorism authorities, including the authority to 

covertly capture and detain individuals "posing a continuing, serious threat of violence or death 

to U.S. persons and interests or planning terrorist activities." The MON made no reference to 

interrogations or coercive interrogation techniques. 

The CIA was not prepared to take custody of its first detainee. In the fall of 2001, the CIA 

explored the possibility of establishing clandestine detention facilities in several countries. The 

CIA's review identified risks associated with clandestine detention that led it to conclude that 

U.S. military bases were the best option for the CIA to detain individuals under the MON 

authorities. In late March 2002, the imminent capture of Abu Zubaydah prompted the CIA to 

again consider various detention options. In part to avoid declaring Abu Zubaydah to the 

International Committee of the Red Cross, which would be required if he were detained at a U.S. 

military base, the CIA decided to seek authorization to clandestinely detain Abu Zubaydah at a 

facility in Country |— a country that had not previously been considered as a potential host for a 

CIA detention site. A senior CIA officer indicated that the CIA "will have to acknowledge 

certain gaps in our planning/preparations,"26 but stated that this plan would be presented to the 

president. At a Presidential Daily Briefing session that day, the president approved CIA's 

proposal to detain Abu Zubaydah in Country 

The CIA lacked a plan for the eventual disposition of its detainees. After taking custody of Abu 

Zubaydah, CIA officers concluded that he "should remain incommunicado for the remainder of 

his life," which "may preclude [Abu Zubaydah] from being turned over to another country."27 

The CIA did not review its past experience with coercive interrogations, or its previous statement 

to Congress that "inhumane physical or psychological techniques are counterproductive because 

they do not produce intelligence and will probably result in false answers."28 The CIA also did 

not contact other elements of the U.S. Government with interrogation expertise. 

In July 2002, on the basis of consultations with contract psychologists, and with very limited 

internal deliberation, the CIA requested approval from the Department of Justice to use a set of 

coercive interrogation techniques. The techniques were adapted from the training of U.S. 

TOP SECRET/ '/NOFORN 

Page 9 of 19 

UNCLASSIFIED 

XViii 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

military personnel at the U.S. Air Force Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) 

school, which was designed to prepare U.S. military personnel for the conditions and treatment 

to which they might be subjected if taken prisoner by countries that do not adhere to the Geneva 

Conventions. 

As it began detention and interrogation operations, the CIA deployed personnel who lacked 

relevant training and experience. The CIA began interrogation training more than seven months 

after taking custody of Abu Zubaydah, and more than three months after the CIA began using its 

"enhanced interrogation techniques." CIA Director George Tenet issued formal guidelines for 

interrogations and conditions of confinement at detention sites in January 2003, by which time 

40 of the 119 known detainees had been detained by the CIA. 

#12: The CIA's management and operation of its Detention and Interrogation Program 

was deeply flawed throughout the program's duration, particularly so in 2002 and early 

2003. 

The CIA's COBALT detention facility in Country | began operations in September 2002 and 

ultimately housed more than half of the 119 CIA detainees identified in this Study. The CIA 

kept few formal records of the detainees in its custody at COBALT. Untrained CIA officers at 

the facility conducted frequent, unauthorized, and unsupervised interrogations of detainees using 

harsh physical interrogation techniques that were not—and never became—part of the CIA's 

formal "enhanced" interrogation program. The CIAplaced a junior officer with no relevant 

experience in charge of COBALT. On November 2002, a detainee who had been held 

partially nude and chained to a concrete floor died from suspected hypothermia at the facility. 

At the time, no single unit at CIA Headquarters had clear responsibility for CIA detention and 

interrogation operations. In interviews conducted in 2003 with the Office of Inspector General, 

CIA's leadership and senior attorneys acknowledged that they had little or no awareness of 

operations at COBALT, and some believed that enhanced interrogation techniques were not used 

there. 

Although CIA Director Tenet in January 2003 issued guidance for detention and interrogation 

activities, serious management problems persisted. For example, in December 2003, CIA 

personnel reported that they had made the "unsettling discovery" that the CIA had been "holding 

a number of detainees about whom" the CIA knew "very little" at multiple detention sites in 

Country (, 2 9 

Divergent lines of authority for interrogation activities persisted through at least 2003. Tensions 

among interrogators extended to complaints about the safety and effectiveness of each other's 

interrogation practices. 

The CIA placed individuals with no applicable experience or training in senior detention and 

interrogation roles, and provided inadequate linguistic and analytical support to conduct effective 

questioning of CIA detainees, resulting in diminished intelligence. The lack of CIA personnel 

available to question detainees, which the CIA inspector general referred to as "an ongoing 

problem,"30 persisted throughout the program. 

TOP SECRET/^ WNOFORN 

Page 10 of 19 

UNCLASSIFIED 

xxvii 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

In 2005, the chief of the CIA's BLACK detention site, where many of the detainees the CIA 

assessed as "high-value" were held, complained that CIA Headquarters "managers seem to be 

selecting either problem, underperforming officers, new, totally inexperienced officers or 

whomever seems to be willing and able to deploy at any given time," resulting in "the production 

of mediocre or, I dare say, useless intelligence...."31 

Numerous CIA officers had serious documented personal and professional problems—including 

histories of violence and records of abusive treatment of others—that should have called into 

question their suitability to participate in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, their 

employment with the CIA, and their continued access to classified information. In nearly all 

cases, these problems were known to the CIA prior to the assignment of these officers to 

detention and interrogation positions. 

#13: Two contract psychologists devised the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and 

played a central role in the operation, assessments, and management of the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program. By 2005, the CIA had overwhelmingly outsourced 

operations related to the program. 

The CIA contracted with two psychologists to develop, operate, and assess its interrogation 

operations. The psychologists' prior experience was at the U.S. Air Force Survival, Evasion, 

Resistance and Escape (SERE) school. Neither psychologist had any experience as an 

interrogator, nor did either have specialized knowledge of al-Qa'ida, a background in 

counterterrorism, or any relevant cultural or linguistic expertise. 

On the CIA's behalf, the contract psychologists developed theories of interrogation based on 

"learned helplessness,"32 and developed the list of enhanced interrogation techniques that was 

approved for use against Abu Zubaydah and subsequent CIA detainees. The psychologists 

personally conducted interrogations of some of the CIA's most significant detainees using these 

techniques. They also evaluated whether detainees' psychological state allowed for the 

continued use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including some detainees whom 

they were themselves interrogating or had interrogated. The psychologists carried out inherently 

governmental functions, such as acting as liaison between the CIA and foreign intelligence 

services, assessing the effectiveness of the interrogation program, and participating in the 

interrogation of detainees in held in foreign government custody. 

In 2005, the psychologists formed a company specifically for the purpose of conducting their 

work with the CIA. Shortly thereafter, the CIA outsourced virtually all aspects of the program. 

In 2006, the value of the CIA's base contract with the company formed by the psychologists with 

all options exercised was in excess of $180 million; the contractors received $81 million prior to 

the contract's termination in 2009. In 2007, the CIA provided a multi-year indemnification 

agreement to protect the company and its employees from legal liability arising out of the 

program. The CIA has since paid out more than $1 million pursuant to the agreement. 

TOP SECRET/^ WNOFORN 

Page 11 of 19 

UNCLASSIFIED 

xxvii 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET; 7NOFORN 

In 2008, the CIA's Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group, the lead unit for detention and 

interrogation operations at the CIA, had a total of positions, which were filled with | CIA 

staff officers and H contractors, meaning that contractors made up 85% of the workforce for 

detention and interrogation operations. 

#14: CIA detainees were subjected to coercive interrogation techniques that had not been 

approved by the Department of Justice or had not been authorized by CIA Headquarters. 

Prior to mid-2004, the CIA routinely subjected detainees to nudity and dietary manipulation. 

The CIA also used abdominal slaps and cold water dousing on several detainees during that 

period. None of these techniques had been approved by the Department of Justice. 

At least 17 detainees were subjected to CIA enhanced interrogation techniques without 

authorization from CIA Headquarters. Additionally, multiple detainees were subjected to 

techniques that were applied in ways that diverged from the specific authorization, or were 

subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques by interrogators who had not been authorized to 

use them. Although these incidents were recorded in CIA cables and, in at least some cases were 

identified at the time by supervisors at CIA Headquarters as being inappropriate, corrective 

action was rarely taken against the interrogators involved. 

#15: The CIA did not conduct a comprehensive or accurate accounting of the number of 

individuals it detained, and held individuals who did not meet the legal standard for 

detention. The CIA's claims about the number of detainees held and subjected to its 

enhanced interrogation techniques were inaccurate. 

The CIA never conducted a comprehensive audit or developed a complete and accurate list of the 

individuals it had detained or subjected to its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA statements 

to the Committee and later to the public that the CIA detained fewer than 100 individuals, and 

that less than a third of those 100 detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques, were inaccurate. The Committee's review of CIA records determined that the CIA 

detained at least 119 individuals, of whom at least 39 were subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques. 

Of the 119 known detainees, at least 26 were wrongfully held and did not meet the detention 

standard in the September 2001 Memorandum of Notification (MON). These included an 

"intellectually challenged" man whose CIA detention was used solely as leverage to get a family 

member to provide information, two individuals who were intelligence sources for foreign 

liaison services and were former CIA sources, and two individuals whom the CIA assessed to be 

connected to al-Qa'ida based solely on information fabricated by a CIA detainee subjected to the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Detainees often remained in custody for months after 

the CIA determined that they did not meet the MON standard. CIA records provide insufficient 

information to justify the detention of many other detainees. 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 12 of 19 

UNCLASSIFIED 

XXl 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

CIA Headquarters instructed that at least four CIA detainees be placed in host country detention 

facilities because the individuals did not meet the MON standard for CIA detention. The host 

country had no independent reason to hold the detainees. 

A full accounting of CIA detentions and interrogations may be impossible, as records in some 

cases are non-existent, and, in many other cases, are sparse and insufficient. There were almost 

no detailed records of the detentions and interrogations at the CIA's COBALT detention facility 

in 2002, and almost no such records for the CIA's GRAY detention site, also in Country At 

CIA detention facilities outside of Country the CIA kept increasingly less-detailed records of 

its interrogation activities over the course of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. 

#16: The CIA failed to adequately evaluate the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation 

techniques. 

The CIA never conducted a credible, comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of its enhanced 

interrogation techniques, despite a recommendation by the CIA inspector general and similar 

requests by the national security advisor and the leadership of the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence. 

Internal assessments of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program were conducted by CIA 

personnel who participated in the development and management of the program, as well as by 

CIA contractors who had a financial interest in its continuation and expansion. An "informal 

operational assessment" of the program, led by two senior CIA officers who were not part of the 

CIA's Counterterrorism Center, determined that it would not be possible to assess the 

effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques without violating "Federal Policy 

for the Protection of Human Subjects" regarding human experimentation. The CIA officers, 

whose review relied on briefings with CIA officers and contractors running the program, 

concluded only that the "CIA Detainee Program" was a "success" without addressing the 

effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.33 

In 2005, in response to the recommendation by the inspector general for a review of the 

effectiveness of each of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA asked two 

individuals not employed by the CIA to conduct a broader review of "the entirety of' the 

"rendition, detention and interrogation program."34 According to one individual, the review was 

"heavily reliant on the willingness of [CIA Counterterrorism Center] staff to provide us with the 

factual material that forms the basis of our conclusions." That individual acknowledged lacking 

the requisite expertise to review the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques, and concluded only that "the program," meaning all CIA detainee reporting 

regardless of whether it was connected to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques, was a "great success."35 The second reviewer concluded that "there is no objective 

way to answer the question of efficacy" of the techniques.36 

There are no CIA records to indicate that any of the reviews independently validated the 

"effectiveness" claims presented by the CIA, to include basic confirmation that the intelligence 

cited by the CIA was acquired from CIA detainees during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced 

TOP SECRET/ '/NOFORN 

Page 13 of 19 

UNCLASSIFIED 

XXii 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

interrogation techniques. Nor did the reviews seek to confirm whether the intelligence cited by 

the CIA as being obtained "as a result" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was 

unique and "otherwise unavailable," as claimed by the CIA, and not previously obtained from 

other sources. 

#17: The CIA rarely reprimanded or held personnel accountable for serious and 

significant violations, inappropriate activities, and systemic and individual management 

failures. 

CIA officers and CIA contractors who were found to have violated CIA policies or performed 

poorly were rarely held accountable or removed from positions of responsibility. 

Significant events, to include the death and injury of CIA detainees, the detention of individuals 

who did not meet the legal standard to be held, the use of unauthorized interrogation techniques 

against CIA detainees, and the provision of inaccurate information on the CIA program did not 

result in appropriate, effective, or in many eases, any corrective actions. CIA managers who 

were aware of failings and shortcomings in the program but did not intervene, or who failed to 

provide proper leadership and management, were also not held to account. 

On two occasions in which the CIA inspector general identified wrongdoing, accountability 

recommendations were overruled by senior CIA leadership. In one instance, involving the death 

of a CIA detainee at COBALT, CIA Headquarters decided not to take disciplinary action against 

an officer involved because, at the time, CIA Headquarters had been "motivated to extract any 

and all operational information" from the detainee.37 In another instance related to a wrongful 

detention, no action was taken against a CIA officer because, "[t]he Director strongly believes 

that mistakes should be expected in a business filled with uncertainty," and "the Director 

believes the scale tips decisively in favor of accepting mistakes that over connect the dots against 

those that under connect them."38 In neither case was administrative action taken against CIA 

management personnel. 

#18: The CIA marginalized and ignored numerous internal critiques, criticisms, and 

objections concerning the operation and management of the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program. 

Critiques, criticisms, and objections were expressed by numerous CIA officers, including senior 

personnel overseeing and managing the program, as well as analysts, interrogators, and medical 

officers involved in or supporting CIA detention and interrogation operations. 

Examples of these concerns include CIA officers questioning the effectiveness of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques, interrogators disagreeing with the use of such techniques 

against detainees whom they determined were not withholding information, psychologists 

recommending less isolated conditions, and Office of Medical Services personnel questioning 

both the effectiveness and safety of the techniques. These concerns were regularly overridden by 

CIA management, and the CIA made few corrective changes to its policies governing the 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 14 of 19 

UNCLASSIFIED 

xxill 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

program. At times, CIA officers were instructed by supervisors not to put their concerns or 

observations in written communications. 

In several instances, CIA officers identified inaccuracies in CIA representations about the 

program and its effectiveness to the Office of Inspector General, the White House, the 

Department of Justice, the Congress, and the American public. The CIA nonetheless failed to 

take action to correct these representations, and allowed inaccurate information to remain as the 

CIA's official position. 

The CIA was also resistant to, and highly critical of more formal critiques. The deputy director 

for operations stated that the CIA inspector general's draft Special Review should have come to 

the "conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives,"39 while the CIA general 

counsel accused the inspector general of presenting "an imbalanced and inaccurate picture" of 

the program.40 A February 2007 report from the International Committee of the Red Cross 

(ICRC), which the CIA acting general counsel initially stated "actually does not sound that far 

removed from the reality,"41 was also criticized. CIA officers prepared documents indicating 

that "critical portions of the Report are patently false or misleading, especially certain key factual 

claims...."42 CIA Director Hayden testified to the Committee that "numerous false allegations of 

physical and threatened abuse and faulty legal assumptions and analysis in the [ICRC] report 

undermine its overall credibility."43 

#19: The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was inherently unsustainable and 

had effectively ended by 2006 due to unauthorized press disclosures, reduced cooperation 

from other nations, and legal and oversight concerns. 

The CIA required secrecy and cooperation from other nations in order to operate clandestine 

detention facilities, and both had eroded significantly before President Bush publicly disclosed 

the program on September 6, 2006. From the beginning of the program, the CIA faced 

significant challenges in finding nations willing to host CIA clandestine detention sites. These 

challenges became increasingly difficult over time. With the exception of Country the CIA 

was forced to relocate detainees out of every country in which it established a detention facility 

because of pressure from the host government or public revelations about the program. 

Beginning in early 2005, the CIA sought unsuccessfully to convince the U.S. Department of 

Defense to allow the transfer of numerous CIA detainees to U.S. military custody. By 2006, the 

CIA admitted in its own talking points for CIA Director Porter Goss that, absent an 

Administration decision on an "endgame" for detainees, the CIA was "stymied" and "the 

program could collapse of its own weight."44 

Lack of access to adequate medical care for detainees in countries hosting the CIA's detention 

facilities caused recurring problems. The refusal of one host country to admit a severely ill 

detainee into a local hospital due to security concerns contributed to the closing of the CIA's 

detention facility in that country. The U.S. Department of Defense also declined to provide 

medical care to detainees upon CIA request. 

TOP SECRET/ '/NOFORN 

Page 15 of 19 

UNCLASSIFIED 

XXlV 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

In mid-2003, a statement by the president for the United Nations International Day in Support of 

Victims of Torture and a public statement by the White House that prisoners in U.S. custody are 

treated "humanely" caused the CIA to question whether there was continued policy support for 

the program and seek reauthorization from the White House. In mid-2004, the CIA temporarily 

suspended the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques after the CIA inspector general 

recommended that the CIA seek an updated legal opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel. In 

early 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court decision to grant certiorari in the case of Rasul v. Bush 

prompted the CIA to move detainees out of a CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 

In late 2005 and in 2006, the Detainee Treatment Act and then the U.S. Supreme Court decision 

in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld caused the CIA to again temporarily suspend the use of its enhanced 

interrogation techniques. 

By 2006, press disclosures, the unwillingness of other countries to host existing or new detention 

sites, and legal and oversight concerns had largely ended the CIA's ability to operate clandestine 

detention facilities. 

After detaining at least 113 individuals through 2004, the CIA brought only six additional 

detainees into its custody: four in 2005, one in 2006, and one in 2007. By March 2006, the 

program was operating in only one country. The CIA last used its enhanced interrogation 

techniques on November 8, 2007. The CIA did not hold any detainees after April 2008. 

#20: The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program damaged the United States' 

standing in the world, and resulted in other significant monetary and non-monetary costs. 

The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program created tensions with U.S. partners and allies, 

leading to formal demarches to the United States, and damaging and complicating bilateral 

intelligence relationships. 

In one example, in June 2004, the secretary of state ordered the U.S. ambassador in Country | to 

deliver a demarche to Country "in essence demanding [Country | Government] provide full 

access to all [Country | I^Hfl^^ h detainees" to the International Committee of the Red 

Cross. At the time, however, the detainees Country | was holding included detainees being held 

in secret at the CIA's behest.45 

More broadly, the program caused immeasurable damage to the United States' public standing, 

as well as to the United States' longstanding global leadership on human rights in general and the 

prevention of torture in particular. 

CIA records indicate that the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program cost well over $300 

million in non-personnel costs. This included funding for the CIA to construct and maintain 

detention facilities, including two facilities costing nearly million that were never used, in 

part due to host country political concerns. 

To encourage governments to clandestinely host CIA detention sites, or to increase support for 

existing sites, the CIA provided millions of dollars in cash payments to foreign government 

TOP SECRET/^ WNOFORN 

Page 16 of 19 

UNCLASSIFIED 

xxvii 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/, '/NQFQRN 

officials. CIA Headquarters cncouraged CIA Stations to construct "wish lists" of proposed 

financial assistance to entities of foreign governmental, and to 

"think big" in terms of that assistance.46 

Page 17 of 19 

UNCLASSIFIED 

XXVi 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

1

 As measured by the number of disseminated intelligence reports. Therefore, zero intelligence reports were 

disseminated based on information provided by seven of the 39 detainees known to have been subjected to the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

I

 May 30,2005, Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, 

from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of 

Justice, re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain 

Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees. 

3

 Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, September 6, 2006. 

4

 This episode was not described in CIA cables, but was described in internal emails sent by personnel in the CIA 

Office of Medical Services and the CIA Office of General Counsel. A review of the videotapes of the interrogations 

of Abu Zubaydah by the CIA Office of Inspector General (OIG) did not note the incident. A review of the catalog 

of videotapes, however, found that recordings of a 21-hour period, which included two waterboarding sessions, were 

missing. 

from to cc: ^^BHHH ^

 r e

 More. 

Throughout the Committee Study, last names in all capitalized letters are pseudonyms. 

6

 ALEC (182321Z JUL 02) 

7

 At the time, confining a detainee in a box with the dimensions of a coffin was an approved CIA enhanced 

interrogation technique. 

8

 [REDACTEDU32^161750Z SEP 03), referring to Hambali. 

9

 Interview of HH^^^ H ty [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, June 17, 

2003 

10

 In one case, interrogators informed a detainee that he could earn a bucket if he cooperated. 

II

 Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, April 7, 

2003, p. 12. 

12

 Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, May 8, 

2003, p. 9. 

13

 November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph 5, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations tor CIA 

Officers," at 1. 

14

 May 30, 2005, Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, 

from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of 

Justice, re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain 

Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees. July 20,2007, Memorandum 

for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, re: Application of War Crimes 

Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May 

be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees. 

15

 The CIA's June 27, 2013, Response to the Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program 

states that these limitations were dictated by the White House. The CIA's June 2013 Response then acknowledges 

that the CIA was "comfortable11 with this decision. 

16

 DIRECTOR (152227Z MAR 07) 

17

 The Committee's conclusion is based on CIA records, including statements from CIA Directors George Tenet and 

Porter Goss to the CIA inspector general, that the directors had not briefed the president on the CIA's interrogation 

program. According to CIA records, when briefed in April 2006, the president expressed discomfort with the 

"image of a detainee, chained to the ceiling, clothed in a diaper, and forced to go to the bathroom on himself." The 

CIA's June 2013 Response does not dispute the CIA records, but states that "[w]hile Agency records on the subject 

are admittedly incomplete, former President Bush has stated in his autobiography that he discussed the program, 

including the use of enhanced techniques, with then-DCIA Tenet in 2002, prior to application of the techniques on 

Abu Zubaydah, and personally approved the techniques." A memoir by former Acting CIA General Counsel John 

Rizzo disputes this account. 

18

 CIA records indicate that the CIA had not informed policymakers of the presence of CIA detention facilities in 

Countries | and It is less clear whether policymakers were aware of the detention facilities in Country | 

and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The CIA requested that country names and information directly or indirectly 

TOP SECRET/^ WNOFORN 

Page 18 of 19 

UNCLASSIFIED 

xxvii 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/FL 1 //NOFOR N 

identifying countries be redacted. The Study therefore lists the countries by letter. The Study uses the same 

designations consistently, so "Country J," forexample^jefers to the same country throughout the Study. 

19

 July 31, 2003, email from John Rizzo to re Rump PC on interrogations. 

20

 Lotus Notes message from Chief of the CIA Station in Country | to D/CTC, COPS; copied in: email from 

| to [REDACTED], [REDACTED], cc: [REDACTED], | 

, subj: ADCI Talking Points for Call to DepSec Armitage, date 9/23/2004, at 7:40:43 PM 

21

 Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003 

22

 No CIA detention facilities were established in these two countries. 

23

 U.S. law (22 U.S.C. § 3927) requires that chiefs of mission "shall be kept fully and currently informed with 

respect to all activities and operations of the Go vera men t within that country," including the activities and 

operations of the CIA. 

24

 Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and April 13, 2005. 

23

 Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and April 13, 2005. 

26

 March 29,2002, email from |t o ^^^^^HTre/V Z Interrogation Plan. 

27

 ALEC ^^ ^ (182321Z JUL 02) 

28

 January 8,1989, Letter from John L. Helgerson, Director of Congressional Affairs, to Vice Chairman William S. 

Cohen, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, re: SSCI Questions on at 7-8. 

29

 [REDACTED] 1528 (191903Z DEC 03) 

30

 Report of Audit, CIA-controlled Detention Facilities Operated Under the 17 September 2001 Memorandum of 

Notification, Report No. 2005-0017-AS, June 14,2006. 

31

 April IS, 2005, email from [REDACTED] (Chief of Base of DETENTION SITE BLACK), to 

^mm m re 

32

 "Learned helplessness" in this context was the theory that detainees might become passive and depressed in 

response to adverse or uncontrollable events, and would thus cooperate and provide information. Memo from 

Grayson SWIGERT, Ph.D., February 1, 2003, "Qualifications to provide special mission interrogation consultation." 

33

 They also concluded that the CIA "should not be in the business of running prisons or 'temporary detention 

facilities."' May 12,2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Chief, 

Information Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division via Associate Deputy 

Director for Operations, with the subject line, "Operational Review of CIA Detainee Program." 

34

 March 21,2005, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Robert L. Grenier, Director DCI 

Counterterrorism Center, re Proposal for Full-Scope Independent Study of the CTC Rendition, Detention, and 

Interrogation Programs. 

35

 September 2, 2005, Memorandum from to Director Porter Goss, CIA, "Assessment of EITs 

Effectiveness." 

36

 September 23, 2005, Memorandum from to The Honorable Porter Goss, Director, Central 

Intelligence Agency, "Response to request from Director for Assessment of EIT effectiveness." 

37

 February 10, 2006, Memorandum for CIA OFFICER 1], CounterTerrorist Center, National 

Clandestine Service, from Executive Director re: Accountability Decision. 

38

 Congressional notification, CIA Response to OIG Investigation Regarding the Rendition and Detention of 

German Citizen Khalid al-Masri, October 9, 2007. 

39

 Memorandum for Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re Comments to 

Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 

27, 2004; attachment: February 24,2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and 

Interrogation Activities. 

4 0

 February 24, 2004, Memorandum from Scott W. Muller, General Counsel, to Inspector General re Interrogation 

Program Special Review (2003-7123-IG). 

•" November 9, 2006, email from John A. Rizzo, to Michael V. Hayden, Stephen R. Kappes, cc: Michael Morell, 

HHHHH > HHH^H ' ^^HH H Subject: Fw: 5 December 2006 Meeting with ICRC Rep. 

42

 CIA Comments on the February 2007 ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen "High Value Detainees" in CIA 

Custody." 

43

 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12, 2007. 

44

 DCIA Talking Points for 12 January 2006 Meeting with the President, re: Way Forward on Counterterrorist 

Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Program. 

45

 HEADQUARTERS ^^B(071742 Z JUN 04) _ _ __ _ 

46

 [REDACTED] 5759 03); ALEC 03); ALEC 03) 

TOP SECRET/, /NOFORN 

Page 19 of 19 

UNCLASSIFIED 

xxvill 
Executive Summary 

Approved December 13, 2012 

Updated for Release April 3, 2014 

Declassification Revisions December 3, 2014 

TOP 

Page 1 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

1 
UNCLASSIFIED 

I<>1*IIM III' I IMIHI11 

Table of Contents 

I. Background on the Committee Study 8 

II. Overall History and Operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program 11 

A. September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification (MON) Authorizes the CIA to Capture and Detain a 

Specific Category of Indi viduals 11 

1. After Considering Various Clandestine Detention Locations, the CIA Determines That a U.S. Military 

Bas^^ht^" Best Option "; the CIA Delegates "Blanket " Detention Approvals to CIA Officers in 

••• • 11 

2. The CIA Holds at Least 21 More Detainees Than ft Has Represented; At Least 26 CIA Detainees 

Wrongly Detained 14 

B. The Detention of Abu Zubaydah and the Development and Authorization of the CIA's Enhanced 

Interrogation Techniques 17 

1. Past Experience Led the CIA to Assess that Coercive Interrogation Techniques Were 

"Counterproductive " and "Ineffective "; After Issuance of the MON, CIA Attorneys Research Possible 

Legal Defense for Using Techniques Considered Torture; the CIA Conducts No Research on Effective 

Interrogations, Relies on Contractors with No Relevant Experience 17 

2. The CIA Renders Abu Zubaydah to a Covert Facility, Obtains Presidential Approval Without InterAgency Deliberation 21 

3. Tensions with Host Country Leadership and Media Attention Foreshadow Future Challenges 23 

4. FBI Officers Are the First to Question Abu Zubaydah, Who States He Intends to Cooperate; Abu 

Zubaydah is Taken to a Hospital Where He Provides Information the CIA Later Describes as 

"Important" and "Vital" 24 

5. While Abu Zubaydah is Hospitalized, CIA Headquarters Discusses the Use of Coercive Interrogation 

Techniques Against Abu Zubaydah 25 

6. New CIA Interrogation Plan Focuses on Abu Zubaydah's "Most Important Secret"; FBI Temporarily 

Barred from the Questioning of Abu Zubaydah; Abu Zubaydah then Placed in Isolation for 47 Days 

Without Questioning 27 

7. Proposal by CIA Contract Personnel to Use SERE-Based Interrogation Techniques Leads to the 

Development of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; The CIA Determines that "the 

Interrogation Process Takes Precedence Over Preventative Medical Procedures" 31 

8. The CIA Obtains Legal and Policy Approval for Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; The CIA 

Does Not Brief the President 37 

9. The CIA Uses the Waterboard and Other Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Abu Zubaydah 

40 

10. A CIA Presidential Daily Brief Provides Inaccurate Information on the Interrogation of Abu 

Zubaydah 47 

11. The CIA Does Not Brief the Committee on the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah 48 

C. Interrogation in Country | and the January 2003 Guidelines 49 

1. The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE COBALT, Places Inexperienced First-Tour Officer in Charge 

49 

2. CIA Records Lack Information on CIA Detainees and Details of Interrogations in Country | 50 

3. CIA Headquarters Recommends That Untrained Interrogators in Country | Use the CIA's Enhanced 

Interrogation Techniques on Ridha al-Najjar 51 

4. Death ofGul Rahman Leads CIA Headquarters to Learn of Unreported Coercive Interrogation 

Techniques at DETENTION SITE COBALT; CIA Inspector General Review Reveals Lack of Oversight 

of the Detention Site 54 

5. The CIA Begins Training New Interrogators; Interrogation Techniques Not Reviewed by the 

Department of Justice Included in the Training Syllabus 57 

6. Despite Recommendation from CIA Attorneys, the CIA Fails to Adequately Screen Potential 

Interrogators in 2002 and 2003 58 

7. Bureau of Prisons "WOW'ed" by Level of Deprivation at CIA's COBALT Detention Site 59 

m i n iii i MMBBBB^^ B imiiiii1 1 

Page 2 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

2 
UNCLASSIFIED 

11 ii 1111 1 i ii i ii 

8. The CIA Places CIA Detainees in Country | Facilities Because They Did Not Meet the MON 

Standard for Detention 61 

9. DC I Tenet Establishes First Guidelines on Detention Conditions and Interrogation; Formal 

Consolidation of Program Administration at CIA Headquarters Does Not Resolve Disagreements 

Among CIA Personnel 62 

D. The Detention and Interrogation of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri 66 

1. CIA Interrogators Disagree with CIA Headquarters About Al-Nashiri's Level of Cooperation; 

Interrogators Oppose Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 66 

2. CIA Headquarters Sends Untrained Interrogator to Resume Al-Nashiri's Interrogations; Interrogator 

Threatens al-Nashiri with a Gun and a Drill 68 

3. CIA Contractor Recommends Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against 

Al-Nashiri; Chief Interrogator Threatens to Quit Because Additional Techniques Might "Push [AlNashiriJ Over The Edge Psychologically, " Refers to the CIA Program /4s a "Train Wreak I sic] 

Waiting to Happen " 70 

E. Tensions with Country | Relating to the CIA Detention Facility and the Arrival of New Detainees 73 

F. The Detention and Interrogation of Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh 75 

1. Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Provides Information While in Foreign Government Custody, Prior to Rendition 

to CIA Custody 75 

2. Interrogation Plan for Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Proposes Immediate Use of Nudity and Shackling with 

Hands Above the Head; Plan Becomes Template for Future Detainees 76 

3. CIA Headquarters Urges Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Despite 

Interrogators' Assessment That Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Wins Cooperative 78 

4. Information Already Provided by Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh in the Custody of a Foreign Government 

Inaccurately Attributed to CIA Interrogations; Interrogators Apply the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation 

Techniques to Bin Al-Shibh When Not Addressed As "Sir" and When Bin Al-Shibh Complains of 

Stomach Pain 79 

G. The Detention and Interrogation of Khalid Shaykli Muhammad 81 

1. KSM Held in Pakistani Custody, Provides Limited Information; Rendered to CIA Custody at 

DETENTION SITE COBALT, KSM Is Immediately Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation 

Techniques 81 

2. The CIA Transfers KSM to DETENTION SITE BLUE, Anticipates Use of the Waterboard Prior to His 

Arrival 83 

3. The CIA Waterboards KSM at Least 183 Times; KSM's Reporting Includes Significant Fabricated 

Information 85 

4. After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against KSM Ends, the CIA Continues 

to Assess That KSM Is Withholding and Fabricating Information 93 

H. The Growth of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program 96 

1. Fifty-Three CIA Detainees Enter the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003 96 

2. The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE BLA CK in Country | and DETENTION SITE VIOLET in 

Country| 97 

3. At Least 17 CIA Detainees Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Without CIA 

Headquarters Authorization 99 

4. CIA Headquarters Authorizes Water Dousing Without Department of Justice Approval; Application of 

Technique Reported as Approximating Waterboarding 105 

5. Hambali Fabricates Information While Being Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation 

Techniques 108 

6. After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, CIA Headquarters Questions 

Detention of Detainee and Recommends Release; Detainee Transferred to U.S. Military Custody and 

Held for An Additional Four Years 109 

11ii 1111 i ' ii i II 

Page 3 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

3 
UNCLASSIFIED 

11II 1111 1 I IIII I IIII 

7. A Year After DETENTION SITE COBA LT Opens, the CIA Reports '' Unsettling Discovery That We 

Are Holding a Number of Detainees About Whom We Know Very Little" 110 

8. CIA Detention Sites in Country | Lack Sufficient Personnel and Translators to Support the 

Interrogations of Detainees Ill 

I. Other Medical, Psychological, and Behavioral Issues Il l 

1. CIA Interrogations Take Precedence Over Medical Care Ill 

2. CIA Detainees Exhibit Psychological and Behavioral Issues 113 

J. The CIA Seeks Reaffirmation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003 115 

1. Administration Statements About the Humane Treatment of Detainees Raise Concerns at the CIA 

About Possible Lack of Policy Support for CIA Interrogation Activities 115 

2. The CIA Provides Inaccurate Information to Select Members of the National Security Council, 

Represents that "Termination of This Program Will Result in Loss of Life, Possibly Extensive"; 

Policymakers Reauthorize Program 117 

K. Additional Oversight and Outside Pressure in 2004: ICRC, Inspector General, Congress, and the U.S. 

Supreme Court 119 

/ . ICRC Pressure Leads to Detainee Transfers; Department of Defense Official Informs the CIA that the 

U.S. Government "Should Not Be in the Position of Causing People to Disappear"; the CIA Provides 

Inaccurate Information on CIA Detainee to the Department of Defense 119 

2. CIA Leadership Calls Draft Inspector General Special Review of the Program "Imbalanced and 

Inaccurate. " Responds with Inaccurate Information; CIA Seeks to Limit Further Review of the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program by the Inspector General 121 

3. The CIA Does Not Satisfy Inspector General Special Review Recommendation to Assess the 

Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 124 

4. The CIA Wrongfully Detains Khalid Al-Masri; CIA Director Rejects Accountability for Officer 

Involved 128 

5. Hassan Ghul Provides Substantial Information—Including Information on a Key UBL FacilitatorPrior to the CIA's Use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 130 

6. Other Detainees Wrongfully Held iti 2004; CIA Sources Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced 

Interrogation Techniques; CIA Officer Testifies that the CIA Is "Not Authorized" "to Do Anything 

Like What You Have Seen " in Abu Ghraib Photographs 133 

7. The CIA Suspends the Use of its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Resumes Use of the Techniques 

on an Individual Basis; Interrogations are Based on Fabricated, Single Source Information 134 

8. Country |Detains Individuals on the CIA's Behalf. 139 

9. U.S. Supreme Court Action in the Case of Rasul v. Bush Forces Transfer of CIA Detainees from 

Guantanamo Bay to Country 140 

L. The Pace of CIA Operations Slows; Chief of Base Concerned About "Inexperienced, Marginal, 

Underperforming" CIA Personnel; Inspector General Describes Lack of Debriefers As "Ongoing Problem" 

143 

M. Legal and Operational Challenges in 2005 145 

1. Department of Justice Renews Approval for the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 

in May 2005 145 

2. Abu Faraj Al-Libi Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Prior to Department of 

Justice Memorandum on U.S. Obligations Under the Convention Against Torture; CIA Subjects Abu 

Faraj Al-Libi to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques When He Complains of Hearing 

Problems 146 

3. CIA Acquires Two Detcunees from the U.S. Military 148 

4. The CIA Seeks "End Game" for Detainees in Early 2005 Due to Limited Support From Liaison 

Partners 149 

5. Press Stories and the CIA's Inability to Provide Emergency Medical Care to Detainees Result in the 

Closing of CIA Detention Facilities in Countries | andj^ 151 

11 ii 11 ii 1 1 MB^BBMI^^^ M 11 "

1

" 

Page 4 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

4 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

6. The CIA Considers Changes to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program Following the Detainee 

Treatment Act, Hanulan v. Rumsfeld 157 

N. The Final Disposition of CIA Detainees and the End of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program...159 

1. President Bush Publicly Acknowledges the Existence of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program 159 

2. The In ternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Gains Access to CIA Detainees After Their 

Transfer to U.S. Military Custody in September 2006 160 

3. The CIA Considers Future of the Program Following the Military Commissions Act 161 

4. The CIA Develops Modified Enhanced Interrogation Program After Passage of the Military 

Commissions Act 162 

5. Muhammad Rahim, the CIA's Last Detainee, is Subjected to Extensive Use of the CIA's Enhanced 

Interrogation Techniques, Provides No Intelligence 163 

6. CIA After-Action Review of Rahim Interrogation Calls for Study of Effectiveness of Interrogation 

Techniques and Recommends Greater Use of Rapport-Building Techniques in Future CIA 

Interrogations 167 

7. CIA Contracting Expenses Related to Company Formed by SWIGERT and DUNBAR 168 

8. The CIA's Detention and In terrogation Program Ends 170 

III. Intelligence Acquired and CIA Representations on the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation 

Techniques to Multiple Constituencies 172 

A. Background on CIA Effectiveness Representations 172 

B. Past Efforts to Review the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 178 

C. The Origins of CIA Representations Regarding the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation 

Techniques As Having "Saved Lives," "Thwarted Plots," and "Captured Terrorists" 179 

D. CIA Representations About the Effectiveness of Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Specific 

CIA Detainees 204 

1. Abu Zubaydah 204 

2. Khalid Sliaykli Muhammad (KSM) 210 

E. CIA Effectiveness Claims Regarding a "High Volume of Critical Intelligence" 216 

F. The Eight Primary CIA Effectiveness Representations—the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation 

Techniques "Enabled the CIA to Disrupt Terrorist Plots" and "Capture Additional Terrorists" 217 

1. The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla 225 

2. The Thwarting of the Karachi Plots 239 

3. The Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group 246 

4. The Thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot and the Capture of Dliiren Barot, aka Issa 

til-Hindi 258 

5. The Identification, Capture, and Arrest oflyman Paris 276 

6. The Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Sajid Badat 284 

7. The Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf Plotting 294 

8. The Capture of Hambali 301 

G. CIA Secondary Effectiveness Representations—Less Frequently Cited Disrupted Plots, Captures, and 

Intelligence that the CIA Has Provided As Evidence for the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced 

Interrogation Techniques 311 

1. The Identification of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) as the Mastermind of the September 11. 2001. 

Attacks 312 

2. The Identification of KSM's "Mukhtar" Alias 315 

3. The Capture ofRamzi bin al-Shibh 316 

4. The Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) 326 

5. The Capture ofMajid Khan 334 

TOP SECRETfl^^^^^MU^^M^NQPQR N 

Page 5 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

5 
UNCLASSIFIED 

IIII'IIM III I "^M^BI^^Wi^B^N'HinH I I 

6. The Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting 336 

7. The Assertion that CIA Detainees Subjected to Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Help Validate CIA 

Sources 342 

8. The Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha 352 

9. Critical Intelligence Alerting the CIA to Jaffar al-Tayyar 358 

10. The Identification and Arrest ofSaleh al-Marri 366 

11. The Collection of Critical Tactical Intelligence on Shkai, Pakistan 368 

12. Information on the Facilitator that Led to the UBL Operation 378 

IV. Overview of CIA Representations to the Media While the Program Was Classified. 401 

A. The CIA Provides Information on the Still-Classified Detention and Interrogation Program to Journalists 

Who then Publish Classified Information; CIA Does Not File Crimes Reports in Connection with the Stories 

401 

B. Senior CIA Officials Discuss Need to "Put Out Our Story" to Shape Public and Congressional Opinion Prior 

to the Full Committee Being Briefed 402 

C. CIA Attorneys Caution that Classified Information Provided to the Media Should Not Be Attributed to the 

CIA 404 

D. The CIA Engages with Journalists and Conveys an Inaccurate Account of the Interrogation of Abu 

Zubaydah 405 

V. Review of CIA Representations to the Department of Justice.... 409 

A. August 1, 2002, OLC Memorandum Relies on Inaccurate Information Regarding Abu Zubaydah 409 

B. The CIA Interprets the August 1, 2002, Memorandum to Apply to Other Detainees, Despite Language of the 

Memorandum; Interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and Other Detainees Diverge from the CIA's 

Representations to the OLC 411 

C. Following Suspension of the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, the CIA Obtains 

Approval from the OLC for the Interrogation of Three Individual Detainees 413 

D. May 2005 OLC Memoranda Rely on Inaccurate Representations from the CIA Regarding the Interrogation 

Process, the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, and the Effectiveness of the Techniques 419 

E. After Passage of the Detainee Treatment Act, OLC Issues Opinion on CIA Conditions of Confinement, 

Withdraws Draft Opinion on the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques After the U.S. Supreme Court 

Case of Haindan v. Rumsfeld 428 

F. July 2007 OLC Memorandum Relies on Inaccurate CIA Representations Regarding CIA Interrogations and 

the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; CIA Misrepresents Congressional Views 

to the Department of Justice 431 

VI. Review of CIA Representations to the Congress 437 

A. After Memorandum of Notification, the CIA Disavows Torture and Assures the Committee Will Be Notified 

of Every Individual Detained by the CIA 437 

B. The CIA Notifies Committee of the Detention of Abu Zubaydah, but Makes No Reference to Coercive 

Interrogation Techniques; the CIA Briefs Chairman and Vice Chairman After the Use of the CIA's 

Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; the CIA Discusses Strategy to Avoid the Chairman's Request for More 

Information 437 

C. No Detailed Records Exist of CIA Briefings of Committee Leadership; the CIA Declines to Answer 

Questions from Committee Members or Provide Requested Materials 439 

D. Vice Chairman Rockefeller Seeks Committee Investigation 441 

E. In Response to Detainee Treatment Act, the CIA Briefs Senators Not on the Committee; Proposal from 

Senator Levin for an Independent Commission Prompts Renewed Calls Within the CIA to Destroy 

Interrogation Videotapes 443 

TOP tfNOFORN 

Page 6 of499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

6 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRETfl^^^^^BI^^^^BflNQgQR N 

F. CIA Director Goss Seeks Committee Support for the Program After the Detainee Treatment Act; CIA 

Declines to Answer Questions for the Record 444 

G. Full Committee First Briefed on the CIA's Interrogation Program Hours Before It Is Publicly Acknowledged 

on September 6, 2006 446 

H. The CIA Provides Additional Information to the Full Committee and Staff, Much of It Inaccurate; 

Intelligence Authorization Act Passes Limiting CIA Interrogations to Techniques Authorized by the Army 

Field Manual 449 

I. President Vetoes Legislation Based on Effectiveness Claims Provided by the CIA; CIA Declines to Answer 

Committee Questions for the Record About the CIA Interrogation Program 452 

VII. CIA Destruction of Interrogation Videotapes Leads to Committee Investigation; Committee Votes 14-1 for 

Expansive Terms of Reference to Study the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program 45S 

VIII. Appendix 1: Terms of Reference 457 

IX. Appendix 2: CIA Detainees from 2002 - 2008 458 

X. Appendix 3: Example of Inaccurate CIA Testimony to the Committee- April 12,2007 462 

TOP SECRET/^ y/NOFORN 

Page 7 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

7 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/JI 1//NOFORN 

I. Background on the Committee Study 

(U) On December 11, 2007, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ("the Committee") 

initiated a review of the destruction of videotapes related to the interrogations of CIA detainees 

Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri after receiving a briefing that day on the matter by 

CIA Director Michael Hayden. At that briefing, Director Hayden stated that contemporaneous 

CIA operational cables were "a more than adequate representation of the tapes," and he agreed to 

provide the Committee with limited access to these cables at CIA Headquarters. 

(U) On February 11, 2009, after the Committee was presented with a staff-prepared summary of 

the operational cables detailing the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri, the 

Committee began considering a broader review of the CIA's detention and interrogation 

practices. On March 5, 2009, in a vote of 14 to 1, the Committee approved Terms of Reference 

for a study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.1 

(U) The Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program is a lengthy, highly 

detailed report exceeding 6,700 pages, including approximately 38,000 footnotes. It is divided 

into three volumes: 

I. History and Operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. This 

volume is divided chronologically into sections addressing the establishment, 

development, and evolution of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. It 

includes an addendum on CIA Clandestine Detention Sites and the Arrangements Made 

with Foreign Entities in Relation to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. 

II. Intelligence Acquired and CIA Representations on the Effectiveness of the CIA's 

Enhanced Interrogation Techniques. This volume addresses the intelligence the CIA 

attributed to CIA detainees and the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, 

specifically focusing on CIA representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques, as well as how the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program was operated and managed. It includes sections on CIA representations to the 

media, the Department of Justice, and the Congress. 

HI. Detention and Interrogation of CIA Detainees. This volume addresses the detention 

and interrogation of 119 CIA detainees, from the program's authorization on September 

17, 2001, to its official end on January 22, 2009, to include information on their capture, 

detention, interrogation, and conditions of confinement. It also includes extensive 

information on the CIA's management, oversight, and day-to-day operation of its 

Detention and Interrogation Program. 

(U) On December 13, 2012, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence approved the 

Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program ("Committee Study") by a 

bipartisan vote of 9-6. The Committee Study included 20 findings and conclusions. The 

1

 See Appendix 1: "Terms of Reference, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Study of the Central Intelligence 

Agency's Detention and Interrogation Pro 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 8 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

8 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/JI 1//NOFORN 

Committee requested that specific executive branch agencies review and provide comment on 

the Committee Study prior to Committee action to seek declassification and public release of the 

Committee Study. On June 27, 2013, the CIA provided a written response, which was followed 

by a series of meetings between the CIA and the Committee that concluded in September 2013. 

Following these meetings and the receipt of Minority views, the Committee revised the findings 

and conclusions and updated the Committee Study. On April 3, 2014, by a bipartisan vote of 11-

3, the Committee agreed to send the revised findings and conclusions, and the updated Executive 

Summary of the Committee Study, to the president for declassification and public release. 

(U) The Committee's Study is the most comprehensive review ever conducted of the CLA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program. The CIA has informed the Committee that it has provided 

the Committee with all CIA records related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.2 

The document production phase lasted more than three years, produced more than six million 

pages of material, and was completed in July 2012. The Committee Study is based primarily on 

a review of these documents,3 which include CIA operational cables, reports, memoranda, 

intelligence products, and numerous interviews conducted of CIA personnel by various entities 

within the CIA, in particular the CIA's Office of Inspector General and the CIA's Oral History 

Program, as well as internal email4 and other communications.5 

(U) The Executive Summary is divided into two parts. The first describes the establishment, 

development, operation, and evolution of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The 

second part provides information on the effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program, to include information acquired from CIA detainees, before, during, and after the use 

of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques; as well as CIA representations on the 

effectiveness and operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to the media, the 

Department of Justice, and the Congress. The Executive Summary does not include a 

2

 The Committee did not have access to approximately 9,400 CIA documents related to the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program that were withheld by the White House pending a determination and claim of executive 

privilege. The Committee requested access to these documents over several years, including in writing on January 

3, 2013, May 22, 2013, and December 19, 2013. The Committee received no response from the White House. 

3

 From January 2, 2008, to August 30, 2012, the Department of Justice conducted a separate investigation into 

various aspects of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, with the possibility of criminal prosecutions of 

CIA personnel and contractors. On October 9, 2009, the CIA informed the Committee that it would not compel CIA 

personnel to participate in interviews with the Committee due to concerns related to the pending Department of 

Justice investigations. (See DTS #2009-4064.) While the Committee did not conduct interviews with CIA 

personnel during the course of this review, the Committee utilized previous interview reports of CIA personnel and 

CIA contractors conducted by die CIA's Office of the Inspector General and the CIA's Oral History Program. In 

addition to CIA materials, the Committee reviewed a much smaller quantity of documents from the Department of 

Justice, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State, as well as documents that had separately been 

provided to the Committee outside of this review. Inconsistent spellings found within the Committee Study reflect 

the inconsistencies found in the underlying documents reviewed. 

4

 The CIA informed die Committee that due to CIA record retention policies, the CIA could not produce all CIA 

email communications requested by the Committee. As a result, in a few cases, the text of an email cited in the 

Study was not available in its original format, but was embedded in a larger email chain. For this reason, the 

Committee, in some limited cases, cites to an email chain that contains the original email, rather than the original 

email itself. 

5

 The report does not review CIA renditions for individuals who were not ultimately detained by the CIA, CIA 

interrogation of detainees in U.S. military custody, or die treatment of detainees in the custody of foreign 

governments, as these topics were not included in the Committee's Terms of Reference. 

TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN 

Page 9 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

9 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/JI 1//NOFORN 

description of the detention and interrogations of all 119 known CIA detainees. Details on each 

of these detainees are included in Volume in. 

(U) Throughout this summary and the entire report, non-supervisory CIA personnel have been 

listed by pseudonym. The pseudonyms for these officers are used throughout the report. To 

distinguish CIA officers in pseudonym from those in true name, pseudonyms in this report are 

denoted by last names in upper case letters. Additionally, the CIA requested that the names of 

countries that hosted CIA detention sites, or with which the CIA negotiated the hosting of sites, 

as well as information directly or indirectly identifying such countries, be redacted from the 

classified version provided to Committee members. The report therefore lists these countries by 

letter. The report uses the same designations consistently, so "Country J," for example, refers to 

the same country throughout the Committee Study. Further, the CIA requested that the 

Committee replace the original code names for CIA detention sites with new identifiers.6 

6

 On April 7, 2014, the Executive Summary of the Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program was provided to the executive branch for declassification and public release. On August I, 2014, the CIA 

returned to the Committee the Executive Summary with its proposed redactions. Over the ensuing months, the 

Committee engaged in deliberations with the CIA and the White House to ensure that the Committee's narrative— 

and support for the Committee's findings and conclusions—remained intact. Significant alterations have been made 

to the Executive Summary in order to reach agreement on a publicly releasable version of the document. For 

example, the CIA requested that in select passages, the Committee replace specific dates with more general time 

frames. The Committee also replaced the true names of some senior non-undercover CIA officials with 

pseudonyms. The executive branch then redacted all pseudonyms for CIA personnel, and in some cases the titles of 

positions held by the CIA personnel. Further, while the classified Executive Summary and full Committee Study 

lists specific countries by letter (for example "Country J"), and uses the same letter to designate the specific country 

throughout the Committee Study, the lette

 1 ' ' branch for this public release. 

TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN 

Page 10 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

10 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/JI 1//NOFORN 

II. Overall History and Operation of the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program 

A. September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification (MON) Authorizes the CIA to 

Capture and Detain a Specific Category of Individuals 

1. After Considering Various Clandestine Detention Locations, the CIA Determines That a 

U.S. Military Base Is the "Best Option"; the CIA Delegates "Blanket" Detention 

Approvals to CIA Officers in \ 

On September 17, 2001, six days after the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush signed a covert action Memorandum of 

Notification (MON) to authorize the director of central intelligence (DCI) to "undertake 

operations designed to capture and detain persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of 

violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities."7 

Although the CIA had previously been provided limited authorities to detain specific, named 

individuals pending the issuance of formal criminal charges, the MON provided unprecedented 

authorities, granting the CIA significant discretion in determining whom to detain, the factual 

basis for the detention, and the length of the detention.K The MON made no reference to 

interrogations or interrogation techniques.9 

On September 14, 2001, three days before the issuance of the 

MON, the chief of operations of the CIA's HHi^^ H based on an urgent requirement from 

the chief of the Counterterrorism Center (CTC), sent an email to CIA Stations in seeking 

input on appropriate locations for potential CIA detention facilities.10 Over the course of the 

next month, CIA officers considered at least four countries in and one in HHIH H

 a s 

possible hosts for detention facilities and H at least three proposed site locations.11 

On September 26, 2001, senior CTC personnel met to discuss the 

capture and detain authorities in the MON. On September 28, 2001, I^^^HCT C Legal, 

sent an email describing the meeting and a number of policy decisions. The 

7

 September 17,2001, Memorandum of Notification, for Members of the National Security Council, re. | 

8

 Attachment 5 to May 14, 2002, letter from Stanley Moskowitz, CIA Office of Congressional Affairs, to A1 

Cumming, Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, transmitting the^ | Memoranda of Notification 

(DTS #2002-2175). ^^ ^ 

9

 September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification, for Members of the National Security Council, re. U^B J 

10

 D1RECTOr|HH (HHHHB ;

 emai l fronl :

 [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Cable re 

Country | ; date: January 29,2009. 

11

 Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of Counterterrorism, via Deputy Director of Central 

Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central 

Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Terrorists." 

Page 11 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

11 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

email stated that covert facilities would be operated "in a manner consistent with, but not 

pursuant to, the formal provision of appropriately comparable Federal instructions for the 

operation of prison facilitiesandthe incarceration of inmates held under the maximum lawful 

security mechanisms." ^^H^l' s email recognized the CIA's lack of experience in running 

detention facilities, and stated that the CIA would consider acquiring cleared personnel from the 

Department of Defense or the Bureau of Prisons with specialized expertise to assist the CIA in 

operating the facilities.12 On September 27, 2001, CIA Headquarters informed CIA Stations that 

any future CIA detention facility would have to meet "U.S. POW Standards."13 

(^S/^^^^H^H^Ni 1) In early November 2001, CIA Headquarters further determined 

that any future CIA detention facility would have to meet U.S. prison standards and that CIA 

detention and interrogation operations should be tailored to "meet the requirements of U.S. law 

and the federal rules of criminal procedure," adding that "[sjpecific methods of interrogation 

w[ould] be permissible so long as they generally comport with commonly accepted practices 

deemed lawful by U.S. courts."14 The CIA's search for detention site locations was then put on 

hold and an internal memorandum from senior CIA officials explained that detention at a U.S. 

military base outside of the United States was the "best option."15 The memorandum thus urged 

the DCI to "[pjress DOD and the US military, at highest levels, to have the US Military agree to 

host a long-term facility, and have them identify an agreeable location," specifically requesting 

that the DCI "[s]eek to have the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay designated as a long-term 

detention facility."16 

(^S/^^I^HHI^^/NF ) Addressing the risks associated with the CIA maintaining a 

detention facility, the CIA memorandum warned that "[a]s captured terrorists may be held days, 

months, or years, the likelihood of exposure will grow over time," and that "[mjedia exposure 

could inflame public opinion against a host government and the U.S., thereby threatening the 

continued operation of the facility." The memorandum also anticipated that, "[i]n a foreign 

country, close cooperation with the host government will entail intensive negotiations."17 The 

CIA memorandum warned that "any foreign country poses uncontrollable risks that could create 

incidents, vulnerability to the security of the facility, bilateral problems, and uncertainty over 

maintaining the facility."1" The memorandum recommended the establishment of a "short-term" 

facility in which the CIA's role would be limited to "oversight, funding and responsibility." The 

12

 Email from: to: [REDACTED]; subject: EYES ONLY - Capture and Detention; date: 

September 28, 2001, at 09:29:24 AM. 

13

 DIRECTOR • • (272119Z SEP 01) 

14

 November 7, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, "Handling Interrogation." See also Volume I. 

15

 Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of Counterterrorism, via Deputy Director of Central 

Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central 

Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Terrorists." 

16

 Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of CounterteiTorism, via Deputy Director of Central 

Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central 

Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Terrorists." 

17

 Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of Counterterrorism, via Deputy Director of Central 

Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central 

Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Terrorists." 

18

 Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of Counterterrorism, via Deputy Director of Central 

Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central 

Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, "Approvahj^ist^ for Terrorists." 

11ii i i 11 1 BBBBB^^Bli M 1 "

1

" 

Page 12 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

12 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/JI 1 //NOFOR N 

CIA would "contract out all other requirements to other US Government organizations, 

commercial companies, and, as appropriate, foreign governments."19 

(^flHHB^ ) On October 8, 2001, DCI George Tenet delegated the management 

and oversight of the capture and detention authorities provided by the MON to the CIA's deputy 

director for operations (DDO), James Pavitt, and the CIA's chief of the Counter-terrorism Center, 

Cofer Black.20 The DCI also directed that all requests and approvals for capture and detention be 

documented in writing. On December 17, 2001, however, the DDO rescinded these 

requirements and issued via a CIA cable "blanket approval" for CIA officers in IBII^^I t 0 

"determine [who poses] the requisite 'continuing serious threat of violence or death to US 

persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities.'"21 By March 2002, CIA 

Headquarters had expanded the authority beyond the language of the MON and instructed CIA 

personnel that it would be appropriate to detain individuals who might not be high-value targets 

in their own right, but could provide information on high-value targets.22 

sent a cable to CIA Stations and Bases stating that "at this stage in the war [we] believe there is 

sufficient opportunity in advance to document the key aspects of many, if not most, of our 

capture and detain operations."23 I^^^^H' s cable also provided guidance as to who could 

be detained under the MON, stating: 

"there must be an articulable basis on which to conclude that the actions of a 

specific person whom we propose to capture and/or detain pose a 'continuing 

serious threat' of violence or death to U.S. persons or interests or that the person 

is planning a terrorist activity. 

.. .We are not permitted to detain someone merely upon a suspicion that he or 

she has valuable information about terrorists or planned acts of terrorism.... 

Similarly, the mere membership in a particular group, or the mere existence of a 

particular familial tie, docs not ncccssarily connote that the threshold of 

'continuing, serious threat' has been satisfied."24 

19

 Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of Counterterrorism, via Deputy Director of Central 

Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central 

Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Terrorists." 

20

 Memorandum from George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, to Deputy Director for Operations, October 8, 

2001, Subject: (U) Delegations of Authorities. 

21

 DIRECTOR||Hla71410 Z DEC 01) 

22

 WASHINGTON®! ! (272040Z MAR 02) 

23

 DIRECTOR |^M(072216 Z APR 03) 

24

 DIRECTOR (072216Z APR 03). In a later meeting with Committee staff, •^^•CT C Legal, 

• • stated that the prospect that the CIA "could hold [detainees] forever" was "terrifying," adding, "[n]o 

one wants to be in a position of being called back from retirement in however many years to go figure out what do 

you do with so and so who still poses a threat " See November 13, 2001, Transcript of Staff Briefing on Covert 

Action Legal Issues (DTS #2002-0629). 

11 >i 1111 1 i ii i ii 

Page 13 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

13 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/JI 1 //NOFORN 

2. The CIA Holds at Least 21 More Detainees Than It Has Represented; At Least 26 CIA 

Detainees Wrongly Detained 

While the CIA has represented in public and classified settings that 

it detained "fewer than one hundred" individuals,25 the Committee's review of CIA records 

indicates that the total number of CIA detainees was at least 119.26 Internal CIA documents 

indicate that inadequate record keeping made it impossible for the CIA to determine how many 

individuals it had detained. In December 2003, a CIA Station overseeing CIA detention 

operations in Country | informed CIA Headquarters that it had made the "unsettling discovery" 

that the CIA was "holding a number of detainees about whom" it knew "very little."27 Nearly 

five years later, in late 2008, the CIA attempted to determine how many individuals the CIA had 

detained. At the completion of the review, CIA leaders, including CIA Director Michael 

Hayden, were informed that the review found that the CIA had detained at least 112 individuals, 

and possibly more.28 According to an email summarizing the meeting, CIA Director Hayden 

25

 CIA Director Hayden typically described the program as holding "fewer than a hundred" detainees. For example, 

in testimony before the Committee on February 4, 2008, in response to a question from Chairman Rockefeller 

during an open hearing, Hayden stated, "[iln the life of the CIA detention program we have held fewer than a 

hundred people." (See DTS #2008-1140.) Specific references to "98" detainees were included in a May 5, 2006, 

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) report on Renditions, Detentions and Interrogations. 

See also Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of 

the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques 

that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation ofHighValueal Qaeda Detainees. Other examples of this CIA 

representatio^nclude a statementb^TCofficer^^H^ m to the HPSCI on February 15, 2006, and a 

statement by ^^HCT C Legal ^•^•^•totheSScTo n June 10, 2008. See DTS #2008-2698. 

26

 The Committee's accounting of the number of CIA detainees is conservative and only includes individuals for 

whom there is clear evidence of detention in CIA custody. The Committee thus did not count, among the 119 

detainees, six of the 31 individuals listed in a memo entitled "Updated List of Detainees In | 

•^•H, " attached to a March 2003 email sent by DETENTION SITE COBALT site manager | 

[CIA OFFICER 1], because they were not explicitly described as CIA detainees and because they did not otherwise 

appearinCIA records. (See email from: ^HH|^|HH[C1A0FF1CE R 11; to:|HHflh > H H 

|HI > and HI^^^ H subjectT^^^H^fefl^H H DETAINEES; date: March 2003.) An 

additional individual is the subject of CIA cables describing a planned transfer from U.S. military to CIA custody at 

DETENTION SITE COBALT. He was likewise not included among the 119 CIA detainees because of a lack of 

CIA records confirming either his transfer to, or his presence at, DETENTION SITE COBALT. As detailed in this 

summary, in December 2008, the CIA attempted to identify the total number of CIA detainees. In a graph prepared 

for CIA leadership, the CIA represented the number of CIA detainees as "112+ ?" See 12417 

(I01719Z OCT 02); ALEC (232056Z OCT 02);• • 190159 (240508Z OCT 02); and ALEC WK M 

(301226Z OCT 02). 

37

 15281 

28

 As of June 27, 2013, when the CIA provided its Response to the Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program (hereinafter, the "CIA's June 2013 Response"), the CIA had not yet made an independent 

determination of the number of individuals it had detained. The CIA's June 2013 Response does not address the 

number of detainees determined by the Committee to be held by the CIA, other than to assert that the discrepancy 

between past CIA representations, that there were fewer than 100 detainees, and the Committee's determination of 

there being at least 119 CIA detainees, was not "substantively meaningful." The CIA's June 2013 Response states 

that the discrepancy "does not impact the previously known scale of the program," and that "[i]t remains true that 

approximately 100 detainees were part of the program; not 10 and not 200." The CIA's June 2013 Response also 

states that, "[t]he Study leaves unarticulated what impact the relatively small discrepancy might have had on 

policymakers or Congressional overseers." The CIA's June 2013 Response further asserts that, at the time Director 

Hayden was representing there had been fewer than 100 detainees (2007-2009), the CIA's internal research 

11II I I III I •^•fr/NOFOR N 

Page 14 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

14 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

instructed a CIA officer to devise a way to keep the number of CIA detainees at the same number 

the CIA had previously briefed to Congress. The email, which the briefer sent only to himself, 

stated: 

"I briefed the additional CIA detainees that could be included in RDI29 

numbers. DCIA instructed me to keep the detainee number at 98 ~ pick 

whatever date i [sic] needed to make that happen but the number is 98."30 

While the CIA acknowledged to the House Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) in February 2006 that it had wrongly detained five 

individuals throughout the course of its detention program,31 a review of CIA records indicates 

"indicate[dj the total number of detainees could have been as high as 112," and that "uncertainty existed within CIA 

about whether a group of additional detainees were actually part of the program, partially because some of them had 

passed tlirough [DETENTION SITE COBALT] prior to the formal establishment of the program under CTC 

auspices on 3 December 2002" (emphasis added). This June 27, 2013, CIA statement is inaccurate: the CIA's 

determination at the time was that there had been at least 112 CIA detainees and that the inclusion of detainees held 

prior to December 3, 2002, would make that number higher. On December 20, 2008, a CTC officer informed the 

chief of CTC that "112 were detained by CIA since September 11, 2001," noting "[tjhese revised statistics do not 

include any detainees at [DETENTION SITE COBALT] (other than Gul Rahman) who departed [DETENTION 

SITE COBALT] prior to RDG assuming authority of [DETENTION SITE COBALT] as of 03 December 2002." 

(See "I^^HB i numbers brief.doc," attached to email from: to: 

|, [REDACTED], ^^^^^^^^^subject : Revised Rendition and Detention 

Statistics; date: December 20, 2008.) By December 23, 2008, CTC had created a graph that identified the total 

number of CIA detainees, excluding Gul Rahman, "Post 12/3/02" as 111. The graph identified the total number 

including Gul Rahman, but excluding other detainees "pre-12/3/02" as "112+ ?." (See CIA-produced PowerPoint 

Slide, RDG Numbers, dated December 23,2008.) With regard to the Committee's inclusion of detainees held at 

DETENTION SITE COBALT prior to December 3, 2002, the CIA does not dispute that they were held by the CIA 

pursuant to the same MON authorities as detainees held after that date. Moreover, the CIA has regularly counted 

among its detainees a number of individuals who were held solely at DETENTION SITE COBALT prior to 

December 3, 2002, as well as several who were held exclusively at Country ^^^Hmfacilitie s on behalf of 

the CIA. In discussing the role of DETENTION SITE COBALT in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, 

then Deputy Director of Operations James Pavitt told the CIA Office of Inspector General in August 2003 that 

"there are those who say that [DETENTION SITE COBALT] is not a CIA facility, but that is 'bullshit.'" (See 

Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, James Pavitt, August 21, 

2003.) 

29

 The "Renditions and Interrogations Group," is also referred to as the "Renditions Group," the "Rendition, 

Detention, and Interrogation Group," "RDI," and "RDG" in CIA records. 

30

 Email from: to: HirnselfJ; subject: Meeting with DCIA; date: January 5, 

2009. According to the CIA's June 2013 Response, "Hayden did not view the discrepancy, if it existed, as 

particularly significant given that, if true, it would increase the total number by just over 10 percent." 

31

 They include Sayed Habib, who was detained duetofabrications made by KSM while KSM was being subjected 

to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques (Bj^^ l 1281 (1308012 JUN 04); | 

2817 

. Ali Saeed Awadh, the subject of mistaken identity (ALEC | 

Modin Nik 

Muhammed, whom the CIA determined had been purposeftilly misidentified by a source due to a blood feud 

143701 —Ml ; DIRECTOR • • | 

152893 d^^^riB^^K T Khalid al-Masri, whose "prolonged detention" was determined by the CIA 

Inspector General to be "unjustified" (CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, The Rendition and 

Detention of German Citizen Khalid al-Masri (2004-7601-IG), July 16, 2007, at 83); and Zarmein, who was one of 

11 ii 1111 1 ^BBMiMWi^ B ' >i i ii 

Page 15 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

15 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//B Bf/NOFORN 

that at least 21 additional individuals, or a total of 26 of the 119 (22 percent) CIA detainees 

identified in this Study, did not meet the MON standard for detention.32 This is a conservative 

calculation and includes only CIA detainees whom the CIA itself determined did not meet the 

standard for detention. It does not inclucfc individuals about whom there was internal 

disagreement within the CIA over whether the detainee met the standard or not, or the numerous 

detainees who, following their detention and interrogation, were found not to "pose a continuing 

threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests" or to be "planning terrorist activities" as 

required by the September 17, 2001. MON." With one known exception, there arc no CIA 

"a number of detainees about whom" the CIA knew "very little" (| 1528 

'

2

 They include Abu Hudhaifa, who was subjected to ice water baths and 66 hours of standing sleep deprivation 

before being released because the CIA discovered he was likely not the person he was believed to be 

(WASHINGTON H H 51303 Muhammad Klnin, who, like 

Zarmeiu, was annul); detainees about whom the CIA acknowledged knowing "very little" 

Gul Rahman, another case of mistaken identity (HEADQUARTERS ^ H 

|): Shaistah Habibullah Khan, who, like his brother. Saved Habib, was the subject of fabrications 

by KSM (MEADQUARTERS^^H^^^^^^H) ; HaiKjhaltfi^vkMvas detained as "useful leverage" 

against a family member Nazar AM, an "intellectually 

challenged" individual whti.se taped crying was used as leverage against his family member J 

13065 ^ 4 7 

[29864 J Jimi;i Gill, wlii' wi;s H'lcuscd with a 

payment of and |other curi rn I f^^M^^ B I I | 

133693 | " • _ 53265 

133693 Hayatullah Haqaani, whom the CIA determined "may have been in the 

wrong place (lie wrong time^HHIi^^^l^^l^ l 33322 ^^^^H^^HkAI i Jan. who was detained 

for using a satellite phone, traces on which "revealed no derogatory inform 1542 | 

two individuals Moliammud al-Shomaila and Salah Nasir Salim Ali—on 

whom derogatory information was "speculative" (email from: | REDACTED]; to: | REDACTED!. | REDACTEDI, 

and IREDACTED]: subject: Backgrounders: date: April 19. 2006; 17411 ALEC 

f undated document titled, "Talking Points for HPSCI about Former CIA Detainees"); 

two individuals who were discovered to be foreign government sources prior to being rendered to CIA custody, and 

later determined to be former CIA ([REDACTED!); ALEC| 

((REDACTED!); HEADQUARTERS B^B([^EDACTED|)rseve n individuals | 

thought to be travelling to Iraq to join alQa'ida who were detained based on claims that were "thin but cannot he 

ignored" (email from: IREDACTED]; to: | REDACTED!-, cc: [REDACTED!. I REDACTED). I^H^^^H ' 

I IREDACTED].[REDACTED! . IREDACTED). [REDACTED|; 

subject: Request Chief/CTC Approval to Apprehend and Detain Individuals Departing Imminently for Iraq to Fight 

Against US Forces; date: September 16, 2003); and Btsmullah, who was mistakenly arrested 

\ and later released with and told not to speak about his experience 46620 

33

 For example, the Committee did not include among the 26 individuals wrongfully detained: Dr. Hikmat Naft 

Shaukat. even though it was determined that he was not involved in CBRN efforts and his involvement with al-

|30414 

j u est ions 

ja'ida members was limited to personal relationships with former neighbors (| 

DIRECTOR HH Karim . aka Asat Sar Jan, about whom < 

were raised within the CIA about whether he may have been slandered by a rival tribal faction (| 

^^^•2793 1 [REDACTED] Memo. ^^HH^^^ H SUBJECT: getting a handle on 

detainees); A real a Khan, who suffered disturbing hallucinations after 56 hours of standing sleep deprivation, after 

which the CIA determined thai he "does not appear to he the subject involved in... current plans or activities against 

l^MjereomieU^Lilities'' 1393 (2GI006ZOCT 03): HEADQUARTERS • • 

and Janat Gul. who also suffered "frightful" hallucinations following sleep deprivation and 

about whom the chief of the detention facility wrote, "[t|here simply is no 'smoking gun' that we can refer to thai 

would justify our continued holding of [Janat Gul| at a site such us [DETENTION SITE BLACK]" <| 

K )\>S\ :( U I I M , ,, OK N 

Page 16 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

16 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/JI 1 //NOFORN 

records to indicate that the CIA held personnel accountable for the detention of individuals the 

CIA itself determined were wrongfully detained.34 

2) On at least four occasions, the CIA used host country detention 

sites in Country | to detain individuals on behalf of the CIA who did not meet the MON 

standard for capture and detention. ALEC Station officers at CIA Headquarters explicitly 

acknowledged that these detainees did not meet the MON standard for detention, and 

recommended placing the individuals in host country detention facilities because they did not 

meet the standard. The host country had no independent reason to detain these individuals and 

held them solely at the behest of the CIA.35 

B. The Detention of Abu Zubaydah and the Development and Authorization of the CIA's 

Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 

1. Past Experience Led the CIA to Assess that Coercive Interrogation Techniques Were 

"Counterproductive " and "Ineffective "; After Issuance of the MON, CIA Attorneys 

Research Possible Legal Defense for Using Techniques Considered Torture; the CIA 

Conducts No Research on Effective Interrogations, Relies on Contractors with No 

Relevant Experience 

^^^^^^H^/NF ) At the time of the issuance of the September 17, 2001, MON— 

which, as noted, did not reference interrogation techniques—the CIA had in place long-standing 

formal standards for conducting interrogations. The CIA had shared these standards with the 

1530 04); 1537 04) 104); email 

from: [REDACTED] (COB [DETENTION SITE BLACK]); to: | 

subject: re ^^HIH H date: April 

34

 The CIA's June 2013 Response "acknowledge^] that there were cases in which errors were made," but points 

only to the case of Khalid al Masri, whose wrongful detention was the subject of an Inspector General review. The 

CIA's June 2013 Response does not quantify the number of wrongfully detained individuals, other than to assert that 

it was "far fewer" than the 26 documented by the Committee. The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that 

"the Agency frequently moved too slowly to release detainees," and that "[o]f the 26 cases cited by the Study, we 

adjudicated only three cases in less than 31 days. Most took three to six months. CIA should have acted sooner." 

As detailed in the Study, there was no accountability for personnel responsible for the extended detention of 

individuals determined by the CIA to have been 

ALEC ^^•J^tfta^^HDlRECTO R •••HBH B DIRECTOR 

ALEC^^BfHI^^^^H . Despite the CIA's conclusion that these individuals did not meet the 

standard for detention, these individuals were included in die list of 26 wrongfully detained if they were released, 

but not if they were transferred to the custody of another country. The list thus does not include Hamid Aich, 

although CIA Headquarters recognized that Aich did not meet the threshold for unilateral CIA custody, and sought 

to place him in Country BI^HIi^^ l custody where the CIA could still debrief him. (See DIRECTOR 

I)). Hamid Aich was transferred to Country custod^r^pn^B^003^ui d 

transferred to ^^^^ftanothe r country's] custody more than a month later. (See 36682 

138836 m^H) . The list also does not include 

Mohammad Dinshah, despite a determination prior to his capture that the CIA "does not view Dinshah as meeting 

the 'continuing serious threat' threshold required for this operation to be conducted pursuant to [CIA] authority," 

and a determination, after his capture, that "he does not meet the strict standards required to go to [DETENTION 

SITE COBALT]." (See DIRECTORjH H HEADQUARTERS ^BlB^^BI^M) -

Dinshah was transferred to custody. See HEADQUARTERS | 

11ii 11111 H^^B^BBB^B^ B

 1"'" 

Page 17 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

17 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/JI 1//NOFORN 

Committee. In January 1989, the CIA informed the Committee that "inhumane physical or 

psychological techniques are counterproductive because they do not produce intelligence and 

will probably result in false answers."36 Testimony of the CIA deputy director of operations in 

1988 denounced coercive interrogation techniques, stating, "[pjhysical abuse or other degrading 

treatment was rejected not only because it is wrong, but because it has historically proven to be 

ineffective."37 By October 2001, CIA policy was to comply with the Department of the Army 

Field Manual "Intelligence Interrogation "38 A CIA Directorate of Operations Handbook from 

October 2001 states that the CIA does not engage in "human rights violations," which it defined 

as: "Torture, cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment, or prolonged detention without 

charges or trial." The handbook further stated that "[i]t is CIA policy to neither participate 

directly in nor encourage interrogation which involves the use of force, mental or physical 

torture, extremely demeaning indignities or exposure to inhumane treatment of any kind as an 

aid to interrogation."39 

(U) The CIA did, however, have historical experience using coercive forms of interrogation. In 

1963, the CIA produced the KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Manual, intended as a 

manual for Cold War interrogations, which included the "principal coercive techniques of 

interrogation: arrest, detention, deprivation of sensory stimuli through solitary confinement or 

similar methods, threats and fear, debility, pain, heightened suggestibility and hypnosis, narcosis 

and induced regression."40 Tn 1978, DCI Stansfield Turner asked former CIA officer John 

Limond Hart to investigate the CIA interrogation of Soviet KGB officer Yuri Nosenko41 using 

the KUBARK methods—to include sensory deprivation techniques and forced standing.42 In 

Hart's testimony before the House Sclcct Committee on Assassinations on September 15, 1978, 

he noted that in his 31 years of government service: 

"It has never fallen to my lot to be involved with any experience as unpleasant 

in every possible way as, first, the investigation of this case, and, second, the 

necessity of lecturing upon it and testifying. To me it is an abomination, and I 

36

 January 8, 1989, Letter from John L. Helgerson, Director of Congressional Affairs, to Vice Chairman William S. 

Cohen, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, re: SSCI Questions on HHf t

 a t 7"8 (DTS #1989-0131). 

37

 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of Richard Stolz, Deputy Director for Operations, Central 

Intelligence Agency (June 17, 1988), p. 15 (DTS #1988-2302). 

38

 Attachment to Memorandum entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Terrorists," CTC: 

1026(13 8)/01 from J. Cofer Black, Director of DCI Counterterrorist Center, to Director of Central Intelligence via 

multiple parties, October 25, 2001; Draft of Legal Appendix, "Handling Interrogations." 

39

 Directorate of Operations Handbook, 50-2, Section XX(l)(a), updated October 9,2001. 

40

 KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation, July 1963, at 85. 

41

 According to public records, in the mid-1960s, the CIA imprisoned and interrogated Yuri Nosenko, a Soviet KGB 

officer who defected to the U.S. in early 1964, for three years (April 1964 to September 1967). Senior CIA officers 

at the time did not believe Nosenko was an actual defector and ordered his imprisonment and interrogation. 

Nosenko was confined in a specially constructed "jail," with nothing but a cot, and was subjected to a series of 

sensory deprivation techniques and forced standing. 

42

 Among other documents, see CIA "Family Jewels" Memorandum, 16 May 1973, pp. 5, 23-24, available at 

www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAr 

TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN 

Page 18 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

18 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/JI 1//NOFORN 

am happy to say that... it is not in my memory typical of what my colleagues 

and I did in the agency during the time I was connected with it."43 

(TS/^l^mi^H/lNF ) Notwithstanding the Hart investigation findings, just five years 

later, in 1983, a CIA officer incorporated significant portions of the KUBARK manual into the 

Human Resource Exploitation (HRE) Training Manual, which the same officer used to provide 

interrogation training in Latin America in the early 1980s, and which was used to provide 

interrogation training to the HHI^^^^^^HIi H

 m 198I-44

 CIA officerH^^ M 

was involved in the HRE training and conducted interrogations. The CIA inspector general later 

recommended that he be orally admonished for inappropriate use of interrogation techniques.45 

In the fall of 2002, BH I became the CIA's chief of interrogations in the CIA's Renditions 

Group,46 the officer in charge of CIA interrogations

 47 

(^pg^^m^^^^^^^NF ) Despite the CIA's previous statements that coercive physical and 

psychological interrogation techniques "result in false answers"48 and have "proven to be 

ineffective,"49 as well as the aforementioned early November 2001 determination that "[sjpecific 

methods of interrogation w[ould] be permissible so long as they generally comport with 

commonly accepted practices deemed lawful by U.S. courts,"50 by the end of November 2001, 

CIA officers had begun researching potential legal defenses for using interrogation techniques 

that were considered torture by foreign governments and a non-governmental organization. On 

November 26, 2001, attorneys in the CIA's Office of General Counsel circulated a draft legal 

memorandum describing the criminal prohibition on torture and a potential "novel" legal defense 

for CIA officers who engaged in torture. The memorandum stated that the "CIA could argue that 

the torture was necessary to prevent imminent, significant, physical harm to persons, where there 

is no other available means to prevent the harm," adding that "states may be very unwilling to 

call the U.S. to task for torture when it resulted in saving thousands of lives."51 An August 1, 

43

 "Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," Hearings before the Select Committee on 

Assassinations of U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, Second Session, September 11-15, 1978. 

Testimony of John Hart, pp. 487-536 (September 15, 1978) (DTS #Q04761). 

44

 Transcript of Committee Hearing on Interrogation Manual, June 17, 1988, pp. 3- 4 (DTS #1988-2302). 

45

 April 13, 1989, Memorandum from CIA Inspector General William F. Donnelly to Jim Currie and John Nelson, 

SSCI Staff, re: Answers to SSCI Questions attachment M to Memorandum to Chairman and Vice 

Chairman, re: Inquiry into Interrogation Training, July 10, 1989 (DTS # 1989-0675). See also 

jHlQS^jMeniorandum for Inspector General from [REDACTED], Inspector, via Deputy Inspector General, re: 

HH^H . IG-||84 . 

46

 As noted, the Renditions Group was also known during the program as the "Renditions and Interrogations 

Group," as well as the "Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group," and by the initials, "RDI" and "RDG." 

47

 December 4, 2002, Training Report, Revised Version, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) 

Training Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 ("dHl l

 wa s

 recently assigned to the CTC/RG to manage the HVT 

Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) mission, assuming die role as HVT interrogator/Team Chief."). 

48

 January 8, 1989, Letter from John L. Helgerson, Director of Congressional Affairs to Vice Chairman William S. 

Cohen, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence re: SSCI Questions on at 7-8 (DTS #1989-0131). 

49

 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of Richard Stolz, Deputy Director for Operations, Central 

Intelligence Agency (June 17, 1988), at 15 (DTS #1988-2302). 

so

 November 7, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, "Handling Interrogation." See also Volume I. 

5

' November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers." 

The draft memo cited the "Israeli example" as a possible basis for arguing that "torture was necessary to prevent 

imminent, significant, physical harm to persons, where there is no other available means to prevent the harm." 

mi 11 iii i i mi inn i 

Page 19 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

19 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

2002, OLC memorandum to the White House Counsel includes a similar analysis of the 

"necessity defense" in response to potential charges of torture.52 

(TS/^^^H^HH^/NF ) In January 2002, the National Security Council principals began to 

debate whether to apply the protections of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 

Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 ("Geneva") to the conflict with al-Qa'ida and the Taliban. 

A letter drafted for DCI Tenet to the president urged that the CIA be exempt from any 

application of these protections, arguing that application of Geneva would "significantly hamper 

the ability of CIA to obtain critical threat information necessary to save American lives."53 On 

February 1, 2002—approximately two months prior to the detention of the CIA's first detainee— 

a CIA attorney wrote that if CIA detainees were covered by Geneva there would be "few 

alternatives to simply asking questions." The attorney concluded that, if that were the case, 

"then the optic becomes how legally defensible is a particular act that probably violates the 

convention, but ultimately saves lives."54 

On February 7, 2002, President Bush issued a memorandum stating 

that neither al-Qa'ida nor Taliban detainees qualified as prisoners of war under Geneva, and that 

Common Article 3 of Geneva, requiring humane treatment of individuals in a conflict, did not 

apply to al-Qa'ida or Taliban detainees.55 

From the issuance of the MON to early 2002, there are no 

indications in CIA records that the CIA conducted significant research to identify effective 

interrogation practices, such as conferring with experienced U.S. military or law enforcement 

interrogators, or with the intelligence, military, or law enforcement services of other countries 

with experience in counterterrorism and the interrogation of terrorist suspects.56 Nor are there 

CIA records referencing any review of the CIA's past use of coercive interrogation techniques 

and associated lessons learned. The only research documented in CIA records during this time 

on the issue of interrogation was the preparation of a report on an al-Qa'ida manual that was 

52

 Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 

18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. Like the November 26, 2001, draft memo, the OLC memorandum addressed the Israeli 

example. 

53

 Email to: [REDACTED] cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose 

Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED]; subject: For OOB Wednesday - Draft Letter to the President; date: January 29, 2002. No records 

have been identified to indicate that this letter was or was not sent. 

54

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: |^HHHH|an d [REDACTED]; subject: POW's and Questioning; date: 

February 1, 2002, at 01:02:12 PM. 

55

 February 7, 2002, Memorandum for the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the 

Attorney General, chief of staff to the President, Director of Central Intelligence, Assistant to the President for 

National Security Affairs, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, re. Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban 

Detainees. 

56

 After the CIA was unsuccessful in acquiring information from its last detainee, Muhammad Rahim, using the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, an after-action review in April 2008 suggested that the CIA conduct a 

survey of interrogation techniques used by other U.S. government agencies and other countries in an effort to 

develop effective interrogation techniques. See undated CIA Memorandum, titled After-Action Review, 

author [REDACTED], and undated CIA Memorandum, titled [Rahim] After Action Review: HVDI Assessment, 

with attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concerning the Modification 

of Sleep Deprivation and Reinstatement of Walling as an EIT. For additional information, see Volume I. 

11II II III I —VNOFOR N 

Page 20 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

20 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRKm^^^^^^^^^^BBflNQFOR N 

initially assessed by the CIA to include strategies to resist interrogation. This report was 

commissioned by the CIA's Office of Technical Services (OTS) and drafted by two CIA 

contractors, Dr. Grayson SWIGERT and Dr. Hammond DUNBAR.57 

Both SWIGERT and DUNBAR had been psychologists with the 

U.S. Air Force Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) school, which exposes select 

U.S. military personnel to, among other things, coercive interrogation techniques that they might 

be subjected to if taken prisoner by countries that did not adhere to Geneva protections. Neither 

psychologist had experience as an interrogator, nor did either have specialized knowledge of alQa'ida, a background in terrorism, or any relevant regional, cultural, or linguistic expertise. 

SWIGERT had reviewed research on "learned helplessness," in which individuals might become 

passive and depressed in response to adverse or uncontrollable events.58 He theorized that 

inducing such a state could encourage a detainee to cooperate and provide information.59 

2. The CIA Renders Abu Zubaydah to a Covert Facility, Obtains Presidential Approval 

Without Inter-Agency Deliberation 

(TSyV^m^^^H^NF ) In late March 2002, Pakistani government authorities, working 

with the CIA, captured al-Qa'ida facilitator Abu Zubaydah in a raid during which Abu Zubaydah 

suffered bullet wounds. At that time, Abu Zubaydah was assessed by CIA officers in ALEC 

Station, the office within the CIA with specific responsibility for al-Qa'ida, to possess detailed 

knowledge of al-Qa'ida terrorist attack plans. However, as is described in greater detail in the 

full Committee Study, this assessment significantly overstated Abu Zubaydah's role in al-Qa'ida 

and the information he was likely to possess.60 

57

 Grayson SWIGERT and Hammond DUNBAR, Recognizing and Developing Countermeasures to A1 Qaeda 

Resistance to Interrogation Techniques: A Resistance Training Perspective (undated). See also Memorandum for 

the Record, November 15, 2007, SSCI Staff Briefing with Grayson SWIGERT and Hammond DUNBAR (DTS 

#2009-0572). 

58 See, for example, Memo from Grayson SWIGERT, subject, "Qualifications to provide special 

mission interrogation consultation"; Undated, untitled memo stating: "The following information was obtained by a 

telephone conversation with [REDACTED], | 

, Interrogator Training, Lesson Plan, Title: A Scientific Approach to Successful Interrogation; D1R 

|(031227Z APR 02). ^^^^^ ^ 

59 See, for example, Memo from Grayson SWIGERT, subject: "Qualifications to provide special 

mission interrogation consultation." 

60 See detainee review of Abu Zubaydah in Volume III. See also CIA Intelligence Assessment, August 16, 2006, 

"Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in Afghanistan, 1990-2001." The document states: "Khaldan 

Not Affiliated With Al-Qa'ida. A common misperception in outside articles is that Khaldan camp was run by alQa'ida. Pre-11 September 2001 reporting miscast Abu Zubaydah as a 'senior al-Qa'ida lieutenant,' which led to the 

inference that the Khaldan camp he was administering was tied to Usama bin Laden. The group's flagship camp, alFaruq, reportedly was created in the late 1980s so that bin Laden's new organization could have a training 

infrastructure independent of 'Abdullah Azzam's Maktab al-Khidamat, the nongovernmental organization that 

supported Khaldan. Al-Qa'ida rejected Abu Zubaydah's request in 1993 to join the group and Khaldan was not 

overseen by bin Laden's organization. There were relations between the al-Qa'ida camps and Khaldan. Trainees, 

particularly Saudis, who had finished basic training at Khaldan were referred to al-Qa'ida camps for advanced 

courses, and Khaldan staff observed al-Qa'ida training. The two groups, however, did not exchange trainers." 

m i 11 iii i MIB^B^BWi^ B ii"iHIM i 

Page 21 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

21 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ 1//NOFORN 

(TS/^^m^^^^^y/NF ) On the day that Abu Zubaydah was captured, CIA attorneys 

discussed interpretations of the criminal prohibition on torture that might permit CIA officers to 

engage in certain interrogation activities.61 An attorney in CTC also sent an email with the 

subject line "Torture Update" to H^HCT C Legal listing, without 

commentary, the restrictions on interrogation in the Geneva Conventions, the Convention 

Against Torture, and the criminal prohibition on torture.62 

In late March 2002, anticipating its eventual custody of Abu 

Zubaydah, the CIA began considering options for his transfer to CIA custody and detention 

under the MON. The CIA rejected U.S. military custody BIHIH , in large part because of 

the lack of security and the fact that Abu Zubaydah would have to be declared to the 

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).63 The CIA's concerns about custody at 

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, included the general lack of secrecy and the "possible loss of control to 

US military and/or FBI."64 Rendition to Country | was rejected because of the perception that 

the results of that country's recent interrogations had been disappointing, as well as the intense 

interest in Abu Zubaydah from CIA leadership. As ALEC Station wrote, the CIA needed to 

participate directly in the interrogation, "[n]ot because we believe necessarily we can improve on 

[Country | j performance, but because the reasons for the lack of progress will be transparent 

and reportable up the line."65 

Over the course of four days, the CIA settled on a detention site in 

Country | because of that country's 

and the lack of U.S. court jurisdiction. The only disadvantages identified by the CIA with 

detention in Country | were that it would not be a "USG-controlled facility" and that 

"diplomatic/policy decisions" would be required.66 As a March 28, 2002, CLA document 

acknowledged, the proposal to render Abu Zubaydah to Country | had not yet been broached 

with that country's officials. The document also warned: "[w]e can't guarantee security. If AZ's 

presence does become known, not clear what the impact would be."67 

(TS/^^^^^^I^I^NF ) The decision to detain Abu Zubaydah at a covert detention facility 

in Country | did not involve the input of the National Security Council Principals Committee, 

the Department of State, the U.S. ambassador, or the CIA chief of Station in Country (, 6 8 On 

March 29, 2002, an email from the Office of the Deputy DCI stated that "[w]e will have to 

61

 March 29, 2002, email from [REDACTED] cc: John Rizzo, [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject, NEW INFO: A-Z Interrogation Plan ("I have thought about the 18 USC 

sect. 2340 issues we briefly discussed yesterday."). 

62

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ^Hlfl^H ; subject: Torture Update; date: March 28, 2002, at 11:28:17 

AM. 

63

 19595 (281106Z MAR 02). PowerPoint presentation, Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 27, 

2002. 

64

 PowerPoint presentation, Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 27, 2002. PowerPoint presentation, 

Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 28, 2002. 

65

 ALEC (282105Z MAR 02) 

66

 PowerPoint presentation, Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 27, 2002. 

67

 PowerPoint presentation, Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 28, 2002. 

68

 Email from: [REDACTED] HflH R

 to :

 James Pavitt; subject: DCI Decision on [DETENTION SITE 

GREEN] Briefing for Armitage; date: September26^002jDIRECTOR^^B (HH | MAR 02). 

m i i II i i MBBI^^^MBM I

 1111

 " | M 1 

Page 22 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

22 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/JI 1 //NOFORN 

acknowledge certain gaps in our planning/preparations, but this is the option the DDCI will lead 

with for POTUS consideration."69 That morning, the president approved moving forward with 

the plan to transfer Abu Zubaydah to Country |. 7 0 During the same Presidential Daily Brief 

(PDB) session, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld suggested exploring the option of putting Abu 

Zubaydah on a ship; however, CIA records do not indicate any further input from the 

jrincipals.71 That day, the CIA Station in Country | obtained the approval of Country |' s 

officials for the CIA detention site.72 The U.S. deputy chief of mission in 

Country who was notified by the CIA Station after Country J's leadership, concurred in the 

absence of the ambassador, ^fl^^fl^^^^HHI^^HB 7 3 Shortly thereafter, Abu 

Zubaydah was rendered from Pakistan to Country | where he was held at the first CIA 

detention site, referred to in this summary as "DETENTION SITE GREEN."74 CIA records 

indicate that Country | was the last location of a CIA detention facility known to the president 

or the vice president, as subsequent locations were kept from the principals as a matter of White 

House policy to avoid inadvertent disclosures of the location of the CIA detention sites.75 

3. Tensions with Host Country Leadership and Media Attention Foreshadow Future 

Challenges 

1) The day after the rendition of Abu Zubaydah to DETENTION 

SITE GREEN, the which was responsible for the security of 

the detention facility, linked its support for the CIA's detention site to a request for | 

support from the CIA The CIA eventually provided the 

requested | 

According to CIA cables and internal documents, | 

69

 Email from: HHHHH : to: HIHH A subject: A-Z Interrogation Plan; date: March 29, 2002. 

POTUS is an abbreviation for President of the United States. 

70

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: subject: NEW INFO: A-Z Interrogation Plan; date: March 29, 

2002. 

71

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: HHi^H > subject: A-Z Interrogation Plan; email from: 

[REDACTED] ^HH ; to: James Pavitt; subject: DCI Decision on [DETENTION SITE GREEN] Briefing for 

Armitage; date: September 26, 2002. After the PDB session, the assistant secretary of state

 wa s 

briefed. The assistant secretary indicated that he would brief the secretary and deputy secretary of state. An internal 

CIA email stated that at the NSC, only National Security Advisor Rice and Deputy National Security Advisor 

Hadley were briefed. See DIRECTOR • • (H^ H MAR 02); email from: [REDACTED] fl^^fl; to: 

James Pavitt; date: September 26, 2002. 

72

 [REDACTED] 69132 MAR 02) 

73

 [REDACTED] 69132 (H| | MAR 02) 

74

 For additional information on the rendition of Abu Zubaydah and the establishment of DETENTION SITE 

GREEN, see. Volume 1. ^^ ^ 

75

 HEADQUARTERS [REDACTED]; HEADQUARTERS ••Hfl^HH B CIA records 

indicate that the CIA had not informed policymakers of the presence of CIA detention facilities in Countries | 

and It is less clear whether policymakers were aware of the detention facilities in Country | and at Guantanamo 

Bay, Cuba. 

76 See, for example, [REDACTED] 70240 (300614Z APR 02); [REDACTED] 70112 (250929Z APR 02); 

[REDACTED] 70459 (080545Z MAY 02); Congressional Notification: Intelligence Support to | 

Operation, 1200 2 (DTS #2002-2932); and 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence; FROM: ~ 

|; SUBJECT: Your meeting with 

12002; cover page dated 2002. 

TOP SECRET/, 

Page 23 of 499 

y/NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

23 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NQFORN 

| to replace | 

| individuals responsible for supporting 

the CIA's detention facility.77 Those officials were replaced by different officials whom the CIA 

believed were not supportive of the CIA's detention site.78 Despite considerable effort by the 

CIA^tationin Countiyltoretaii^upport for DETENTION SITE GREEN from its new 

partners, ll^^l^H H called for the closing of the CIA detention facility 

within three weeks.79 Continued lobbying by the chief of Station, however, eventually led 

Country | to reverse this decision, allowing DETENTION SITE GREEN to remain 

operational.80 

On April 2002, the CIA Station in Country | attempted to list 

the number of Country | officers who, "[t]o the best of Station's knowledge," had "knowledge 

of the presence of Abu Zubaydah" in a specific city in Country The list included eight 

individuals, references to "various" personnel ^gggg^gg ^ an d {h e »staff» of H 

••H , and concluded "[d]oubtless many others."81 By April H , 2002, 

a media organization had learned that Abu Zubaydah was in Country prompting the CIA to 

explain to the media organization the "security implications" of revealing the information.82 The 

CIA Station in Country | also expressed concern that press inquiries "would do nothing for our 

liaison and bilateral relations, possibly diminishing chances that [the ^^^Bl^ l of Country 

| ] will permit [Abu Zubaydah] to remain in country or that he would accept other [Abu 

Zubaydah]-like renderees in the future."83 In November 2002, after the CIA learned that a major 

U.S. newspaper knew that Abu Zubaydah was in Country senior CIA officials, as well as Vice 

President Cheney, urged the newspaper not to publish the information.84 While the U.S. 

newspaper did not reveal Country | as the location of Abu Zubaydah, the fact that it had the 

information, combined with previous media interest, resulted in the decision to close 

DETENTION SITE GREEN.85 

FBI Officers Are the First to Question Abu Zubaydah, Who States He Intends to 

Cooperate; Abu Zubaydah is Taken to a Hospital Where He Provides Information the 

CIA Later Describes as "Important" and "Vital" 

on March 

) After Abu Zubaydah was rendered to DETENTION SITE GREEN 

, 2002, he was questioned by special agents from the Federal Bureau of 

77 See, for example, [REDACTED] 74636 

78

 [REDACTED] 76975 

79

 [REDACTED] 77115 

80

 [REDACTED] 77281 The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[i]t was only as leaks 

detailing the program began to emerge that foreign partners felt compelled to alter the scope of their involvement." 

As described, however, the tensions with Country | were unrelated to public revelations about the program. 

81

 [REDACTED] 69626 ••^•• B 

82

 Email from: William Harlow, Director of the CIA Office of Public Affairs; to: John McLaughlin, Buzzy 

Krongard, John Moseman, John Rizzo, James Pavitt, [REDACTED], Stanley Moskowitz; subject: [REDACTED] 

call Re: Abu Zubaydah; date: April 25, 2002,12:06:33 PM. 

83

 [REDACTED] 701681 

84

 ALEC H H

 A Pr i l

 6> 2006, Interview, | Chief, Renditions and 

Detainees Group 

85

 DIRECTOR | 

TOP SECRET//I — 

Page 24 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

24 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/JI 1//NOFORN 

Investigation (FBI) who spoke Arabic and had experience interrogating members of al-Qa'ida. 

Abu Zubaydah confirmed his identity to the FBI officers, informed the FBI officers he wanted to 

cooperate, and provided background information on his activities. That evening, Abu 

Zubaydah's medical condition deteriorated rapidly and he required immediate hospitalization. 

Although Abu Zubaydah was largely unable to communicate because of a breathing tube, he 

continued to provide information to FBI and CIA officials at the hospital using an Arabic 

alphabet chart. According to records, the FBI officers remained at Abu Zubaydah's bedside 

throughout this ordeal and assisted in his medical care. When Abu Zubaydah's breathing tube 

was removed on April 8, 2002, Abu Zubaydah provided additional intelligence and reiterated his 

intention to cooperate.85 

During an April 10, 2002, debriefing session, conducted in the 

hospital's intensive care unit, Abu Zubaydah revealed to the FBI officers that an individual 

named "Mukhtar" was the al-Qa'ida "mastermind" of the 9/11 attacks. Abu Zubaydah identified 

a picture of Mukhtar provided by the FBI from the FBI's Most Wanted list. The picture was of 

Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM), who had been indictcd in 1996 for his role in Ramzi 

Yousef s terrorist plotting to detonate explosives on 12 United States-flagged aircraft and destroy 

them mid-flight over the Pacific Ocean.87 Abu Zubaydah told the interrogators that "Mukhtar" 

was related to Ramzi Yousef, whom Abu Zubaydah said was in an American jail (Yousef had 

been convicted for the aforementioned terrorist plotting and was involved in the 1993 World 

Trade Center terrorist attack).88 

(TS^^BH^^P&JF ) Abu Zubaydah told the FBI officers that "Mukhtar" trained the 

9/11 hijackers and also provided additional information on KSM's background, to include that 

KSM spoke fluent English, was approximately 34 years old, and was responsible for al-Qa'ida 

operations outside of Afghanistan.89 Subsequent representations on the success of the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program consistently describe Abu Zubaydah's identification of 

KSM's role in the September 11, 2001, attacks, as well as his identification of KSM's alias 

("Mukhtar"), as being "important" and "vital" information.90 A review of CIA records found 

that this information was corroborative of information already in CIA databases.91 

5. While Abu Zubaydah is Hospitalized, CIA Headquarters Discusses the Use of Coercive 

Interrogation Techniques Against Abu Zubaydah 

10005 (092316Z APR 02). See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional 

information. ^^^ ^ 

87 See United States Court of Appeals, August Term, 2001, U.S. v Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, and DIRECTOR • • 

H-TAN 02). See also ^^••^^•CI A MAR 02). 

^ 10022 (121216Z APR 02). CIA records include the variant spelling, "Muhktar." KSM was placed on 

the FBI's public "Most Wanted Terrorist" list on October 10,2001. See also U.S. Department of Justice materials 

related to Ramzi Ahmed Yousef. 

89

 H^ H 10022(1212167 APR 02); 18334 (261703Z MAR 02) 

90 See, for example, President Bush's September 6, 2006, speech, based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, 

which stated that Abu Zubaydah provided "quite important" information and "disclosed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, 

or KSM, was the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks and used the alias Mukhtar. This was a vital piece of the 

puzzle that helped our intelligence community pursue KSM." 

91 See information later in this summary and Volume II for additional details. I I II I I I I I I III II 

Page 25 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

25 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

(TSZ/H^I^^I^^B^^ ) While Abu Zubaydah was still hospitalized, personnel at CIA 

Headquarters began discussing how CIA officers would interrogate Abu Zubaydah upon his 

return to DETENTION SITE GREEN. The initial CIA interrogation proposal recommended that 

the interrogators engage with Abu Zubaydah to get him to provide information, and suggested 

that a "hard approach," involving foreign government personnel, be taken "only as a last 

resort."92 At a meeting about this proposal, ^^^^^^CT C Legal, 

recommended that a psychologist working on contract in the CIA's Office of Technical Services 

(OTS), Grayson SWIGERT, be used by CTC to "provide real-time recommendations to 

overcome Abu Zubaydah^esistance to interrogation."93 SWIGERT had come to ^^H^l' s 

attention through who worked in OTS. Shortly thereafter, CIA 

Headquarters formally proposed that Abu Zubaydah be kept in an all-white room that was lit 24 

hours a day, that Abu Zubaydah not be provided any amenities, that his sleep be disrupted, that 

loud noise be constantly fed into his cell, and that only a small number of people interact with 

him. CIA records indicate that these proposals were based on the idea that such conditions 

would lead Abu Zubaydah to develop a sense of "learned helplessness."94 CIA Headquarters 

then sent an interrogation team to Country including SWIGERT, whose initial role was to 

consult on the psychological aspects of the interrogation.95 

DCI Tenet was provided an update on the Abu Zubaydah 

interrogation plans on April 12, 2002. The update stated that the CIA team was preparing for 

Abu Zubaydah's transfer back to DETENTION SITE GREEN, and noted the CIA interrogation 

team intended to "set the stage" and increase control over Abu Zubaydah.96 The update stated: 

"Our [CIA] lead interrogator will require Abu Zubaydah to reveal the most 

sensitive secret he knows we are seeking; if he dissembles or diverts the 

conversation, the interview will stop and resume at a later time.... In 

accordance with the strategy, and with concurrence from FBI Headquarters, 

the two on-site FBI agents will no longer directly participate in the 

interview/debriefing sessions."97 

Attachment to email from: [REDACTED] [REDACTED]; to: ^HH^^H B subject: Interrogation 

Strategy, Powerpoint on H^H^^^ I [Abu Zubaydah] Interrogation Strategy, 01 April 2002; date: March 

31,2002. ^^^^^^ ^ 

93

 Email from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], cc: April 1,2002, re: POC for [Grayson 

SWIGERT]- consultant who drafted al-Qa'ida resistance to interrogation backgrounder (noting that CTC/LGL 

woukUeach out to SWIGERT). According to die email, after the meeting, IH^HHCT C Legal, 

W ^ m provided SWIGERT's contact information to ALEC Station officers, noting that it was SWIGERT 

who composed an OTS assessment on al-Qa'ida resistance techniques. 

94

 On the evening of April 1, 2002, "at the request of CTC/OPSand ALEC" Station, a cable from OTS with a 

proposed interrogation strategy was sent to Country | (H^ H 178955 (012236Z APR 02). The information in 

this cable was consistent with a subsequent cable, which was coordinated with SWIGERT, that proposed "several 

environmental modifications to create an atmosphere that enhances the strategic interrogation process." The cable 

noted, "[t |he deliberate manipulation of the environment is intended to cause psychological disorientation, and 

reduced psychological wherewithal for the interrogation," as well as "the deliberate establishment of psychological 

dependence upon the interrogator," and "an increased sense of learned helplessness." (See [REDACTED] 69500 

(070009Z APR 02).) For detailed information, see Volume I and the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III. 

95

 DIRECTOR • • APR 02) 

56

 CIA Sensitive Addendum "Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation," dated 12 April 2002, "1630 Hours." 

97

 CIA Sensitive Addendum "Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation," dated 12 April 2002, "1630 Hours." 

m i 11 iii i UBBMi^^BBM 1 mi l ur n i 

Page 26 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

26 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECi^^^^——//NQFQR N 

The FBI special agents questioning Abu Zubaydah at the hospital 

objected to the CIA's plans. In a message to FBI Headquarters, an FBI special agent wrote that 

the CIA psychologists had acquired "tremendous influence."98 The message further stated: 

"AZ's health has improved over the last two days and Agency [CIA] is ready 

to move [Abu Zubaydah] out of the hospital and back to^H^^^o n 

in an elaborate plan to change AZ's environment. Agency [CIA] 

advised this day that they will be immediately changing tactics in all future AZ 

interviews by having only there [sic] [CIA officer] interact with AZ (there will 

be no FBI presence in interview room). This change contradicts all 

conversations had to date.... They believe AZ is offering, 'throw away 

information' and holding back from providing threat information (It should be 

note [sic] that we have obtained critical information regarding AZ thus far and 

have now got him speaking about threat information, albeit from his hospital 

bed and not [an] appropriate interview environment for full follow-up (due to 

his health). Suddenly the psychiatric team here wants AZ to only interact with 

their [CIA officer, and the CIA sees this] as being the best way to get the threat 

information.... We offered several compromise solutions... all suggestions 

were immediately declined without further discussion. .. .This again is quite 

odd as all information obtained from AZ has come from FBI lead interviewers 

and questioning.... 1 have spent an un-calculable amount of hours at [Abu 

Zubaydah's] bedside assisting with medical help, holding his hand and 

comforting him through various medical procedures, even assisting him in 

going [to] the bathroom.... We have built tremendous report [sic] with AZ and 

now that we are on the eve of 'regular' interviews to get threat information, we 

have been 'written out' of future interviews."99 

6. New CIA Interrogation Plan Focuses on Abu Zubaydah's "Most Important Secret"; FBI 

Temporarily Barred from the Questioning of Abu Zubaydah; Abu Zubaydah then Placed 

in Isolation for 47 Days Without Questioning 

(^S/ylHHHUH^P ) On April 13, 2002, while Abu Zubaydah was still at the hospital, 

the CIA implemented the "new interrogation program."100 This initial meeting was held with 

just one interrogator in the room and lasted 11. minutes. A cable stated that the CIA interrogator 

was coached by the "psychological team."101 The CIA interrogator advised Abu Zubaydah that 

he (Abu Zubaydah) "had a most important secret that [the interrogator] needed to know." 

According to the cable, Abu Zubaydah "amazingly" nodded in agreement about the secret, but 

98

 Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu 

Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS 

#2010-2939). 

99

 Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu 

Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS 

#2010-2939). 

110026 (131233Z APR 02) 

110026 (131233Z APR 02) 

llll I I III I MMfJI^^^^MB^NOFOR N 

Page 27 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

27 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

"did not divulge any information, as [the interrogation team] expected."102 A cable further 

explained that Abu Zubaydah indicated that he understood that the key question was about 

"impending future terrorist plans against the United States,"103 and that the CIA officer told Abu 

Zubaydah to signal for him "when he decides to discuss that 'one key item he knows he is 

keeping from the [interrogator].'"104 The FBI officers provided a similar account to FBI 

Headquarters, adding that: "We spent the rest of the day in the adjoining room with [the CIA 

officer] and one of the psychiatrists [REDACTED] waiting for [Abu Zubaydah] to signal he was 

ready to talk. [Abu Zubaydah] apparently went to sleep... they did not approach [Abu 

Zubaydah] the rest of the day."105 In their communications with FBI Headquarters, the FBI 

officers wrote that they explained their rapport-building approaches to the CIA interrogation 

team and "tried to explain that we have used this approach before on other Al-Qaeda members 

with much success (al-Owhali,106 KKM, Jandal, Badawi etc.). We tried to politely suggest that 

valuable time was passing where we could attempt to solicit threat information...."107 

vxmm^mmw ) On April 15, 2002, per a scripted plan, the same CIA interrogator 

delivered what a CIA cable described as "the pre-move message" to Abu Zubaydah: that "time is 

running out," that his situation had changed, and that the interrogator was disappointed that Abu 

Zubaydah did not signal "to discuss the one thing he was hiding."108 Abu Zubaydah was sedated 

and moved from the hospital to DETENTION SITE GREEN. When Abu Zubaydah awoke at 

11:00 PM, four hours after his arrival, he was described as surprised and disturbed by his new 

situation. An April 16, 2002, cable states the "objective is to ensure that [Abu Zubaydah] is at 

his most vulnerable state."109 

(TS/^^B^^^^H^^ ) A cable described Abu Zubaydah's ccll as white with no natural 

lighting or windows, but with four halogen lights pointed into the cell.110 An air conditioner was 

also in the room. A white curtain separated the interrogation room from the ccll. The 

interrogation cell had three padlocks. Abu Zubaydah was also provided with one of two chairs 

that were rotated based on his level of cooperation (one described as more comfortable than the 

other). Security officers wore all black uniforms, including boots, gloves, balaclavas, and 

goggles to keep Abu Zubaydah from identifying the officers, as well as to prevent Abu Zubaydah 

"from seeing the security guards as individuals who he may attempt to establish a relationship or 

dialogue with."111 The security officers communicated by hand signals when they were with 

102

 10026 (131233Z APR 02) 

103

 10029 (131505Z APR 02) 

104

 10029 (131505Z APR 02) 

105

 Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu 

Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS 

#2010-2939). 

106 See Intelligence Science Board "Intelligence Interviewing: Teaching Papers and Case Studies" for additional 

details on the FBI's interrogation of Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali. 

107

 Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu 

Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS 

#2< 

110 

108 

II 

109 

10043 (151614Z APR 02) 

10047 (161406Z APR 02) 

10116 (250731Z APR 02) 

10053 (162029Z APR 02) 

TOP SECRET/, 7NOFORN 

Page 28 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

28 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

Abu Zubaydah and used hand-cuffs and leg shackles to maintain control. In addition, either loud 

rock music was played or noise generators were used to enhance Abu Zubaydah's "sense of 

hopelessness."112 Abu Zubaydah was typically kept naked and sleep deprived.113 

An April 16, 2002, cable explained that the interrogation strategy 

had shifted since Abu Zubaydah's medical condition prevented "total isolation as originally 

planned." According to the cable, a 24-hour interrogation strategy was now "deemed to be the 

best approach" for acquiring information. As a result, the FBI officers were once again allowed 

to question Abu Zubaydah.114 On April 17, 2002, an FBI officer met with Abu Zubaydah for six 

hours.115 FBI records state that Abu Zubaydah had "not seen the interviewing (FBI) agent" since 

April 11, 2002, but that Abu Zubaydah greeted the agent by name.116 During the questioning 

Abu Zubaydah denied any knowledge related to specific targets for a pending attack and 

"advised that many of the brothers on the front lines (nfi) [no further information] talked about 

all types of attacks against America but that for the most part this was usually just talk and that 

[the United States] should not be concerned about this type of talk."117 Abu Zubaydah provided 

information on al-Qa'ida, KSM, his past travel to the United States, as well as general 

information on extremists in Pakistan.118 

(TS/Zm^HII^I^NF ) Abu Zubaydah continued to provide information to interrogators 

throughout April 2002, but not information on pending attacks against the United States. On the 

evening of April 20, 2002, Abu Zubaydah told the FBI officers about two men who approached 

him with a plan to detonate a uranium-based explosive device in the United States. Abu 

Zubaydah stated he did not believe the plan was viable and did not know the names of the two 

individuals, but provided physical descriptions of the pair.119 This information was acquired 

after Abu Zubaydah was confronted with emails indicating that he had sent the two individuals 

to KSM.120 The CIA would later represent that this information was acquired "as a result" of the 

use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and that the information acquired resulted in 

110116 (250731Z APR 02). CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah was nude, but given a towel to 

cover himself when interrogated. See, for exampl^Jj m 10080 (200735Z APR 02). 

113 B H H 1005 3

 (162029Z APR 02);^^^^10094(21 l90i z APR02 ) -

 A s

 detailed in Volume III, the FBI 

Special Agents only questioned Abu Zubaydah when he was covered with a towel. Sleep deprivation during this 

period also differed from how sleep deprivation was implemented after the Department of Justice approved the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in August 2002. Rather than being placed in a stress position during sleep 

deprivation, Abu Zubaydah was kept awake by being questioned nearly non-stop by CIA and FBI interrogators. 

Records further indicate that during breaks in the interrogations at this time, Abu Zubaydah was allowed to briefly 

sleep. See, for example, •• • 10116 (250731Z APR 02). 

110047 (161406Z APR 02) 

110058 (171904Z APR 02) 

116

 Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu 

Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS 

#2010-2939). 

117 I^H H 10058 (171904Z APR 02) 

118 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional information. 

119

 •• • 10090 (210703Z APR 02). As described in more detail in Volume II, Abu Zubaydah did provide 

kunyas for the pair. 

120

 MH i

 1006 3

 (180515Z APR 02). As described in detail in Volume II and Volume III, as well as more 

briefly in this summary, Abu Zubaydah provided this information after being allowed to sleep. 11 ii 11 i i i MWI^B^MBB B i ii i II 

Page 29 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

29 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/JI 1//NOFORN 

the thwarting of the "Dirty Bomb Plot" and the capture of Jose Padilla.121 However, the chief of 

the Abu Zubaydah Task Force stated that "AZ's info alone would never have allowed us to find 

them," while another CIA officer stated that the CIA was already "alert" to the threat posed by 

Jose Padilla, and that the CIA's "suspicion" was only "enhanced during the debriefings of Abu 

Zubaydah."122 Additional information on the "Dirty Bomb Plot" and the capture of Jose Padilla 

is provided later in this summary. 

(TS^HI^mHH^^ ) During the month of April 2002, which included a period during 

which Abu Zubaydah was hospitalized, on life support, and unable to speak, the CIA 

disseminated 39 intelligence reports based on his interrogations.123 At the end of April 2002, the 

DETENTION SITE GREEN interrogation team provided CIA Headquarters with three 

interrogation strategies. CIA Headquarters chose the most coercive interrogation option, which 

was proposed and supported by CIA contractor SWIGERT.124 This coercive interrogation 

option—which included sensory deprivation—was again opposed by the FBI special agents at 

the detention site.125 The interrogation proposal was to engage in "only a single-minded, 

consistent, totally focused questioning of current threat information."126 Once implemented, this 

approach failed to produce the information CIA Headquarters believed Abu Zubaydah 

possessed: threats to the United States and information about al-Qa'ida operatives located in the 

United States. Nonetheless, Abu Zubaydah continued to provide other intelligence. In May 

2002, the CIA disseminated 56 intelligence reports based on the interrogations.127 

(TS/^^^^H^^^^/NF ) In early June 2002, the CIA interrogation team recommended that 

Abu Zubaydah spend several weeks in isolation while the interrogation team members departed 

the facility "as a means of keeping [Abu Zubaydah] off-balance and to allow the team needed 

time off for a break and to attend to personal matters as well as to discuss "the 

endgame" of Abu Zubaydah HI H with officers from CIA Headquarters.128 As a result, from 

June 18, 2002, through August 4, 2002, Abu Zubaydah spent 47 days in isolation without being 

121 See information in this summary and Volume II for additional details on the CIA's representations on the 

effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to policy makers and the Department of Justice. 

122

 CIA email from: H^^HHHR t o : ^I^I^^H^ H subject: AZ information; date: July 10,2002, at 

01:18:50 PM. The email states: "The only way we put this together is that Paki liaison mentioned to 

the arrest of two individuals (one being an American) and H^^BHH Put two anc '

t w o

 together. Therefore, AZ's 

info alone would never have allowed us to find them." See also SSCI Transcript "Detention of Jose Padilla," dated 

June 12, 2002 (DTS #2002-2603), in which a CIA officer states, "the Pakistani liaison felt it was important to bring 

[Padilla] to our attention, given the recent raids.. .there was enough information indicating that his travel was 

suspicious, to put us on alert. This suspicion was enhanced during the debriefings of Abu Zubaydah, which 

occurred on 21 April." 

'"Se e analysis provided to the Committee on April 18, 2011, by the CIA, based on CIA searches in 2011 of the 

^B^latabase. The titles of specific intelligence reports resulting from information provided by Abu Zubaydah are 

listed in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III. 

124

 ALEC ^^ ^ •• • MAY 02) 

125 See email exchange from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; with multiple ccs; subject: Turning Up the Heat in 

the AZ Interrogations; date: April 30, 2002, at 12:02:47 PM. 

126 See email exchange from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; with multiple ccs; subject: Turning Up the Heat in 

the AZ Interrogations; date: April 30,2002, at 12:02:47 PM. 

TMSee analysis provided to the Committee on April 18,2011, by the CIA, based on CIA searches in 2011 of the 

database. The titles of specific intelligence reports resulting from information provided by Abu Zubaydah are 

listed in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III. 

I2H 10424 (070814ZJUN 02) 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 30 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

30 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/JI 1//NOFORN 

asked any questions. Despite the fact that Abu Zubaydah was in isolation for nearly half of the 

month, the CIA disseminated 37 intelligence reports based on the interrogations of Abu 

Zubaydah in June 2002.129 The CIA would later represent publicly—as well as in classified 

settings-—that during the use of "established US Government interrogation techniques," Abu 

Zubaydah "stopped all cooperation" in June 2002, requiring the development of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques.130 CIA records do not support this assertion. 

Prior to Abu Zubaydah's 47-day isolation period, Abu Zubaydah 

provided information on al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships, in addition to 

information on its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, 

training, and tactics.131 As described in more detail in the full Committee Study, Abu 

Zubaydah's inability to provide information on the next attack in the United States and 

operatives in the United States served as the basis for CIA representations that Abu Zubaydah 

was "uncooperative," as well as for the CIA's determination that Abu Zubaydah required the use 

of what would later be known as the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques" to become 

"compliant" and reveal the information the CIA believed he was withholding. Abu Zubaydah 

never provided this information, and CIA officers later concluded this was information Abu 

Zubaydah did not possess.132 

(^S/V^BBBjjj^^B^yNF) After Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation, the Abu Zubaydah 

IIIIIIIII | iliniili M I ^^BBH^BBBH^^BI[departe d Country Security and medical 

personnel remained at the detention site. The FBI special agents did not return to DETENTION 

SITE GREEN.133 

7. Proposal by CIA Contract Personnel to Use SERE-Based Interrogation Techniques 

Leads to the Development of the CIA 's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; The CIA 

Determines that "the Interrogation Process Takes Precedence Over Preventative 

Medical Procedures " 

m

 See analysis provided to tlie Committee on April 18, 2011, by the CIA, based on CIA searches in 2011 of the 

H I database. The titles of specific intelligence reports resulting from information provided by Abu Zubaydah are 

listed in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III of the Committee Study. 

130 See Presidential Speech on September 6,2006, based on CIA information and vetted by CI A personnel. See also 

ODNI September 2006 Unclassified Public Release: "During initial interrogation, Abu Zubaydah gave some 

information that lie probably viewed as nominal. Some was important, however, including that Khalid Shaykh 

Mohammad (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the moniker 'Mukhtar.' This identification allowed us to 

comb previously collected intelligence for both names, opening up new leads to this terrorist plotter—leads that 

eventually resulted in his capture. It was clear to his interrogators that Abu Zubaydah possessed a great deal of 

information about al-Qa'ida; however, he soon stopped all cooperation. Over the ensuing months, the CIA designed 

a new interrogation program that would be safe, effective, and legal." See also CIA Director Michael Hayden, 

Classified Statement for the Record, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation 

Program, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-1563) ("...FBI and CIA continued unsuccessfully to try to glean information 

from Abu Zubaydah using established US Government interrogation techniques...."). 

131 See reporting charts in Abn Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, as well as CIA paper entitled "Abu 

Zubaydah," dated March 2005. The same information is included in an "Abu Zubaydah Bio" document "Prepared 

on 9 August 2006." 

132 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details. 

133 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume IB for additional details. 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 31 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

31 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/JI 1//NOFORN 

In early July 2002, CIA officers held several meetings at CIA 

Headquarters to discuss the possible use of "novel interrogation methods" on Abu Zubaydah.134 

During the course of those meetings SWIGERT proposed using techniques derived from the U.S. 

military's SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape) school.135 SWIGERT provided a 

list of 12 SERE techniques for possible use by the CIA: (1) the attention grasp, (2) walling, (3) 

facial hold, (4) facial slap, (5) cramped confinement, (6) wall standing, (7) stress positions, (8) 

sleep deprivation, (9) waterboard, (10) use of diapers, (11) use of insects, and (12) mock 

burial.136 SWIGERT also recommended that the CIA enter into a contract with Hammond 

DUNBAR, his co-author of the CIA report on potential al-Qa'ida interrogation resistance 

training, to aid in the CIA interrogation process.137 Like SWIGERT, DUNBAR had never 

participated in a real-world interrogation. His interrogation experience was limited to the paper 

he authored with SWIGERT and his work with U.S. Air Force personnel at the SERE school.138 

134 See CIA document dated, July 3, 2002, .1630 Hours, titled, "CIA Operational Update Memorandum for CIA 

Leadership, SENSITIVE ADDENDUM: Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation and H i Raid 

135

 For more information on the SERE program, see the Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry into the 

Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, December 2008. See also statement of Senator Carl Levin on the inquiry, 

December 11, 2008: "SERE training is intended to be used to teach our soldiers how to resist interrogation by 

enemies that refuse to follow the Geneva Conventions and international law. In SERE school, our troops who are at 

risk of capture are exposed in a controlled environment with great protections and caution - to techniques adapted 

from abusive tactics used against American soldiers by enemies such as the Communist Chinese during the Korean 

War. SERE training techniques include stress positions, forced nudity, use of fear, sleep deprivation and, until 

recently, the Navy SERE school used the waterboard. These techniques were designed to give our students a taste 

of what they might be subjected to if captured by a ruthless, lawless enemy so that they would be better prepared to 

resist. The techniques were never intended to be used against detainees in U.S. custody. As one [Joint Personnel 

Recovery Agency (JPRA)] instructor explained, SERE training is based on illegal exploitation (under the rules listed 

in the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War) of prisoners over the last 50 years." 

135

 Email from: to: subject: Description of Physical Pressures; date: July 8, 

2002, at 04:15:15 PM. 

137

 ALEC • • (051724Z JUL 02) 

138 See Resume, Hammond DUNBAR, submitted to the CLA in March 2003. In a section on "Interrogation and 

Debriefing Experience," DUNBAR's 2003 resume noted that he had been a "dehriefer for all USG DOD and 

Civilian 

|.)." All other experience in the section related to his 

interrogation experience as a contractor for the CIA beginning in 2002. DUNBAR's resume did state that he had 

participated in an interrogation training course in in 1992, and that he had taken a one-week 

Defense Interrogation Course at some point in 2002, although his resume does not indicate whether this was prior to, 

or after, the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the Committee Study was 

"incorrect... in asserting that the contractors selected had no relevant experience." The CIA's June 2013 Response 

notes SWIGERT and DUNBAR's experience at the Department of Defense SERE school, and SWIGERT's 

"academic research" and "research papers" on "such topics as resistance training, captivity familiarization, and 

learned helplessness - all of which were relevant to the development of the program." The CIA's June 2013 

Response does not describe any experience related to actual interrogations or counterterrorism, or any relevant 

cultural, geographic, or linguistic expertise. The CIA's June 2013 Response provides tine following explanation: 

"Drs. [SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR] had the closest proximate expertise CIA sought at the beginning of the program, 

specifically in the area of non-standard means of interrogation. Experts on traditional interrogation methods did not 

meet this requirement. Non-standard interrogation methodologies were not an area of expertise of CIA officers or of 

the US Government generally. We believe their expertise was so unique that we would have been derelict had we 

not sought them out when it became clear that CIA would be heading into the uncharted territory of the program" 

(italics and emphasis in original). As noted above, the CIA did not seek out SWIGERT and DUNBAR after a 

decision was made to use coercive interrogation techniques; rather, SWIGERT and DUNBAR played a role in 

convincing the CIA to adopt such a policy. 

11 ii 1111 1 

Page 32 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

32 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/JI 1 //NOFORN 

(^SyV^^I^^HIHr^ 1) I" May 2003, a senior CIA interrogator would tell personnel from 

the CIA's Office of Inspector General that SWIGERT and DUNBAR's SERE school model was 

based on resisting North Vietnamese "physical torture" and was designed to extract "confessions 

for propaganda purposes" from U.S. airmen "who possessed little actionable intelligence." The 

CIA, he believed, "need[ed] a different working model for interrogating terrorists where 

confessions are not the ultimate goal."139 

After the July 2002 meetings, the CIA's l^flCT C Legal, 

m^l^m^drafte d a letter to Attorney General John Ashcroft asking the Department of 

Justice for "a formal declination of prosecution, in advance, for any employees of the United 

States, as well as any other personnel acting on behalf of the United States, who may employ 

methods in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah that otherwise might subject those individuals to 

prosecution."140 The letter further indicated that "the interrogation team had concluded" that 

"the use of more aggressive methods is required to persuade Abu Zubaydah to provide the 

critical information we need to safeguard the lives of innumerable innocent men, women and 

children within the United States and abroad." The letter added that these "aggressive methods" 

would otherwise be prohibited by the torture statute, "apart from potential reliance upon the 

doctrines of necessity or of self-defense."141 This letter was circulated internally at the CIA, 

including to SWIGERT; however, there are no records to indicate it was provided to the attorney 

general.142 

and the CIA's acting general counsel, John Rizzo, met with attorneys from the National Security 

Council and the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), as well as with Michael 

Chertoff, the head of the Department of Justice Criminal Division, and Daniel Levin, the chief of 

staff to the FBI director, to provide an overview of the CIA's proposed interrogation techniques 

and to ask for a formal, definitive DOJ opinion regarding the lawfulness of employing the 

specific CIA interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah.143 

The CIA attorneys described the 12 proposed interrogation 

techniques and told the Department of Justice and National Security Council attorneys that Abu 

Zubaydah continued to withhold critical intelligence on the identities of al-Qa'ida personnel in 

the United States and planned al-Qa'ida attacks. The CIA attorneys also told the group that CIA 

officers were complemented by: 

"expert personnel retained on contract who possess extensive experience, 

gained within the Department of Defense, on the psychological and physical 

139

 Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, October 

22, 2003. The senior interrogator had participated in the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques with 

SWIGERT and DUNBAR 

140

 Email from: 

141

 Email from: 

142

 Email from: 

143

 DIRECTOR 

|; to: 

; to: 

; to: 

(031357Z AUG 02) 

TOP SECRETA 

; subject: EYES ONLY- DRAFT; date: July 8, 2002. 

; subject: EYES ONLY- DRAFT; date: July 8, 2002. 

; subject: EYES ONLY- DRAFT; date: July 8, 2002. 

y/NOFORN 

Page 33 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

33 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

methods of interrogation and the resistance techniques employed as 

countermeasures to such interrogation."144 

According to the CIA cable describing the meeting, the 

representatives from the OLC, including Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, advised 

that the criminal prohibition on torture would not prohibit the methods proposed by the 

interrogation team because of the absence of any specific intent to inflict severe physical or 

mental pain or suffering.145 On July 13,2002, Yoo sent an unclassified letter to the CIA's acting 

general counsel describing his interpretation of the statute.146 

(TS/^H^^HH^^/NF ) Despite the initial view expressed by Yoo that the use of the 

proposed CIA interrogation techniques would be lawful, on July 17, 2002, National Security 

Advisor Condoleezza Rice requested a delay in the approval of the interrogation techniques for 

Abu Zubaydah's interrogation until the attorney general issued an opinion.147 The following 

day, Rice and Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley requested that the Department 

of Justice "delay the approval of the memo detailing the next phase of interrogations" until the 

CIA provided specific details on its proposed interrogation techniques and "an explanation of 

why the CIA is confident these techniques will not cause lasting and irreparable harm to Abu 

Zubaydah."148 Rice asked the CIA to provide the OLC with a description of each of the planned 

interrogation techniques, and to "gather and provide any available empirical data on the reactions 

and likelihood of prolonged mental harm from the use of the 'water board' and the staged 

burial."149 

(TSy/^B^^^^H^^P ) On July 15, 2002, a cable providing details on the proposed 

interrogation phase stated that only the DETENTION SITE GREEN chief of Base would be 

allowed to interrupt or stop an interrogation in process, and that the chief of Base would be the 

final decision-making authority as to whether the CIA's interrogation techniques applied to Abu 

Zubaydah would be discontinued.150 The CIA officers at the detention site added: 

"If [Abu Zubaydah] develops a serious medical condition which may involve a 

host of conditions including a heart attack or another catastrophic type of 

condition, all efforts will be made to ensure that proper medical care will be 

provided to [him]. In the event [Abu Zubaydah] dies, we need to be prepared 

to act accordingly, keeping in mind the liaison equities involving our hosts."151 

144

 DIRECTOR ^^ M (031357Z AUG 02) 

145

 DIRECTOR BB B (031357Z AUG 02) 

146

 July 13, 2002, Letter from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, 

CIA. 

147 Memorandum for the Record from John H. Moseman, Chief of Staff, re: NSC Weekly Meeting, July 17, 2002. 

148

 July 19, 2002, 1630 Hours, CIA Operational Update Memorandum for CIA Leadership, SENSITIVE 

ADDENDUM: Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation and Raid 

149

 July 21, 2002, 1630 Hours, CIA Operational Update Memorandum for CIA Leadership, SENSITIVE 

ADDENDUM: Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation and Raid 

10536 (151006Z JUL 02) 

151

 10536 (151006Z JUL 02) 

TOP SECRET//^ //NOFORN 

Page 34 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

34 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/JI 1 //NOFORN 

(TS/^im^mi^NF ) To address these issues, the cable stated that if Abu Zubaydah were 

to die during the interrogation, he would be cremated.152 The interrogation team closed the cable 

by stating: 

"regardless which [disposition] option we follow however, and especially in 

light of the planned psychological pressure techniques to be implemented, we 

need to get reasonable assurances that [Abu Zubaydah] will remain in isolation 

and incommunicado for the remainder of his life."153 

(TS^SHI^^IB^^ ) Officers from the CIA's ALEC Station responded to the 

interrogation team's comments several days later. Their cable noted that the interrogation team 

was correct in its "understanding that the interrogation process takes precedcncc over 

preventative medical procedures."154 ALEC Station further observed: 

"There is a fairly unanimous sentiment within HQS that [Abu Zubaydah] will 

never be placed in a situation where he has any significant contact with others 

and/or has the opportunity to be released. While it is difficult to discuss 

specifics at this point, all major players are in concurrence that [Abu 

Zubaydah] should remain incommunicado for the remainder of his life. This 

may preclude [Abu Zubaydah] from being turned over to another country, but 

a final decision regarding his future incarceration condition has yet to be 

made."155 

(TS/^H^^^^^^H^H 2) As a result of the request by National Security Advisor Rice for 

additional research on the CIA's proposed interrogation techniques, CIA and DOJ personnel 

contacted individuals at the Department of Defense's Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), 

the agency that administers the SERE school, to gather information about the effects of using the 

techniques in training exercises.156 According to CIA officer who had 

H t joined the CIA's OTS after | years at JPRA, an individual with SERE school 

experience commented that "information gleaned via harsh treatment may not be accurate, as the 

prisoner may say anything to avoid further pain," and that "[c]urrent doctrine for interrogations 

conducted in the permanent phase of capture may lean towards 'soft' or 'indirect' rounds of 

questioning. 

»1S 7 

(zsmmmmm ) Pursuant to National Security Advisor Rice's request, CIA 

Headquarters personnel also requested information from the interrogation team—particularly 

156

 Email from: 

July 24, 2002, fax from 

10536 (151006Z JUL 02) 

10536 (151006Z JUL 02) 

(182321Z JUL 02) 

182321Z JUL 02) 

|; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Request for JPRA information; date: July 19, 2002; 

to John Yoo and [REDACTED] providing information from the 

OTS/OAD psychologists; email from: to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

ject: Discussion with JPRA Chief of Staff; date: July 24, 2002. 

157 Email from: to: [REDACTED]; subject: Request for JPRA information; date: July 19, 2002. 

Records indicatethat^^B^fs notes were not provided to the Department of Justice. In November 2002, 

|, along with Chief of Interrogations led the first CIA interrogator training course. 

Page 35 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

35 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

SWIGERT and DUNBAR—about the psychological effects of the use of the waterboard and 

mock burial. The chief of Base at DETENTION SITE GREEN responded by cable noting that: 

"We are a nation of laws and we do not wish to parse words. A bottom line in 

considering the new measures proposed is that [Abu Zubaydah] is being held 

in solitary confinement, against his will, without legal representation, as an 

enemy of our country, our society and our people. Therefore, while the 

techniques described in Headquarters meetings and below are administered to 

student volunteers in the U.S. in a harmless way, with no measurable impact 

on the psyche of the volunteer, we do not believe we can assure the same here 

for a man forced through these processes and who will be made to believe this 

is the future course of the remainder of his life. Station, [DETENTION SITE 

GREEN chief of Base] and [DETENTION SITE GREEN] personnel will make 

every effort possible to insure [sic] that subject is not permanently physically 

or mental harmed but we should not say at the outset of this process that there 

is no risk."158 

As former psychologists for the United States Air Force, 

SWIGERT and DUNBAR had no direct experience with the waterboard, as it was not used in 

Air Force SERE training. Nonetheless, they indicated that the waterboard—which they 

described as an "absolutely convincing technique"—was necessary to overwhelm Abu 

Zubaydah's ability to resist.159 They also responded that they were aware that the Navy—which 

used the waterboard technique in training—had not reported any significant long-term 

consequences on individuals from its use. Unlike the CIA's subsequent use of the waterboard, 

however, the Navy's use of the technique was a single training exercise and did not extend to 

multiple sessions. SWIGERT and DUNBAR wrote: 

"any physical pressure applied to extremes can cause severe mental pain or 

suffering. Hooding, the use of loud music, sleep deprivation, controlling 

darkness and light, slapping, walling, or the use of stress positions taken to 

extreme can have the same outcome. The safety of any technique lies 

primarily in how it is applied and monitored.

 160 

On July 24, 2002, the attorney general verbally approved the use 

of 10 interrogation techniques, which included: the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the 

facial slap (insult slap), cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation, 

use of diapers, and use of insects.161 The interrogation team, however, indicated that they 

intended to wait for the approval to use the waterboard before proceeding with their 

interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. On July 26, 2002, the attorney general verbally approved the 

158

 [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02) 

159

 I^ H 10568 (261101Z JUL 02) 

160

 [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02) 

161

 DIRECTOR H H (251609Z AUG 0 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 36 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

36 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

use of the waterboard.162 The OLC finalized its classified written legal opinion on August 1, 

2002. The earlier CIA request to conduct a mock burial was not formally considered by the 

OLC. The approved interrogation techniques, along with other CIA interrogation techniques 

that were subsequently identified and used by the CIA, are referred to as the CIA's "enhanced 

interrogation techniques," or more commonly by the CIA as "EITs." 

(TSidlHM 1) In the course of seeking approval to use the techniques, CIA 

Headquarters advised the Department of Justice and the national security advisor that "countless 

more Americans may die unless we can persuade AZ to tell us what he knows." CIA 

Headquarters further represented that the DETENTION SITE GREEN interrogation team 

believed "Abu Zubaydah continues to withhold critical threat information," and "that in order to 

persuade him to provide" that information, "the use of more aggressive techniques is 

required."163 The cable to DETENTION SITE GREEN from CIA Headquarters documenting 

the information CIA Headquarters had provided to the Department of Justice warned that "[t]he 

legal conclusions are predicated upon the determinations by the interrogation team that Abu 

Zubaydah continues to withhold critical threat information."164 According to cables, however, 

the CIA interrogators at the detention site had not determined that "the use of more aggressive 

techniques was required" to "persuade" Abu Zubaydah to provide threat information. Rather, 

the interrogation team believed the objective of the coercive interrogation techniques was to 

confirm Abu Zubaydah did not have additional information on threats to the United States, 

writing: 

"Our assumption is the objective of this operation is to achieve a high degree 

of confidence that [Abu Zubaydah] is not holding back actionable information 

concerning threats to the United States beyond that which [Abu Zubaydah] has 

already provided."165 

(fS^mi^iF ) As is described in this summary, and in more detail in the full 

Committee Study, the interrogation team later deemed the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques a success, not because it resulted in critical threat information, but 

because it provided further evidence that Abu Zubaydah had not been withholding the 

aforementioned information from the interrogators.166 

8. The CIA Obtains Legal and Policy Approval for Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; 

The CIA Does Not Brief the President 

162

 Email from: to: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], ^ACTED] ; 

subject: EYES ONLY - Where we stand re: Abu Zubaydah; date: July 26,2002. JeTofrolH^H I 10568 

(261101Z JUL02). 

163

 DIRECTOR ^^ M (031357Z AUG 02) 

164

 DIRECTOR (031357Z AUG 02) ^^^^^^ ^ 

165

 [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02) and email from: ••••^^fl ; to: [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], and subject: Addendum from [DETENTION SITE GREEN], [REDACTED] 

73208 (231043Z JUL 02); date: July 23, 2002, at 07:56:49 PM. 

10644 (201235Z AUG 02) 

TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN 

Page 37 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

37 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

(TS/^^^^^^^^BP/NF ) A S described, CIA officers represented to National Security 

Advisor Rice that Abu Zubaydah was withholding information on pending attacks and operatives 

in the United States. On July 31, 2002, Rice informed Deputy DCI John McLaughlin that, in 

balancing the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against the possible 

loss of American lives, she would not object to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques if 

the attorney general determined them to be legal.167 

(T&vBIHflB^B''^ ) During the month of July 2002, the CIA anticipated that the 

president would need to approve the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques before 

they could be used. Therefore, in late July 2002, the CIA prepared talking points for a briefing 

of the president. These draft talking points indicated that the CIA was planning to use 

inteirogation techniques beyond what was normally permitted by law enforcement, and included 

a brief description of the waterboard interrogation technique. On August 1, 2002, based on 

comments from White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, the talking points were revised to 

eliminate references to the waterboard.168 CIA records indicate, however, that the talking points 

were not used to brief the president. On August 2, 2002, the National Security Council legal 

advisor informed the DCI's chief of staff that "Dr. Rice had been informed that there would be 

no briefing of the President on this matter,"169 but that the DCI had policy approval to employ 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.170 

CIA records state that prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah in 2002, the CIA did not brief Secretary of State 

Colin Powell or Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, two members of the National Security 

Council, on the techniques.171 The Committee, including the chairman and vice chairman, was 

also not briefed on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques prior to their use.172 

Approximately a year later, on July 31, 2003, senior CIA personnel 

believed the president had still not been briefed on the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques.173 In August 2003, DCI Tenet told the CIA Office of Inspector General that "he had 

never spoken to the President regarding the detention and interrogation program or EITs, nor was 

167

 Memorandum for the Record from John Moseman, Chief of Staff, re: NSC Weekly Meeting, July 31, 2002. 

168

 July 26, 2001, DCI Talking Points with the President- Next Phase of the Abu Zubaydah Interrogation; July 31, 

2001, DCI Talking Points with the President- Next Phase of the Abu Zubaydah Interrogation. Note that the draft 

document lists the incorrect year. 

169

 CIA records do not indicate who informed National Security Advisor Rice "that there would be no briefing of the 

President on this matter." 

170

 Email from: John Moseman; to: John McLaughlin, Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], John Rizzo, [REDACTED]; 

subject: Abu-Z Interrogation; date: August 2, 2002. 

171

 Email from: John Rizzo; to: subject: Rump PC on interrogations; date: July 31, 2003. 

172 See Volume II for additional information on congressional briefings. 

173

 An email from CIA Senior Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo stated that "the President will be briefed as part 

of the regular annual [covert action] review. Briefing (by Rice or VP or Counsel to the President or some 

combination thereof) will describe the interrogation program, the fact that some aggressive but AG-approved 

techniques have been used, but will not apparently get into the details of the techniques themselves." See email 

from: John Rizzo; to: ^^^HB R subject: Rump PC on interrogations; date: July 31, 2003. 

11II Ml III I III III 

Page 38 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

38 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

he aware of whether the President had been briefed by his staff."174 The May 2004 CIA 

Inspector General Special Review included a recommendation for the DCI to: 

"Brief the President regarding the implementation of the Agency's detention 

and interrogation activities pursuant to the MON of 17 September 2001 or any 

other authorities, including the use of EITs and the fact that detainees have 

died. This Recommendation is significant."175 

In transmitting the Special Review to the Committee, DCI Tenet 

responded to the recommendation, noting only that "[t]he DCI will determine whether and to 

what extent the President requires a briefing on the Program."176 On April 6, 2006, CIA 

Inspector General Helgerson responded to a request from Committee Vice Chairman John D. 

Rockefeller IV on the status of corrective actions taken in response to the Special Review 

recommendations. With regard to a briefing for the president, Helgerson wrote: "Consistent 

with this recommendation, DCI Tenet, before he left office, and Director Goss, shortly after 

taking office, both advised me that they had made requests to brief the President."177 Prepared 

"Questions and Answers" for the National Security Council principals in connection with the 

disclosure of the program in September 2006 and subsequent media outreach also suggest that 

the president was not briefed at the outset about the CIA's interrogation techniques. In response 

to the potential question: "What role did the President play.. .Was he briefed on the interrogation 

techniques, and if so when?" the proposed answer did not assert that the president was briefed, 

but rather that the "President was not of course involved in CIA's day to day operations -

including who should be held by CIA and how they should be questioned - these decisions are 

made or overseen by CIA Directors."178 

174

 Office of General Counsel Comments on Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program Special Review, 

at 23 ("[i]n August 2003, the DCI advised OIG..."); CIA Office of Inspector General, Interview of George Tenet, 

memorandum dated 8 September 2003, Subject: 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogation for Counterterrrorism 

Purposes. 

175

 Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001-

October 2003), May 7, 2004 (DTS #2004-2710). 

176

 Letter from George J. Tenet to Chairman Pat Roberts, June 22,2004 (DTS #2004-2710). 

177 Helgerson then added, "Additionally, public disclosure of many of these activities ensured wide awareness. In 

light of these developments, 1 consider the matter closed." The Helgerson letter does not indicate to whom Directors 

Tenet and Goss, who met regularly with the President, submitted requests to brief the President about the program. 

See letter from John L. Helgerson to Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, April 5, 2006 (DTS #2006-1564). The 

CIA's June 2013 Response does not dispute these records. It states, however, that "[w]hile Agency records on the 

subject are admittedly incomplete, former President Bush has stated in his autobiography that he discussed the 

program, including the use of enhanced techniques, with DCIA Tenet in 2002, prior to application of the techniques 

on Abu Zubaydah, and personally approved the techniques." A subsequent memoir by former CIA Acting General 

Counsel John Rizzo (published January 7,2014) states, "The one senior U.S. Government national security official 

during this time—from August 2002 through 2003—who I did not believe was knowledgeable about the E.I.T.s was 

President Bush himself. He was not present at any of the Principal Committee meetings ... and none of the 

principals at any of the E.I.T. sessions during this period ever alluded to the President knowing anything about 

them." 

178

 Included in the packet of CIA information was the following: "Question: 'What role did the President play in 

authorizing this program? Did he select detainees held by CIA or direct their interrogation? Was he briefed on the 

interrogation techniques, and if so when?' Answer: 'In the days after 9/11, the President directed that all the 

instruments of national power, including the resources of our intelligence, military, and law enforcement 

communities, be employed to fight and wi ' '" '"'"'iates, within the bounds of the law. 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 39 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

39 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

(^S/^I^^HHH^NF ) CIA records indicate that the first CTA briefing for the president on 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques occurred on April 8, 2006.179 CIA records state that 

when the president was briefed, he expressed discomfort with the "image of a detainee, chained 

to the ceiling, clothed in a diaper, and forced to go to the bathroom on himself."180 

9. The CIA Uses the Waterboard and Other Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against 

Abu Zubaydah 

(^^S^fH^li^l^NP ) On August 3, 2002, CIA Headquarters informed the interrogation 

team at DETENTION SITE GREEN that it had formal approval to apply the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, including the waterboard, against Abu Zubaydah. According to CIA 

records, only the two CIA contractors, SWIGERT and DUNBAR, were to have contact with Abu 

Zubaydah. Other CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN - including CIA medical 

personnel and other CIA "interrogators with whom he is familiar" - were only to observe.181 

Fro m

 August 4, 2002, through August 23, 2002, the CIA subjected 

Abu Zubaydah to its enhanced interrogation techniques on a near 24-hour-per-day basis. After 

Abu Zubaydah had been in complete isolation for 47 days, the most aggressive interrogation 

phase began at approximately 11:50 AM on August 4, 2002.182 Security personnel entered the 

cell, shackled and hooded Abu Zubaydah, and removed his towel (Abu Zubaydah was then 

naked). Without asking any questions, the interrogators placed a rolled towel around his neck as 

a collar, and backed him up into the cell wall (an interrogator later acknowledged the collar was 

This included important, new roles for CIA in detaining and questioning terrorists. [He was periodically updated by 

CIA Directors on significant captures of terrorists, and information obtained that helped stop attacks and led to 

capture of other terrorists.] [The President was not of course involved in CIA's day to day operations - including 

who should be held by CIA and how they should be questioned - these decisions are made or overseen by CIA 

Directors].'" See Draft Questions and Proposed Answers, attached to Memorandum from National Security Advisor 

Stephen J. Hadley; for: the Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, Director of 

National Intelligence and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; cc: chief of staff to the President, Counsel to the 

President, Assistant to the President for National Security, White House Spokesman, dated September 2, 2006. 

Brackets in the original. 

m

 See April 16, 2008, CIA "Backgrounder: Chronology of Interrogation Approvals, 2001-2003" (noting that "CIA 

documentation and discussions with Presidential briefers and individuals involved with the interrogation program at 

the time suggest that details on enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs) were not shared with the President" in the 

2001-2003 timeframe); CIA Q&A, Topic: Waterboarding ("The information we have indicates the President was not 

briefed by CIA regarding the specific interrogation techniques until April 2006, and at that time DC1A Goss briefed 

him on the seven EITs proposed at that time for the post-Detainee Treatment Act CIA interrogation program."). As 

described, in the April 2006 briefing the President "expressed discomfort" with the "image of a detainee, chained to 

the ceiling, clothed in a diaper^an^forced to go to the bathroom on himself." See email from: Grayson SWIGERT; 

to: [REDACTED]; cc: subject: Dr. SWIGERT's 7 June meeting with DCI; date: June 7, 2006. 

180

 Email from: Grayson SWIGERT; to: [REDACTED]; cc: subject: Dr. SWIGERT's 7 June 

meeting with DCI; date: June 7, 2006. 

181

 Increased Pressure in the Next Phase of the Abu Zubaydah Interrogations, Attachment to email from: 

[REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED]; subject: Increased Pressure Phase - for DCI Sensitive Addendum; date: July 10, 2002. 

110586 (041559Z AUG 02) Mil I I III I ^^^^BM^^BBBOTWFTmN 

Page 40 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

40 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

used to slam Abu Zubaydah against a concrete wall).183 The interrogators then removed the 

hood, performed an attention grab, and had Abu Zubaydah watch while a large confinement box 

was brought into the cell and laid on the floor.184 A cable states Abu Zubaydah "was unhooded 

and the large confinement box was carried into the interrogation room and paced [sic] on the 

floor so as to appear as a coffin."185 The interrogators then demanded detailed and verifiable 

information on terrorist operations planned against the United States, including the names, phone 

numbers, email addresses, weapon caches, and safe houses of anyone involved. CIA records 

describe Abu Zubaydah as appearing apprehensive. Each time Abu Zubaydah denied having 

additional information, the interrogators would perform a facial slap or face grab.186 At 

approximately 6:20 PM, Abu Zubaydah was waterboarded for the first time. Over a two-and-ahalf-hour period, Abu Zubaydah coughed, vomited, and had "involuntary spasms of the torso and 

extremities" during waterboarding.187 Detention site personnel noted that "throughout the 

process [Abu Zubaydah] was asked and given the opportunity to respond to questions about 

threats" to the United States, but Abu Zubaydah continued to maintain that he did not have any 

additional information to provide.188 In an email to OMS leadership entitled, "So it begins," a 

medical officer wrote: 

"The sessions accelerated rapidly progressing quickly to the water board after 

large box, walling, and small box periods. [Abu Zubaydah] seems very 

resistant to the water board. Longest time with the cloth over his face so far 

has been 17 seconds. This is sure to increase shortly. NO useful information 

183 See email from: [REDACTED]; to: HHI^^^ B subject: Subject detainee allegation - per our telcon of 

today; date: March 28, 2007, at 04:42 PM, which states Abu Zubaydah claims "a collar was used to slam him 

against a concrete wall. While we do not have a record that this occurred, one interrogator at the site at the time 

confirmed that this did indeed happen. For the record, a plywood 'wall' was immediately constructed at the site 

after the walling on the concrete wall." 

110644 (201235Z AUG 02) 

10586 (041559Z AUG 02) 

10586 (041559Z AUG 02); •• • 10644 (201235Z AUG 02) 

10644 (201235Z AUG 02) 

110586 (041559Z AUG 02). CIA contractor DUNBAR later told the CIA OIG that "[t]heir 

instructions from [chief of Base] were to focus on only one issue, that is, Zubaydah's knowledge of plans to attack 

the U.S." According to the OIG's record of the interview, "[DUNBAR] and [SWIGERT] could ask that question in 

a number of ways, but it was the only theme they were authorized by [chief of Base] to use with [Abu] Zubaydah." 

(See February 10, 2003, interview report of Hammond DUNBAR, Office of the Inspector General.) The acting 

chief of Station in Country in an interview with the CIA OIG, stated that "there were days at [DETENTION 

SITE GREEN] when the team had no requirements from Headquarters," and that CTC did not give the chief of Base 

(COB) the "flexibility as COB to ask other questions" besides those related to threats to the United States. (See May 

28, 2003, interview report of IHHHHHfl K Office of the Inspector General.) The chief of Support 

Services at the CIA Station stated that "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR] were frustrated that they kept beating 

Zubaydah up on the same question while getting the same physiologic response from hiin." (See May 21, 2003, 

interview report of Office of die Inspector General.) Other interviewees described how 

analytical assumptions about Abu Zubaydah drove the interrogation process. (See May 22, 2003, interview report of 

| Office of the Inspector General; and February 27,2003, interview report 

|, Office of the Inspector General.) Chief of CTC, Jose Rodriguez, told the OIG that "CTC subject 

matter experts" pointed to intelligence that they said indicated that Abu Zubaydah knew more than he was admitting 

and thus disagreed with the assessment from DETENTION SITE GREEN that Abu Zubaydah was "compliant." 

According to the OIG's record of the Jose Rodriguez interview, "disagreement between the analysts and 

interrogators can be healthy, but in this case Rodriguez believes that the analysts were wrong." (See interview of 

Jose Rodriguez, Office of the Inspector General, March 6, 2003.) 

I I II I I I I I — I II I II 

Page 41 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

41 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

so far.. ..He did vomit a couple of times during the water board with some 

beans and rice. It's been 10 hours since he ate so this is surprising and 

disturbing. We plan to only feed Ensure for a while now. I'm head[ing | back 

for another water board session."189 

(I^/i^^lK/W j The use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques— 

including "walling, attention grasps, slapping, facial hold, stress positions, cramped confinement, 

white noise and sleep deprivation"—continued in "varying combinations, 24 hours a day" for 17 

straight days, through August 20, 2002.190 When Abu Zubaydah was left alone during this 

period, he was placed in a stress position, left on the waterboard with a cloth over his face, or 

locked in one of two confinement boxes. According to the cables, Abu Zubaydah was also 

subjected to the waterboard "2-4 times a day... with multiple iterations of the watering cycle 

during each application."191 

(rnm^mmm ) The "aggressive phase of interrogation" continued until August 23, 

2002.192 Over the course of the entire 20 day "aggressive phase of interrogation," Abu Zubaydah 

spent a total of 266 hours (11 days, 2 hours) in the large (coffin size) confinement box and 29 

hours in a small confinement box, which had a width of 21 inches, a depth of 2.5 feet, and a 

height of 2.5 feet. The CIA interrogators told Abu Zubaydah that the only way he would leave 

the facility was in the coffin-shaped confinement box.193 

(TS^I^^^BH^NF ) According to the daily cables from DETENTION SITE GREEN, 

Abu Zubaydah frequently "cried," "begged," "pleaded," and "whimpered," but continued to 

deny that he had any additional information on current threats to, or operatives in, the United 

States.194 

By August 9, 2002, the sixth day of the interrogation period, the 

interrogation team informed CIA Headquarters that they had come to the "collective preliminary 

assessment" that it was unlikely Abu Zubaydah "had actionable new information about current 

threats to the United States."195 On August 10, 2002, the interrogation team stated that it was 

"highly unlikely" that Abu Zubaydah possessed the information they were seeking.196 On the 

same day, the interrogation team reiterated a request for personnel from CIA Headquarters to 

189

 Emphasis in the original. Email from: [REDACTED]; to: and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: So 

it begins; date: August 4, 2002, at 09:45:09AM. CIA Director Hayden informed the Committee in 2007 that "in the 

section [of the ICRC report] on medical care, the report omits key contextual facts. For example, Abu Zubaydah's 

statement that he was given only Ensure and water for two to three weeks fails to mention the fact that he was on a 

liqui^die^jmte appropriate because he was recovering from abdominal surgery at the time." 

,9I)

 10644 (201235Z AUG 02). For the first 17 days, the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were 

used against Abu Zubaydah in "varying combinations, 24 hours a day." The "aggressive phase," as defined by the 

CIA, continued for an additional three days. The CIA continued to use its enhanced interrogation techniques against 

Abu Zubaydah until August 30, 2002. 

10644 (201235Z AUG 02) 

10667 (231206Z AUG 02); | 

10615 (120619Z AUG 02) 

10644 (201235Z AUG 02) 

10604 (091624Z AUG 02) 

10607 (100335Z AUG 02) 

TOP SECRET//! 

110672 (240229Z AUG 02) 

//NOFORN 

Page 42 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

42 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

travel to the detention site to view the interrogations. A cable stated that the team believed that a 

"first-hand, on-the-ground look is best," but if CIA Headquarters personnel could not visit, a 

video teleconference would suffice.197 DETENTION SITE GREEN personnel also informed 

CIA Headquarters that it was their assessment that the application of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques was "approaching] the legal limit."198 The chief of CTC, Jose 

Rodriguez, responded: 

"Strongly urge that any speculative language as to the legality of given 

activities or, more precisely, judgment calls as to their legality vis-a-vis 

operational guidelines for this activity agreed upon and vetted at the most 

senior levels of the agency, be refrained from in written traffic (email or cable 

traffic). Such language is not helpful."199 

DETENTION SITE GREEN cables describe Abu Zubaydah as 

"compliant," informing CIA Headquarters that when the interrogator "raised his eyebrow, 

without instructions," Abu Zubaydah "slowly walked on his own to the water table and sat 

down."200 When the interrogator "snapped his fingers twice," Abu Zubaydah would lie flat on 

the waterboard.201 Despite the assessment of personnel at the detention site that Abu Zubaydah 

was compliant, CIA Headquarters stated that they continued to believe that Abu Zubaydah was 

withholding threat information and instructed the CIA interrogators to continue using the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques.202 

(fSjV^m^F ) At times Abu Zubaydah was described as "hysterical"203 and 

"distressed to the level that he was unable to effectively communicate."204 Waterboarding 

sessions "resulted in immediate fluid intake and involuntary leg, chest and arm spasms" and 

"hysterical pleas."205 In at least one waterboarding session, Abu Zubaydah "became completely 

197 10607 (100335Z AUG 02). On August 2002, a video-conference between DETENTION SITE 

GREEN and CIA Headquarters occurred, which included an interrogation video described by the interrogation team 

as "quite graphic" and possibly "disturbing to some viewers." After the video-conference, CIA Headquarters 

instructed DETENTION SITE GREEN to continue the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against 

Abu Zubaydah, but agreed to send two CIA Headquarters officers to the detention site to observe the interrogations 

first-hand. On August 2002, a team from CIA Headquarters, including Legal | 

and Deputy Chief of ALEC Station visited DETENTION SITE GREEN and observed die use 

of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including waterboarding. Th^aggressive phase^interrogation" 

ended days after the arrival of the officers from CIA Headquarters. See |H|HHl061 6 i^^^ H AUG 

02); ALECHHJH H AUG 02); 10643 AUG 02)JHBHi066 7 (231206Z AUG 

02)j_and^^^B(l0672(240229Z AUG 02). 

10607 (100335Z AUG 02) 

199

 Email from: Jose Rodriguez; to: [REDACTED]; subject: [DETENTION SITE GREEN]; date: August 12, 2002, 

with attachment of earlier email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]. 

10614 (111633Z AUG 02) 

10614 (111633Z AUG 02) 

See, for example, ALEC||^|(10172 8 AUG 02); ALEC | 

AUG 02); and 10700 (280820Z AUG 02). 

10644 (201235Z AUG 02) 

|(130034Z AUG 02); ALEC | 

10643 (191518Z AUG 02) 

10643 (191518Z AUG 02) 

TOP SECRET//! //NOFORN 

Page 43 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

43 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SF.CRKT//^^^^—^^»/NOFOR N 

unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth."206 According to CIA records, 

Abu Zubaydah remained unresponsive until medical intervention, when he regained 

consciousness and expelled "copious amounts of liquid." This experience with the waterboard 

was referenced in emails, but was not documented or otherwise noted in CIA cables.207 When 

two CIA Headquarters officers later compared the Abu Zubaydah interrogation videotapes to the 

cable record, neither commented on this session. A review of the catalog of videotapes, 

however, found that recordings of a 21-hour period, which included two waterboarding sessions, 

were missing.208 

CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN reported being 

disturbed by the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah. 

CIA records include the following reactions and comments by CIA personnel: 

• August 5, 2002: "want to caution [medical officer] that this is almost certainly not a 

place he's ever been before in his medical career...It is visually and psychologically 

very uncomfortable."209 

• August 8, 2002: "Today's first session.. .had a profound effect on all staff members 

present.. .it seems the collective opinion that wc should not go much 

further.. .everyone seems strong for now but if the group has to continue.. .wc cannot 

guarantee how much longer."210 

• August 8, 2002: "Several on the team profoundly affected... some to the point of 

tears and choking up."211 

206

 The description of the episode stated that "on being righted, he failed to respond until the interrogators gave him 

a xyphoid thrust (with our medical folks edeingtowanlthe room)." This passage was included in multiple emails, 

to include emails from the|^H|OMS , MH^I^IH .

 Se e

 email from: Mta^^^HH ; to: [DETENTION 

SIT^BLUE] and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Departure; date: March 6, 2003, at 7:11:59 PM; email from: 

OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Acceptable lower ambient temperatures; 

date: March 7, 2003, at 8:22 PM; email from: ^••flMf , OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]; 

subject: Re: Talking Points for review and comment; date: August 13, 2004, at 10:22 AM; and email from: 

• I B to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: 

Discussion with Dan Levin- AZ; date: October 26, 2004, at 6:09 PM. 

207

 Email from: OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Acceptable lower 

ambient temperatures; date: March 7,2003, at 8:22 PM; email from: IHHHflH , OMS; to: [REDACTED] 

and [REDACTED]^jubiect: Re: Talking Points for review and comment; date: August 13, 2004, at 10:22 AM; 

email from: ••HH ; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Discussions with Dan Levin - AZ; date: October 26, 2004, at 6:09 PM. 

208

 CIA Inspector General's Special Review on Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities issued on 

May 7,2004. ^^^^^ ^ 

209

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Monday; date: August 5, 

2002, at 05:35AM. ^^^^^ ^ 

210

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject: Update; date: 

August 8, 2002, at 06:50 AM. ^^^^^^ ^ 

311

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject: Update; date: 

August 8, 2002, at 06:50 AM. 

I//NOFORN 

Page 44 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

44 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

• August 9, 2002: "two, perhaps three [personnel] likely to elect transfer" away from 

the detention site if the decision is made to continue with the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques.212 

• August 11, 2002: Viewing the pressures on Abu Zubaydah on video "has produced 

strong feelings of futility (and legality) of escalating or even maintaining the 

pressure." Per viewing the tapes, "prepare for something not seen previously."213 

After the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 

ended, CIA personnel at the detention site concluded that Abu Zubaydah had been truthful and 

that he did not possess any new terrorist threat information.214 

(^S^jl^^^^^m^WF ) As noted, CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah never provided 

die information for which the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were justified and 

approved: information on the next terrorist attack and operatives in the United States. 

Furthermore, as compared to the period prior to August 2002, the quantity and type of 

intelligence produced by Abu Zubaydah remained largely unchanged during and after the August 

2002 use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.215 Nonetheless, CIA Headquarters 

informed the National Security Council that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques used 

against Abu Zubaydah were effective and were "producing meaningful results."216 A cable from 

212

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: 9 August Update; date: 

August 9, 2002, at 10:44:16 PM. ^^^^^^ ^ 

213

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: H^^HHI a n d [REDACTED]; subject: Greetings; date: August 11, 2002, 

at 09:45AM. 

214 See, for example, •• • 10672 (240229Z AUG 02). 

215 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for details on Abu Zubaydah's intelligence production. As 

noted, Abu Zubaydah was taken into CIA custody on March H , 2002, and was hospitalized until April 15, 2002. 

During the months of April and May 2002, which included a period during which Abu Zubaydah was on life support 

and unable to speak, the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah produced 95 intelligence reports. Abu Zubaydah spent 

much of June 2002 and all of July 2002 in isolation, without being asked any questions. The CIA reinstituted 

contact with Abu Zubaydah on August 4, 2002, and immediately began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques—including the waterboard. During the months of August and September 2002, Abu Zubaydah produced 

91 intelligence reports, four fewer than the first two months of his CIA detention. CIA records indicate that the type 

of intelligence Abu Zubaydah provided remained relatively constant prior to and after the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques. According to CIA records, Abu Zubaydah provided information on "al-Qa'ida activities, 

plans, capabilities, and relationships," in addition to information on "its leadership structure, including personalities, 

decision-making processes, training, and tactics." See also CIA paper entitled "Abu Zubaydah," dated March 2005, 

as well as "Abu Zubaydah Bio" document, "Preparedon9Augus^006." 

2 , 6

 On August 30, 2002, Legal, ^HHH^^l m e t wit h NS C Legal Adviser John Bellinger to 

discuss Abu Zubaydah's interrogation. See email from: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman; subject: Meeting with NSC 

Legal Adviser; date: August 30, 2002; ALEC ^^ H (052227Z SEP 02). In his email documenting the meeting, 

^BH U "noted that we had employed the walling techniques, confinement box, waterboard, along with some of 

the other methods which also had been approved by the Attorney General," and "reported that while the experts at 

the site and at Headquarters were still assessing the product of the recent sessions, it did appeal" that the current 

phase was producing meaningful results." (See email from: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman; subject: Meeting with 

NSC Legal Adviser; date: August 30, 2002.) The email did not provide any additional detail on what was described 

to Bellinger with respect to either the use of the techniques or the "results" of the interrogation. It is unclear from 

CIA records whether the CIA ever informed the NSC Legal Adviser or anyone else at the NSC or the Department of 

Justice that Abu Zubaydah failed to provide information about future attacks against the United States or operatives 

tasked to commit attacks in the U.S. during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

Page 45 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

45 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

DETENTION SITE GREEN, which CIA records indicate was authored by SWIGERT and 

DUNBAR, also viewed the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah as a success. The cable 

recommended that "the aggressive phase at [DETENTION SITE GREEN] should be used as a 

template for future interrogation of high value captives,"217 not because the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques produced useful information, but rather because their use confirmed that 

Abu Zubaydah did not possess the intelligence that CIA Headquarters had assessed Abu 

Zubaydah to have. The cable from the detention site stated: 

"Our goal was to reach the stage where we have broken any will or ability of 

subject to resist or deny providing us information (intelligence) to which he 

had access. We additionally sought to bring subject to the point that we 

confidently assess that he does not/not possess undisclosed threat information, 

or intelligence that could prevent a terrorist event."218 

(TS/^HBI^^^A^^ ) The cable further recommended that psychologists—a likely 

reference to contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR — "familiar with interrogation, exploitation 

and resistance to interrogation should shape compliance of high value captives prior to 

debriefing by substantive experts."219 

Fro m Ab u

 Zubaydah's capture on March 28, 2002, to his transfer 

to Department of Defense custody on September 5, 2006, information provided by Abu 

Zubaydah resulted in 766 disseminated intelligence reports.220 According to CIA documents, 

Abu Zubaydah provided information on "al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and 

relationships," in addition to information on "its leadership structure, including personalities, 

decision-making processes, training, and tactics."221 As noted, this type of information was 

provided by Abu Zubaydah before, during, and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques. At no time during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 

According to CIA records, on September 27, 2002, the CIA briefed the chairman and the vice chairman of the 

Committee, Senators Graham and Shelby, as well as the Committee staff directors, on Abu Zubaydah's 

interrogation. The CIA's memorandum of the briefing indicates that the chairman and vice chairman were briefed 

on "the enhanced techniques that had been employed," as well as "the nature and quality of reporting provided by 

Abu Zubaydah." See (DIRECTOR (252018Z OCT 02). 

2 . 7

 ^H H 10644 (201235Z AUG 02) 

2 . 8

 10644 (201235Z AUG 02) 

2 . 9

 10644 (201235Z AUG 02) 

220

 The Committee uses sole-source intelligence reporting in this summary. While CIA multi-source intelligence 

reports are included in the full Committee Study, the focus of the Committee analysis is on sole-source intelligence 

reporting, as these reports were deemed to more accurately reflect useful reporting from individual CIA detainees. 

As background, multi-source intelligence reports are reports that contain data from multiple detainees. For example, 

a common multi-source report would result from the CIA showing a picture of an individual to all CIA detainees at 

a specific CIA detention site. A report would be produced regardless if detainees were or were not able to identify 

or provide information on the individual. As a specific example, see HEADQUARTERS 1H I (202255Z JUN 

06), which states that from January 1,2006 - April 30, 2006, information from Hambali was "used in the 

dissemination of three intelligence reports, two of which were non-recognitions of Guantanamo Bay detainees," and 

the third of which "detailed [Hambali's] statement that he knew of no threats or plots to attack any world sporting 

events." Sole-source reports, by contrast, are based on specific information provided by one CIA detainee. 

221

 CIA paper entitled, "Abu Zubaydah," dated March 2005. Same information included in an "Abu Zubaydah 

Bio" document "Prepared on 9 August 2006." 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 46 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

46 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

did Abu Zubaydah provide information about operatives in, or future attacks against, the United 

States.222 

10. A CIA Presidential Daily Brief Provides Inaccurate Information on the Interrogation of 

Abu Zubaydah 

Although CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN agreed 

that Abu Zubaydah was compliant and cooperative, personnel at CIA Headquarters prepared a 

Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) in October 2002 that, according to a cable, "accurately reflect[ed] 

the collective HQS view of the information provided [by Abu Zubaydah] to date."223 The 

October 2002 PDB stated Abu Zubaydah was still withholding "significant threat information," 

including information on operatives in the United States, and that Abu "Zubaydah resisted 

providing useful information until becoming more cooperative in early August, probably in the 

hope of improving his living conditions."224 The PDB made no reference to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques or the counter-assessment from the detention site interrogation team 

indicating that Abu Zubaydah was cooperative and not withholding information.225 

CIA documents identified the "key intelligence" acquired from 

Abu Zubaydah as information related to suspected terrorists Jose Padilla and Binyam 

Mohammad, information on English-speaking al-Qa'ida member Jaffar al-Tayyar, and 

information identifying KSM as the mastermind of the September 11, 2001, attacks who used the 

alias "Mukhtar."226 All of this information was acquired by FBI special agents shortly after Abu 

Zubaydah's capture.227 

(^^S/zfU^^BI^^^/NF ) The CIA has consistently represented that Abu Zubaydah stated 

that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were necessary to gain his cooperation. For 

example, the CIA informed the OLC that: 

"As Zubaydah himself explained with respect to enhanced techniques, 

'brothers who are captured and interrogated are permitted by Allah to provide 

222 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details. 

223

 ALEC • • (181439Z OCT 02) 

224

 ALEC (181439Z OCT 02) — 

225

 Among other documents, see^^^ i 10667 (231206Z AUG 02); 10672 (240229Z AUG 02); and 

email from: [REDACTED] (^^^fdiiefo f Base at DETENTION SITE GREEN); to: CIA Headquarters; subject: 

"Assessment to Date" of Abu Zubaydah; date: October 6, 2002, at 05:36:46 AM. 

226 See "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and KSM," dated February 2008, updated for 

briefings on several dates, including for a 2009 briefing to Director Leon Panetta, as well as the "Effectiveness 

Memo" provided to the Department of Justice, testimony provided by CIA Director Michael Hayden, and other 

documents discussed in detail in Volume II. For example, see ODNI September 2006 press release stating: "During 

initial interrogation, Abu Zubaydah gave some information that he probably viewed as nominal. Some was 

important, however, including that Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the 

moniker 'Mukhtar.' This identification allowed us to comb previously collected intelligence for both names, 

opening up new leads to this terrorist plotter—leads that eventually resulted in his capture. It was clear to his 

interrogators that Abu Zubaydah possessed a great deal of information about al-Qa'ida; however, he soon stopped 

all cooperation. Over the ensuing months, the CIA designed a new interrogation program that would be safe, 

effective, and legal." 

227 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details. 

11 ii 1111 1 I II I II 

Page 47 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

47 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

information when they believe they have 'reached the limit of their ability to 

withhold it' in the face of psychological and physical hardships.'"228 

(TS^m^^iF ) As is described in greater detail in the full Committee Study, CIA 

records do not support the CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah made these statements

 229

 CIA 

records indicate that Abu Zubaydah maintained that he always intended to talk and never 

believed he could withhold information from interrogators.230 In February 2003, Abu Zubaydah 

told a CIA psychologist that he believed prior to his capture that every captured "brother" would 

talk in detention and that he told individuals at a terrorist training camp that "brothers should be 

able to expect that the organization will make adjustments to protect people and plans when 

someone with knowledge is captured."231 

11. The CIA Does Not Brief the Committee on the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah 

Tn contrast to relatively open communications that the CIA had 

with the Committee following the issuance of the September 17, 2001, MON, the CIA 

significantly limited its communications with the Committee on its detention and interrogation 

activities after Abu Zubaydah's capture on March 28, 2002.232 In responses to three different 

sets of Committee Questions for the Record addressed to the CIA regarding the MON authorities 

in the spring and summer of 2002, the CIA provided no indication that the CIA had established 

DETENTION SITE GREEN, or was using, or considering using, coercive interrogation 

techniques.233 

On September 27, 2002, CIA officials provided a briefing on Abu 

Zubaydah's interrogation only to Committee Chairman Bob Graham, Vice Chairman Richard 

Shelby, and their staff directors. After this briefing Chairman Graham made multiple and 

228 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of 

United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be 

Used in the Interrogation of High Value A1 Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11). This OLC memorandum 

citesCIA memorandum for Steve Bradbury at the Department of Justice, dated March 2,2005, from 

^HH , w m Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist 

Interrogation Techniques." 

^^OTiil^hei^jre no records of Abu Zubaydah making these statements, the deputy chief of ALEC Station, 

t o ld

 the Inspector General on July 17, 2003, that the "best information [the CIA] received on 

howtohandle die [CIA] detainees came from a walk-in [a source 

to volunteer information to the CIA] after the arrest of Abu Zubaydah. He told us we were 

underestimating Al-Qa'ida. The detainees were happy to be arrested by the U.S. because they got a big show trial. 

When they were turned over to [foreign governments], they were treated badly so they talked. Allah apparently 

allows you to talk if you feel threatened. The [CIA] detainees never counted on being detained by us outside the 

U.S. and being subjected to methods they never dreamed of." See Memorandum for the Record; 

subiect^eeting with deputy chief, Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003. 

230

 H H 1°496 (162014Z FEB 03). For more information, see a March 7, 2005, cable describing Abu 

Zubaydah^xplanations more fully (|^|216 6 (070647Z MAR 05)). 

231

 Mfe^Hl049 6 (162014Z FEB 03) For additional details on this matter, see Volume IJ, specifically the section 

on information provided by the CIA to the Department of Justice. 

232

 The information provided by the CIA to the Committee on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program is 

summarized later in this document, and described in greater detail in Volume IL 

233 See Volume II, specifically the section on CIA representations to Congress. 

Page 48 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

48 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

specific requests for additional information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. 

Internal CIA emails include discussion of how the CIA could "get... off the hook on the cheap" 

regarding Chairman Graham's requests for additional information.234 In the end, CIA officials 

simply did not respond to Graham's requests prior to his departure from the Committee in 

January 2003. 

C. Interrogation in Country | and the January 2003 Guidelines 

1. The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE COBALT, Places Inexperienced First-Tour 

Officer in Charge 

(^S/^H^HH^^^I^^P ) Plans for a specialized CIA detention facility in Country | began 

in April 2002, with the intention that it would be "totally under [|^^^^^|]/Statio n 

Control."23'' On June 6, 2002, CIA Headquarters approved more than $200,000 for the 

construction of the facility, identified in this summary as "DETENTION SITE COBALT."236 In 

a 2003 interview with the CIA Office of Inspector General, Associate Deputy Director for 

Operations described his views of this facility and "stated that [DETENTION 

SITE COBALT] was opened because there needed to be a detention site in [Country | ] for those 

detainees enroute ^Hfl^H t o [DETENTION SITE GREEN]. It was not a place for the use 

of EITs."237 

£) DETENTION SITE COBALT, constructed with CIA funding, 

opened in Country | in September 2002.238 According to CIA records, the windows at 

DETENTION SITE COBALT were blacked out and detainees were kept in total darkness. The 

guards monitored detainees using headlamps and loud music was played 

constantly in the facility. While in their cells, detainees were shackled to the wall and given 

buckets for human waste. Four of the twenty cells at the facility included a bar across the top of 

the cell.239 Later reports describe detainees being shackled to the bar with their hands above 

their heads, forcing them to stand, and therefore not allowing the detainees to sleep.240 

234

 Email from: Stanley Moskowitz; to: John H. Moseman; cc: Scott Muller and James Pavitt; subject: [attached 

document] Re: Graham request on interrogations; date: December 9, 2002, at 05:46:11 PM. 

235

 By June 2002 the CIA had taken custody of five detainees who were captured outside of Country lan d placed 

these CIA detainees in Country ^^^ H detention facilities. The detainees were held at the Country^ facilities at 

the request of the CIA and the CIA had unlimited access to them. See MHHH^^^^^ H 21147 | 

236

 DIRECTOR (062212Z JUN 02) 

237

 Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, | 

September 9, 2003. 

238

 For additional information on DETENTION SITE COBALT, see Volume 1 and Volume III. The specific date 

has been generalized at the request of the CIA. 

239

 ••^^•••• l 28246 I^Hi^^ H 

240

 For additional information on DETENTION SITE COBALT, see Volume I and Volume 111, and among other 

documents: 31118 DlRECTOR|^H|^HHHH < email 

from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Hfl^B^HT[REDACTED] ; 

subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 4, 2002; email from: [REDACTED]; to: 

[REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 5, 2002; Special Review, 

Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), May 7, 

2004; Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from January 28,2003, Subject: 

Page 49 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

49 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFQRN 

The CIA officer in charge of DETENTION SITE COBALT, 

^^BHH^ H [CIA OFFICER 1 ], was a junior officer on his first overseas assignment with 

no previous experience or training in handling prisoners or conducting interrogations. 

[CIA OFFICER 1] was the DETENTION SITE COBALT manager during the period in which a 

CIA detainee died and numerous CTA detainees were subjected to unapproved coercive 

interrogation techniques.241 A review of CIA records found that prior to [CIA 

OFFICER l's] deployment and assignment as the CIA's DETENTION SITE COBALT 

manager, other CIA officers recommended [CIA OFFICER 1] not have continued 

access to classified information due to a "lack of honesty, judgment, and maturity."242 

According to records, "the chief of CTC told [CIA OFFICER 1]] that he would not 

want [him] in his overseas station."243 A supervising officer assessed that [CIA 

OFFICER 1]: 

"has issues with judgment and maturity, [and his] potential behavior in the 

field is also worrisome. [The officer] further advised that [|Hfl H [CIA 

OFFICER 1]] was only put into processing for an overseas position so that 

someone would evaluate all of the evidence of this situation all together. [The 

officer further noted that fl^^H [CIA OFFICER 1]] might not listen to his 

chief of station when in the field."244 

2. CIA Records Lack Information on CIA Detainees and Details of Interrogations in 

Country | 

(TS/^H^^^^H'/NF ) Detainees held in Country | were detained under the authority of 

the MON; however, CIA officers conducted no written assessment of whether these detainees 

DeatMnvestigation - Gul RAHMAN; and CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee | 

• • • (2003-7402-IG), April 27, 2005. One senior interrogator,

 tol d

 the CIA OIG that 

"literally, a detainee could go for days or weeks without anyone looking at him," and that his team found one 

detainee who, "'as far as we could determine,' had been chained to the wall in a standing position for 17 days." 

According to the CIA interrogator, some of the CIA detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT "'literally looked 

like a dog that had been kenneled.' When the doors to their cells were opened, 'they cowered.'" (See Interview 

Report, 2003-7123-IG, Revie^Hnterrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, April 30, 2003.) 

The chief of interrogations,

 tol d tll e

 CIA OIG that "[DETENTION SITE COBALT] is good for 

interrogations because it is the closest thing he has seen to a dungeon, facilitating the displacement of detainee 

E

ions." (See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, 

April 7, 2003.) An analyst who conducted interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT told the CIA 

OIG that "[DETENTION SITE COBALT] is anEIT^(5e e Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of 

Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, May 8, 2003.) 

241 See April 27, 2005, CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Death of a Detainee 

April 7, 2005, Memorandum for John Helgerson, Inspector General, from Robert Grenier, Subject: Comments on 

Draft Report of Investigation: Death of a Detainee (2003-7402-IG). 

242 I 

| [CIA OFFICER 1]. 

| [CIA OFFICER 1]| 

| [CIA OFFICER 1] | 

TOP SECRET/d //NOFORN 

Page 50 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

50 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

"pose[d] a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or... 

| we]re planning terrorist activities." The CIA maintained such poor records of its detainees in 

Country | during this period that the CIA remains unable to determine the number and identity 

of the individuals it detained. The full details of the CIA interrogations there remain largely 

unknown, as DETENTION SITE COBALT was later found to have not reported multiple uses of 

sleep deprivation, required standing, loud music, sensory deprivation, extended isolation, 

reduced quantity and quality of food, nudity, and "rough treatment" of CIA detainees.245 

3. CIA Headquarters Recommends That Untrained Interrogators in Country | Use the 

CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques on Ridha al-Najjar 

Ridha al-Najjar was the first CIA detainee to be held at 

DETENTION SITE COBALT. Al-Najjar, along with Hassan Muhammad Abu Bakr amU 

number of other individuals, was arrested in Karachi, Pakistan, after raids conducted by 

^•HPakistan^ H in late May 2002.246 Al-Najjar was identified by the CIA as a 

former bodyguard for Usama bin Laden,247 and was rendered with Abu Bakr to CIA custody at a 

Country |Hfl^^^ l detention facility on June | , 2002.248 Ridha al-Najjar was transferred 

to DETENTION SITE COBALT on September2002. 2 4 9 

While the CIA was describing to the Department of Justice why it 

needed to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, a parallel 

internal discussion at the CIA was taking place regarding Ridha al-Najjar. An ALEC Station 

cable from a CTC officer stated that, on June 27, 2002: 

"ALEC/HQS held a strategy session regarding the interrogation of high 

priority detainee Ridha Ahmed al-Najjar in [Country The 

goal of the session was to review the progress of the interrogation to date and 

to devise a general plan as to how best to proceed once the new [Country | 

detention/debriefing facility [i.e., DETENTION SITE COBALT] is 

completed."250 

The meeting participants included individuals who were also 

involved in discussions related to Abu Zubaydah's interrogation, including deputy chief of 

ALEC Station, H^I^^^H ' ^^fl^R^T C Legal and the 

245

 The full Committee Study includes a CIA photograph of a waterboard at DETENTION SITE COBALT. While 

there are no records of the CIA using the waterboard at COBALT, the waterboard device in the photograph is 

surrounded by buckets, with a bottle of unknown pink solution (filled two tliirds of the way to the top) and a 

watering can resting on the wooden beams of the waterboard. In meetings between the Committee Staff and the 

CIA in the summer of 2013, the CIA was unable to explain the details of the photograph, to include the buckets, 

solution, and watering can, as well as the waterboard's presence at COBALT. 

246

 1^••• H 11443 

247 ^^^^^^^^ ^ 

248 

249

 27054 

250

 ALEC^^B(162135ZJU L 02). Although the plans at the time were for DETENTION SITE COBALT to be 

owned and operated by the Country | government, the detention site was controlled and overseen by the CIA and 

its officers from the day it became operational in September 2002. 

Page 51 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

51 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

the followed on 

2002, to the CIA Station in Country | suggesting possible interrogation techniques to use 

against Ridha al-Najjar, including: 

• utilizing "Najjar's fear for the well-being of his family to our benefit," with the cable 

explicitly stating that interrogators could not "threaten his family with imminent death"; 

• using "vague threats" to create a "mind virus" that would cause al-Najjar to believe that 

his situation would continue to get worse until he cooperated;252 

• manipulating Ridha al-Najjar's environment using a hood, restraints, and music; and 

• employing sleep deprivation through the use of round-the-clock interrogations.253 

(TS/^^^^^^^I^/NF ) The cable went on to note that the "possibility that [al-Najjar] may 

have current threat or lead information demands that we keep up the pressure on him,"254 With 

the exception of a brief mention of "diminished returns from the most recent interviews of alNajjar," and references to the detainee's complaints about physical ailments, the cable offers no 

evidence al-Najjar was actively resisting CIA interrogators.255 

(TS^m^^^^^l^F ) Ten days later, on July 26, 2002, CIA officers in Country none 

of whom had been trained in the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, proposed 

putting al-Najjar in isolation256 and using "sound disorientation techniques," "sense of time 

deprivation," limited light, cold temperatures, and sleep deprivation.257 The CIA officers added 

that they felt they had a "reasonable chance of breaking Najjar" to get "the intelligence and 

locator lead information on UBL and Bin Ladin's family."258 The plan for al-Najjar was 

circulated to senior CIA officers as part of the Daily DCI Operations Update.259 

2SI

 ALEC 

Legal 

162135Z JUL 02). The deputy chief of ALEC Station, and H^^HCT C 

|, would later travel to DETENTION SITE GREEN to observe the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah. 

252

 The term "mind virus" first appeared in the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah. See 10086 (201900Z 

APR 02). 

253

 Referenced July 16, 2002, cable is ALEC • • (162135Z JUL 02). 

254

 ALEC (162135Z JUL 02) 

255

 ALEC (162135Z JUL 02) 

256

 At this time, July 26,2002, Abu Zubaydah was in isolation at DETENTION SITE GREEN. Abu Zubaydah was 

placed in isolation on June 18, 2002, and remained in isolation for 47 days, until the CIA began subjecting him to its 

enhanced interrogation techniques on August 4, 2002. 

257

 107 (260903Z JUL 02) 

258

 25107 (260903Z JUL 02) 

259

 Email from: [REDACTED]MoJJuzz^Crongard, John O. Brennan, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], John H. 

Moseman, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTEdT^^^M. Jose Rodriguez^^Hj^^Kjph n P. 

Mudd, HHI^I , [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

m i 11 III i BBBW^B^BBB i

 11111111111 

Page 52 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

52 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

On August 5, 2002, the day after Abu Zubaydah's interrogation 

using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE GREEN began, CIA 

Headquarters authorized the proposed interrogation plan for al-Najjar, to include the use of loud 

music (at less than the level that would cause physical harm such as permanent hearing loss), 

worse food (as long as it was nutritionally adequate for sustenance), sleep deprivation, and 

hooding.260 

More than a month later, on September 21, 2002, CIA interrogators 

described al-Najjar as "clearly a broken man" and "on the verge of complete breakdown" as 

result of the isolation.261 The cable added that al-Najjar was willing to do whatever the CIA 

officer asked.262 

In October 2002, officers from the U.S. military conducted a short 

debriefing of al-Najjar at DETENTION SITE COBALT and subsequently expressed an interest 

in a more thorough debriefing.263 On November 2002, a U.S. military legal advisor visited 

DETENTION SITE COBALT and described it as a "CIA detentior^cility/^ioting that "while 

CIA is the only user of the facility they contend it is a [Country facility."264 

The U.S. military officer also noted that the junior CIA officer designated as warden of the 

facility "has little to no experience with interrogating or handling prisoners." With respect to alNajjar specifically, the legal advisor indicated that the CIA's interrogation plan included 

"isolation in total darkness; lowering the quality of his food; keeping him at an uncomfortable 

temperature (cold); [playing music] 24 hours a day; and keeping him shackled and hooded." In 

addition, al-Najjar was described as having been left hanging—which involved handcuffing one 

or both wrists to an overhead bar which would not allow him to lower his arms—for 22 hours 

each day for two consecutive days, in order to "'break' his resistance." It was also noted alNajjar was wearing a diaper and had no access to toilet facilities.265 

The U.S. military legal advisor concluded that, because of alNajjar' s treatment, and the concealment of the facility from the 1CRC, military participation in 

al-Najjar's interrogation would involve risks for the U.S. military The legal advisor 

recommended briefing the CIA's detention and interrogation activities to U.S. 

IREDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: ABU ZUBAYDAH - SENSITIVE ADDENDUM TO DCI DAILY 1630 

OPS UPDATE -2 6 JULY; date: July 26,2002. 

260

 DIRECTOR • • (052309Z AUG 02). The OLC opinion that reviewed and approved the use of CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques, signed on August 1, 2002, was specific to Abu Zubaydah. The Office of Legal 

Counsel did not produce legal opinions for al-Najjar or other detainees held by or for the CIA until August 2004. 

261

 [REDACTED] 27297 (210713Z SEP 02) 

262

 [REDACTED] 27297 (210713Z SEP 

November 2002, Memorandum for 

Subject: Legal Analysis of Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in 

[REDACTED] (aka "[DETENTION SITj^OBALTT^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^ 

November 2002, Memorandum for 

Subject: Legal Analysis of Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in 

[REDACTED] (aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]"). 

November 2002, Memorandum for 

Subject: Legal Analysis of H I Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in 

[REDACTED] (aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]"). 

Page 53 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

53 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

| [combatant command] to alert the command of the risks prior to the U.S. military 

| being involved in any aspect of the interrogation of al-Najjar.266 According to the CIA 

inspector general, the detention and interrogation of Ridha al-Najjar "became the model" for 

handling other CIA detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT.267 The CIA disseminated one 

intelligence report from its detention and interrogation of Ridha al-Najjar.268 

4. Death of Gul Rahman Leads CIA Headquarters to Learn of Unreported Coercive 

Interrogation Techniques at DETENTION SITE COBALT; CIA Inspector General 

Review Reveals Lack of Oversight of the Detention Site 

In November 2002, ALEC Station officers requested that CIA 

contract interrogator Hammond DUNBAR, one of the two primary interrogators of Abu 

Zubaydah in August 2002, travel to DETENTION SITE COBALT to assess a detainee for the 

possible use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.269 While DUNBAR was present at 

DETENTION SITE COBALT, he assisted||HH0 H [ C I A OFFICER 1] in the 

interrogations of Gul Rahman, a suspected Islamic extremist. As reported to CTA Headquarters, 

this interrogation included "48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload, total darkness, 

isolation, a cold shower, and rough treatment." CIA Headquarters did not approve these 

interrogation techniques in advance. Upon receipt of these cables, however, officers at CIA 

Headquarters responded that they were "motivated to extract any and all operational information 

on al-Qa'ida and Hezbi Islami from Gul Rahman" and suggested that "enhanced measures" 

might be needed to gain Gul Rahman's compliance. CIA Headquarters also requested that a 

psychological assessment of Rahman be completed.270 Prior to DUNBAR's departure from the 

detention site on November 2002, [a few days before the death of Gul Rahman] DUNBAR 

proposed the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on other detainees and offered 

suggestions to [CIA OFFICER 1], the site manager, on the use of such techniques.271 

(T^fHI^^^^H^ 1) On November 2002, [CIA OFFICER 1] ordered that 

Gul Rahman be shackled to the wall of his cell in a position that required the detainee to rest on 

the bare concrete floor. Rahman was wearing only a sweatshirt, as | m [CIA OFFICER 1] 

had ordered that Rahman's clothing be removed when he had been judged to be uncooperative 

during an earlier interrogation. The next day, the guards found Gul Rahman's dead body. An 

internal CIA review and autopsy assessed that Rahman likely died from hypothermia—in part 

266

 November | , 2002, Memorandum for | 

Subject: Legal Analysis of HHPersonne l Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in 

[REDACTED] (aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]"). 

^^According to the IG report, "in late July or early August 2002, a senior operations officer on TDY to | 

interrogated a particularly obstinate detainee [Ridha al-Najjar] at detention facility 

that was used before [COBALT] was opened. The officer drafted a cable that proposed techniques that, ultimately, 

becamethemodel for [COBALT]." See April 27, 2005, report by the CIA Inspector General, Death of a Detainee | 

••^• H (2003-7402JGWeefl^ntovie w Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for 

Counterterrorism Purposes, Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of 

Interrogations for Counterterrorism PuiposesT^^^^^^^^ , April 2, 2003. 

268 See Volume II and Volume III for additional information. 

269

 ALEC I 

270

 ALEC | 

271 

TOP SECRET//I ^^^^^^^^^P^NOFQR N 

Page 54 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

54 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

from having been forced to sit on the bare concrete floor without pants.272 [CIA 

OFFICER l's] initial cable to CIA Headquarters on Rahman's death included a number of 

misstatements and omissions that were not discovered until internal investigations into Rahman's 

death.273 

The death of Gul Rahman resulted in increased attention to CIA 

detention and interrogation activities in Country | by CIA Headquarters. The CTC formally 

designated the CTC's Renditions Group274 as the responsible entity for the management and 

maintenance of all CIA interrogation facilities, including DETENTION SITE COBALT, in early 

December 2002.275 Despite this change, many of the same individuals within the CIA— 

including DUNBAR, officers at DETENTION SITE COBALT, and officers within ALEC 

Station who had recommended the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against 

Gul Rahman—remained key figures in the CIA interrogation program and received no reprimand 

or sanction for Rahman's death. Instead, in March 2003, just four months after the death of Gul 

Rahman, the CIA Station in Country | recommended that 1] 

receive a "cash award" of $2,500 for his "consistently I ' ^BB B [CIA 

OFFICER 1] remained in his position as manager of the detention site until July 2003 and 

continued to be involved in the interrogations of other CIA detainees. He was formally certified 

as a CIA interrogator in April 2003 after the practical portion of his training requirement was 

waived because of his past experience with interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT.277 

immobilit 

273 

272

 Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from January 28, 2003, Subject: Death 

Investigation - Gul RAHMAN. Other contributing factors were identified as dehydration, lack of food, and 

due to "short chaining." ^^^^^^^^^ ^ 

30211 See Volume 1 and III for additional details. 

274

 As noted, the Renditions Group was also known during the program as the "Renditions and Interrogations 

Group," as well as the "Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group," and by the initials, "RDI" and "RDG." 

275

 llll I l Hll j^Mi n I II DEC02) 

276 ^ 

277

 DIRECTOR^^H^^lH^^^Hl n late 2005, the CIA convened an Accountability Board to review the 

actions of CIA personnel in Gul Rahman's death. The board recommended that the executive director "impose a 10 

day suspension without pay" on [CIA OFFICER 1 ], and noted that this action would "strike the 

appropriate balance between: 1) the fact that [HIH H [CIA OFFICER 1]] was the only individual who made 

decisions that led directly, albeit unintentionally, to Rahman's death, and 2) the significant weight die Board 

attached to the mitigating factors at play in this incident." (See Memorandum for Executive Director from | 

H , Deputy Director for Science and Technology, re: Report and Recommendations of the Special Accountability 

Board Regarding the Death of Afghan Detainee Gul Rahman.) On February 10, 2006, however, the CIA Executive 

Director K.B. Foggo notified |BH H [CIA OFFICER 1 ] that he intended to take no disciplinary action against 

him. In his memo describing that decision, the executive director stated: "While not condoning your actions, it is 

imperative, in my view, that they... be judged within the operational context that existed at the time of Rahman's 

detention. Cable traffic reviewed by the board shows conclusively that Headquarters generally was aware of, and 

S

osed no objections to, the confinement conditions and interrogation techniques being imposed on Rahman as late as 

| November. On that date, Headquarters notified [the CIA Station in COUNTRY 1].. . that it was ' motivated to 

extract any and all operational information' from Rahman, that it rated achieving Rahman's cooperation to be of 

'great importance' and that it acknowledged that Rahman 'may need to be subjected to enhanced interrogation 

measures to induce him to comply." (See February 10, 2006, Memorandum for [^H^MH I [CIA OFFICER 

1 ]], CounterTerrorist Center, National Clandestine Service, from Executive Director, re: "Accountability Decision.") 

With regard to the death of Gul Rahman, the CIA's June 2013 Response states: "Most egregiously, we believe that 

CIA leaders erred in not holding anyone formally accountable for the actions and failure of management related to 

the death of Gul Rahman at [COBALT] in 2002. We understand the reasoning underlying CIA management's 

decision to overturn an accountability board recommendation that would have imposed sanctions on the least 

m i 11 i n i 11(1111111 1 

Page 55 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

55 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

Later investigations of DETENTION SITE COBALT conducted 

by the CIA inspector general and the deputy director of operations following the death of Gul 

Rahman found that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—and other coercive 

interrogation techniques—was more widespread than was reported in contemporaneous CIA 

cables. Specifically, the interrogation techniques that went unreported in CIA cables included 

standing sleep deprivation in which a detainee's arms were shackled above his head, nudity, 

dietary manipulation, exposure to cold temperatures, cold showers, "rough takedowns," and, in 

at least two instances, the use of mock executions.278 

(TSZ/I^HHI^^ft^^ 1 1 Novembe^8^002^tafffrom the CIA's Office of Inspector 

Generalcontacted^^^HBiCTC Legal, to indicate their interest in being 

briefed by CTC on the detention facility in Country At their meeting with the DDO and the 

chief of CTC on November 2002, the OIG staff explained that, while in that country on a 

separate matter, the staff had overheard a conversation that included references to "war crimes" 

and "torture" at a CIA detention facility and were therefore seeking to follow-up on this 

information. According to notes from the meeting, the DDO described the "most recent event 

concerning Gul Rahman"—his death, which occurred on November 2002.279 

experienced officer involved. The most junior in the chain of command should not have to bear the full weight of 

accountability when larger, systemic problems exist and when they are thrust into difficult battlefield situations by 

their supervisors and given a risky and difficult task and little preparation or guidance. Still, it is hard to accept that 

a CIA officer does not bear at least some responsibility for his or her actions, even under trying circumstances." 

278

 Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003) 

(2003-7123-IG), May 7, 2004; Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from January 

28, 2003, Subiect^eath Investigation - Gul RAHMAN; CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Death of a 

Detainee M^H I (2003-7402-IG), April 27, 2005. Inspector General records of the interview of a senior CIA 

debriefer indicated that, "[djuring the two weeks of interrogation training, she heard stories of [COBALT] detainees 

being 'hung for days on end,' not being fed, mock assassinations, and at least one case of a detainee being 

repeatedly choked." The senior debriefer also informed the Office of Inspector General that, "[s]he heard that while 

at [COBALT] [^^HH H aka "CIA OFFICER 2"] had hung detainees up for long periods with their toes 

barely touchimMh^round." (See interview report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism 

Purposes, April 5, 2003.) DUNBAR described a "rough takedown" following the death of Gul 

Rahman at COBALT. "According to [DUNBAR], there were approximately five CIA officers from the renditions 

team. Each one had a role during the takedown and it was thoroughly planned and rehearsed. They opened the door 

of Rahman's cell and rushed in screaming and yelling for him to 'get down.' They dragged him outside, cut off his 

clothes and secured him with Mylar tape. They covered his head with a hood and ran him lip and down a long 

corridor adjacent to his cell. They slapped him and punched him several times. [DUNBAR] stated that although it 

was obvious they were not trying to hit him as hard as they could, a couple of times the punches were forceful. As 

they ran him along the corridor, a couple of times he fell and they dragged him through the dirt (the floor outside of 

the cells is dirt). Rahman did acquire a number of abrasions on his face, legs, and hands, but nothing that required 

medical attention. (This may account for the abrasions found on Rahman's body after his death. Rahman had a 

number of surface abrasions on his shoulders, pelvis^nnsjegs, and face.) At this point, Rahman was returned to 

his cell and secured. [DUNBAR] stated that [H^HH H [CIA OFFICER 1]| [the CIA officer in charge of 

DETENTION SITE COBALT] may have spoken to Rahman for a few moments, but he did not know what 

[••• 1 [CIA OFFICER 1]] said. [DUNBAR] stated that after something like this is done, interrogators should 

speak to the prisoner to 'give them something to think about.'" (See Memorandum for Deputy Director of 

Operations, from |HHHH^H < January 28,2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN, pp. 21-22.) 

279 See Notes of November J , 2002, meeting D/IG [REDACTED]. 

Page 56 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

48 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

Tn January 2003, CIA Inspector General John Helgerson began a 

formal review of the death of Gul Rahman and began a separate review of the entire CIA 

Detention and Interrogation Program. The resulting Special Review of Counterterrorism 

Detention and Interrogation Activities ("Special Review") found that there were no guidelines 

for the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE COBALT 

prior to December 2002, and that interrogators, some with little or no training, were "left to their 

own devices in working with detainees."280 

(TS^m^^l^^l^NF ) The Inspector General's Special Review also revealed the lack of 

oversight of DETENTION SITE COBALT by CIA leadership. DCI Tenet stated that he was 

"not very familiar" with DETENTION SITE COBALT and "what the CIA is doing with medium 

value targets."281 Associate Deputy Director of Operations stated that he was 

unaware that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were being used there.282 In August 

2003, CIA General Counsel Scott Muller relayed that he was under the impression that 

DETENTION SITE COBALT was only a holding facility and that he had "no idea who is 

responsible for [COBALT]."283 Senior Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo informed the OIG 

that he knew little about DETENTION SITE COBALT and that his focus was on DETENTION 

SITE GREEN and DETENTION SITE BLUE.284 CTC Chief of Operations • • 

stated that he had much less knowledge of operations at DETENTION SITE 

COBALT, and that the CIA's GREEN and BLUE detention sites were much more important to 

him.285 Finally, Chief of CTC Jose Rodriguez stated that he did not focus on DETENTION 

SITE COBALT because he had "other higher priorities."286 

5. The CIA Begins Training New Interrogators; Interrogation Techniques Not Reviewed by 

the Department of Justice Included in the Training Syllabus 

280 See Office of Inspector General Special Review of Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities 

(September 2001-October 2003), May 7,2004, p. 52. According to an OIG interview with an analyst who 

conducted interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT, "indicative of the lack of interrogators was the fact that 

[CIA OFFICER 1]] enlisted a [REDACTED] case officer friend... to conducHnterrogatio^ 

[DETENTION SITE COBALT] after he completed his [REDACTED] business in ." 

(See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for I Ii il I ni|in i May 

8, 2003.) Inspector General records of an interview with a senior CIA debriefer indicate that the debriefer, "heard 

prior to taking the [interrogator] training that people at [COBALT] had debriefed detainees on their own, sometimes 

going out to the site at night." (See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism 

Purposes, April 5, 2003.) As described elsewhere, DCI Tenet issued formal interrogation guidelines 

for the program on January 28, 2003. (See Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential 

Memorandum of Notification of 17 September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, 

January 28, 2003.) 

281

 Interview of George Tenet, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, memorandum 

dated, September 8, 2003. 

282

 Interview of Office of the Inspector General, September 9, 2003. 

283

 Interview of Scott Muller, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector 

General, August 20, 2003. 

284

 Interview of John Rizzo, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 

August 14,2003. 

283

 Interview of Office of the Inspector General, February 11,2003. 

286

 Interview of Jose Rodriguez, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 12, 

2003. 

m i 111ii iBMB^^BB^^MI 11111111111 1 

Page 57 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

57 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

The CIA's CTC Renditions Group began preparing for the first 

CIA interrogator training course in August 2002—during the period in which Abu Zubaydah was 

being interrogatethjsing the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE 

GREEN. ••^• L the CIA's chief of interrogations,2*

7

 and^^^^H^ H the CIA 

officer with OTS who had spent | years as a SERE Instructor with JPRA, led the interrogation 

training. The first interrogation training, conducted with the assistance of JPRA personnel, 

occurred from November 12, 2002, to November 18, 2002.288 The class included eight students 

who were seeking to become CIA interrogators and three students seeking to support the CIA 

interrogation process.289 The CIA training program involved 65 hours of instruction and training 

on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including at least two interrogation techniques 

whose legality had not been evaluated by the Department of Justice: the "abdominal slap" and 

the "finger press." Although a number of personnel at CIA Headquarters reviewed the training 

materials, there are no CIA records of any CIA officer raising objections to the techniques being 

included in the syllabus.290 

6. Despite Recommendation from CIA Attorneys, the CIA Fails to Adequately Screen 

Potential Interrogators in 2002 and 2003 

On NovemberBJ2002;after the completion of the first formal 

trainin^lass7^^^^^|CTC Legal, asked CTC attorney H 

to "[m]ake it known that from now on, CTC/LGL must vet all personnel who are 

enrolled in, observing or teaching - or otherwise associated with - the class."291 

added: 

"Moreover, we will be forced to Disapprove [sic] the participation of specific 

personnel in the use of enhanced techniques unless we have ourselves vetted 

287

 December 4, 2002, Training Report, High Value Target IntenrogationandExpioitation (HVTIE) Training 

Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 (pilot running) at 4. See also email from: IH1HHHH; t o : [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], subject: Formation of a High Value Target Interrogation team (describing initial 

training plan and requirements); date: August 30,2002, at 8:30 AM. 

288

 December 4, 2002, Training Report, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training 

Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 (pilot running). 

289

 December 4,2002, Training Report, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training 

Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 (pilot running), at 15. 

200 See, for example, email from: HHf^^Hf t [REDACTED]; subject: HVT training; 

date: October 10, 2002; email from: [REDACTED]; to: ^B^H^^Iffcc : 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: HVT trainine^date^ctober 10,2002; November 1,2002, 

Memorandum for: Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center, from Chief, Renditions Group, 

CTC, re: Request for use of Military Trainers in Support of Agency Interrogation Course, REFERENCE: Memo for 

D/CTC from C/RG/CTC, dtd 26 Aug 02, Same Subject. 

291

 Email from: ||^HHH^HL|CTC/LGL ; to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED],^^^^^^^H~subject : EYES ONLY; date: November 2002, at 03:13:01 FM. As 

described above, Gul Rahman likely froze to death at DETENTION SITE COBALT sometime in the morning of 

November^, 2002. email, however, appears to have been drafted before the guards had 

found Gul Rahman's body and before that death was reported to CIA Headquarters. See [REDACTED] 30211 

^^^^BiH K describing the guards observing Gul Rahman alive in the morning of November 2002. Gul 

Rahman's death appeared in cable traffic at least H^^ ^ after ^^^^^H' s email. No records could be identified 

to provide the impetus for ^^^H^' s email. 

11 ii i M 1 1 j^ H i II i II 

Page 58 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

58 
UNCLASSIFIED 

t op secret; 7NOFQRN 

them and are satisfied with their qualifications and suitability for what are 

clearly unusual measures that are lawful only when practiced correctly by 

personnel whose records clearly demonstrate their suitability for that role. The 

vetting process will not be that dissimilar from the checks that are provided by 

the OIG, OS, etc. in certain cases before individuals are promoted or receive 

awards, and the selection and training of aggressive interrogators certainly 

warrants a similar vetting process."292 

( ) The chief of CTC, Jose Rodriguez, objected to this approach, 

"I do not think that CTC/LGL should or would want to get into the business of 

vetting participants, observers, instructors or others that are involved in this 

program. It is simply not your job. Your job is to tell all what are the 

acceptable legal standards for conducting interrogations per the authorities 

obtained from Justice and agreed upon by the White House."293 

(^FS^IBHHH^^^ ) Contrary to statements later made by CIA Director Michael 

Hayden and other CIA officials that "[a]ll those involved in the questioning of detainees are 

carefully chosen and screened for demonstrated professional judgment and maturity,"294 CIA 

records suggest that the vetting sought by did not take place. The Committee 

reviewed CIA records related to several CIA officers and contractors involved in the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program, most of whom conducted interrogations. The Committee 

identified a number of personnel whose backgrounds include notable derogatory information 

calling into question their eligibility for employment, their access to classified information, and 

their participation in CIA interrogation activities. In nearly all cases, the derogatory information 

was known to the CIA prior to the assignment of the CIA officers to the Detention and 

Interrogation Program. This group of officers included individuals who, among other issues, had 

engaged in inappropriate detainee interrogations, had workplace anger management issues, and 

had reportedly admitted to sexual assault.295 

7. Bureau of Prisons "WOW'ed" by Level of Deprivation at CIA's COBALT Detention Site 

I" December 2002, the CIA's Renditions Group sent a team of 

recently trained interrogators to DETENTION SITE COBALT to engage in interrogations. The 

interrogation plans proposed by that team for at least three detainees at DETENTION SITE 

292

 Email from: ^^^^^^^KHCTC/LGL ; to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED],subject : EYES ONLY; date: November2002 , at 03:13:01 PM. 

293

 Email from: Jose RodriguezTto^HH^H^H| , |CTC/LGL; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], ^fl^H^HFsubject : EYES ONLY; date: November 2002, at 04:27 

PM. 

294

 Transcript of hea 

255

 The information is described at length in the Committee Study in 

stating: 

Volume 111. 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 59 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

59 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

COBALT included the use of interrupted sleep, loud music, and reduction in food quality and 

quantity. Less than a month after the death of Gul Rahman from suspected hypothermia, the 

plans also called for detainees' clothes to be removed in a facility that was described to be 45 

degrees Fahrenheit. CIA Headquarters approved the proposals for these detainees, whom the 

CIA described as "Medium Value."296 

(TS^^^^mH^^^/NF ) Prior to this, in November 2002, a delegation of several officers 

from the Federal Bureau of Prisons conducted an assessment of DETENTION SITE COBALT. 

Following the November 2002, through November 2002, visit,297 CIA officers in Country 

(remarked that the Federal Bureau of Prisons assessments, along with recommendations and 

training, had "made a noticeable improvement on how the day to day operations at the facility 

are performed," and made the detention site a "more secure and safer working environment for 

I officers."298 

(TS/fl^HH^IHP^^ ) On December 4, 2002, officers at CIA Headquarters met with 

individuals from the Federal Bureau of Prisons to learn more about their inspection of 

DETENTION SITE COBALT and their training of H| B security staff.299 During that 

meeting, the Federal Bureau of Prisons personnel described DETENTION SITE COBALT and 

stated that there was "absolutely no talking inside the facility," that the guards do not interact 

with the prisoners, and that "[e]verything is done in silence and [in] the dark."300 According to a 

CIA officer, the Federal Bureau of Prisons staff also commented that "they were 'WOW'ed'" at 

first by the facility, because: 

"They have never been in a facility where individuals are so sensory deprived, 

i.e., constant white noise, no talking, everyone in the dark, with the guards 

wearing a light on their head when they collected and escorted a detainee to an 

interrogation cell, detainees constantly being shackled to the wall or floor, and 

the starkness of each cell (concrete and bars). There is nothing like this in the 

Federal Bureau of Prisons. They then explained that they understood the 

mission and it was their collective assessment that in spite of all this sensory 

deprivation, the detainees were not being treated in humanely [sic]. They 

explained that the facility was sanitary, there was medical care and the guard 

force and our staff did not mistreat the detainee[s]."301 

By the end of December 2002, the CIA Renditions Group that had 

visited DETENTION SITE COBALT had concluded that the detention facility's initial "baseline 

conditions" involved so much deprivation that any further deprivation would have limited impact 

296

 31118 DIRECTOR 

297

 CIA detainee Gul Rahman died at DETENTION SITE COBALT at the end of the Federal Bureau of Prisons visit 

to the CIA detention site. 

298

 [REDACTED] 30589 (271626Z NOV 02) 

299

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], | 

[REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 4, 2002. 

300

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], | 

[REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 4, 2002. 

301

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: 

December 5,2002. 

1//NOFORN 

Page 60 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

60 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

on the interrogations. The team thus recommended that "experts and authorities other than the 

individuals who crafted the process" review the interrogation process and conditions, and that a 

legal review be conducted.302 CIA Headquarters does not appear to have taken action on these 

recommendations. 

8. The CIA Places CIA Detainees in Country | Facilities Because They Did Not Meet the 

MON Standard for Detention 

c

) In the spring of 2003, the CIA continued to hold detainees at 

facilities in Country J who were known not to meet the MON standard for detention. CIA 

officer ^H^B^ H [CIA OFFICER 1] described the arrangement he had with Country | 

officers in an email, writing: 

They also happen to have 3 or 4 rooms where they can lock up people 

discretely [sic]. I give them a few hundred bucks a month and they use the 

rooms for whoever I bring over - no questions asked. It is very useful for 

housing guys that shouldn't be in [DETENTION SITE COBALT] for one 

reason or another but still need to be kept isolated and held in secret 

detention."303 

(T S /i ^^^^^^^^^B^N F) CIA cables indicate that CIA officers transferred at least four 

detainees to these Country | facilities because they did not meet the standard for CIA detention 

under the MON.304 

In total, four CIA detention facilities were established in Country 

CIA records indicate that DETENTION SITE COBALT held a total of 64 detainees during 

the period of its operation between September 2002 and^B2004 , while DETENTION SITE 

GRAY held eight detainees between 2003 and ••12003 . The CIA later 

established two other CIA facilities in Country j : DETENTION SITE ORANGE, which held 

34 detainees between |^B200 4 and •••(2006 ; and DETENTION SITE BROWN, which 

held 12 detainees betweenHBj 2006 and 2008.305 

302

 CIA document entitled Renditions Group Interrogation Team (RGIT), Baseline assessment for MVT, 

Detainee/Prisoner management, December 30, 2002. The CIA does not appear to have taken action on this 

recommendation. 

303

 Email from: [CIA OFFICER 1]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Thanks and Query re: List of 

I^HI^^^^^^B d ETAINEES ; date: March 14,2003. 

304

 The cables did not explain any legal basis for detaining individuals who did not meet the detention requirements 

of the September 17,2001, MON. HEADQUARTERS 

38836 J 

305 See Volume III for additional information. 

TOP SECRET//! 

Page 61 of 499 

I); HEADQUARTERS! 

ale c • • mm^^m -

I //NOFOR N 

UNCLASSIFIED 

61 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

9. DCI Tenet Establishes First Guidelines on Detention Conditions and Interrogation; 

Formal Consolidation of Program Administration at CIA Headquarters Does Not 

Resolve Disagreements Among CIA Personnel 

In late January 2003, in response to the death of CIA detainee Gul 

Rahman and the use of a gun and a drill in the CIA interrogations of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri 

(described later in this summary), DCI Tenet signed the first formal interrogation and 

confinement guidelines for the program.306 In contrast to proposals from late 2001, when CIA 

personnel expected that any detention facility would have to meet U.S. prison standards, the 

confinement guidelines signed in January 2003 set forth minimal standards for a detention 

facility. The confinement guidelines required only that the facility be sufficient to meet basic 

health needs, meaning that even a facility like DETENTION SITE COBALT, in which detainees 

were kept shackled in complete darkness and isolation, with a bucket for human waste, and 

without notable heat during the winter months, met the standard.307 

The guidelines also required quarterly assessments of the 

conditions at the detention facilities. The first quarterly review of detention facilities covered the 

period from January 2003 to April 2003, and examined conditions at DETENTION SITE 

COBALT, as well as at DETENTION SITE BLUE in a different country, Country |. 3 0 8 At that 

time, DETENTION SITE BLUE, which was initially designed for two detainees, was housing 

five detainees. Nonetheless, the site review team found that conditions at DETENTION SITE 

BLUE —including the three purpose-built "holding units"—met "the minimum standards set by 

the CIA" in the January 2003 guidance. Detainees received bi-weekly medical evaluations, 

brushed their teeth once a day, washed their hands prior to each meal, and could bathe once a 

week. Amenities such as solid food, clothing (sweatshirts, sweatpants, and slippers), reading 

materials, prayer rugs, and Korans were available depending on the detainee's degree of 

cooperation with interrogators.309 

The first quarter 2003 review also found that conditions at 

DETENTION SITE COBALT satisfied the January 2003 guidance, citing "significant 

improvements" such as space heaters and weekly medical evaluations. The review noted that a 

new facility was under construction in Country f | to replace DETENTION SITE COBALT, and 

that this new detention facility, DETENTION SITE ORANGE, "will be a quantum leap 

forward" because "[it] will incorporate heating/air conditioning, conventional plumbing, 

appropriate lighting, shower, and laundry facilities."310 DETENTION SITE ORANGE opened 

in • 2004. Although some of the cells at DETENTION SITE ORANGE included plumbing, 

306

 Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17 

September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, January 28, 2003. 

307

 Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17 

September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, January 28, 2003. 

308

 CIA document titled, Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, 1/28/03 - 4/30/03, May 

22, 2003. 

309

 CIA document titled. Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, 1/28/03 - 4/30/03, May 

22, 2003. 

310

 CIA document titled. Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, 1/28/03 - 4/30/03, May 

22, 2003. 

m i 11 in i MM ^ M ^ M W ^ M ^ ofor n 

Page 62 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

62 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ //NO FORN 

detainees undergoing interrogation were kept in smaller cells, with waste buckets rather than 

toilet facilities.311 

The DCI's January 2003 interrogation guidelines listed 12 

"enhanced techniques" that could be used with prior approval of the director of CTC, including 

two—use of diapers for "prolonged periods" and the abdominal slap—that had not been 

evaluated by the OLC. The "enhanced techniques" were only to be employed by "approved 

interrogators for use with [a] specific detainee." The guidelines also identified "standard 

techniques"—including sleep deprivation up to 72 hours, reduced caloric intake, use of loud 

music, isolation, and the use of diapers "generally not to exceed 72 hours"—that required 

advance approval "whenever feasible," and directed that their use be documented. The "standard 

techniques" were described as "techniques that do not incorporate physical or substantial 

psychological pressure." The guidelines provided no description or further limitations on the use 

of either the enhanced or standard interrogation techniques.312 

Although the DCI interrogation guidelines were prepared as a 

reaction to the death of Gul Rahman and the use of unauthorized interrogation techniques on 

'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, they did not reference all interrogation practices that had been 

employed at CIA detention sites. The guidelines, for example, did not address whether 

interrogation techniques such as the "rough take down,"313 the use of cold water showers,314 and 

prolonged light deprivation were prohibited. In addition, by requiring advance approval of 

"standard techniques" "whenever feasible," the guidelines allowed CIA officers a significant 

amount of discretion to determine who could be subjected to the CIA's "standard" interrogation 

techniques, when those techniques could be applied, and when it was not "feasible" to request 

advance approval from CIA Headquarters. Thus, consistent with the interrogation guidelines, 

throughout much of 2003, CIA officers (including personnel not trained in interrogation) could, 

at their discretion, strip a detainee naked, shackle him in the standing position for up to 72 hours, 

and douse the detainee repeatedly with cold water315—without approval from CIA Headquarters 

if those officers judged CIA Headquarters approval was not "feasible." In practice, CIA 

personnel routinely applied these types of interrogation techniques without obtaining prior 

approval.316 

| 3741 

312

 Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17 

September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, January 28, 2003. 

313

 For a description of the "rough takedown," see Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from BIH I 

January 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN, pp. 21-22. 

31A

 One cold water shower was described by a CIA linguist: "Rahman was placed back under the cold water by the 

guards at [CIA OFFICER l]]'s direction. Rahman was so cold that he could barely utter his alias. 

According to [the on-site linguist], the entire process lasted no more than 20 minutes. It was intended to lower 

Rahman's resistance and was not for hygienic reasons. At the conclusion of the shower, Rahman was moved to one 

of the four sleep deprivation cells where he was left shivering for hours or overnight with his hand chained over his 

head." See CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee (2003-7402-IG), 

April 27, 2005. 

315

 Water dousing was not designated by the CIA as a "standard" interrogation technique until June 2003. In 

January 2004 water dousing was recategorized by the CIA as an "enhanced" interrogation technique. 

316 See Volume III for additional information. 

11 ii 11 ii i i j^^^U^Mm^BvNm-on N 

Page 63 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

63 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

(TS^HI^^l^^^H^^ ) The DCI interrogation guidelines also included the first 

requirements related to recordkeeping, instructing that, for "each interrogation session in which 

an enhanced technique is employed," the field prepare a "substantially contemporaneous 

record... setting forth the nature and duration of each such technique employed, the identities of 

those present, and a citation to the required Headquarters approval cable."317 In practice, these 

guidelines were not followed.318 

(^flHI^B^ ) There were also administrative changes to the program. As noted, 

on December 3, 2002, CTC's Renditions Group formally assumed responsibility for the 

management and maintenance of all CIA detention and interrogation facilities.319 Prior to that 

timc^hcintcrrogation program was "joined at the hip" with CTC's ALEC Station, according to 

I^B^^^IIT C Legal, although another CTC attorney who was directly involved in the 

program informed the CIA OIG that she "was never sure what group in CTC was responsible for 

interrogation activities."320 Even after the formal designation of the CIA's Renditions Group,321 

tensions continued, particularly between CTC personnel who supported SWIGERT and 

DUNBAR's continued role, and the Renditions Group, which designated as the 

3,7

 DIRECTOR (302126Z JAN 03); DIRECTOR (311702Z JAN 03). Despite the formal record 

keeping requirement, the CIA's June 2013 Response argues that detailed reporting on the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques at CIA detention sites was not necessary, stating: "First, the decline in reporting over time 

on the use of enhanced techniques, which the Study characterizes as poor or deceptive record keeping, actually 

reflects the maturation of the program. In early 2003, a process was put in place whereby interrogators requested 

permission in advance for interrogation plans. The use of these plans for each detainee obviated the need for 

reporting in extensive detail on the use of specific techniques, unless there were deviations from the approved plan." 

As detailed in the Study, the process put in place by the CIA in early 2003 explicitly required record keeping, 

including "the nature and duration of each such technique employed, the identities of those present, and a citation to 

the required Headquarters approval cable." That requirement was never revised. 

318

 Subsequent to the January 2003 guidance, many cables reporting the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques listed the techniques used on a particular day, but did not describe the frequency with which those 

techniques were employed, nor did they integrate the specific techniques into narratives of the interrogations. As the 

CIA interrogation program continued, descriptions of the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were 

recorded in increasingly summarized form, providing little information on how or when the techniques were applied 

during an interrogation. There are also few CIA records detailing the rendition process for detainees and their 

transportation to or between detention sites. CIA records do include detainee comments on their rendition 

experiences and photographs of detainees in the process of being transported. Based on a review of the 

photographs, detainees transported by the CIA by aircraft were typically hooded with their hands and feet shackled. 

The detainees wore large headsets to eliminate their ability to hear, and these headsets were typically affixed to a 

detainee's head with duct tape that ran the circumference of the detainee's head. CIA detainees were placed in 

diapers and not permitted to use the lavatory on the aircraft. Depending on the aircraft, detainees were either 

strapped into seats during the flights, or laid down and strapped to the floor of the plane horizontally like cargo. See 

CIA photographs of renditions among CIA materials provided to the Committee pursuant to the Committee's 

document requests, as well as CIA detainee reviews in Volume III for additional information on the transport of CIA 

detainees. 

3,9 DIRECTOR••(032336ZDE C 03) 

320

 Interview of |HHI H

 b y [REDACTED], [REDACTED! and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector 

General, August 20,2003. Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the 

Inspector General, February 14, 2003. CTC Chief of Operations told the Inspector General that the program was 

handled by the Abu Zubaydah Task Force. See February 11, 2003, interview report of Office 

of the Inspector General. 

321

 As noted, the CIA's Rendition Group is variably known as the "Renditions Group," the "Renditions and 

Detainees Group," the "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations Group," and by the initials, "RDI" and "RDG." 

m i 11 i n i"^^BMBBH^BBI i m i im i i 

Page 64 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

64 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

CIA's chief interrogator.322 As late as June 2003, SWIGERT and DUNBAR, operating outside 

of the direct management of the Renditions Group, were deployed to DETENTION SITE BLUE 

to both interrogate and conduct psychological reviews of detainees.323 The dispute extended to 

interrogation practices. The Renditions Group's leadership considered the waterboard, which 

Chief of Interrogations ^B^B^ B was not certified to use, as "life threatening," and 

complained to the OIG that some CIA officers in the Directorate of Operations believed that, as a 

result, the Renditions Group was "running a 'sissified' interrogation program."324 At the same 

time, CIA CTC personnel criticized the Renditions Group andB^ B f° r their use of painful 

stress positions, as well as for the conditions at DETENTION SITE COBALT.325 

(T&^iBBBiflBB^^ )

 r ^e i e wer e a 's o concern s

 about possible conflicts of interest 

related to the contractors, SWIGERT and DUNBAR. On January 30, 2003, a cable from CIA 

Headquarters stated that "the individual at the interrogation site who administers the techniques 

is not the same person who issues the psychological assessment of record," and that only a staff 

psychologist, not a contractor, could issue an assessment of record."326 In June 2003, however, 

SWIGERT and DUNBAR were deployed to DETENTION SITE BLUE to interrogate KSM, as 

well as to assess KSM's "psychological stability" and "resistance posture."327 As described later 

in this summary, the contractors had earlier subjected KSM to the waterboard and other CIA 

enhanced interrogation techniques. The decision to send the contract psychologists to 

DETENTION SITE BLUE prompted an OMS psychologist to write to OMS leadership that 

322

 Interview of [BH^^^^Bl '

 b y [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 

3, 2003. February 21, 2003, interview report, ^BBI^BB , Office of the Inspector General. Hammond 

DUNBAR told the Office of Inspector General that there was "intrigue" between the RDG and him and SWIGERT, 

and "there were emails coming to [DETENTION SITE BLUE] that questioned [his] and [SWIGERT]'s 

qualifications." See Interview of Hammond DUNBAR, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the 

Inspector General, February 4, 2003. 

323

 Email fan: to: cc:J 

W^^^mma^m ^ Re : ^^JRD G Tasking for IC Psychologists 

[DUNBAR] and [SWIGERT]; date: June 20,2003, at 5:23:29 PMnl^^^HOM S expressed concern that "no 

professional in the field would credit [SWIGERT and DUNBAR's] later judgments as psychologists assessing the 

subjects of their enhanced measures." (See email from:

 cc :

 ^^ ^ 

|; subject: Re: BH^ 0 0 

Tasking for IC Psychologists DUNBAR and SWIGERT; date: June 20, 2003, at 2:19:53 PM.) The CIA's June 2013 

Response states that CIA "Headquarters established CTC's Renditions and Detentions Group CTC/RDG as the 

responsible entity for all CIA detention and interrogation sites in December 2002, removing any latent institutional 

confusion." 

324

 Interview by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 

February 21, 2003. The chief of interrogations, ^^BIHI K

 to'd the Inspector General that the waterboard was 

overused with Abu Zubaydah and KSM and was ineffective in the interrogations of KSM. (See Interview of 

by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of the Office of the Inspector General, March 27, 2003.) One doctor 

involved in CIA interrogations using the waterboard interrogation technique stated that "has a huge bias 

against the waterboard b/c he's not approved to use it. The reverse is true of the contract psy guys [SWIGERT and 

DUNBAR] who have a vested interest in favor of it." See email from: BIHHHI> t o : ^^^^Bl^ k 

cc: [REDACTED]; subject: re: More; date^prim^003 , at 08:11:07 AM. ^ ^ 

325

 March 10, 2003, interview report of Office of the Inspector General. Interview of | B 

^•^•HbWRE D ACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, February 27, 2003. Interview 

ufHHH ' by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 2003. March 

24, 2003, interview report of ^^^HH , Office of the Inspector General. 

326

 DIRECTOR • • (301835Z JAN 03) 

112168 (301822Z J UN 03) 

11 ii 1111 1 Ij^MI^^^BB^B B I II I II 

Page 65 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

65 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

"[a]ny data collected by them from detainees with whom they previously interacted as 

interrogators will always be suspect."328 then informed the management of 

the Renditions Group that "no professional in the field would credit [SWIGERT and 

DUNBAR's] later judgments as psychologists assessing the subjects of their enhanced 

measures."329 At the end of their deployment, in June 2003, SWIGERT and DUNBAR provided 

their assessment of KSM and recommended that he should be evaluated on a monthly basis by 

"an experienced interrogator known to him" who would assess how forthcoming he is and 

"remind him that there are differing consequences for cooperating or not cooperating."330 In his 

response to the draft Inspector General Special Review, HH^BOM S noted that "OMS 

concerns about conflict of interest... were nowhere more graphic than in the setting in which the 

same individuals applied an EIT which only they were approved to employ, judged both its 

effectiveness and detainee resilience, and implicitly proposed continued use of the technique - at 

a daily compensation reported to be $1800/day, or four times that of interrogators who could not 

use the technique."331 

D. The Detention and Interrogation of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri 

1. CIA Interrogators Disagree with CIA Headquarters About Al-Nashiri's Level of 

Cooperation; Interrogators Oppose Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation 

Techniques 

'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri,332 assessed by the CIA to be an alQa'ida "terrorist operations planner" who was "intimately involved" in planning both the USS 

Cole bombing and the 1998 East Africa U.S. Embassy bombings, was captured in the United 

Arab Emirates in mid-October 2002.333 He provided information while in the custody of a 

foreign government, including on plotting in the Persian Gulf,334 and was then rendered by the 

328

 The email, which expressed concern that SWIGERT and DUNBAR would interfere with on-site psychologists, 

stated that, "[although these guys believe that their way is the only way, there should be an effort to define roles and 

responsibilitie^efo^dieir arrogance and narcissism evolve into unproductive conflict in the field." See email 

from: H^HH^^H ; to: (^^^HII B ^^HHHHH ; subject: IHrDG 

Psychologists DUNBAR and SWIGERT; date: June 16, 2003, at 4:54:32 PM. 

329

 Email from: ^^^^^^^^^^to^ ^ 

^^TTsubjecrReTBBfcRDG Tasking for IC Psychologists DUNBAR and 

SWIGERT; date: June 20, 2003, at 2:19:53 PM. 

330

 •• • 12168 (301822Z JUN 03). The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "In practice, by April 2003, [CIA] 

staff psychologists had taken over almost all of the provisions of support to the RDI program. As it concerned 

[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR], however, the appearance of impropriety continued, albeit to a lesser degree, because 

they were occasionally asked to provide input to assessments on detainees whom they had not interrogated" 

(emphasis added). The CIA's June 2013 Response is inaccurate. For example, in June 2003, SWIGERT and 

DUNBAR provided an assessment on KSM, a detainee whom they had interrogated. 

331

 Memorandum for Inspector General, Attention: Assistant IG for Investigations, [REDACTED], from 

[REDACTED], M.D., ^^Medica l Services^ | re Draft Special Review-Counterterrorism Detention and 

Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG), at 13. 

332

 For more information on al-Nashiri, see detainee review of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri in Volume III. 

333

 ALtC^pi^^^^HIH H 11357 (02I242ZDEC02);HB H 367.101 

See •^••••LALEC j 

For disseminated inli Mil i in i i i ^^^^^^^^^^B o a I 

IIA • • •^^^^••CI A 

|. For other reporting from al-Nashiri while he was in foreign government custody, see 

m i 11 in i BMBB^^ B i mi inn i 

Page 66 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

66 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFOR N 

CIA to DETENTION SITE COBALT in Country | on November 2002, where he was held 

for • days before being transferred to DETENTION SITE GREEN on November 2002.335 

At DETENTION SITE GREEN, al-Nashiri was interrogated using the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, including being subjected to the waterboard at least three times.336 In 

December 2002, when DETENTION SITE GREEN was closed, al-Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah 

were rendered to DETENTION SITE BLUE.337 

(^WKKBKM^ ) In total, al-Nashiri was subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques during at least four separate periods, with each period typically ending 

with an assessment from on-site interrogators that al-Nashiri was compliant and cooperative.338 

Officers at CIA Headquarters disagreed with these assessments, with the deputy chief of ALEC 

Station, HH^H , commenting that DETENTION SITE BLUE interrogators should 

not make "sweeping statements" in cable traffic regarding al-Nashiri's compliance.339 Officers 

at CIA Headquarters sought to reinstate the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 

based on their belief that al-Nashiri had not yet provided actionable intelligence on imminent 

attacks.340 

Shortly after al-Nashiri arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE, CIA 

interrogators at the detention site judged al-Nashiri's cooperation and compliance by his 

engagement and willingness to answer questions, while CIA Headquarters personnel judged his 

compliance based on the specific actionable intelligence he had provided (or the lack thereof). 

For example, in December 2002, interrogators informed CIA Headquarters that al-Nashiri was 

"cooperative and truthful," and that the "consensus" at the detention site was that al-Nashiri was 

70866| 

For disseminated intelligence, see \ 

335 | 

336 See, for example, 

11263 ^^MNO V 02); 

11294| 

I11352| 

|29768 

11246| 

|11270 

| NOV 02); 

| DEC 02); 

|NOV 02); | 

HNO V 02); | 

| NOV 02) 

1112931 

113591 

[11243 (I 

112581 

|112841 

| NOV 02); 

| DEC 02); 

[NOV 02) 

\ NOV 02); | 

| NOV 02); 

111 322 H^ B NOV 

111 3221 

178275 (J^^^DE C 02) 

338

 Al-Nashiri's time at DETENTION SITE COBALT is not well documented in CIA records. As described 

elsewhere, standard operating procedure at COBALT at the time included total light deprivation, loud continuous 

music, isolation, and dietary manipulation. Based on CIA records, the other four "enhanced interrogation" periods 

of al-Nashiri took place at DETENTION SITE BLUE on December 5-8, 2002; December 27,2002-January 1, 

2003; January 9-10, 2003; and January 15-27, 2003. See •^•1003 0 (111541Z DEC 02); ^^^ M 10078 

(211733Z DEC02)J|^Bl014 0 (031727ZJAT^rALECl^ | (191729Z JAN 03). 

339

 Email from: •I^^H K to: •••• I [REDACTED]; cc: 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: [DETENTION SITE BLUE] follow-up; date: December 15, 

2002. __ _ 

340 See, for example, ALEC ••(072315 Z DEC 02); ALEC ••(130352 Z DEC 02); ALEC 

(180247Z DEC 02); ALEC ^^|(191729 Z JAN 03); CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: 

Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29,2003. See 

also CIA Office of Inspector General report, Counterterrorism Detention And Interrogation Activities (September 

2001 - October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), released on May 7, 2004. im 11 III i' i mi hi i 

Page 67 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

67 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRiawBI^^^BM^^^HflNQFQR N 

"a compliant detainee" who was not "withholding important threat information."341 Officers 

from the CIA's ALEC Station at CIA Headquarters responded: 

"it is inconceivable to us that al-Nashiri cannot provide us concrete leads.... 

When we are able to capture other terrorists based on his leads and to thwart 

future plots based on his reporting, we will have much more confidence that he 

is, indeed, genuinely cooperative on some level."342 

Later, after multiple follow-up debriefings, DETENTION SITE 

BLUE officers again wrote that they had "reluctantly concluded" that al-Nashiri was providing 

"logical and rational explanations" to questions provided by CIA Headquarters and therefore 

they recommended "against resuming enhanced measures" unless ALEC Station had evidence 

al-Nashiri was lying.343 A cable from the detention site stated: 

"without tangible proof of lying or intentional withholding, however, we 

believe employing enhanced measures will accomplish nothing except show 

[al-Nashiri] that he will be punished whether he cooperates or not, thus eroding 

any remaining desire to continue cooperating.... [The] bottom line is that we 

think [al-Nashiri] is being cooperative, and if subjected to indiscriminate and 

prolonged enhanced measures, there is a good chance he will either fold up and 

cease cooperation, or suffer the sort of permanent mental harm prohibited by 

the statute. Therefore, a decision to resume enhanced measures must be 

grounded in fact and not general feelings."344 

2. CIA Headquarters Sends Untrained Interrogator to Resume Al-Nashiri's Interrogations; 

Interrogator Threatens al-Nashiri with a Gun and a Drill 

After the DETENTION SITE BLUE chief of Base sent two 

interrogators back to the United States because of "prolonged absences from family" and the 

"facUha^nhanced measures are no longer required for al-Nashiri," CIA Headquarters sent 

iHHI^^ H [CIA OFFICER 2], a CIA officer who had not been trained or qualified 

as an interrogator, to DETENTION SITE BLUE to question and assess al-Nashiri.345 

341 

342

 ALEC 

343 

344 

345 

10030(1115412 DEC 02) 

(180247Z DEC 02) 

10085 (230906Z DEC 02) 

10085 (230906Z DEC 02) 

10040 (122122Z DEC02^rio r to tCI A OFFICER 2's] deployment, CIA records 

included numerous concerns about [CIA OFFICER 2's] anger management, HHHIH >

 ancl 

For more information on HH H [CIA OFFICER 2] and other CIA personnel in the 

program with similar alarming issues in their background, see Volume III. The CIA's June 2013 Response states 

that: 

some of the | officers mentioned in the Study— ^ 

excluded—much of the derogatory information was not in fact available to senior managers making assignments | 

[." NotwithstandingtheCIA's June 2013 assertion, as detailed in Volume HI, senior 

managers were aware of concerns related to Bl^^ B [CIA OFFICER 2] prior to his deployment. 

m i 11 in i ^^BB^BBBMBBiyNftrrn m 

Page 68 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

68 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

(TS^^I^^^^^H^NF ) In late December 2002, following a meeting at CIA Headquarters 

to discuss resuming the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri, 

H^^H^^Hf t the chief of RDG346—the entity that managed the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program—objected to sending I^M i [CIA OFFICER 2] to the detention site 

because he "had not been through the interrogation training" and because "had 

heard from some colleagues that [BH^HjCIAOFFICER 2]] was too confident, had a 

temper, and had some securityissues7^^^M^^ | later learned from other CIA officials that 

"[CTC chief of operations [CIA OFFICER 2]] at 

[DETENTION SITE BLUE] over the holidays." •••toldth e Office of Inspector 

General that "his assessment is that the Agency management felt that the [RDG] interrogators 

were being too lenient with al-Nashiri and that [HH H [CIA OFFICER 2]] was sent to 

[DETENTION SITE BLUE] to 'fix' the situation."347 

2) H H [ c i a OFFICER 2] arrived at DETENTION SITE 

BLUE on December B 2002, and the CIA resumed the use of its enhanced interrogation 

techniques on al-Nashiri shortly thereafter, despite the fact that [CIA OFFICER 2] 

had not been trained, certified, or approved to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

[CIA OFFICER 2] wrote in a cable to CIA Headquarters that "[al]-Nashiri responds 

well to harsh treatment" and suggested that the interrogators continue to administer "various 

degrees of mild punishment," but still allow for "a small degree of 'hope,' by introducing some 

'minute rewards.'"348 

It was later learned that during these interrogation sessions, 

[CIA OFFICER 2], with the permission and participation of the DETENTION SITE 

BLUE chief of Base, who also had not been trained and qualified as an interrogatoi^ised a series 

of unauthorized interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri. For example, [CIA 

OFFICER 2] placed al-Nashiri in a "standing stress position" with "his hands affixed over his 

head" for approximately two and a half days.349 Later, during the course of al-Nashiri's 

debriefings, while he was blindfolded, [CIA OFFICER 2] placed a pistol near alNashiri's head and operated a cordless drill near al-Nashiri's body.350

 Al-Nashiri did not provide 

any additional threat information during, or after, these interrogations.351 

3A0

 As described, the "Renditions and Interrogations Group," is also referred to as the "Renditions Group," the 

"Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group," "RDI," and "RDG" in CIA records. 

347

 Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, | 

February 23, 2003. 

348

 MM M 10140 (031727Z JAN 03) 

from: to: ^••Hi H subject: EYES ONLY - ONLY 

- MEMORANDUM FOR ADDO/DDO; date: January 22,2003. In an April 12, 2007, Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence hearing, Senator Carl Levin asked the CIA Director if the CIA disputed allegations in an International 

Committee of the Red Cross report that suggested CIA detainees were placed in "[prolonged stress standing 

position, naked, arm[s] chained above the head...." The CIA Director responded, "Not above the head. Stress 

positions are part of the EITs, and nakedness were part of the EITs, Senator." See Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence Hearing Transcript, dated April 12,2007 (DTS #2007-3158). 

350 See, for example, CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation 

Techniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29, 2003; email from: [DETENTION SITE 

BLUE] COB to: subject: EYES ONLY - flHHIHB ONLY -

MEMO FOR ADDO/DDO; date: January 22, 2003. 

351

 For additional details, see Volume III. 

Ill l I I III I JM^^BBMBBB'/'NOFOR N 

Page 69 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

69 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET// 1//NQFORN 

(TSZ/^^^^J^^^JiWF ) Based on a report from CTC, the CIA Office of Inspector General 

conducted a review of these interrogation incidents, and issued a report of investigation in the 

fall of 2003.352 The Office of Inspector General later described additional allegations of 

unauthorized techniques used against al-Nashiri by [CIA OFFICER 2] and other 

interrogators, including slapping al-Nashiri multiple times on the back of the head during 

interrogations; implying that his mother would be brought before him and sexually abused; 

blowing cigar smoke in al-Nashiri's face; giving al-Nashiri a forced bath using a stiff brush; and 

using improvised stress positions that caused cuts and bruises resulting in the intervention of a 

medical officer, who was concerned that al-Nashiri's shoulders would be dislocated using the 

stress positions.353 When interviewed by the Office of Inspector General, the DETENTION 

SITE BLUE chief of Base stated he did not object to using the gun and drill in the interrogations 

because he believed [CIA OFFICER 2] was sent from CIA Headquarters "to resolve 

the matter of al-Nashiri's cooperation" and that he believed [CIA OFFICER 2] had 

permission to use the interrogation techniques.354 The chief of Base added that his own on-site 

approval was based on this and "the pressure he felt from Headquarters to obtain imminent threat 

information from al-Nashiri on 9/11-style attacks."355 In April 2004, m [CIA OFFICER 

2] and the chief of Base were disciplined.356 

3. CIA Contractor Recommends Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation 

Techniques Against Al-Nashiri; Chief Interrogator Threatens to Quit Because Additional 

Techniques Might "Push [Al-Nashiri] Over The Edge Psychologically, " Refers to the 

CIA Program As a "Train Wreak [sic] Waiting to Happen " 

352

 CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at 

[DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29,2003. 

353

 CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review - Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program, 

(2003-7123-IG), May 2004. 

354

 CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at 

[DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29, 2003. 

355

 CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at 

[DETCNTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29, 2003. 

356

 [CIA OFFICER 2) received a one-year Letter of Reprimand, was suspended for five days without pay, 

and was prohibited from promotions, within-grade step increases, quality step increases, or permanent salary 

increases during that one-year period. The decision did not affect |HHH | [CIA OFFICER 2's] eligibility to 

receive Exceptional Performance Awards, bonuses, or non-monetary forms of recognition. See I 

[CIA OFFICER 2] retired from the CIA on 

1 ) On 

June 20, 2005, the CIA director of transnational issues, aware of [CIA OFFICER 2's] problematic 

background, approved HIH H [CIA OFFICER 2's] employment on a CIA contract because the project was 

'mission critical" and "no other contractor with the needed skills was available." (See I 

Reprimand and a ten-day suspension without 

CIA during the period of reprimand. On 

individual retired from the CIA. See 

i The chief of Base received a two-year Letter of 

, and was prohibited from receiving any bonus awards from the 

2003, prior to the implementation of the prohibitions, this 

TOP SECRETA 7NOFORN 

Page 70 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

70 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

DETENTION SITE BLUE to conduct a "Psychological Interrogation Assessment" to judge alNashiri's suitability for the additional use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and 

develop recommendations for his interrogation. The resulting interrogation plan proposed that 

the interrogators would have the "latitude to use the full range of enhanced exploitation and 

interrogation measures," adding that "the use of the water board would require additional support 

from" fellow CIA contractor Grayson SWIGERT. According to the interrogation plan, once the 

interrogators had eliminated al-Nashiri's "sense of control and predictability" and established a 

"desired level of helplessness," they would reduce the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques and transition to a debriefing phase once again.357 

receiving the proposed interrogation plan for al-Nashiri on 

January2l720037^^^^^^H, the CIA's chief of interrogations—whose presence had 

previously prompted al-Nashiri to tremble in fear358—emailed CIA colleagues to notify them that 

he had "informed the front office of CTC" that he would "no longer be associated in any way 

with the interrogation program due to serious reservation[s] [he had] about the current state of 

affairs" and would instead be "retiring shortly." In the same email, ^ H wrote, "[t]his is a 

train wreak [sic] waiting to happen and I intend to get the hell off the train before it happens."359 

• • drafted a cable for CIA Headquarters to send to DETENTION SITE BLUE raising a 

number of concerns that he, the chief of interrogations, believed should be "entered for the 

record." The CIA Headquarters cable—which does not appear to have been disseminated to 

DETENTION SITE BLUE—included the following: 

"we have serious reservations with the continued use of enhanced techniques 

with [al-Nashiri] and its long term impact on him. [Al-Nashiri] has been held 

for three months in very difficult conditions, both physically and mentally. It 

is the assessment of the prior interrogators that [al-Nashiri] has been mainly 

truthful and is not withholding significant information. To continue to use 

enhanced technique[s] without clear indications that he [is] withholding 

important info is excessive and may cause him to cease cooperation on any 

level. [Al-Nashiri] may come to the conclusion that whether he cooperates or 

not, he will continually be subjected to enhanced techniques, therefore, what is 

the incentive for continued cooperation, Also, both C/CTC/RG [Chief of CTC 

RDG ••I^^^H l and HVT Interrogator [HH^Hf e

 wh o 

departed [DETENTION SITE BLUE] in Hpanuary , believe continued 

enhanced methods may push [al-Nashiri] over the edge psychologically."360 

sees 

359

 Email from: 

Despite this notification, 

360

 Email from: •• • 

TOP SECRET// 7NOFORN 

Page 71 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

71 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

The draft cable from | 

responsibility" concerns, stating: 

also raised "conflict of 

"Another area of concern is the use of the psychologist as an interrogator. The 

role of the ops psychologist is to be a detached observer and serve as a check 

on the interrogator to prevent the interrogator from any unintentional excess of 

pressure which might cause permanent psychological harm to the subject. The 

medical officer is on hand to provide the same protection from physical actions 

that might harm the subject. Therefore, the medical officer and the 

psychologist should not serve as an interrogator, which is a conflict of 

responsibility. We note that [the proposed plan] contains a psychological 

interrogation assessment by psychologist [DUNBAR] which 

is to be carried out by interrogator [DUNBAR], We have a problem with him 

conducting both roles simultaneously."361 

(TS/^^^I^^^^V^F ) CIA Rather than releasing the cable that was drafted by | 

Headquarters approved a plan to reinstitute the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques against al-Nashiri, beginning with shaving him, removing his clothing, and placing 

him in a standing sleep deprivation position with his arms affixed over his head.362 CIA cables 

describing subsequent interrogations indicate that al-Nashiri was nude and, at times, "put in the 

standing position, handcuffed and shackled."363 According to cables, CIA interrogators decided 

to provide al-Nashiri clothes to "hopefully stabilize his physiological symptoms and prevent 

them from deteriorating,"364 noting in a cable the next day that al-Nashiri was suffering from a 

head cold which caused his body to shake for approximately ten minutes during an 

interrogation.365 

(^^/^l^^^^fl^WlNF ) Beginning in June 2003, the CIA transferred al-Nashiri to five 

different CIA detention facilities before he was transferred to U.S. military custody on 

September 5, 2006.366 In the interim, he was diagnosed by some CIA psychologists as having 

"anxiety" and "major depressive" disorder,367 while others found no symptoms of either 

illness.368 He was a difficult and uncooperative detainee and engaged in repeated belligerent 

acts, including attempts to assault CIA detention site personnel and efforts to damage items in his 

161

 Email from: HHHi t o : ^^HH , [REDACTED], | 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: CONCERNS OVER REVISED INTERROGATION PLAN FOR 

NASHIRI; date: January 22, 2003. As noted above, personnel from CIA's Office of Medical Services raised the 

same concerns about medical and psychological personnel serving both to assess the health of a detainee and to 

participate in the interrogation process. 

DIRECTOR • • (230008Z JAN 03) 

10296 (251I13Z JAN 03), Mj^ M 10306 (261403Z JAN 03) 

362

 DIRECTOR (201659Z JAN 03 

363

 10289 (241203Z JAN 03); ~ 

364

 10309 (261403Z JAN 03) 

365

 10312 (270854Z JAN 03) 

366

 HEADQUARTERS (03I945Z SEP 06); 

(051613Z SEP 06) ^^^ ^ 

367 See, for example, ^^^^1124 7 (141321Z APR 03); 

2038 (21155? I III! I " " (251133ZMAR 05); 

1756 (I90800Z SEP 03). 

365

 ^^^ ^ 1502 (021841Z AUG 04); •• • 2709 (271517Z APR 06); 

12709 (271517Z APR 06) 

1242 (050744Z SEP 06); HEADQUARTERS | 

1_959 (111700Z DEC 04); | 

11701 (191640Z MAY 03); 

| 3910 (241852Z JAN 06); 

TOP SECRET/^ //NOFORN 

Page 72 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

72 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

cell.369 Over a period of years, al-Nashiri accused the CIA staff of drugging or poisoning his 

food, and complained of bodily pain and insomnia.370 At one point, al-Nashiri launched a shortlived hunger strike that resulted in the CIA force feeding him rectally.371 

(TSZ/miB/W ) In October 2004, 21 months after the final documented use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri, an assessment by CIA contract 

interrogator DUNBAR and another CIA interrogator concluded that al-Nashiri provided 

"essentially no actionable information," and that "the probability that he has much more to 

contribute is low."372 Over the course of al-Nashiri's detention and interrogation by the CIA, the 

CIA disseminated 145 intelligence reports based on his debriefings. Al-Nashiri provided 

information on past operational plotting, associates whom he expected to participate in plots, 

details on completed operations, and background on al-Qa'ida's structure and methods of 

operation.373 Al-Nashiri did not provide the information that the CIA's ALEC Station sought 

and believed al-Nashiri possessed, specifically "perishable threat information to help [CIA] 

thwart future attacks and capture additional operatives."374 

E. Tensions with Country | Relating to the CIA Detention Facility and the Arrival of New 

Detainees 

( ) According to CIA records, three weeks after | 

and political leadership of Country | agreed to host a CIA detention facility, the CIA 

informed the U.S. ambassador, because, as was noted in a cable, by not doing so, the CIA was 

369 See, for example, 

(111600Z AUG 04); 

(291750Z JUN 06); 

1716 (180742Z SEP 04). 

370 See, for example, 

1959 (111700Z DEC 04); 

H^^ H 2038 (211558Z JAN 

1266 (052309Z JAN 04); 

371

 1203 (231709Z MAY 

372

 ^^^ ^ 1843 (271356Z OCT 04) 

1029 (291750Z JUN 06); 

1716 (180742Z SEP 04); 

2474 (251622Z JUN 05); 

1356 (011644Z JUL 04); 

1962 (121029Z DEC 04); 

1142 (041358Z AUG 06); 

3051 (301235Z SEP 05); 

2673 (021451Z AUG 05); 

1880(140917Z NOV 04); | 

1959 (111700Z DEC 04); 

1091 (031835Z NOV 03); | 

(271440Z MAR 04). 

1202 (231644Z MAY 04) 

In the final years of al-Nashiri's detention, most of the intelligence 

requirements for al-Nashiri involved showing al-Nashiri photographs. In June 2005, the DETENTION SITE 

BLACK chief of Base suspended even these debriefings because it was "the very, very rare moment" that al-Nashiri 

would recognize a photograph, and because the debriefings often were the "catalyst" for his outbursts. See 

\ 2474 (251622Z JUN 05). 

373

 While still in the custody of a foreign government, prior to his rendition to CIA custody, al-Nashiri provided 

details on multiple terrorist plots in which he was involved prior to his detention, including the attacks against the 

USS Cole and the MV Limburg, plans to sink oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, plans to attack warships docked at 

ports in Dubai and Jeddah, and his casing of a Dubai amusement park. This information was disseminated in 

from al-Nashiri while he was in the 

70866 

. For disseminated 

intelligence, see 

374

 ALEC 

TOP SECRET/, /NOFORN 

Page 73 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

73 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

"risking that he hear of this initiative" from Country ( officials.375 As was the case in other host 

countries, the ambassador in Country ( was told by the CIA not to speak with any other State 

Department official about the arrangement.376 

(TS/^^^HBBBB^jPHPrio^^jj e opening of the CIA detention facility in Country ( , | 

Legal, warned of possible legal actions against CIA 

employees in countries that "take a different view of the detention and interrogation practices 

employed by [theCIAj."377 He further recommended against the establishment of CIA facilities 

in countries that m^^^^^^^^mmmi^^l^ 3 7 8 

advice was not heeded and, in December 2002, the two individuals then being 

detained by the CIA in Country ( (Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri) were 

transferred to Country (, 3 7 9 

(^S/^l^mm^/NF ) The agreement to host a CIA detention facility in Country | 

created multiple, ongoing difficulties between Country ( and the CIA. Country I'sflfl l 

proposed a written "Memorandum of Understanding" covering the relative roles and 

responsibilities of the CIA and d^B^lf c which the CIA ultimately refused to sign.380 

Four months after the detention site began hosting CIA detainees, Country ( rejected the transfer 

of^^^^H H which included Khalid Shaykh Muhammad. The decision was 

reversed only after the U.S. ambassador intervened with the political leadership of Country (o n 

the CIA's behalf.381 The following montiMheClAprovided $ | million to Country B's 

~

3X2

 after which officials, speaking for ^^H H

 an d the 

Country ( political leadership, indicated that Country ( was now flexible with regard to the 

number of CIA detainees at the facility and when the facility would eventually be closed.383 The 

facility, which was describedby the CIA as "over capacity," was nonetheless closed, as had been 

previously agreed, in [the fall of] 2003.384 

HH^^HVNF ) According to CIA cables, years later, officials in 

I reacted and 

^^^^Jwhic h they acknowledged was 

offici i

 wcr c

 "extremely upset"386 at the 

CIA's inability to keep secrets and were "deeply disappointed" in not having had more warning 

375

 [REDACTED] 

376

 DIRECTOR T 

377

 •• • 10640J 

378

 The CIA insisted he redacted in the Committee Study prior to the Study 

beingrelocatedtothe U.S. Senate from the off-site research facility. 

379

 78275||^BDEC02 ) 

380

 [REDACTED] 18881 

381

 [REDACTED] 26661 

382

 HEADQUARTERS f 

383

 [REDACTED] 3280 •••^•H - According to the cable, the CIA Station speculated that the change of 

position was "at least somewhat attributable... to our gift of million...." 

384 See Volume I for additional details. 

385

 [REDACTED] 7526 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED]) 

386

 [REDACTED] 7849 ([REDACTED] [REDACreD]^^^^^^^^ ^ 

11ii' hi i III i I'IIim i i 

Page 74 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

74 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

of President Bush's September 2006 public acknowledgment of the CIA program.387 The CIA 

Station, for its part, described the a s a " ser j o u s b]ow» to the 

bilateral relationship.388 

F. The Detention and Interrogation of Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh 

1. Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Provides Information While in Foreign Government Custody, Prior 

to Rendition to CIA Custody 

As early as September 15, 2001, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was assessed 

by the CIA to be a facilitator for the September 11, 2001, attacks and an associate of the 9/11 

hijackers.389 While targeting another terrorist, Hassan Ghul, H | Pakistani officials 

unexpectedly captured bin al-Shibh during raids in Pakistan on September 11, 2002.390 On 

September 2002, bin al-Shibh was rendered to a foreign government, BHU- 3 9 1 

Approximately five months later, on February | , 2003, bin al-Shibh was rendered from the 

custody of B^ H to CIA custody, becoming the 41st CIA detainee.392 

As with Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, personnel at 

CIA Headquarters—often in ALEC Station—overestimated the information bin al-Shibh would 

have access to within al-Qa'ida, writing that bin al-Shibh "likely has critical information on 

upcoming attacks and locations of senior al-Qa'ida operatives."393 Later, after bin al-Shibh was 

interrogated using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques for an estimated 34 days, the 

CIA's ALEC Station concluded that bin al-Shibh was not a senior member of al-Qa'ida and was 

not in a position to know details about al-Qa'ida's plans for future attacks.394 In another parallel, 

officers at CIA Headquarters requested and directed the continued use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques against bin al-Shibh when CIA detention site personnel recommended 

ending such measures.395 

387

 [REDACTED] 9210 (231043Z SEP 06) 

388

 [REDACTED] 7839 ([REDACTED]). Email from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; subject: BOMBSHELL; 

date: [REDACTED], Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: CIA Prisons in 

[Country [| ; date: [REDACTED], Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: 1 think 

had to react [REDACTED], date: [REDACTED]. 

(222334Z SEP 01); BH|9253 7 (15SEP 01) 

(292345Z AUG 02)-ALEclBH i (111551Z SEP 02). Tire CIA represented to policymakers 

inaccurately—that "as a result of the use of EITs" Abu Zubaydah provided information on Ramzi bin 

al-Shibh that played a "key role in the ultimate capture of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh." See section of this summary on the 

"Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh" and Volume 11 for additional details. 

See ^H H 20744 

389

 ALEC 

390

 ALEC 

and others393

 ALEC (130206Z SEP 02); ALEC (222334Z SEP 01); | 

| (270132Z JUL 02);

 9747 0

 ( 281317 2 MA R 02> 

394

 ALEC 

395

 ALEC 

(302240Z JUN 05) 

I (131444Z FEB 03) 

TOP SECRET//! 

92557 (15SEP01); ALEC 

I//NOFORN 

Page 75 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

75 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRETfl^^^^^B^^^^^M/WQgQR N 

(TSZ/^m^^^^^p^F ) Ramzi bin al-Shibh was initially interrogated by a foreign 

government.396 While officers at CIA Headquarters were dissatisfied with the intelligence 

production from his five months of detention in foreign government custody, CIA officers in that 

country were satisfied with bin al-Shibh's reporting.397 Those CIA officers wrote that bin alShibh had provided information used in approximately 50 CIA intelligence reports, including 

information on potential future threats, to include a potential attack on London's Heathrow 

Airport ancUtLNashiri's planning for potential operations in the Arabian Peninsula. The CIA 

officers [in-country] also noted that they found bin al-Shibh's information to be generally 

accurate and that they "found few cases whereheopenly/clearly misstated facts."398 In a cable 

to CIA Headquarters, the CIA officers in H ^ [the country where Ramzi bin al-Shibh was 

being held] concluded, "overall, he provided what was needed." The same cable stated that bin 

al-Shibh's interrogation was similar to other interrogations they had participated in, and that the 

most effective interrogation tool was having information available to confront him when he tried 

to mislead or provide incomplete information.399 Personnel at CIA Headquarters concluded in 

2005 that the most significant intelligence derived from bin al-Shibh was obtained during his 

detention in foreign government custody, which was prior to his rendition to CIA custody and 

the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.400 

2. Interrogation Plan for Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Proposes Immediate Use of Nudity and 

Shackling with Hands Above the Head; Plan Becomes Template for Future Detainees 

(TS/^^H^^^^^^^WF ) Despite the aforementioned assessments from CIA officers in 

i mi' i 111111,1 • Inn al-Shibh's cooperation, officers at CIA Headquarters decided the CIA 

should obtain H custody of bin al-Shibh and render him to DETENTION SITE BLUE in 

Country | 4 0 1 On February | , 2003, in anticipation of bin al-Shibh's arrival, interrogators at the 

detention site, led by the CIA's chief interrogator, IH^HH K prepared an interrogation plan 

for bin al-Shibh.402 The plan became a template, and subsequent requests to CIA Headquarters 

to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against other detainees relied upon near 

identical language.403 

3% ALEC MBkjJi551ZSEPi02 ) 

397

 DIRECTORIE S HH H DEC 02) 

122888 (240845Z FEB 03) 

122888 (240845Z FEB 03) 

400

 According to a 2005 CIA assessment, the "most significant" reporting from Ramzi bin al-Shibh on potential 

future attacks was background information related to al-Qa'ida's plans to attack Heathrow Airport. According to the 

CIA, Ramzi bin al-Shibh provided "useful intelligence," including an "overview of the plot" that was then used in 

the inteiTogation of other detainees. (See ALEC jH H (302240Z JUN 05).) Ramzi bin al-Shibh provided the 

majority of this information in mid-October 2002, while in foreign government custody. See CIA f 

I. See also \ 

|22695 T 

104071 

1103611 

403

 This included Khaled Shaykh Mohammed 10654 (030904Z MAR 03)); Hambali | 

1310 (101825Z SEP 03)); Abu Yasir al-Jaza'iri Abd al-Latif alBarq]|^^^|l234 8 jj^^^BI^M) ; Hambali and (152049Z AUG 

M i l Mil l — 

Page 76 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

76 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

The interrogation plan proposed that immediately following the 

psychological and medical assessments conducted upon his arrival, bin al-Shibh would be 

subjected to "sensory dislocation."404 The proposed sensory dislocation included shaving bin alShibh's head and face, exposing him to loud noise in a white room with white lights, keeping 

him "unclothed and subjected to uncomfortably cool temperatures," and shackling him "hand 

and foot with arms outstretched over his head (with his feet firmly on the floor and not allowed 

to support his weight with his arms)."405 Contrary to CIA representations made later to the 

Committee that detainees were always offered the opportunity to cooperate before being 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the plan stated that bin al-Shibh would 

be shackled nude with his arms overhead in a cold room prior to any discussion with 

interrogators or any assessment of his level of cooperation

 406

 According to a cable, only after 

the interrogators determined that his "initial resistance level [had] been diminished by the 

conditions" would the questioning and interrogation phase begin.407 

(TS^^^I^^^^^I^NF ) The interrogation phase described in the plan included near 

constant interrogations, as well as continued sensory deprivation, a liquid diet, and sleep 

deprivation. In addition, the interrogation plan stated that the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques would be used, including the "attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the facial 

slap... the abdominal slap, cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep 

deprivation beyond 72 hours, and the waterboard, as appropriate to [bin al-Shibh's] level of 

resistance."408 

(TS/Z^^^^^^lj^BiVNF) Based on versions of this interrogation plan, at least six detainees 

were stripped and shackled nude, placed in the standing position for sleep deprivation, or 

subjected to other CIA enhanced interrogation techniques prior to being questioned by an 

interrogator in 2003

 409

 Five of these detainees were shackled naked in the standing position 

with their hands above their head immediately after their medical check

 410

 These interrogation 

03)); Hassan Gliul (| 

10361 

10361 

10361 

1267 

and AL-TURKI 

; Adnan al-Libi | 

2179| 

1758 

|. See Volume 11 for detailed information on CIA representations to 

Con; 

407 

408 

10361 

10361 

409

 This included Asadullah (DIRECTOR i^^ B FEB 03)); Abu Yasir al-Jaza'iri | 

135558 MAR 03)); Suleiman Abdullali 35787 i 

03); | 

| MAR 

|36023 ^^^BAPR03)) ; Abu Hudhaifa | 138576 

|MAY 03)); Hambali AUG 03)); and Majid Khan 

^^4647 1 (241242ZMAY03)~^^^^^feHiHI 3907 7 (271719Z MAY 03)). 

4 , 0

 For additional information, see Volume III. In an April 12,2007, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

hearing, Senator Levin asked the CIA Director if die CIA disputed allegations in an International Committee of the 

Red Cross report that suggested CIA detainees were placed in "[prolonged stress standing position, naked, armfs] 

chained above the head..." The CIA Director responded, "Not above the head. Stress positions are part of the EITs, 

and nakedness were part of the EITs, Senator." Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing Transcript, dated 

April 12,2007 (DTS #2007-3158). 

m i M iii i 1111111111 1 

Page 77 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

77 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRMWB^^MMB^^^P/NQEQR N 

plans typically made no reference to the information the interrogators sought and why the 

detainee was believed to possess the information.411 

3. CIA Headquarters Urges Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation 

Techniques, Despite Interrogators' Assessment That Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Was 

Cooperative 

(^S^^^^^^H^NF ) When CIA interrogators at DETENTION SITE BLUE assessed 

that bin al-Shibh was cooperative and did not have additional knowledge of future attacks

 412 

CIA Headquarters disagreed and instructed the interrogators to continue using the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques, which failed to elicit the information sought by CIA 

Headquarters.413 On Febinary 11, 2003, interrogators asked CIA Headquarters for questions that 

ALEC Station was "85 percent certain [bin al-Shibh ] will be able to answer," in order to verify 

bin al-Shibh's level of cooperation

 414

 The interrogators stated that information from Abu 

Zubaydah and al-Nashiri suggested that bin al-Shibh would not have been given a new 

assignment or trusted with significant information given his high-profile links to the September 

11, 2001, attacks.415 They further stated that bin al-Shibh had "achieved substantial notoriety 

after 11 September," but was still unproven in al-Qa'ida circles and may have "been privy to 

information more as a bystander than as an active participant."416 

The CIA's ALEC Station disagreed with the assessment of the 

detention site personnel, responding that it did not believe the portrayals of bin al-Shibh offered 

by Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri were accurate and that CIA Headquarters assessed that bin alShibh must have actionable information due to his proximity to KSM and CIA Headquarters' 

belief that bin al-Shibh had a history of withholding information from interrogators. ALEC 

Station wrote: 

"As base [DETENTION SITE BLUE] is well aware, Ramzi had long 

been deliberately withholding and/or providing misleading information to 

his interrogators in [a foreign government].... From our optic, it is 

imperative to focus Ramzi exclusively on two issues: 1) What are the 

next attacks planned for the US and 2) Who and where are the operatives 

inside the United States."417 

4 , 3

 ALEC 

414 

411 See Volume IE for additional information. 

4 , 2

 10452 (121723Z FEB 03) 

(131444Z FEB 03) 

10446 (111754Z FEB 03). The Committee was informed that the CIA's standard practice during 

coercive interrogations was to ask questions to which interrogators already knew the answers in order to assess the 

detainee's level of cooperation. Hie Committee was further informed that only after detainees were assessed to be 

cooperative did interrogators ask questions whose answers were unknown to the CIA. See, for example, Transcript 

of SSCHIearing, April 12, 2007 (testimony of CIA Director Michael Hayden) (DTS #2007-3158). 

415

 •• • 10452 (121723Z FEB 03). In June 2002, Ramzi bin al-Shibh participated with KSM in an interview 

with the al-Jazeera television network on the 9/11 attacks. DIRECTOR (112136Z SEP 02). 

10452 (121723Z FEB 03) 

417

 ALEC H B (131444Z FEB 03). Contrary to the statement in the CIA cable, as described, CIA officers in the 

country where Ramzi bin al-Shibh was held prior to being rendered to CIA custody wrote that Ramzi bin al-Shibh 

had provided information used in approximately 50 CIA intelligence reports, including information on potential 

m i 'ii i III i ^^bimIB I '" i "i n i 

Page 78 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

78 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

(TS/fllHH^BP^F ) The ALEC Station cable stated that bin al-Shibh had "spent 

extensive time with [KSM]," and "must have heard discussions of other targets." The cable 

added that "HQS strongly believes that Binalshibh was involved in efforts on behalf of KSM to 

identify and place operatives in the West." The February 13, 2003, cable concluded: 

"We think Binalshibh is uniquely positioned to give us much needed 

critical information to help us thwart large-scale attacks inside the United 

States, and we want to do our utmost to get it as soon as possible. Good 

luck."418 

(TS/Z^HHIH^NF ) CIA officers at DETENTION SITE BLUE therefore continued to 

use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against bin al-Shibh for approximately three 

additional weeks after this exchange, including sleep deprivation, nudity, dietary manipulation, 

facial holds, attention grasps, abdominal slaps, facial slaps, and walling

 419

 Bin al-Shibh did not 

provide the information sought on "operatives inside the United States" or "large-scale attacks 

inside the United States."420 

4. Information Already Provided by Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh in the Custody of a Foreign 

Government Inaccurately Attributed to CIA Interrogations; Interrogators Apply the 

CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Bin Al-Shibh When Not Addressed As "Sir" 

and When Bin Al-Shibh Complains of Stomach Pain 

(TSA'HIBH^ )

 ci a records indicate that the CIA interrogators at DETENTION 

SITE BLUE questioning Ramzi bin al-Shibh were unaware of the intelligence bin al-Shibh had 

previously provided in foreign government custody, even though | 

I^HBHli^^^ l

 an d ^ intelligence from those interrogations had been disseminated by 

the CIA. On multiple occasions, personnel at the detention site drafted intelligence reports that 

contained information previously disseminated from interrogations of bin al-Shibh while he was 

in foreign government custody, under the faulty understanding that bin al-Shibh was providing 

new information.421 

future threats, to include a potential attack on London's Heathrow airport and al-Nashiri's planning for potential 

operations in the Arabian Peninsula. The CIA officers in that country also noted that diey found Ramzi bin 

al-Sliibh's information to be generally accurate, and that they "found few cases where he openly/clearly misstated 

facts." The CIA officers in l^l^ H concluded, "overall, [Ramzi bin al-Shibh] provided what was needed." See 

M M 22888 (240845Z FEB 03). 

418

 ALEC M (131444Z FEB 03) ^^ ^ 

419 See, for example, •• • 10525 (200840Z FEB 03) and •• • 10573 (241143Z FEB 03). For further 

detail, see the detainee review of Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Volume III. 

420 See detainee review of Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Volume ID for additional information. 

421 See, for example, CIA | 

1(describin g the foreign government's interrogators' "plan 

to ask Binalshibh to clarify his statements that Mohamed Atta, Marwan el-Shehhi, anc^iadJarrah could not agree 

on the wisdom of targeting nuclear facilities"); 10568 (231514Z FEB 03); •• • 20817 | 

• ; CIA ^H i 

m i 1111 1 H^MM B

 |||I|M| 1 

Page 79 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

79 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

Ramzi bin al-Shibh was subjected to interrogation techniques and 

conditions of confinement that were not approved by CIA Headquarters. CIA interrogators used 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques for behavior adjustment purposes, in response to 

perceived disrespect, and on several occasions, before bin al-Shibh had an opportunity to 

respond to an interrogator's questions or before a question was asked. The CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques were applied when bin al-Shibh failed to address an interrogator as 

"sir," when interrogators noted bin al-Shibh had a "blank stare" on his face, and when bin alShibh complained of stomach pain.422

 Further, despite CIA policy at the time to keep detainees 

under constant light for security purposes, bin al-Shibh was kept in total darkness to heighten his 

sense of fear.423 

(TS/fl^H^H^NF ) CIA psychological assessments of bin al-Shibh were slow to 

recognize the onset of psychological problems brought about, according to later CIA 

assessments, by bin al-Shibh's long-term social isolation and his anxiety that the CIA would 

return to using its enhanced interrogation techniques against him. The symptoms included 

visions, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm

 424

 In April 2005, a CIA psychologist 

stated that bin al-Shibh "has remained in social isolation" for as long as two and half years and 

the isolation was having a "clear and escalating effect on his psychological functioning." The 

officer continued, "in [bin al-Shibh's] case, it is important to keep in mind that he was previously 

a relatively high-functioning individual, making his deterioration over the past several months 

more alarming."425 The psychologist wrote, "significant alterations to RBS'[s] detention 

environment must occur soon to prevent further and more serious psychological disturbance."426 

On September 5, 2006, bin al-Shibh was transferred to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo 

Bay, Cuba

 427

 After his arrival, bin al-Shibh was placed on anti-psychotic medications

 428 

GFS/jm^^^^^^^/NF ) The CIA disseminated 109 intelligence reports from the CIA 

interrogations of Ramzi bin al-Shibh

 429

 A CIA assessment, which included intelligence from his 

10582 (242026Z FEB 03); 10627 (281949Z FEB 03) 

10521 (191750Z FEB 03). The cable referred to keeping bin al-Shibh in darkness as a "standard 

interrogation technique." The same cable states that during the night of February 18, 2003, the light went out in bin 

al-Shibh's cell and that "[w]hen security personnel arrived to replace the bulb, bin al-Shibh was cowering in the 

corner, shivering. Security personnel noted that he appeal ed relieved as soon as die light was replaced." 

424

 1759 (021319Z OCT 04); HEADQUARTERSHI|(040023Z NOV 05); I^H^ H 1890 

(171225Z NOV 04); (140915Z NOV 04); |^^Hll93 0 (061620Z DEC 04); | 

2207 (111319Z APR 05XHMB2210(141507 Z APR 05)T^Hi^ | 2535 (051805Z JUL 05); 

^^^^•258 9 (120857ZJUL05)~HB^B H 2830 (291304Z AUG 05); •••I189 0 (171225Z NOV 

04h^^B^Bl893(200831 Z NOV 04); CIA document entitled, "Detainee Talking Points for ICRC Rebuttal, | 

•••T^^^^|2210(141507 Z APR 05); ^[051805 Z JUL 05); 221 Q 

(141507Z APR05)j^^HM253 5 (051805Z JUL05)~B^^^B283 0 (291304Z AUG05);| 

1930 (061620Z DEC 2210 (141507Z APR 05) 

2210 (141507Z APR 05) 425 

426

 2210 (141507Z APR 05) 

427

 HEADQUARTERS • • (031945Z SEP 06)_ 

428 I J ^ H SITE DAILY REPORT - 24 MAY 07: 

429 See Volume II for additional information. 

18904 (182103Z APR 08) 

TOP SECRET/d 1//NOFORN 

Page 80 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

80 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

time in foreign government custody, as well as his reporting in CIA custody before, during, and 

after being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,430 concluded that: 

"Much of [bin al-Shibh's] statements on the 11 September attacks have been 

speculative, and many of the details could be found in media accounts of the 

attacks that appeared before he was detained. In the few instances where his 

reporting was unique and plausible, we cannot verify or refute the 

information... he has been sketchy on some aspects of the 9/11 plot, perhaps in 

order to downplay his role in the plot. His information on individuals is nonspecific; he has given us nothing on the Saudi hijackers or others who played a 

role... The overall quality of his reporting has steadily declined since 2003."431 

G. The Detention and Interrogation of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad 

1. KSM Held in Pakistani Custody, Provides Limited Information; Rendered to CIA Custody 

at DETENTION SITE COBALT, KSM Is Immediately Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced 

Interrogation Techiiques 

(T&V^^^^Hfl^/NF ) The capture of KSM was attributable to a single CIA source who 

first came to the CIA's attention in the spring of 2001

 432

 The source IHIHII^^HHH l 

H H led the CIA and Pakistan authorities directly to KSM. KSM was held in Pakistani 

custody from the time of his capture on March 1, 2003, to March | , 2003, and was interrogated 

by CIA officers and Pakistani officials. According to CIA records, while in Pakistani custody, 

KSM was subjected to some sleep deprivation, but there are no indications of other coercive 

interrogation techniques being used.433 While KSM denied knowledge of attack plans and the 

locations of Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri,434 he did provide limited information on 

various al-Qa'ida leaders and operatives who had already been captured. KSM's willingness to 

discuss operatives when confronted with information about their capture—-behavior noted by 

CIA officers on-site in Pakistan—was a recurring theme throughout KSM's subsequent detention 

and interrogation in CIA custody.435 

Les s

 than two hours after KSM's capture^anticipating KSM's 

arrival at DETENTION SITE COBALT, the chief of interrogations, HHH^ K

 sen t a n emai l 

to CIA Headquarters with the subject line, "Let's roll with the new guy." The email requested 

permission to "press [KSM] for threat info right away."436 Later that day, CIA Headquarters 

authorized to use a number of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against 

430

 Ramzi bin al-Shibh was immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION 

SITE BLUE. 

431

 ALEC • • (302240Z JUN 05) 

432

 For more details, see section of this summary on the capture of KSM and additional information in Volume II. 

141403 (020949Z MAR 03) 

141484 (031315Z MAR 03) ^^^^^ ^ 

141564 (041307Z MAR 03);H^^^^B4159 2 (051050Z MAR 03). For details on KSM's 

detention in Pakistani custody, see the KSM detainee review in Volume III. 

436

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: I^Hii^^ H subject: Let's Roll with the new guy; 

date: March 1,2003, at 03:43:12 AM. 

m i i i III i m i "i n i 

Page 81 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

81 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

KSM. The cable from CIA Headquarters did not require that non-coercive interrogation 

techniques be used first.437 On March | , 2003, two days before KSM's arrival at the detention 

site, CIA Headquarters approved an interrogation plan for KSM

 438 

According to CIA records, interrogators began using the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE COBALT a "few minutes" after the 

questioning of KSM began. KSM was subjected to facial and abdominal slaps, the facial grab, 

stress positions, standing sleep deprivation (with his hands at or above head level), nudity, and 

water dousing

 439

 Chief of Interrogations also ordered the rectal rehydration of 

KSM without a determination of medical need, a procedure that the chief of interrogations would 

later characterize as illustrative of the interrogator's "total control over the detainee."440 At the 

end of the day, the psychologist on-site concluded that the interrogation team would likely have 

more success by "avoiding confrontations that allow [KSM] to transform the interrogation into 

battles of will with the interrogator."441 KSM's reporting during his first day in CIA custody 

included an accurate description of a Pakistani/British operative, which was dismissed as having 

been provided during the initial "'throwaway' stage" of information collection when the CIA 

believed detainees provided false or worthless information.442 

437

 DIRECTOR 

•138 

439 

440 

MAR 03) 

|, by [REDACTED] and 

012240Z MAR 03) 

34354 MAR 03); DIRECTOR | 

34491 (051400Z MAR 03) 

34491 (051400Z MAR 03); Interview of | 

[REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 27 March 2003. 

441

 34575 

442

 "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT, 

April 3,2003. KSM also named three individuals who, he said, worked on an al-Qa'ida anthrax program that was 

still in its "earliest stages." They were led, he said, by "Omar" who had been arrested in the country of | 

The group also included Abu Bakr al-Filistini. (See I^^H^H^^^^H I 34475 ^^HH^M^^I' ) KSM 

would later state that "YazidjMedal-Qa'ida's anthraxeffortT(5ee^^^Hl076 9 (120937Z MAR 03).) Yazid 

Sufaat, who had been in I^^ H [foreign government] custody since 2001, had long been suspected of 

articipating in al-Qa'ida chemical and biological activities. (See email from: [REDACTED]; to: 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; 

subject: FOR COORD by noon please: Yazid Sufaat PDB; date: March 14, 2003, at 09:05 AM; email from: 

[REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: RESPONSE - INDIVIDUALS CONNECTED TO 

USAMA BINLADINASSOCIATE YAZID SUFAAT; date: March 6, 2003, at 12:50:27 PM; 

email from: i^^^^HI^ H to: [REDACTED]; SUBJECT: Re: KSM on WMD; date: March 12, 2003, at 

08:28:31 AM.) A draft PDB prepared on March 17, 2003, states that "Sufaat's own claims to [foreign 

government] authorities and personal background tracks with KSM's assertions." (See "KSM Guarding Most 

Sensitive Information," labeled "For the President Only 18 March 2003," stamped 0319 ksmupdate.doc 17 March 

2003.) On April 3, 2003, an IICT analysis stated that KSM "likely judges that information related to Sufaat already 

has been compromised since his arrest." (See "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, 

Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT, April 3, 2003.) CIA analysis from 2005 stated that "^^HlH I 

[a foreign government holding Sufaat] was likely to have known details of Yazid's involvement in alQa'ida's anthrax program by early 2002," although that information was not provided at the time to the CIA. (See 

CIA Directorate of Intelligence; "Al-Qa"id£^nthraj^ogram^racks Emerge in a Key Reporting Stream; New 

Insights into Yazid Sufaat's Credibility ^HHH^HI^V ' (DTS #2005-3264).) Al-Filistini was later 

captured and detained by the CIA. While being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques he 

changed his description of al-Qa'ida's anthrax efforts multiple times. On August 1, 2003, Abu Bakr al-Filistini, also 

known as Samr al-Barq, told CIA interrogators that "we never made anthrax." At the time, he was being subjected 

to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and was told that the harsh treatment would not stop until he "told 

the truth." According to cables, crying, al-Barq then said "1 made the anthrax." Asked if he was lying, al-Barq said 

m i 11 iii i BWBl^BBMMB i in m 

Page 82 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

82 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

(^^••••••^F ) On March 5, 2003, and March 6, 2003, while he was still at 

DETENTION SITE COBALT, KSM was subjected to nudity and sleep deprivation. On March 

5, 2003, KSM was also subjected to additional rectal rehydration,443 which 

I^^^^Hm , described as helping to "clear a person's head" and effective in getting KSM 

to talk.444 On March 6, 2003, adopted a '"softer Mr. Rogers' persona" after the 

interrogation team concluded that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques had caused KSM 

to "clam up."445 During this session KSM was described as "more cooperative," and the day's 

interrogation was deemed the "best session held to date" by the interrogation team.445 During 

this period KSM fabricated information on an individual whom he described as the protector of 

his children.447 That information resulted in the capture and CIA detention of two innocent 

individuals.448 

2. The CIA Transfers KSM to DETENTION SITE BLUE, Anticipates Use of the Waterboard 

Prior to His Arrival 

Within hours of KSM's capture, ALEC Station successfully argued 

that CIA contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR should take over the interrogation of KSM upon 

KSM's arrival at DETENTION SITE BLUE.449 On March 3, 2003, CIA Headquarters approved 

an interrogation plan indicating that KSM "will be subjected to immediate interrogation 

techniques," and that "the interrogation techniques will increase in intensity from standard to 

that he was. After CIA interrogators "demonstrated the penalty for lying," al-Barq again stated that "I made the 

anthrax" and then immediately recanted, and then again stated that he made anthrax. (See 1015 (012057Z 

AUG 03).) Two days later, al-Barq stated that he had lied about the anthrax production "only because he thought 

that was what interrogators wanted." (030812Z AUG 03). 

443

 ^••••^^•3457 5 

444

 I I I MBBBB i to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], subject: Re: 

Departure; date: March 6, 2003, at 7:11:59 PM; email from: ••^^•Bto![REDACTED] ; cc: 

B^M^Ksubject^Re^Update ; date: March 6,2003, at 4:51:32 PM. 

M^^^Jmgamm m 34573 (O61751Z MAR 03); 34614 (071551Z MAR 

446

 34573 (061751Z MAR 03); 34614 (071551Z MAR 03) 

447

 In June 2004, KSM described his reporting as "all lies." ^H^HI^^^^ H

 3456 9

 (061722Z MAR 03); 

1281 (130801ZJUN 04). 

445

 The two individuals, Sayed Habib and Shaistah Habibullali Khan, entered CIA custod^i^pnUjn^ul y 2003 

respectively, and were released in August and February 2004, respectively. (See 57 J 2 

email from: to: H^HH H [REDACTED]JREDACTED]^ubiect: 

planned release of [DETENTION SITE ORANGE] detainee Syed Habib; and 

CIA document, "Additional Details for DCIA on Sayed Habib's Arrest and Detention.") The CIA's June 2013 

Response states that die detention of the two individuals "can only be considered 'wrongful' after the fact, not in the 

light of credible information available at the time and in a context in which plot disruption was deemed an urgent 

national priority." The CIA's June 2013 Response further states that KSM's reporting on March 6, 2003, was 

"credible" because, at the time, "[CIA] assessed that Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) had moved to a more 

cooperative posture as his interrogation progressed." A review of CIA records indicates that the CIA subjected 

KSM to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques the following day^h^s e of the techniques continued until 

March 25, 2003, and included 183 applications of the waterboard. See 1071.1 

, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 

; from: ^BH^MB ; cc: [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], 

I, [REDACTED]; subject: KSM planning; date: March 1, 2003, at 07:07:33 AM. 

Ill l I I I I I ^^^BB^^BPB^BVNOFOR N 

Page 83 of 499 

449

 Interview of | 

2003. Email to: | 

[REDACTED], I 

[REDACTED], | 

UNCLASSIFIED 

83 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

enhanced techniques commensurate with [KSM's] level of resistance, until he indicates initial 

cooperation."450 On March | , 2003, the day of KSM's arrival at DETENTION SITE BLUE, the 

on-site medical officer described the use of the waterboard on KSM as inevitable: 

"[T]he team here apparently looks to use the water board in two different 

contexts. One is as a tool of regression and control in which it is used up front 

and aggressively. The second is to vet information on an as needed basis. 

Given the various pressures from home vs what is happening on the ground, I 

think the team's expectation is that [KSM] will [be] getting treatment 

somewhere in between. I don't think they believe that it will be possible to 

entirely avoid the water board given the high and immediate threat to US and 

allied interests. It is an interesting dynamic because they are well aware of the 

toll it will take on the team vs. the detainee. The requirements coming from 

home are really unbelievable in terms of breadth and detail."451 

Meanwhile, OMS completed draft guidelines on the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically addressing the waterboard interrogation 

technique. These guidelines were sent to the medical personnel at the detention site. The 

guidelines included a warning that the risk of the waterboard was "directly related to number of 

exposures and may well accelerate as exposures increase," that concerns about cumulative 

effects would emerge after three to five days, and that there should be an upper limit on the total 

number of waterboard exposures, "perhaps 20 in a week." CIA records indicate that, as of the 

day of KSM's arrival at DETENTION SITE BLUE, the interrogation team had not reviewed the 

draft OMS guidelines

 452 

KSM arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE at approximately 6:00 

PM local time on March | , 2003, and was immediately stripped and placed in the standing sleep 

deprivation position.453 At 6:38 PM, after the medical and psychological personnel who had 

traveled with KSM from DETENTION SITE COBALT cleared KSM for the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, the detention site requested CIA Headquarters' approval to begin the 

interrogation process

 454

 The detention site received the approvals at 7:18 PM

 455

 at which point 

the interrogators began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on KSM

 456 

(TSZ/flHI^^^^S^ 1) Between March | , 2003, and March 9, 2003, contractors 

SWIGERT and DUNBAR, and a CIA interrogator, H1HHH , used the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques against KSM, including nudity, standing sleep deprivation, the attention 

110654 (030904Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR 

SWIGERT and CIA interrogator 

2003. DIRECTOR 

451

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: 

| , 2003, at 3:51:09 AM. 

452

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: 

March 2003, at 3:22:45 PM 

453

 ^H H 10711 

454

 H^ H 10705 

455

 DIRECTOR 

10711 

TOP SECRET/, 

| (041444Z MAR 03). The initial approval was for 

The authorization was extended to DUNBAR on March | , 

cc: |; subject: Technique; date: March 

|; subject: Re: Technique; date: 

//NOFORN 

Page 84 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

84 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET// 1//NOFOKN 

grab and insult slap, the facial grab, the abdominal slap, the kneeling stress position, and 

walling.457 There were no debriefers present. According to the CIA interrogator, during KSM's 

first day at DETENTION SITE BLUE, SWIGERT and DUNBAR first began threatening KSM's 

children.458 H^H^^T C Legal, later told the inspector general that 

these threats were legal so long as the threats were "conditional."459 On March 9, 2003, KSM 

fabricated information indicating that Jaffar al-Tayyar and Jose Padilla were plotting together460 

because, as he explained on April 23, 2003, he "felt some pressure to produce information about 

operations in the United States in the initial phases of his interrogation."461 

i) On March 2003, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station | 

|, and a second ALEC Station officer, arrived at DETENTION SITE 

BLUE to serve as debriefers. The detention site also reportedly received a phone call from CIA 

Headquarters conveying the views of the CIA's Deputy Director of Operations James Pavitt on 

the interrogation of KSM

 462

 Pavitt later told the inspector general that he "did not recall 

specifically ordering that a detainee be waterboarded right away," but he "did not discount that 

possibility." According to records of the interview, "Pavitt did recall saying, 'I want to know 

what he knows, and I want to know it fast.'"463 The on-site medical officer later wrote in an 

email that the CIA interrogators "felt that the [waterboard] was the big stick and that HQ was 

more or less demanding that it be used early and often."464 

3. The CIA Waterboards KSM at Least 183 Times; KSM's Reporting Includes Significant 

Fabricated Information 

(TS^^H^^^Ht^F ) On March 10, 2003, KSM was subjected to the first of his 15 

separate waterboarding sessions. The first waterboarding session, which lasted 30 minutes (10 

more than anticipated in the Office of Legal Counsel's August 1, 2002, opinion), was followed 

by the use of a horizontal stress position that had not previously been approved by CIA 

Headquarters.465 The chief of Base, worried about the legal implications, prohibited the on-site 

10725| 10732 

10741 (100917Z MAR 03) 

|, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 30, 

by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 

|10711| 

|10731| 

458

 Interview of | 

2003. Interview of | 

October 22, 2003. 

459

 CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG), 

January 2004. 

460

 10740 (092308Z MAR 03), disseminated as | 10741 (100917Z MAR 

03) 

461

 mm m 11377 (231943Z APR 03), disseminated as | 

462

 Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 30 April 

2003. ' 

4fi3

 Interview of James Pavitt, by and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 21, 

2003. ^^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^^ ^ 

from: to: cc: 

10, 2003, at 5:59:27 PM. 

110752 (102320Z MAR 03) 

TOP SECRET//! 

Page 85 of 499 

|; subject: More; date: April 

I//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

85 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRETfl^^^BBB^^M^MtoQgQR N 

medical officer from reporting on the interrogation directly to OMS outside of official CIA cable 

traffic.466 

(TS^HHH^HV^ 1) March 12, 2003, KSM provided information on the Heathrow 

Airport and Canary Wharf plotting. KSM stated that he showed a sketch in his notebook of a 

building in Canary Wharf (a major business district in London) to Ammar al-Baluchi.467 He also 

provided statements about directing prospective pilots to study at flight schools,468 and stated that 

Jaffar al-Tayyar was involved in the Heathrow Plot.469 KSM retracted all of this information 

later in his detention.470 There are no CIA records indicating that these and other retractions 

were assessed to be false. 

(^S/^I^^Hiij^l^^/NF ) The March 12, 2003, reporting from KSM on the Heathrow Airport 

plotting was deemed at the time by CIA interrogators to be an effort by KSM to avoid discussion 

of plotting inside the United States and thus contributed to the decision to subject KSM to two 

waterboarding sessions that day.471 During these sessions, KSM ingested a significant amount of 

water. CIA records state that KSM's "abdomen was somewhat distended and he expressed water 

when the abdomen was pressed."472 KSM's gastric contents were so diluted by water that the 

medical officer present was "not concerned about regurgitated gastric acid damaging KSM's 

esophagus."473 The officer was, however, concerned about water intoxication and dilution of 

electrolytes and requested that the interrogators use saline in future waterboarding sessions.474 

The medical officer later wrote to ^^^^HiOM S that KSM was "ingesting and aspiration [sic] 

a LOT of water," and that "[i]n the new technique we are basically doing a series of near 

drownings."475 During the day, KSM was also subjected to the attention grasp, insult slap, 

abdominal slap, and walling.476 

On March 13, 2003, after KSM again denied that al-Qa'ida had 

operations planned for inside the United States, CIA interrogators decided on a "day of intensive 

| subject: Re: MEDICAL SITREP 

10883(1821272 MAR 03), 

ARfl

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: 

3/10; date: March 11,2003, at 8:10:39 AM. 

110798 (131816Z MAR 03), disseminated as I 

10778 (121549Z MAR 03), disseminated as 

10778 (121549Z MAR 03), disseminated as | 

11214m722312^UN 03); 22939 (031541Z JUL 04); 

disseminated as 

471

 •• • 10787 (130716Z MAR 03). The CIA would later represent that the information KSM provided on the 

Heathrow plotting was an example of the effectiveness of the waterboard interrogation technique, listing the 

Heathrow Plot as one of the "plots discovered as a result of EITs" in a briefing on the waterboard for the President 

in November 2007. See document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated 

November 6, 2007, with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." 

472

 10800 (131909Z MAR 03) 

473

 Interview of IHttHH , by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 

2003. 

474

 10800 (131909Z MAR 03); Interview of | 

Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003. 

from: to: cc: 

10, 2003, at 5:59:27 PM. Emphasis in the original. 

110787 (130716Z MAR 03) 

TOP SECRET//! 

Page 86 of 499 

| by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], 

|; subject: More; date: April 

I//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

86 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

waterboard sessions."477 During the first of three waterboarding sessions that day, interrogators 

responded to KSM's efforts to breathe during the sessions by holding KSM's lips and directing 

the water at his mouth

 478

 According to a cable from the detention site, KSM "would begin 

signaling by pointing upward with his two index fingers as the water pouring approached the 

established time limit." The cable noted that "[t]his behavior indicates that the subject remains 

alert and has become familiar with key aspects of the process."479 CIA records state that KSM 

"yelled and twisted" when he was secured to the waterboard for the second session of the day, 

but "appeared resigned to tolerating the board and stated he had nothing new to say" about 

terrorist plots inside the United States.480 

(TS^^HIHIH^NF ) Prior to the third waterboard session of that calendar day, the onsite medical officer raised concerns that the waterboard session—which would be the fourth in 

14 hours—would exceed the limits included in draft OMS guidelines that had been distributed 

the previous afternoon.481 Those draft guidelines stated that up to three waterboard sessions in a 

24-hour period was acceptable.482 At the time, KSM had been subjected to more than 65 

applications of water during the four waterboarding sessions between the afternoon of March 12, 

2003, and the morning of March 13, 2003. In response to a request for approval from the chief 

of Base, CTC attorney assured detention site personnel that the medical officer 

"is incorrect that these guidelines have been approved and/or fully coordinated."483 

sent an email to the detention site authorizing the additional waterboarding session

 484

 Despite 

indications from BU B that the detention site personnel would receive a formal authorizing 

cable, no such authorization from CIA Headquarters was provided. At the end of the day, the 

medical officer wrote ^H||H|OM S that "[t]hings are slowly evolving form [sic] OMS being 

viewed as the institutional conscience and the limiting factor to the ones who are dedicated to 

maximizing the benefit in a safe manner and keeping everyone's butt out of trouble." The 

medical officer noted that his communication with

 wa s n o

 longer "viewed with 

suspicion,"485 On the afternoon of March 13, 2003, KSM was subjected to his third waterboard 

session of that calendar day and fifth in 25 hours. CIA records note that KSM vomited during 

and after the procedure.485 

477

 ^^^ B 10804 (140710Z MAR 03); ^^^ B 10790 (130946Z MAR 03) 

478

 Interview of ^^BBBB K by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 30, 

2003. The interviewee was a CIA interrogator for KSM at the CIA detention site. 

479

 H^ H 10790 (130946Z MAR 03) 

480

 ^^^ B 10791 (131229Z MAR 03) ^^^^^^^ ^ 

[REDACTED]; to: Bi^^^^B ; cc: BI^B H Jose 

Rodriguez; subject: re: Eyes Only - Legal and Political Quand[]ry; date: March 13,2003, at 11:28:06 AM. 

482

 Email from: BHHHH^ t o : [REDACTED]; cc: HI^BB^Bi B subject: Re: MEDICAL S1TREP 

3/10; date: March 12, 2003, at 2:09:47 PM. 

from: to: cc: ^B^H^HI ' HB^^^^H .

 Jos e 

Rodriguez; subject: Re: EYES ONLY - Legal and Political Quandary; date: March 13, 2003, at 8:01:12 AM. 

484

 Email from: ^^^BBBi ; to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, BHBHHBBIH I 

i^BBBHB : subject: EYES ONLY - Use of Water Board; date: March 13, 

2003, at 08:28 AM. ^^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^^ ^ 

485

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to:

 cc :

 ^^^^H^Hflf t subject: Re: State cable; date: 

March 13,2003, at 1:43:17 PM. The previous day, the medical officer had written that "I am going the extra mile to 

try to handle this in a non confrontational manner." Email from: [REDACTED]; to:

 cc : 

|; subject: Re: MEDICAL SITREP 3/10; date: March 12, 2003, at 5:17:07 AM. 

10803 (131929ZMAR 03) 

M I 11 III I 'I MI HIM I 

Page 87 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

87 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

(^S^imBpMP ) Shortly thereafter, CIA Headquarters began reevaluating the use of 

the waterboard interrogation technique. According to a March 14, 2003, email from an 

interrogator who was not at DETENTION SITE BLUE, but was reviewing cable traffic, the 

"|o]verall view seems to be" that the waterboard "is not working in gaining KSM['s] 

compliance."487 The deputy chief of the CIA interrogation program responded in agreement, 

adding that "[a]gainst KSM it has proven ineffective," and that "[t]he potential for physical harm 

is far greater with the waterboard than with the other techniques, bringing into question the issue 

of risk vs. gain...." The deputy chief further suggested that the waterboard was 

counterproductive, stating that "[w]e seem to have lost ground" with KSM since progress made 

at DETENTION SITE COBALT, and as a result, the CIA should "consider the possibility" that 

the introduction of the waterboard interrogation technique "may poison the well."488 The email 

in which these sentiments were expressed was sent to HIHfl^^H ' the CTC attorney 

overseeing the interrogation of KSM. Despite these reservations and assessments, the 

waterboarding of KSM continued for another 10 days.489 

On March 15, 2003, KSM was waterboarded for failing to confirm 

references in signals intercepts on al-Qa'ida's efforts to obtain "nuclear suitcases."490 

Subsequent signals intercepts and information from a foreign government would later indicate 

that the nuclear suitcase threat was an orchestrated scam

 491

 KSM was waterboarded a second 

time that day after failing to provide information on operations against the United States or on alQa'ida nuclear capabilities

 492

 During the waterboarding sessions that day, the application of the 

interrogation technique further evolved, with the interrogators now using their hands to maintain 

a one-inch deep "pool" of water over KSM's nose and mouth in an effort to make it impossible 

for KSM to ingest all the water being poured.493 At one point, SWIGERT and DUNBAR waited 

for KSM to talk before pouring water over his mouth.494 

| [REDACTED], 

• As of 1000 HRS 14 Mar 03; date: March 14, 

487

 Email from: ^^^^^H ; to: cc: 

[REDACTED]; subject: re Summary of KSM Waterboard Sessions -

2003, at 10:44:12 AM. ^^^^ ^ ^^^ ^ ^^ ^ 

^maiHronr^^^^^H ; to: •U K cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

j^^^HHTsubject : re Summary of KSM Waterboard Sessions - As of 1000 HRS 14 MAR 03; date: March 

14, 2003, at 02:02:42 PM. 

489 See detailed review of these sessions in Volume III. 

490

 10831 (151510Z MAR 03); •• • 10841 (152007Z MAR 03); ^H H 10849 (161058Z MAR 

03); Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 

May 15,2003. 

491

 The original reporting, that al-Qa'ida had purchased nuclear suitcases in Yemen, was later determined to be 

based on an effort by unknown Yemenis to sell "suitcase weapons" to al-Qa'ida. Al-Qa'ida operatives concluded 

that the offer was a scam. See 74492 (250843Z JUL 03), disseminated as and 

HEADQUARTERS • • (092349Z DEC 04) 

492

 •• • 10841 (152007Z MAR 03); BH ^ 10831 (151510ZMAR 03) 

493

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ••^^•ftccj^H^^^^PB ; subject: Re: Sitrep as of AM 3/15; 

date: March 15, 2003, at 3:52:54 A.M. hiterviewof^H^^||||[^^OwREDACTED ] and [REDACTED], 

Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003. See also interviewof^BiHHI^l . by [REDACTED] and 

[REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003. The descriptions of the use of the waterboard 

interrogation technique against KSM were provided by these two on-site medical officers. 

494

 Interview of HlH^H , by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 

2003. ^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^ 

11 ii 111 1 i BBI^^^M^^MB I 'ur n 

Page 88 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

88 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

) On the afternoon of March 17, 2003, and into the morning of 

March 18, 2003, ^HUHflllH ' HIHHOMS , exchanged emails with the medical officer 

at DETENTION SITE BLUE on the waterboarding of KSM. According to H| , the 

waterboard interrogation technique had "moved even further from the SERE model."495 

also wrote: 

"Truthfully, though, I don't recall that the WB [waterboard] produced anything 

actionable in AZ [Abu Zubaydah] any earlier than another technique might 

have. This may be different with KSM, but that is still as much a statement of 

faith as anything else - since we don't seem to study the question as we go... 

it's been many more days of constant WB repetitions, with the evidence of 

progress through most of them not being actionable intel but rather that 'he 

looks like he's weakening.' The WB may actually be the best; just don't like 

to base it on religion."496 

On March 18, 2003, KSM was confronted with the reporting of 

Majid Khan, who was then in the custody of a foreign government,497 regarding plotting against 

gas stations inside the United States, information that KSM had not previously discussed. In 

assessing the session, DETENTION SITE BLUE personnel noted that "KSM will selectively lie, 

provide partial truths, and misdirect when he believes he will not be found out and held 

accountable." On the other hand, they wrote that "KSM appears more inclined to make accurate 

subject: Re: Medical limitations of WB - draft thoughts; date: 

to: [REDACTED]; cc: | |; subject: Oct 18; date: March 18, 

495

 Email to: [REDACTED]; from: | 

March 17, 2003, at 01:11:35 PM. 

496

 Email from: ^ 

2003, at 10:52:03 AM. 

497

 Majid Khan, who was arrested on March 5, 2003, provided extensive information prior to being rendered to CIA 

custody. This included information on lyman Faris, Uzhair (Paracha) and his father, Aafia Sidiqqi, his transfer of 

al-Qa'ida funds to a Bangkok-based Zubair, and his discussions with KSM regarding various proposed plots. Majid 

Khan also provided assistance to the CIA in its efforts to locate Ammar al-BaluchiJncluc^^ alPakistani. J^££^B^^J3697_(0S()730Z MAR 03); •H^|l376 5 

144244 (161423Z APRO^BBI^W^4468 4 (250633Z APR 03); 

113678 (070724Z MAR 03); •^^ • 13785 (260251Z MAR 

03); ^Hlii382 6 (190715Z MAR 03)IBBH H 13833 (200454Z MAR 03)T^^^Bl3890 1 

113686 (071322Z MAR03)~^^^ H 13932 (271244Z MAR03)~^BH B

 ]3710 

(081218Z MAR 03).) After being rendered to CIA custody, Majid Khan was subjected by the CIA to sleep 

deprivation, nudity, and dietary manipulation, and may have been subjected to an ice water bath. 

[39077 (271719Z MAY 03); •^••MHHH l 39099 (281101Z MAY ( 

] , Briefing for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 14, 2008; f 

141772 (121230Z JUL03);emai l 1 

to: [REDACTEDL^^^^^^H ' and subject, hope the 

approvals for enhanced comes through quickly for this guy... this does not look good"; date: June 30,2003.) A 

June 2006 CIA email stated that Majid Khan said he "fabricated a lot of his early [CIA] interrogation reporting to 

stop... what he called 'torture.'" According to the email, Khan stated that he was "hung up" for approximately one 

day in a sleep deprived position and that he provided "everything they wanted to hear to get out of the situation." 

(See email from: [REDACTED] [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], H^ljj^^Hsubject^ljHfreques t for prozac; date: June 16, 2006.) As 

detailed in this summary and in more detail in Volume II, the CIA inaccurately attributed information provided by 

Majid Khan in foreign government custody to the CIA interrogations of KSM. 

M I 11 III I ^^MMMBI^M B

 1111111111 1 

Page 89 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

89 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

disclosures when he believes people, emails, or other source material are available to the USG 

for checking his responses."498 

(TSZ/fll^^im^^^/NF ) The same day, KSM provided additional information on the 

Heathrow Airport plotting, much of which he would recant in 2004

 499

 KSM also discussed 

Jaffar al-Tayyar again, prompting the detention site personnel to refer to the "all-purpose" alTayyar whom KSM had "woven... into practically every story, each time with a different 

role."500 After KSM had included al-Tayyar in his discussion of Majid Khan's gas station plot, 

KSM debriefer wrote in an email that "[t]oday [al-Tayyar's] working with Majid 

Khan, yesterday the London crowd, the day before Padilla - you get the point."501 Beginning the 

evening of March 18, 2003, KSM began a period of sleep deprivation, most of it in the standing 

position, which would last for seven and a half days, or approximately 180 hours.502 

On March 19, 2003, the interrogators at the detention site decided 

to waterboard KSM due to KSM's inconsistent information about Jaffar al-Tayyar's passport.503 

According to CIA cables, after assuming his position on the waterboard, KSM "seemed to lose 

control" and appeared "somewhat frantic," stating that he "had been forced to lie, and ma[k]e up 

stories about" Jaffar al-Tayyar because of his interrogators.504 KSM then stated that his 

reporting on al-Tayyar's role in Majid Khan's plotting was a "complete fabrication" and that alTayyar had been compromised as an operative and that as a result, al-Tayyar could not be used 

for a terrorist operation

 505

 In response, the interrogators told KSM that they only wanted to hear 

hin^peak if he was revealing information on the next attack.506 Deputy Chief of ALEC Station 

later told the inspector general that it was around this time that contract interrogator 

DUNBAR stated that "he had not seen a 'resistor' [sic] like KSM, and was 'going to go to school 

on this guy."'507 According to CIA records, the interrogators then "devote[d] all measures to 

pressuring [KSM] on the single issue of the 'next attack on America,'" including attention grabs, 

insult slaps, walling, water dousing, and additional waterboard sessions.508 

On March 20, 2003, KSM continued to be subjected to the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques throughout the day, including a period of "intense questioning 

10884 (182140Z MAR 03) ^^^^^ ^ ^ ^ 

10883 (182127Z MAR 03), disseminated as H 22939 (03I541Z JUL 04). CIA 

records indicate that CIA officers believed that KSM's recantations were credible. See KSM detainee review in 

Volume III. 

10884 (182140Z MAR 03) 

301

 Email from: [REDACTED], OFFICE: 

18,2003, at 08:16:07 PM. 

502 ^^TM3l088 4 (182140Z MAR 03); 

03); ^^^ P 10969 (240950Z MAR 03) 

503

 '^^^1089 2 (191503Z MAR 03);" 

3041

 10902 (201037Z MAR 03) 

505 

506 

507

 Interview of 

2003. 

508 I 

03) 

; to: [REDACTED]; subject: JAFAR REQUEST; date: March 

10888 (190805Z MAR 03); 10999 (260835Z MAR 

10902 (201037Z MAR 03) 

10894 (191513Z MAR 03); 10902 (201037Z MAR 03) 

10902 (201037Z MAR 03) 

by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 

10902 (201037Z MAR 03); | 

TOP SECRET//! 

110900 (191907Z MAR 03); 10896 (191524Z MAR 

MMBI^BBBBB I MINIUM 

Page 90 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

90 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

and walling."509 KSM was described as "|t|ired and sore," with abrasions on his ankles, shins, 

and wrists, as well as on the back of his head.510 He also suffered from pedal edema resulting 

from extended standing.511 After having concluded that there was "no further movement" in the 

interrogation, the detention site personnel hung a picture of KSM's sons in his cell as a way to 

"[heighten] his imagination concerning where they are, who has them, [and] what is in store for 

them."512 

The waterboarding of KSM on March 21, 2003, and March 22, 

2003, was based on a misreading of intelligence provided by Majid Khan byDcnut^Chief of 

ALEC Station HHH^H - According to a cable from the CIA's HHHH > Khan, 

who was in foreign government custody, had stated that KSM wanted to use "two to three 

unknown Black American Muslim converts who were currently training in Afghanistan," to 

"conduct attacks" on gas stations in the United States, and that "KSM was interested in usim^ ^ 

anyone with US status to assist with this operation."513 Upon receipt of this reporting, 

wrote in an email "i love the Black American Muslim at AQ camps in Afghanuistan [sic] ... 

Mukie [KSM] is going to be hatin' life on this one."514 However, her subsequent questioning of 

KSM was not based on Khan's actual reporting, which was about potential operatives already in 

Afghanistan, but rather something Khan had not said—that KSM directed him to make contact 

with African-American converts in the United States

 515

 According to CIA records, in a 

"contentious" session that lasted for hours and involved the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, KSM "flatly denied" any efforts to recruit African-American Muslim 

converts. KSM was then waterboarded.516 Later in the day, facing the threat of a second 

waterboarding session, KSM "relented and said that maybe he had told Khan that he should see 

if he could make contact with members of the Black American Muslim convert community." 

The CIA interrogators then returned KSM to the standing sleep deprivation position without a 

second waterboarding session.517 

(l^/Z^^HV^ 1) The next day, March 22, 2003, interrogators subjected KSM to 

"intense" questioning and walling, but when KSM provided no new information on AfricanAmerican Muslim converts or threats inside the United States, he was subjected to additional 

10916(2108452 MAR 03); | 10921 (211046Z MAR 03) 

10916(2108452 MAR 03) 

110909 (2019182 MAR 03) 

512

 Interviewof^HH m by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, October 

22,^003 1 _^^^BI0917(210907Z MAR 03). 

113839 (201434Z MAR 03) 

514

 Email to: •^^^•H ; from: [REDACTED] OFHC&^MB^ DETENTIO N S1T E BLUE]; subject: Re: 

Majid Khan; date: March 20, 2003, at 03:40:17 PM. The ^^Hcablewa s formally sent to DETENTION SITE 

BLUE via ALEC • • (210015Z MAR 03). 

10932 (212132Z MAR 03) 

10932 (212132Z MAR 03); | 

10932 (212132Z MAR 03) 

TOP SECRET//! 

10922 (211256Z MAR 03) 

1//NOFORN 

Page 91 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

91 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

waterboarding.518 An hour later, KSM stated that he was "ready to talk."519 He told the CIA 

interrogators that he had sent Abu Issa al-Britani to Montana to recruit African-American 

Muslim converts, a mission he said had been prompted by discussions with a London-based 

shaykh whose bodyguards had families in Montana.520 KSM also stated that he tasked Majid 

Khan with attending Muslim conferences in the United States to "spot and assess potential 

extremists" who would assist in the gas station plot.521 In June 2003, KSM admitted that he 

fabricated the story about Abu Issa al-Britani and Montana, explaining that he was "under 

'enhanced measures' when he made these claims and simply told his interrogators what he 

thought they wanted to hear."S22 In August 2003, KSM reiterated that he had no plans to recruit 

or use "black American Muslim" converts operationally.523 In December 2005, he denied ever 

asking Majid Khan to recruit converts or attend Islamic conferences.524 

(TS^HI^^^^B^F ) On March 24, 2003, KSM underwent his fifteenth and final 

documented waterboarding session due to his "intransigence" in failing to identify suspected 

Abu Bakr al-Azdi operations in the United States, and for having "lied about poison and 

biological warfare programs."525 KSM was described in the session as being "composed, stoic, 

and resigned."526 

(^••M ) That evening, the detention site received two reports. The first 

recounted the reporting of Majid Khan, who was still in the custody of a foreign government, on 

Uzhair, who ran the New York branch of his father's Karachi-based import-export business, and 

on Uzhair's father.527 According to Khan, his meetings with the two were facilitated by Ammar 

al-Baluchi.528 The second report described the reporting of lyman Faris, who was in FBI 

custody, on a plot to cut the suspension cables on the Brooklyn Bridge and exploration of plans 

to derail trains and conduct an attack in Washington, D.C.529 KSM, whom detention site 

personnel described as "boxed in" by the new reporting,530 then stated that Uzhair's father, Sayf 

al-Rahman Paracha, had agreed to smuggle explosives into the United States.531 As described 

10941 (221506Z MAR 03); •• • 10950 (222127Z MAR 03). One cable from DETENTION 

SITE BLUE hypothesized that KSM was lying in order to force the CIA interrogators to apply the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques: "[T]he enhanced measures resulting from his lying in [sic] details could be a resistance 

strategy to keep the interrogation from threatening issues... [KSM's] apparent willingness to provoke and incur the 

use of enhanced measures may represent a calculated strategy to either: (A) redirect the course of the interrogation; 

or (B) to attempt to cultivate some doubt that he had knowledge of any current or future operations against the US." 

See 10950 (222127Z MAR 03). 

[10950 (222127Z MAR 03) 

] 10942(2216102^1AR 03), disseminated as 10948 (2221017. MAR 03), 

disseminated as 

10942 (221610Z MAR 03), disseminated as 

12095 (222049Z JUN 03) 

12558 (041938Z AUG 03) 

31148 (171919Z DEC 05); 

10983 (242321Z MAR 03); 

10974 (241834Z MAR 03); 

[31147 (171919Z DEC 05), disseminated as | 

110972 (241122Z MAR 03) 

110983 (242321Z MAR 03) 

' See the sections of this summary and Volume II on the Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifuliah 

Paracha. 

113890 •^^^•IRJHH H 10984 (242351Z MAR 03) 

| (242226ZMART)3)~H^Ml098 3 (24232 IZ MAR 03) 

[10983 (24232 IZ MAR 03) 

[ 10984 (24235IZ MAR 03), disseminated as | 

11II I I III I VNOFORN 

Page 92 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

92 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

elsewhere in this summary, the purported parties to the agreement denied that such an agreement 

existed.532 In confirming Faris's reporting, KSM exhibited what the Interagency Intelligence 

Committee on Terrorism would later describe as an effort to "stay obvious/general" and "provide 

little information that might enable the US to thwart attacks."533 

(TS^^^^^^I^^^NF ) With the exception of sleep deprivation, which continued for one 

more day, the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM stopped abruptly 

on March 24, 2003.534 There are no CIA records directing the interrogation team to cease using 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, nor any contemporaneous 

documentation explaining the decision

 535 

4. After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against KSM Ends, the 

CIA Continues to Assess That KSM Is Withholding and Fabricating Information 

(T&fl^^^^B/NF ) On April 3, 2003, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on 

Terrorism produced an assessment of KSM's intelligence entitled, "Precious Truths, Surrounded 

by a Bodyguard of Lies." The assessment concluded that KSM was withholding or lying about 

terrorist plots and operatives targeting the United States. It also identified contradictions 

between KSM's reporting on CBRN and other sources.536 

On April 24, 2003, FBI Director Robert Mueller began seeking 

direct FBI access to KSM in order to better understand CIA reporting indicating threats to U.S. 

cities.537 Despite personal commitments from DCI Tenet to Director Mueller that access would 

be forthcoming, the CIA's CTC successfully formulated a CIA position whereby the FBI would 

532

 According to one cable, KSM did not volunteer the purported smuggling plot, but rather was asked about it by 

interrogators. (See ALEC (052230Z MAY 03). All parties to the purported plot - Paracha and AmmafalBaluchi - denied any agreement had been reached. DIRECTOR MIH(181929 Z JUN 03), disseminated as 

••••^•••^••^•• H 39239 (301600Z MAY03)il^ M 13588 (171505Z JUL 03); 

III! II III! [JTr r "9Z JUN 03),disseminated as •^^•I^B^HH^^HH I 39239 

(301600Z MAY 03); ALEC H H (012248Z APR 03).) With regard to the explosives smuggling reporting, the 

former chief of the Bin Ladin Unit wrote in a March 2003 email: "again, another ksm op worthy of the lamentable 

knuckleheads... why 'smuggle' in explosives when you can get them here? neither fertilizer for bombs or regular 

explosives are that hard to come by. ramzi yousef came to conus with a suitcase and hundred bucks ancUjot 

everything he needed right here, this may be true, but it just seems damn odd to me." See email from: 

to: i^Hi^H,•••i^^ n subject: see 

highlight: again, another ksm op worthy of the lamentable; date: March 25, 2003, at 6:29:08 AM. 

533 10985 (242351Z MAR 03). "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, 

Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT, April 3,2003. 

534

 Sleep deprivation was extended for an additional day, although it was interrupted by "catnapping." See \ 

10999 (260835Z MAR 03). 

535

 For additional details, see KSM detainee review in Volume III. 

536

 "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT, 

April 3, 2003. 

|; cc: James L. Pavitt; J°hn H. Moseman; 

|; subject: Mueller's Interest in FBI Access to KSM; 

537

 Email from: 

Jose Rodriguez; 

date: April 24,2003, at 10:59:53 AM. 

TOP SECRET//! k/NOIORN 

Page 93 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

93 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

not be provided access to KSM until his anticipated transfer to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Neither 

the CIA nor the FBI knew at the time that the transfer would not occur until September 2006.538 

Between April 2003 and July 2003, KSM frustrated the CIA on a 

number of fronts. On May 7, 2003, after more than two months of conflicting reporting, ALEC 

Station concluded that KSM "consistently wavers" on issues of UBL's location, protectors, and 

hosts, and that his information "conveniently lack[s] sufficient detail [to be] actionable 

intelligence."539 On June 12, 2003, CIA Headquarters indicated that it "remained] highly 

suspicious that KSM is withholding, exaggerating, misdirecting, or outright fabricating 

information on CBRN issues."540 At the end of April 2003, KSM was shown pictures of the 

recently captured Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash, after which he provided additional 

information related to their plotting in Karachi.541 ALEC Station wrote in a May 20, 2003, cable 

that "[w]e consider KSM's long-standing omission of [this] information to be a serious concern, 

especially as this omission may well have cost American lives had Pakistani authorities not been 

diligent in following up on unrelated criminal leads that led to the capture of Ammar, bin Attash, 

and other probable operatives involved in the attack plans."542 

(zsmmmmrn ) I n May and June 2003, Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash 

provided reporting that contradicted KSM's statements about the Heathrow Airport plotting and 

included information that KSM had not provided.543 After KSM was confronted with this 

reporting, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station wrote in an email, "OK, that's it... 

yet again he lies and ONLY ADMITS details when he knows we know them from someone 

338

 Memorandum for: James L. Pavitt; ^H^HH^ K Jose Rodriguez; | 

from: H^^^^H R subject: Update: Director Mueller - DCI Tenet Conversation on KSM; date: June 4, 2003, 

at 05:47:32 PM. Note for: James L. Pavitt; from: cc: Jose Rodriguez, 

subject: Director Mueller Plans to Call DCI on KSM Issue; date: May 21, 2003, at 08:40:22 PM. In 

addition to the FBI, senior CIA officers, including CTC's representatives to the FBI, complained about the 

limitations on the dissemination of intelligence derived from CIA interrogations and the impact those limitations had 

on counterterrorism analysis. The CTC's representative to the FBI described this to the OIG as a "serious concern." 

He stated that the compartmentation of interrogation information resulted in 

delays in dissemination that could result in information being "missed." He also stated that the CIA's 

compartmentation of information prevented him from providing to the FBI "some insight into the value/credibility 

of intelligence reports." (See interview of HHHHH > by Office of the Inspector General, 

August 18, 2003.) Among the other CIA officers expressing these concerns were the deputy chief of CTC's AlQa'ida Department, who told the OIG that limited access to operational traffic "has had an impact on [analysts'] full 

knowledge of activities, and thus their analysis." (See Memorandum for the Record; subject: 

Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Center Al-Qa'ida Department; July 28,2003.) The Director of 

Analysis at CTC described analysts' limited access to information as a "continuing problem." (See August 18, 

2003, Memorandum for the Record, meeting with Counterterrorism Center, Director of Analysis, Office of the 

Inspector General.) The CIA's Deputy Director of Intelligence told the OIG that limitations on the dissemination of 

operational information prevented the "full cadre of analysts" from reviewing the intelligence and that, as a result, 

"we're losing analytic ability to look at [foreign intelligence] in a timely manner." See interview of 

• • , by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, September 12,2003. 

539

 ALEC ^••C072002 Z MAY 03) 

540

 DIRECTOR^ — (121550Z JUN 03) 

541

 (301710Z APR 03); 11448 (301141Z APR 03) 

542

 ALEcHHH (022012Z MAY 03). See information in this summary and Volume II on the "Karachi Plot" for 

additional information. 

543 See detainee reviews for Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash in Volume III for additional information on 

the reporting the detainees provided. 

11 ii 1111 1 B^M^BB B I ii I II i 

Page 94 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

94 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

else."544 On April 19, 2003, KSM was questioned for the first time about summer 2002 

reporting from Masran bin Arshad, who was in the custody of a foreign government, regarding 

the "Second Wave" plot. Informed that bin Arshad had been detained, KSM stated, "I have 

forgotten about him, he is not in my mind at all."545 In response, ALEC Station noted that it 

"remain[e]d concerned that KSM's progression towards full debriefing status is not yet apparent 

where it counts most, in relation to threats to US interests, especially inside CONUS."546 In June 

2003, almost three months after the CIA had stopped using its enhanced interrogation techniques 

against KSM, senior ALEC Station and RDG officers met at least twice to discuss concerns 

about KSM's lack of cooperation.547 As an ALEC Station cable noted at the time, "KSM's 

pattern of behavior over the past three months, trying to control his environment, lying and then 

admitting things only when pressed that others have been caught and have likely admitted the 

plot, is a cause for concern."548 In an email, one CIA officer noted that "what KSM's doing is 

fairly typical of other detainees... KSM, Khallad [bin Attash], and others are doing what makes 

sense in their situation - pretend cooperation."549 

(TSyVl^^^^^^H^^ ) the fall of 2003, after KSM's explanations about how to decrypt 

phone numbers related to British operative Issa al-Britani (KSM did not identify the operative as 

"Issa al-Hindi," or by his true name, Dhiren Barot) yielded no results, and after KSM 

misidentified another individual, known not to be Issa, as Issa, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station 

m m stated in an email that KSM was "obstructing our ability to acquire good 

information," noting that KSM "misidentifie[s] photos when he knows we are fishing" and 

"misleads us on telephone numbers."550 Later, after KSM's transfer to DETENTION SITE 

BLACK, ALEC Station wrote that KSM "may never be fully forthcoming and honest" on the 

topic of UBL's whereabouts.551 Despite repeated challenges, KSM maintained that he lacked 

information on UBL's location.552 

1, [REDACTED], 

Memorandum for: ^^HH^H R from: subject: 

Action detainee branch; date: June 12, 2003 (emphasis in the original). 

545

 1319 (191445Z APR 03), disseminated as | 

546

 ALEC^H^222153ZAP R 03) ^^^^^ ^ 

547Email ftomT^^^^^^^^^^JoHHHI^Hi' cc:I 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], | 

[REDACTED], 

I, [REDACTED]; subject: Khallad & KSM Detainee Case Discussion; date: June 18, 2003, at 10:09 AM; 

ALEC ^•|(302258 Z JUN 03). 

548

 ALEC^BB(302258ZJU N 03) 

549

 Email fromT^^H^^B ; to: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], | 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: KSM's passive restraint - please let me know if you 

have comments for a memo to the DCI; date: June 24,2003, at 1:27:06 PM. 

550

 Email from: to: 

^HH^^H^^^F^^^^HH^ H [ REDACTED ] ~ c c ~^H^^H' ' subject: KSM and Kliallad Issues; 

date: October 16, 2003, at 5:25:13 PM. 

551

 ALECMM(111932 Z NOV 03) 

552

 10400 (161754Z NOV 03). KSM, who was with Ayman al-Zawahiri the day before his March 1, 

2003, capture, first informed the CIA of this fact more than a month later, on April 3, 2003. See H^ H 11139 

(051956Z APR 03). 

11 II 1111 1 I II I II 

Page 95 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

95 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ i//NOFORN 

(m^BHH^ )

 KS M wa s

 transferred to DETENTION SITE

 o n

 I 

| 2005,553 to DETENTION SITE BROWN on March 2006,554 and to U.S. military detention 

at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, on September 5, 2006.555 The CIA disseminated 831 intelligence 

reports from the interrogations of KSM over a period of 3.5 years. While KSM provided more 

intelligence reporting than any other CIA detainee (nearly 15 percent of all CIA detainee 

intelligence reporting), CIA records indicate that KSM also received the most intelligence 

requirements and attention from CIA interrogators, debriefers, analysts, and senior CIA 

leadership. Further, as noted, a significant amount of the disseminated intelligence reporting 

from KSM that the CIA identified as important threat reporting was later identified as 

fabricated.556 

H. The Growth of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program 

I. Fifty-Three CIA Detainees Enter the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003 

While the CIA held detainees from 2002 to 2008, early 2003 was 

the most active period of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Of the 119 detainees 

identified by the Committee as held by the CIA, 53 were brought into custody in 2003, and of the 

39 detainees the Committee has found to have been subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, 17 were subjected to such techniques between January 2003 and 

August 2003. The CIA's enhanced interrogations during that time were primarily used at 

DETENTION SITE COBALT and DETENTION SITE BLUE.557 Other interrogations using the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques took place at a CIA in Country at which 

at least one CIA detainee was submerged in a bathtub filled with ice water.558 

(TSZ/jl^^^^H^m^^NF) In 2003, CIA interrogators sought and received approval to use the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against at least five detainees prior to their arrival at a 

CIA detention facility.559 In two of those cases, CIA Headquarters approved the use of the CIA's 

2218 |; HEADQUARTERS 

12214 (050539Z SEP 06) 

556 See KSM detainee review in Volume IIL 

557

 For more information, see detainee reviews and reports in Volume III for Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Muhammad Umar 

'Abd al-Rahman aka Asadallah, Abu Khalid, Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi, Abu Yasir 

al-Jaza'iri, Suleiman Abdullah, Abu Hazim, Al-Shara'iya aka Abd al-Karim, Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad bin Attash, 

Laid Ben Dohman Saidi aka Abu Hudhaifa, Majid Khan, Mohd Farik bin Amin aka Abu Zubair, Samr Hilmi Abdul 

Latif al-Barq, Bashir bin Lap aka Lillie, and Riduan bin Isomuddin aka Hambali. 

558

 For example, Abu Hudhaifa was subjected to this technique at the safehouse. (See email from: [REDACTED]; 

to: [REDACTEDj^ubiect^Iemo; date^arcin5^004.) The incident was reported to the CIA inspector general. 

See email from: ^^fl^^^fl ; to: IHHI^^I' c c : [REDACTED], HH^HH -

subject^u^elcon^t^arch 17, 2004, at 11:24 AM. See also claims related to the treatment of 

Majid Khan. See Briet"

ing f° r

 the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 

Implementation of Central Intelligence Agency Secret Detention and Interrogation Program, March 14, 2008. 

559

 DIRECTOR (012214Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR (040049Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR • • 

(252003Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR (162224Z MAY 03); HEADQUARTERS • • (102352Z SEP 03) 

11 ii 11 ii 1 1 B^^^^^BHB^j^jorofi N 

Page 96 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

96 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ i//NOFORN 

enhanced interrogation techniques before they were requested by CIA personnel at the detention 

sites. 

560 

2. The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country | and DETENTION SITE 

VIOLET in Country | 

) The CIA entered into an agreement with the [ 

in Country | to host a CIA detention facility In 

CIA Headquarters invited the CIA Station in Country | to identify ways to support the | 

m in Country | to "demonstrate to HHHf l

 anc* the highest levels of the [Country | 

government that we deeply appreciate their cooperation and support" for the detention 

rogram.562 The Station responded with an $ | million "wish list" H^I^B^H^ H 

;

563

 CIA Headquarters provided the Station with $ | million more than was 

requested for the purposes of the subsidy.564 CIA detainees were transferred to 

DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country | in the fall of 2003.565 

In August 2003, the U.S. ambassador in Country | sought to 

contact State Department officials to ensure that the State Department was aware of the CIA 

detention facility and its "potential impact on our policy vis-a-vis the [Country | ] 

government."566 The U.S. ambassador was told by the CIA Station that this was not possible, 

and that no one at the State Department, including the secretary of state, was informed about the 

CIA detention facility in Country Describing the CIA's position as "unacceptable," the 

ambassador then requested a signed document from "at least the President's National Security 

Advisor" describing the authorities for the program, including a statement that the CIA's 

interrogation techniques met "legal and human rights standards," and an explicit order to him not 

to discuss the program with the secretary of state.567 CIA Headquarters then sought the 

intervention of Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who called the U.S. ambassador. 

Deputy Secretary Armitage told the CIA to keep him and the secretary of state informed so that 

they would not be caught unaware when an ambassador raised concerns.568 

(ISfHIHM 1) Nearly a year later, in May 2004, revelations about U.S. detainee 

abuses at the U.S. military prison in Abu Ghraib, Iraq, prompted the same U.S. ambassador in 

Country | to seek information on CIA detention standards and interrogation methods.569 In the 

fall of 2004, when U.S. ambassador to Country | sought documents authorizing the 

program, the CIA again sought the intervention of Deputy Secretary Armitage, who once again 

500

 DIRECTOR • • (012214Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR 

5fil

 [REDACTED] 60040 

562

 HEADQUARTERS 

563

 [REDACTED] 5759 

564

 HEADQUARTERS 

565

 According to a cable from CIA Headquarters, 

^•,2003 . HEADQUARTERS 

566

 [REDACTED] 

567

 [REDACTED] 

568

 Email from: to: 

Detention Facility; date: AugustH, 2003. 

5fi9

 [REDACTED] 6762 (•••MA Y 04 

TOP SECRET/. 

(040049Z MAR 03) 

detainees arrived in Country | 

; subject: Re: DDCI-Armitage call on [Country | ] 

//NOFORN 

Page 97 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

97 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET// 1//NOFORN 

made "strong remarks" to the CIA about how he and the secretary of state were "cut out of the 

NSC [National Security Council] clearance/coordination process" with regard to the CIA 

program. According to CIA records, Armitage also questioned the efficacy of the program and 

the value of the intelligence derived from the program.570 While it is unclear how the f 

ambassador's concerns were resolved, he later joined the chief of Station in making a 

presentation to Country |' s on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The 

presentation talking points did not describe the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, but 

represented that "[w]ithout the full range of these interrogation measures, we would not have 

succeeded in overcoming the resistance of [Khalid Shaykh Muhammad] and other equally 

resistant HVDs." The talking points included many of the same inaccurate representations571 

made to U.S. policymakers and others, attributing to CIA detainees critical information on the 

"Karachi Plot," the "Heathrow Plot," the "Second Wave Plot," and the "Guraba Cell"; as well as 

intelligence related to Issa al-Hindi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, Hambali, Jose Padilla, Binyam 

Mohammed, Sajid Badat, and Jaffar al-Tayyar. The presentation also noted that the president of 

the United States had directed that he not be informed of the locations of the CIA detention 

facilities to ensure he would not accidentally disclose the information.572 

W^i^^^^^^^^^w/NFMr t a separate country, Country the CIA obtained the approval of 

the ^ | and the political leadership to establish a detention facility before 

informing the U.S. ambassador.573 As the CIA chief of Station stated in his request to CIA 

Headquarters to brief the ambassador, Country |' s ^^^^^^B^^^^^in d the I 

irobably would ask the ambassador about the CIA detention facility.574 Afterl 

(delayed briefing the for 

| months, to the consternation of the CIA Station, which wanted political approval prior to the 

amvaUrfCI^letainee^^heJ^^^^^^^^^^HI^^ I Country | official outside of 

the mt^^^m^^^mma m

 aware of the described as 

"shocked," but nonetheless approved.576 

By mid-2003 the CIA had concluded that its completed, but still 

unused "holding cell" in Country | was insufficient, given the growing number of CIA detainees 

in the program and the CIA's interest in interrogating multiple detainees at the same detention 

site. The CIA thus sought to build a new, expanded detention facility in the country.577 The CIA 

570

 Lotus Notes message from Chief of Station to D/CTC, COPS; copied in: email from: 

|; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], | 

|; subject: ADCI Talking Points for Call to DepSec Armitage; date: at 7:40:43 PM. 

The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "with regard to the Study's claims that the State Department was 'cut out' 

of information relating to the program, the record shows that the Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of State... 

were aware of the sites at the time they were operational." As detailed throughout the Committee Study, CIA 

records indicate the secretary of state was not informed of the CIA detention site locations. During meetings with 

the CIA in the summer of 2013, the Committee requested, but was not provided, documentary evidence to support 

the assertion in the CIA's June 2013 Response. 

571 See relevant sections of this summary and Volume II for additional details. 

572

 HEADQUARTERS •BjElDACTED ] 

573

 [REDACTED] 641051 

514

 [REDACTED] 30296 [ 

575 See Volume I for additional details. 

576

 [REDACTED] 4076 [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] 32266 [REDACTED] 

577

 HEADQUARTERS 

top-SEGS^IHHHII^^HHH^^O ^ 

Page 98 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

98 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET// 1//NOFORN 

also offered $ | million to the ^H^H^ I to "show appreciation" for the | 

the program.378 According to a CIA cable, however, the | 

support for 

|."579 While the plan to construct the 

expanded facility was approved by the of Countr 

| developed complex mechanisms to | 

| in order to provide the $ | million 

| in Country B complicated the arrangements. 

| when the Country B requested an update on planning for the CIA 

detention site, he wastoldj^—-inaccurately—tha t the planninghadbeen 

discontinued.581 In ^^B^^^Kwhe n the facility received its first CIA detainees, 

informed the ClA^^B^^^B l that the HHfl^^ l of Country | "probably has an 

incomplete notion [regarding the facility's] actual function, i.e., he probably believes that it is 

some of center, 

"582 

3. At Least 17 CIA Detainees Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 

Without CIA Headquarters Authorization 

^^^^B/ZNF ) CIA cables from the spring of 2003 and afterwards describe 

multiple examples of interrogation practices at CIA detention sites that were inconsistent with 

the CIA's detention and interrogation guidelines. CIA officers at DETENTION SITE 

COBALT—led principally by Chief of Interrogations HHHI—als o described a number 

of interrogation activities in cables that were not approved by CIA Headquarters. CIA 

Headquarters failed to respond, inquire, or investigate: 

• Cables revealing that the CIA's chief of interrogations used water dousing against 

detainees, including with cold water and/or ice water baths, as an interrogation technique 

without prior approval from CIA Headquarters;583 

578

 HEADQUARTERS | 

579

 [REDACTED] 4088 | 

580 See Volume I for additional details. 

581

 [REDACTED] 5293 

582

 [REDACTED] 5417 

details on detainees in Count: 

583

 39042 MAY 03 

[39582 (041743Z JUN 03) 

_ J 38597 (201225Z MAY 03); 

Water dousing was categorized as a "standard" interrogation technique in June 2003. 

III ! 'il l III 

Page 99 of 499 

See Volume 111 for additional 

38596 (201220Z MAY 03); 

38557 (191641Z MAY 03); 

' 39101 •• • MAY 03). 

UNCLASSIFIED 

99 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

• Cables and records indicating that CIA detainees who were undergoing or had undergone 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were subjected to rectal rehydration, 

without evidence of medical necessity, and that others were threatened with it;584 

• Cables noting that groups of four or more interrogators, who required practical 

experience to acquire their CIA interrogation "certification," were allowed to apply the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques as a group against a single detainee;585 and 

384 See 34491 (051400Z MAR 03). Interview 

[REDACTED] of the Office of the Inspector General, March 27, 

[REDACTED] and 

^ 34575 

email from: to: [REDACTED]; cc: subject: Re: Update; date: 

at4:51:32PMT^^|ij238 5 (222045ZJUL03)?^^^Hmi5]H^^HBri . In 

addition to the rectal rehydration or feeding of al-Nashiri, KSM and Majid Khan, described elsewhere, there is at 

leasUm^-ecord of Abt^ubaydahreceiving "rectal fluid resuscitation" for "partially refusing liquids." (See 

•1H1007 0 M^ H Marwan al-Jabbur was subjected to what was originally referred to in a 

cabl^^^enema, " but was later acknowledged to be rectal rehydration. (See 

email from: to: ^•^•^^^B[REDACTED] , [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: TASKING - March 30, 2007; DTS #2007-1502.) 

Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Khallad bin Attash and Adnan al-Libi were threatened with rectal rehydration. (See | 

Hi^ t 2385 (222045Z JUL 03); from: •^•jHH H to: | 

HI^ E subject: Medical Evaluation/Update H(047) ; date: March | , 2004.) CIA medical officers discussed 

rectal rehydration as a means of behavior control. As one officer wrote, "[w]hile IV infusion is safe and effective, 

we were impressed_with the ancillary effectiveness of rectal infusion on ending the water refusal in a similar case." 

(See fromJII^HI^HHHIl ; to subject: Re: (048); 

date: February 2004.) The same officer provided a description of the procedure, writing that "[regarding the 

rectal tube, if you place it and open up the IV tubing, the flow will self regulate, sloshing up the large intestines." 

Referencing the experience of the medical officer who subjected KSM to rectal rehydration, the officer wrote that, 

"[w]hat I infer is that you get a tube up as far as you can, then open the IV wide. No need to squeeze the bag - let 

the work." (See email from

 t 0

 H i 

HI^H , and [REDACTED], February 27,2004, Subject: Re^^H(048)3Th e same 

email exchange included a description of a previous application of the technique, in which "we used the largest Ewal 

[sicUub^we had." (See email from: [REDACTED]; to •^^•^^••^[REDACTED] , 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re-^^HI^^HHHI i (048); date: Febmary 

2004, at 11:42:16 PM.) As described in the context of the rectal feeding of al-Nashiri, Ensure was infused into alNashiri "in a forward-facing position (Trendlenberg) with head lower than torso." (See ^H|^|l20 3 (231709Z 

MAY 04).) Majid Khan's "lunch tray," consisting of hummus, pasta with sauce, nuts, and raisins was "pureed" and 

rectally infused. (See ^^^••(^^••324 0 (231839Z SEP 04).) The CIA's June 2013 Response does 

not address the use of rectal feeding with CIA detainees, but defends the use of rectal rehydration as a "well 

acknowledged medical technique." CIA leadership, including General Counsel Scott Muller and DDO James Pavitt, 

was also alerted to allegations that rectal exams were conducted with "excessive force" on two detainees at 

DETENTION SITE COBALT. CIA attorney was asked to follow up, although CIA records do not 

indicate any resolution of the inquiry. CIA records indicate that one of the detainees, Mustafa al-Hawsawi, was later 

diagnosed with chronic hemorrhoids, an anal fissure, and symptomatic rectal prolapse. See email from: 

[REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: ACTIONS 

from the GC Update this Morning, dateT^^^^^^^^ K at 12:15 PM; email from: to: 

[REDACTED]; cc: ^^^^••^REDACTED] , [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: ACTIONS from the 

GC Update this Morning^late^^H||Hi^^H <

 a t

 1:23:31 PM; email from: to: 

[REDACTED]; cc: ••^^•jREDACTED] ; subject: Re: ACTIONS from the GC Update this Moming 

REQUEST FOR STATUS UPDATE; date: December!, 2003, at 10:47:32 AM; • • 32231 

HEADQUARTERS | 

38130 (121722Z MAY 03); 38584 

' 38127 (121714Z MAY 38161 

7NOFORN 

Page 100 of 499 

585 See, for example, 

(201133Z MAY 03); 

TOP SECRET//^ 

UNCLASSIFIED 

100 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ 1//NOFQRN 

Cables revealing that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were used at CIA 

| that were not designated as CIA detention sites.586 

In the first half of 2003, the CIA interrogated four detainees with 

medical complications in their lower extremities: two detainees had a broken foot, one detainee 

had a sprained ankle, and one detainee had a prosthetic leg

 587

 CIA interrogators shackled each 

of these detainees in the standing position for sleep deprivation for extended periods of time until 

medical personnel assessed that they could not maintain the position. The two detainees that 

each had a broken foot were also subjected to walling, stress positions, and cramped 

confinement, despite the note in their interrogation plans that these specific enhanced 

interrogation techniques were not requested because of the medical condition of the detainees.588 

CIA Headquarters did not react to the site's use of these CIA enhanced interrogation techniques 

despite the lack of approval. 

Over the course of the CIA program, at least 39 detainees were 

subjected to one or more of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.589 CIA records 

indicate that there were at least 17 CIA detainees who were subjected to one or more CIA 

enhanced interrogation techniques without CIA Headquarters approval. This count includes 

detainees who were approved for the use of some techniques, but were subjected to unapproved 

techniques, as well as detainees for whom interrogators had no approvals to use any of the 

techniques. This count also takes into account distinctions between techniques categorized as 

"enhanced" or "standard" by the CIA at the time they were applied.590 The 17 detainees who 

(131326Z MAY 03); | 

(121709Z MAY 03). 

586 See, for example, I 

| 38595 (201216Z MAY 03); 38126 

35341 Bi^^^^^^^^ B 39098 

|39042(^^MMAY03) ; email from: [REDACTED]; to: 

[REDACTED]; subject: M I I ^^MB^ B 391011 

MAY 03);(051225ZMA Y 03);(271719 Z 

MAY 03); ^3909 9 (281101Z MAY 03). 

587

 For more details, see detainee reviews for Muhammad Umar 'Abd al-Rahman aka Asadallah; Abu Hazim al-Libi; 

Al-Shara'iya aka Abd al-Karim; and Khallad bin Attash. 

388

 The two detainees were Abu Hazim al-Libi and Al-Shara'iya aka Abd al-Karim. 

589

 This is a conservative estimate. CIA records suggest that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques may have 

also been used against five additional detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT in 2002, which would bring the 

number of CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to 44. Those additional 

detainees were [DETAINEE R], who was approved for the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, but whose records do not refer to the use of the techniques (ALEC ^B H (H H 

B))l Ayub Murshid Ali Salih and Ha'il Aziz Ahmad Al-Maythali, whose records refer t^Hacl^)l^jlccpJ)uUioUhe 

application of sleep deprivation j^B^^HI^^^ H

 2813 2

 (101143Z OCT 02); 

27964 (071949Z OCT 02)); Bashir Nasir Ali al Marwalah, who later told debriefers that, when he was first 

captured, he "had to stand up for five days straight and answer questions" and "was also forced to strip naked and 

stand in front of a female interrogator" (fllHBHIH H

 1435 3

 ( 23152l z AP R 03)); and Sa'id Salih Sa'id, 

who later told debriefers that he was "mistreated and beaten by Americans while blind-folded and stripped down to 

his underwear in HI H " Se e ^H^^I^H^ H 13386 (090154Z JAN 03)). See also detainee reviews in 

Volume III for more information. 

590

 The CIA's June 2013 Response objects to the Committee's count, arguing that "[n]o more than seven detainees 

received enhanced techniques prior to written Headquarters approval." The CIA's June 2013 Response then asserts 

diat "the Study miscounts because it confuses the use of standard techniques that did not require prior approval at the 

TOP 

Page 101 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

101 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ k/NOFORN 

were subjected to techniques without the approval of CIA Headquarters were: Rafiq Bashir alHami,591

 Tawfiq Nasir Awad al-Bihandi,592 Hikmat Nafi Shaukat,593 Lufti al-Arabi al-Gharisi,S94 

Muhammad Ahmad Ghulam Rabbani aka Abu Badr,595 Gul Rahman,596 Abd al-Rahim altime they were administered with enhanced techniques that did." This statement in the CIA's June 2013 Response is 

inaccurate. First, prior to January 2003, the CIA had not yet designated any technique as a "standard" technique. 

Because sleep deprivation was included in the August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum approving the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah, the Committee included, among the 17, CIA detainees 

subjected to sleep deprivation without CIA Headquarters authorization prior to January 2003. In January 2003, 

sleep deprivation under a specific time limit was categorized as a "standard" CIA interrogation technique. Second, 

the January 2003 guidelines state that advance CIA Headquarters approval was required for "standard" techniques 

"whenever feasible." For this reason, the Committee did not include cases where CIA interrogators failed to obtain 

authorization in advance, but did acquire approval within several days of initiating the use of the "standard" 

techniques. Finally, water dousing was not characterized as a "standard" technique until June 2003. (See 

DIRECTORHB1(2115I8ZJIM03); DIRECTOR•^|(302126ZJAN03);DIRECTOR• • (311702Z 

JAN 03); 39582 (041743Z JUN 03).) In numerous cases prior to June 2003, water 

dousing was explicitly described in CIA cables as an "enhanced" interrogation technique. (See, for example, 

DIRECTOR (101700Z FEB 03).) The Committee thus included, among the 17, CIA detainees subjected to 

water dousing prior to June 2003 without CIA Headquarters authorization. The distinction between standard and 

enhanced interrogation techniques, which began in January 2003, was eliminated by CIA leadership in 2005. See 

Volume I and Volume III for additional details. 

591

 Rafiq Bashir al-Hami was subjected to 72 hours of sleep deprivation between his arrival at DETENTION SITE 

COBALT and his October 2002, interrogation. See 28297 HHHUH^H 

592

 Tawfiq Nasir Awad al-Bihani was subjected to 72 hours of sleep deprivation between his arrival at DETENTION 

SITE COBALT and his October 2002, interrogation. See ^^^KKI^^Ut/M 28462 ^ 

393

 CIA cables from October 2002 noted that Shaukat was "tired from his regimen of limited sleep deprivation." See 

29381 

^^uft^^rab^i^harisi underwent at least two 48-hour sessions of sleep deprivation in October 2002. See 

HHHHHHH H 29036 and 29352 ^HHiHHi ' 

595

 Abu Badr was subjecte^^orce^tanding^ttention grasps, and cold temperatures without blankets in 

November See ^^^BH H 29963 

596

 CIA interrogators used sleep deprivation, facial slap, use of cold (including cold cells and cold showers), "hard 

takedowns," dietary manipulation, nudity, and light deprivation on Gul Rahman. See \ 

of ^^HI^H l [CIA OFFICER December 

2002; ^^H^^^^^Hlntervie^Oiammon d DUNBAR, January 9, 2003; Memorandum for Deputy Director 

of OperationirfroiTi^^^^^^^^^B, January 28, 2003, Subiect^eatMnvestigation - Gul RAHMAN; CIA 

Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee (2003-7402-IG), April 27, 2005; and 

CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention And Interrogation Activities (September 2001 -

October 2003), May 7, 2004. 

I III I IIII I ^Ol-Oli N 

Page 102 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

102 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ k/NOFORN 

Nashiri,597 Ramzi bin al-Shibh,598 Asadallah,599 Mustafa al-Hawsawi,600 Abu Khalid,601 Laid bin 

Duhman aka Abu Hudliaifa,602 Abd al-Karim,603 Abu Hazim,604 Sayyid Ibrahim,605 Abu Yasir 

al-Jaza'iri,606 and Suleiman Abdullah.607 In every case except al-Nashiri, the unauthorized 

597

 Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was subjected to unapproved nudity and approximately two-and-a-half days of sleep 

deprivation in December 2002, with his arms shackled over his head for as long as 16 hours. See email from: 

[DETENTION SITE BLUE] ••••••••• ; to: subject: EYES ONLY -

I^^H l ONLY - MEMO FOR ADDO/DDO; date: January 22, 2003. ^^^ ^ 

598

 The facial hold was used against Ramzi bin al-Shibh multiple times without approval. See HH^fl l 0415 

• • 10429 (101215Z FEB 03); ^H H 10S73 (241143Z FEB 10582 

(242026Z FEB 03);(252002 Z FEB 03); 10602 (262020Z FEB 03);

 1063 3 

(011537Z MAR 03);and^H | 10704 (071239Z MAR 03). 

599

 Interrogators used water dousing, nudity, and cramped confinement on Asadallah without having sought or 

received authorization from CIA Headquarters. Bathing detainees did not require authorization by CIA 

Headquarters; however, as described in CIA cables, the application of "bathing" in the case of Asadallah was done 

punitively and was used as an interrogation technique. Nudity was also used in conjunction with water 

dousing/bathing and later as an interrogation technique^vitho^ from CIA Headquarters. See \ 

34241 and ^HM^^I^ H

 3431 0 

600

 Mustafa al-Hawsawi was subjected to water dousing without approval from CIA Headquarters. See \ 

Wm^ m (08 I207Z APR 03). 

601

 Interrogators used sleep deprivation against Abu Khalid prior to seeking authorization from CIA Headquarters, 

and then failed to obtain such aulimn iliini i i ^^BUBBBjHB^I I 35193 and 

^li m 35341 H^HIHliU' ^ Abu Khalid had been in CIA custody for 17 days prior to 

the use of the technique. Advance authorization from CIA Headquarters was therefore "feasible," and thus required 

under the guidelines. 

602

 Abu Hudliaifa was subjected to baths in which ice water was used, standing sleep deprivation for 66 hours that 

was discontinued due to a swollen leg attributedtoprolo:^^ (Se^mail 

|; to: [REDACTED], j^flHHlH K

 an d

 I H 

our telecom; date: March M- 2004; CIA Office of Inspector General Report; 2005-8085-IG; 

39098 39042 MAY and 

139101 MAY 03).). No request or approval for the use of standard or 

enhanced interrogation techniques could be located in CIA records. 

603

 Abd al-Karim, who suffered from a foot injury incurred during his capture, was subjected to cramped 

confinement, stress positions, and walling despite CIA HeadquartersJiavin^ioUipproved their use. See 

DIRECTOR • • HMA Y 03); and DIRECTOR HHHH I 

elM Abu Hazim, who also had a foot injury incurred during his capture, was subjected to walling, despite CIA 

Headquarters having not approved its use. (See 36908 and 

H^HHII^^flH^ M 37410 (291828Z APR 03).) Nudity, dietary manipulation, and facial grasp were used on 

Abu Hazim at least 13 days prior to receiving approval. 37411 (291829Z APR 03); 

^^•^^^HHBh^l O (291828Z APR 03); | 

I III I I 11 II ^MMMI l I i 03). 

605

 CIA cables indicate that Sayyid Ibrahim was subjected to sleep deprivation from January 27, 2004, to January 30, 

2004, which exceeded the 48 hours approved by CIA Headquarters. See HEADQUARTERS (272155Z 

JAN 04); ^^••l303j^|||ijAN04)^^^^|Mil29 8 •^•JA N 04); ••••130 3 

jANT)4)r||HHn^lHH w 

606

 During March 2003 interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT, Abu Yasir al-Jaza'iri was "bathed," a term 

used to describe water dousing, which was considered at the time to be an enhanced interrogation technique. (See 

35558 MAR 03).) Water dousing had not been approved, and the subsequent 

request, by DETENTION SITE BLUE, to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on al-Jaza'iri, did not 

include water dousing. See 10990 ^I^I^^^ B 

607

 Interrogators requested approvals to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Suleiman Abdullah, 

including water dousing. CIA Headquarters then approved other techniques, but not water dousing. (See 

36559^^•H H DmECTORHH^HHHBlSuleima n 

Abdullah was nonetheless subjected to water dousing. See 371171 mi 11 III i 1

i mi him i 

Page 103 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

103 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

interrogation techniques were detailed in CIA cables, but CIA Headquarters did not respond or 

take action against the CIA personnel applying the unauthorized interrogation techniques.608 

GFS/^^H^I^B^NF ) This list does not include examples in which CIA interrogators 

were authorized to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, but then implemented the 

techniques in a manner that diverged from the authorization. Examples include Abu Zubair609 

and, as detailed, KSM, whose interrogators developed methods of applying the waterboard in a 

manner that differed from how the technique had previously been used and how it had been 

described to the Department of Justice. This count also excludes additional allegations of the 

unauthorized use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.610 

Over the course of the CTA's Detention and Interrogation Program, 

numerous detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques by untrained 

interrogators. As noted, the CIA did not conduct its first training course until November 2002, 

by which time at least nine detainees had already been subjected to the techniques.611 The DCI's 

January 28, 2003, guidelines, which stated that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 

608

 The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the CIA "conducted at least 29 investigations of RDJ-related conduct, 

plus two wide-ranging reviews of the program... one involved the death of an Afghan national who was beaten by a 

contractor. The individual involved was prosecuted by the Department of Justice and convicted of a felony charge. 

Another case involved a contractor who slapped, kicked, and struck detainees while they were in military custody. 

... [T]he contractor was terminated from the CIA, had his security clearances revoked, and was placed on a 

contractor watch list." However, the two specific examples provided in the CIA's June 2013 Response refer to 

detainees who were never part of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. On November 6, 2013, the CIA 

provided a list of "IG Investigations Concerning Detention, Interrogations, and Renditions." The list of 29 included 

14 investigations that were directly related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Four additional 

investigations were related to detainees who claimed they had been subjected to abuse in transit from CIA custody 

to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay. The remaining 11 investigations were unrelated to die CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program. See DTS #2013-3250. 

609

 CIA chief of interrogations, placed a broomstick behind the knees of Zubair when Zubair was in a 

stress position on his knees on the floor. Although stress positions had been approved for Zubair, the use of the 

broomstick was not approved. See April 7,2005, Briefing for Blue Ribbon Panel, CIA Rendition, Detention, and 

Interrogation Programs, at 22. 

610

 Majid KhajJia^laimecUhaUr^lav 2003, he was subjected to immersion in a tub that was filled with ice and 

water. (See Briefing for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Implementation 

of Central Intelligence Agency Secret Detention and Interrogation Program, dated March 14, 2008.) While CIA 

cables do not confirm bathing or water dousing, Chief of Interrogations subjected Abu Hudhaifa to 

an (unauthorized) "icy water" bath at the same where Majid Khan was held. (See email from: | 

to: [REDACTGDMREDACTED], 

our telecon; date: email from: [REDACTED] to: | 

subject: Memo; datel^^^m^- ) Ayub Murshid Ali Salih and Ha'il Aziz Ahmad al-Maythali were described 

a^ioUiavin^lept^lthough it is unclear from CIA records whether CIA interrogators kept them awake. (See 

128132 (101143Z OCT 02) and ^12796 4 (071949Z OCT 02).) 

Bashir Nasri Ali al-Marwalah told debriefers at Guantanamo Bay that he was "tortured" at DETENTION SITE 

COBALT with five days of continual standing and nudity. (See ^HBH^BHI^ I 14353 (231521Z APR 

03).) Sa'id Salih Sa'id likewise informed debriefers at Guantanamo that he was "beaten" while blind-folded in CIA 

custody. (See I^HI^HHH I 13386 (090154Z JAN 03).) Sixteen other detainees were held at 

DETENTION SITE COBALT between September and December 2002, a period during which exposure to the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques such as sleep deprivation and nudity cannot be determined based on the 

lack of details in CIA cables and related documents. 

611

 December 4, 2002, Training Report, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training 

Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 (pilot running). 

m i 11 III i ^MMMBMBMB^QFon N 

Page 104 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

104 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

"may be employed only by approved interrogators for use with specific detainees," raised the 

additional issue of approved techniques used by unapproved interrogators.612 The January 28, 

2003, DCI guidelines did not explicitly require CIA Headquarters to approve who could use the 

CIA's "standard" interrogation techniques, including techniques that were not previously 

considered "standard" and that would later be reclassified as "enhanced" interrogation 

techniques. Rather, the DCI guidelines required only that "all personnel directly engaged in the 

interrogation" be "appropriately screened," that they review the guidelines, and that they receive 

"appropriate training" in the implementation of the guidelines.613 

4. CIA Headquarters Authorizes Water Dousing Without Department of Justice Approval; 

Application of Technique Reported as Approximating Waterboarding 

CIA Headquarters approved requests to use water dousing, nudity, 

the abdominal slap, and dietary manipulation, despite the fact that the techniques had not been 

reviewed by the Department of Justice

 614

 Interrogators used the water dousing technique in 

various ways. At DETENTION SITE COBALT, detainees were often held down, naked, on a 

tarp on the floor, with the tarp pulled up around them to form a makeshift tub, while cold or 

refrigerated water was poured on them.615 Others were hosed down repeatedly while they were 

shackled naked, in the standing sleep deprivation position. These same detainees were 

subsequently placed in rooms with temperatures ranging from 59 to 80 degrees Fahrenheit.616 

612

 DIRECTOR BB1302126ZJA N 03); DIRECTOR (311702Z JAN 03). For example, on May | , 

2003, CIA intemigator]B|^|B H applied three facial attention grabs, fiv^aciaHnsul^laps, and three 

abdominal slaps to Abd al-Karim, under the supervision of CIA interrogator ^Hj^^^^^BlCI A OFFICER 1], 

(See ^HB H 37821 BiBlH^^H-) B H had not been approved by CIA Headquarters 

to employ the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on al-Karim; approval had only been provided for | 

[CIA OFFICER 1] to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. (See DIRECTOR | B-) On • • CIA interrogatorI^^BBIB' under die supervision of BB^^^I'

 conducted an 

interrogation of Abd al-Karim in which interrogators used the facial attention grab, facial insult slap, and abdominal 

slap against al-Karim. (See Bi^^^^^Bfl^ B 38583 ^^^B^BBfr ) I^^ B

 ha d bee n 

approved by CIA Headquarters to employ the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abd al-Karim. In 

another example, onHB^^HDETENTIO N SITE COBALT requested approval for certified interrogators 

^^^B l and fCIA OFFICER 1] to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against 

Khallad bin Attash, and for three other interrogators, Bi^^^^^^l '

 t 0 

also use the techniques "under the direct supervision of senior certified interrogator [|^|Bl- " (See \ 

38325 Later that day, CIA Headquarters approved the use of CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques against Khallad bin Attash, but the approval cable did not include approval for participation 

I under I H'S supervision. (See DIRECTOR BB l (162224Z MAY 

landuse d the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on bin 

|. including facial grabs, facial insult slap^abdomhw and 

| 38557 (191641Z MAY 03); 3g59 ? 

hy H^ B or 

03).) On May 17 and 18, 2003, 

Attash under the supervision of 

water dousing. See 

(201225Z MAY 03). ___ _ 

613

 DIRECTOR (302126Z JAN 03); DIRECTOR BB l (311702Z JAN 03). The DCI guidelines provided 

no further information, other than to note that the screening should be "from the medical, psychological, and 

security standpoints." 

r

'"1 See, for example, DIRECTOR (101700Z FEB 03). 

615

 In the case of Abu Hudhaifa, and allegedly Majid Khan, interrogators placed the detainee in an actual tub in a 

CIA B^ H when employing water dousing that included ice water. 

616

 CIA cable records often describe die detainees as naked after the water dousing, while other records omit such 

detail. See Volume III for additional information. 

m i 1111 1

 11 1 

Page 105 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

105 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1 //NOFOR N 

Other accounts suggest detainees were water doused while placed on a waterboard.617 Although 

CIA Headquarters approved the use of the "water dousing" interrogation technique on several 

detainees, interrogators used it extensively on a number of detainees without seeking or 

obtaining prior authorization from CIA Headquarters.618 

In interrogation sessions on April 5, 2003, and April 6, 2003, 

senior CIA interrogator and another interrogator used the water dousing 

technique on detainee Mustafa al-Hawsawi at DETENTION SITE COBALT. AI-Hawsawi later 

described the session to a different CIA interrogator, who wrote that alHawsawi might have been waterboarded or subjected to treatment that "could be 

indistinguishable from the waterboard."619 An email from the interrogator stated that: 

"We did not prompt al-Hawsawi - he described the process and the table on 

his own. As you know, I have serious reservations about watering them in a 

prone position because if not done with care, the net effect can approach the 

effect of the water board. If one is held down on his back, on the table or on 

the floor, with water poured in his face I think it goes beyond dousing and the 

effect, to the recipient, could be indistinguishable from the water board. 

I have real problems with putting one of them on the water board for 'dousing.' 

Putting him in a head down attitude and pouring water around his chest and 

face is just too close to the water board, and if it is continued may lead to 

problems for us."620 

(TSZ/^H^^^H^/NF ) Several months later, the incident was referred to the CIA inspector 

general for investigation. A December 6, 2006, inspector general report summarized the findings 

of this investigation, indicating that water was poured on al-Hawsawi while he was lying on the 

floor in a prone position, which, in the opinion of at least one CIA interrogator quoted in the 

report, "can easily approximate waterboarding."621 The OIG could not corroborate whether alHawsawi was strapped to the waterboard when he was interrogated at DETENTION SITE 

COBALT. Both of the interrogators who subjected al-Hawsawi to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques on April 6, 2003, said that al-Hawsawi cried out for God while the 

, using [REDACTED] account; to: | 

, subject: Al-Hawsawi Incident; date: November 21, 2003. 

618

 For additional details, see Volume III 

^EmaiHrom: ^^^HHI^^HH I [REDACTED] account; | 

^HHHI'^^^^^^I : subject: Al-Hawsawi Incident; date: November 21, 2003. 

^"Emai^oni: H^^^^^J^sing[REDACTED ] account; 

and^^l^^^H ; subject: Al-Hawsawi Incident; date: November 21, 2003. Volume III of the 

Committee Study includes a CIA photograph of a wooden waterboard at DETENTION SITE COBALT. As detailed 

in the full Committee Study, there are no records of the CIA using the waterboard interrogation technique at 

COBALT. The waterboard device in the photograph is surrounded by buckets, with a bottle of unknown pink 

solution (filled two thirds of the way to the top) and a watering can resting on the wooden beams of waterboard. In 

meetings between the Committee staff and the CIA in the summer of 2013, the CIA was unable to explain the details 

of the photograph, to include the buckets, solution, and watering can, as well as the waterboard's presence at 

DETENTION SITE COBALT. 

621

 CIA OIG Disposition Memorandum, "Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques" OIG Case 2004-

7604-1G, December 6, 2006. 

m i n III i j^BM^BI^^BU^oroR N 

Page 106 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

106 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ k/NOFORN 

water was being poured on him and one of the interrogators asserted that this was because of the 

cold temperature of the water. Both of the interrogators also stated that al-Hawsawi saw the 

waterboard and that its purpose was made clear to him. The inspector general report also 

indicates that al-Hawsawi's experience reflected "the way water dousing was done at 

[DETENTION SITE COBALT]," and that this method was developed with guidance from CIA 

CTC attorneys and the CIA's Office of Medical Services.622 

(T^S/Z^^^l^m^/N^ ) During the same time that al-Hawsawi claimed he was placed on 

the waterboard in April 2003, a CIA linguist claimed that CIA detainee Abu Hazim had also 

been water doused in a way that approximated waterboarding.623 a linguist in 

Country^HH I from ^fl H 2003, until m 2003, told the OIG that: 

"when water dousing was used on Abu Hazim, a cloth covered Abu Hazim's 

face, and [^HH f [ C I A OFFICER 1]] poured cold water directly on Abu 

Hazim's face to disrupt his breathing. [The linguist] said that when Abu 

Hazim turned blue, Physician's Assistant [^^^^B l removed the cloth so 

that Abu Hazim could breathe."624 

(TS/VHHI^^H^/NF ) This allegation was reported to the CIA inspector general on 

August 18, 2004. The CIA reported this incident as a possible criminal violation on September 

622

 CIA OIG Disposition Memorandum, "Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques" OIG Case 2004-

7604-1G, December 6, 2006. 

623

 An accusation related to an additional detainee was included in a September 6, 2012, Human Rights Watch report 

entitled, "Delivered Into Enemy Hands." The report asserts that documents and interviews of former detainees 

contradict CIA claims that "only three men in US custody had been waterboarded." Specifically, the report states 

diat Mohammed Shoroeiya, aka Abd al-Karim, "provided detailed and credible testimony that he was waterboarded 

on repeated occasions during US interrogations in Afghanistan." According to the report, Mohammed Shoroeiya 

stated that a hood was placed over his head and he was strapped to a "wooden board." The former CIA detainee 

stated that after being strapped to the waterboard, "then they start with the water pouring... They start to pour water 

to the point where you feel like you are suffocating." As detailed in the full Committe^tudy, Mohammed 

Shoroeiya, aka Abd al-Karim, was rendered to CIA custody at DETENTION SITE

 011 A Pr i l

 I - 2003. 

While there are no CIA records of Mohammed Shoroeiya, aka Abd al-Karim, being subjected to the waterboard at 

DETENTION SITE the full nature of the CIA interrogations at DETENTION SITE ^• H remains 

largely unknown. Detainees at DETENTION SITE were subjected to techniques that were not recorded 

in cable traffic, including multiple periods of sleep deprivation, required standing, loud music, sensory deprivation, 

extended isolation, reduced quantity and quality of food, nudity, and "rough treatment." As described^/olume III 

of tire Committee Study includes a CIA photograph of a wooden waterboard at DETENTION SITE As 

detailed in the full Committee Study, there are no records of the CIA using the waterboard interrogation technique at 

DETENTION SITE The waterboard device in the photograph is surrounded by buckets, with a bottle of 

unknown pink solution (filled two thirds of the way to the top) and a watering can resting on the wooden beams of 

waterboard. In meetings between the Committee staff and die CIA in the summer of 2013, the CIA was unable to 

explain the details of the photograph, to include the buckets, solution, and watering can, as well as the waterboard's 

presence at DETENTION SITE In response to the allegations in the September 2012 Human Rights 

Watch report, the CIA stated: "The agency has been on the record that there are three substantiated cases in which 

detainees were subjected to the waterboarding technique under the program." See "Libyan Alleges Waterboarding 

by CIA, Report Says," New York Times, September 6,2012. 

624

 CIA IG Disposition Memo, "Alleged Use of Unauthorized Techniques," dated December 6, 2006. 2004-77717-

16. 

TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN 

Page 107 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

107 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET; WO FO RN 

10, 2004, to the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Eastern District of Virginia.625 The inspector 

general report concluded that there was no corroboration of the linguist's allegation, stating, 

"[t]here is no evidence that a cloth was placed over Abu Hazim's face during water dousing or 

that his breathing was impaired."626 

5. Hambali Fabricates Information While Being Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced 

Interrogation Techniques 

(TS^H^^HIH^F ) 1° the summer of 2003, the CIA captured three Southeast Asian 

operatives: Zubair,627 Lillie,628 and Hambali. (These captures are discussed later in this 

summary in the section entitled, "The Capture of Hambali.")629 

(TS/^^m^l^H^lNF ) In August 2003, Hambali was captured and transferred to CIA 

custody

 630

 Despite assessments that Hambali was cooperative in the interview process without 

"the use of more intrusive standard interrogation procedures much less the enhanced measures," 

CLA interrogators requested and obtained approval to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques on Hambali approximately a month after his transfer to CIA custody.631 In late 2003, 

Hambali recanted most of the significant information he had provided to interrogators during the 

use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, recantations CIA officers assessed to be 

credible.632 According to a CIA cable: 

625

 CIA IG Disposition Memo, "Alleged Use of Unauthorized Techniques," dated December 6, 2006. 2004-77717-

16. 

626

 CIA IG Disposition Memo, "Alleged Use of Unauthorized Techniques," dated December 6, 2006. 2004-77717-

16. 

627

 84854 

87617 87426 (111223Z AUG 03). Lillie was subjected to the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques almost immediately upon his arrival at DETENTION SITE COBALT, on 

August 2003. H^a^strippe^nii^Iothing, " and "placed in a cell in the standing sleep deprivation position, 

in darkness." (See 1242 (151914Z AUG 03).) A day later an interrogation plan for 

Lillie, including the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, was submitted to CIA Headquarters on 

August 2003. (See 1243 (152049Z AUG 03).) CIA Headquarters approved the use 

of the CIA's enhancecUntOTOcationtecliniques on Lillie on the following day, August 2003. (See 

HEADQUARTERS H (IH H AUG 03).) As described, die Committee's count of detainees subjected to 

unauthorized techniques did not include detainees such as Lillie, who were subjected to the CIA's "standard" 

techniques prior to authorization from CIA Headquarters, but for whom authorization from CIA Headquarters was 

acquired shortly thereafter. As noted, the January 2003 guidelines required advance approval of such techniques 

"whenever feasible." 

The cable also noted that CIA contractor Hammond DUNBAR had arrived at the detention site and was 

participating in Hambali's interrogations as an interrogator. The "psychological assessment" portion of the cable 

was attributed to a CIA staff psychologist, however, and not to DUNBAR. 

632

 CIA officers interrogating Hambali in November 2003 wrote about Hambali's "account of how, through 

statements read to him and constant repetition of questions, he was made aware of what type of answers his 

questioners wanted. [Hambali] said he merely gave answers that were similar to what was being asked and what he 

inferred the interrogator or debriefer wanted, and when the pressure subsided or he was told that the information he 

gave was okay, [Hambali] knew that he had provided the answer that was being sought." The cable states, "Base 

assesses [Hainbali]'s admission of previous fabrication to be credible. [HambaliJ's admission came after three 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 108 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

108 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ k/NOFORN 

"he had provided the false information in an attempt to reduce the pressure on 

himself ... and to give an account that was consistent with what [Hambali] 

assessed the questioners wanted to hear."633 

(WmH^^^F ) CIA officers later suggested that the misleading answers and 

resistance to interrogation that CIA interrogators cited in their requests to use the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques against Hambali and an associated CIA detainee, Lillie, may 

not have been resistance to interrogation, but rather the result of issues related to culture and 

their poor English language skills.634 

6. After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, CIA Headquarters 

Questions Detention of Detainee and Recommends Release; Detainee Transferred to U.S. 

Military Custody and Held for An Additional Four Years 

In October 2003, the CIA interrogated Arsala Khan, an Afghan 

national in his mid-fifties who was believed to have assisted Usama bin Laden in his escape 

through the Tora Bora Mountains in late 2001

 635

 After 56 hours of standing sleep deprivation, 

Arsala Khan was described as barely able to enunciate, and being "visibly shaken by his 

hallucinations depicting dogs mauling and killing his sons and family." According to CIA 

cables, Arsala Khan "stated that [the interrogator] was responsible for killing them and feeding 

them to the dogs."636 

Arsala Khan was subsequently allowed to sleep.637 Two days later, 

however, the interrogators returned him to standing sleep deprivation. After subjecting Khan to 

21 additional hours of sleep deprivation, interrogators stopped using the CIA's enhanced 

weeks of daily debriefing sessions with [the case officer] carried out almost entirely in Bahasa Indonesia. [Hambali] 

has consistently warmed to [the case officer's] discussions with him, and has provided to [the case officer] 

additional information that he had avoided in die past... More tellingly, [Hambali] has opened up considerably to 

[the case officer] about his fears and motivations, and has taken to trusting [the case officer] at his word. [Hambali] 

looks to [the case officer] as his sole confidant and the one person who has [Hambali]'s interest in mind...." See 

1142 (301055Z NOV 03). This cable appears to have been retransmitted the following day as HHI^ I 

1144(0108232DEC 03). 

f

'

33

 ^^•1142(301055 2 NOV 03) ^^^ ^ ^^ ^ 

1072 (1106062 OCT 03)j^^^^BH)75(111828 2 OCT 03); 1142 (301055Z NOV 03); 

(081459Z DEC 03); 1604 (191232Z JAN 04). After an Indonesian 

speaker was deployed to debrief Hambali, the debriefer "got the distinct impression [Hambali] was just responding 

'yes' in the typical Indonesian cultural manner when they [sic] do not comprehend a question." The CIA cable dien 

noted that, "|j]ust to clarify, [the Indonesian speaking debriefer] then posed the same question in Indonesian," and 

"[w]ithout pause, [Hambali] replied with a direct contradiction, claiming that on 20 September 2001, he was in 

Karachi, not Qandahar." (See 1075 (111828Z OCT 03).) A January 2004 cable stated that "Lillie is of 

limited value," adding that "[h]is English is very poor, and we do not have a Malay linguist." See \ 

1604 (191232Z JAN 04). See also detainee reviews in Volume 111 for additional information. 

635

 WASHINGTON | 

636

 1006Z OCT 03). The information was also released in | 

I48122MMHB . CIA records indicate that tire CIA's interrogations of Arsala Khan resulted 

in one disseminated intelligence report, derived from information Khan provided the day he experienced the 

hallucinations. See ^MlM^M , via CIA WASHINGTON DC • 

637

 OCT 03) 

M I i i III I I II II i in 11 

Page 109 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

109 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/M B//NOFORN 

interrogation techniques "|d|uc to lack of information from [Arsala Khan| pinning him directly 

to a recent activity."63'

5

 Three days after the reporting about Khan's hallucinations, and after the 

interrogators had already subjected Khan to the additional 21 hours of standing sleep deprivation 

(beyond the initial 56 hours), CIA Headquarters sent a cablc slating that RDG and the Office of 

Medical Services believed that Arsala Khan should not be subjected to additional standing sleep 

deprivation beyond the 56 hours becausc of his hallucinations.639 

( ) After approximately a month of detention and the extensive use of 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Arsala Khan, the CIA concluded that the 

"detainee Arsala Khan docs not appear to be the subjcct involved in... current plans or activities 

against U.S. personnel or facilities," and recommended that he be released to his village with a 

cash payment.640 CIA interrogators at DETENTION SITE COBALT instead transferred him to 

U.S. military custody, where he was held for an additional four years despite the development of 

significant intelligence indicating that the source who reported that Arsala Khan had aided 

Usama bin Laden had a vendetta against Arsala Khan's family.641 

7. A Year After DETENTION SITE COBALT Opens, the CIA Reports "Unsettling Discovery 

That We Are Holding a Number of Detainees About Whom We Know Very Little" 

l[1 th c

 fall of 2003, CIA officers began to take a closer look at the 

CIA detainees being held in Country raising concerns about both thc number and types of 

detainees being held by thc CIA. CIA officers in Country | provided a list of CIA detainees to 

CIA Headquarters, resulting in thc observation by CIA Headquarters that they had not previously 

had thc names of all 44 CIA detainees being held in that country. At thc direction of CIA 

Headquarters, thc Station in Country ("completed an exhaustive scarch of all available records 

in an attempt to develop a clearer understanding of thc [CIA | detainees." A December 2003 

cable from thc Station in Country | to CIA Headquarters stated that: 

"In thc proccss of this research, we have made thc unsettling discovery that we 

arc holding a number of detainees about whom we know very little. Thc 

majority of |CIA | detainees in [Country | | have not been debriefed for months 

and, in some cases, for over a year. Many of them appear to us to have no 

further intelligence value for (thc C1AJ and should more properly be turned 

over to the ]U.S. military], to [Country | | authorities or to third countries for 

further investigation and possibly prosecution. In a few cases, there docs not 

appear to be enough evidcncc to continue incarceration, and, if this is in fact 

thc case, thc detainees should be released."642 

Page I I Oof 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

110 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ K/NOFORN 

(TSZ/f^^Hlim^NF ) Records indicate that all of these CIA detainees had been kept in 

solitary confinement. The vast majority of these detainees were later released, with some 

receiving CIA payments for having been held in detention.643 

8. CIA Detention Sites in Country | Lack Sufficient Personnel and Translators to Support 

the Interrogations of Detainees 

(TS/^^mm^F ) Throughout 2003, the CIA lacked sufficient personnel and 

adequate translators to conduct debriefings and interrogations in Country Because of this 

personnel shortage, a number of detainees who were transferred to CIA custody were not 

interrogated or debriefed by anyone for days or weeks after their arrival at CIA detention 

facilities in Country J.6,14 As noted in a cable from the CIA Station in Country in April 2003: 

"Station is supporting the debriefing and/or interrogation of a large number of 

individuals... and is constrained by a lack of personnel which would allow us 

to fully process them in a timely manner."645 

I. Other Medical, Psychological, and Behavioral Issues 

7. CIA Interrogations Take Precedence Over Medical Care 

While CIA Headquarters informed the Department of Justice in 

July 2002 "that steps will be taken to ensure that [Abu Zubaydah's] injury is not in any way 

exacerbated by the use of these [enhanced interrogation] methods,"646 CIA Headquarters 

informed CIA interrogators that the interrogation process would take "precedence" over Abu 

Zubaydah's medical care.647 Beginning on August 4, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was kept naked, fed a 

"bare bones" liquid diet, and subjected to the non-stop use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques

 648

 On August 15, 2002, medical personnel described how Abu Zubaydah's 

interrogation resulted in the "steady deterioration" of his surgical wound from April 2002.649 On 

643

 This included Saved Habib Zarmein ("a nominal payment"), Modin Nik Mohammed ($H|), and Ali 

Saeed Awadh See Volume 111 for additional details. 

MA

 For detailed information, see Volume III. 

645

 ^^BHHI^ H 36229 (060943Z APR 03). See also detainee reviews for Lillie, Hambali, Mustafa alHawsawi, and Suleiman Abdullah. 

646 See Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, 

Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative." 

647

 ALEC HlH( 182321 Z JUL 02) 

648 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional information, as well as email from: 

[REDACTED], to: HHIH H and [REDACTED], subject: 15 Aug Clinical; date: August 15, 2002, at 06:54 

AM. 

649

 An email to OMS stated: "We are currently providing absolute minimum wound care (as evidenced by the steady 

deterioration of the wound), [Abu Zubaydah] has no opportunity to practice any form of hygienic self care (he's 

filthy), the physical nature of this phase dictates multiple physical stresses (Ilia reaction to today's activity is I 

believe the culprit for the superior edge separation), and nutrition is bare bones (six cans of ensure daily)." See 

email from: [REDACTED], to: HHHH H

 an d

 [REDACTED], subject: 15 Aug Clinical; date: August 15, 

2002, at 06:54 AM. 

11 ii 11 ii 1 1 

Page 111 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

111 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

August 20, 2002, medical officers wrote that Abu Zubaydah's wound had undergone 

"significant" deterioration.650 Later, after one of Abu Zubaydah's eyes began to deteriorate,651 

CIA officers requested a test of Abu Zubaydah's other eye, stating that the request was "driven 

by our intelligence needs vice humanitarian concern for AZ." The cable relayed, "[w]e have a 

lot riding upon his ability to see, read and write."652 

In April 2003, CIA detainees Abu Hazim and Abd al-Karim each 

broke a foot while trying to escape capture and were placed in casts.653 CIA cables requesting 

the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on the two detainees stated that the 

interrogators would "forego cramped confinement, stress positions, walling, and vertical 

shackling (due to [the detainees'] injury)."654 Notwithstanding medical concerns related to the 

injuries, both of these detainees were subjected to one or more of these CIA enhanced 

interrogation techniques prior to obtaining CIA Headquarters approval.655 

In the case of Abu Hazim, on May 4, 2003, the CIA regional 

medical officer examined Abu Hazim and recommended that he avoid all weight bearing 

activities for an additional five weeks due to his broken foot.656 In the case of Abd al-Karim, on 

April 18, 2003, a CIA physician assistant recommended that al-Karim avoid extended standing 

for "a couple of weeks."657 Six days later, on April 24, 2003, CIA Headquarters reviewed x-rays 

of al-Karim's foot, diagnosing him with a broken foot, and recommending no weight bearing and 

the use of crutches for a total of three months.658 Despite these recommendations, on May 10, 

10647 110679 (250932Z (201331Z AUG 02); ^H H 10654 (211318Z AUG 02); | 

AUG 02) 

651

 Records indicate that Abu Zubaydah ultimately lost the eye. See 11026 (070729Z OCT 02). 

10679 (250932Z AUG 02); MB^ l 11026 (070729Z OCT 02) 

144147 APR 03) 

36862 (181352Z APR 

To accommodate Abu Hazim's and Abd al-Karim's injuries, the cable stated that, rather than being shackled 

standing during sleep deprivation, the detainees would be "seated, secured to a cell wall, with intermittent 

disruptions of normal sleeping patterns." For water dousing, the detainees' injured legs would be "wrapped in 

alas tic." The requests were approved. See DIRECTOR HH I ^^^^fl^H ; DIRECTOR | 

655

 With regard to Abu Hazim, on April 24, 2003, an additional CIA Headquarters approval cable was sent to 

DETENTION SITE COBALT authorizing interrogator I^I^^^^IH t o us e the attention grasp, facial insult 

slap, abdominal slap, water dousing, and sleep deprivation up to 72 hours; the cable did not approve the use of 

walling or the facial hold. (See DIRECTOR Despite the lack of approval, walling was 

used against Abu Hazim on April 28-29, 2003, and the facial hold was used on April 27, 2003. (See 

37411 (291829Z APR 03);

 3741 0

 (291828Z APR 03); 

37509 (021309ZMA^3^ A May 10, 2003, CIA Headquarters cable approved walling and the facial 

grasp. (See DIRECTOR MAY 03).) Abd al-Karim was also subjected to unapproved CIA 

enhanced interrogation techniques that the detention site initially indicated would not be used due to the detainee's 

injuries. Without approval from CIA Headquarters, CIA interrogators subjected Abd al-Karim to cramped 

confinement on April 19-20, 2003; stress positions on April 21, 2003; and walling on April 21, and 29, 2003. (See 

37121 (221703Z APR 03);

 3715 2

 ( 231424 z AP R 

37202 (250948Z APR 03); 37508 (021305Z MAY 03).) On 

May 10, 2003, CIA Headquarters approved an expanded list of CIA enhanced interrogation techniques that could be 

used against Abd al-Karim, including walling and stress positions. See DIRECTOR | H MAY 03). 

656

 DIRECTOR ^^ M ^H B MAY 03) 

36862(181352Z APR 03) 657 

658

 DIRECTOR 

TOP SECRET// 7NOFORN 

Page 112 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

112 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

2003, CIA interrogators believed that both Hazim and al-Karim were "strong mentally and 

physically due to [their] ability to sleep in the sitting position."659 On May 12, 2003, a different 

CIA physician assistant, who had not been involved in the previous examinations determining 

the need for the detainees to avoid weight bearing, stated that it was his "opinion" that Abu 

Hazim's and Abd al-Karim's injuries were "sufficiently healed to allow being placed in the 

standing sleep deprivation position."660 He further reported that he had "consulted with [CIA's 

Office of Medical Services] via secure phone and OMS medical officer concurred in this 

assessment."661 CIA Headquarters approved the use of standing sleep deprivation against both 

detainees shortly thereafter.662 As a result, both detainees were placed in standing sleep 

deprivation. Abu Hazim underwent 52 hours of standing sleep deprivation from June 3-5, 

2003,663 and Abd al-Karim underwent an unspecified period of standing sleep deprivation on 

May 15, 2003.664 

(TS^HH^HH^NF ) CIA detainee Asadallah was left in the standing sleep deprivation 

position despite a sprained ankle. Later, when Asadallah was placed in stress positions on his 

knees, he complained of discomfort and asked to sit. Asadallah was told he could not sit unless 

he answered questions truthfully.665 

2. CIA Detainees Exhibit Psychological and Behavioral Issues 

(TS/fl^HHH^B^^ ) Psychological and behavioral problems experienced by CIA 

detainees, who were held in austere conditions and in solitary confinement, also posed 

38262 (150541Z MAY 03); | 

38161 (131326Z MAY 03) 

38161 (131326Z MAY 03) 

MAY 03) for Abu Hazim; and DIRECTOR | 

138161 (131326Z MAY 03) 

| MAY 03) for 

139656 (060955Z JUN 03) 

6591 

660 I 

66! 

fi62 See DIRECTOR | 

Abd al-Karim. 

c

» 39582 (041743Z JUN 03); | 

664

 38365 (170652Z MAY 03) 

665

 Asadallah was also placed in a "small isolation box" for 30 minutes, without authorization and without discussion 

of how the technique would affect his ankle. (See 34098 

34294^^^^•H^nli^Hi^^^HH I 34310^HHHHH- ) 

While CIA records contain information on other detainee medical complaints (see Volume III), those records also 

suggest that detainee medical complaints could be underreported in CIA medical records. For example, CIA 

medical records consistently report that CIA detainee Ramzi bin al-Shibh had no medical complaints. However, 

CIA interrogation records indicate that when bin al-Shibh had previously complained of ailments to CIA personnel, 

he was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and told by CIA interrogators that his medical 

condition was not of concern to the CIA. (See •• • 10591 (252002Z FEB 03); •• • 10627 (281949Z 

FEB 03).) In testimony on April 12, 2007, CIA Director Michael Hayden referenced medical care of detainees in 

the context of the ICRC report on CIA detentions. Hayden testified to the Committee: "The medical section of the 

ICRC report concludes that the association of CIA medical officers with the interrogation program is 'contrary to 

international standards of medical ethics.' That is just wrong. The role of CIA medical officers in the detainee 

program is and always has been and always will be to ensure the safety and the well-being of the detainee. The 

placement of medical officers during the interrogation techniques represents an extra measure of caution. Our 

medical officers do not recommend the employment or continuation of any procedures or techniques. The allegation 

in the report that a CIA medical officer threatened a detainee, stating that medical care was conditional on 

cooperation is blatantly false. Health care has always been administered based upon detainee needs. It's neither 

policy nor practice to link medical care to any odier aspect of the detainee program." This testimony was 

incongruent with CIA records. 

KM II HI I m i i n 

Page 113 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

113 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

management challenges for the CIA.666 For example, later in his detention, Ramzi bin al-Shibh 

exhibited behavioral and psychological problems, including visions, paranoia, insomnia, and 

attempts at self-harm.667 CIA psychologists linked bin al-Shibh's deteriorating mental state to 

his isolation and inability to cope with his long-term detention.668 Similarly, 'Abd al-Rahim alNashiri's unpredictable and disruptive behavior in detention made him one of the most difficult 

detainees for the CIA to manage. Al-Nashiri engaged in repeated belligerent acts, including 

throwing his food tray,659 attempting to assault detention site personnel

 670

 and trying to damage 

items in his cell.671 Over a period of years, al-Nashiri accused the CIA staff of drugging or 

poisoning his food and complained of bodily pain and insomnia.672 As noted, at one point, alNashiri launched a short-lived hunger strike, and the CIA responded by force feeding him 

rectally.673 An October 2004 psychological assessment of al-Nashiri was used by the CIA to 

advance its discussions with National Security Council officials on establishing an "endgame" 

for the program.674 In July 2005, CIA Headquarters expressed concern regarding al-Nashiri's 

"continued state of depression and uncooperative attitude."675 Days later a CIA psychologist 

assessed that al-Nashiri was on the "verge of a breakdown."676 

Beginning in March 2004, and continuing until his rendition to 

U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay in September 2006, Majid Khan engaged in a series of 

hunger strikes and attempts at self-mutilation that required significant attention from CIA 

detention site personnel. In response to Majid Khan's hunger strikes, medical personnel 

666

 For additional details, see Volume III. 

067

 •• • 1759 (021319Z OCT 04); HEADQUARTERSB|^1(040023Z NOV 05); | 

(171225Z NOV 04); (140915Z NOV 04); H^^HTl93 p (061620Z DEC 04); | 

2207 (111319Z APR 05)i^^^HB2210(141507 Z APR05)~|^H|253 5 (051805Z JUL05); 

12589 (120857ZJUL05)T|^^^H2830(291304Z AUG 05); 1890 (171225Z NOV 

04); ^^^^ • 1893(200831Z NOV 04); CIA document entitled, "Detainee Talking Points for ICRC Rebuttal, 12 

April200F~HHHh210(141507 Z APR 05); •^••253 5 (051805Z JUL 05); •• • 2210 

(141507Z APR05X^HJBB253 5 (051805Z JUL05)!^Mlll^ l 2830 (291304Z AUG 05); | 

1930 (061620Z DEC 2210 (141507Z APR 05) 

2210(1415072 APR 05); 

U691 (081609Z SEP 04); 

05); 2023 (151735Z JAN 05) 

(282019Z NOV 03) 

11029 (291750Z JUN 06); 

11716(180742Z SEP 04) 

671 See, for example, 

1716 (180742Z SEP 04). 

2535 (051805Z JUL 05); | 

1716 (180742Z SEP 04); | 

2515 (3019462 JUN 05); I 

[1142 (0413582 AUG 06); | 

\ 3051 (301235Z SEP 05); I 

12474 (251622Z JUN 05); 

12830 (291304Z AUG 

1998 (020752Z JAN 

11150 

11543 (111600Z AUG04); 

11029 (291750Z JUN 06) 

12673 (021451Z AUG 05); 

672 See, for example 

1959(1117002 DEC 04); 

1356 (011644Z JUL 04); ••^^•188 0 (140917Z NOV 04); | 

I 'I ll III ' HI I Mil ^M B 1959 (111700ZDEC04); 

2038 (211558ZJAN05)^^^BHH^ H 1091 (031835Z NOV 03); | 

1266 (052309Z JAN 04); MAR 04). 

673 •|^^|120 3 (231709ZMAY04)i^HlM | 1202 (231644Z MAY04). CIA records indicate that at 

least five detainees were subjected to rectal rehydration or rectal feeding: Abu Zubaydah, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, 

Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, Majid Khan, and Marwan al-Jabbur. See Volume III for additional details. 

674

 Email from: to: [DETENTION SITE BLACK|j| B cc: j 

subject: Interrogator Assessments/Request for Endgame Views; date: October 30, 2004. 

675

 HEADQUARTERS (282217Z JUL 05) 

676

 CIA Sametime exchange, dated 29/JUL/05 08:01:51 - 08:50:13; between and I 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

Page 114 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

114 
UNCLASSIFIED 

m i 111111 1 Bi^^^M^BBB B i m i i in11 

implemented various techniques to provide fluids and nutrients, including the use of a 

nasogastric tube and the provision of intravenous fluids. CIA records indicate that Majid Khan 

cooperated with the feedings and was permitted to infuse the fluids and nutrients himself.677 

After approximately three weeks, the CIA developed a more aggressive treatment regimen 

"without unnecessary conversation."678 Majid Khan was then subjected to involuntary rectal 

feeding and rectal hydration, which included two bottles of Ensure. Later that same day, Majid 

Khan's "lunch tray," consisting of hummus, pasta with sauce, nuts, and raisins, was "pureed" 

and rectally infused.679 Additional sessions of rectal feeding and hydration followed.680 In 

addition to his hunger strikes, Majid Khan engaged in acts of self-harm that included attempting 

to cut his wrist on two occasions,681 an attempt to chew into his arm at the inner elbow,682 an 

attempt to cut a vein in the top of his foot,683 and an attempt to cut into his skin at the elbow joint 

using a filed toothbrush.684 

J. The CIA Seeks Reaffirmation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003 

1. Administration Statements About the Humane Treatment of Detainees Raise Concerns at 

the CIA About Possible Lack of Policy Support for CIA Interrogation Activities 

On several occasions in early 2003, CIA General Counsel Scott 

Muller expressed concern to the National Security Council principals, White House staff, and 

Department of Justice personnel that the CIA's program might be inconsistent with public 

statements from the Administration that the U.S. Government's treatment of detainees was 

"humane."685 CIA General Counsel Muller therefore sought to verify with White House and 

Department of Justice personnel that a February 7, 2002, Presidential Memorandum requiring the 

U.S. military to treat detainees humanely did not apply to the CIA.686 Following those 

3184 (161628Z SEP 04); 

3196 (201731Z SEP 04); 

3206 (211819Z SEP 04); 

3181 (161621Z SEP 04) 

| 3183 (161626Z SEP 04)J 

13190 (181558ZSEP 04); \ 

3197 (201731Z SEP 04); 

[3135 (120625Z SEP 04); | 

\ 3237 (230552Z SEP 04) 

3240 (231839Z SEP 04) 

13259 (261734Z SEP 04). The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "rectal 

rehydration" is a "well acknowledged medical technique to address pressing health issues." A follow-up CIA 

document provided on October 25,2013 (DTS #2013-3152), states that "[fjrom a health perspecti ve, Majid Khan 

became uncooperative on 31 August 2004, when he initiated a hunger strike and before he underwent rectal 

rehydration... CIA assesses that the use of rectal rehydration is a medically sound hydration technique...." The 

assertion that Majid Khan was "uncooperative" prior to rectal rehydration and rectal feeding is inaccurate. As 

described in CIA records, prior to being subjected to rectal rehydration and rectal feeding, Majid Khan cooperated 

with the nasogastric feedings and was permitted to infuse the fluids and nutrients himself. 

\ 3694 (301800Z NOV 04); Hi^HIHiHHi 424 2 (191550Z MAR 05); 

[4250 (221213Z MAR 05) 

\ 3724 (031723Z DEC 04) 

3835 (260659Z DEC 04) 

|4614 (071358Z JUN 05) 

685

 February 12,2003, MFR from Scott Muller, Subject: "Humane" treatment of CIA detainees; March 7, 2003, 

Memorandum for DDCIA from Muller, Subject: Proposed Response to Human Rights Watch Letter. 

686

 January 9, 2003, Draft Memorandum for Scott Mueller [sic], General Counsel of the Centra] Intelligence Agency, 

from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, re: Application of the President's 

m i 11111 1 BB^^B^ B 1 m i in n 1 

Page 115 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

115 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

discussions in early 2003, the White House press secretary was advised to avoid using the term 

"humane treatment" when discussing the detention of al-Qa'ida and Taliban personnel.687 

In mid-2003, CIA officials also engaged in discussions with the 

Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, and attorneys in the White House on whether 

representations could be made that the U.S. Government complied with certain requirements 

arising out of the Convention Against Torture, namely that the treatment of detainees was 

consistent with constitutional standards in the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.688 In 

late June 2003, after numerous inter-agency discussions, William Haynes, the general counsel of 

the Department of Defense, responded to a letter from Senator Patrick Leahy stating that it was 

U^SjDolicy to compl^vittUhes^jtandards.689 According to a memorandum from the CIA's 

Legal, the August 1, 2002, OLC opinion provided a legal 

"safe harbor" for the CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques.690 The August 1, 2002, 

opinion did not, however, address the constitutional standards described in the letter from 

William Haynes. 

In July 2003, after the White House made a number of statements 

again suggesting that U.S. treatment of detainees was "humane," the CIA asked the national 

security advisor for policy reaffirmation of the CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation 

techniques. During the time that request was being considered, CIA Headquarters stopped 

approving requests from CIA officers to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.691 

Because of this stand-down, CIA interrogators, with CIA Headquarters approval, instead used 

repeated applications of the CIA's "standard" interrogation techniques. These "standard" 

techniques were coercive, but not considered to be as coercive as the CIA's "enhanced" 

interrogation techniques. At this time, sleep deprivation beyond 72 hours was considered an 

February 7, 2002, Memorandum on the Geneva Convention (HI) of 1949 to the Release of an al Qaeda Detainee to 

the Custody of the CIA. The memorandum stated that neither al-Qa'ida nor Taliban detainees qualified as prisoners 

of war under Geneva, and that Common Article 3 of Geneva, requiring humane treatment of individuals in a 

conflict, did not apply to al-Qa'ida or Taliban detainees 

687

 March 18, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Subject: meeting with DOJ and NSC 

Legal Adviser. 

688 See, for example, March 18, 2003, email from: HHHHH; t o : Scot t

 Muller; subject: Memorandum for 

the Record - Telcoi^itl^LC^ate : March 13, 2003^mailfronrScott W. Muller; to: Stanley M. Moskowitz, John 

H. Moseman; cc: John A. Rizzo, H^^H^ B subject: Interrogations; date: April 1,2003, at 

1:18:35 PM; to: Scott Muller; cc: John Rizzo, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED]; subject: Black letter law on Interrogations; Legal Principles Applicable to CIA Detention and 

Interrogation of Captured Al-Qa'ida Personnel; date: April 17, 2003. 

689

 June 25, 2003, Letter from William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense to Patrick 

Leahy, United States Senate. 

690

 June 30, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Subject: White House Meeting on 

Enhanced Techniques (DTS #2009-2659). 

691 See, for example, email from: HH^^^H ; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]; subject: FYI - Draft 

Paragraphs for the DCI on the Legal Issues on Interrogation, as requested by the General Counsel; date: March 14, 

2003; June 26, 2003, Statement by the President, United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/2003Q626-3.htm; email from: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman, 

cc: Buzzy Krongard, Scott Muller, William Harlow; subject: Today's Washington Post Piece on 

Administration Detainee Policy; date: June 27, 2003; July 3, 2003, Memorandum for National Security Advisor 

from Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, Subject: Reaffirmation of the Central Intelligence Agency's 

Interrogation Program. 

11 ii 11 ii i i Bjj^^^^^^^^BMfVNOFon N 

Page 116 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

116 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

"enhanced" interrogation technique, while sleep deprivation under 72 hours was defined as a 

"standard" CIA interrogation technique. To avoid using an "enhanced" interrogation technique, 

CIA officers subjected Khallad bin Attash to 70 hours of standing sleep deprivation, two hours 

less than the maximum. After allowing him four hours of sleep, bin Attash was subjected to an 

additional 23 hours of standing sleep deprivation, followed immediately by 20 hours of seated 

sleep deprivation.692 

Unlike during most of the CIA's interrogation program, during the 

time that CIA Headquarters was seeking policy reaffirmation, the CIA responded to infractions 

in the interrogation program as reported through CIA cables and other communications. 

Although the chief of the interrogations program in RDG, does not appear to have 

been investigated or reprimanded for training interrogators on the abdominal slap before its use 

was approved,693 training significant numbers of new interrogators to conduct interrogations on 

potentially compliant detainees

 694

 or conducting large numbers of water dousing on detainees 

without requesting or obtaining authorization;695 the CIA removed his certification to conduct 

interrogations in late July 2003 for placing a broom handle behind the knees of a detainee while 

that detainee was in a stress position.696 CIA Headquarters also decertified two other 

interrogators, [CIA OFFICER 1] and HHH < >n the same period, 

although there are no official records of why those decertifications occurred.697 

2. The CIA Provides Inaccurate Information to Select Members of the National Security 

Council, Represents that "Termination of This Program Will Result in Loss of Life, 

Possibly Extensive "; Policymakers Reauthorize Program 

(¥S4|HHHIiO n July 29, 2003, DCI Tenet and CIA General Counsel Muller 

attended a meeting with Vice President Cheney, National Security Advisor Rice, Attorney 

General Ashcroft, and White House Counsel Gonzales, among others, seeking policy 

692

 Bin Attash has one leg, which swelled during standing sleep deprivation, resulting in the transition to seated sleep 

deprivation. He was also subjected to nudity and dietary manipulation during this period. See 12371 

(2I2121Z JUL 03); •• • 12385 (222045Z JUL 03); and 12389 (232040Z JUL 03). 

en HV T x r a i n j n g alKj Curriculum, November 2,2002, at 17. 

6M HV T Training and Curriculum, November 2,2002, at 17. 

695 See, for example, 10168 (092130Z JAN 03); Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of 

Interrogations for Counterterrorism Puqwses, April 7, 2003; CIA Office of Inspector General, 

Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities(September2001 - October 2003) (2003-

T^S^GlJi^a^MMjBII^ H 10168 (092130Z JAN 03)JIHHH||H| H 340981 

| 34179 (262200Z FEB 03); ^^^^^^^^^^34294 1 

134310^^^^^^^^^•3475 7 (101742ZMAR 03); and 

135025 (161321ZMAR03). 

696

 April 7, 2005, Briefing for Blue Ribbon Panel: CIA Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Programs at 22; 

Memorandum for Chief,vi a CTC LegaHrou^hief, CTC/RDG. July 28, 2003, 

Subject: Decertification of former Interrogator. Document not signed by ^H H because he was "not 

available for signature." 

697 See Memorandum for Chief, ^HH - vi a

 ^•CTCLegalfro m Chief, CTC/RDG, July 

28, 2003, Subject: Decertification of former Interrogator, signed [CIA OFFICER 1] on July 

29, 2003; and April 7,2005, Briefing for Blue Ribbon Panel: CIA Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Programs 

at 22; Memorandum for Chief,

 vi a

 ^ H CTC Legal from Chief, CTC/RDG, July 28, 

2003, Subject: Decertification of former Interrogator. 

m i 11 III i BMB^B^ B I m i <m i i 

Page 117 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

117 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ k/NOFORN 

reaffirmation of its coercive interrogation program. The presentation included a list of the CIA's 

standard and enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA General Counsel Muller also provided a 

description of the waterboard interrogation technique, including the inaccurate representation 

that it had been used against KSM 119 times and Abu Zubaydah 42 times.698 The presentation 

warned National Security Council principals in attendance that "termination of this program will 

result in loss of life, possibly extensive." The CIA officers further noted that 50 percent of CIA 

intelligence reports on al-Qaida were derived from detainee reporting, and that "major threats 

were countered and attacks averted" because of the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques. The CIA provided specific examples of "attacks averted" as a result of using the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including references to the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, 

the Heathrow Plot, the Second Wave Plot, and Iyman Faris.699 As described later in this 

summary, and in greater detail in Volume II, these claims were inaccurate. After the CIA's 

presentation, Vice President Cheney stated, and National Security Advisor Rice agreed, that the 

CIA was executing Administration policy in carrying out its interrogation program.700 

The National Security Council principals at the July 2003 briefing 

initially concluded it was "not necessary or advisable to have a full Principals Committee 

meeting to review and reaffirm the Program."701 A CIA email noted that the official reason for 

not having a full briefing was to avoid press disclosures, but added that: 

"it is clear to us from some of the runup meetings we had with [White House] 

Counsel that the [White House] is extremely concerned [Secretary of State] 

698

 CIA records indicate that KSM received at least 183 applications of the waterboard technique, and that Abu 

Zubaydah received at least 83 applications of the waterboard technique. In April 2003, CIA Inspector General John 

Helgerson asked General Counsel Scott Muller about the repetitious use of the waterboard. In early June 2003, 

White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales and the Vice President's Counsel, David Addington, who were aware of the 

inspector general's concerns, asked Muller whether the number of waterboard repetitions had been too high in light 

of the OLC guidance. This question prompted Muller to seek information on the use of the waterboard on Abu 

Zubaydah and KSM. (See interview of Scott Muller, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and 

[REDACTEDl^Offic^fth^nspector General, August 20, 2003; and email from: Scott Muller; to: John Rizzo; cc: 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: "Report from 

Gitmo trip (Not proofread, as usual)"; date: June | , 2003, 05:47 PM.) As Muller told the OIG, he could not keep up 

with cable traffic from CIA detainee interrogations and instead received monthly briefings. According to OIG 

records of the interview, Muller "said he does not know specifically how [CIA guidelines on interrogations] changed 

because he does not get that far down into the weeds," and "each detainee is different and those in the field have 

some latitude." (See interview of Scott Muller, Office of the Inspector General, August 20, 2003.) Despite this 

record and others detailed in the full Committee Study, the CIA's June 2013 Response asserts that the CIA's 

"confinement conditions and treatment of high profile detainees like Abu Zubaydah were closely scrutinized at all 

levels of management from the outset." 

699

 August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 

July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003. 

700

 August 5, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of the Interrogation Program 

on 29 July 2003. A briefing slide describing the "Pros" and "Cons" associated with the program listed the following 

under the heading "Con": (1) "Blowback due to public perception of 'humane treatment,'" (2) "ICRC continues to 

attack USG policy on detainees," and (3) "Congressional inquiries continue." See Volume II for additional details. 

701

 August 5, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program,July 

29, 2003. 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 118 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

118 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ K/NOFORN 

Powell would blow his stack if he were to be briefed on what's been going 

on."702 

(TS/^H^^^I^^^/NF ) National Security Advisor Rice, however, subsequently decided 

that Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld should be 

briefed on the CIA interrogation program prior to recertification of the covert action.703 As 

described, both were then formally briefed on the CIA program for the first time in a 25 minute 

briefing on September 16, 2003.704 

On September 4, 2003, CIA records indicate that CIA officials may 

have provided Chairman Roberts, Vice Chairman Rockefeller, and their staff directors a briefing 

regarding the Administration's reaffirmation of the program.705 Neither the CIA nor the 

Committee has a contemporaneous report on the content of the briefing or any confirmation that 

the briefing occurred. 

K. Additional Oversight and Outside Pressure in 2004: ICRC, Inspector General, Congress, 

and the U.S. Supreme Court 

/. ICRC Pressure Leads to Detainee Transfers; Department of Defense Official Informs the 

CIA that the U.S. Government "Should Not Be in the Position of Causing People to 

Disappear"; the CIA Provides Inaccurate Information on CIA Detainee to the 

Department of Defense 

In January 2004, the ICRC sent a letter to | 

indicating that it was aware that the United States Government was holding 

unacknowledged detainees in several facilities in Country | "incommunicado for extensive 

periods of time, subjected to unacceptable conditions of internment, to ill treatment and torture, 

while deprived of any possible recourse."706 According to the CIA, the letter included a "fairly 

complete list" of CIA detainees to whom the ICRC had not had access.707 This prompted CIA 

Headquarters to conclude that it was necessary to reduce the number of detainees in CIA 

custody.708 The CIA subsequently transferred at least 25 of its detainees in Country | to the 

U.S. military and foreign governments. The CIA also released five detainees.709 

702

 Email from: John Rizzo; to: subject: Rump PC on interrogations; date: July 31, 2003. 

703

 August 5,2003, Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program, July 

29, 2003. 

704

 September 26,2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program. 

705

 September 4,2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing 

706

 January 6,2004, Letter from | 

707

 HEADQUARTERS I 

708

 HEADQUARTERS | 

709 See, for example, DIRECTOR^^M^^^^^^M ; DIRECTOR | 

1696 HHI ^ 

|; HEADQUARTERS f 

123081 

|1001| 

TOP SECRET//I 

Page 119 of 499 

I; DIRECTOR 

I; HEADQUARTERS f ~ 

12335 

I //NOFOR N 

UNCLASSIFIED 

119 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ k/NOFORN 

The CIA provided a factually incorrect description to the 

Department of Defense concerning one of the 18 CIA detainees transferred to U.S. military 

custody in March 2004. The transfer letter described CIA detainee Ali Jan as "the most trusted 

bodyguar(U)f Jaluluddin Haqqani (a top AQ target of the USG)" who was captured in the village 

of orUun^H, 2002.710 Although there was an individual named Ali Jan captured in 

the village of June 2002i

7

^CIArecords indicate that he was not the detainee 

being held by the CIA in the Country ^^HH^ H facility. The Ali Jan in CIA custody was 

apprehended circa early August 2003, during the U.S. military operation in 

Zormat Valley, Paktia Province, Afghanistan.712 CIA records indicate that Ali Jan was 

transferred to CIA custody after his satellite phone rang while he was in military custody, and the 

translator indicated the caller was speaking in Arabic.713 After his transfer to U.S. military 

custody, Ah Jan was eventually released on July | , 2004.714 

In response to the ICRC's formal complaint about detainees being 

kept in Country | without ICRC access, State Department officials met with senior ICRC 

officials in Geneva, and indicated that it was U.S. policy to encourage all countries to provide 

ICRC access to detainees, including Country (, 7 1 5 While the State Department made these 

official representations to the ICRC, the CIA was repeatedly directing the same country to deny 

the ICRC access to the CIA detainees. In June 2004, the secretary of state ordered the U.S. 

ambassador in that countmcMlehverademarche, "in essence demanding [the country] provide 

full access to all [country detainees," which included detainees being held at 

the CIA's behest.715 These conflicting messages from the United States Government, as well as 

increased ICRC pressure on the country for failing to provide access, created significant tension 

between the United States and the country in question.717 

Later that year, in advance of a National Security Council 

Principals Committee meeting on September 14, 2004, officials from the Department of Defense 

called the CIA to inform the CIA that Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz would not 

support the CIA's position that notifying the ICRC of all detainees in U.S. Government custody 

would harm U.S. national security. According to an internal CIA email following the call, the 

deputy secretary of defense had listened to the CIA's arguments for nondisclosure, but believed 

that it was time for full notification. The email stated that the Department of Defense supported 

the U.S. Government's position that there should be full disclosure to the ICRC, unless there 

were compelling reasons of military necessity or national security. The email added that the 

710

 March 4, 2004, Letter from Jose Rodriguez, Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center to Thomas O'Connell, 

Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict. 

180219 

12296(101709Z 

_ | 2296(101709Z 

714

 Details in June 13, 2005, Letter to ICRC, responding to 2004 ICRC note verbale. 

7 , 5

 2348 

716

 HEADQUARTERS 

CIA custody were issuing demarches. 

issued a demarche to the U.S. in 2004. See 

and 93291 •••i^H -

717

 For more information, see Volume I. 

I HI II III I ^^^^^^^^^^^•//NOIOH N 

L During this same period, countries whose nationals were in 

issued a demarche to Country B in 2004, and J 

2274 F 

Page 120 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

120 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

Department of Defense did not believe an adequate articulation of military necessity or national 

security reasons warranting nondisclosure existed, that "DoD is tired of 'taking hits' for CIA 

'ghost detainees,'" and that the U.S. government "should not be in the position of causing people 

to 'disappear.'"718 

Despite numerous meetings and communications within the 

executive branch throughout 2004, the United States did not formally respond to the January 6, 

2004, ICRC letter until June 13, 2005.719 

2. CIA Leadership Calls Draft Inspector General Special Review of the Program 

"Imbalanced and Inaccurate, " Responds with Inaccurate Information; CIA Seeks to 

Limit Further Review of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program by the Inspector 

General 

The CIA's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) was first 

informed of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in November 2002, nine months 

after Abu Zubaydah became the CIA's first detainee. As described, the information was 

conveyed by the DDO, who also informed the OIG of the death of Gul Rahman. In January 

2003, the DDO further requested that the OIG investigate allegations of unauthorized 

interrogation techniques against 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri. Separately, the OIG "received 

information that some employees were concerned that certain covert Agency activities at an 

overseas detention and interrogation site might involve violations of human rights," according to 

the OIG's Special Review.720 

(TSZ/UHmfim/^F ) During the course of the OIG's interviews, numerous CIA officers 

expressed concerns about the CIA's lack of preparedness for the detention and interrogation of 

Abu Zubaydah.721 Other CIA officers expressed concern about the analytical assumptions 

driving interrogations,722 as well as the lack of language and cultural background among 

718

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: John Rizzo, [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez, John P. Mudd, [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: DoD's position on ICRC notification; date: September 13, 2004. 

719

 June 13, 2005, Letter to ICRC, responding to 2004 ICRC note verbale. 

720

 Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003) 

(2003-7123-IG), 7 May 2004, (DTS #2004-2710). 

721

 The chief of Station in the country that hosted the CIA's first detention site told the OIG that "[t]he Reports 

Officers did not know what was required of them, analysts were not knowledgeable of the target, translators were 

not native Arab speakers, and at least one of the [chiefs of Base] had limited fieldexperience/\Sec Interview report 

of [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 20, 2003. According to •••• • of CTC Legal, 

there was no screening procedure in place for officers assigned to DETENTION SITE GREEN. See interview of 

by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED, Office of the Inspector General, February 14, 2003. See 

also interview of HHHHHBI < Office of the Inspector General, March 24,2003. 

722

 In addition to the statements to the OIG described above, regarding the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, CIA 

officers expressed more general concerns. As noted, the assumptions at CIA Headquarters that 

Abu Zubaydah "knew everything about Al-Qa'ida, including details of the next attack" reflected liow "the 'Analyst 

vs. Interrogator' issue ha[d] been around from 'day one."' {See interview of^^^^^^^^H^ ^ Office of the 

Inspector General, February 27, 2003.) According to Chief of InteiTogations^^^^^^BTsubject matter experts 

often provided interrogation requirements that were "not valid or well thought out," providing the example of 

Mustafa al-Hawsawi. (See interview of^^^^^^B^ffic^^h^nspectorGeneral , April 7, 2003.) Senior CIA 

m i 11 i n i i m i in n i 

Page 121 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

121 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

members of the interrogation teams.723 Some CIA officers described pressure from CIA 

Headquarters to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, which they attributed to faulty 

analytical assumptions about what detainees should know.724 As the chief of RDG, | 

stated to the OIG in a February 2003 interview: 

"CTC does not know a lot about al-Qa'ida and as a result, Headquarters 

analyst^ave constructed 'models' of what al-Qa'ida represents to them, 

[•i^ n noted that the Agency does not have the linguists or subject 

matter experts it needs. The questions sent from CTC/Usama bin Laden 

(UBL) to the interrogators are based on SIGINT [signals intelligence] and 

other intelligence that often times is incomplete or wrong. When the detainee 

does not respond to the question, the assumption at Headquarters is that the 

detainee is holding back and 'knows' more, and consequently, Headquarters 

recommends resumption of EITs. This difference of opinion between the 

interrogators and Headquarters as to whether the detainee is 'compliant' is the 

type of ongoing pressure the interrogation team is exposed to. [^^HlH l 

believes the waterboard was used 'recklessly' - 'too many times' on Abu 

Zubaydah at [DETENTION SITE GREEN], based in part on faulty 

intelligence."725 

interrogator told the OIG that interrogators "suffered from a lack of substantive requirements from 

CIA Headquarters," and that "in every case so far, Headquarters' model of what the detainee should know is 

flawed." told the OIG that "I do not want to beat a man up based on what Headquarters says he should 

know," commenting that, "I want my best shotonsomething he (the detainee) knows, not a fishing expedition on 

things he should know." (See interview of Hi^^^Hf t Office of the Inspector General, April 30, 2003.) Two 

interviewees told the OIG tilaUequiremen ts were sometimes based on inaccurate or improperly translated intercepts, 

jfc^ntemew of interrogator Office of the Inspector General, March 24, 2003; Interview of |_ 

[former chief of Station in the country that hosted the CIA's first detention site], Office of the 

Inspector General, May 29, 2003. 

723

 One interviewee noted that several interrogators with whom he had worked insisted on conducting interrogations 

in English to demonstrate their dominance over the detainee. (See interview report ofHim| , Office of 

the Inspector General, March 17, 2003.) The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that "[t]he program 

continued to face challenges in identifying sufficient, qualified staff -- particularly language-qualified personnel - as 

requirements imposedbyAgency involvement in Iraq increased." 

724

 According toH^BBHl o f CTC Legal, "[t]he seventh floor [CIA leadership] can complicate the process 

because of the mindset that interrogations are the silver bullet [and CIA leadership is] expecting immediate results." 

(Setunterview Office of the Inspector General, February 14, 2003.) Senior Interrogator 

provided the example of Khallad bin Attash, who, he told the OIG, was determined by the chief of Base at 

DETENTIO£^ITEBLUE not to "warrant" the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. According to 

debriefer ^H H called ALEC Station and told them to "go to the mat" in advocating for the use of the CIA's 

enhancecHntem5gation techniques, claiming that bin Attash was holding back information. (See interview of 

^HHH B Office of the Inspector General, April 30, 2003.) HI^Hi l described the "inherent tension 

that occasionally exists between officers at the interrogation facilities and those at Headquarters who view the 

detainee^r^ithholding information." provided the example of Abu Yassir al-Jaza'iri. (See interview 

of^^ H Office of the Inspector General, May 8, 2003.) H^H^ l also described disagreements on 

whether to subject detainees to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques as a "field versus Headquarters issue." 

(See interview of Office of the Inspector General, August 18, 2003.) As described, interviewees also 

described pressure from CIA Headquarters related to the interrogations of KSM and Abu Zubaydah. 

725

 Interview of Office of the Inspector General, February 21, 2003. 

M i l II I I I 

Page 122 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

122 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECREifl^^—/WQEQR N 

(TS^l^^^^VNF ) One senior interrogator, informed the OIG that 

differences between CIA Headquarters and the interrogators at the CIA detention sites were not 

part of the official record. According to "all of the fighting and criticism is done over 

the phone and is not put into cables," and that CIA "[cjables reflect things that are 'all rosy.'"726 

(WiB^H^ ) As is described elsewhere, and reflected in the final OIG Special 

Review, CIA officers discussed numerous other topics with the OIG, including conditions at 

DETENTION SITE COBALT, specific interrogations, the video taping of interrogations, the 

administration of the program, and concerns about the lack of an "end game" for CIA detainees, 

as well as the impact of possible public revelations concerning the existence and operation of the 

CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.727 

In January 2004, the CIA inspector general circulated for comment 

to various offices within the CIA a draft of the OIG Special Review of the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program. Among other matters, the OIG Special Review described divergences 

between the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques as applied and as described to the 

Department of Justice in 2002, the use of unauthorized techniques, and oversight problems 

related to DETENTION SITE COBALT. The draft OIG Special Review elicited responses from 

the CIA's deputy director for operations, the deputy director for science and technology, the 

Office of General Counsel, and the Office of Medical Services. Several of the responses— 

particularly those from CIA General Counsel Scott Muller and CIA Deputy Director for 

Operations James Pavitt—were highly critical of the inspector general's draft Special Review. 

General Counsel Muller wrote that the OIG Special Review presented "an imbalanced and 

inaccurate picture of the Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program," and claimed 

the OIG Special Review, "[o]n occasion," "quoted or summarized selectively and misleadingly" 

from CIA documents.728 Deputy Director for Operations James Pavitt wrote that the OIG 

Special Review should have come to the "conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and 

saved lives," and that "EITs (including the water board) have been indispensable to our 

successes." Pavitt attached to his response a document describing information the CIA obtained 

"as a result of the lawful use of EITs" that stated, "[t]he evidence points clearly to the fact that 

without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist 

726

 Interview Office of the Inspector General, April 30, 2003. 

727

 DDO Pavitt described possible public revelations related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program as 

"the CIA's worst nightmare." Interview of James Pavitt, Office of the Inspector General, September 21, 2003. 

According to OIG records of an interview with DCI Tenet, "Tenet believes that if the general public were to find out 

about this program, many would believe we are torturers." Tenet added, however, that his "only potential moral 

dilemma would be if more Americans die at the hands of terrorists and we had someone in our custody who 

possessed information that could have prevented deaths, but we had not obtained such information." See interview 

of George Tenet, Office of the Inspector General, memorandum dated, September 8,2003. 

728 See CIA Memorandum from Scott W. Muller, General Counsel, to Inspector General re Interrogation Program 

Special Review, dated February 24, 2004 (2003-7123-IG). 

mi 11 iii i ^^MMBM^^B B

 11(11111111 

Page 123 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

123 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

attacks involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties."729 A review of CIA records found 

that the representations in the Pavitt materials were almost entirely inaccurate.730 

Edition to conveying inaccurate information on the operation, 

management, and effectiveness of the CIA program, CIA leadership continued to impede the 

OIG in its efforts to oversee the program. In July 2005, Director Goss sent a memorandum to the 

inspector general to "express several concerns regarding the in-depth, multi-faceted review" of 

the CIA's CTC. The CIA director wrote that he was "increasingly concerned about the 

cumulative impact of the OIG's work on CTC's performance," adding that "I believe it makes 

sense to complete existing reviews... before opening new ones." Director Goss added, "[t]o my 

knowledge, Congress is satisfied that you are meeting its requirements" with regard to the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program.731 At the time, however, the vice chairman of the Senate 

Select Committee on Intelligence was seeking a Committee investigation of the CIA program, in 

part because of the aspects of the program that were not being investigated by the Office of 

Inspector General.732 In April 2007, CIA Director Michael Hayden had his "Senior 

Councilor"—an individual within the CIA who was accountable only to the CIA director— 

conduct a review of the inspector general's practices. Defending the decision to review the OIG, 

the CIA told the Committee that there were "morale issues that the [CIA] director needs to be 

mindful of," and that the review had uncovered instances of "bias" among OIG personnel against 

the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.733 In 2008, the CIA director announced the 

results of his review of the OIG to the CIA work force and stated that the inspector general had 

"chosen to take a number of steps to heighten the efficiency, assure the quality, and increase the 

transparency of the investigative process."734 

3. The CIA Does Not Satisfy Inspector General Special Review Recommendation to Assess 

the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 

(T^m^F ) The final May 2004 OIG Special Review included a 

recommendation that the CIA's DDO conduct a study of the effectiveness of the CIA's 

interrogation techniques within 90 days. Prompted by the recommendation, the CIA tasked two 

senior CIA officers to lead "an informal operational assessment of the CIA detainee program." 

The reviewers were tasked with responding to 12 specific terms of reference, including an 

assessment of "the effectiveness of each interrogation technique and environmental deprivation" 

729

 Memorandum to the Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, dated February 

27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and 

Interrogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and 

Interrogation Activities," dated February 24, 2004. 

730 po r addit] ona i information, see Volume II. 

731

 July 21, 2005, Memorandum for Inspector General from Porter J. Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency re: 

New IG Work Impacting the CounterTerrorism Center. 

732

 Transcript of business meeting, April 14, 2005 (DTS #2005-2810). 

733

 Committee Memorandum for the Record, "Staff Briefing with Bob Deitz on his Inquiry into the Investigative 

Practices of the CIA Inspector General," October 17, 2007 (DTS #2007-4166); Committee Memorandum for the 

Record, "Notes from Meetings with John Helgerson and Bob Deitz in late 2007 and early 2008" (DTS #2012-4203); 

Committee Memorandum for the Record, "Staff Briefing with CIA Inspector General John Helgerson" (DTS #2007-

4165). 

734

 Letter from DCIA Michael Hayden to Senator John D. Rockefeller TV, January 29, 2008 (DTS #2008-0606). 

i > ii 11111 MBM^^^BHBM I

 111 ( " 

Page 124 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

124 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ k/NOFORN 

to determine if any techniques or deprivation should be "added, modified, or discontinued."735 

According to a CIA memorandum from the reviewers, their review was based on briefings by 

CTC personnel, "a discussion with three senior CTC managers who played key roles in running 

the CIA detainee program," and a review of nine documents, including the OIG Special Review 

and an article by the CIA contractors who developed the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques, Hammond DUNBAR and Grayson SWIGERT.736 As described in this summary, 

and in more detail in Volume II, these documents contained numerous inaccurate representations 

regarding the operation and effectiveness of the CIA program. There are no records to indicate 

the two senior CIA officers reviewed the underlying interrogation cables and intelligence records 

related to the representations. Their resulting assessment repeated information found in the 

documents provided to them and reported that the "CIA Detainee Program is a success, 

providing unique and valuable intelligence at the tactical level for the benefit of policymakers, 

war fighters, and the CIA's covert action operators." The assessment also reported that 

regulations and procedures for handling detainees were "adequate and clear," and that the 

program had responded swiftly, fairly, and completely to deviations from the structured 

program.737 Nonetheless, the assessment came to the conclusion that detention and 

interrogations activities should not be conducted by the CIA, but by "experienced U.S. law 

enforcement officers," stating: 

"The Directorate of Operations (DO) should not be in the business of running 

prisons or 'temporary detention facilities.' The DO should focus on its core 

mission: clandestine intelligence operations. Accordingly, the DO should 

continue to hunt, capture, and render targets, and then exploit them for 

intelligence and ops leads once in custody. The management of their 

incarceration and interrogation should be conducted by appropriately 

experienced U.S. law enforcement officers, because that is their charter and 

they have the training and experience."738 

The assessment noted that the CIA program required significant 

resources at a time when the CIA was already stretched thin. Finally, the authors wrote that they 

"strongly believe" that the president and congressional oversight members should receive a 

735

 May 12, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Chief, Information 

Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Director for 

Operations, with the subject line, "Operational Review of CIA Detainee PrograiiL"^^^^ 

736 [^ay 12, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Chief, Information 

Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Director for 

Operations, with the subject line, "Operational Review of CIA Detainee Program." The CIA's June 2013 Response 

states, "[w]e acknowledge diat die Agency erred in permitting the contractors to assess the effectiveness of enhanced 

techniques. They should not have been considered for such a role given their financial interest in continued 

contracts from CIA." 

737

 May 12, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Chief, Information 

Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Director for 

Operations re Operational Review of CIA Detainee Program. For additional information, see Volume II. 

738

 May 12, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Chief, Information 

Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Director for 

Operations re Operational Review of CIA ^ ' TM 

TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN 

Page 125 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

125 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

comprehensive update on the program, "[g]iven the intense interest and controversy surrounding 

the detainee issue."739 

(TSA^^^^HH^F ) On January 26, 2005, DCI Goss forwarded the senior officer 

review to Inspector General John Helgerson.740 The DCI asked whether the review would satisfy 

the inspector general recommendation for an independent review of the program.741 On January 

28, 2005, the inspector general responded that the senior officer review would not satisfy the 

recommendation fo^uUndependent review.742 The inspector general also responded to a 

concern raised by that studying the results of CIA interrogations would 

amount to human experimentation, stating: 

"1 fear there was a misunderstanding. OIG did not have in mind doing 

additional, guinea pig research on human beings. What we are recommending 

is that the Agency undertake a careful review of its experience to date in using 

the various techniques and that it draw conclusions about their safety, 

effectiveness, etc., that can guide CIA officers as we move ahead. We make 

this recommendation because we have found that the Agency over the decades 

has continued to get itself in messes related to interrogation programs for one 

overriding reason: we do not document and learn from our experience - each 

generation of officers is left to improvise anew, with problematic results for 

our officers as individuals and for our Agency. Wc are not unaware that there 

are subtleties to this matter, as the effectiveness of techniques varies among 

individuals, over time, as administered, in combination with one another, and 

so on. All the more reason to document these important findings."743 

1° November and December 2004, the CIA responded to National 

Security Advisor Rice's questions about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques by asserting that an effectiveness review was not possible, while highlighting 

examples of "[k]ey intelligence" the CIA represented was obtained after the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques. The December 2004 memorandum prepared for the national 

security advisor entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," 

begins: 

739

 May 12, 2004 Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Chief, Information 

Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Director for 

Operations re Operational Review of CIA Detainee Program. 

740 See Volume I for additional information. 

741

 Email from: John Helgerson; to: Porter Goss, | 

[REDACTED]; subject: DCI Question Regarding 

742

 Email from: John Helgerson; to: Porter Goss,] 

[REDACTED]; subject: DCI Question Regarding 

743

 Email from: John Helgerson; to: Porter Goss,] 

|; cc: Jose Rodriguez, John Rizzo, [REDACTED], 

; OIG Report; date: January 28, 2005. 

|; cc: Jose Rodriguez, John Rizzo, [REDACTED], 

;OIG Report; January 28, 2005. 

cc: Jose Rodriguez, John Rizzo, [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED]; subject: DCI Question Regarding OIG Report; date: January 28, 2005. The CIA's June 2013 

Response maintains that "[a] systematic study over time of the effectiveness of the techniques would have been 

encumbered by a number of factors," including "Federal policy on the protection of human subjects and the 

impracticability of establishing an effective control group." 

11 ii 11 ii i i ^BBBBBMi^^B^Noron N 

Page 126 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

126 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ k/NOFORN 

"Action Requested: None. This memorandum responds to your request for an 

independent study of the foreign intelligence efficacy of using enhanced 

interrogation techniques. There is no way to conduct such a study. What we 

can do, however, if [sic] set forth below the intelligence the Agency obtained 

from detainees who, before their interrogations, were not providing any 

information of intelligence [value]."744 

(TS^flH^^HZ/NF ) Under a section of the memorandum entitled, "Results," the CIA 

memo asserts that the "CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of 

a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots [and] capture 

additional terrorists." The memorandum then lists examples of "[k]ey intelligence collected 

from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques," which led to "disruptefed] 

terrorist plots" and the "capture [of] additional terrorists." The examples include: the "Karachi 

Plot," the "Heathrow Plot," "the 'Second Wave'" plotting, the identification of the "the Guraba 

Cell," the identification of "Issa al-Hindi," the arrest of Abu Talha al-Pakistani, "Hambali's 

Capture," information on Jaffar al-Tayyar, the "Dirty Bomb" plot, the arrest of Sajid Badat, and 

information on Shkai, Pakistan. CIA records do not indicate when, or if, this memorandum was 

provided to the national security advisor.745 

A subsequent CIA memorandum, dated March 5, 2005, concerning 

an upcoming meeting between the CIA director and the national security advisor on the CIA's 

progress in completing the OIG recommended review of the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques states, "we [CIA] believe this study is much needed and should be 

headed up by highly respected national-level political figures with widely recognized reputations 

for independence and fairness."746 

On March 21, 2005, the director of the CTC formally proposed the 

"establishment of an independent 'blue ribbon' commission... with a charter to stud^u^^ ^ 

ElTs."747 The CIA then began the processofestablishing^ 

and 

Both panelists received briefings and papers from CIA 

personnel who participated in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. BH I [the 

first panelist] wrote: "It is clear from our discussions with both DO and DI officers that the 

program is deemed by them to be a great success, and I would concur. The EITs, as part of the 

overall program, are credited with enabling the US to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional 

terrorists, and collect a high volume of useful intelligence on al-Qa'ida (AQ).... There are 

accounts of numerous plots against the US and the West that were revealed as a result of HVD 

744

 December 2004 CIA Memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence," 

Subject: "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." 

745

 December 2004 CIA Memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence," 

Subject: "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." Italics in original. 

746

 March 5,2005, Talking Points for Weekly Meeting with National Security Advisor re CIA Proposal for 

Independent Study of the Effectiveness of CTC Interrogation Program's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques. 

747

 March 21, 2005, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Robert L. Grenier, Director DCI 

Counterterrorism Center, re Proposal for Full-Scope Independent Study of the CTC Rendition, Detention, and 

Interrogation Programs. 

TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN 

Page 127 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

127 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/d y/NOFORN 

interrogations." He also observed, however, that "[n]either my background nor field of expertise 

particularly lend themselves to judgingtheeffectiveness of interrogation techniques, taken 

individually or collectively."748 HH 1 [the second panelist] concluded that "there is no 

objective way to answer the question of efficacy," but stated it was possible to "make some 

general observations" about the program based on CIA personnel assessments of "the quality of 

the intelligence provided" by CIA detainees. Regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, he wrote: "here enters the epistemological problem. We can never 

know whether or not this intelligence could have been extracted though alternative procedures. 

Spokesmen from within the organization firmly believe it could not have been."749 

4. The CIA Wrongfully Detains Khalid Al-Masri; CIA Director Rejects Accountability for 

Officer Involved 

After the dissemination of the draft CIA Inspector General Spccial 

Review in early 2004, approvals from CIA Headquarters to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques adhered more closely to the language of the DCI guidelines. Nonetheless, CIA 

records indicate that officers at CIA Headquarters continued to fail to properly monitor 

justifications for the capture and detention of detainees, as well as the justification for the use of 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on particular detainees.750 

F o r

 example, on January 2004, the CIA rendered German 

citizen Khalid al-Masri to a Country | facility used by the CIA for detention purposes. The 

rendition was based on the determination by officers in the CIA's ALEC Station that "al-Masri 

knows key information that could assist in the capture of other al-Qa'ida operatives that pose a 

serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests and who may be planning 

terrorist activities."751 The cable did not state that Khalid al-Masri himself posed a serious threat 

of violence or death, the standard required for detention under the September 17, 2001, 

Memorandum of Notification (MON). 

(^S/^^^HHi^^^ ) CIA debriefing cables from Country | on January 27, 2004, and 

January 28, 2004, note that Khalid al-Masri "seemed bewildered on why he has been sent to this 

particular prison,"752 and was "adamant that [CIA] has the wrong person."753 Despite doubts 

from CIA officers in Country | about Khalid al-Masri's links to terrorists, and RDG's 

concurrence with those doubts, different components within the CIA disagreed on the process for 

his release.754 As later described by the CIA inspector general, officers in ALEC Station 

continued to think that releasing Khalid al-Masri would pose a threat to U.S. interests and that 

748

 September 2, 2005 Memorandum from

 t o

 Director Porter Goss, CIA re Assessment of EITs 

Effectiveness. For additional information, see Volume II. 

749

 September 23, 2005 Memorandum from BIHIH1t o the Honorable Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence 

Agency re Response to Request from Director for Assessment of EIT Effectiveness. For additional information, see 

Volume II. 

750

 For additional information, see Volume III. 

151 

752 

754 

753 

(0223412 APR 04) 

Page 128 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

128 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET^ 1//NOFOKN 

monitoring should be required, while those in the CIA's Division did not want to notify 

the German government about the rendition of a German citizen.755 Because of the significance 

of the dispute, the National Security Council settled the matter, concluding that al-Masri should 

be repatriated and that the Germans should be told about al-Masri's rendition.756 

On May B , 2004, Khalid al-Masri was transferred from Country | 

to ^^If 7 5 7 After al-Masri arrived CIA officers released him and sent him toward 

a fake border crossing, where the officers told him he would be sent back to Germany because he 

had entered illegally.758 At the time of his release, al-Masri was provided 14,500 

Euros,759 as well as his belongings.760 

(TS/VHUIH^^HB 1^ ^ ) On July 16, 2007, the CIA inspector general issued a Report of 

Investigation on the rendition and detention of Khalid al-Masri, concluding that "|a]vailable 

intelligence information did not provide a sufficient basis to render and detain Khalid al-Masri," 

and that the "Agency's prolonged detention of al-Masri was unjustified."761 On October 9, 2007, 

the CIA informed the Committee that it "lacked sufficient basis to render and detain al-Masri," 

and that the judgment by operations officers that al-Masri was associated with terrorists who 

posed a threat to U.S. interests "was not supported by available intelligence." The CIA director 

nonetheless decided that no further action was warranted against then the 

deputy chief of ALEC Station, who advocated for al-Masri's rendition, because "[t]he Director 

strongly believes that mistakes should be expected in a business filled with uncertainty and that, 

when they result from performance that meets reasonable standards, CIA leadership must stand 

behind the officers who make them." The notification also stated that "with regard to 

counterterrorism operations in general and the al-Masri matter in particular, the Director believes 

the scale tips decisively in favor of accepting mistakes that over connect the dots against those 

that under connect them."762 

755

 CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, The Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid 

al-Masri (2004-7601-IG), July 16,2007. 

756

 CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, The Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid 

al-Masri (2004-7601 IG), July 16,2007. 

757

 ^^^HI^^H M 25071 758

 ^^^4265 5 | 

759

 Using May 2004 exchange rates, this amounted to approximately $17,000. 

760

 Hl^ l 42655 | 

761

 CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation, The Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid 

al-Masri (2004-7601-IG), July 16, 2007. 

762

 Referring to | | and a second CTC officer named in the OIG's Report of Investigation, the 

notification to Congress stated that the director "does not believe that... the performance of the two named CTC 

officers fall below a reasonable level of professionalism, skill, and diligence as defined in CIA's Standard for 

Employee Accountability." The notification also stated that there was a "high threat environment" at the time of die 

rendition, which "was essentially identical to the one in which CTC employees, including the two in question here, 

previously had been sharply criticized for not connecting the dots prior to 9/11." The notification acknowledged "an 

insufficient legal justification, which failed to meet the standard prescribed in the [MON]," and referred to the acting 

general counsel the task of assessing legal advice and personal accountability. Based on recommendations from the 

inspector general, the CIA "developed a template for rendition proposals that makes clear what information is 

required, including the intelligence basis for that information." (See Congressional notification, with the subject, 

"CIA Response to OIG Investigation Regarding the Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid al-Masri," 

dated October 9, 2007 (DTS #2007-4026).) The last CIA detainee, Muhammad Rahim, had already been rendered 

to CIA custody by the time of this notificatior^ni^IA^un^Ol^espons e points to a review of analytical 

m i 1111 1

 1111 1 

Page 129 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

129 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ k/NOFORN 

5. Hassan Ghul Provides Substantial Information—Including Information on a Key UBL 

Facilitator—Prior to the CIA's Use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 

mmm^m m foreign authorities captured Hassan 

Ghul in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region on January 2004.76J After his identity was confirmed on 

January 2004,764 Ghul was rendered from U.S. military custody to CIA custody at 

DETENTION SITE COBALT on January 2004.765 The detention site interrogators, who, 

according to CIA records, did not use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul, sent 

at least 21 intelligence reports to CIA Headquarters based on their debriefings of Hassan Ghul 

from the two days he spent at the facility.766 

(TS/JHHHIHI^NE ) As detailed in this summary, and in greater detail in Volume II, 

CIA records indicate that the most accurate CIA detainee reporting on the facilitator who led to 

Usama bin Laden (UBL) was acquired from Hassan Ghul—prior to the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques.767 Ghul speculated that "UBL was likely living in [the] 

training arising out of the al-Masri rendition, but states that, "[n]onetheless, we concede that it is difficult in 

hindsight to understand how the Agency could make such a mistake, take too long to correct it, determine that a 

flawed legal interpretation contributed, and in the end only hold accountable three CTC attorneys, two of whom 

received only an oral admonition." 

763

 HEADQUARTERS M M JAN 04) 

7<M HEADQUARTERS •|||i^HjAN04) . The CIA confirmed that the individual detained matched the 

biographical data on Hassan Ghul. Khalid Shaykh Muhammad and Khallad bin Attash confirmed that a photo 

provided was of Ghul. See M M 1260 I^^M I JAN 04). 

765 

7FIS 

1642 

54194 

released as HEADQUARTERS 

later released as HEADQUARTERS 

04), later released as HEADQUARTERS 

JAN 04), later released as HEADQUARTERS 

EB 04) 

IAN 04); DIRECTOR | 

~IAN 04); | 

IAN 04); | 

[AN 04); | 

IAN 04); | 

FEB 04); | 

1650 

1652 

AN 04); 

AN 04), later released as 

165 7

 •••JA N 04); 

1679 

1681 

1685 

AN 04)j 

AN 04); 

AN 04), later released as 

1654^^^BTA N 04 

IA. 

1677 

1680 

AN 04), later released as 

AN 04), later released as 

AN 04) 

1644 H^HJA N 04), later 

1645^^^MjA N 04), 

1646||^^MlA N 

1647| 

|CIA| 

1651 

"EB 04); 

JAN 04); 

[TAN 04); 

JAN 04), later released as | 

[1688|^^^HjA N 04), later released as I 

04); I 

1656 

767

 As the dissemination of 21 intelligence reports suggests, information in CIA records indicates Hassan Ghul was 

cooperative prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. In an interview with the CIA 

Office of Inspector General, a CIA officer familiar with Ghul's initial interrogations stated, "He sang like a tweetie 

bird. He opened up right away and was cooperative from the outset." (See December 2, 2004, interview with 

[REDACTED], Chief, DO, CTC UBL Department, •^••••^H- ) CIA records reveal that Ghul's 

information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was disseminated while Ghul was at DETENTION SITE COBALT, prior to 

the initiation of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. On April 16, 2013, die Council on Foreign Relations 

hosted a forum in relation to the screening of the film, "Manhunt." The forum included former CIA officer Nada 

Bakos, who states in the film that Hassan Ghul provided the critical information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to 

Kurdish officials prior to entering CIA custody. When asked about the interrogation techniques used by the Kurds, 

mi 11 in i ^ U ^ ^ M B '^^ n 

Page 130 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

130 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRETfl^^^^BM^^MM^NQPQR N 

Peshawar area," and that "it was well known that he was always with Abu Ahmed [alKuwaiti]."768

 Ghul described Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti as UBL's "closest assistant,"769 who 

couriered messages to al-Qa'ida's chief of operations, and listed al-Kuwaiti as one of three 

individuals likely with UBL.770 Ghul further speculated that: 

"UBL's security apparatus would be minimal, and that the group likely 

lived in a house with a family somewhere in Pakistan.... Ghul speculated 

that Abu Ahmed likely handled all of UBL's needs, including moving 

messages out to Abu Faraj [al-Libi]...."771 

(VVj^mmmW ) During this same period, prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, Ghul provided information related to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Abu 

Faraj al-Libi (including his role in delivering messages from UBL), Jaffar al-Tayyar, 'Abd alHadi al-Iraqi, Hamza Rabi'a, Shaik Sa'id al-Masri, Sharif al-Masri, Abu 'Abd al-Rahman alNajdi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, and numerous other al-Qa'ida operatives. He also provided 

information on the locations, movements, operational security, and training of al-Qa'ida leaders 

living in Shkai, Pakistan, as well as on the visits of other leaders and operatives to Shkai.772 

Ghul's reporting on Shkai, which was included in at least 16 of the 21 intelligence reports,773 

confirmed earlier reporting that the Shkai valley served as al-Qa'ida's command and control 

center after the group's 2001 exodus from Afghanistan.774 Notwithstanding these facts, in March 

768

 HEADQUARTERS 

169 

770 

771

 HEADQUARTERS 

772 

Bakos stated: ".. .honestly, Hassan Ghul.. .when he was being debriefed by the Kurdish government, he literally 

was sitting there having tea. He was in a safe house. He wasn't locked up in a cell. He wasn't handcuffed to 

anything. He was—he was having a free flowing conversation. And there's—you know, there's articles in Kurdish 

papers about sort of their interpretation of the story and how forthcoming he was." (See 

www.cfr.org/countei1errorism/film-screening-manhunt/p30560.) Given the unusually high number of intelligence 

reports disseminated in such a short time period, and the statements of former CIA officer Bakos, the Committee 

requested additional information from the CIA oil Ghul's interrogation prior to entering CIA custody. The CIA 

wrote on October 25, 2013: "We have not identified any information in our holdings suggesting that Hassan Gul 

first provided information on Abu Ahmad while in [foreign] custody." No information was provided on Hassan 

Ghul's intelligence reporting while in U.S. military detention. See DTS #2013-3152. 

AN 04) 

AN 04) 

AN 04) 

JAN 04) ^^^^^^^^^^ ^ 

AN 1654 

AN 04) ^^^^^^^^^ ^ 

AN 1644 

JAN 1 

1655 

1679 

JAN 1656 

AN 1650 

1657 

AN 1690 

774

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Detainee Profile on Hassan Ghul for coord; date: 

December 30,2005, at 8:14:04 AM. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^ 

11 ii 11 i n iII i II 

Page 131 of 499 

JAN 04); 

JAN 04); 

AN 04); 

04); 

04); 

AN 04); 

AN 04); 

AN 04); 

AN 04); 

JAN 04) 

UNCLASSIFIED 

131 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

2005, the CIA represented to the Department of Justice that Hassan Ghul's reporting on Shkai 

was acquired "after" the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.775 

After two days of questioning at DETENTION SITE COBALT 

and the dissemination of 21 intelligence reports, Ghul was transferred to DETENTION SITE 

BLACK.776 According to CIA records, upon arrival, Ghul was "shaved and barbered, stripped, 

and placed in the standing position against the wall" with "his hands above his head" with plans 

to lower his hands after two hours.777 The CIA interrogators at the detention site then requested 

to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul, writing: 

"[the] interrogation team believes, based on [Hassan Ghul's] reaction to the 

initial contact, that his al-Qa'ida briefings and his earlier experiences with U.S. 

military interrogators have convinced him there are limits to the physical 

contact interrogators can have with him. The interrogation team believes the 

approval and employment of enhanced measures should sufficiently shift 

[Hassan Ghul's] paradigm of what he expects to happen. The Jack of these 

increasd [sic] measures may limit the team's capability to collect critical and 

reliable information in a timely manner."778 

(TS^mim^^m^NF ) CIA Headquarters approved the request the same day.779 

Following 59 hours of sleep deprivation,780 Hassan Ghul experienced hallucinations, but was told 

by a psychologist that his reactions were "consistent with what many others experience in his 

condition," and that he should calm himself by telling himself his experiences are normal and 

will subside when he decides to be truthful.781 The sleep deprivation, as well as other enhanced 

interrogations, continued,782 as did Ghul's hallucinations.783 Ghul also complained of back pain 

and asked to see a doctor,784 but interrogators responded that the "pain was normal, and would 

stop when [Ghul] was confirmed as telling the truth." A cable states that "[interrogators told 

[Ghul] they did not care if he was in pain, but cared only if he provided complete and truthful 

information."785 A CIA physician assistant later observed that Hassan Ghul was experiencing 

"notable physiological fatigue," including "abdominal and back muscle pain/spasm, 'heaviness' 

and mild paralysis of arms, legs and feet [that] are secondary to his hanging position and extreme 

775

 March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from Legal Group, DCI 

Countertenorist Center, re: Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques. Italics in original. 

For additional representations, see Volume II. 

AN 04) 

AN 04) 

AN 04) 

JAN 04) 

JAN 04) 

JAN 04) 

JAN 04) 

JAN 04); | 1312 | JAN 04). The CIA's June 2013 Response 

states that when hallucinations occurred during sleep deprivation, "medical personnel intervened to ensure a 

detainee would be allowed a period of sleep." As described in this summary, and more extensively in Volume III, 

CIA records indicate that medical personnel did not always intervene and allow detainees to sleep after experiencing 

hallucinations. 

784

 1299 •• • JAN 04) 

[ 1299 JAN 04). See Volume III for similar statements made to CIA detainees. 

M I M II 111 BMjj^^^B^^Bi^B 1' ! II II I mi i 

Page 132 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

132 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

degree of sleep deprivation," but that Ghul was clinically stable and had "essentially normal vital 

signs," despite an "occasional premature heart beat" that the cable linked to Ghul's fatigue.786 

Throughout this period, Ghul provided no actionable threat information, and as detailed later in 

this summary, much of his reporting on the al-Qa'ida presence in Shkai was repetitive of his 

reporting prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Ghul also provided no 

other information of substance on UBL facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.787 Nonetheless, on 

May 5, 2011, the CIA provided a document to the Committee entitled, "Detainee Reporting on 

Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," which lists Hassan Ghul as a CIA detainee who was subjected to the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and who provided "Tier One" information "link[ing] 

Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin."788 Hassan I liul i and 

later released.789 ^ 

6. Other Detainees Wrongfully Held in 2004; CIA Sources Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced 

Interrogation Techniques; CIA Officer Testifies that the CIA Is "Not Authorized" "to Do 

Anything Like What You Have Seen " in Abu Ghraib Photographs 

In March 2004, the CLA took custody of an Afghan national who 

had sought employment at a U.S. military base because he had the same name (Gul Rahman) as 

an individual believed to be targeting U.S. military forces in Afghanistan.791 During the period 

in which the Afghan was detained, the CIA obtained signals intelligence of their true target 

communicating with his associates. DNA results later showed conclusively that the Afghan in 

custody was not the target. Nonetheless, the CIA held the detainee in solitary confinement for 

approximately a month before he was released with a nominal payment.792 

In the spring of 2004, after two detainees were transferred to CIA 

custody, CIA interrogators proposed, and CIA Headquarters approved, using the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques on one of the two detainees because it might cause the detainee to 

provide information that could identify inconsistencies in the other detainee's story.793 After 

both detainees had spent approximately 24 hours shackled in the standing sleep deprivation 

position, CIA Headquarters confirmed that the detainees were former CIA sources.794 The two 

detainees had tried to contact the CIA on multiple occasions prior to their detention to inform the 

CIA of their activities and provide intelligence. The messages they had sent to the CIA | 

786

 l^ m 1308 JAN 04) 

787 See Volume II for additional information. 

788 See CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, dated May 5, 2011, which includes a document 

entitled, "Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti," with an accompanying six-page chart 

entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti" (DTS #2011-2004). 

789

 2441 ••••••I ; HEADQUARTERS ••••l^^ l 1635 

[1712 ••••••THEADQUARTER S | 

190 

791

 The individual detained and the individual believed to be targeting U.S. forces were different from the Gul 

Rahman who died at DETENTION SITE COBALT. 

792

 2035 ^••••• 1 

793

 ([REDACTED]) 

794

 111 B m in I II M I 

M i l II I I 

Page 133 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

133 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

| were not translated until after the detainees were subjected to the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques.795 

During this same period in early 2004, CIA interrogators 

interrogated Adnan al-Libi, a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. CIA Headquarters 

did not approve the use of the CIA's enhanced techniques against al-Libi, but indicated that 

interrogators could use "standard" interrogation techniques, which included up to 48 hours of 

sleep deprivation.796 CIA interrogators subsequently reported subjecting Adnan al-Libi to sleep 

deprivation sessions of 46.5 hours, 24 hours, and 48 hours, with a combined three hours of sleep 

between sessions.797 

Beginning in late April 2004, a number of media outlets published 

photographs of detainee abuse at the Department of Defense-run Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The 

media reports caused members of the Committee and individuals in the executive branch to focus 

on detainee issues. On May 12, 2004, the Committee held a lengthy hearing on detainee issues 

with Department of Defense and CIA witnesses. The CIA used the Abu Ghraib abuses as a 

contrasting reference point for its detention and interrogation activities. In a response to a 

question from a Committee member, CIA Deputy Director McLaughlin said, "we are not 

authorized in [the CIA program] to do anything like what you have seen in those 

photographs."798 In response, a member of the Committee said, "I understand," and expressed 

thc understanding, consistent with past CIA briefings to the Committee, that the "norm" of CIA's 

interrogations was "transparent law enforcement procedures [that] had developed to such a high 

level... that you could get pretty much what you wanted." The CIA did not correct the 

Committee member's misunderstanding that CIA interrogation techniques were similar to 

techniques used by U.S. law enforcement.799 

7. The CIA Suspends the Use of its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Resumes Use of the 

Techniques on an Individual Basis; Interrogations are Based on Fabricated, Single 

Source Information 

(TSZ/H^^^^^^m^/NF ) In May 2004, the OLC, then led by Assistant Attorney General 

Jack Goldsmith, informed the CIA's Office of General Counsel that it had never formally opined 

on whether the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the CIA's program was 

| ([REDACTED]). For more information on AL-TURKI and AL-MAGREBI, see 

795

 HEADQUARTERS | 

Volume III. 

796 See Volume I and II, including HEADQUARTERS^^HJH|^^^^^ ^ In November 2003, CIA 

General Counsel Scott Muller sent an email to H^^|^|^fsuggestin g "changing the sleep deprivation line 

a^sicUjetweer^nhanced and standard from 72 to 48 hours." (See November 23, 2003, email from Scott Muller to 

HHHIHfc c c : John Rizzo, Subject: Al-Hawsawi Incident.) On January 10, 2004, CIA Headquarters 

informed CIA detention sites of the change, stating that sleep deprivation over 48 hours would now be considered an 

enhanced" interrogation technique. See HEADQUARTER£^^B(101713ZJAN 04). 

1888 (09.1823Z MAR 04); 1889 (091836Z MAR 04). 

There is no indication in CIA records that CIA Headquarters addressed the repeated use of "standard" sleep 

deprivation against Adnan al-Libi. For more information, see Volume III detainee report for Adnan al-Libi. 

798

 Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, May 12, 2004 (DTS #2004-2332). 

799

 Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, May 12, 2004 (DTS #2004-2332). 

11 ii 11 in i ^^M^^B B^^^Bvnofqrn 

Page 134 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

134 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

consistent with U.S. constitutional standards.800 Goldsmith also raised concerns about 

divergences between the CIA's proposed enhanced interrogation techniques, as described in the 

August 1, 2002, memorandum, and their actual application, as described in the CIA Inspector 

General's Special Review.801 In late May 2004, DCI Tenet suspended the use of the CIA's 

"enhanced" and "standard" interrogation techniques, pending updated approvals from the 

OLC.802 On June 4, 2004, DCI Tenet issued a formal memorandum suspending the use of the 

CIA's interrogation techniques, pending policy and legal review.803 The same day, the CIA 

sought reaffirmation of the program from the National Security Council.804 National Security 

Advisor Rice responded, noting that the "next logical step is for the Attorney General to 

complete the relevant legal analysis now in preparation."805 

(T&V^^^^^^B^P ) On June 2004, a foreign government captured Janat Gul, an 

individual believed, based on reporting from a CIA source, to have information about al-Qa'ida 

plans to attack the United States prior to the 2004 presidential election.806 In October 2004, the 

CIA source who provided the information on the "pre-election" threat and implicated Gul and 

others admitted to fabricating the information. However, as early as March 2004, CIA officials 

internally expressed doubts about the validity of the CIA source's information.807 

On July 2, 2004, the CIA met with National Security Advisor Rice, 

other National Security Council officials, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, as well as the 

attorney general and the deputy attorney general, to seek authorization to use the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, specifically on Janat Gul,808 The CIA represented that CI A 

soo Ma y 25; 2004, Talking Points for DCI Telephone Conversation with Attorney General: DOJ's Legal Opinion re 

CIA's Counter-terrorist Program (CT) Interrogation. Letter from Assistant Attorney General Jack L. Goldsmith III to 

Director Tenet, June 18, 2004 (DTS #2004-2710). 

801

 May 27, 2004, letter from Assistant Attorney General Goldsmith to General Counsel Muller. 

802

 May 24, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from subject: Memorandum of Meeting with the 

DCI Regarding DOJ's Statement that DOJ has Rendered No Legal Opinion on Whether CIA's Use of Enhanced 

Interrogation Techniques would meet Constitutional Standards. Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations 

from Director of Central Intelligence, June 4, 2004, re: Suspension of Use of Interrogation Techniques. 

803

 June 4, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Director of Central Intelligence, re: 

Suspension of Use of Interrogation Techniques. On June 2, 2004, George Tenet informed the President that he 

intended to resign from his position on July 11, 2004. The White House announced the resignation on June 3, 2004. 

804

 June 4, 2004, Memorandum for the National Security Advisor from DCI George Tenet, re: Review of CIA 

Interrogation Program. 

805

 June 2004, Memorandum for the Honorable George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence from Condoleezza 

Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, re: Review of CIA'interrogation Program. 

139254 HHH^H^^HBI 3121 1 

807

 The former chief of the CIA's Bin Ladin Unit wrote in a March 2004, email that the reporting was "vague" 

and "worthless in terms of actionable intelligence." He suggested that the reporting "would be an easy way [for alQa'ida] to test" the loyalty of the source, given al-Qa'ida's knowledge thay^edjhreatreporting "causes panic in 

Wasliington." (See email from: ^•flHM; t o : ^HI^IHHH ' I^HI^^^H . [REDACTED], 

I; subject: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and [source name REDACTED]?; 

date: March 2004, at 06:55 AM.) ALE^tatioiMrfficer expresse<Uimilai^loubts it^ ^ 

response to the See email from: ^^^H^^^^BrioTBUBI^^B' c c : 

[REDACTED],|HHHB|^Bsubject :

 Re :

 could AQbetesting [ASSE^Y^in^source name 

REDACTED]?; date: March 2004, at 07:52:32 AM). See also H B 1411 (^•^^•04) . 

808

 July 2, 2004, CIA Memorandum re Meeting with National Adviser Rice in the White House Situation Room, re 

Interrogations and Detainee Janat Gul, July 2, 2004. 

III! I I III I ^JJj^^^^^^BI/mOrOB N 

Page 135 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

135 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRE^Mi^M^^^MM^OPOB N 

"interrogations have saved American lives," that more than half of the CIA detainees would not 

cooperate until they were interrogated using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,809 and 

that "unless CIA interrogators can use a full range of enhanced interrogation methods, it is 

unlikely that CIA will be able to obtain current threat information from Gul in a timely 

manner."810 Janat Gul was not yet in CIA custody.811 

On July 6, 2004, National Security Advisor Rice sent a 

memorandum to DCI Tenet stating that the CIA was "permitted to use previously approved 

enhanced interrogation methods for Janat Gul, with the exception of the waterboard." Rice 

offered "to assist [the CIA] in obtaining additional guidance from the Attorney General and NSC 

Principals on an expedited basis" and noted the CIA's agreement to provide additional 

information about the waterboard technique in order for the Department of Justice to assess its 

legality. Rice's memorandum further documented that the CIA had informed her that "Gul 

likely has information about preelection terrorist attacks against the United States as a result of 

Gul's close ties to individuals involved in these alleged plots."812 

In a meeting on July 20, 2004, National Security Council 

principals, including the vice president, provided their authorization for the CIA to use its 

enhanced interrogation techniques—again, with the exception of the waterboard—on Janat Gul. 

They also directed the Department of Justice to prepare a legal opinion on whether the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques were consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 

the U.S. Constitution.813 On July 22, 2004, Attorney General John Ashcroft sent a letter to 

Acting DCI John McLaughlin stating that nine interrogation techniques (those addressed in the 

August 1, 2002, memorandum, with the exception of the waterboard) did not violate the U.S. 

Constitution or any statute or U.S. treaty obligations, in the context of the interrogation of Janat 

Gul.814 For the remainder of 2004, the CIA used its enhanced interrogation techniques on three 

detainees—Janat Gul, Sharif al-Masri, and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani—with individualized 

approval from the Department of Justice.815 

After being rendered to CIA custody on July 2004, Janat Gul 

was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including continuous sleep 

deprivation, facial holds, attention grasps, facial slaps, stress positions, and walling,816 until he 

809

 At the time of this CIA representation, the CIA had held at least 109 detainees and subjected at least 33 of them 

(30 percent) to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

810

 July 6, 2004, Memorandum from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to 

the Honorable George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, re Janat Gul. CIA Request for Guidance Regarding 

Interrogation of Janat Gul, July 2, 2004. 

811

 For additional details, see Volume III. 

812

 July 6, 2004, Memorandum from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to 

the Honorable George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, re Janat Gul. 

813

 July 29, 2004, Memorandum for the Record from CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, "Principals Meeting 

relating to Janat Gul on 20 July 2004." 

814

 The one-paragraph letter did not provide legal analysis or substantive discussion of the interrogation techniques. 

Letter from Attorney General Ashcroft to Acting DCI McLaughlin, July 22,2004 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 4). 

815 See Volume III for additional details. 

Page 136 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

136 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ k/NOFORN 

experienced auditory and visual hallucinations.817 According to a cable, Janat Gul was "not 

oriented to time or place" and told CIA officers that he saw "his wife and children in the mirror 

and had heard their voices in the white noise."818 The questioning of Janat Gul continued, 

although the CIA ceased using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques for several days. 

According to a CIA cable, "[Gul] asked to die, or just be killed."819 After continued 

interrogation sessions with Gul, on August 19, 2004, CIA detention site personnel wrote that the 

interrogation "team does not believe [Gul] is withholding imminent threat information."820 On 

August 21, 2004, a cable from CIA Headquarters stated that Janat Gul "is believed" to possess 

threat information, and that the "use of enhanced techniques is appropriate in order to obtain that 

information."821 On that day, August 21, 2004, CIA interrogators resumed using the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul.822 Gul continued not to provide any reporting on 

the pre-election threat described by the CIA source.823 On August 25, 2004, CIA interrogators 

sent a cable to CIA Headquarters stating that Janat Gul "may not possess all that [the CIA] 

believes him to know."824 The interrogators added that "many issues linking [Gul] to al-Qaida 

are derived from single source reporting" (the CIA source).825 Nonetheless, CIA interrogators 

continued to question Gul on the pre-election threat. According to an August 26, 2004, cable, 

after a 47-hour session of standing sleep deprivation, Janat Gul was returned to his cell, allowed 

to remove his diaper, given a towel and a meal, and permitted to sleep.826 In October 2004, the 

CIA conducted a^BIH I of the CIA source who had identified Gul as having knowledge of 

attack planning for the pre-election threat. I^^HH^^H R

 th e

 CIA source admitted to 

fabricating the information.827 Gul was subsequently transferred to a foreign government. On 

the CIA that Janat Gul had been released.828 

(^S/lllllHifr^ ) Janat Gul never provided the threat information the CIA originally 

told the National Security Council that Gul possessed. Nor did the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques against Gul producc the "immediate threat information that could save 

American lives," which had been the basis for the CIA to seek authorization to use the 

techniques. As described elsewhere in this summary, the CIA's justification for employing its 

enhanced interrogation techniques on Janat Gul—the first detainee to be subjected to the 

techniques following the May 2004 suspension—changed over time. After having initially cited 

Gul's knowledge of the pre-election threat, as reported by the CLA's source, the CIA began 

representing that its enhanced interrogation techniques were required for Gul to deny the 

existence of the threat, thereby disproving the credibility of the CIA source.829 

829

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attc ~ ' "' May 30, 2005, Re: Application of 

TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN 

Page 137 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

137 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NQFORN 

0 n

 August 11, 2004, in the midst of the interrogation of Janat Gul 

using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, CIA attorney HH^H^ I wrote a letter 

to Acting Assistant Attorney General Dan Levin with "brief biographies" of four individuals 

whom the CIA hoped to detain. Given the requirement at the time that the CIA seek individual 

approval from the Department of Justice before using the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques against a detainee, the CIA letter states, "[w]e are providing these preliminary 

biographies in preparation for a future request for a legal opinion on their subsequent 

interrogation in CIA control." Two of the individuals—Abu Faraj al-Libi and Hamza Rabi'a— 

had not yet been captured, and thus the "biographies" made no reference to their interrogations 

or the need to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The third individual, Abu Talha 

al-Pakistani, was in foreign government custody. His debriefings by a foreign government, | 

^^^^H^I^H^I , were described in the letter as "only moderately effective" because Abu 

Talha was "distracting [those questioning him] with noncritical information that is truthful, but is 

not related to operational planning." The fourth individual, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, was also 

inforeign government custody and being debriefed by foreign government officials 

According to the letter, Ghailani's foreign government debriefings were "ineffective" 

because Ghailani had "denied knowledge of current threats." The letter described reporting on 

the pre-election threat—much of which came from the CIA source—in the context of all four 

individuals.830 Ahmed Ghailani and Abu Faraj al-Libi were eventually rendered to CIA custody 

and subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

(TSZ/I^^^^^^^B^NF ) On September 2004, after the CIA had initiated a 

counterintelligence review of the CIA source who had reported on the pre-election threat, but 

prior to the CIA source's the CIA took custody of Sharif al-Masri, whom the CIA 

source had reported would also have information about the threat.831 Intelligence provided by 

Sharif al-Masri while he was in foreign government custody resulted in the dissemination of 

more than 30 CIA intelligence reports.832 After entering CIA custody, Sharif al-Masri expressed 

his intent to cooperate with the CIA, indicating that he was frightened of interrogations because 

he had been tortured while being interrogated in

 833

 The CIA nonetheless 

sought approval to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Masri because of 

his failure to provide information on the pre-election threat.834 

(^FS/^^^^^m^plNF ) After approximately a week of interrogating al-Masri using the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including sleep deprivation that coincided with 

United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be 

Used in the Interrogation of High Value at Qaeda Detainees, at 11. See section of this summary and Volume II 

entitled, "The Assertion that CIA Detainees Subjected to Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Help Validate CIA 

Sources." 

|, Assistant General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, 

830

 Letter from 

2004. 

831

 WASHINGTON |MAR 04). See HEADQUARTERS 

!

 See, for example, 

3191 

|3194| 

TOP SECRET//] 

|; and | 

I; HEADQUARTERS] 

Page 138 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

24611| 

|3192| 

VNOFORN 

138 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

auditory hallucinations, CIA interrogators reported that al-Masri had been "motivated to 

S

'" ipate" at the time of his arrival.835 Despite al-Masri's repeated descriptions of torture in 

, the CIA transferred al-Masri to that government's custody after approximately three 

months of CIA detention.836 

As in the case of Janat Gul and Sharif al-Masri, the CIA's requests 

for OLC advice on the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Ahmed 

Khalfan Ghailani were based on the fabricated reporting on the pre-election threat from the same 

CIA source.837 Like Janat Gul and Sharif al-Masri, Ghailani also experienced auditory 

hallucinations following sleep deprivation.838 As described in this summary, after having opined 

on the legality of using the CTA's enhanced interrogation techniques on these three individual 

detainees, the OLC did not opine again on the CIA's enhanced interrogation program until May 

2005. 

8. Country^Detains Individuals on the CIA's Behalf 

(TS/flHHHB/NF ) Consideration of a detention facility in Country | began in 

2003, when the CIA sought to transfer Ramzi bin al-Shibh from the custody of a foreign 

government to CIA custody.839 which had not yet informed the 

country'spolitical leadership of the CIA's request to establish a clandestine detention facility in 

Country surveyed potential sites for the facility, while the CIA set aside $ | million for its 

construction.840 In 2003, the CIA arranged for a "temporary patch" involving placing two 

CIA detainees (Ramzi bin al-Shibh and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri) within an already existing 

Country | detention facility, until the CIA's own facility could be built.841 That spring, as the 

CIA was offering millions of dollars in subsidies to in Countries and |, 8 4 2 

13289Fo r more information, see Volume III, detainee report for 

Sharif al-Masri. 

837 See letter from ^^^^^^^^^Associat e General Counsel, CIA, to Dan Levin, ActingAssistant Attorney 

General, August 25, 2004 (DTS #2009-1809). (Note: At various times during this period^H^Bis identified as 

both CIA associate general counsel and IHBr^T C Legal). See also a letter from Assistant 

General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, September 5, 2004 (DTS #2009-1809). A CIA 

email sent prior to the CIA's request for advice from the OLC indicated that the judgment that Ghailani had 

knowledge of terrorist plotting was speculative: "Although Ghailani's role in operational planning is unclear, his 

respected role in al-Qa'ida and presence in Shkai as recently as October 2003 may have provided him some 

knowledge about ongoing attack planning against the United States homeland^uidtheoperatives involved." (See 

email from: ^HH H CTC/UBLDiHHBI^ I (formerly ALEC^^^HflH ; to: [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: derog information for ODDO on Talha, Ghailani, Hamza 

Rabi'a and Abu Faraj; date: August 10, 2004.) Ghailani was rendered to CIA custody on September ^2004 . (See 

3072 H^HBIfH. ) The CIA began using its enhanced interrogation techniques 

on Ghailani on September 17, 2004, as the CIA was initiating its counterintelligence review of the source who 

provided the false reporting on the pre-election threat. Sec 3189 (181558Z SEP 04); 

HEADQUARTERS 04); 

838

 [REDACTED] 32211 

839

 [REDACTED] 22343] 

840

 HEADQUARTERS \ 

841

 HEADQUARTERS | 

842

 While CIA Headquarters offered $ | million to Country | for hosting a CIA detention facility, | 

precluded the opening of the facility. OnlyJilmillionwasti^ CIA Station for support to the 

lll l I I I III — Mill lllll l 

Page 139 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

139 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECREm^^^^M^l^^^MtfNQgQR N 

think big" about how CIA 

843

 After the Station initially 

CIA Headquarters directed the CIA Station in Country 

Headquarters could support Country |'s | 

submitted relatively modest proposals, CIA Headquarters reiterated the directive, adding that the 

Station shouk^jrovid^i "wish list."844 h^BJ>003 , the Station proposed a more expansive 

million in H^^I^I H subsidies.843 Hlflsubsid y payments, intended in part as 

compensation for support of the CIA detention program, rose as high as million.846 By 

2003, after an extension of five months beyond the originally agreed upon timeframe 

for concluding CIA detention activities in Country | , both bin al-Shibh and al-Nashiri had been 

transferred out of Country | to the CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.847 

9. U.S. Supreme Court Action in the Case of Rami r Bush Forces Transfer of CIA 

Detainees from Guantanamo Bay to Country | 

Beginning in September 2003, the CIA held a number of detainees 

at CIA facilities on the grounds of, but separate from, the U.S. military detention facilities at 

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.848 In early January 2004, the CIA and the Department of Justice began 

discussing the possibility that a pending U.S. Supreme Court case, Rasul v. Bush, might grant 

habeas corpus rights to the five CIA detainees then being held at a CIA detention facility at 

although CIA Headquarters asked the CIA Station to "advise if additional funds may be needed to 

keep [the facility] viable over the coming year and beyond." CIA Headquarters added, "we cannot have enough 

blacksite hosts, and we are loathe to let one we have slip away." Country [ never hosted CIA detainees. See 

HEADQUAR [REDACTED] 5298 iHHfllill H HEADQUARj 

I'm not about to count 

did not identify the 

(RJ) - October 

843

 ALEC ••i^ H 03). In an interview on the CIA program, noted that the 

program had "more money than we could possibl^pen^^hought, and it turned out to be accurate." In the same 

interview, he stated that "in one case, we gave $(,000,00 0 

Myself and Jos6 [Rodriguez] 

We never counted it 

that kind of money for a receipt." The boxes contained one hundred dollar bills, 

recipient of the million. See transcript of Oral History Interview, Interviewee: 

13, 2006, Interviewer: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. 

ALEC 

ALEC 

846 See DTS #2010-2448. 

847

 [REDACTED] 2498 

848

 April 2003, Memorandum for Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center, from 

Renditions and Counterterrorist Center, Chief of Operations, 

Chief, Subject: Request to Relocate High-Value Detainees to an Interim 

Detention Facility at Guantanamo. See also DIRECTOR I^^^^HIflH - CIA detainees were held at 

two facilities at Guantanamo Bay, DETENTION SITE MAROON and DETENTION SITE INDIGO. (See 

Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, Coverage Period: ^BBM^^^B. ) A third 

CIA detention facility, DETENTION SITE REDl 

|, Chief 

13897 3445 

9754 1 

and September 1, 2006, Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA) Concerning the Detention by DOD of Certain Terrorists at a Facility at Guantanamo Bay 

Naval Station. 

m i M III i B^B^^MMi^Ml^oFon N 

Page 140 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

140 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ k/NOFORN 

Guantanamo Bay.849 Shortly after these discussions, CIA officers approached the | 

in Country | to determine if it would again be willing to host these CIA detainees, who would 

remain in CIA custody within an already existing Country | facility.850 By January 2004, the 

| in Country | had agreed to this arrangement for a limited period of time.851 

Meanwhile, CIA General Counsel Scott Muller asked the 

Department of Justice, the National Security Council, and the White House Counsel for advice 

on whether the five CIA detainees being held at Guantanamo Bay should remain at Guantanamo 

Bay or be moved pending the Supreme Court's decision.852 After consultation with the U.S. 

solicitor general in February 2004, the Department of Justice recommended that the CIA move 

four detainees out of a CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay pending the Supreme Court's 

resolution of the case.853 The Department of Justice concluded that a fifth detainee, Ibn Shaykh 

al-Libi, did not need to be transferred because he had originally been detained under military 

authority and had been declared to the ICRC.854 Nonetheless, by April 2004, all five CIA 

detainees were transferred from Guantanamo Bay to other CIA detention facilities.855 

(TSZ/^^^^^^H^-INP ) Shortly after placing CIA detainees within an already existing 

Country | facility fora second time, tensions arose between the CIA and Country | 

|.856 In H 2004, CIA detainees in a Counti 

pain from other detainees presumed to be in the 

facility.857 When the CIA chief of Station approached the 

facility claimed to hear cries of 

[REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Detainees in m

 Email from: Scott W. Muller; to: 

Gitmo; date: January | , 2004. 

850 See HEADQUARTERS [REDACTED] 1845 The CIA's longterm facility in Country which the CIA Station in Country 1 had warned was a drain on the Station's resources, 

had not yet been completed. See [REDACTED] 1785 | 

851

 [REDACTED] 16791 

852

 Email from: Scott Muller; to: James Pavitt, | 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], | 

February 2004. 

853

 Email from: Scott Muller; to: James Pavitt, 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], | 

February | , 2004. 

854

 Email from: Scott Muller; to: James Pavitt, | 

[REDACTED],1 1 I I I II ll| | 

February 2004. 

|; cc: George Tenet, John McLaughlin, [REDACTED], 

subject: CIA Detainees at GITMO; date: 

cc: George Tenet, John McLaughlin, [REDACTED], 

|; subject: CIA Detainees at GITMO; date: 

| cc: George Tenet, John McLaughlin, [REDACTED], 

, subject: CIA Detainees at GITMO; date: 

13698 

For additional details of the CIA's interactions with 

[REDACTED] 1898|~ ^ 

856 See, for example, [REDACTED] 16791 

Country see Volume I. 

857

 Among the detainees making this claim was Ibn Shaykh al-Libi, who had previousl^eei^endered from CIA 

custody to A Libyan national, Ibn Shaykh al-Libi reported while inmHcustod y that Iraq 

was supporting al-Qa'ida and providing assistance with chemical and biological weapons. Some of this information 

was cited by Secretary Powell in his speech to the United Nations, and was used as a justification for the 2003 

invasion of Iraq. Ibn Shaykh al-Libi recanted the claim after he was rendered to CIA custody on February 2003, 

claiming that he had been tortured by the mH| , and only told them what he assessed they wanted to hear. For 

more details, see Volume III. While in Counfryl^^ibHol^I^ebnrfer^ia t the "sobbing and yelling" he 

mi i M I i i' MBBJJ^^BMPWBB" ! n u < m H 

Page 141 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

141 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

| about the accounts of the CIA detainees, the stated with "bitter 

dismay" that the bilateral relationship was being "tested."858 There were also counterintelligence 

concerns relating to CIA detainee Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who had attempted to influence a Country 

| officer.859 These concerns contributed to a request from | 

2004 for the CIA to remove all CIA detainees from Country | 

(TSiV^^H^^^^^H/ZNEMi^^^^BsOM^whcntt a chief of Station in Country | again 

approachedlhe^^^^B^HH^Il^lll^HH^wit h allegations from CIA detainees 

about the mistreatment of Country | detai neesj^^^ B in the facility, the chief of Station 

received an angry response that, as he reported to CIA Headquarters, "starkly illustrated the 

inherent challenges [ofj 

According to the ririef of Station, Country | saw the CIA as 

"querulous and unappreciative recipients of their | cooperation."861

 By the end of 

2004, relations between the CIA and Country | deteriorated, particularly with regard to 

intelligence cooperation.862 The CIA detainees were transferred out of Country | i 

2005. 

863 

-) Beginning in ^^ ^ 2005, the | 

in Country | insisted, over the CIA's opposition, to brief Country j|'s on 

the effort to establish a more permanent and unilateral CIA detention facility, which was under 

construction. A proposed phone call to the from Vice President Cheney to 

solidify support for CIA operations in Country | was complicated by the fact that Vice President 

Cheney had not been told about the locations of the CIA detention facilities. The CIA wrote that 

there was a "primary need" to "eliminate any possibility that [I^^^^^^H ] could 

explicitly or implicitly refer to the existence of a black site in [the country]" during the call with 

the vice president.864 There are no indications that the call occurred. The mj^J ^ of 

Country | nonetheless approved the unilateral CIA detention facility, which cost million, but 

was never used by the CIA.865 By 2006, the CTA was working with Country | to 

decommission what was described as the "aborted" project. 

866 

heard reminded him of what he previously endured in | and it sounded to him like a prisoner had 

been tied up and beaten. See [REDACTED] 1989 \ 

858

 [REDACTED] 20101 

855

 [REDACTED] 2010 

860

 [REDACTED] 2317 The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[i|t was only as leaks 

detailing the program began to emerge that foreign partners felt compelled to alter the scope of their involvement.' 

As described above, the tensions with Country Jwere unrelated to press leaks. 

86' [REDACTED] 2602 

862

 [REDACTED] 31281 •••••• ; and [REDACTED] 

2783 BH^^^HI ' Country | officials refuse^oprovidetheCIA with counterterrorism information, 

including information obtained through CIA-funded See [REDACTED] 312811 

863

 HEADQUARTERS I 

864

 HEADQUARTERS 

865

 [REDACTED] and CTCdBRDG , "Evolution of the Program." 

866

 [REDACTED] 3706 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED]) 

TOP SECRET//I 

Page 142 of 499 

//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

142 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

L. The Pace of CIA Operations Slows; Chief of Base Concerned About "Inexperienced, 

Marginal, Underperforming" CIA Personnel; Inspector General Describes Lack of 

Debriefers As "Ongoing Problem" 

In the fall of 2004, CIA officers began considering "end games," or 

the final disposition of detainees in CIA custody. A draft CIA presentation for National Security 

Council principals dated August 19, 2004, identified the drawbacks of ongoing indefinite 

detention by the CIA, including: the need for regular relocation of detainees, the "tiny pool of 

potential host countries" available "due to high risks," the fact that "prolonged detention without 

legal process increases likelihood of HVD health, psychological problems [and] curtails intel 

flow," criticism of the U.S. government if legal process were delayed or denied, and the 

likelihood that the delay would "complicate, and possibly reduce the prospects of successful 

prosecutions of these detainees."867 CIA draft talking points produced a month later state that 

transfer to Department of Defense or Department of Justice custody was the "preferred endgame 

for 13 detainees currently in [CIA] control, none of whom we believe should ever leave USG 

custody."868 

(TS/^^^^^^^^^^/NF ) By the end of 2004, the overwhelming majority of CIA 

detainees—113 of the 119 identified in the Committee Study—had already entered CIA custody. 

Most of the detainees remaining in custody were no longer undergoing active interrogations; 

rather, they were infrequently questioned and awaiting a final disposition. The CIA took custody 

of only six new detainees between 2005 and January 2009: four detainees in 2005, one in 2006, 

and one—the CIA's final detainee, Muhammad Rahim—in 2007.869 

(TSZ/^^lf^^^^l^NF ) In 2004, CIA detainees were being held in three countries: at 

DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country | , at the Motilit y |i n 

Country 1 as well as at detention facilities in Country | . DETENTION SITE VIOLET in 

Country | opened in early 2005.870 On April 15, 2005, the chief of Base at DETENTION SITE 

BLACK in Country | sent the management of RDG an email expressing his concerns about the 

detention site and the program in general. He commented that "we have seen clear indications 

that various Headquarters elements are experiencing mission fatigue vis-a-vis their interaction 

with the program," resulting in a "decline in the overall quality and level of experience of 

deployed personnel," and a decline in "level and quality of requirements." He wrote that 

because of the length of time most of the CIA detainees had been in detention, "[the] detainees 

have been all but drained of actionable intelligence," and their remaining value was in providing 

"information that can be incorporated into strategic, analytical think pieces that deal with 

motivation, structure and goals." The chief of Base observed that, during the course of the year, 

the detention site transitioned from an intelligence production facility to a long-term detention 

facility, which raised "a host of new challenges." These challenges included the need to address 

867

 CIA PowerPoint Presentation, CIA Detainees: Endgame Options and Plans, dated August 19, 2004. 

868

 September 17, 2004, DRAFT Talking Points for die ADC1: Endgame Options and Plans for CIA Detainees. 

869

 The CIA took custody of Abu Faraj al-Libi 

2005, and Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi in 2006. 

870

 The first detainees arrived in Countr 

| facility in Country | from H to 

information, see Volume I. 

TOP SECRET/, 

Abu Munthir al-Magrebi, Ibrahim Jan, and Abu Ja'far al-lraqi in 

2003. CIA detainees were held within an existing Country 

2003, and then again beginning in j^ i 2004. For additional 

1//NOFORN 

Page 143 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

143 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

the "natural and progressive effects of long-term solitary confinement on detainees" and ongoing 

behavioral problems.871 

chief of Base wrote: 

£

) With respect to the personnel at DETENTION SITE BLACK, the 

"I am concerned at what appears to be a lack of resolve at Headquarters to 

deploy to the field the brightest and most qualified officers for service at [the 

detention site]. Over the course of the last year the quality of personnel 

(debriefers and [security protective officers]) has declined significantly. With 

regard to debriefers, most are mediocre, a handfull [sic] are exceptional and 

more than a few are basically incompetent. From what we can determine there 

is no established methodology as to the selection of debriefers. Rather than 

look for their best, managers seem to be selecting either problem, 

underperforming officers, new, totally inexperienced officers or whomever 

seems to be willing and able to deploy at any given time. We see no evidence 

that thought is being given to deploying an 'A-Team.' The result, quite 

naturally, is the production of mediocre or, I dare say, useless intelligence.... 

We have seen a similar deterioration in the quality of the security personnel 

deployed to the site.... If this program truly does represent one of the agency's 

most secret activities then it defies logic why inexperienced, marginal, 

underperforming and/or officers with potentially significant 

[counterintelligence] problems are permitted to deploy to this site. It is also 

important that we immediately inact [sic] some form of rigorous training 

program."872 

A CIA OIG audit completed in June 2006 "found that personnel 

assigned to CIA-controlled detention facilities, for the most part, complied with the standards 

and guidelines in carrying out their duties and responsibilities." The OIG also found that, 

"except for the shortage of debriefers, the facilities were staffed with sufficient numbers and 

types of personnel." The lack of debriefers, however, was described as "an ongoing problem" 

for the program. According to the audit, there were extended periods in 2005 when the CIA's 

DETENTION SITE ORANGE in Country | had either one or no debriefers. At least twice in 

the summer of 2005, the chief of Station in that country requested additional debriefers, warning 

that intelligence collection could suffer. Months later, in January 2006, the chief of Base at the 

detention site advised CIA Headquarters that "the facility still lacked debriefers to support 

intelligence collection requirements, that critical requirements were 'stacking up,' and that gaps 

in the debriefing of detainees were impacting the quantity and quality of intelligence reporting 

and would make the work of future debriefers more difficult."873 

^mailfrom : [REDACTED] (COB DETENTION SITE BLACK); to: 

subject: General Comments; date: April 15, 2005. 

^EmaUfrom: [REDACTED] (COB DETENTION SITE BLACK); to: | 

i^H H subject: General Comments; date: April 15, 2005. 

873

 Report of Audit, CIA-controlled Detention Facilities Operated Under the 17 September 2001 Memorandum of 

Notification, Report No. 2005-0017-AS, June 14,2006, at DTS # 2006-2793. As further described in the 

m i ii i iii i"MH^^BBBBM"!iiiiimi i 

Page 144 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

144 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

M. Legal and Operational Challenges in 2005 

1. Department of Justice Renews Approval for the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation 

Techniques in May 2005 

On May 10, 2005, the new acting assistant attorney general for 

OLC, Steven Bradbury, issued two legal memoranda. The first analyzed whether the individual 

use of the CIA's 13 enhanced interrogation techniques—including waterboarding, as well as a 

number of interrogation techniques that had been used in 2003 and 2004, but had not been 

analyzed in die original August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum—were consistent with the criminal 

prohibition on torture.874 The second memorandum considered the combined use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques.875 Both legal memoranda concluded that the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques did not violate the torture statute. 

On May 26, 2005, the CIA inspector general, who had been 

provided with the two OLC memoranda, wrote a memo to the CIA director recommending that 

the CIA seek additional legal guidance on whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 

and conditions of confinement met the standard under Article 16 of the Convention Against 

Torture.876 The inspector general noted that "a strong case can be made that the Agency's 

authorized interrogation techniques are the kinds of actions that Article 16 undertakes to 

prevent," adding that the use of the waterboard may be "cruel" and "extended detention with no 

clothing would be considered 'degrading' in most cultures, particularly Muslim." The inspector 

general further urged that the analysis of conditions was equally important, noting that the 

inspector general's staff had "found a number of instances of detainee treatment which arguably 

violate the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, and/or degrading treatment."877 

Committee Study, the Inspector General audit described how the CIA's detention facilities were not equipped to 

provide detainees with medical care. The audit described unhygienic food preparation, including at a facility with a 

"rodent infestation," and noted that a physician assistant attributed symptoms of acute gastrointestinal illness and 

giardiasis experienced by six staff and a detainee to food and water contamination. The audit further identified 

insufficient guidelines covering possible detainee escape or the death of a detainee. 

874 See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven 

G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application 

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al 

Qaeda Detainee. 

875 See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven 

Ci. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application 

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to the Combined Use of Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of 

High Value al Qaeda Detainees. 

876

 May 26, 2005, Memorandum for Director, Central Intelligence Agency, from John Helgerson, Inspector General, 

re: Recommendation for Additional Approach to Department of Justice Concerning Legal Guidance on Interrogation 

Techniques. 

877

 May 26,2005, Memorandum for Director, Central Intelligence Agency, from John Helgerson, Inspector General, 

re: Recommendation for Additional Approach to Department of Justice Concerning Legal Guidance on Interrogation 

Techniques. 

m i ,i i III ii'BBBI^MBB^W" 1 "iH I 

Page 145 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

145 
UNCLASSIFIED 

n i l I I III I I llll Illll I 

(TS/V^^^^^^^^/TNF ) On May 30, 2005, a third OLC memorandum examining U.S. 

obligations under the Convention Against Torture was completed.878 The conclusions in this 

opinion were based largely on the CIA's representations about the effectiveness of the CIA 

interrogation program in obtaining unique and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence." 

As described later in this summary, and in more detail in Volume II, the CIA's effectiveness 

representations were almost entirely inaccurate. 

2. Abu Faraj Al-Libi Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Prior to 

Department of Justice Memorandum on U.S. Obligations Under the Convention Against 

Torture; CIA Subjects Abu Faraj Al-Libi to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation 

Techniques When He Complains of Hearing Problems 

On May 2, 2005, when Abu Faraj al-Libi, al-Qa'ida's chief of 

operations, was captured in Pakistan, the OLC had not yet issued the three aforementioned May 

2005 legal memoranda.879 CIA officers described Abu Faraj al-Libi's capture as the "most 

important al-Qa'ida capture since Khalid Shaykh Muhammad."880 Shortly after al-Libi's 

capture, the CIA began discussing the possibility that Abu Faraj al-Libi might be rendered to 

U.S. custody.881 

On May 2005, four days before the rendition of Abu Faraj alLibi to CIA custody, Director of CTC Robert Grenier asked CIA Director Porter Goss to send a 

memorandum to the national security advisor and the director of national intelligence "informing 

them of the CIA's plans to take custody of Abu Faraj al-Libi and to employ interrogation 

techniques if warranted and medically safe."882 On May 24, 2005, the White House informed the 

CIA that a National Security Council Principals Committee meeting would be necessary to 

discuss the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Faraj al-Libi, but the 

travel schedule of one of the principals was delaying such a meeting.883 CIA Director Goss 

instructed CIA officers to proceed as planned, indicating that he would call the principals 

individually and inform them that, if Abu Faraj al-Libi was found not to be cooperating and there 

were no contraindications to such an interrogation, he would approve the use of all of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques other than the waterboard, without waiting for a meeting of 

878 See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven 

G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application 

of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be 

Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees. 

879

 For more information on Abu Faraj al-Libi's detention and interrogation, see Volume III. 

880

 HEADQUARTERS®® ! (251840Z MAY 05) 

881 See, for example, |^^Hl085 1 

882

 May | 

| (describing meetings on May 6 and 7, 2005). 

, 2005, Memorandum for Director, Central Intelligence Agency, via Acting Deputy Director, Central 

Intelligence Agency, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations from Robert Grenier, Director, DCI 

Counterterrorist Center, re: Interrogation Plan for Abu Faraj al-Libi. 

883

 Email to: Robert Grenier, John Mudd, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], | 

I^^^HH e R E D ACTED], •^•••l ; cc: | 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Possible significant delay in EITs for AFAL; date: May 24, 

2005. 

m i 11 iii i BBB^^BMIlMM ^o^fi N 

Page 146 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

146 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ k/NOFORN 

the principals.884 Abu Faraj al-Libi was rendered to CIA custody at DETENTION SITE 

ORANGE on May 2005,885 and transferred to DETENTION SITE BLACK on May 

2005.886 

(¥S//|HjHBH#NF ) 0 ° May 2005, CIA Director Goss formally notified National 

Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) John Negroponte 

that Abu Faraj al-Libi would be rendered to the unilateral custody of the CIA.887 Director Goss's 

memorandum stated: 

"[s]hould Abu Faraj resist cooperating in CIA debriefings, and pending a 

finding of no medical or psychological contraindictations [sic], to 

interrogation, I will authorize CIA trained and certified interrogators to employ 

one or more of the thirteen specific interrogation techniques for which CIA 

recently received two signed legal opinions from the Department of Justice 

(DOJ), Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) that these techniques, both individually 

and used collectively, are lawful."888 

(TSZ/flH^l^^^lNF ) The memorandum from Director Goss described Abu Faraj al-Libi 

as holding the third most important position in al-Qa'ida, and "playfing] a leading role in 

directing al-Qa'ida's global operations, including attack planning against the US homeland." 

Abu Faraj al-Libi was also described as possibly overseeing al-Qa'ida's "highly compartmented 

anthrax efforts."889 

On May 2005, one day after al-Libi's arrival at DETENTION 

SITE BLACK, CIA interrogators received CIA Headquarters approval for the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Faraj al-Libi.890 CIA interrogators began using the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Faraj al-Libi on May 28, 2005, two days before 

the OLC issued its memorandum analyzing whether the techniques violated U.S. obligations 

under the Convention Against Torture.891 

The CIA interrogated Abu Faraj al-Libi for more than a month 

using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. On a number of occasions, CIA 

interrogators applied the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to Abu Faraj al-Libi when he 

884

 Email from: to: Robert Grenier, John Mudd, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], | 

Hi!! ' ^^^^• JREDACTED ] , HHI^H H

 cc : 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Possible significant delay in EITs for AFAL; date: May 24, 

2005. 

885 ^ 

886

 19 

887

 Memorandum for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of National Intelligence, from 

Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, May 2005, re: Interrogation Plan for Abu Faraj al-Libi. 

888

 Memorandum for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of National Intelligence, from 

Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, May 2005, re: Interrogation Plan for Abu Faraj al-Libi. 

889

 Memorandum for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of National Intelligence, from 

Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, May 2005, re: Interrogation Plan for Abu Faraj al-Libi. 

890

 HEADQUARTERS | 

891

 2336 (282003Z MAY 05) 

M I 11 III I I MI HIM I 

Page 147 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

147 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

complained of a loss of hearing, repeatedly telling him to stop pretending he could not hear 

well.892 Although the interrogators indicated that they believed al-Libi's complaint was an 

interrogation resistance technique, Abu Faraj al-Libi was fitted for a hearing aid after his transfer 

to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay in 2006.893 Despite the repeated and extensive use 

of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Faraj al-Libi, CIA Headquarters 

continued to insist throughout the summer and fall of 2005 that Abu Faraj al-Libi was 

withholding information and pressed for the renewed use of the techniques. The use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Faraj al-Libi was eventually discontinued 

because CIA officers stated that they had no intelligence to demonstrate that Abu Faraj al-Libi 

continued to withhold information, and because CIA medical officers expressed concern that 

additional use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "may come with unacceptable 

medical or psychological risks."894 After the discontinuation of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, the CIA asked Abu Faraj al-Libi about UBL facilitator Abu Ahmad alKuwaiti for the first time.895

 Abu Faraj al-Libi denied knowledge of al-Kuwaiti.896 

3. CIA Acquires Two Detainees from the U.S. Military 

(TSyy^l^HH^ ) Another legal issue in late 2005 was related to the U.S. Department 

of Defense's involvement in CIA detention activities. In September 2005, the CIA and the 

Department of Defense signed a Memorandum of Understanding on this subject,897 and the U.S. 

military agreed to transfer two detainees, Ibrahim Jan and Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi, to CIA custody. 

Both were held by the U.S. military without being registered with the ICRC for over 30 days, 

pending their transfer to CIA custody.898 The transfer of Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi took place 

notwithstanding Department of State concerns that the transfer would be inconsistent with 

statements made by the secretary of state that U.S. forces in Iraq would remain committed to the 

law of armed conflict, including the Geneva Conventions.899 

892 I 

893 I 

12499 (262123Z TUN 05) 

894Email from: to: ^^^^^^^H^cc : [REDACTED], [REDACTED],| 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]7^^^^Hf r [REDACTED], IHllHl H subject: 

| Response to DDO Tasking of 7 July on Abu Faraj Interrogation; date: July 8,2005, at 06:16 PM. 

695

 DIRECTOR m | (121847ZJUL05); HEADQUARTERS ••^•(•lA N 04); • • 20361 

(291232Z JAN 04); DIRECTOR • • (040522Z MAY 04) 

896

 ^H i 29454 (131701Z JUL 05) 

897

 Memorandum of Understanding Concerning DOD Support to CIA with Sensitive Capture and Detention 

Operations in the War on Terrorism. 

898 See email from: [REDACTED], to: ^^H^HM , [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: 

••I , [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: DoD Request for 

a list of HVTs not to be issued ISN numbers. The email stated: "In conjunction with discussions between CIA and 

DoD over the weekend regarding our request to have the military render Ibrahim Jan to our custody and NOT 

issuing him an ISN number, DoD has requested CIA provide a list of HVTs to whom, if captured, the military 

should NOT issue TSN numbers" (emphasis in original). See HH^Hl505_HHH | OCT 05). 

899

 July 2005 Memorandum for Joint Staff (fllM^H t fo^^^^HHIHjHM^ Interim Guidance 

Regarding ( ^ 

TOP SECRE^I^^^BM^^BM^NQPOR N 

Page 148 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

148 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

I" ' a t e 2005, during the period the U.S. Senate was debating the 

Detainee Treatment Act bailing "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,"900 the 

CIA subjected Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi to its enhanced interrogation techniques.901 A draft 

Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) stated that Abu ja'far al-Iraqi provided "almost no information 

that could be used to locate former colleagues or disrupt attack plots"—the type of information 

sought by the CIA, and the CIA's justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation 

techniques.902 Later, the statement that Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi provided "almost no information that 

could be used to locate former colleagues or disrupt attack plots" was deleted from the draft 

PDB.903 Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi remained in CIA custody until early September 2006, when he was 

transferred to U.S. military custody in Iraq.904 

4. The CIA Seeks "End Game" for Detainees in Early 2005 Due to Limited Support From 

Liaison Partners 

900

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: 

^^HH H [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; Subject: McCain Amendment on Detainee Treatment; date: October 

6,2005, at 12:37 PM. 

901

 According to CIA records, Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi was subjected to nudity, dietary manipulation, insult slaps, 

abdominal slaps, attention grasps, facial holds, walling, stress positions, and water dousing with 44 degree 

Fahrenheit water for 18 minutes. He was shackled in the standing position for 54 hours as part of sleep deprivation, 

and experienced swelling in his lower legs requiring blood thinner and spiral ace bandages. He was moved to a 

sitting position, and his sleep deprivation was extended to 78 hours. After the swelling subsided, he was provided 

with more blood thinner and was returned to the standing position. The sleep deprivation was extended to 102 

hours. After four hours of sleep, Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi was subjected to an additional 52 hours of sleep deprivation, 

after which CIA Headquarters informed interrogators that eight hours was the minimum rest period between sleep 

deprivation sessions exceeding 48 hours. In addition to the swelling, Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi also experienced an edema 

on his head due to walling, abrasions on his neck, and blisters on his ankles from shackles. SeeW^B^ M 1810 

|DEC05);H|Hl813^^HDEC05);H|||Hl819^^HpEC05)|J||[^Hl84 7 

| DEC 05); H i 1848 DEC 05); HEADQUARTERS^^ ® ••fDECO?) . See 

additional information on Abu Ja'far al-lraqi in Volume PI. 

Draft titled: Date: December 

13, 2005, ALT ID#: -2132586. Director Goss notified the national security advisor that he had authorized the use of 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi because "CIA believes that Abu Ja'far possesses 

considerable operational information about Abu Mu'sab al-Zarqawi." See December 1, 2005, Memorandum for the 

National Security Advisor, Director of National Intelligence, from Porter Goss, Central Intelligence Agency, 

subject, "CountertetTorist Interrogation Techniques." 

903

 PDB Draft titled: Date: December 2005, ALT 

ID: 20051217 PDB on Abu Jafar al-Iraqi. Urging the change to the draft PDB, one of the interrogators involved in 

Abu Ja'far al-lraqi's interrogation wrote, "If we allow the Director to give this PDB, as it is written, to the President, 

I would imagine the President would say, 'You asked me to risk my presidency on your interrogations, and now you 

give me this that implies the interrogations are not working. Why do we bother?' We think the tone of the PDB 

should be tweaked. Some of the conclusions, based on our experts' observations, should be amendedThegkissis 

half full, not half empty, and is getting more full every day." See email from: [REDACTED] 

t o :

 [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; 

subiectjPDBon [AbuJa'far al-lraqi]; date: December 15, 2005, at 12:25 AM. 

904

 2031 In June 2007, inaccurate information about the effectiveness of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi was provided to the Committee. See CIA Response to 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Questions for the Record, June 18, 2007 (DTS #2007-2564); \ 

32732 •• • OCTOsn^BH B 32707^H H OCT05kMM M 32726 •• • OCT 05); 

11 ii 11111 i M I ii 

Page 149 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

149 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

(TSA^^^H^^HB^P ) early 2005, the CIA again sought an "endgame" policy for its 

detainees, citing its unstable relations with host governments and its difficulty in identifying 

additional countries to host CIA detention facilities.905 Talking points prepared for the CIA 

director for a meeting with the national security advisor made the following appeal: 

"CIA urgently needs [the President of the United States] and Principals 

Committee direction to establish a long-term disposition policy for the 12 

High-Value detainees (HVD)s we hold in overseas detention sites. Our liaison 

partners who host these sites are deeply concerned by [REDACTED]905 press 

leaks, and they are increasingly skeptical of the [U.S. government's] 

commitment to keep secret their cooperation.... A combination of press leaks, 

international scrutiny of alleged [U.S. government] detainee abuse, and the 

perception that [U.S. government] policy on detainees lacks direction is 

eroding our partners' trust in U.S. resolve to protect their identities and 

supporting roles. If a [U.S. government] plan for long-term [detainee] 

disposition does not emerge soon, the handful of liaison partners who 

cooperate may ask us to close down our facilities on their territory. Few 

countries are willing to accept the huge risks associated with hosting a CIA 

detention site, so shrinkage of the already small pool of willing candidates 

could force us to curtail our highly successful interrogation and detention 

program. Fear of public exposure may also prompt previously cooperative 

liaison partners not to accept custody of detainees we have captured and 

interrogated. Establishment of a clear, publicly announced [detainee] 

'endgame' - one sanctioned by [the President of the United States] and 

supported by Congress - will reduce our partners' concerns and rekindle their 

enthusiasm for helping the US in the War on Terrorism."907 

(^PS/^^^^^^^HI^NF ) Tn March 2005, talking points prepared for the CIA director for a 

discussion with the National Security Council Principals Committee stated that it was: 

905

 The CIA's June 2013 Response stales that an "important factor" contributing to the slower pace of CIA detention 

operations was al-Qa'ida's relocation to the FATA, which "made it significantly more challenging [for the Pakistani 

government] to mount capture operations resulting in renditions and detentions by the RDI program." A review of 

CIA records by the Committee found that legal, policy, and other operational concerns dominated internal 

deliberations aboutthe program. In 2005, CIA officers asked officials to render two detainees to CIA 

one IB H

 an d one m| . neither 

detainee was transferred to CIA custody. CIA officers noted that obtaining custody of detainees held by a foreign 

government during this period was becoming increasingly difficult, highlighting that | 

In March 2006, Director 

Goss testified to the Committee that lack of space was the limiting factor in taking custody of additional detainees. 

See HEADQUARTERS® ® •••H E ADQUARTERS MUmM^M^emai l from: 

[REDACTED], cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]nHMHiHBBi , 

[REDACTEDUREDACTEDL [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: for coord, pis: D/CIA 

talkingpointsJ^H^^HH^ I re rendition of J 

6702|H^^|^HhEADQUARTERS and transcript of Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308). 

906

 Text redacted by the CIA prior to provision to Committee members at the U.S. Senate. 

907 See CIA document dated, January 12,2005, entitled, "DCI Talking Points for Weekly Meeting with National 

Security Advisor." 

I'l l Mil l B^BUW^^^^B^OFO^ N 

Page 150 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

150 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ k/NOFORN 

"only a matter of time before our remaining handful of current blacksite hosts 

concludes that [U.S. government] policy on [detainees] lacks direction and... 

[the blacksite hosts] ask us to depart from their soil.... Continuation of status 

quo will exacerbate tensions in these very valuable relationships and cause 

them to withdraw their critical support and cooperation with the [U.S. 

government]."908 

During this period, the U.S. solicitor general, however, expressed 

concern that if CIA detainees were transferred back to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, they might be 

entitled to file a habeas petition and have access to an attorney.909 Meanwhile, the National 

Security Council continued to discuss a public roll-out, and as described later in this summary, 

the CIA engaged the media directly in order to defend and promote the program.910 

The question of what to do with the remaining detainees in CIA 

custody remained unresolved throughout 2005, during which time the CIA pursued agreements 

with additional countries to establish clandestine CIA detention facilities.911 The Detainee 

Treatment Act was passed by Congress on December 23, 2005, as part of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. That day, the CIA suspended its interrogation program 

again.912 As described later in this summary, in February 2006, the CIA informed the National 

Security Council principals that the CIA would not seek continued use of all of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques.913 

5. Press Stories and the CIA's Inability to Provide Emergency Medical Care to Detainees 

Result in the Closing of CIA Detention Facilities in Countries | and | 

(TS/Z^^^^^I^I^/NF ) In October 2005, the CIA learned that Washington Post reporter 

Dana Priest had information about the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, H|| | 

^^Hii^^^^^^^^^l^HBI^H^^^I ' ^he then a 

negotiations with the Washington Post in which it sought to prevent the newspaper from 

publishing information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.914 Fearful that 

908 See CIA Talking Points for Principals Committee Meeting on Long-Term Disposition of High-Value Detainees, 

8 March 2005. 

909 See email from: to :

 J°lin Rizzo; subject: Meeting this am with WH counsel on endgame 

planning; date: January 14,2005. ^^^^^^^ ^ 

910

 Email fromJHMH^H ; toJ^^^HHjccJ^REDACTEDJ , [REDACTED], John 

A. Rizzo, ^^^^nHM H subject: Re: Brokaw Take 

date: April 14, 2005, at 9:22:32 AM. In 2006, Vice President Cheney expressed reservations about any public 

release of information regarding the CIA program. See CIA Memorandum for the Record from [REDACTED], 

C/CTC|^| , subject, "9 March 2006 Principals Committee Meeting on Detainees." 

911

 Negotiations with Countries | and | to host CIA detention facilities are described in this summary, and in 

greater detail in Volume I. 

912

 HEADQUARTERS (232040Z DEC 05) 

913

 DDCIA Talking Points for 10 February 2006 Un-DC re Future of the CIA Counterterrorist Rendition, Detention, 

|; HEADQUARTERS 

Page 151 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

151 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/d y/NOFORN 

the CIA recommended the 

immediate transfer of CIA detainees to Department of Defense custody.915 When the 

Department of Defense rejected the proposal, the National Security Council directed the CIA to 

prepar^ther options.916 Meanwhile, two U.S. ambassadors, one in

 an d

 another in 

B H , inquired whether Secretary of State Rice had been briefed on the impending 

Washington Post article and sought to speak to the secretary herself to ensure that the CIA 

program was authorized. According to CIA documents, Secretary Rice was not aware of the 

specific countries where the CIA detention facilities were located.917 In lieu of a phone call from 

Secretary Rice, the CIA recommended that the State Department's Counterterrorism Coordinator 

and former CTC DDO, Henry Crumpton, call the ambassadors.918 The Washington Post 

published an article about CIA detention sites on November 2, 2005.919 

The publication of the Washington Post article resulted in a 

demarche to A^nite^tatesfrom^^^BBBBI , which also suggested that | 

contribution be in jeopardy.920 The United States also 

received a demarch^om^^^^^^HHI- 9 2 1 According to a CIA cable, U.S. 

representatives to "if another shoe were to drop," there would be 

considerable ramifications for U.S. relations with on a number of issues that 

depended on U.S. credibility in the area of human rights. The representatives also "questioned 

whether the gravity of this potential problem is fully appreciated in Washington."922 

915

 The other options put forward by the CIA were transfer of CIA detainees which the CIA 

anticipated would release the detainees after a short period. The CIA also proposed its own outright release of the 

detainees | Principals Meeting (2005). . See CIA document entitled D/CIA Talking Points for use at 

9 , 6

 HEADQUARTERS • • •••H^ H 

1)17

 Talking Points for Dr. J.D. Crouch for telephone calls to Ambassadors in [REDACTED] regarding possibility of 

forthcoming Dana Priest press article; email from: J; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTEDUREDACTED]; subject: Phone Call with State/L re Ambassadors who want to 

speak to the SecState^date^^H|^m , at 06:45 PM. 

918

 Email from: ^^^M^HTtoT[REDACTED] , [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED]; subject: Phone Call with State/L re Ambassadors who want to speak to the SecState; date: October 

24, 2005, at 06:45 PM; email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: •••H , [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACT^DUREDACTEDUREDACTED]; subject: Phone call from S/CT 

Amb. Hank Crumpton to Ambassador in ^BH^B^Hldate : November 1,2005, at 6:13:21 PM. 

After the subsequent press revelations, the U.S. ambassador in Country | asked again about whether the secretary of 

state had been briefed, prompting the CIA Station in Country | to note in a cable that briefing U.S. officials outside 

of the CIA "would be a significant departure from current policy." See [REDACTED] • • [REDACTED 1 

9,9— ^ 

See "CIA 

Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons," the Washington Post, November 2, 2005. 

See cable to [REDACTED] at HEADQUAR | 

|; cables to [REDACTED] at HEADQUARB^^^MM^BandHEADQUA R 

|; and cable to [REDACTED] at HEADQUA r HH^^^^HI^H . 

52485 Memorandum from D/CIA Goss to Hadley, Townsend and Negroponte, 

754 

33053 

S3053 

TOP SECRET/, '/NOFORN 

Page 152 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

152 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ K/NOFORN 

(TS/Z^HHIB^^A^^ ) The CIA catalogued how the Washington Post story created 

tensions in its bilateral counterterrorism relations with ^^^ H allies and determined that: 

"[t]he article is prompting our partners to reassess the benefits and costs of 

cooperating with the [U.S. government] and CIA. These services have 

conducted aggressive, high-impact operations with CIA against... targets, 

including We no longer expect the services to be as 

aggressive or cooperative. 

»923 

informed CIA officers that press stories on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program led 

the B government to prohibit from providing "information that could lead to the 

rendition or detention of al-Qa'ida or other terrorists to U.S. Government custody for 

interrogation, including CIA and the Department of Defense."924 

(TS/d^^B^F ) Media leaks also created tensions with countries that had hosted or 

continued to host CIA detention facilities. For example, leaks prompted Country | officials to 

convey their intent to communicate directly with the Departments of Justice and State. They 

then formally demarched the U.S. government.923 As late as B 2009, the 

Country | raised with CIA Director Panetta the "problem of the secret detention facility" that 

had "tested and strained" the bilateral partnership. The I^^^HI H of Country | also stated 

that assurances were needed that future cooperation with the CIA would be safeguarded.926 

After publication of the Washington Post article, | 

Country | demanded the closure of DETENTION SITE BLACK within | hours927 The CIA 

transferred the ^ ^ remaining CIA detainees out of the facility shortly thereafter.928 

923

 [REDACTED] | 

TM See email from^HHH^^MuoJREDACTED] ; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTEDL^^^HH H [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: 

sensitive do not forward - draft Intel; date: April 7, 2006, at 04:12:59 AM. See also September 2, 2006, Fax from 

DD/CTC, to Steve Bradbury, John Bellinger in, Steve Cambone, forwarding September 1, 2006 

Memorandum, "Anticipated Foreign Reactions to the Public Announcement of the US Secret Terrorist Detention 

Center." begun raising legal and policy concerns related to [any potential] support and assistance to the 

CIA in rendition, detention, and interrogation operations in Marcl^00^J|»fficet^ndicatecUhaUhey believed 

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the prohibited 

• from aiding or assisting in these CIA operations. For additional backgroundori^B legal concerns about 

Renditions and Detention, see email from: [REDACTCDLCOS I^^Hjto . John A. Rizzo^c^REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: more from ^HlH I I^^H H

 visit ; date: HH^H K a t 

11:09 AM. ^^^^ ^ 

925

 "[REDACTED] article fallout." According to CIA records, the of Country | was "very angry" 

about press reports, which, he believed, would be "exploitedbyradical elements" to "foment increased hostility 

toward [Country | ] government." [REDACTED] DIRR • • [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] • • 

[REDACTED], CIA records further state that the press reporting would "put considerable strain on the 

relationship." (See "[REDACTED] article fallout.") Despite this record, and other records in the full Committee 

Study, the CIA's June 2013 Response states: "[w]e found no evidence that the RDI program in any way negatively 

affected US relations overall with Country 

926

 [REDACTED] 2328 ••••• P 

927

 [REDACTED] 7885 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED]) 

928

 [REDACTED] 4895 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED]) 

lll l 'ill III I "I llll Mill I 

Page 153 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

153 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ k/NOFORN 

| Country | ^^^^^^^^ ^ officers refused to admit CIA detainee Mustafa 

Ahmad al-Hawsawi to a local hospital despite earlier discussions with country representatives 

abouUiow a detainee's medical emergency would be handled.930 While the CIA understood the 

H H officers' reluctance to place a CIA detainee in a local hospital given media reports, CIA 

Headquarters also questioned the "willingness of HH t 0 participate as originally 

agreed/planned with regard to provision of emergency medical care."931 After failing to gain 

assistance from the Department of Defense

 932

 the CIA was forced to seek assistance from three 

third-party countries in providing medical care to al-Hawsawi and four other CIA detainees with 

acute ailments. Ultimately, themillio n for 

th^reatment of |^H^an(^HHHHj^paidthe^^^^^^H|||riapproximate h 

$ • 1 foiMh^reatmentof I^HI^^^^^H^ 3 4 and made arrangements for | 

tobetreatedin^HH:

935T h e medical issues resulted in the closing 

of DETENTION SITE VIOLET in Country] in 2006.936 The CIA then transferred its 

remaining detainees to DETENTION SITE BROWN. At that point, all CIA detainees were 

located in Country | 9 3 7 

(T^yV^H^^^^^H 1^ ^ ) Meanwhile, the pressures on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program brought about by the Washington Post story prompted the CIA to consider new options 

among what it called the "[d]windling pool partners willing to host CIA Blacksites."938 

The CIA thus renewed earlier efforts to establish a detention facility in Country The CIA had 

earlier provided $ | million to Country |' s H^^^^H H in preparation for a potential CIA 

detentior^ite^rompting the chief of Station to comment, "Do you realize you can buy [Country 

l^o^^^^l?" 9 3 9 On December 2005, the chief of Station in Country | met with the 

who was not concerned about the CIA's detention of terrorists in his 

country, but wanted assurances that the CIA interrogation program did not include the use of 

929 l 

' HEADQUARTERS H I ([REDACTED] [REDACTED]). See also HEADQUARTERS | 

([REDACTED] [REDACTED]). 

930

 [REDACTED] 50141 

931

 HEADQUARTERS f _ _ 

932 See CIA Request Letter to DOD for Medical Assistance, dated 2006, from DCIA Porter Goss. This 

letter was written four days after the CIA Headquarters cable noting the emerging difficulties in relying on hostcountry medical care. See also CIA document entitled, Summary and Reflections of Chief of Medical Services on 

OMS Participation in the RDI Program. While the document is undated, it includes information updated through 

2007. 

933

 SecCI^(^umen^ntiHed^COMPENSATION TO FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT," date not listed. 

934 •^^•771 9 See also CIA document entitled, "COMPENSATION TO LIAISON FOR 

MEDICAL TREATMENT," date not listed, which indicates that the total compensation provided was $|HH ' 

935

 Summary and Reflections of Chief of Medical Services on OMS Participation in the RDI Program. 

935 See Volume I for additional details. 

937

 4118 HEADQUARTERS 

938 See CIA Counterterrorist Rendition, Detainee, and Interrogation Program; dated | 

Meeting slides. 

939

 Transcript of Oral History Interview, Interviewee: (R-D - October 13, 2006, Interviewer: 

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED], 

11>i i i iii i ^^^^^Mi^B^MyNoron N 

February 2006, "Un-DC" 

Page 154 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

154 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

torture.940 In providing his approval, the | agreed to a request from the chief 

941

of Station not to inform the U.S. ambassador in Country The CIA also reached an 

agreement with another country, Country to establish a CIA detention facility in that country 

and arranged with the leadership of Country | not to inform the U.S. ambassador there

 942

 The 

CIA ultimately did not detain individuals in either country. 

In late October 2005, days before the publication of the 

Washington Post article, the CIA asked a separate country, Country to temporarily house | 

CIA detainees.943 The chief of Station briefed the U.S. ambassador in Country who requested 

that the National Security Council and the White House be bricfech)iUh^>lan.944 There are no 

CIA records to indicate the briefing occurred. Country |' s then provided 

approval, while seeking assurances that the CIA would develop a contingenc^lar^r^as^he 

detention site was exposed in the press.945 While the CIA Station and the ^I^^HI^^ H 

considered in Country CIA Headquartersdirectedthat a 

long-term CIA detention facility be established in th^ountr^Countt^|s^H|^^H B 

approved a plan to build a CIA detention facility IHIHIH^^^^HI^^^HI^^H ' but 

noted his ongoing concerns about the lack of a CIA "exit strategy."946 

The lack of emergency medical care for detainees, the issue that 

had forced the closing of DETENTION SITE VIOLET in Country was raised repeatedly in 

the context of the construction of the CIA detention facility in Country On March 2006, 

CIA Headquarters requested that the CIA Station in Country | ask Country | to arrange discreet 

access to the nearest hospital and medical staff. The cable stated that the CIA "look[s] forward 

to a favorable response, prior to commencing with the construction of our detention facility."947 

Construction nonetheless began on the facility without the issue of emergency medical care 

having been resolved. In 2006, after the deputy chief of the CIA Station in Country the 

deputy chief of RDG, and an OMS officer met with officers, the Station reported 

that the establishment of emergency medical care proximal to the site was "not tenable."948 In 

July 2006, an OMS representative informed the chief of MHI^^^^^I^H H

 a t 

CIA Headquarters that the facility in Country | "should not be activated without a clear, 

committed plan for medical provider coverage."949 

<Ma

 [REDACTED] 1938 

941

 [REDACTED] 1938 

942

 [REDACTED] 3145 

943

 HEADQUARTERS 

944

 [REDACTED] 6481 

945

 [REDACTED] 6481 

946

 [REDACTED] 6877 

947

 HEADQUARTERS 

94R

 [REDACTED] 7670 

949 See email from: [REDACTED]; to: 

subject: m CTC^^fl meetin 

discussion is also referenced in 

C/CTC^H^RDG; subject: Site Visit to 

[^REDACTED]; cc: • • 

;re. date: at 4:57:29PM. The June 

|; Memorandum for the Record; to: C/CTC^^H; from: 

|and Recommendations. As described, in June 2006, the CIA 

inspector general issued an audit that concluded that while CIA detention facilities lacked sufficient debriefers, they 

"were constructed, equipped, and staffed to securely and safely contain detainees and prompt intelligence 

exploitation of detainees." The audit further determined that the facilities "are not equipped to provide medical 

treatment to detainees who have or develop serious physical or mental disorders, and operable plans are not in place 

m i 11 III i ^MW^MB^^Mhi"i" i ii 

Page 155 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

155 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

GIS/ZHI^^^HH^P ) By the time a CIA team visited the Country | detention site in late 

2006, the CIA had already invested million in the new facility. Describing the absence of 

adequate emergency medical care options as "unacceptable," the chief of RDG recommended in 

a draft memo that construction efforts be abandoned for this reason.950 The following day, an 

edited version of the same memo described the issue as a "challenge," but did not recommend 

that the CIA cease construction of the facility.951 The resulting CIA detention facility, which 

would eventually cost million, was never used bythe CIA. Press reports about the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program that appeared in and H eventually forced the CIA 

to pass possession of the unused facility to the Country | government.952 

(^PS^I^^^^H^^/NF ) In early January 2006, officials at the Department of Defense 

informed CIA officers that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had made a formal decision not to 

accept any CIA detainees at the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.953 At the time, the 

CIA was holding 28 detainees in its two remaining facilities, DETENTION SITE VIOLET, in 

Country and DETENTION SITE ORANGE, in Country |. 9 5 4 In preparation for a meeting 

with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld on January 6, 2006, CIA Director Goss was provided a 

document indicating that the Department of Defense's position not to allow the transfer of CIA 

detainees to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay "would cripple legitimate end game 

planning" for the CIA.955 The talking points for that meeting suggested that Director Goss tell 

Secretary Rumsfeld that the: 

"only viable 'endgame' for continued US Government custody of these most 

dangerous terrorists is a transfer to GTMO... [a]bsent the availability of 

GTMO and eventual DoD custody, CIA will necessarily have to begin 

transferring those detainees no longer producing intelligence to third countries, 

to provide inpatient care for detainees," and concluded that CIA detention facilities were not equipped to provide 

emergency medical care to detainees. The audit team did not visit the facility in Country but stated, with regard 

to another country, Country that "CIA funds have been wasted in constructing and equipping a medical facility 

that was later determined not to be a viable option for providing inpatient care for detainees." See Report of Audit, 

CIA-controlled Detention Facilities Operated Under the 17 September 2001 Memorandum of Notification, Report 

No. 2005-0017-AS, June 14, 2006, at DTS # 2006-2793. The CIA's supervised the 

CIA's Renditions and Detention Group. 

2006, Memorandum for the Record, to: C/CTCHH - from: C/CTC^^^RDG, re: Site Visit to 

1 Recommendations. 

951

 Memorandum for the Record, to: C/CTC|^H, from: C/CTC|^H/RDG, re: Site Visit 

to II^HiHi^riand Recommendations (2). 

952

 Congressional Notification: Central IntelligenceAgency Response to Host Country Government Order to Vacate 

an Inactiv^Blacksit^Detention Facility, (DTS #2009-3711); SSCI Memorandum for the 

Record, CIA Document, RDI Program Background Brief for Leon Panetta, 2009. 

953

 DCIA Talking Points for 6 January 2006 Breakfast with Secretary of Defense, re: SecDef Refusal to Take CIA 

Detainees on GTMO. 

954 See CIA Memo, "As of 01 January 2006, there were 28 HVDs in CIA custody." As noted above, DETENTION 

SITE VIOLET in Country | would be closed in 2006. 

955

 DCIA Talking Points for 6 January 2006 Breakfast with Secretary of Defense, re: SecDef Refusal to Take CIA 

Detainees on GTMO. 

11 ii M 111 MBI^^^^^BBM i

 111111 

Page 156 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

156 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ k/NOFORN 

which may release them, or [the CIA itself may need to] outright release 

them."956 

After Secretary Rumsfeld declined to reconsider his decision not to 

allow the transfer of CIA detainees to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay, CIA officers 

proposed elevating the issue to the president. CIA officers prepared talking points for Director 

Goss to meet with the president on the "Way Forward" on the program on January 12, 2006.957 

The talking points recommended that the CIA director "stress that absent a decision on the longterm issue (so called 'endgame') we are stymied and die program could collapse of its own 

weight."958 There are no records to indicate whether Director Goss made this presentation to the 

president. 

In 2005 and 2006, the CIA transferred detainees from its custody to 

at least nine countries, including 

^^^mi^^^^^^^lB^aswel l as to the U.S. military in Iraq. Many of these 

detainees were subsequently released.959 By May 2006, the CIA had 11 detainees whom it had 

identified as candidates for prosecution by a U.S. military commission. The remaining detainees 

were described as having "repatriation options open."960 

6. The CIA Considers Changes to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program Following 

the Detainee Treatment Act, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 

(TS/Z^HHHI^NF ) Following the passage of the Detainee Treatment Act in December 

2005, the CIA conducted numerous discussions with the National Security Council principals 

about modifications to the program that would be acceptable from a policy and legal standpoint. 

In February 2006, talking points prepared for CIA Director Goss noted that National Security 

Advisor Stephen Hadley: 

"asked to be informed of the criteria CIA will use before accepting a detainee 

into its CIA Counterterrorist Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Program, 

stating that he believed CIA had in the past accepted detainees it should not 

have."961 

(TSZ/^im^l^/NF ) The CIA director proposed future criteria that would require not 

only that CIA detainees meet the standard in the MON, but that they possess information about 

threats to the citizens of the United States or other nations, and that detention in a CIA facility 

956

 DC1A Talking Points for 6 January 2006 Breakfast with Secretary of Defense, re: SecDef Refusal to Take CIA 

Detainees on GTMO. 

957

 DCI A Talking Points for 12 January 2006 Meeting with the President, re: Way Forward on Counterterrorist 

Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Program. 

958

 DCIA Talking Points for 12 January 2006 Meeting with the President, re: Way Forward on Counterterrorist 

Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Program. 

959 See Volume 1 for additional details. 

960

 May 18,2006, Deputies Committee (Un-DC) Meeting, Preliminary Detainee End Game Options. For additional 

information, see Volume I. 

961

 DCIA Talking Points for 9 February 2006 Un-DC, re: Future of the CIA Counterterrorist Rendition, Detention, 

and Interrogation Program - Detainees. 

m i 11 in i i nii imi i 

Page 157 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

157 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ 

wa^ppropriate for intelligence exploitation.962 A few months later, Legal, 

wrote to Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury suggesting a 

modified standard for applying the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The suggested new 

standard was that "the specific detainee is believed to possess critical intelligence of high value 

to the United States." While the proposed modification included the requirement that a detainee 

have "critical intelligence of high value," it represented an expansion of CIA authorities, insofar 

as it covered the detention and interrogation of an individual with information that "would assist 

in locating the most senior leadership of al-Qa'ida of [sic] an associated terrorist organization," 

even if that detainee was not assessed to have knowledge of, or be directly involved in, imminent 

terrorist threats.963 

Discussions with the National Security Council principals also 

resulted in a March 2006 CIA proposal for an interrogation program involving only seven of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques: sleep deprivation, nudity, dietary manipulation, facial 

grasp, facial slap, abdominal slap, and the attention grab.964 This proposal was not acted upon at 

the time. The proposal for sleep deprivation of up to 180 hours, however, raised concerns among 

the National Security Council principals.965 

(TS/^l^^m^^^NF ) In April 2006, the CIA briefed the president on the "current status" 

of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. According to an internal CIA review, this 

was the first time the CIA had briefed the president on the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques.966 As previously noted, the president expressed concern at the April 2006 briefing 

about the "image of a detainee, chained to the ceiling, clothed in a diaper, and forced to go to the 

bathroom on himself."967 

(^^/^m^HI^^NF ) On June 29, 2006, the Supreme Court issued its decision in the 

case of Harridan v. Rumsfeld, concluding that the military commission convened to try Salim 

962

 DCIA Talking Points for 9 February 2006 Un-DC, re: Future of the CIA Counterterrorist Rendition. Detention, 

and Interrogation Program - Detainees. 

863

 Letter from HHHCT C Legal HH^^^^ I to Acting Assistant Attorney General Bradbury, May 23, 2006. 

(DTS #2009-1809); Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, 

from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10,2005, Re: 

Application of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May be Used in the Interrogation of a 

High Value al Qaeda Detainee (DTS #2009J8K)iTub9), citing Fax for Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General^ffice of Legal Counsel, from Assistant General Counsel, CIA (Jan. 4, 2005) ('January 4 

[^• B Fax'); Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, 

from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10,2005, Re: 

Application of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to the Combined Use of Certain Techniques in the Interrogation of 

High Value al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 10); Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy 

General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of 

the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al 

Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11). 

964

 DCIA Talking Points for 9 March 2006 Principals Committee Meeting. 

965

 Memorandum for the Record from [REDACTED], C/CTCH , re: 9 March 2006 Principals Committee 

Meeting on Detainees. 

966 See CIA document entitled, "DCIA Meeting with the President," dated ApriI 8, 2006. 

967

 Email from: Grayson SWIGERT; to: [REDACTED]; cc: ^•IHIH ; subject: Dr. [SWIGERT's] 7 June 

meeting with DCI; date: June 7, 2006. 

11 H I M I I 

Page 158 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

158 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ K/NOFORN 

Hamdan, a detainee at Guantanamo Bay, was inconsistent with statutory requirements and 

Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The implication of the decision was that treating 

a detainee in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of Common Article 3 would constitute 

a violation of federal criminal law. CIA attorneys analyzed the Hamdan decision, noting that it 

could have a significant impact on "current CIA interrogation practices."968 Their memorandum 

also referenced that Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury had the "preliminary 

view ... that the opinion 'calls into real question' whether CIA could continue its CT 

interrogation program involving enhanced interrogation techniques," as the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques "could be construed as inconsistent with the provisions of Common 

Article 3 prohibiting 'outrages upon personal dignity' and violence to life and person."969 

(TS/Z^^B^^^^^BZ/NF) The case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld prompted the OLC to withdraw a 

draft memorandum on the impact of the Detainee Treatment Act on the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques.970 The CIA did not use its enhanced interrogation techniques again 

until July 2007, by which time the OLC had interpreted the Military Commissions Act, signed by 

the president on October 17, 2006, in such a way as to allow the CIA to resume the use of the 

techniques.971 

N. The Final Disposition of CIA Detainees and the End of the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program 

1. President Bush Publicly Acknowledges the Existence of the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program 

After significant discussions throughout 2006 among the National 

Security Council principals, the Department of Defense ultimately agreed to accept the transfer 

of a number of CIA detainees to U.S. military custody.972 

(U) On September 6, 2006, President George W. Bush delivered a public speech acknowledging 

that the United States had held al-Qaida operatives in secret detention, stating that the CIA had 

employed an "alternative set of procedures" in interrogating these detainees, and describing 

information obtained from those detainees while in CIA custody

 973

 As described later in this 

summary, the speech, which was based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, contained 

968

 CIA memorandum from the CIA's Office of General Counsel, circa June 2006, entitled, "Hamdan v. Rumsfeld." 

969

 CIA memorandum from the CIA's Office of General Counsel, circa June 2006, entitled, "Hamdan v. Rumsfeld." 

970

 Email from: to: [REDACTED]; cc: John Rizzo; subject: FW: Summary 

of Hamdan Decision; date: June 30, 2006, at 4:44 PM. Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility; 

Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to die Central 

Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected Terrorists, July 29, 2009 (DTS 

#2010-1058). 

971

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Acting Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the 

War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain 

Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees. 

972 See Volume I for details on these discussions. 

973

 September 6, 2006, The White House, President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected 

Terrorists. 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 159 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

159 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

significant inaccurate statements, especially regarding the significance of information acquired 

from CIA detainees and the effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation techniques.974 

(U) In the speech, the president announced the transfer of 14 detainees to Department of 

Defense custody at Guantanamo Bay and the submission to Congress of proposed legislation on 

military commissions

 975

 As all other detainees in the CIA's custody had been transferred to 

other nations, the CIA had no detainees in its custody at the time of the speech.976 

2. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Gains Access to CIA Detainees 

After Their Transfer to U.S. Military Custody in September 2006 

(TS/^^Afte r the 14 CIA detainees arrived at the U.S. military base at 

Guantanamo Bay, they were housed in a separate building from other U.S. military detainees and 

remained under the operational control of the CIA.977 In October 2006, the 14 detainees were 

allowed meetings with the ICRC and described in detail similar stories regarding their detention, 

treatment, and interrogation while in CIA custody. The ICRC provided information on these 

claims to the CIA.978 Acting CIA General Counsel John Rizzo emailed the CIA director and 

other CIA senior leaders, following a November 8, 2006, meeting with the ICRC, stating: 

"[a]s described to us, albeit in summary form, what the detainees allege 

actually does not sound that far removed from the reality... the ICRC, for its 

part, seems to find their stories largely credible, having put much stock in the 

fact that the story each detainee has told about his transfer, treatment and 

conditions of confinement was basically consistent, even though they had been 

incommunicado with each other throughout their detention by us."979 

(TS^I^^^^^^B^P )

 I n

 February 2007 the ICRC transmitted to the CIA its final report 

on the "Treatment of Fourteen 'High Value Detainees' in CIA Custody." The ICRC report 

concluded that "the ICRC clearly considers that the allegations of the fourteen include 

descriptions of treatment and interrogation techniques - singly or in combination - that amounted 

to torture and/or crucl, inhuman or degrading treatment."980 Notwithstanding Rizzo's comments, 

the CIA disagreed with a number of the ICRC's findings, provided rebuttals to the ICRC in 

974 See Volume I and Volume II for additional information. 

September 6, 2006, The White House, President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected 

Terrorists. 

976 See Volume III for additional information. 

977

 CIA Background Memo for CIA Director visit to Guantanamo, December 2006, entitled Guantanamo Bay 

High-Value Detainee Detention Facility. 

'

m

 Email from: ^^^^^^HHCTC/LGL ; to: John Rizzo, [REDACTED], 

BUj^K^^^^^MTlREDACTED] , [REDACTED], [REDACTEDl Ji^—^H . 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: ••••[ ; subject: 8 November2006 Meeting with ICRC reps; date: 

November 9, 2006, at 12:25 PM. 

979

 Email from: John A. Rizzo; to: Michael V. Hayden, Stephen R. Kappes, Michael J. Morell; cc: 

[REDACTED]; subject; Fw: 8 November 2006 Meeting with ICRC Reps; date: November 9, 

2006, at 12:25 PM. 

980

 February 14, 2007, Letter to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, from | 

International Committee of the Red Cross, | 

m i i i 1 1 i B^^M^^Bz/NOHHt N 

Page 160 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

160 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

writing, and informed the Committee that "numerous false allegations of physical or threatened 

abuses and faulty legal assumptions and analysis in the report undermine its overall 

credibility."981 The ICRC report was acquired by The New York Review of Books and posted on 

the Review's website in April 2009.982 The Committee found the ICRC report to be largely 

consistent with information contained in CIA interrogation records.983 

3. The CIA Considers Future of the Program Following the Military Commissions Act 

As noted, in June 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court case of Hamdan v. 

Rumsfeld prompted the OLC to withdraw a draft legal memorandum on the impact of the 

Detainee Treatment Act on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques

 984

 The administration 

determined that the CIA would need new legislation to continue to use the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques.985 The Military Commissions Act addressed the issues raised by the 

Hamdan decision and provided the president the authority to issue an Executive Order detailing 

permissible conduct under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The bill passed the 

Senate on September 28, 2006, and the House of Representatives the following day.986 

(TS/^^^H^^^^B/TNF ) On November | , 2006, when Abd Hadi al-Iraqi was rendered to 

CIA custody, the draft Executive Order and an updated OLC memorandum had not yet been 

prepared.987 Although Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi was consistently assessed as being cooperative, 

981

 CIA Comments on the February 2007 ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen "High Value Detainees" in 

CIA Custody. At a Committee Hearing on April 12, 2007, CIA Director Hayden emphasized die close relationship 

the CIA had with the ICRC ("I believe our contacts with the ICRC have been very useful. I have met withj 

I, die for the Red Cross, on several occasions at CIA. It appears that | 

1 is a runner and he's promised to bring his gear with him next time he comes to Langley so that we can 

jog on the compound."), but emphasized the errors in the ICRC report, stating: "While CIA appreciates the time, 

effort, and good intentions of the ICRC in forming its report, numerous false allegations of physical or threatened 

abuses and faulty legal assumptions and analysis in the report undermine its overall credibility." (See SSCI Hearing 

Transcript, dated April 12, 2007 (DTS# 2007-3158).) As is described in more detail in Volume II, Director 

Hayden's statements to the Committee regarding the ICRC report included significant inaccurate information. 

982 See Assets/nybooks.com/media/doc/2010/04/022/icrc—report.pdf and detainee reviews and reports in Volume 

III. 

983

 CIA officers in RDG and OMS prepared a number of documents disputing the ICRC allegations. See document 

entitled, "CIA Comments on the February 2007 ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen 'High Value Detainees' 

in CIA Custody." See Volumes I and III for additional information. 

984

 Email from: ^HHI^ K

 ,o :

 [REDACTED]; cc: John Rizzo; subject: FW: Summary 

oi Hamdan Decision; date: June 30, 2006, at 4:44 PM. 

985

 Acting Assistant Attorney General Bradbury told the Department of Justice's Office of Professional 

Responsibility (OPR) that officials from the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice met with the president and 

officials from the CIA and the NSC to consider the impact of the Hamdan decision, and that it was clear from die 

outset that legislation would have to be enacted to address the application of Common Article 3 and the War Crimes 

Act to the CIA interrogation program. As the OPR report noted, "Hamdan directly contradicted OLC's January 22, 

2002 opinion to the White House and the Department of Defense, which had concluded that Common Article 3 did 

not apply to captured members of al Qaeda." See Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility; 

Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central 

Intelligence Agency's Use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques on Suspected Terrorists, July 29, 2009 (DTS 

#2010-1058). 

986

 S. 3930 passed the Senate by a vote of 65-34 (Record Vote Number: 259) and the House by a vote of 250-170 

(Roll no. 508). It was signed into law on October 17, 2006. 

16361 11 ii 11 i i i BBBBUBmii M oi m 

Page 161 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

161 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

interrogators also believed he was withholding information on operational plots and the locations 

of high-value targets.988 The CIA believed his ^^HHHI i n February 2007 supported this 

conclusion,989 prompting discussions at CIA Headquarters about the possible use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques against him. By the end of the month, however, the CIA had 

determined there was "insufficient intelligence...that [Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi] possesses actionable 

information.. .to justify the use of' the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.990 

In October 2006, a panel of CIA interrogators recommended that 

four CIA enhanced interrogation techniques—the abdominal slap, cramped confinement, nudity, 

and the waterboard—be eliminated, but that the remainder of the interrogation techniques be 

retained.991 Under this proposal, the CIA would have been authorized to subject detainees to 

dietary manipulation, sleep deprivation, the facial slap, the facial grasp, the attention grab, 

walling, stress positions, and water dousing. There are few CIA records describing the panel's 

deliberations, or the CIA's response to its recommendations. The panel proposed dropping two 

of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—nudity and the abdominal slap—that the CIA 

director had proposed retaining in March 2006, while recommending that the CIA retain three 

other techniques— walling, stress positions, and water dousing—that had not otherwise been 

requested for retention.992 

4. The CIA Develops Modified Enhanced Interrogation Program After Passage of the 

Military Commissions Act 

(TS^^^^^H^^^/NF ) In the spring of 2007, the OLC completed a draft of a legal opinion 

concluding that the use of the CIA's seven proposed enhanced interrogation techniques—sleep 

deprivation, nudity, dietary manipulation, facial grasp, facial slap, abdominal slap, and the 

attention grab—would be consistent with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 

Conventions and the Military Commissions Act. This draft generated significant disagreement 

between the State Department's legal advisor, John Bellinger, and the Acting Assistant Attorney 

General Steven Bradbury, resulting in Secretary of State Rice refusing to concur with the 

proposed Executive Order.993 

988 See, for example, ^^^ ^ 1335 (0219462 NOV 06) 

(041805Z NOV 06); 1370 (071318Z NOV 06) 

(271250Z NOV 1703 (040918Z DEC 06) 

(081606Z JAN 07); ^^1^195 6 (151211Z JAN 07); 

989

 2065 (081633Z FEB 07) 

^Emai l from: |CTC/LGL; to: 

subject: What needs to occur before we ask for EITs on 

07); date: February 9,2007. 

991 See October 23, 2006, Memorandum for Director, CIA from 

1340 (041114Z NOV 06); 

1574 (230910Z NOV 06) 

1860(1816222 DEC 06); 

2007 (251057Z JAN 07). 

[REDACTED], 

|; HEADQUARTERS (272015Z FEB 

|, Chief, 

9925e<?October 23, 2006, Memorandum for Director, CIA from Chief, 

and DCIA Talking Points for 9 March 2006 Principals Committee Meeting 

993

 February 9, 2007, letter from John B. Bellinger 111, Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Steven G. Bradbury, 

Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice. At the time, there were internal 

disagreements within the CIA about whether the CIA should have a detention and interrogation program. An April 

2007 Sametime communication between the chief of CTC and another senior CIA leader described these 

disagreements and how CIA leadership responded to them. According to "[REDACTED] 

was carping to [REDACTED] and Jose [RodriguezUas^rifo Sulick (!) had a long talk 

i MI 11 i i i B^^BMW i iHII Im i I 

Page 162 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

162 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I //NOFOR N 

(TSy^HHIHHW^^ ) J u n c 2007, in an effort to gain Secretary Rice's support, the CIA 

asked CIA contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR to brief Secretary Rice on the CIA's 

interrogation program. During that briefing, Secretary Rice expressed her concern about the use 

of nudity and a detainee being shackled in the standing position for the purpose of sleep 

deprivation. According to CIA records, in early July 2007, after the capture of Muhammad 

Rahim, Secretary Rice indicated that she would not concur with an interrogation program that 

included nudity, but that she would not continue to object to the CIA's proposed interrogation 

program if it was reduced to six of the enhanced interrogation techniques listed in the draft OLC 

memorandum: (1) sleep deprivation, (2) dietary manipulation, (3) facial grasp, (4) facial slap, 

(5) abdominal slap, and (6) the attention grab.994 

5. Muhammad Rahim, the CIA's Last Detainee, is Subjected to Extensive Use of the CIA 's 

Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Provides No Intelligence 

(TS/^^^^^^H^B^^ ) On June 25, 2007, al-Qa'ida facilitator Muhammad Rahim was 

captured in Pakistan.995 Based on reports of debriefings of Rahim in foreign government custody 

and other intelligence, CIA personnel assessed that Rahim likely possessed information related 

to the location of Usama bin Laden and other al-Qa'ida leaders.996 On July 3, 2007, Acting CIA 

General Counsel John Rizzo informed Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury that 

the CIA was anticipating a "new guest," and that the CIA "would need the signed DOJ opinion 

'in a matter of days.'"997 

Muhammad Rahim was rendered to CIA custody at DETENTION 

SITE BROWN in Country | on HI^^^IM y l > 2007.998 Upon his arrival, CIA 

interrogators had a single discussion with Rahim during which he declined to provide answers to 

questions about threats to the United States and the locations of top al-Qa'ida leaders.999 Based 

on this interaction, CIA interrogators reported that Rahim was unlikely to be cooperative. As a 

and agree the CIA is off the track and rails... that we should not be doing detention, rendition, interrogation." 

Referring to a CIA leadership meeting that day in which the Committee's April 12, 2007, hearing would be 

discussed, mmH I stated that: "I want to take that [criticism] on by letting all know how importan [sic] this 

[hearing] is... and what the leaderships [sic] position is from hayden, kappes and jose... in case there is some 

corrosive, bullshit mumbling and rumblings among comopcnnt |sic - "componenT^hieft^ome of which i am 

seeing." Sametime communication between and12/Apr/07 , 09:50:54 

to 09:56:57. ^^^^^^^ ^ 

994

 Email from: to: Jose Rodriguez, John Rizzo etc.; subject: EIT briefing for SecState on 

June 22, 2007; date: June 22, 2007; July 3, 2007, Steven Bradbury, Handwritten Notes, "John Rizzo"; email from: 

John A. Rizzo; to: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Conversation with Bradbury; date: 

July 3,2007. 

11199 (251634Z JUN 07); 6439 7516 

996

 CIA memorandum titled, CTC/RDG Planning for Possible Rendition of Mohammed Rahim - 19 June 2007. The 

document was unsigned, and the author is unknown. A subsequent version, with identical text, was titled CTC/RDG 

Planning for Possible Rendition of Mohammad Rahim - 25 June 2007. See also 2463 (201956Z JUL 07). 

; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Conversation with 997

 Email front: John A. Rizzo; to: 

Bradbury; date: July 3, 2007. 

6439 

2432 I^^HrU L 07) 

TOP SECRET/, '/NOFORN 

Page 163 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

163 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

result, CIA Director Michael Hayden sent a letter to the president formally requesting that the 

president issue the Executive Order interpreting the Geneva Conventions in a manner to allow 

the CIA to interrogate Rahim using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. A classified 

legal opinion from OLC concluding that the use of the CIA's six enhanced interrogation 

techniques proposed for use on Rahim (sleep deprivation, dietary manipulation, facial grasp, 

facial slap, abdominal slap, and the attention grab) did not violate applicable laws was issued on 

July 20, 2007. The accompanying unclassified Executive Order was issued the same day.1000 

Although Rahim had been described by the CIA as "one of a handful of al-Qa'ida facilitators 

working directly for Bin Ladin and Zawahiri,"1001 Rahim remained in a CIA cell without being 

questioned for a week, while CIA interrogators waited for approval to use the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques against him.1002 

CIA interrogators initially expressed optimism about their ability to 

acquire information from Rahim using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. A cable 

sent from the CIA detention site stated: 

"Senior interrogators on site, with experience in almost every HVD [highvalue detainee] interrogation conducted by [CIA], believe the employment of 

interrogation with measures would likely provide the impetus to shock 

[Rahim] from his current resistance posture and provide an opportunity to 

influence his behavior to begin truthful participation."1003 

Four CIA interrogators present at the CIA detention site began 

applying the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on July 21, 2007.1004 According to CIA 

records, the interrogators "employed interrogation measures of facial slap, abdominal slap, and 

facial hold, and explained to [Rahim] that his assumptions of how he would be treated were 

wrong."1005 The interrogators emphasized to Rahim that "his situation was the result of his 

deception, he would stay in this position until interrogators chose to remove him from it, and he 

could always correct a previous misstatement."1006 According to the cable describing the 

interrogation, Rahim then threatened to fabricate information: 

"[Rahim] reiterated several times during the session that he would make up 

information if interrogators pressured him, and that he was at the complete 

101)0

 July 16, 2007, letter from Michael Hayden, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to President George W. 

Bush; Executive Order 13440, July 20, 2007; and Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central 

Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Acting Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, 

July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the 

Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al 

Qaeda Detainees. 

1001

 CIA memorandum titled, "CTC/RDG Planning for Possible Rendition of Mohammed Rahim - 19 June 2007." 

The document was unsigned, and the author is unknown. A subsequent version, with identical text, was titled 

"CTC/RDG Planning for Possible Rendition of Mohammad Rahim - 25 June 2007." 

1002

 2445 (181104Z JUL 07); •• • 2463 (201956Z JUL 07); ••1246 7 (211341Z JUL 07) 

1003

 2463 (201956Z JUL 07) 

1004

 2467 (211341Z JUL 07) 

1005

 2467 (211341Z JUL 07) 

looe 2467 (211341Z JUL 07) 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 164 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

164 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

mercy of the interrogators and they could even kill him if they wanted. 

Interrogators emphasized to [Rahim] that they would not allow him to die 

because then he could not give them information, but that he would, 

eventually, tell interrogators the truth."1007 

During the interrogation of Rahim using the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, Rahim was subjected to eight extensive sleep deprivation sessions,1008 

as well as to the attention grasp, facial holds, abdominal slaps, and the facial slap.1009 During 

sleep deprivation sessions, Rahim was usually shackled in a standing position, wearing a diaper 

and a pair of shorts.1010 Rahim's diet was almost entirely limited to water and liquid Ensure 

meals.1011 CIA interrogators would provide Rahim with a cloth to further cover himself as an 

incentive to cooperate. For example, a July 27, 2007, cable from the CIA detention site states 

that when Rahim showed a willingness to engage in questioning about "historical information," 

he was "provided a large towel to cover his torso" as a "subtle reward."1012 CIA interrogators 

asked Rahim a variety of questions during these interrogations, seeking information about the 

current location of senior al-Qa'ida leaders, which he did not provide.1013 

1007 2467 (211341Z JUL 07) 

1008

 Rahim was subjected to 104.5 hours of sleep deprivation from July 21, 2007, to July 25, 2007. Sleep 

deprivation was stopped when Rahim "described visual and auditory hallucinations." After Rahim was allowed to 

sleep for eight hours and the psychologist concluded that Rahim had been faking his symptoms, Rahim was 

subjected to another 62 hours of sleep deprivation. A third, 13 hour session, was halted due to a limit of 180 hours 

of sleep deprivation during a 30 day period. (Scf^^^ B 2486 (251450Z JUL07)J^H M 2491 (261237Z JUL 

07)JH| | 2496 (261834Z JUL 07); |HMp50 1 (271624Z JUL 07); HM^02(281557 Z JUL 07); and 

2508 (291820Z JUL 07).) On August 20, 2007, Rahim was subjected to a fourth sleep deprivation 

session. After a session that lasted 104 hours, CIA Headquarters consulted with the Department of Justice and 

determined that "[tjermi nation at this point is required to be consistent with the DCIA Guidelines, which limit sleep 

deprivation to an aggregate of 180 hours in any repeat any 30 day period." (See HEADQUARTERS 

(240022Z AUG 07).) Between August 28, 2007, and September 2, 2007, Rahim was subjected to three additional 

sleep deprivation sessions of 32.5 hours, 12 hours, and 12 hours. (See ^BB^^64^291552 Z AUG 07); 

•M266 1 (311810Z AUG 07);H^H266 2 (010738Z SEP 07)~and|^^ H 2666 (020722Z SEP 07).) 

As described, CIA interrogators conducted an eighth sleep deprivation session, lasting 138.5 hours, in November 

2007. 

2502 (281557Z JUL 07);J 

2654 (301659Z AUG 07); \ 

2508 (291820Z JUL 07); 

2626 (241158Z AUG 07); V 

2661 (3118I0Z AUG 07); | 

12467 (211341Z JUL 07)^ 

12558 (081511Z AUG 07); 

12496 (261834Z JUL 07); 

12558 (081511Z AUG 07); 

2645 (29 I552Z AUG 07); 

12666 (030722Z SEP 07) 

2467 (211341Z JUL 07) 

2501 (271624Z JUL 07) 

12467 (211341Z JUL 07 

12502 (281557Z JUL 07); 

2558 (081511Z AUG 07); 

2644 (281606Z AUG 07) 

2661 (311810Z AUG 07); 

2554 (071453Z AUG 07); 

2671 (061450Z SEP 07) 

2554 (071453Z AUG 07); 

2644 (281606Z AUG 07); 

2662 (020738Z SEP 07); 

2570 (101155Z AUG 07); | 12615 (201528Z AUG 07) 

12476 (231419Z JUL 07); | 

[2508 (291820Z JUL 07); \ 

1257 0 (101155Z AUG 07); 

2645 (29I552Z AUG 07); 

12662 (020738Z SEP 07); [ 

12671 (061450Z SEP 07). CIA contractor DUNBAR participated in Muhammad Rahim's interrogation 

sessions from August 9, 2007, to August 29, 2007. See Volume III for additional details. 

11 ii 11 ii 1 1 ^^^BBB^BBBBW^NfiFOR N 

Page 165 of 499 

2496 (261834Z JUL 07); 

2554 (071453Z AUG 07); 

2626 (241158Z AUG 07); 

2654 (301659Z AUG 07); 

2666 (030722Z SEP 07); 

UNCLASSIFIED 

165 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

On September 8, 2007, CIA Director Hayden approved an 

extension of Muhammad Rahim's CIA detention.1014 The Director of the National Clandestine 

Service Jose Rodriguez disagreed with the approved extension, writing: 

"I did not sign because I do not concur with extending Rahim's detention for 

another 60 days. I do not believe the tools in our tool box will allow us to 

overcome Rahim's resistance techniques. J.A.R."1015 

(^S^HHH^^fr^U? ) Shortly after the September 2007 extension, CIA personnel were 

directed to stop the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Rahim. Rahim was 

then left in his cell with minimal contact with CIA personnel for approximately six weeks.1016 

On September 10, 2007, Rahim's interrogators reported to CIA Headquarters that Rahim had 

"demonstrated that the physical corrective measures available to HVDIs1017 have become 

predictable and bearable."1018 The use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Rahim 

resumed on November 2, 2007, with a sleep deprivation session that lasted until November 8, 

2007, for a total of 138.5 hours. This sleep deprivation session, the longest to which Rahim had 

been subjected, was his eighth and final session. Rahim was also subjected to dietary 

manipulation during this period.1019 

(^SyVH^^mHIH 1^ ^ ) According to CIA records, intermittent questioning of Rahim 

continued until December 9, 2007, when all questioning of Rahim ceased for nearly three weeks. 

During this time, CIA detention site personnel discussed and proposed new ways to encourage 

Rahim's cooperation. These new proposals included suggestions that Rahim could be told that 

audiotapes of his interrogations might be passed to his family, or that | 

1014

 CIA memorandum from Director, Counterterrorism Center, to Director, Central 

Intelligence Agency, September 7,2007, Subject: Request to Extend Detention of Muhammad Rahim. 

1015

 CIA Routing and Record Sheet with Signatures for approval of the Memorandum, "Request to Extend Detention 

of Muhammad Rahim," September 5, 2007. J.A.R. are the initials of the Director of the NCS, Jose A. Rodriguez. 

2697 (121226Z SEP 07); CIA memorandum from Director, Counterterrorism 

Center, to Director, Central Intelligence Agency, October 31, 2007, Subject: Request Approval for the use of 

Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; HEADQUARTERS ••(10171 0 SEP07). During this period, contractor 

Grayson SWIGERT recommended two approaches. The first was increasing Rahim's amenities over 8-14 days 

"before returning to the use of EITs." The second was "switching from an interrogation approach that in effect 

amounts to a 'battle of wills,' to a 'recruiting* approach that sidesteps the adversarial contest inherent in framing the 

session as an interrogation." SWIGERT noted, however, that the latter approach "is apt to be slow in producing 

information" since intelligence requirements would not be immediately serviced, and "it would work best if [Rahim] 

believe^i^yill be ir^CIA^ustody indefinitely." (See email from: Grayson SWIGERT; to: [REDACTED] and 

cc: m^m m

 anc l

 Hammond DUNBAR; subject: Some thoughts on [Rahim] interrogation 

next steps; date: September 17,2007, at 4:05 PM.) The CTC's deputy chief of operations replied that, "It's clear 

that the 'harsh' approach isn't going to work and the more we try variants on it, the more it allows [Rahim] to 

believe he has won^^iequestion is whether that perception will be conveyed in Scenario 2." See email from 

[REDACTED] to: ^MB^ B |l I ll I II 11| Grayson SWIGERT, Hammond 

DUNBAR, [REDACTEDL^^B^M . [REDACTED]; subject: Fw: Some thoughts on [Rahim] 

interrogation next steps; date: September 17, 2007, at 4:28 PM. 

1017

 High Value Detainee Interrogators (HVDI) 

2691 (101306Z SEP 07) ^^ ^ 

2888 (022355Z NOV 07); 2915 (081755Z NOV 07). Due to the time zone difference, 

when this sleep deprivation session began it was November 2, 2007, at CIA Headquarters, but November 3, 2007, at 

the detention site. 

i m 1 1 1 iii i 'MBBWBB I 'NIII i III i'i 

Page 166 of 499 

1018 

1019 

UNCLASSIFIED 

166 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

| Rahim was cooperating with U.S. forces. On December 

18, 2007, CIA Headquarters directed the detention site to stand down on the proposals.1020 

The CIA's detention and interrogation of Mohammad Rahim 

resulted in no disseminated intelligence reports.1021 On March H 2008, Muhammad Rahim was 

jj^ B by the CIA to where ^^^^H^^ H took custody of Rahim. 

The|HHlgovernmen t immediately transferred Rahim to the custody of at 

which point Rahim was transferred back to CIA custody and rendered by the CIA to U.S. 

military custody at Guantanamo Bay.1022 

6. CIA After-Action Review of Rahim Interrogation Calls for Study of Effectiveness of 

Interrogation Techniques and Recommends Greater Use of Rapport-Building Techniques 

in Future CIA Interrogations 

On April 21, 2008, and April 22, 2008, the CIA's RDG convened 

an after-action review of the CIA's interrogation of Muhammad Rahim. According to summary 

documents, the CIA review panel attempted to determine why the CIA had been unsuccessful in 

acquiring useful information from Rahim. The summary documents emphasized that the 

primary factors that contributed to Rahim's unresponsiveness were the interrogation team's lack 

of knowledge of Rahim, the decision to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 

immediately after the short "neutral probe" and subsequent isolation period, the lack of clarity 

about whether the non-coercive techniques described in the Army Field Manual were permitted, 

the team's inability to confront Rahim with incriminating evidence, and the use of multiple 

improvised interrogation approaches despite the lack of any indication that these approaches 

might be effective.1023 The summary documents recommended that future CIA interrogations 

should incorporate rapport-building techniques, social interaction, loss of predictability, and 

deception to a greater extent.1024 The documents also recommended that the CIA conduct a 

3144(2704402 DEC 07); 

3165 (311016Z DEC 07); 

(180120ZDEC07) 

13097 (141321Z DEC 30981 

13151 (291607Z DEC 07); 1 

13166 (011404Z JAN 08); HEADQUARTERS | 

1021 See Volume II and Volume III for additional information. 

1^1^^840 8 I^^^^^^^^ERecord s indicate that Rahim depart 

his time in nominal^^^Bcustody. See Volume III for additional details on this transfer. 

1023

 Undated CIA Memorandum, titled After-Action Review, author (REDACTED); Undated CIA 

Memorandum, titled [Rahim] After Action Review: HVDI Assessment, with attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons 

Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concerning the Modification of Sleep Deprivation and Reinstatement of 

Walling as an E1T, and Memorandum from | 

I B t o Director, CTC, May 9, 2008, Subject: Results of After-Action Review of [Rahim] Interrogation. A 

document drafted by one of the participants prior to the review suggested that "intense legal/policy scrutiny" was 

also a negative factor; however, this point was not mentioned in any of the post-review summaries, except in the 

context of discussing confusion over whether particular interrogation methods were legal. The summary documents 

state that CIA officers devised and implemented several different strategies, one after another. According to one of 

the documents, "[t]hese varied strategies were implemented due to frustration and concern regarding the lack of 

intelligence production." 

1024

 Undated CIA Memorandum, titled After-Action Review, author (REDACTED), Undated CIA 

Memorandum, titled [Rahim] After Action Review: HVDI Assessment, with attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons 

Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concerning the ModificationofSleep Deprivation and Reinstatement of 

I NI I I III I 'B^BBI^M^^^B// NUI 'OH N 

Page 167 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

167 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOPSIX IM I/, l/NOFOHN 

survey of interrogation techniques used by other U.S. government agencies and other countries 

in an effort to develop effective interrogation methods.1025 

Muhammad Rahim was the last CIA detainee in the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program."®* 

7. CM Contracting Expenses Related to Company Formed by SWIGERT and DUNBAR 

(TS^^^^^^^H'/NF ) CIA contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR, who played a central 

role in the development of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the summer of 2002, 

and then used the techniques as contract interrogators, formed a company in 2005 | 

["Company Y"|.1027 In addition to providing interrogators for the CIA's interrogation program, 

Company Y was granted a sole source contract to provide operational psychologists, debriefers, 

and security personnel at CIA detention sites.1028 Under the contract, Company Y was tasked 

with conducting ongoing conversations with CIA detainees to learn about the terrorist mind set 

(this project was named the 'Terrorist Think Tank" or "T1"), developing | 

strategies, and writing the history of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.1029 Later 

descriptions of their services note that—on behalf of ihc CIA—Company Y officers participated 

in the interrogations of detainees held in foreign government custody and served as 

intermediaries between entities of those governments and the CIA.11'"10 

By 2006, the value of the base contract for their company, with all 

options exercised, was in excess of $180 million.1031 As of May 2007, Company Y had hired 11 

former CIA staff officers, many of whom had previously been involved with the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program, Company Y's chief operating officer was the former 

Walling as an BIT, and Memorandum from | 

| to Director, CTC, May 9, 2008. SubiectMteults of After-Action Review of [Rahim] Interrogation. 

I0

-

5

 Undated CIA Memorandum, lilted After-Action Review, author (REDACTED), Undated CIA 

Memorandum, titled [Rahim [ After Action Review: I tVDI Assessment, with attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons 

Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concerning the Modification of Sleep Deprivation and Reinstatement of 

Walling as an EIT. 

102(1 See Volume III for additional information. 

11)37

 For mure information on CIA contracting with [Company Y]. see Volume I 

ln

-

8

 Letter to H^^^^^^^^HHH B [Company YJ.altn: Hammond DUNBAR from [REDACTED], 

Contracting Officer, re Confirmation of Verbal Authorization to Proceed Not to Exceed (ATP/NTE): email from: 

| REDACTED); to: [REDACTED], ]REDACTED), [REDACTED]: 

subject: Next Contractual Steps with SWIGERT& DUNBAR; date: March 2, 2005; March 18. 2005, Letter from 

[ KEDACTED|, Y |. re Letter Contract 

l o w

 Email from: subject: dale: June 17, 2005. at 11:08:22 

AM^maiHromri^^^^^^ B to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED!. [REDACTED]: cc: ^HH^^^ H 

1 REDACTED[REDACTED], [REDACTED]: subject: PCS CTC officer to [Company Y 

location] ("One of the primary functions is to develop and set-up what we call the 'Terrorist Think Tank' 

(previously briefed to the DDO and ADDO) which will be critical as we develop our 

date: July 12.2005. at 10:25:48 AM: Justification Date: 28 February 2006. Justification For Other Than Full And 

Open Competition. Contractor: [Company Y], 

1030 See. for example. [Company Y] Monthly report, February 2006; [Company Y| Monthly Report, March 2006; 

[Company Y| Quarterly. 01 Jan - 31 March 2007. 

ll>:" Justification Date: 25 July 2006, Justification For Other Than Pull and Open Competition, Contractor: 

[Company YJ. 

INI I I III I ^^^^^^^^^^^B^NUI'OU N 

Page 168 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

168 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SEC RET// 1//NQFORN 

chief of the division of the CIA supervising the Renditions and 

Detention Group. In addition, Company Y hired at least | CIA security protective officers to 

work on Company Y's CIA contracts. In March 2006, a list of projected staff and contractors 

within CIA's Renditions and Detention Group included H separate positions.1032 Of those 

positions, | | [73%] were for contractors, the majority of whom were contractors from 

Company Y.1033 By June 2007, RDG reported having | staff officers and 

contractors.1034 By 2008, RDG had a total of H positions, with | staff ofTicersand B | [85%] 

contractors, according to the CIA.1035 

(TS^j^^^HHH^^ 1) The CIA's contract with Company Y was terminated in mid-2009. 

From the time of the company's creation in 2005 through the close-out of its contract in 2010, 

the CIA paid Company Y more than $75 million for services in conjunction with the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program.1036 The CIA also certified Company Y's office in 

as a Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), which required 

a CIA officer to be detailed to and provided Company Y access to CIA internal 

computer networks at its facility. In 2008, the CIA authorized an additional payment to 

Company Y of approximately $570,000, after Company Y indicated that it had incurred costs for 

conducting countersurveillancc of its officers when 

appeared in the press in conjunction with the program. The CIA agreed to a $5 million 

indemnification contract for the company that covered, among other expenses, criminal 

prosecution.

 7 Company Y hired a prominent | | law firm for representation in 

2007,1038 and billed the CIA $1.1 million for legal expenses from 2007 through 2012 per its 

indemnification agreement.1039 Part of these expenses included legal representation at a 

Committee staff briefing by SWIGERT and DUNBAR on November 2008.1040 Under the 

CIA's indemnification contract, the CIA is obligated to pay Company Y's legal expenses 

through 2021.1041 

1032

 DO/CTC«/RD G Projected Staff & Contractors, updated as of March 15, 2006. 

1033

 DO/CTCMH'RDG Projected Staff & Contractors, updated as of March 15, 2006. 

1034

 June 4, 2007, RDG, Mission Summary. 

1035 CTC confirmation, received by telephone on November 16, 2012. 

1036

 DTS #2009-1258; DTS #2012-4008. CIA paid Company Y $612,000 in 2010 for contract close-out costs. In a 

March 2009 notification, the CIA also informed the Committee that, in addition to payments to Company Y, 

Grayson SWIGERT and Hammond DUNBAR had received $1.5 million and $1.1 million, respectively, as 

individuals. As noted elsewhere, the notification includes inaccurate representations about the effectiveness of the 

CIA program. See Congressional Notification, March 18, 2009 (DTS #2009-1258). 

1037

 Email from: [REDACTED], CTC^M ; to: Hammond DUNBAR, Grayson SWIGERT; cc: 

[REDACTED], i^^HH^ H [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Copy of 

Signed Indemnification Agreement; date: July 13, 2007, at 02:22 PM; email from: [REDACTED], Chief, Contract 

Law Division; to: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED), 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Fw: Modified Indemnification Agmt... New AR 7-17 Waiver Memo, 

Too?; date: November 13,2007, at 10:32 AM. 

1038

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: subject: Billing, May-December 2007; date: 

August 12,2008, at 06:42 PM. 

1039

 Response from the CIA regarding Contract Costs for [Company Y], October 15, 2012 (DTS #2012-4008). 

1040 See DTS #2009-0572. 

1041

 Response from the CIA regarding Contract Costs for [Company Y], October 15, 2012 (DTS #2012-4008). 

iii i 1111 1 j^BB^BBlMi^M I 11" 11111 1 

Page 169 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

169 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

8. The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program Ends 

(U) On December 5, 2007, fewer than nine months after Director Hayden told the European 

Union that the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was not a CIA program, but 

"America's program," the House-Senate conference for the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence 

Authorization Act voted to include an amendment that banned coercive interrogation techniques 

and established the Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations as the 

interrogation standard for all U.S. government interrogations.1042 The conference report passed 

both the House and the Senate with bipartisan majorities.1043 

(U) On March 8, 2008, President Bush vetoed the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2008 that banned coercive interrogations. In a radio address explaining the decision, the 

president stated "[t]he bill Congress sent me would take away one of the most valuable tools in 

the war on terror—the CIA program to detain and question key terrorist leaders and operatives." 

Addressing the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, President Bush stated that 

the "main reason" the CIA program "has been effective is that it allows the CIA to use 

specialized interrogation procedures to question a small number of the most dangerous terrorists 

under careful supervision." The president stated that the CIA program had a "proven track 

record," and that the CIA obtained "critical intelligence" as a result of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques related to the Camp Lemonier plotting, the Karachi plotting, the Second 

Wave plotting, and the Heathrow Airport plotting. The president then repeated a warning the 

CIA had previously provided to the White House, that to "restrict the CIA to [interrogation] 

methods in the [Army] Field Manual," "could cost American lives."1044 As is described in this 

summary, and detailed more extensively in the full Committee Study, the CIA's representations 

to the White House regarding the role of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the 

thwarting of the referenced plots were inaccurate. 

(U) On March 11, 2008, by a vote of 225-188, the House of Representatives failed to override 

the presidential veto.1045 

(T&V^IHHI^H^^ )

 I n

 December 2008 and January 2009, CIA officers briefed the 

transition team for President-elect Barack Obama on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program. CIA Director Hayden prepared a statement that relayed, "despite what you have heard 

or read in a variety of public fora, these [enhanced interrogation] techniques and this program did 

1042

 DIRECTOR ••(152227 Z MAR 07); House Report 110-478 - Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2008, 110lh Congress (2007-2008), Section 327. 

1043

 H.R. 2082 passed the House of Representatives on December 13, 2007, by a vote of 222-197 (Roll No: 1160) 

and passed the Senate on February 13,2008, by a vote of 51-45 (Record Vote Number: 22). 

1044 See "Text: Bush on Veto of Intelligence Bill," The New York Times, dated March 8, 2008. Located, among 

other places, at www.nytiines.com/2008/03/08/washington/08cnd-ptext.html. For an example of a previous CIA 

briefing to the White House with similar assertions, see CIA Memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation 

Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; with briefing 

slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program." dated July 29, 2003. The CIA document provided to the participants 

states, "Termination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." For additional commentary, see 

"Veto of Bill on CIA Tactics Affirms Bush's Legacy," The New York Times, dated March 9, 2008. 

1045

 U.S. House of Representatives Roll Call Vote 117 of the 1 i0Lh Congress, Second Session, March 11, 2008, 7:01 

PM. 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 170 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

170 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET; 7NOFORN 

work."1046 The prepared materials included inaccurate information on the operation and 

management of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, as well as the same set of 

examples of the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that the CIA had 

provided to policymakers over several years.1047 The examples provided were nearly entirely 

inaccurate. 

(TSZ/fl^^B^^^H^^ ) C>n January 22, 2009, President Obama issued Executive Order 

13491, which required the CIA to "close as expeditiously as possible any detention facilities that 

it currently operates and... not operate any such detention facility in the future." The Executive 

Order prohibited any U.S. government employee from using interrogation techniques other than 

those in the Army Field Manual 2-22.3 on Human Intelligence Collector Operations.1048 

ioi6 q a Briefing for Obama National Security Team - "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including 

"Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009." Referenced materials attached to cover 

memorandum with the title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect Barrack [sic] Obama 

National Security Team Tuesday, 13 January 2009; 8:30 - 11:30 a.m." The briefing book includes the previously 

mentioned, "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting," dated 15 May 2006, which provided the same 

intelligence claims found in the document of the same name, but dated April 15, 2005. 

1047 po r defie d information, see Volume IT. 

1048

 The Executive Order also stated that the FBI and "other Federal law enforcement agencies" could "continu[e] to 

use authorized, non-coercive techniques of interrogation that are designed to elicit voluntary statements and do not 

Page 171 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

171 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

III. Intelligence Acquired and CIA Representations on the Effectiveness of 

the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Multiple 

Constituencies 

A. Background on CIA Effectiveness Representations 

From 2002 through 2009, in order to obtain policy authorizations 

and legal approvals, the CIA made a series of representations to officials at the White House,1049 

the Department of Justice, and the Congress, asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques were uniquely effective and necessary to produce otherwise unavailable intelligence 

that the U.S. government could not obtain from other sources.1050 The CIA further represented 

1049 Xhe.se representations were also made by the CIA to other elements of the executive branch, to include the 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence. As described in this Study, the Department of Justice first approved 

the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on August 1, 2002. 

1050

 From 2003 through 2009, the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that 

the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA 

representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see: 

(1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, 

which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. The CIA representations referenced by the 

OLC include that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical," 

"vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect 

and disrupt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that 

the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United 

States." (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from 

Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: 

Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques 

that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the 

Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA 

representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

Citing CIA documents and the President's September 6, 2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation program 

(which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: 'The CIA interrogation program— 

and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security 

of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As the President 

explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, 

the program has saved innocent lives.'" (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central 

Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 

Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 

of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value 

al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003 

represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence 

information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives," and which warned policymakers that 

"[t]ermination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for 

the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA 

Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member 

Briefing; and September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) 

(4) The CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: 

"Information [the CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has 

almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to 

11 ii 11 ii i i M^^^MMj^BMiVNoroi m 

Page 172 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

172 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "saved lives" and "enabled the CIA to disrupt 

terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on 

al-Qa'ida."1031 The Department of Justice used these representations of effectiveness to assess 

the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks 

involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, 

Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention 

and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27,2004; attachment: February 24,2004, Memorandum 

re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for 

CIA Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and 

the [enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, 

of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by 

other means." (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI ProgramI8FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid 

Shaykli Muhammad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and 

Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," 

"Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background 

on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 

March 18,2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]" (DTS #2009-1258), which provides a list of "some of the 

key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation 

techniques, and states: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this 

program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means." See Volume II for additional CIA 

representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the CIA to obtain unique, 

otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives." 

1051

 Among other documents that contain the exact, or similar CIA representations, see: (1) CIA memorandum for 

the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, 

dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003, presented to 

senior White House officials with additional briefings using die slides as documented in September 4, 2003, CIA 

Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and September 26,2003, Memorandum for the Record 

from Scott Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program. (2) CIA memorandum to the CIA Inspector General from 

James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, dated February 27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to 

Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, 

"Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities," dated February 24, 2004. (3) CIA 

Directorate of Intelligence. "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida," dated July 13^004; 

fax to the Department of Justice, April 22,2005, entitled, "H , Materials on KSM and Abu Zubaydah. H " This 

report was widely disseminated in the Intelligence Community and a copy of this report was provided to the Senate 

Select Committee on Intelligence on July 15, 2004. On March 31,2009, former Vice President Cheney requested 

the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released with redactions on August 24, 

2009. (4) CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence/^ubiect: 

"Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," included in email from: to: 

and subject: 

techniques"; date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM. The email references the attached "information paper to Dr. 

Rice explaining the value of the interrogation techniques." (5) CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of 

Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2,2005, from IHIHl^l , i^ H Legal Group, DCI 

Counterterrorist Center, subject: "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," (6) CIA 

briefing for Vice President Cheney, dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA 

Detention and Interrogation Program." (7) CIA Talking Points entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI 

Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques." (8) CIA "Briefing 

Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting" faxed from the CIA to the DepartmentofJustice on April 15, 2005, at 

10:47 AM. (9) CIA fax to DOJ Command Center^latec^prim, 2005, forHH| , Office of Legal 

Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, from ^ H Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, re: 

Materials of KSM and Abu Zubaydah, included CIA Intelligence Assessment "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: 

Preeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida," and CIA document, "Materials of KSM and Abu Zubaydah.; (10) CIA 

Intelligence Assessment, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa'ida," June 2005, which CIA 

m i i i III i BBH^BIMB^B^B 1 1 mi inn i 

Page 173 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

173 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were legal;1052 policymakers at the White 

House used these representations—and the legal analysis by the Department of Justice—to 

records indicate was provided to White House officials on June 1, 2005. The Intelligence Assessment at the 

SECRET//NOFORN classification level was more broadly disseminated on June 3, 2005. On March 31, 2009, 

former Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly 

released with redactions on August 24, 2009. (11) CIA memorandum entitled, "Future of CIA's Counterterrorist 

Detention and Interrogation Program," dated December 23, 2005, from CIA Director Porter Goss to Stephen J. 

Hadley, Assistant to the President/National Security Advisor, Frances F. Townsend, Assistant to the 

President/Homeland Security Advisor, and Ambassador John D. Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence, 

Attachment, "Impact of the Loss of the Detainee Program to CT Operations and Analysis." (12) CIA briefing 

document dated May 2, 2006, entitled, "BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 

Briefing for Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Programs." 

(13) CIA briefing document entitled, "Detainee Intelligence Value Update," dated 11 July 2006, internal document 

saved within CIA records as, "DNI Memo Intel Value July 11 2006.. .TALKING POINTS FOR DCI MEETING." 

(14) CIA document dated July 16, 2006, entitled, "DRAFT Potential Public Briefing of CIA's High-Value Terrorist 

Interrogations Program," and "CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy," drafts supporting the September 6, 

2006, speech by President George W. Bush acknowledging and describing the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program, as well as an unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, "Summary of the 

High Value Terrorist Detainee Program." (15) CIA classified statement for the record, Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007, and 

accompanying Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing transcript, entitled, "Hearing on Central Intelligence 

Agency Detention and Interrogation Program." (16) CIA fax from CIA employee [REDACTED] to U.S. Senate 

Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, with fax cover sheet entitled, "Talking points," sent on 

October 26, 2007, at 5:39:48PM,entitled, "Talking Points Appeal of the $jj | Million reduction in CIA/CTC's 

Rendition and Detention Program." (17) "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 

6, 2007, with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." (18) CIA 

Briefing for Obama National Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," 

named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009," prepared "13 January 2009." (19) CIA briefing 

documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- 18FEB.2009" and graphic 

attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)." 

The documents include "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and Effectiveness," with 

associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key 

Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background on Key Captures and 

Plots Disrupted." (20) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on March 18, 2009, at 

3:46PM, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]" (DTS #2009-1258). See also CIA representations detailed in 

OLC memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven 

G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application 

of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be 

Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees; and OLC memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting 

General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment 

Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the 

Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees. 

1052 See section of this summary addressing representations to the Department of Justice, as well as Memorandum 

for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, 

Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative; Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, 

Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under 

Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High 

Value Al Qaeda Detainees; and Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence 

Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 

2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva 

Conventions to Certain Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda 

Detainees. 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 174 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

174 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

assess whether the CIA interrogation program should be approved as a matter of policy;1053 and 

members of Congress relied on the CIA representations in overseeing and assessing the program, 

providing funding, and crafting related legislation.1054 

1053

 Among other documents, see. the August 5, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller from a 

July 29,2003, National Security Council Principals Meeting with the subject, "Review of Interrogation Program on 

29 July 2003," as well as the accompanying briefing slides, "CIA Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003"; March 4, 

2005, Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. CIA document, dated March 

4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program"; CIA document, 

dated May 2, 2006, entitled, BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 Briefing for 

Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Programs; CIA document 

entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, with the notation the 

document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting"; and CIA Briefing for Obama National 

Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing 

on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009," prepared "13 January 2009." 

1054Among other documents, see: (1) CIA testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) on April 

24, 2002, regarding Abu Zubaydah's initial interrogation; (2) CIA written answers to Committee Questions for the 

Record, dated August 15, 2002, regarding results of Abu Zubaydah's interrogations; (3) CIA testimony to SSCI on 

September 5, 2002, regarding covert detention facilities and results of Abu Zubaydah's interrogation; (4) CIA cable 

documenting September 27, 2002, briefing to Chairman Bob Graham and Vice Chairman Richard Shelby and their 

staff directors regarding the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah; (5) 

CIA Memorandum for the Record documenting February 4, 2003, briefing to SSCI Chairman Pat Roberts and 

Committee staff directors regarding the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program; (6) CIA testimony to SSCI on 

March 5, 2003, regarding the capture and initial interrogation of KSM; (7) CIA witness testimony to SSCI on 

March 19,2003, regarding KSM's interrogation; (8) CIA witness testimony to SSCI on April 1, 2003, regarding 

KSM's capture; (9) April 3, 2003, Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment regarding KSM threat 

reporting, entitled "Klialid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting—Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard 

of Lies," provided to the SSCI on April 7, 2003; (10) CIA testimony to SSCI on April 30, 2003, regarding detainee 

reporting; (11) CIA testimony to SSCI on June 25, 2003, regarding KSM interrogation; (12) CIA testimony to 

SSCI on July 30, 2003, regarding CIA detainee threat reporting; (13) CIA testimony to SSCI on September 3, 

2003, regarding i^Hfl^ i authorities, including CIA detention authorities; (14) CIA prepared briefing for 

Chairman Pat Roberts and Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV entitled, "CIA Interrogation Program: DDO 

Talking Points, 04 September 2003"; (15) CIA witness testimony to SSCI on May 12, 2004, regarding CIA role in 

abuses at Abu Ghraib prison; (16) SSCI staff notes for July 15,2004, CIA briefing to Chairman Pat Roberts and 

Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV regarding the status of the CIA interrogation program; (17) CIA testimony 

to SSCI on September 13, 2004, regarding CIA and the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison; (18) Hand-written notes of 

Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV recording a briefing by Jose Rodriguez on March 7, 2005; (19) CIA 

Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Sensitive Issue -Counterterrorism, October 31, 2005, regarding briefing for 

Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist regarding the Detainee Treatment Act, and email exchanges between John Rizzo, 

subject: "Re: Immediate Re: Sen. Frist required for briefing on impact of 

McCain Amendment"; date: October 31, 2005, and associated records concerning CIA briefings for Senators John 

McCain, Thad Cochran, Ted Stevens, and John Cornyn; (20) SSCI Memorandum for the Record, March 8, 2006, 

documenting CIA briefing of March 7, 2006, to staff on status of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program; 

(21) CIA Director Porter Goss testimony to the SSCI on March 15, 2006, regarding the status of the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program; (22) CIA Director Michael Hayden testimony to the SSCI on September 6, 

2006, regarding the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, prior to Senate consideration of the Military 

Commissions Act of 2006; (23) CIA Director Michael Hayden testimony to the SSCI on November 16, 2006, 

regarding the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, following passage of the Military Commissions Act of 

2006; (24) CIA Director Michael Hayden testimony to the SSCI on April 12, 2007, regarding the CIA's Detention 

and Interrogation Program and a report of the International Committee of the Red Cross; (25) CIA fax from CIA 

employee [REDACTED] to U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, with fax cover 

sheet entitled, "Talking points," sent on October 26, 2007, at 5:39:48 PM. Document faxed entitled, "Talking Points 

Appeal of the Million reduction in CIA/CTC's Rendition and Detention Program"; (26) CIA Director 

Michael Hayden testimony to the SSCI on December 11,2007, regarding the public revelation of the CIA's 

m i 11 in i 11111111111 

Page 175 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

175 
UNCLASSIFIED 

M I 11111 I I MI HIM I 

(i^S/^I^H^^HB^^ ) In CIA presentations to the executive and legislative branches, the 

CIA represented that other parties had consented to, or endorsed, the CIA's interrogation 

program. As an example, during a policy review of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 

in July 2003, the CIA informed a subset of the National Security Council principals that the use 

of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "approved by the attorney general," and was 

"fully disclosed to the SSCI and HPSCI leadership." In the same presentation, the CIA 

represented that the CIA interrogation program "had produced significant intelligence 

information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives." The CIA then provided 

examples of "attacks averted" as a direct result of the CIA interrogation program, and warned 

policymakers that "[germination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly 

extensive."1055 

When the CIA was asked by White House officials to review and 

provide further evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in 

2004, the CIA responded that it was "difficult, if not impossible" to conduct such a review, but 

assured White House officials that "this program works," "the techniques are effective," and the 

program produces "results."1056 The "results" provided by the CIA consisted of the "disruption" 

of specific terrorist plots and the capture of specific terrorists. The CIA further represented that 

the information acquired as a result of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was unique 

and "otherwise unavailable."1057 These specific CIA claims played an especially important role 

destruction of videotapes of the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri; (27) CIA Director 

Michael Hayden public testimony to the SSCI on February 5, 2008, regarding waterboarding and CIA 

interrogations, prior to Senate vote on February 13, 2008, on the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization Act 

that would have prohibited any member of the U.S. Intelligence Community from using interrogation techniques not 

authorized by the U.S. Army Field Manual. 

1055

 Memorandum for the Record: "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003." Memorandum prepared by 

CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003, and briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation 

Program," dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials. Those attending the meeting included 

the director of the CIA, George Tenet; the CIA general counsel, Scott Muller; Vice President Cheney; National 

Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice; White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales; Attorney General John Ashcroft; 

Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Patrick Philbin; and counsel to the National Security 

Council, John Bellinger. 

1056

 CIA talking points for the National Security Council entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting 

PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques," dated March 4, 2005, for a March 

8, 2005, meeting. See also CIA Memorandum for National Security Advisor Rice entitled, "Effectiveness of the 

CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," dated December 2004. 

1057 p r o m 2003 through 2009, the CIA's representations regarding die effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that 

the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA 

representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see-. 

(1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, 

which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. The CIA representations referenced by the 

OLC include that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical," 

"vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect 

and disrupt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that 

the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United 

States." (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from 

IMI i i i i i BB^^BB^BUB^OFOR N 

Page 176 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

176 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

in the Department of Justice's legal review of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.1058 

Department of Justice documents stated that an analysis of the legality of the CIA's enhanced 

Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: 

Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques 

that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the 

Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20,2007, which also relied on CIA 

representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

Citing CIA documents and the President's September 6, 2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation program 

(which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: 'The CIA interrogation program— 

and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security 

of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ... As the President 

explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, 

the program has saved innocent lives.'" (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central 

Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 

Counsel, July 20,2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 

of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Intenogation of High Value 

al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003, 

which represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant 

intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives," and which warned policymakers 

that "[tjermination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensi ve." (See August 5,2003 Memorandum 

for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA 

Interrogation Program, July 29,2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member 

Briefing; and September 26,2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) 

(4) The CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: 

"Information [the CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has 

almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to 

the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks 

involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, 

Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Countertenorism Detention 

and Interrogation Program" 2003-7J23-IG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum 

re Successes of CIA's Countertenorism Detention and Intenogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA 

Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and die 

[enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[mjost, if not all, of 

the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other 

means." (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Piogram18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid 

Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and 

Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," 

"Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background 

on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 

March 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]" (DTS #2009-1258), which provides a list of "some of the 

key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the CIA's enhanced intenogation 

techniques, and states: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this 

program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means." See Volume II for additional CIA 

representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques enabled the CIA to obtain unique, 

otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives." 

1058 See Volume II for detailed infonnation. The OLC's May 30, 2005, memorandum relied on the CIA's 

representations in determining that the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques did not violate the Fifth 

Amendment's prohibition on executive conduct that "shocks the conscience," indicating that this analysis was a 

"highly context-specific and fact-dependent question." The OLC also linked its analysis of whether the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "constitutionally arbitrary" to the representation by the CIA that the 

program produced "substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence." (See Memorandum for 

John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office ofLega^ounsel^a^0^005^e : Application of United States 

i m i i IIi i iJJM^^B" 1111111111 1 

Page 177 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

177 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRETZ/M^^^^^M^^^B^/NOFOR N 

interrogation techniques was a "highly context-specific, fact-dependent question" and 

highlighted the importance of the CIA representation that the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques produced "substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence," 

and were "largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United States."1059 

B. Past Efforts to Review the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation 

Techniques 

(TS/^^^^^^^^^^VNF ) During the period in which the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program was operational, from 2002 to 2009, there were three reviews that addressed the 

effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques: (1) the CIA Office of Inspector 

General Special Review, released in May 2004; (2) an internal review conducted by two senior 

CIA officers in 2004; and (3) a 2005 "Blue Ribbon" panel consisting of two individuals not 

employed by the CIA. According to CIA records, as of the spring of 2007, the CIA had not 

"conducted any other studies on the effectiveness of interrogation techniques."1060 

(TS/^H^^^H^I^NF ) Each of the previous reviews relied on interviews with CIA 

personnel involved in the program, as well as documents prepared by CIA personnel, which 

represented that the CIA interrogation program was effective, and that the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques had "enabled the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture 

Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the 

Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees.) The CIA provided examples of the purported effectiveness of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in response to a request from the OLC. According to an email from B 

BHB^T C Legal Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury explained that 

"because the standards under Article 16 [of the Convention Against Torture] require a balancing of the 

government's need for the information, it would be quite helpful if we had any case studies or examples to 

demonstrate the value of information produced by the program." £eeemail^ronr^M(BBBB ; to: ^^^ B 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; date: March 2, 2005, 2:32 PM. 

10.TO Among other documents, see Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel memoranda dated May 30,2005, 

and July 20, 2007. The May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum repeats additional CIA representations, including that 

"enhanced interrogation techniques remain essential to obtaining vital intelligence necessary to detect and disrupt 

such emerging threats" and that the use of the techniques "led to specific, actionable intelligence." The July 20, 

2007, OLC memorandum states that the ".. .use of enhanced interrogation techniques is intended to service this 

paramount interest [security of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable 

intelligence," citing CIA representations to the President that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced 

information "we could not get anywhere else," and that "the use of such techniques saved American lives by 

revealing information about planned terrorist plots." 

1060 e l a draft response to Questions for the Record submitted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

after an April 12, 2007, hearing on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The CIA draft response states 

the CIA Blue Ribbon Panel, consisting of two outside reviewers, was the only independent review of the 

effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and that "CIA had not conducted any other studies on 

the effectiveness of [the] interrogation techniques." The final CIA response to die Committee states: "The 2004 

CIA Office of the Inspector General report that reviewed CIA's counterterrorism detention and interrogation 

activities recommended a non-CIA independent experts' review of the effectiveness of each of the authorized EIT 

and a determination regarding the necessity for the continued use of each technique. As a result, CIA sought and 

obtained the agreement of Mr. BBIBB anc l Mr- ^Bi^B^BBto conduct an independent review, which is 

also known as the Blue-Ribbon Panel report. Their individual reports are provided at Tabs A and B." 

IIII M ii i i W^^^JBJI^^B.yNorrm N 

Page 178 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

178 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ y/NOFORN 

additional terrorists, and collect a high-volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida."1061 CIA 

personnel represented: "[t]his is information that CTC could not have gotten any other way."1062 

(TS/^ll^m^^/NF ) There are no indications in CIA records that any of the past 

reviews attempted to independently validate the intelligence claims related to the CIA's use of its 

enhanced interrogation techniques that were presented by CIA personnel in interviews and in 

documents. As such, no previous review confirmed whether the specific intelligence cited by the 

CIA was acquired from a CIA detainee during or after being subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, or if the intelligence acquired was otherwise unknown to the United 

States government ("otherwise unavailable"), and therefore uniquely valuable. 

C. The Origins of CIA Representations Regarding the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced 

Interrogation Techniques As Having "Saved Lives," "Thwarted Plots," and "Captured 

Terrorists" 

(TS^^^^^^^H^^NF ) Before the CIA took custody of its first detainee, CIA attorneys 

researched the limits of coercive interrogations and the legal definitions of torture. On 

November 26, 2001, CIA Office of General Counsel (OGC) attorneys circulated a draft legal 

memorandum entitled "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers."1063 The 

memorandum listed interrogation techniques considered to be torture by a foreign government 

and a specific nongovernmental organization, including "cold torture," "forced positions," 

"enforced physical exhaustion," "sensory deprivation," "perceptual deprivation," "social 

deprivation," "threats and humiliation," "conditioning techniques," and "deprivation of 

sleep."1064 The draft memorandum described various prohibitions on torture and the potential 

use of "necessity" as a legal defense against charges of torture, stating: 

"[i]t would, therefore, be a novel application of the necessity defense to avoid 

prosecution of U.S. officials who tortured to obtain information that saved 

many lives... A policy decision must be made with regard to U.S. use of 

torture in light of our obligations under international law, with consideration 

given to the circumstances and to international opinion on our current 

1001 See: (1) CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review - Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation 

Program, (2003-7123-IG), May 2004; (2) May 12,2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from 

| Chief, Information Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Divisions 

via Associate Deputy Director for Operations, with the subject line, "Operational Review of CIA Detainee 

Program"; and (3) Blue Ribbon Panel Review, including a September 2, 2005, Memorandum from 

Hl^l t o Director Porter Goss, CIA, entitled "Assessment of EITs Effectiveness," and a September 23, 2005, 

Memorandum from to the Honorable Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, entitled, 

"Response to request from Director for Assessment of EIT effectiveness." 

1062 See, among other examples, a June 27,2003, Inspector General interview with^TC^hie f of Operations, 

HB^HH^I ' The record of that interview (2003-7123-IG) states: "[Hi^^^^ H .stated that the 

Agency's Al-Qa'ida program has been very effective. .. [HIHHH l views the intelligence as the main criteria 

forjudging the success of the program; specifically, intelligence that has allowed CTC to take other terrorists off the 

street and to prevent terrorist attacks. This is information that CTC could not have gotten any other way." 

1063 Novem b e r 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph 5, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for 

CIA Officers." This document includes information regarding Paragraph 4. 

1064 November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph 5, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for 

CIA Officers." See Volume I for additional information. 

11 ii1 11 i i i ^^M^MMBMB I <" 1" 

Page 179 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

179 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

campaign against terrorism—states may be very unwilling to call the U.S. to 

task for torture when it resulted in saving thousands of lives."1065 

On February 1, 2002, a CTC attorney researched the impact of the 

application of the Geneva Conventions (GC) on future CIA interrogation activities.1066 The 

attorney wrote: 

"If the detainee is a POW and enjoys GC coverage, then the optic becomes 

how legally defensible is a particular act that probably violates the convention, 

but ultimately saves lives. I believe that [a named CIA attorney]'s papers 

reflecting on necessity and anticipatory self defense are the two most obvious 

defenses available."1067 

(U) The Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) included the "necessity defense" 

in its August 1, 2002, memorandum to the White House Counsel, determining, among other 

things, that "under the current circumstances, necessity or self-defense may justify interrogation 

methods that might violate" the criminal prohibition against torture.1068 The OLC memorandum 

states: 

"It appears to us that under the current circumstances the necessity defense 

could be successfully maintained in response to an allegation of a Section 

2340A violation. ...Under these circumstances, a detainee may possess 

1065

 Italics added. November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph 5, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal 

Considerations for CIA Officers," at 1. The CIA would later repeat both claims, representing to senior officials and 

the Department of Justice that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced intelligence that 

"saved lives," and that this intelligence was otherwise unavailable. Further, on August 1, 2002, OLC issued an 

unclassified, but non-public opinion, in the form of a memorandum to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, 

analyzing whether certain interrogation methods would violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. The memorandum 

provides a similar rationale for the necessity defense, stating, "certain justification defenses might be available that 

would potentially eliminate criminal liability. Standard criminal law defenses of necessity and self-defense could 

justify interrogation methods needed to elicit information to prevent a direct and imminent threat to the United 

States and its citizens." The memorandum later concludes: "even if an interrogation method might violate Section 

2340A, necessity or self-defense couk^jrovideiustifications that would eliminate any criminal liability." 

I0M Email from: [REDACTED]; to: •^•H^H I and [REDACTED]; subject: "POW's and Questioning"; 

date: February 1, 2002. 

1067

 Italics added. Email from: [REDACTED]; to: and [REDACTED]; subject: "POW's and 

Questioning"; date: February 1, 2002. In response to a request from the Department of Justice's Office of 

Professional Responsibility (OPR), the CIA provided two memoranda - one dated November 7,2001, the other 

undated - neither of which discussed the necessity defense. The OPR report states: "Although the CIA Office of 

General Counsel (OGC) told us that these were the only CIA memoranda in its possession on interrogation policy, 

some of the information we obtained from the CIA suggested otherwise. In an internal email message dated 

February I, 2002, from CTC attorney [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], [REDACTED] referred to '[CIA Attorney 

[REDACTED]] papers reflecting on necessity and anticipatory self defense.'" See Department of Justice, Office of 

Professional Responsibility, Report. Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues 

Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected Terrorists, 

July 29, 2009, pp. 31-32. 

1068

 Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from Jay C. Bybee, Assistant Attorney 

General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, "Re Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C 

2340-2340A," the U.S. Federal Torture Statute. 

III! I I III I ^^^^^^^^B^^BIVNOROH N 

Page 180 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

180 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

information that could enable the United States to prevent attacks that 

potentially could equal or surpass the September 11 attacks in their magnitude. 

Clearly, any harm that might occur during an interrogation would pale to 

insignificance compared to the harm avoided by preventing such an attack, 

which could take hundreds or thousands of lives."1069 

(TS^^^^^m^^l^NF ) According to a report by the Department of Justice Office of 

Professional Responsibility (OPR), released in July 2009, Deputy Assistant Attorney General 

John Yoo "acknowledged that the CIA may have indirectly suggested the new sections [related 

to Commander-in-Chief authority and possible defenses, including the necessity defense] by 

asking him what would happen in a case where an interrogator went 'over the line' and 

inadvertently violated the statute." Yoo also told the OPR that he drafted those relevant sections. 

Another senior Department of Justice lawyer at the time, Patrick Philbin, informed the OPR that 

when he told Yoo that the sections were superfluous and should be removed, Yoo responded, 

"They want it in there." The CIA's former Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo told the OPR 

that the CIA did not request the addition of the sections.1070 In his response to the OPR report, 

Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee stated that the "ticking time bomb" that could justify the 

necessity defense was, in fact, a "real world" scenario. According to Bybee, "the OLC attorneys 

working on the [August 1, 2002] Memo had been briefed on the apprehension of Jose Padilla on 

May 8, 2002. Padilla was believed to have built and planted a dirty bomb."1071 The August 1, 

2002, memorandum states that the "[interrogation of captured al Qaida operatives allegedly 

allowed U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies to track Padilla and to detain him upon 

his entry into the United States."1072 This information was inaccurate.1073 

1069

 Italics added. Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales. Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for 

Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, pp. 39-41. On December 30, 2004, the OLC issued a new 

memorandum superseding the August 1, 2002, memorandum in its entirety. The OLC wrote that "[b]ecause the 

discussion in [the August 1, 2002] memorandum concerning the President's Commander-in-Chief power and the 

potential defenses to liability was - and remains—unnecessary, it has been eliminated from the analysis that follows. 

Consideration of the bounds of any such authority would be inconsistent with the President's unequivocal directive 

that United States personnel not engage in torture." (See Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney 

General, Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A). No CIA detainees were subjected to 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques between the issuance of the December 2004 memorandum and May 

2005, when the OLC opined on the application of the federal prohibition on torture to the techniques. 

1070

 Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal 

Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced 

Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected Terrorists, July 29,2009, p. 51. 

1071

 Bybee response, at 74, n. 6, cited in the OPR Report at fn. 171. Department of Justice, Office of Professional 

Responsibility, Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to 

tlie Central Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected Terrorists, July 29, 

1072

 Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation 

under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. 

1073 See section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the 

Capture of Jose Padilla. 

2009. 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 181 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

181 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFQRN 

(TS/^^^^^^^^^/NF ) With the issuance on August 1, 2002, of a second OLC 

memorandum specific to Abu Zubaydah,1074 the CIA initiated the use of its enhanced 

interrogation techniques. After the CIA subjected Abu Zubaydah and other CIA detainees to the 

techniques, the CIA made increasingly stronger assertions about the effectiveness of the CIA's 

interrogation program, eventually asserting that the CIA interrogation program "saved lives,"1075 

and that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was necessary, as the 

intelligence obtained could not have been acquired in any other way.1076 

Many of the representations made by the CIA about the 

effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were first made in the spring of 

2003 and evolved over the course of the year and into early 2004. In April 2003, CIA officers 

told the CIA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) that KSM, who had been subjected to the 

techniques between March | , 2003, and March 25, 2003, was still not fully cooperative. For 

example, on April 3, 2003, more than a week after the CIA had discontinued the use of its 

enhanced interrogation techniques on KSM, thc deputy chief of ALEC Station, ^H H 

informed the OIG that KSM had made "remarkable progress," but there was "a lot 

more to be done." did not cite any specific intelligence obtained from KSM in this 

context. 

1077 

(^FS/^H^^^^H^NP ) On June 27, 2003, more than three months after the CIA had 

ceased using its enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, CTC Chief of Operations 

| told the OIG that he was convinced that KSM "knows more and is just 

1(174

 Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1,2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 1). 

1075

 Among other documents, see CIA memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 

2003," prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CIA 

Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials; Memorandum to the 

Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, dated February 27,2004, with the 

subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program' 

(2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities," dated 

February 24, 2004; and the September 6, 2006, CIA-vetted speech by the President on the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program. 

l07e See, among other examples, interview of James Pavitt, by and [REDACTED], Office of the 

Inspector General, August 21, 2003; Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for 

Operations; subject: re Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation 

Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27,2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of 

CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities; and a June 27, 2003, Inspector General interview of 

the Chief of Operations CTC, The record of that interview states: "[^IH^Hi ] stated 

that the Agency's AI-Qa'ida program has been very effective. views the intelligence as the main 

criteria forjudging the success of the program; specifically, intelligence that has allowed CTC to take other terrorists 

off the street and to prevent terrorist attacks. This is information that CTC could not have gotten any other way." 

1077

 Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 

2003. On April 21, 2003, a CTC analyst told the IG that KSM "has not provided anything significant to date." (See 

interview by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 21, 

2003.) On April 30, 2003, one of KSM's interrogators pointed to "information on hijackings, bridges in New York, 

and nuclear plants," and information on hidden uranium, which was never found. See interview of H H 

by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 30, 2003. 

11 ii M 11 1 ^MBHBBBI^B I I ii I II 

Page 182 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

182 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

waiting for us to ask the right questions."1078 then provided two examples of 

information that KSM had not provided until he was asked specifically about the matters by CIA 

interrogators: information on the "tallest building in California" plot (also known as the "Second 

Wave" plot), and the inclusion of a building in Canary Wharf as a target in the plotting against 

Heathrow Airport.1079 Asked if he could think of any instances in which information from CIA 

detainees had led to the arrest of a terrorist, HHH H stated only that Majid Khan provided 

information that led to the arrest of Iyman Faris by the FBI.1080 This information was inaccurate, 

as Majid Khan was not in CIA custody when he provided information on Iyman Faris.1081 

(TS^H^B^H^VNF ) represented to the OIG that the CIA's interrogation 

program was "very effective," and that the intelligence obtained from CIA detainees was "the 

main criteria forjudging the success of the program; specifically, intelligence that has allowed 

CTC to take other terrorists off the street and to prevent terrorist attacks." also 

told the OIG that the information obtained from CIA interrogations was "information that CTC 

could not have gotten any other way."1082 

(U) On June 26, 2003, President Bush issued a statement for the United Nations International 

Day in Support of Victims of Torture. That statement—referenced in multiple news articles— 

relayed that the: 

"United States is committed to the world-wide elimination of torture and we 

are leading this fight by example. 1 call on all governments to join with the 

United States and the community of law-abiding nations in prohibiting, 

investigating, and prosecuting all acts of torture and in undertaking to prevent 

other cruel and unusual punishment."1083 

The following day, after the Washington Post published an article 

on the Administration's detainee policy, CIA Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo called John 

Bellinger, the legal advisor to the National Security Council. According to an email from Rizzo 

to other senior CIA officers, Rizzo called Bellinger to: 

| told the OIG that KSM was asked about the plan to hijack an airplane in Malaysia and fly it into 

the Library Tower in Los Angeles, which the CIA had learned from another detainee. That detainee was Masran bin 

Arshad, who was in foreign government custody. told the OIG that KSM "provided information on 

the Heathrow/Canary Wharf option, buUioHmtiUersonnel at [DETENTION SITE BLUE] asked him about a 

picture he drew of an I-beam." See Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Chief of 

OperationsJHI^I^mi , Counterterrorist Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003. 

^^^^^^^^Memorandu m for the Record; subject: Meeting with Chief of Operations, | 

Counterterrorist Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003. See sections of this summary and Volume II on the 

Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group, and the Thwarting of the 

Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf Plotting. 

|, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Chief of Operations, Counterterrorist 

Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003. 

1081 See section of this summary and Volume 11 on the Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Iyman Faris. 

1082 Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Chief of Operations, HI^^H^^^ I 

Counterterrorist Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003. 

1083

 June 26, 2003, Statement by the President, United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030626-3.html. 

m i 11 iii i MBBI^B^M^^ B i m i mi l I 

Page 183 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

183 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

"express our surprise and concern at some of the statements attributed to the 

Administration in the piece, particularly the Presidential statement on the UN 

International Day in Support of Victims of Torture as well as a quote from the 

Deputy White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan that all prisoners being 

held by the USG are being treated 'humanely.'"1084 

(TS/T^^^^^^^^BZ/NF) While Rizzo expressed the view that the presidential statement did 

not appear to contain anything "we can't live with," Rizzo conveyed to senior CIA leaders that it 

"might well be appropriate for us to seek written reaffirmation by some senior White House 

official that the Agency's ongoing practices... are to continue. 

>1085 

(TS^^^^^^^^^B^NF ) On July 3, 2003, DCT George Tenet sent a memorandum to 

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice seeking reaffirmation of the Administration's 

support for the CIA's detention and interrogation policies and practices. The memorandum 

stated that the reaffirmation was sought because: 

"recent Administration responses to inquiries and resulting media reporting 

about the Administration's position have created the impression that these 

[interrogation] techniques are not used by U.S. personnel and are no longer 

approved as a policy matter."1086 

(TS/Z^H^^H^H^^ ) While the CIA was preparing to meet with the White House on the 

reaffirmation of the CIA interrogation program, CIA personnel provided additional inaccurate 

information about the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to the 

OIG, as well as to senior CIA leadership. These inaccurate representations described the 

"thwarting" of specific plots and the capture of specific terrorists attributed to the interrogation 

of CIA detainees and the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

?) On July 16, 2003, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station 

| was interviewed again by the OIG. In this interview asserted that KSM 

"provided information that helped lead to the arrest of' Iyman Faris, Uzhair Paracha, Saleh alMarri, Majid Khan, and Ammar al-Baluchi.1087

 These representations were almost entirely 1AJJO

 J 

inaccurate. 

1084

 Email from: John Rizzo; to: John cc: Buzzy Krongard, Scott Muller, William 

Harlow; subject: Today's Washington Post Piece on Administration Detainee Policy; date: June 27, 2003. 

1085

 Email from: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman,H|^^^H' c c : Buzzy Krongard, Scott Muller, William 

Harlow; subject: Today's Washington Post Piece on Administration Detainee Policy; date: June 27, 2003. 

lose j u | y 2003, CIA Memorandum for National Security Advisor from Director of Central Intelligence George J. 

Tenet with the Subject: Reaffirmation of the Central Intelligence Agency's Interrogation Program. See also Scott 

Muller, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; date: 5 August 

2003(OGC^C^003-50078). 

1087

 Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, 

Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003. 

1088 See sections of this summary and Volume II on the Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Iyman Faris; the 

Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha; the Identification and Arrest of Saleh al-Marri; die 

Capture of Majid Khan; and the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots (regarding the capture of Ammar al-Baluchi). 

11ii i i iii i ^^^BBBMMBB^^TYW N 

Page 184 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

184 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET// I//NOFQRN 

also informed the OIG that information from CIA 

detainees "provided a wealth of information about Al-Qa'ida plots," including: a terrorist plot in 

Saudi Arabia against Israel; a plot against the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan; a plot against 

Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf; a plot to derail trains; a plot against subways; a gas station 

plot; a plot against the "tallest building" in California; a plot against suspension bridges; and a 

plot to poison water supplies.1089 Much of this information was inaccurate.1090 According to 

OIG records, "[o]n the question of whether actual plots had been thwarted, [HH^f t opined 

that since the operatives involved in many of the above plots had been arrested, [CTC had], in 

effect, thwarted the operation[s]." IHHf l provided a list to the OIG of terrorists^aptured and 

the plots with which they were associated. None of the individuals listed by were 

captured as a result of reporting from CIA detainees.1091 

During this same period in 2003, CIA officers were compiling 

similar information for CIA leadership. On July 18, 2003, die chief of ALEC Station, B l 

m^H , wrote an email to ALEC Station officers requesting information on the "value and 

impact" of CIA detainee information on behalf of the CIA Renditions Group (RDG),1092 which 

he stated was being compiled for senior CIA leadership.1093 wrote that "[o'Jne way to 

assist now is to provide input to RDG on highlights of intel and ops reporting from the 

detainees," in particular "reporting that helped reveal or stop plots, reporting that clinched the 

identity of terrorist suspects, etc."1094 The first portion ofthcresponse^ompiled by ALEC 

Station, was drafted by Deputy Chief of ALEC Station who wrote that CIA 

detainee reporting "plays a key role in our ability to identify and capture al-Qa'ida terrorists^ 

including those who were planning to attack inside the United States." In an email, IHI H 

wrote that "[t]he ability of the detainees to identify many operatives previously unknown to us or 

to the FBI resulted in the successful capture/detention of several terrorists," and that the use of 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "key" to acquiring this information on these 

operatives. As examples of operatives "previously unknown" to the CIA and the FBI and 

identified by CIA detainees, cited Jose Padilla, Binyam Mohammed, Majid Khan, 

1089 I |, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center 

ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003. 

1090 See sections of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots; the Thwarting of the 

Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf Plotting; the Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Iyman Paris; the Capture of 

Majid Khan; the Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group; and the KSM 

detainee review in Volume III. 

1091 liste d Majid Khan (gas station and poison plotting), lyman Faris (the suspension bridge plot, as well as 

a possible shopping mall plot), Khallad bin Attash (the Heathrow plot), Masran bin Arshad (the "tallest building" 

plot), and Ammar al-Baluchi (the plot against the U.S. consulate in Karachi). See relevant sections of tliis summary 

and Volume II for additional information. 

1092

 As noted, the "Renditions and Interrogations Group," is also referred to as the "Renditions Group," the 

"Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group," "RD1," and "RDG" in CIA records. 

1093

 Email from: to: DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs; cc: | 

[subject: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 01:09 PM. 

1094

 Email from: to: DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs; cc: | 

fsubject: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 01:09 PM. 

TOP SECRETFLBBI^^M^R " 

Page 185 of 499 

I//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

185 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

Iymai^aris, and Sayf al-Rahman Paracha.1095 These representations were inaccurate.1096 

i m email concluded: 

"Simply put, detainee information has saved countless American lives inside 

the US and abroad. We believe there is no doubt al-Qa'ida would have 

succeeded in launching additional attacks in the US and that the information 

obtained from these detainees through the use of enhanced measures was key 

to unlocking this information. It is our assessment that if CIA loses the ability 

to interrogate and use enhanced measures in a responsible way, we will not be 

able to effectively prosecute this war."1097 

(TS/^^^HHH^^ )

 Th e

 information relayed from ALEC Station to RDG in July 2003 

for CIA leadership also included information from a CIA assessment entitled "Significant 

Detainee Reporting."1098 That document included information that was largely congruent with 

CIA records. It stated that KSM provided details on the Heathrow Airport Plot and the Karachi 

Plots only after being confronted with the capture of Khallad bin Attash and Ammar alBaluchi;1099

 that with regard to plots inside the United States, KSM had only admitted to plots 

that had been abandoned or already disrupted; that KSM fabricated information in order to tell 

CIA interrogators "what he thought they wanted to hear"; and that KSM generally only provided 

information when "boxed in" by information already known to CIA dcbriefers."00 This 

information was not included in CIA representations to policymakers later that month. 

On July 29, 2003, as a result of DCI Tenet's July 3, 2003, request 

seeking reaffirmation of the CIA's detention and interrogation policies and practices, Tenet and 

CIA General Counsel Scott Muller conducted a briefing for a subset of the National Security 

I, [REDACTED] 1095

 Email from: 

[REDACTED1,1[REDACTED] , | 

I; subject: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 2:30:09 PM; email from:] 

DO_CTC_ALEC Chiefs Groups, | 

|, [REDACTED], | 

I; subject: Re: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 3:57:45 PM. 

1096 See sections of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the 

Capture of Jose Padilla; the Capture of Majid Khan; the Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Iyman Faris; and the 

Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha. 

1097

 Italics added. Email from: I^^^^^^^LloLMBMI^^ m DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs 

|, [REDACTED], 

2003, at 3:57:45 PM. 

1098

 Email from: ^ H 

; subject: Re: value of detainees; date: July 18, 

, DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs, | 

[REDACTED], cc: subject: Re: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 3:57:45 

PM. See CIA document "Significant Detainee Reporting." 

1099 See section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots, and the KSM detainee review 

in Volume III. 

1100

 Email from: I 

[REDACTED], cc: subject: Re: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 3:57:45 

PM. See also "Signifi^nt Petmi^e^i^OT 

Page 186 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

186 
UNCLASSIFIED 

T O P SECRI^/^MMMBM^MMB^nofor n 

Council principals."01 According to a CIA memorandum, Muller represented that CIA 

"detainees subject to the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced 

significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives."1102 

(TSAflmi^HH/WF ) The CIA briefing provided the "results" of using the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques in briefing slides with the heading: "RESULTS: MAJOR 

THREAT INFO." The slides represented that KSM provided information on "[ajttack plans 

against US Capitol, other US landmarks"; "[a]ttacks against Chicago, New York, Los Angeles; 

against towers, subways, trains, reservoirs, Hebrew centers, Nuclear power plants"; and the 

"Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plot." The slides also represented that KSM identified Iyman 

Faris, the "Majid Khan family," and Sayf al-Rahman Paracha.1103 These representations were 

largely inaccurate.1104 

The CIA slides represented that "major threat" information was 

obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on CIA detainee 'Abd alRahim al-Nashiri regarding "US Navy Ships in the Straits of Hormuz." This representation was 

inaccurate and omitted material facts.1105 The CIA slides further indicated that "major threat" 

information was obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against 

CIA detainee Ramzi bin al-Shibh—specifically that bin al-Shibh "[identified Hawsawi" and 

1101

 CIA Memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA 

General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated 

July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials. Those attending the meeting included the director of the 

CIA, George Tenet; the CIA general counsel, Scott Muller; Vice President Cheney; National Security Advisor Rice; 

White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales; Attorney General Ashcroft; Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of 

Legal Counsel, Patrick Philbin; and counsel to the National Security Council, John Bellinger. 

1102

 CIA Memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA 

General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated 

July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials. 

1103

 CIA Memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA 

General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated 

July 29,2003, presented to senior White House officials. 

1104

 CIA records indicate that the "attacks," "attack plans," and "targets" discussed by KSM were well known to the 

Intelligence Community prior to any reporting from CIA detainees, or were merely ideas for attacks that were 

proposed, but never operationalized. The CIA briefing slides made no mention of KSM withholding or fabricating 

information during and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. See relevant sections of this 

summary and Volume II, as well as the KSM detainee review in Volume III. 

1105

 CIA records indicate that al-Nashiri provided details on multiple terrorist plots—including plans to target ships 

in the Strait of Hormuz—prior to his CIA detention and the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

With regard to the targeting of ships in the Strait of Hormuz, this information was provided by al-Nashiri while he 

was still in foreign government custody and was disseminated in CIA intelligence repoitsp^rtolusCI^detentiwi. 

{See •••36595•••••^^^•3672 6 

For disseminated intelligenceTreg^^^^^^^^^^BgZIA 

For other reporting from al-Nashiri while in foreign government custody 

•••• • 70868 

disseminated intelligence, see \ 

^t^^^^K^^K^^^^^^K^eeah o detainee review of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri in Volume III. 

m i ii i III i 1111111111 1 

Page 187 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

187 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

provided "major threat" information on "[a]ttacks against Nuclear Power Plants, Hebrew 

Centers." This representation was inaccurate and omitted material facts.1106 

I n th e

 context of "[m]ajor threats [that] were countered and attacks 

averted," the CIA slides represented that "major threat" information was obtained from the use 

of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Khallad bin Attash on an "[a]ttack 

against U.S. Consulate in Karachi." This representation was inaccurate.1107 The CIA slides 

further represented that "major threat" information was obtained from the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques on CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah, resulting in the 

"[identification of [Jose] Padilla, Richard Reid," as well as information on "[a]ttacks on banks, 

subways, petroleum and aircraft industries." These representations were inaccurate.1108 

(TSZ/HI^^H^^^/NF ) The briefing slides, which contained additional inaccuracies 

detailed in Volume II of the Committee Study, were used, at least in part, for CIA briefings for 

1106

 Al-Hawsawi was linked to the September 11,2001, attacks and targeted by the CIA and other intelligence 

agencies prio^^ir^^hibh|scapture . (See WASHINGTON 1HF(232012ZMA Y 02), CIA ^jjjj f (032022Z 

AP^02); 17743 (051408Z MAR 02); DIRECTOR |||(231756 Z APR 02); ALEC 

I ^ H (16182.1Z JUL 03^A1-Hawsawi's arrest on March 1, 2003, was unrelated to any reporting from CIA 

detainees. (See ALEC (161821Z JUL 03).) With regard to the referenced "attacks," no operational plots 

targeting the sites referenced were ever identified by the CIA. Personnel at CIA Headquarters concluded in 2005 

that the "most significant" intelligence derived from Ramzi bin al-Shibh was obtained prior to his rendition to CIA 

custody and the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. According to a 2005 CIA assessment, the 

"most significant" reporting from Ramzi bin al-Shibh on future attacks was background information related to alQa'ida's plans to attack Heathrow Airport. (See ALEC • • (302240Z JUN 05).) Ramzi bin al-Shibh provided 

the majority of this information in mid-October 2002, while in the custody of a foreign government and prior to 

being transferred to CIA custody. (See CIA • • ^flHHI^H ) See also detainee review of Ramzi bin alShibh in Volume III. 

1,07 See the section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots. CIA officers in 

wrote of the referenced reporting from bin Attash: "[w]hile reporting from both [al-Baluchi and bin Attash] was 

chilling-[CIA officers] had become aware of most of this reporting either through previous information or through 

interviews of al-Baluchi and Ba Attash prior to their transfer out of Karachi." This cable also stated, "[a]s noted in 

severalprevious cables, in December 2002 HConsulat e became aware of the threat to Consulate officials." See 

• • • 14510^HH|^H . 

1108

 For information on the "[identification of [Jose] Padilla," see the section of this summary and Volume II on the 

Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla. Richard Reid was arrested in 

December 2001, prior to Abu Zubaydah's capture. See multiple open source reporting and Department of Justice 

materials, including, United States v. Richard Reid Indictment, U.S. District Court, District of Massachusetts, 

January 16, 2002. Abu Zubaydah provided information on potential places al-Qa'ida might target, including banks 

and subways, shortly after his capture to FBI interrogators, months prior to the use of the CIA's "enhanced 

interrogation techniques" in August 2002. See Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the 

interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS #2010-2939). See also Abu Zubaydah detainee review in 

Volume III. 

11ii 1111 1 III III 

Page 188 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

188 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

Secretary of State Powell and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld,1109 as well as for Assistant 

Attorney General Jack Goldsmith.1110 

(T&^H^^^HI^B^^ ) subsequent interviews of CIA personnel, the OIG received 

information that contradicted other CIA representations about the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program. The chief of the Branch of thc UBL Group at CTC described at 

length how the arrests of Majid Khan and lyman Faris were unrelated to reporting from CIA 

detainees.11,1 The deputy director for law enforcement for the FBI's Counterterrorism Division 

told the OIG how Uzhair Paracha and FBI operational activities were ultimately responsible for 

the capture of Sayf al-Rahman Paracha.1112 The chief of targeting and special requirements for 

CTC's al-Qa'ida Department and former chief of the Abu Zubaydah Task Force, 

told the OIG that "the often-cited example of Zubaydah identifying Padilla is not 

quite accurate."1113 According to "[n]ot only did [Abu Zubaydah^iot tell us who 

Padilla was, his information alone would never have led us to Padilla." H^^^ i stated that the 

Pakistanis had told the CIA about Jose Padilla and his partner prior to Abu Zubaydah providing 

any information on the pair, relaying, "[i]n essence, CTC got lucky."1114 

(TS/T^^^I^H^iiVNF ) At the same time, however, CIA personnel provided inaccurate 

examples of the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to the OIG. The 

deputy chief of the Al-Qa'ida Department of CTC told the OIG that "KSM gave us Majid Khan 

and Uzair Paracha."1115 Deputy DCI John McLaughlin told the OIG that information from KSM 

"led to the capture" of Majid Khan, which in turn led to the capture of Hambali. McLaughlin 

also represented that "the capture of Richard Reid was a result of modus operandi information 

obtained from [Abu] Zubaydah."1116 These representations were inaccurate.1117 

(TS^H^^^m^B^NF ) In addition to these specific inaccurate examples, CIA leadership 

made additional general claims to the OIG about the effectiveness of the CIA interrogation 

1,09

 Memorandum for the Record; subject: CIA Interrogation Program; September 27, 2003 (OGC-FO-2003-50088). 

Slides, CIA Interrogation Program, 16 September 2003. The Memorandum for the Record drafted by John Bellinger 

refers to a "detailed handout" provided by the CIA. See John B. Bellinger, ID, Senior Associate Counsel to the 

President and Legal Advisor, National Security Council; Memorandum for the Record; subject: Bxiefing of 

Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld regarding Interrogation of High-Value Detainees; date: September 30, 2003. 

1110

 Scott W. Muller; Memorandum for the Record; Interrogation briefing for Jack Goldsmith; date: 16 October 2003 

(OGC-FO-2003-50097). " ^^^^^ ^ ^^^^ ^ 

1111

 Interview of chief of the Branch of the UB L Group, by Office of the 

Inspector General, July 30, 2003. 

I,12

 Interview of mtmB , by Office of the Inspector General, August 5, 2003. 

II, 3

 August 19, 2003, Memorandum for the Record, meeting with flflH^^^R Office of the Inspector 

General. 

1114

 August 19,2003, Memorandum for the Record, meeting with l^^flHHI^ K Office of the Inspector 

General. This information was not included in the IG Special Review. 

1115

 Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center AlQa'ida Department; date: 28 July 2003. 

1116

 Interview of John E. McLaughlin, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 

September 5, 2003. This information was included in the CIA's July 2003 briefing slides. Richard Reid was 

arrested in December 2001, prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah. 

1117 See the section in this summary and in Volume II on the Capture of Majid Khan; the Capture of Hambali; and 

the Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha. See also the KSM detainee review in Volume III. 

Richard Reid was arrested prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah. 

m i II i n i ^^^BH^^MMU^NQi'Pii N 

Page 189 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

189 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

program that highlighted the "critical threat information" that could only be acquired by using 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against CIA detainees. Jose Rodriguez, then CTC 

director, told the CIA OIG that "the use of EITs has saved lives and prevented terrorist 

operations from occurring."1118 Deputy DCI McLaughlin told the OIG that he "believes the use 

of EITs has proven critical to CIA's efforts in the war on terrorism."1119 DDO Pavitt stated that 

the program was "invaluable to U.S. national security," that "American lives have been saved as 

a result of information received from detainees," and that the CIA "has been able to obtain 

information that would not have been obtained without the use of EITs."1120 According to OIG 

records, DCI Tenet stated he "firmly believes that the interrogation program, and specifically the 

use of EITs, has saved many lives." Tenet added that the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques was "extremely valuable" in obtaining "enormous amounts of critical 

threat information," and that he did not believe that the information could have been gained any 

other way.1121 

(W/^^^HB/ZN^ ) On January 2, 2004, CIA Inspector General John Helgerson 

provided a draft of the OIG Special Review, entitled "Counterterrorism Detention and 

Interrogation Program," to senior CIA officials for comment. The draft Special Review, which 

was based on numerous interviews of CIA personnel, as well as additional research by the OIG, 

described the origins of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, the detention sites that 

were operational at the time of the review, and the guidance that had been provided on both 

interrogation and detention. The draft also identified a number of unauthorized interrogation 

techniques that had been used,1122 and concluded that, in a number of cases, CIA interrogations 

went "well beyond what was articulated in the written DOJ legal opinion of 1 August 2002."1123 

1118

 Interview of Jose E. Rodriguez, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 

12, 2003. 

1119

 Interview of John E. McLaughlin, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 

September 5, 2003. 

1.20

 Pavitt also stated that by "September, October and November" of 2002, "they saw a clear benefit" to the use of 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah (Interview of James Pavitt, by H^HI^ H and 

[REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 21, 2003). 

1.21

 Interview of George Tenet, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 8 September, 

2003. 

1122

 For example, the draft described interrogators placing pressure on a detainee's artery, conducting mock 

executions, blowing cigarette or cigar smoke into a detainee's face, using cold water to interrogate detainees, and 

subjecting a detainee to a "hard takedown." In an interview conducted after Gul Rahman's death at DETENTION 

SITE COBALT, Dr. DUNBAR described a "rough takedown." The interview report stated: "According to 

[DUNBAR], there were approximately five CIA officers from the renditions team. Each one had a role during the 

takedown and it was thoroughly planned and rehearsed. They opened the door of [a detainee] cell and rushed in 

screaming and yelling for him to 'get down.' They dragged him outside, cut off his clothes and secured him with 

Mylar tape. They covered his head with a hood and ran him up and down a long corridor adjacent to his cell. They 

slapped him and punched him several times. [DUNBAR] stated that although it was obvious they were not trying to 

hit him as hard as they could, a couple of times the punches were forceful. As they ran him along the corridor, a 

couple of times he fell and they dragged him through the dirt (the floor outside of the cells is dirt). [The detainee] 

did acquire a number of abrasions on his face, legs, and hands, but nothing that required medical attention." 

DUNBAR stated that after "something like this is done, interrogators should speak to the prisoner to 'give them 

something to think about.'" See Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from 

January 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul Rahman, pp. 21-22, paragraph 34. 

1123

 CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG), 

January 2004. 

TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN 

Page 190 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

190 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRfeT//^^^^^—//NOFOK N 

The draft report repeated the inaccurate examples of the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques that had been conveyed by CIA officers to OIG personnel,1124 but 

nonetheless concluded: 

"[w]ith the capture of some of the operatives for the above-mentioned plots, 

it is not clear whether these plots have been thwarted or if they remain viable 

or even if they were fabricated in the first place. This Review did not 

uncover any evidence that these plots were imminent."1125 

(TS/Z^H^H^^B^/NF ) After reviewing the draft Special Review, including the OIG's 

qualified conclusions about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques^he 

CIA's CTC began preparing a highly critical response. In preparation for that response, 

|CT C Legal,requeste d additional information that could be used as 

evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques from CTC 

personnel. sent an email seeking "a list of specific plots that have been thwarted by 

the use of detainee reporting that we acquired following the use of enhanced techniques." 

noted that he would compile the information, "emphasizing that hundreds or 

thousands of innocent lives have been saved as a result of our use of those techniques.. .."U26 In 

a separate email, emphasized that it was "critical" that the information "establish 

direct links between die application of the enhanced interrogation techniques and the production 

of intelligence that directly enabled the saving of innocent lives," that the intelligence obtained 

after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques be "significantly different in nature 

from the intelligence acquired before the use of the enhanced techniques," and that the 

information be "absolutely ironclad" and "demonstrably supported by cable citations, analytical 

pieces, or what have you."1127 further noted that "[w]e can expect to need to 

present these data to appropriately cleared personnel at the IG and on the Hill, to the Attorney 

General, and quite possibly to the President at some point, and they must be absolutely 

verifiable." He concluded, "[i]t is not an exaggeration to say that the future of the program, and 

the consequent saving of innocent lives, may depend substantially upon the input you 

provide."1128 

1124

 The Special Review draft stated that KSM "provided information that helped lead to the arrests" of Sayf alRahman Paracha, Uzhair Paracha, Saleh al-Marri, and Majid Khan, and that KSM's information "led to the 

investigation and prosecution" of Iyman Faris. The draft Special Review also stated that information from Abu 

Zubaydah "helped lead to the identification" of Jose Padilla and Binyam Muhammad. Finally, the draft included the 

"plots" described by Deputy Chief of ALEC Station during her July 16, 2003, interview. Most 

of the inaccurate representations would remain in the final version of the Special Review completed in May 2004. 

See CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-

1G), January 2004. 

1,25

 CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG), 

January 2004. 

1126

 Email from: to: Scott Muller, John Rizzo, | 

subject: "For the response to the IG report"; date: February 4, 2004, at 1:04:03 

PM. 

1127

 Email from:

 to :

 [REDACTED]; subject: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: 

February 10,2004. 

1128

 Email from:

 t0 :

 [REDACTED]; subject: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: 

February 10, 2004. As described in this summary and in greater detail in the full Committee Study, the examples 

m i 11 iii i 111 "

11111 1 

Page 191 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

191 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

Responding to the request for information, Deputy Chief of ALEC 

Station sent an email describing intelligence from KSM in which she wrote, 

"let's be foward [sic] leaning."1129 The content of email would serve as a template 

on which future justificationsforthe CIA program and the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques were based.1130 email stated that "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's 

information alone has saved at least several hundred, possibly thousands, of lives." She then 

wrote that KSM "identified" Iyman Faris, "who is now serving time in the US for his support to 

al-Qa'ida," and "identified a photograph" of Saleh al-Marri, "whom the FBI suspected of some 

involvement with al-Qa'ida, but against whom we had no concrete information," adding that alMarri "is now being held on a material witness warrant." H^^^' s email stated that KSM 

"provided information" on Majid Khan, who "is now in custody," "identified a mechanism for 

al-Qa'ida to smuggle explosives into the US," and "identified" Jaffar al-Tayyar.1131 

email also represented that "[a]fter the use of enhanced [interrogation techniques], [Abu 

Zubaydah] grew into what is now our most cooperative detainee," and that Abu Zubaydah's 

information "produced concrete results that helped saved lives."1132 These representations were 

almost entirely inaccurate.1133 As she had in an interview with the OIG, 

former chief of the Abu Zubaydah Task Force, refuted this view, writing in an email that Abu 

Zubaydah "never really gave 'this is the plot' type of information," that Abu Zubaydah discussed 

Jose Padilla prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and that "he never 

really gave us actionable intel to get them."1134 Separately, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station 

compiled were provided over the following years to the President, the Congress, the Department of Justice, and the 

American public. 

1129

 Email from: to: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

|; subject: re Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004. ^d' s email 

began: "here is my draft contribution... it's late, I'm tired, so it's not especially elegant... welcome any fact 

correcting I got wrong, but let's be foward [sic] leaning." The inaccurate information included in the email was 

used in the CIA's formal response to the OIG. 

1130

 email and the subsequent DD^esponsetothe OIG wereusedasthe template for talking points on 

program. See, for from: to: HH^^^I^flH ; subject: 

re EDITED Final -- RE: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures (forwarding comments for response to draft Inspector 

Genera^eviev^o^ape^fo^ondoleezz^ic^n Decembe^004); date: December 6, 2004; email from: | 

H

 to :

 Wmm ^ H H •^••i ; cc: ^^^HH^ V subject: 

re EDITED Final - RE: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures (forwarding comments for response to draft Inspector 

General review for talking points in November 2005); date: November 4, 2005. 

1131

 In response to email, one CIA officer asked whether "re the jaffar al-tayyar stuff, didnt [sic] we 

alreadWiave th^ulhiairu^frOT See email from: [REDACTED]; to: 

HIH ; cewmm^m, I^HHHH > subject: on 

KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 10,2004, at 09:38 AM. 

1132

 Email from: IH|Hi|^H| ; to: cc: ••H^H , [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

|; subject: re Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004. 

1133 See relevant sections of this summary and Volume II on the eight primary CIA effectiveness representations and 

12 other prominent CIA representations of effectiveness. 

1134

 Email from: to: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], ^^^^^•jdinRMuddJRE D ACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez, 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]~|H[|^^| , subject: Re: Please Read - Re CTC Response to the Draft IG 

Report^ate: February 10, 2004. As noted, in an August 19, 2003;Memorandum for the Record detailing B^ H 

|]HHI' S interview with the Office of the Inspector General, |H H told the OIG that "the often-cited 

example of Zubaydah identifying Padilla is not quite accurate," and that "[n]ot only did [Abu Zubaydah] not tell us 

who Padilla was, his information alone would never have led us to Padilla." Noting that the Pakistani government 

11II I I III I ^^^Bl^^^^JBI/mOFOR N 

Page 192 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

192 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

| forwarded additional inaccurate information from CIA personnel in ALEC 

Station to CTC Legal related to KSM,1135 al-Nashiri,1136 and Hambali.1137 

On February 27, 2004, DDO Pavitt submitted his formal response 

to the OIG draft Special Review in the form of a memorandum to the inspector general. Pavitt 

urged the CIA OIG not to "shy away from the conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks 

and saved lives," and to "make it clear as well that the EITs (including the waterboard) have 

been indispensable to our successes."1138 Pavitt's memorandum included an attachment 

describing the "Successes of CIA's Counterteirorism Detention and Interrogation Activities," 

and why the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were necessary. The attachment stated: 

"Information we received from detained terrorists as a result of the lawful use 

of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has almost certainly saved 

countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence 

points clearly to the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our 

had told the CIA about Jose Padilla and Ills partner prior to Abu Zubaydah providing any information on the pair, 

m H stated, "[i]n essence, CTC got lucky." This information was not included in the draft or final OIG 

Special Review. 

1,35

 The information forwarded by

 wa s

 related to die Heathrow Airport plotting and stated that "[o]nly 

after enhanced measures" did KSM "admit that the sketch of a beam labeled Canary Wharf in his notebook was in 

fact an illustration that KSM the engineer drew himself to show another AQ operative that the beams in the Wharf -

liJce those in the World Trade Center- would likely melt and collapse the building, killing all inside." The email 

also stated that KSM "identified the leading operatives involved in both the UK and Saudi cells that would support 

the operation." These representations were inaccurate. See the section of this summary and Volume II on the 

Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf Plotting, and the KSM detainee review in Volume III. 

1136

 The information forwarded by stated that, "subsequent to the application of enhanced measures," the 

CIA "learned more in-depth details" about operational planning, "to include ongoing operations against both the US 

and Saudi interests in Saudi Arabia." This representation omitted key information provided by al-Nashiri in foreign 

government custody and prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. See the 'Abd al-Rahim alNashiri detainee review in Volume HI. 

1137

 The information forwarded by stated that, "after die use of enhanced measures [Hambali] provided 

information that led to the wrap-up of an al-Qa'ida cell in Karachi, some of whose members were destined to be the 

second wave attack pilots inside the US after 911.... [Tjheir identification and subsequent detention saved hundreds 

of lives." This representation was inaccurate. See the section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of 

the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group. (See email from: I^^HHH' t o : 

multiple cc's; subject: EDITED—Re: Heathrow plot 

insight from KSM; date: February 10, 2004, at 2:38:36 Ph^Theemainncluded tli^ollowin^ext: "Here is 

Heathrow." Below this text were forwarded emails from and BH^H . See email from: 

li^H^I^H ? to: B^^H^I^^^^^^^^^^Hjsub j ect|H^athro^)lot insight 

from KSM; date: February 10, 2004, at n| llll l II Hf^^^^B l to: •^^H^ R H H 

H H subject: OGCrebuttalpart 5 andfinaNRejal-^shiri; date: February 12, 2004, at 02:59 PM; 

forwarding email from:

 to :

 ^ 

I; subject: Re: al-Nashiri; date: February 10, 2004, at 06:11 PM; email from: HH^^^^H ; to: 

'mm ; subject: **immediate—Hambali Reporting; date: February 10, 2004, at 

11:43 AM. 

1138

 Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) 

Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); 

date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism 

Detention and Interrogation Activities. 

11II I I III I ^B^Jj^^^B^^BVMUFOH M 

Page 193 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

193 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks involving hundreds, if not 

thousands, of casualties."1139 

(mflHBHH W The attachment to Pavitt's memorandum repeated much of the 

inaccurate information contained in Deputy Chief of ALEC Station email 

about KSM and Abu Zubaydah, as well as the additional information ALEC Station personnel 

provided on KSM, al-Nashiri, and Hambali. In Pavitt's memorandum, every intelligence success 

claim was preceded with some version of the phrase, "as a result of the lawful use of EITs."1140 

Inaccurate information provided to the OIG during interviews and in the Pavitt memorandum 

was included in the final version of the OIG's Special Review.1141 The relevant portion of the 

Special Review, including much of the inaccurate information, has been declassified.1142 

A S ^mmCT C Legal anticipated 

February 10, 2004, email, much of the information provided to the inspector general on the 

"effectiveness" of the CIA' s enhanced interrogation techniques was later provided to 

policymakers and the Department of Justice as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA' s 

enhanced interrogation techniques.1143 

?) In late 2004, as the National Security Council was considering 

"endgame" options for CIA detainees, the CIA proposed a public relations campaign that would 

include disclosures about the "effectiveness" of the CIA program. CIA talking points prepared 

in December 2004 for the DCI to use with National Security Council principals stated that "[i]f 

done cleverly, selected disclosure of intelligence results could heighten the anxiety of terrorists at 

large about the sophistication of USG methods and underscore the seriousness of American 

commitment to prosecute aggressively the War on Terrorism."1144 The following month, the 

11,9

 Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) 

Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); 

date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism 

Detention and Interrogation Activities. 

1140

 Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) 

Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); 

date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism 

Detention and Interrogation Activities. 

1141

 A review of CIA records found that almost all of the information in the Pavitt memorandum was inaccurate and 

unsupported by CIA interrogation and intelligence records. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that CIA officers 

"generally provided accurate information [to the Inspector General] on the operation and effectiveness of the 

program," and that "with rare exceptions, [CIA officers] provided accurate assessments to the OIG." 

1142

 The CIA Inspector General Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program," was 

declassified with redactions in May 2008. On August 24, 2009, some portions of the Review that were redacted in 

May 2008, were unredacted and declassified. 

1143

 H^^^ H wrote in an email: "We can expect to need to present these data to appropriately cleared personnel 

at the IG and on the Hill, to the Attorney General, and quite possibly to the President at some point, and they must 

be absolutely verifiable." (See email from: to: [REDACTED]; subject: Addition on KSM/AZ 

and measures; date: February 10, 2004.) As detailed in this Study, the CIA consistently used the same 

"effectiveness" case studies. The eight most frequently cited "thwarted" plots and captured terrorists are examined 

in this summary, and in greater detail in the full Committee Study, as are 12 other prominent examples diat the CIA 

has cited in the context of the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

1144 Talkin g Points for the DCI: DOD Proposals to Move Forward on Transfer of HVDs to Guantanamo, 16 

December 2004. 

iii i 11 ii 1 1 BBBBBi^BBi^^TOR N 

Page 194 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

194 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

CIA proposed that the public information campaign include details on the "intelligence gained 

and lives saved in HVD interrogations."1145 There was no immediate decision by the National 

Security Council about an "endgame" for CIA detainees or the proposed public information 

campaign. 

asked that information on the success of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program be 

compiled in anticipation of interviews of CIA personnel by Tom Brokaw of NBC News. The 

first draft included effectiveness claims relating to the "Second Wave" plotting, the Heathrow 

Airport plotting, the Karachi plotting, and the identification of a second shoe bomber.1146 A 

subsequent draft sought to limit the information provided to what was already in the public 

record and included assertions about Issa al-Hindi, Iyman Faris, and Sajid Badat.1147 That day, 

Deputy Director of CTC Philip Mudd told that "we either get out and sell, or we get 

hammered, which has implications beyond the media. [C]ongress reads it, cuts our authorities, 

messes up our budget."1148 The following day, the draft was cleared for release to the media.1149 

1145

 DCI Talking Points for Weekly Meeting with National Security Advisor, 12 January 2005; included in email 

fromOI^ACn ^ 

HHHH > subject: 

Coord on NSC Talkings for 1/14; date: January 11, 2005, at 03:33 PM. 

1146

 The draft stated that the "Second Wave" plotting "was uncovered during the initial debriefings of a senior alQa'ida detainee," that the Heathrow plotting "was also discovered as a result of detainee debriefings," that the 

Karachi plotting "was revealed during the initial debriefings of two senior al-Qa'ida detainees," and diat the CIA 

"learned form [sic] detainee debriefings of' the second shoe bomber. (See email from: to: 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], • 

I, [REDACTED]7Bi^^^M![REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED; cc: 

|; subject: FOR IMMEDIATE COORDINATION: summary of impact of detainee 

program; date: April 13, 2005, at 5:21:37 PM.) These claims were inaccurate. See relevant sections of this 

summary and Volume II. 

1147

 The draft discussed Issa al-Hindi, who had been referenced in the 9/11 Commission Report, stating that "[pjrior 

to KSM's reporting, the U.S. Government was not aware of Issa's casing activity, nor did we know his true 

identity." It added that "KSM's reporting was the impetus for an intense investigation, culminating in Issa's 

identification and arrest." The draft also included two examples that had not been in official public documents, but 

had been described in press stories. The first was that "KSM led U.S. investigators to an Ohio truck driver named 

Iyman Faris." The second was that "KSM's confessions were also instrumental in determining the identity of Saajid 

Badat," the second shoe bomber. (See email from: HH H Chief of Operations, ALEC Station; to: |BH I 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], MBMW , ^^MBBB . 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], •••^••^••••H , 

[REDACTED], 

subject: Brokaw interview: Take one; date: April 13, 2005, at 6:46:59 PM.) As described elsewhere, these claims 

were incongruent with CIA records. At least one earlier media account of KSM's purported role in the arrest of 

Iyman Faris was provided in a book by an author who had extensive access to CIA officials. (See Ronald Kessler, 

The CIA at War, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2003.). The CIA's cooperation with the author is described 

elsewhere in this summary, as well as in more detail in the full Committee Study. 

1148

 Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and I^^HHIH , April 13, 2005, from 19:23:50 to 

19:56:05. ^^^^^ ^ 

I; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], John 

|; subject: Re: Brokaw interview: Take one; 

1149

 Email from: | 

A. Rizzo, | 

date: April 14, 2005, at 9:22:32 AM. 

TOP SECRET// k/NOFORN 

Page 195 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

195 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SRCRIvtVy^^^^^—//NOFOR N 

(TS/Z^^^^^^HI^P/fl^ ) On April 20, 2005, the same examples were circulated as part of an 

anticipated official public campaigns promote the "effectiveness" of the still-classified CIA 

program.1150 In response, |HHH|CT C Legal, expressed concern that 

"the examples cited, while true, and perhaps as far as we can go, are not nearly the most striking 

examples of lives saved." Referencing KSM's reporting on Iyman Faris, noted that 

"we risk making ourselves look silly if the best we can do is the Brooklyn Bridge - perhaps we 

should omit specific examples rather than 'damn ourselves with faint praise.'" H^I^H ' 

who offered the Heathrow Airport plot as an example, made the following suggestion: "Can 

[Office of Public Affairs] be more strongly declarative - 'while we can't provide details' (or 

maybe we can) 'the program has produced intelligence that has directly saved 100's/1000's of 

American and other innocent lives'?" H^KHj i then attached claims originally compiled in 

February 2004 for the purpose of responding to the draft OIG Special Review which, he wrote, 

described "some of the actionable intelligence acquired as a result of the Program and the lawful 

use of such techniques."1151 The examples were inaccurate.1152 

(TS^^m^ ) On June 24, 2005, Dateline NBC aired a program, accompanied by 

several online articles, which quoted CIA Director Goss and Deputy Director of CTC Mudd, as 

well as anonymous "top American intelligence officials." Among other claims, NBC reported 

that the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh "le[d] ultimately" to the captures of KSM and Khallad bin 

Attash.1153 This information was inaccurate."54 

At the end of 2005, congressional concerns about the treatment of 

detainees again spurred interest at the CIA for public disclosures on the "effectiveness" of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Specifically, congressional action on the Detainee 

Treatment Act (the "McCain amendment") prompted a CIA attorney working at the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence to express concern that legislative support was needed for the 

CIA to continue to use its enhanced interrogation techniques, and that a public information 

campaign would be required to garner that support. The CIA attorney described the "striking" 

similarities between the public debate surrounding the McCain amendment and the situation in 

Israel in 1999, in which the Israeli Supreme Court had "ruled that several... techniques were 

possibly permissible, but require some form of legislative sanction," and that the Israeli 

"

so See CIA document entitled, "INTERROGATION PROGRAM DRAFT PRESS BRIEFING," from April 2005. 

from: cc: H^^^^^l^oh n Rizzo; 

Interrogation Program-Going Public Draft Talking Points—Com mentsDueto^Bjm e by COB TODAY Thanks; 

date: April 20, 2005, at 5:10:10 PM. 

1152 See the sections of this summary and Volume II on the Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) and the 

Thwarting of the Karachi Plots (regarding the capture of Khallad bin Attash). 

1153

 "The frightening evolution of al-Qaida; Decentralization has led to deadly staying power," Dateline NBC, June 

24, 2005. In 2003, Ronald Kessler published a book with which the CIA cooperated that stated "intercepts and 

information developed months earlier after the arrest of Ramzi Binalshibh... allowed the CIA to trace [KSM]." The 

Kessler book also stated that the bin Attash capture was the "result" of interrogations of KSM. This information is 

incongruent with CIA records. See Ronald Kessler, The CIA at War, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2003. See also 

John A. Rizzo; to cc: Scott W. Muller, 

[REDACTED]; subject: Re: CIA at War; date: January 22, 2004, at 09:28 AM). 

1154 See the sections of this summary and Volume II on the Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) and the 

Thwarting of the Karachi Plots (regarding the capture of Khallad bin Attash). 

Page 196 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

196 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

government "ultimately got limited legislative authority for a few specific techniques."1155 The 

CIA attorney then wrote: 

"Once this became a political reality here, it became incumbent on the 

Administration to publicly put forth some facts, if it wanted to preserve these 

powers. Yet, to date, the Administration has refused to put forth any specific 

examples of significant intelligence it adduced as a result of using any 

technique that could not reasonably be construed as cruel, inhuman or 

degrading. Not even any historical stuff from three or four years ago. What 

conclusions are to be drawn from the utter failure to offer a specific 

justification: That no such proof exists? That the Administration does not 

recognize the legitimacy of the political process on this issue? Or, that need to 

reserve the right to use these techniques really is not important enough to 

justify the compromise of even historical intelligence?"1156 

(TS^Hiimilli^NF ) As described in more detail in the full Committee Study, the 

Administration sought legislative support to continue the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program, and chose to do so by publicly disclosing the program in a 2006 speech by President 

Bush. The speech, which was based on CIA-provided information and vetted by the CIA, 

included numerous inaccurate representations about the CIA program and the effectiveness of 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The CIA's vetting of the speech is detailed in CIA 

"validation" documents, which include CIA concurrence and citations to records to support 

specific passages of the speech. For example, the CIA "Validation of Remarks" document 

includes the following: 

"'...questioning the detainees in this program has given us information that 

has saved innocent lives by helping us to stop new attacks - here in the United 

States and across the world.'' 

CIA concurs with this assessment. Information from detainees prevented -

among others - the West Coast airliner plot, a plot to blow up an apartment 

1155

 The CIA attorney also described the Israeli precedent with regard to the "necessity defense" that had been 

invoked by CIA attorneys and the Department of Justice in 2001 and 2002. The CIA attorney wrote that the Israeli 

Supreme Court "also specifically considered the 'ticking time bomb' scenario and said that enhanced techniques 

could not be pre-approved for such situations, but that if worse came to worse, an officer who engaged in such 

activities could assert a common-law necessity defense, if he were ever prosecuted." (See email from: 

[REDACTED]; to: John A. Rizzo; cc: [REDACTED], John A. Rizzo, 

[REDACTEDl^ubject: Re: McCain^late^December 19, 2005, at 10:18:58 AM.) At the time, the CIA attorney and 

the former m^|CT C Legal,

 wer e

 working in the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence. The OLC, in its July 20,2007, memorandum, included an analysis of the Israeli court case in the 

context of concluding that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were "clearly authorized and justified by 

legislative authority" as a result of the Military Commissions Act. See memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting 

General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment 

Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by die CIA in the 

Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees. 

1156

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: John A. Rizzo; cc: [REDACTED], John A. Rizzo, | 

[REDACTED]; subject: Re: McCain; date: December 19,2005, at 10:18:58 AM. 

M I 11 II 1 1 I II II I HI 11 

Page 197 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

197 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

building in the United States, a plot to attack various targets in the United 

Kingdom, and plots against targets in Karachi and the Arabian Gulf. These 

attacks would undoubtedly have killed thousands."1157 

(TS^flHHHH^NP ) Multiple iterations of the CIA "validation" documents reflect 

changes to the speech as it was being prepared. One week before the scheduled speech, a 

passage in the draft speech made inaccurate claims about the role played by Abu Zubaydah in the 

capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and the role of Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh in the 

capture of KSM, but did not explicitly connect these claims to the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques. In an August 31, 2006, email exchange, CIA officers proposed the 

following language for the speech: 

"That same year, information from Zubaydah led the CIA to the trail of one of 

KSM's accomplices, Ramzi bin al Shibh. Information from Zubaydah together 

with information from Shibh gave the CIA insight into al-Qa'ida's 9/11 attack 

planning and theimportanceof KSM. With the knowledge that KSM was the 

'mastermind,' Pakistani partners planned and mounted an 

operation that resulted in his eventual capture and detention."1158 

(^^/^HI^^H^/NF ) The August 31, 2006, email exchange included citations to CIA 

cables to support the proposed passage; however, neither the cables, nor any other CIA records, 

support the assertions.1159 

1157

 Emphasis in original. CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, 6 September 2006, Draft 

#15. As described in the relevant sections of this summary, and more extensively in Volume II, these claims were 

inaccurate. 

1158

 Email from: ; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: | 

I; subject: Source list for our AZ paragraphs; date: August 31, 2006, at 08:56 AM. 

1159

 The cited cables describe Abu Zubaydah's June 2002 description of a meeting with Ramzi bin al-Shibh 

(acquired prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah), and Abu 

Zubaydah's August 2002reportinediscussing the same meeting (after the use of the techniques). (See CIA 

(101514Z JUN 02); ••^•••(2 1 August 2002).) Neither cable—or any other CIA record—indicates a 

connection between Abu Zubaydah's reporting on his meeting with bin al-Shibh and bin al-Shibh's capture. The 

cited cables also do not include information, which was available to the CIA prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah, 

highlighting KSM's "importance." The cited cable describes Abu Zubaydah's April 2002 reporting, prior to the use 

of the CIA's enhancecHnterrogation techniques, identifying KSM as "Mukhtar" and the "mastermind" of the 9/11 

attacks. (See April 2002).) The citations did not include cables referencing information 

available to the CIA about KSM that was obtained prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah, including information on 

KSM's alias "Mukhtar" and KSM's role in the September 11, 2001, attacks, as is detailed elsewhere in this 

summary. The cables also did not support the claim that information provided by Abu Zubaydah or Ramzi bin alShibh led to the capture of KSM. One cited cable related to the identification by Ramzi bin al-Shibh, while bin alShibh wasui^oreier^overnment custody, of Ali Abdul Aziz Ali as "Ammar." [The cable was cited as 

20700 H^H^^^^^^H - determined later, the actual cable was 20790.] As described elsewhere in 

this summary, KSM was not captured as a result of information related to Ammar al-Baluchi. The email exchange 

listed two cables directly related to the capture of KSM. The first cable, from approximately a week before KSM's 

capture, described the CIA's operational use and value of the asset who led the CIA to KSM. The cable stated that 

the relationshir^^^ the asset gained access to KSM, was "based 

on The cable stated that CIA Headquarters 

continues to be impressed with the evidence of [the asset's] access to ^HI^MiKS M associates,! 

(See DIRECTOR | 

TOP SECRET//^ 

|.) The second cable 

1 //NOFOR N 

Page 198 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

198 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

(TS/T^^^^^^^^V/NF ) Within a few days, the passage in the draft speech relating to the 

captures of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and KSM was modified to connect the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. The 

updated draft now credited information from Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh with 

"help[ing] in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh 

Mohammed." The updated draft speech stated: 

"Zubaydah [zoo-BAY-da] was questioned using these [interrogation] 

procedures, and he soon began to provide information on key al-Qaida 

operatives - including information that helped us find and capture more of 

those responsible for the attacks of Nine-Eleven. For example, Zubaydah 

[zoo-BAY-da] identified one of KSM's accomplices in the Nine-Eleven 

attacks - a terrorist named Ramzi bin al Shibh [SHEEB], The information 

Zubaydah [zoo-BAY-da] provided helped lead to the capture of bin al Shibh. 

And together these two terrorists provided information that helped in the 

planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh 

Mohammed."1160 

An updated CIA "validation" document concurring with the 

proposed passage provided a modified list of CIA cables as "sources" to support the passage. 

Cable citations to Abu Zubaydah's reporting prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques were removed.1161 Like the previous version, the CIA's updated "validation" 

document did not cite to any cables demonstrating that information from Abu Zubaydah "helped 

lead to the capture of [Ramzi] bin al-Shibh."1162 Similarly, none of the cables cited to support 

the passage indicated that information from Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh (who was in 

foreign government custody when he provided the information cited by the CIA) "helped in the 

described KSM's capture, stating that it was "based on Ideational information" provided by the asset. (See 

41351 l^mmm. ) Neither of the two cables cited to support the claim made any 

reference to Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, or any other detainee in CIA or foreign government custody. The 

capture of KSM, including the role of the asset (referred to herein as "ASSET X") is detailed elsewhere in this 

summary and in g reatcr detail in the full Com mittee Study. Sec e inailfrom^HHI B 5, o : [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED]; cc: ^^^B H ^^HHflffsubject : Source our AZ 

paragraphs', date: August 31, 2006, at 08:56 AM. 

1160

 Pronunciation brackets in original draft. CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, 6 

September 2006, Draft #15. 

1161

 The document cited a cable on Abu Zubaydah's August 2002 description of his meeting with Ramzi bin alShibh, but not the previously cited June 2002 cable related to Abu Zubaydah's description of the same meeting, 

which was provided before Abu Zubaydah was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. See 

1102

 The information included in the cable describing Abu Zubaydah's August 2002 reportin 

Ramzi bin al-Shibh was unrelated to die capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. (Sec 

on his meeting with 

I-) 

The CIA document also cited as a "source" a cable describing the capture of bin al-Shibh with no mention of Abu 

Zubaydah's reporting. (See The details of Ramzi bin al-Shibh's capture are 

described elsewhere in this summary and in greater detail in the full Committee Study. 

11ii i i 11 1 BBH^BBI^^^^^ B iIIiin h 

Page 199 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

199 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

planning and execution of the operation that captured [KSM]."J163 As described elsewhere in 

this summary, there are no CIA records to support these claims.1164 

(TS/Z^^^m^^^^l/NF ) The CIA documents validating the president's speech addressed 

other passages that were likewise unsupported by the CIA's cited cables. For example, the 

speech included an inaccurate claim regarding KSM that had been part of the CIA's 

representations on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques since 2003. 

The speech stated: 

"Once in our custody, KSM was questioned by the CIA using these 

procedures, and he soon provided information that helped us stop another 

planned attack on the United States. During questioning, KSM told us about 

another al Qaeda operative he knew was in CIA custody - a terrorist named 

Majid Khan. KSM revealed that [Majid] Khan had been told to deliver 

$50,000 to individuals working for a suspected terrorist leader named Hambali, 

the leader of al Qaeda's Southeast Asian affiliate known as 'J-I.' CIA officers 

confronted Khan with this information. Khan confirmed that the money had 

been delivered to an operative named Zubair, and provided both a physical 

description and contact number for this operative. Based on that information, 

Zubair was captured in June of 2003, and he soon provided information that 

helped lead to the capture of Hambali."1165 

(TS^i^^BHW ) As support for this passage, the CIA cited a June 2003 cable 

describing a CIA interrogation of Majid Khan in which Majid Khan discussed Zubair.1166 The 

CIA "validation" document did not include cable citations from March 2003 that would have 

revealed that Majid Khan provided this information while in foreign government custody, prior 

to the reporting from KSM.1167 

1103

 The CIA document included a previous! 

reporting from CIA detainees. (See 

cited cable relating to the capture of KSM that made no mention of 

41351 •^•••H ) The CIA document also 

included the previously cited cable describing bin al-Shibh's identification of "Ammar." As described in the section 

of this summary, as well as in Volume II, on the Capture of KSM, KSM was not captured as a result of information 

relatedto Ammar al-Baluchi. (The document cited the cable as 20700, as noted, the actual cite was 

20790.) The CIA cable also cited an analytical product whose relevance was limited to the connection 

between KSM and al-Aziz (Ammar al-Baluchi). (See DI Serial Flier CTC 2002-30086CH: CIA analytic report, 

"Threat Threads: Recent Advances in Understanding 11 September.") Finally, the document included a cable that 

was unrelated to the content of the speech. 

See sections of this summary and Volume II on the Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and the Capture of Khalid 

Shaykh Mohammad (KSM). 

1165

 Presidential Speech on September 6, 2006, based on CIA information and vetted by CIA personnel. 

"

wi

 CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, 6 September 2006, Draft #15; | 

|13678 (070724Z MAR 03), disseminated as W^^KK^^B ' Further, the June 2003 cable, 

DIRECTOR HH I (122120Z JUN 03), cited by the CIA as validation, makes no reference to reporting from KSM. 

Khan was captured on March 5, 2003 and was in foreign government detention until being transferred to CIA 

custody on May 2003. See details on the detention and interrogation of Majid Khan in Volume III. 

IMI 11 III I I mi inn i 

Page 200 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

200 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

On September 6, 2006, President Bush delivered the speech based 

on the CIA-vetted information.1168 On September 8, 2006, the chief of the 

Department in CTC, H^^^^H^H , who had participated in the CIA's validation of the 

speech, distributed the "final validation document" for possible updates or changes. In an email, 

m m

 urge

d the recipients to "[p]lease look very carefully, as this is going to be a very 

important document."1169 

On September 11, 2006, a CIA officer responded, questioning the 

passage in the speech related to the capture of KSM, as well as the relevance of the CIA cables 

cited in the validation document to support the passage. The CIA officer questioned whether a 

CIA cable describing Ramzi bin al-Shibh's identification of "Ammar" supported the claim that 

bin al-Shibh's reporting helped lead to the capture of KSM. The officer wrote: 

"I presume the information in this cable that supports the statement is Ramzi's 

admission regarding Ammar?? Did that actually help lead us to KSM?? not 

sure who did this section, but we may want to double-check this and provide 

additional cables on how this actually 'assisted us'. This also seems to be a 

point critics in the press seem to be picking on. I will do some digging on my 

own as well."1170 

(TS/Z^^H^^^^V/NF ) There are no CIA records to indicate that the CIA officer's 

comments about the inadequate sourcing were further addressed. As described in this summary, 

and in more detail in Volume II, there are no CIA records to support the passage in the speech 

related to the capture of KSM. 

After the speech, press accounts challenging aspects of the speech 

became the subject of internal discussion amongsomeCIAofficers. On September 7, 2006, the 

chief of the IHH H Department in CTC, sent an email stating: "The 

NY Times has posted a story predictably poking holes in the President's speech." Defending the 

passage in the speech asserting that, after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, 

U(i8

 On April 29, 2009, Marc Thiessen, the speechwriter responsible for President Bush's September 6, 2006, 

speech, wrote: "This was the most carefully vetted speech in presidential history - reviewed by all the key players 

from the individuals who ran the program all the way up to the director of national intelligence, who personally 

attested to the accuracy of the speech in a memo to the president. And just last week on Fox News, former CIA 

Director Michael Hayden said he went back and checked with the agency as to the accuracy of that speech and 

reported: 'We stand by our story.'" See Marc Thiessen, "The West Coast Plot: An 'Inconvenient Truth,'" The 

National Review £pri^^200^ 

u® Email from: to: | 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTEDL^^HHHn^HHi^B > [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

•IHHHHHH ; subject: THE MOMENT YOU MAY HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR!!! Please verify the 

attached; date: September 8, 2006, at 06:28 PM. 

1,70

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ^••••H ; cc: [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]7^^^B|^^^^H , H 

i subject: Re: THE MOMENT YOU MAY HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR!!! 

Please verify the Attached; date: September 11, 2006, at 9:16:15 AM; attachment Nl: CIA Validation of Remarks 

on Detainee Policy Final (Draft #15). The email also identified as unrelated one cable that had been cited as a 

source and corrected a transposed number of the cable describing Ramzi bin al-Shibh's identification of "Ammar." 

Page 201 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

201 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

Abu Zubaydah provided information "that helped lead to the capture of bin al-Shibh," m 

explained: 

"...we knew Ramzi bin al-Shibh was involved in 9/11 before AZ was captured; 

however, AZ gave us information on his recent activities that—when added 

into other information—helped us track him. Again, on this point, we were 

very careful and the speech is accurate in what it says about bin al-Shibh."jm 

(TS/fl^HHB/NP ) HH' s statement, that Abu Zubaydah provided "information 

on [bin al-Shibh's] recent activities" that "helped [CIA] track him," was not supported by the 

cables cited in the CIA's "validation" document, or any other CIA record. HHH N email 

did not address the other representation in the president's speech—that Abu Zubaydah 

"identified" Ramzi bin al-Shibh.1172 

The New York Times article also challenged the representation in 

the speech that Abu Zubaydah "disclosed" that KSM was the "mastermind behind the 9/11 

attacks and used the alias 'Mukhtar,"' and that "[t]his was a vital picce of the puzzle that helped 

our intelligence community pursue KSM." As the New York Times article noted, the 9/11 

Commissioijiad pointed to a cable from August 2001 that identified KSM as "Mukhtar." In her 

email, acknowledged the August 2001 report identifying KSM as "Mukhtar" and 

provided additional information on the drafting of the speech: 

"[0]n 28 August, 2001, in fact, [CIA's] B i [database] does show a report 

from [a source] stating that Mohammad Rahim's brother Zadran told him that 

KSM was now being called 'Mukhtar.' Moreover, we were suspicious that 

KSM might have been behind 9/11 as early as 12 Sept 2001, and we had some 

reporting indicating he was the mastermind. We explained this latter fact to 

the White House, although the 28 August report escaped our notice."

 1173 

from: ^mmi^i ^ to imm , 

Mark Mansfield, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]^^MIK^^MBBnREDACrED] , 

[REDACTED]; subject: Questions about Abu Zubaydah's identification of KSM as "Mukhtar"; date: September 7, 

2006. A September 7, 2006, article (published September 8, 2006) in the New York Times, by Mark Mazzetti, 

entitled, "Questions Raised About Bush's Primary Claims of Secret Detention System" included comments by CIA 

officials defending the assertions in the President's speech. The article stated: "Mr. Bush described the 

interrogation techniques used on the C.I.A. prisoners as having been 'safe, lawful and effective,' and he asserted that 

torture had not been used. .. .Mr. Bush also said it was the interrogation of Mr. Zubaydah that identified Mr. bin alShibh as an accomplice in the Sept. 11 attacks. American officials had identified Mr. bin al-Shibh's role in the 

attacks months before Mr. Zubaydah's capture." 

1,72

 There are no CIA records to support these claims. See the section of this summary on the capture of Ramzi bin 

al-Shibh, as well as a more detailed account in Volume II. 

from: m^H ; to 

Mark Mansfield, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTEDL^^^Bf^i^^HnREDACTED] , 

[REDACTED]; subject: Questions about Abu Zubaydah's identification of KSM as "Mukhtar"; date: September 7, 

2006. There are no CIA records indicating what was "explained" to the White House. The CIA validation 

document provided officially concurred w"' " " " " idation of Remarks on Detainee 

Policy, Wednesday, 6 September 2006, Di 

TOP SECRET/ 7N0F0RN 

Page 202 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

202 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

commission, with 20-20 hindsight, thinks we should have known this in August 2001 does not 

alter the fact that we didn't."1174 

(TS^HHHHI^^'^ )

 I n

 addition to the New York Times article, the CIA was concerned 

about an article by Ron Suskind in Time Magazine that also challenged the assertions in the 

speech about the captures of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and KSM.1175 In a September 11, 2006, email, 

the chief of the HHHf l Department in CTC, ^H^HI^H L wrote: "[wje are not 

claiming [Abu Zubaydah] provided exact locational information, merely that he provided us with 

information that helped in our targeting efforts." email did not address the 

representations in the president's speech that Abu Zubaydah "identified" Ramzi bin al-Shibh and 

that the information from Abu Zubaydah "helped lead to the capture" of bin al-Shibh. With 

regard to the capture of KSM, ^HlH^ s email acknowledged that Suskind's assertion that 

"the key was a cooperative source" was "correct as far as it goes, but the priority with which we 

pursued KSM changed once AZ conclusively identified him as the mastermind of 9/11."1]76 

Mfl' s email did not address the representation in the president's speech that Abu 

Zubaydah, along with Ramzi bin al-Shibh, "helped in ttanalanmng and execution of the 

operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed." H^^l' s statements about the captures 

of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and KSM are not supported by CIA records.1177 

(TS/V^I^HIIIII^^^/NF) The president's September 6, 2006, speech, which was based on 

CIA-provided information and vetted by the CIA, was the first detailed, formal public 

representation about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.1178 The 

1174

 Email from: I^^HH B

 t0 1 

Mark Mansfield, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]7H^H7^^^^B > [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED]; subject: Questions about Abu Zubaydah's identification of KSM as "Mukhtar"; date: September 7, 

2006. 

1175

 The Unofficial Story of the al-Qaeda 14; Their torture by the CLA was wrong - in more ways than you might 

think, Ron Suskind, Time, 18 September 2006. 

1176

 Email from: •^^••l ; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: URGENT: FOR YOUR COMMENT: DCIA Questions on 

the Suskind Article; date: September 11, 2006, at 08:23 PM. 

1177 See the section of this summary and Volume II on the Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and the Capture of Khalid 

Shaykh Mohammad (KSM). In 2007, CIA officers also questioned the passage in the President's September 6, 

2006, speech concerning the disruption of plotting against Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. See the section of this 

summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting for additional information. 

1178

 President Bush made other public statements that relied on inaccurate information provided by the CIA. For 

example, as described elsewhere in this summary, on March 8, 2008, President Bush vetoed legislation that would 

have limited interrogations to techniques authorized by the Army Field Manual. The President's veto message to 

the House of Representatives stated that "[t]he CIA's ability to conduct a separate and specialized inteirogation 

program for terrorists who possess the most critical information in the war on terror has helped the United States 

prevent a number of attacks, including plots to fly passenger airplanes into the Library Tower in Los Angeles and 

into Heathrow Airport or buildings in downtown London." (Sec message to the House of Representatives, President 

George W. Bush, March 8, 2008). The President also explained his veto in his weekly radio address, in which he 

referenced the "Library Tower," also known as the "Second Wave" plot, and the Heathrow plot, while representing 

that the CIA program "helped us stop a plot to strike a U.S. Marine camp in Djibouti, a planned attack on the U.S. 

consulate in Karachi..." (See President's Radio Address, President George W. Bush, March 8, 2008). As detailed 

in this summary, and described more fully hiVolumell^I^represer^ the role of the CIA's 

lll l I I III I ^^^^BP M I lll l Mill I 

Page 203 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

203 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

inaccurate representations in the speech have been repeated in numerous articles, books, and 

broadcasts. The speech was also relied upon by the OLC in its July 20, 2007, memorandum on 

the legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically to support the premise 

that the use of the techniques was effective in "producing substantial quantities of otherwise 

unavailable intelligence.""79 

D. CIA Representations About the Effectiveness of Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 

Against Specific CIA Detainees 

While the CIA made numerous general representations about the 

effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques, CIA representations on specific detainees 

focused almost exclusively on two CIA detainees, Abu Zubaydah, detained on March 28, 2002, 

and KSM, detained on March 1, 2003.1180 

/. Abu Zubaydah 

As described in greater detail in the full Committee Study, the CIA 

provided significant information to policymakers and the Department of Justice on the CIA's 

decision to use the newly developed CIA "enhanced interrogation techniques" on Abu Zubaydah 

and the effects of doing so. These representations were provided by the CIA to the CIA OIG,1181 

enhanced interrogation techniques with regard to the Second Wave, Heathrow, Djibouti and Karachi plots were 

inaccurate. 

1179

 The OLC memorandum, along with other OLC memoranda relying on inaccurate CIA representations, has been 

declassified, as has the May 2004 OIG Special Review containing inaccurate information provided by CIA officers. 

Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, 

Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20,2007, Re: Application of the War 

Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques 

that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 14). 

1180 See Volume II for additional information on CIA representations. 

1181

 Among other documents, see Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for 

Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation 

Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of 

CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Int *' ' '•' 

TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN 

Page 204 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

204 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

the White House,1182 the Department of Justice,1183 Congress,1184 and the American public.1185 

The representations include that: (1) Abu Zubaydah told the CIA he believed "the general US 

population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to 'do what was necessary";1186 

(2) Abu Zubaydah stopped cooperating with U.S. government personnel using traditional 

interrogation techniques;1187 (3) Abu Zubaydah's interrogation team believed the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques would result in critical information on terrorist 

operatives and plotting;1188 and (4) the use of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu 

Zubaydah was effective in eliciting critical intelligence from Abu Zubaydah.1189 These 

representations are not supported by internal CIA records. 

The CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah "expressed [his] belief 

that the general US population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to 'do what 

was necessary' to prevent the terrorists from succeeding in their goals" is not supported by CIA 

1182

 Among otlier documents, see Memorandum for the Record: "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 

2003." Memorandum prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003, and briefing slides 

entitled,"CIA Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials; and Briefing 

for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program, CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled, 

"Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program." ___ _ 

1183

 Among otlier documents, see March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from H^^^^H R H H 

Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center re: Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques. 

1184

 Among other documents, see CIA classified statement for the record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 

provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007; and accompanying 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12, 2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central 

Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program." Director Hayden stated: "Now in June [2002], after 

about four months of interrogation, Abu Zubaydah reached a point where he refused to cooperate and he shut down. 

He would not talk at all to the FBI interrogators and although he was still talking to CIA interrogators no significant 

progress was being made in learning anything of intelligence value." 

1185 po r example, see CIA "Questions and Proposed Answers" 9/2/2006, Tab 2 of CIA Validation of Remarks on 

Detainee Policy, September 6,2006. ^^ ^ 

1186 See, for example, March 2, 2005, CIA memorandum for Steve Bradbury from | H Legal 

Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." 

1187 Sec, for example, ODNI September 2006 Unclassified Public Release: "During initial interrogation, Abu 

Zubaydah gave some information diat he probably viewed as nominal. Some was important, however, including 

that Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the moniker 'Mukhtar.' This 

identification allowed us to comb previously collected intelligence for both names, opening up new leads to this 

terrorist plotter—leads that eventually resulted in his capture. It was clear to his interrogators that Abu Zubaydah 

possessed a great deal of information about al-Qa'ida; however, he soon stopped all cooperation. Over the ensuing 

months, the CIA designed a new interrogation program that would be safe, effective, and legal." See also 

Presidential Speech on September 6, 2006, based on CIA information and vetted by CIA personnel. 

1188

 As detailed in DIRECTOR • • (031357Z AUG 02). See also Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum for 

John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, dated August 1, 2002, and entitled 

"Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative," which states: "The interrogation team is certain [Abu Zubaydah] has 

additional information that he refuses to divulge. Specifically, he is withholding information regarding terrorist 

networks in the United States or in Saudi Arabia and information regarding plans to conduct attacks within the 

United States or against our interests overseas." 

1189

 Among other documents, see Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Summary of the High Value 

Terrorist Detainee Program," September 6, 2006; and CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at the Department of 

Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from flUHUHH, H I Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject 

"Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterroris"

 T ' "" 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 205 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

205 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

records.1190 On August 30, 2006, a CIA officer from the CIA's al-Qa'ida Plans and Organization 

Group wrote: "we have no records that 'he declared that America was weak, and lacking in 

resilience and that our society did not have the will to 'do what was necessary' to prevent the 

terrorists from succeeding in their goals.'"1191 In a CIA Sametime communication that same day, 

a CIA ALEC Station officer wrote, "I can find no reference to AZ being deifant [sic] and 

declaring America weak... in fact everything I have read indicated he used a non deifiant [sic] 

resistance strategy." In response, the chief of the H^^I H Department in CTC, 

wrote: "I've certainly heard that said of AZ for years, but don't know why...." The 

CI^AOi^Station officer replied, "probably a combo of [deputy chief of ALEC Station, 

•IH^^ B and ll^HB.. . I'll at that." The chief the HHI^ I 

Department completed the exchange, writing "yes, believe so... and agree, we shall pass over in 

silence."1192 

(TS/^^^^HHU^P ) The CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah stopped cooperating 

with debriefers using traditional interrogation techniques is also not supported by CIA 

records.119-

1

 In early June 2002, Abu Zubaydah's interrogators recommended that Abu Zubaydah 

spend several weeks in isolation while the interrogation team members traveled ^ H "as a 

means of keeping [Abu Zubaydah] off-balance and to allow the team needed time off for a break 

and to attendtopcrsonal matters IH^^H, " as well as to discuss "the endgame" for Abu 

Zubaydah with officers from CIA Headquarters.1194 As a result, Abu Zubaydah spent 

much of June 2002, and all of July 2002,47 days in total, in isolation. When CIA officers next 

interrogated Abu Zubaydah, they immediately used the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques, 

including the waterboard.1195 Prior to this isolation period, Abu Zubaydah provided information 

on al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships, in addition to information on its 

leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics.1196 

Abu Zubaydah provided the same type of information prior to, during, and after the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.1197 Abu Zubaydah's inability to provide information 

1,90 See, for example, March 2, 2005, CIA memorandum for Steve Bradbury from ^H l Legal 

Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." 

from: to: and subject: 

"Suggested language change for AZ"; date: August 30, 2006, at 06:32 PM. 

1192

 Sametime communication, ^Hl^l a n d HHHI < 30/Aug/06 13:15:23 to 19:31:47. 

1193 See ODNI September 2006 Unclassified Public Release: "During initial intenogation, Abu Zubaydah gave some 

information that he probably viewed as nominal. Some was important, however, including that Khalid Shaykh 

Mohammad (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the moniker 'Mukhtar.' This identification allowed us to 

comb previously collected intelligence for both names, opening up new leads to this terrorist plotter—leads that 

eventually resulted in his capture. It was clear to his interrogators that Abu Zubaydah possessed a great deal of 

information about al-Qa'ida; however, he soon stopped all cooperation, Over the ensuing months, the CIA designed 

a new interrogation program that would be safe, effective, and legal." See also Presidential Speech on September 6, 

2006, based on CIA information and vetted by CIA personnel, that states: "We knew that Zubaydah had more 

information that could save innocent lives. But he stopped talking... And so, the CIA used an alternative set of 

procedures." 

1,94

 10424 (070814Z JUN 02) 

1195 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, to include CIA email [REDACTED] dated March 28, 2007, 

04:42 PM, with the subject line, "Subject detainee allegation - per our telcon of today." 

1196 See reporting charts in Abu Zubaydah detainee review, as well as CIA paper entitled "Abu Zubaydah" and dated 

March 2005. The same information was included in an "Abu Zubaydah Bio" document "Prepared on 9 August 

2006." 

1197 See reporting charts in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume 111. 

11ii i i iii i 

Page 206 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

206 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRES//^^^^—flNQFOR N 

on the next attack in the United States—and operatives in the United States—provided the basis 

for CIA representations that Abu Zubaydah was "uncooperative," as well as for the CIA's 

determination that Abu Zubaydah required the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques to become "compliant" and reveal the information that CIA Headquarters believed he 

was withholding. The CIA further stated that Abu Zubaydah could stop the application of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, like the waterboard, by providing the names of 

operatives in the United States or information to stop the next attack.1198 At no point during or 

after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did Abu Zubaydah provide this type 

of information.1199 

(T&BHI^HIIiH^ 1^ ) The CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah's interrogation team 

believed the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques would result in new information 

on operatives in the United States and terrorist plotting is also incongruent with CIA records. 

While Abu Zubaydah was in isolation in July 2002, CIA Headquarters informed the Department 

of Justice and White House officials that Abu Zubaydah's interrogation team believed Abu 

Zubaydah possessed information on terrorist threats to, and al-Qa'ida operatives in, the United 

States.1200 The CIA officials further represented that the interrogation team had concluded that 

the use of more aggressive methods "is required to persuade Abu Zubaydah to provide the 

critical information needed to safeguard the lives of innumerable innocent men, women, and 

children within the United States and abroad," and warned "countless more Americans may die 

unless we can persuade AZ to tell us what he knows."1201 However, according to CIA cables, the 

interrogation team at the detention site had not determined that the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques were required for Abu Zubaydah to provide such threat information. Rather, the 

interrogation team wrote "[o]ur assumption is the objective of this operation is to achieve a high 

degree of confidence that [Abu Zubaydah] is not holding back actionable information concerning 

threats to the United States beyond that which [Abu Zubaydah] has already provided."1202 

(^S/VHIIH^^^B^P ) The CIA representation that the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah was effective in producing critical threat information 

1198 See 10586 (04.1559Z AUG 02), which states: "In truth, [Zubaydah] can halt the proceedings at any 

time by providing truthful revelations on the threat which may save countless lives." 

1195 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume in. 

120,1

 As detailed in DIRECTOR (031357Z AUG 02). The CIA further represented: (1) that the enhanced 

interrogation phase of Abu Zubaydah's interrogation would likely last "no more than several days but could last up 

to thirty days," (2) "that the use of the [enhanced interrogation techniques] would be on an as-needed basis and that 

not all of these techniques will necessarily be used," (3) that the CIA expected "these techniques to be used in some 

sort of escalating fashion, culminating with the waterboard, though not necessarily ending with this technique," (4) 

"that although some of these techniques may be used more than once, that repetition will not be substantial because 

the techniques generally lose their effectiveness after several repetitions," and (5) "that steps will be taken to ensure 

that [Abu Zubaydah's] injury is not in any way exacerbated by the use of these methods." See the Abu Zubaydah 

detainee review for detailed information for how these statements proved almost entirely inaccurate. See also 

Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative. 

1201

 DIRECTOR • • (031357Z AUG 02) ^^^^^^ ^ 

1202

 [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02); email from: to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

and subject: Addendum from [DETENTION SITE GREEN]; date: July 23, 2002, at 07:56:49 PM; 

[REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02). Additional assessments by the interrogation team that Abu Zubaydah was 

not withholding information axe described in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume 111. 

m i 'i i III i 1 io i i m i'i 

Page 207 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

207 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

on terrorists and terrorist plotting against the United States is also not supported by CIA records. 

Abu Zubaydah did not provide the information for which the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques were justified and approved—information on the next attack and operatives in the 

United States.1203 According to CIA records, Abu Zubaydah provided information on "al-Qa'ida 

activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships," in addition to information on "its leadership 

structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics."1204 This type 

of information was provided by Abu Zubaydah prior to, during, and after the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques.1205 At no point during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques did Abu Zubaydah provide information on al-Qa'ida cells in the United 

States or operational plans for terrorist attacks against the United States.1206 Further, a 

quantitative review of Abu Zubaydah's intelligence reporting indicates that more intelligence 

reports were disseminated from Abu Zubaydah's first two months of interrogation, before the use 

of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and when FBI special agents were directly 

participating, than were derived during the next two-month phase of interrogations, which 

included the non-stop use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 24 hours a day for 17 

days.1207 Nonetheless, on August 30, 2002, the CIA informed the National Security Council that 

1203 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III. Participants in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah also wrote 

that Abu Zubaydah "probably reached the point of cooperation even prior to the August institution of 'enhanced' 

measures - a development missed because of the narrow focus of the questioning. In any event there was no 

evidence that the waterboard produced time-perishable information which otherwise would have been 

unobtainable." See CIA Summary and Reflections of Services on OMS participation in the RDI 

program. 

1204

 CIA paper entitled "Abu Zubaydah" and dated March 2005. See also "Abu Zubaydah Bio" document "Prepared 

on 9 August 2006." 

1205 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, and CIA paper entitled, "Abu Zubaydah," dated March 2005; 

as well as "Abu Zubaydah Bio" document "Prepared on 9 August 2006." 

1206 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III. 

1207

 Abu Zubaydah was taken into CIA custody on March 2002, and was shortly thereafter hospitalized until 

April 15, 2002. Abu Zubaydah returned to DETENTION SITE GREEN on April 15, 2002. During the mondis of 

April and May 2002, which included a period during which Abu Zubaydah was on life support and unable to speak 

(Abu Zubaydah communicated primarily with FBI special agents in writing), Abu Zubaydah's interrogations 

resulted in 95 intelligence reports. In February 2008, the CIA identified the "key intelligence and reporting derived" 

from Abu Zubaydah. The three items identified by the CIA were all acquired in April and May of 2002 by FBI 

interrogators. Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation from June 18, 2002, to August 4, 2002, without being asked 

any questions. After 47 days in isolation, the CIA reinstituted contact with Abu Zubaydah at approximately 11:50 

AM on August 4, 2002, when CIA personnel entered the cell, shackled and hooded Abu Zubaydah, and removed his 

towel, leaving Abu Zubaydah naked. Without asking any questions, CIA personnel made a collar around his neck 

with a towel and used the collar "to slam him against a concrete wall." Multiple enhanced interrogation techniques 

were used non-stop until 6:30 PM, when Abu Zubaydah was strapped to the waterboard and subjected to the 

waterboard technique "numerous times" between 6:45 PM and 8:52 PM. The "aggressive phase of interrogation" 

using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques continued for 20 days. (See Abu Zubaydah treatment chronology 

in Volume III.) During the months of August and September 2002, Abu Zubaydah's reporting resulted in 91 

intelligence reports, four fewer than the first two months of his CIA detention. (See Abu Zubaydah detainee review 

in Volume III.) Specifically, for information on Abu Zubaydah's initial walling, see CIA email dated March 28, 

2007, at 04:42 PM, with the subject line, "Subject detainee allegation - per our telcon of today," which states that 

Abu Zubaydah claims "a collar was used to slam him against a concrete wall." The CIA officer wrote, "While we 

do not have a record that this occurred, one interrogator at the site at the time confirmed that this did indeed happen. 

For the record, a plywood 'wall' was immediately constructed at die site after the walling on the concrete wall." 

Regarding the CIA's assessment of the "key intelligence" from Abu Zubaydah, see CIA briefing documents for 

Leon Panetta entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- 18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key 

Intelligence and Reporting Derived from / ' TM lammad (KSM)" (includes "DCIA 

TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN 

Page 208 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

208 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were effective and "producing meaningful 

results."1208 Shortly thereafter, however, in October 2002, CIA records indicate that President 

Bush was informed in a Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) that "Abu Zubaydah resisted providing 

useful information until becoming more cooperative in early August, probably in the hope of 

improving his living conditions." The PDB made no reference to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques.1209 Subsequently, the CIA represented to other senior policymakers 

and the Department of Justice that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were 

successfully used to elicit critical information from Abu Zubaydah.1210 For example, in a March 

2, 2005, CIA memorandum to the Department of Justice, the CIA represented that information 

obtained from Abu Zubaydah on the "Dirty Bomb Plot" and Jose Padilla was acquired only 

"after applying [enhanced] interrogation techniques."1211 This CIA representation was repeated 

in numerous CIA communications with policymakers and the Department of Justice.1212 The 

information provided by the CIA was inaccurate. On the evening of April 20, 2002, prior to the 

Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and Effectiveness," witli associated documents, "Key 

Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: 

Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted."). 

1208

 On August 30, 2002,|H|^|CT C Legal, met with NSC Legal Adviser John Bellinger 

to discuss Abu Zubaydah's interrogation. (See email from: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman; subject: Meeting with 

NSC Legal Adviser, 30 August 2002; date: September 3, 2002; ALEC 052227Z SEP 02.) According to 

email documenting the meeting, he "noted that we had employed the walling techniques, 

confinement box, waterboard, along with some of the other methods which also had been approved by the Attorney 

General," and "reported that while the experts at the site and at Headquarters were still assessing the product of the 

recent sessions, it did appear that the current phase was producing meaningful results." (See email from: John 

Rizzo; to: John Moseman; subject: Meeting with NSC Legal Adviser, 30 August 2002; date: September 3,2002.) 

The email did not provide any additional detail on what was described to Bellinger with respect to either the use of 

the techniques or the "results" of the interrogation. It is unclear from CIA records whether the CIA ever informed 

the NSC legal adviser or anyone else at the NSC or the Department of Justice that Abu Zubaydah failed to provide 

information about future attacks against the United States or operatives tasked to commit attacks in the U.S., during 

or after die use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

l2W ALEC • • (181439Z OCT 02) 

1210

 These representations were eventually included in the President's September 6, 2006, speech, in which the 

President stated: "We knew that Zubaydah had more information that could save innocent lives, but he stopped 

talking... so the CIA used an alternative set of procedures... Zubaydah was questioned using these procedures, and 

soon he began to provide information on key al Qaeda operatives, including information that helped us find and 

capture more of those responsible for the attacks on September the 11"'." These representations were also made to 

the Committee. On September 6, 2006, Director Hayden testified that, "faced with the techniques and with the 

prospects of what he did not know was coming, Abu Zubaydah decided that he had carried the burden as far as 

Allah had required him to carry it and that he could put the burden down and cooperate with his interrogators." (See 

transcript of briefing, September 6, 2006 (DTS #2007-1336).) Director Hayden's Statement for the Record for an 

April 12, 2007, hearing stated that: "[a]fter the use of these techniques, Abu Zubaydah became one of our most 

important sources of intelligence on al-Qa'ida." See statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence from 

CIA Director Hayden, for April 12, 2007, hearing (DTS #2007-1563). 

1211

 Italics in original document. CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of 

Justice, dated March 2,2005, from HH^^^^ H H H Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject 

"Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." 

1212

 Among other documents, see Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memoranda dated May 30, 2005, 

and July 20,2007. The July 20, 2007, memorandum - now declassified - states (inaccurately) that: "Interrogations 

of Zubaydah—again, once enhanced techniques were employed—revealed two al Qaeda operatives already in the 

United States and planning to destroy a high rise apartment building and to detonate a radiological bomb in 

Washington, D.C." See Volume II, specifically the section on the "Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings 

Plot" and die capture of Jose Padilla, for additional details concerning the inaccuracies of this statement. 

m i i i III i iiiiiiiiii i 

Page 209 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

209 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRESfl^^^^BM^^^^MflNQEQR N 

use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah provided this information to 

FBI officers who were using rapport building interrogation techniques.1213 

2. Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) 

(TS/^I^^^I^^^^NF ) As described in more detail in the full Committee Study, the CIA 

provided significant inaccurate information to policymakers on the effectiveness of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques in the interrogation of KSM. These representations were 

| J0091 (210959Z APR 02). Despite requests by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the 

CIA has never corrected the record on this assertion. On September 8, 2008, the Committee submitted Questions for 

the Record (QFRs) to the CIA from a hearing on the legal opinions issued by the Department of Justice's Office of 

Legal Counsel on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Because of time constraints, the CIA agreed "to 

take back several questions from Members that [the CIA was] unable to answer at the hearing." On the topic of the 

effectiveness of die CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the Committee asked "Why was this information 

[related to Padilla], which was not obtained through the use of EITs, included in the 'Effectiveness Memo?'" CIA 

records provided for thiju^view contain coinpleteckesponses to these Questions for the Record. The CIA's answer 

to this question was: Legal ttHH^D simply inadvertently reported this wrong. Abu 

Zubaydah provided information on Jose Padilla while being interrogated by the FBI 10091)." The 

Committee never received this response, despite numerous requests. Instead, the CIA responded with a letter dated 

October 17, 2008, stating that the "CIA has responded to numerous written requests for information from SSCI on 

this topic [the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program]," and that "[w]e are available to provide additional 

briefings on this issue to Members as necessary." In a letter to CIA Director Michael Hayden, Chairman 

Rockefeller wrote, "[t]he CIA's refusal to respond to hearing Questions for the Record is unprecedented and is 

simply unacceptable." Senator Feinstein wrote a separate letter to CIA Director Michael Hayden stating, "I want 

you to know that 1 found the October 17, 2008 reply., .appalling." The CIA did not respond. (See: (1) Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence Questions for the Record submitted to CIA Director Michael Hayden on September 8, 

2008, with a request for a response by October 10,2008 (DTS #2008-3522); (2) CIA document prepared in 

response to "Questions for the Record" submitted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on September 8, 

2008; (3) letter from Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, dated October 29, 

2008, to CIA Director Michael Hayden (DTS #2008-4217); (4) letter from Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, dated October 29,2008, to CIA Director Michael Hayden (DTS #2008-4217); 

and (5) letter from Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Committee member, Dianne Feinstein, dated October 

30, 2008, to CIA Director Michael Hayden (DTS #2008-4235).) In February 2004, a senior CIA officer wrote: "AZ 

never really gave 'this is the plot' type of information. He claimed every plot/operation he had knowledge of and/or 

was working on was only preliminary. (Padilla and the dirty bomb plot was prior to enhanced and he never really 

gave actionable to get them)." See email from: cc: 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTEDL^^BBjliKoh^^ud^rredacted] , 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [ REDACTEDL UHIHK subject: Please 

Read - Re CTC Response to the Draft IG Report; date: February 10, 2004). 

11 ii 111 1 i WBBMMIB^^^P^Fftn N 

Page 210 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

210 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

provided by the CIA to the OIG,1214 the White House,1215 the Department of Justice,1216 the 

Congress,1217 and the American public.1218 The representations include that: (1) KSM provided 

little threat information or actionable intelligence prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques;1219 (2) the CIA overcame KSM's resistance through the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques;1220 (3) the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique 

was particularly effective in eliciting information from KSM;1221 (4) KSM "recanted little of the 

information" he had provided, and KSM's information was "generally accurate" and 

"consistent";1222 (5) KSM made a statement to CIA personnel—"soon, you will know"— 

indicating an attack was imminent upon his arrest; and (6) KSM believed "the general US 

1214

 Among other documents, see Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for 

Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation 

Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of 

CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities. 

1215

 Among other documents, see Memorandum for the Record: "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 

2003," Memorandum prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003, and briefing slides 

entitled, "CIA Interrogation Program," dated July 29,2003, presented to senior White House officials; Briefing for 

Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled, 

"Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program," and "DCIA Talking Points: 

Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 

6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." 

I2,fi

 Among other documents, see March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from | 

Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center re: Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques. 

1217

 Among other documents, see CIA classified Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 

provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007; and accompanying 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12, 2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central 

Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program." 

1218 See, for example, CIA "Questions and Proposed Answers" (related to the President's speech) 9/2/2006; Tab 2 of 

CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, September 6, 2006; and speech by President Bush on September 6, 

2006. 

12,9

 CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence,^ubiect^^^ 

"Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," included in email from: to: 

and subject: on value 

techniques"; date: December 6,2004, at 5:06:38 PM. CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for 

Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program." CIA Talking Points entitled, "Talking Points 

for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques." 

CIA briefing document dated May 2, 2006, entitled, "BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 

May 2006 Briefing for Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation 

Programs." March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from Legal Group, DCI 

Counterterrorist Center re: Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques. 

1220

 CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence,'^jubject^^^^ 

"Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," included in email from: to: 

^^^^^^^^^^ ^ and ^HI^^^^HB subject: on 

techniques"; date: December 6,2004, at 5:06:38 PM; CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for 

Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program." CIA briefing document dated May 2, 2006, 

entitled, "BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 Briefing for Chief of Staff to the 

President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Programs." 

1221 See, for example, transcript, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158). 

1222

 "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source On Al-Qa'ida," authored by [REDACTED], 

CTC/UBLD/AQPO/AQLB; CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and 

Interrogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009," referenced 

materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect 

Barrack [sic] Obama National Security Team Tuesday. 13 January 2009; 8:30 - 11:30 a.m." 

11 ii 1111 1 i II i II 

Page 211 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

211 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to 'do what was necessary."1223 

These representations are not supported by internal CIA records. 

(TSZ/^^^^I^H^^F ) While the CIA represented to multiple parties that KSM provided 

little threat information or actionable intelligence prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, CIA records indicate that KSM was subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques within "a few minutes" of first being questioned by CIA 

interrogators.1224 This material fact was omitted from CIA representations. 

(TS/JIII^I^^^^^^/NF ) The CIA represented that the CIA overcame KSM's resistance to 

interrogation by using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.1225 CIA records do not 

support this statement. To the contrary, there are multiple CIA records describing the 

ineffectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in gaining KSM's cooperation. 

On March 26, 2003, the day after the CIA last used its enhanced interrogation techniques on 

KSM, KSM was described as likely lying and engaged in an effort "to renew a possible 

resistance stance."1226 On April 2, 2003, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism 

(IICT) produced an assessment of KSM's intelligence entitled, "Precious Truths, Surrounded by 

a Bodyguard of Lies." The assessment concluded that KSM was withholding information or 

lying about terrorist plots and operatives targeting the United States.1227 During and after the use 

of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA repeatedly expressed concern that KSM 

was lying and withholding information in the context of CBRN (Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear) programs,1228 plotting against U.S. interests in Karachi, Pakistan,1229 

plotting against Heathrow Airport,1230 Abu Issa al-Britani,1231 as well as the "Second Wave" 

plotting against the "tallest building in California," which prompted the CIA's ALEC Station to 

note in a cable dated April 22, 2003, that it "remain[e]d concerned that KSM's progression 

towards full debriefing status is not yet apparent where it counts most, in relation to threats to US 

interests, especially inside CONUS."1232 

1223

 March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from Legal Group, DCI 

Counterterrorist Center re: Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques. 

1224

 ^^^•••^•13449 1 (051400Z MAR 03) 

1225

 CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence," Subject: 

"Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," included in email from: 

anc ' H^HH ; subject: on value 

techniques"; date: December 6,2004, at 5:06:38 PM. CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for 

Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program." CIA briefing document dated May 2, 2006, 

entitled, "BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 Briefing for Chief of Staff to the 

President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Programs." 

1226

 •• • 11026 (271034Z MAR 03) 

1227

 "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," 

Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT), April 3, 2003. 

1228

 DIRECTORi^ H (121550Z JUN 03) 

1229

 ALEC ^M(022012 Z MAY 03) 

1230

 Memorandum for: 

Action detainee branch; date: 12 June 2003. 

1231

 ALEC ^^ M (210159Z OCT 03); email from: 

|; subject: 

subject: KSM and Khallad Issues; date: October 16,2003, at 5:25:13 PM. 

1232

 ALEC • • (222153Z APR 03) 

TOP SECRET//! /ZNOFORN 

Page 212 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

212 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOr SECRET// 1//NOFORN 

(TS/T^^^^^I^B^NF ) The CIA repeatedly represented that the CIA's waterboard 

interrogation technique was particularly effective in eliciting information from KSM.1233 This 

representation is not supported by CIA records. Numerous CIA personnel, including members 

of KSM's interrogation team, expressed their belief that the waterboard interrogation technique 

was ineffective on KSM. The on-site medical officer told the inspector general that after three or 

four days it became apparent that the waterboard was ineffective and that KSM "hated it but 

knew he could manage."1234 KSM debriefer and Deputy Chief of ALEC Station 

m m told the inspector general that KSM "figured out a way to deal with [the 

waterboard],"1235 and she relayed in a 2005 Sametime communication that "we broke KSM... 

using the Majid Khan stuff... and theemails^in other words b^onfrontin^KSM with 

information from other sources.1236 Legal, fl^l^HHIflK told the 

inspector general that the waterboard "was of limited use on KSM."1237 A KSM interrogator told 

the inspector general that KSM had "beat the system,"1238 and assessed that KSM responded to 

"creature comforts and sense of importance" and not to "confrontational" approaches.1239 The 

interrogator later wrote in a Sametime communication that KSM and Abu Zubaydah "held back" 

despite the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, adding "I'm ostracized whenever 

I suggest those two did not tell us everything. How dare I think KSM was holding back."1240 In 

April 2003, told the inspector general that the waterboard had "not been very 

effective on KSM." He also "questioned how the repeated use of the waterboard was 

categorically different from 'beating the bottom of my feet,' or from torture in general."1241 

(TS^H^^^HIH^NE ) The CIA repeatedly represented that KSM had "recanted little of 

the information" he had provided, and that KSM's information was "generally accurate" and 

"consistent."1242 This assertion is not supported by CIA records. Throughout the period during 

1233 See, for example, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency 

Detention and Interrogation Program, April 12, 2007 (SSCI #2007-3158). 

1234

 Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 

15,2003. ^^^^^^ ^ 

1235

 Interview

 b y [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 

2003. ^^^^^^ ^ 

1236

 Sametime Communication, BHH^HH and [

REDACTED l.° 2/Ma y/05 ' 14:51:48 to 15:17:39. The 

"Majid Khan stuff' refers to confronting KSM with the reporting of Majid Khan, then in foreign government 

custody. ^^^^^^^^^ ^ 1237

 Interview of by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector 

General, August 20,2003. 

1238

 Interview of

 b y [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, October 

22, 2003. 

1239

 ^^^ M 11715 (201047Z MAY 03) ^^^^ ^ 

1240

 Sametime Communication, and •|^^BU5/Aug/06 , 10:28:38 to 10:58:00. The 

Sametime also includes die following statement from ^^^H^H : "I think it's a dangerous message to say we 

could do almost the same without measures. Begs the question- then why did you use them before?" 

124' Interview of by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 11 

and 13, 2003. 

1242

 "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source On Al-Qa'ida," was authored by [REDACTED], 

CTC/UBLD/AQPO/AQLB. CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and 

Interrogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009," referenced 

materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, "D/C1A Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect 

Barrack [sic] Obama National Security TeamTuesdayJ3Jan^ 11:30 a.m." 

Ill l II III I I H'l Ml I 

Page 213 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

213 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

which KSM was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM provided 

inaccurate information, much of which he would later acknowledge was fabricated and recant. 

Specifically, KSM's fabrications and recantations covered his activities immediately before his 

capture,1243 the identity of an individual whom he described as the protector of his children,1244 

plotting against a U.S. aircraft carrier, a meeting with Abu Faraj al-Libi, and the location of 

Hassan Ghul.1245 KSM fabricated significant information, which he would later recant, related to 

Jaffar al-Tayyar, stating that al-Tayyar and Jose Padilla were plotting together,1246 linking alTayyar to Heathrow Airport plotting1247

 and to Majid Khan's plotting,1248 and producing what 

CIA officials described as an "elaborate tale" linking al-Tayyar to an assassination plot against 

former President Jimmy Carter.1249 KSM later explained that "he had been forced to lie" about 

al-Tayyar due to the pressure from CIA interrogators.1250 KSM recanted other information about 

the Heathrow Airport plotting, including information regarding the targeting,1251 additional 

operatives, and the tasking of prospective pilots to study at flight schools.1252 KSM provided 

significant information on Abu Issa al-Britani (Dhiren Barot) that he would later recant, 

including linking Abu Issa al-Britani to Jaffar al-Tayyar and to the Heathrow Airport plot.1253 

Under direct threat of additional waterboarding,1254 KSM told CIA interrogators that he had sent 

Abu Issa al-Britani to Montana to recruit African-American Muslim converts.1255 In June 2003, 

KSM stated he fabricated the story because he was "under 'enhanced measures' when he made 

these claims and simply told his interrogators what he thought they wanted to hear."1256 KSM 

also stated that he tasked Majid Khan with recruiting Muslims in the United States,1257 which he 

|5712 

[REDACTED 

34513 (052246Z MAR 03); ^^^B l 1139 (051956Z APR 03) 

34569 (061722Z MAR 03); 1281 (130801Z JUN 04); 

from: •^H^HTton^HB^IHI ' [REDACTED^ 

iect: planned release of [DETENTION SITE ORANGE] detainee Syed Habib; date 

10751 (102258Z MAR 03)^HH i 10762 (U2020Z MAR 03), disseminated as | 

123796 (121932Z AUG 04); §^|2087 3 (08163IZ MAR 04); ••2087 3 (081631Z MAR 04); 

DIRECTOR • • (101847Z MAY 04); DIRECTOR |^H(101847ZMA Y 04) 

[10740 (092308ZMAR03), disseminatedas|BB||||^ R I^H H

 1074 1

 (100917Z MAR 

03);_ALECBHi(120134ZMAR03 ) 

H 10883 (182127ZMAIU)3),disseminated as1171 7 (201722Z MAY 

03), disseminated as •••1077 8 (121549Z MAR 03), disseminated as | 

110894 (191513Z MAR 10902 (201037Z MAR 03) 

10959 (231205Z MAR 03); 10950 (222127Z MAR 03) 

110902 (201037Z MAR 03); 10959 (231205Z MAR 03); | 

111377 (231943Z APR 03), disseminated as \ 

110798 (131816Z MAR 03), disseminated as | 

| (192314Z MAY 03); • • 11717 (201222Z MAY ( 

10950 (222127Z MAR 

03); 

114420| 

112141 (272231Z JUN 

110778 12141 (272231Z JUN 03); (121549Z MAR 03), disseminated as | 

122939 (031541Z JUL 04); ••• • 10883 (182127Z MAR 03), disseminated asj 

110828 (151310Z MAR 03), included as part of disseminated intelligence ( 

l March 17, 2003, interrogation; ••• ! 10883 (182127Z MAR 03), disseminated as | 

1171V (201722Z MAY 03), disseminated as IHI^HHi . 

10941 (221506ZMAR03);H|| | 10950 (222127Z MAR 03) 

110942 (2216I0Z MAR 03), disseminated as B^ H 10948 (222101Z MAR 

03), disseminated as | 

112095 (222049Z JUN 03) 

110942 (2216I0Z MAR 03), disseminated as | 

N H I M I i M i >i < ii 

Page 214 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

214 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

would later recant.1258 On May 3, 2003, CIA officers recommended revisiting the information 

KSM had provided "during earlier stages of his interrogation process," noting that "he has told us 

that he said some things during this phase to get the enhanced measures to stop, therefore some 

of this information may be suspect."1259 

(TS/ V HIHH ^ H ^

1

^ ) The CIA also repeatedly referred to a comment made by KSM 

while he was still in Pakistani custody as indicating that KSM had information on an imminent 

attack. In reports to the inspector general,1260 the national security advisor,1261 and the 

Department of Justice,1262 among others, the CIA represented that: 

"When asked about future attacks planned against the United States, he coldly 

replied 'Soon, you will know.' In fact, soon we did know - after we initiated 

enhanced measures."1263 

Contrary to CIA representations, CIA records indicate that KSM's comment was interpreted by 

CIA officers with KSM at the time as meaning that KSM was seeking to use his future 

cooperation as a "bargaining chip" with more senior CIA officers.1264 

(TSZ/HHH^HB*'^ ) Finally, the CIA attributed to KSM, along with Abu Zubaydah, the 

statement that "the general US population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to 

'do what was necessary' to prevent the terrorists from succeeding in their goals."1265 There are 

no CIA operational or interrogation records to support the representation that KSM or Abu 

Zubaydah made these statements. 

1258 I 11255iU0419382^UG 13t 148 (171919Z DEC 05); | 31147 (171919Z DEC 05), 03); • 

disseminated as 

1259

 11487 (031551Z MAY 03). As detailed in Volumes II and III, KSM's claims that he fabricated 

information appeared credible to CIA officers. Other intelligence collection supported these claims. 

1260

 Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) 

Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorisin Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7I23-IG); 

date: February 27,2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism 

Detention and Interrogation Activities. 

1261

 CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence,^ubject^^^ 

"Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," included in email from: to: 

and subject: on 

techniques"; date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM. 

1262

 March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from ^| , ^ H Legal Group, DCI 

Counterterrorist Center re: Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques. 

1263

 Email from: to: HH^^^H ; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

HHH^^H^B!subject : re Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004. Memorandum for: 

Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG 

Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-1G); date: February 27, 2004; 

attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation 

Activities. ^^^^^^ ^ 

l 2

« ••• • 41592 (051050Z MAR 03); ^••^•416m051329^A R 03) 

1265

 March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve BradburyfromlB||[^^^H , ^ H Legal Group, DCI 

Countertenorist Center re: Effectiveness of the CIA Couiiterterrorist Interrogation Techniques. 

11ii 1111 1 ^^MBBBI^^MB i 'in n 

Page 215 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

215 
UNCLASSIFIED 

m i 11 in i IMi^ M imi inn i 

E. CIA Effectiveness Claims Regarding a "High Volume of Critical Intelligence" 

(TSA^^^^^^m^/NF ) The CIA represented that the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques resulted in the collection of "a high volume of critical intelligence1265 on alQa'ida.'"267

 The Committee evaluated the "high volume" of intelligence collected by compiling 

the total number of sole source and multi-source disseminated intelligence reports from the 119 

known CIA detainees.1268 

GES/^HI^Him^/NF ) The CIA informed the Committee that its interrogation program 

was successful in developing intelligence and suggested that all CIA detainees produced 

disseminated intelligence reporting. For example, in September 2006, CIA Director Michael 

Hayden provided the following testimony to the Committee: 

Senator Bayh: "I was impressed by your statement about how effective the 

[CIA's enhanced interrogation] techniques have been in eliciting important 

information to the country, at one point up to 50 percent of our information 

about al-Qa'ida. I think you said 9000 different intelligence reports?" 

Director Hayden: "Over 8000, sir." 

Senator Bayh: "And yet this has come from, I guess, only thirty individuals." 

1266 "c liti c a i" description in this CIA representation is addressed in the section of this summary concerning the 

reported acquisition of actionable intelligence after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that the 

CIA represented as enabling the CIA to thwart terrorist plots and capture specific terrorists. See Volume II for 

additional information. 

1267

 Among other documents, see CIA Memorandum for the National Security Advisor (Rice) entitled, 

"Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," December 2004; CIA Memorandum to the 

Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," March 2, 

2005; CIA briefing notes entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program," 

March 4, 2005; CIA talking points for the National Security Council entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 

DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques," dated March 4, 

2005; CIA briefing notes entitled, "Briefing for Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, 

Detention, and Interrogation Programs," dated May 2, 2006; CIA briefing document, entitled, "DCIA Talking 

Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, with the notation the document was "sent to 

DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." Also included in additional briefing documents referenced and 

described in this summary. 

1268 while CIA multi-source intelligence reports are included in the Committee Study, the quantitative analysis in 

this summary is based on sole-source intelligence reporting, as these reports best reflect reporting from CIA 

detainees. Multi-source intelligence reports are reports that contain data from multiple detainees. As described 

above, a common multi-source report would result from the CIA showing a picture of an individual to all CIA 

detainees at a specific CIA detention site. A report would be produced regardless if detainees were or were not able 

to identify or provide information on the individual. As a specific example, see HEADQUARTERS 

(202255Z JUN 06), which states that from January 1, 2006 - April 30, 2006, information from Hambali was "used 

in the dissemination of three intelligence reports, two of which were non-recognitions of Guantanamo Bay 

detainees," while the third "detailed [Hambali's] statement that he knew of no threats or plots to attack any world 

sporting events." Sole-source reports, by contrast, are based on specific information provided by one CIA detainee. 

Page 216 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

216 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

Director Hayden: "No, sir, 96, aU 96."1269 

In April 2007, CIA Director Hayden testified that the CIA's 

interrogation program existed "for one purpose - intelligence," and that it is "the most successful 

program being conducted by American intelligence today" for "preventing attacks, disabling alQa'ida."1270

 At this hearing Director Hayden again suggested that the CIA interrogation program 

was successful in obtaining intelligence from all CIA detainees.1271 A transcript of that hearing 

included the following exchange: 

Senator Snowe: "General Hayden. Of the 8000 intelligence reports that were 

provided, as you said, by 30 of the detainees." 

Director Hayden: "By all 97, ma'am."1272 

(TSyT^^^^^^^^H/ZNF) The suggestion that all CIA detainees provided information that 

resulted in intelligence reporting is not supported by CIA records. CIA records reveal that 34 

percent of the 119 known CIA detainees produced no intelligence reports, and nearly 70 percent 

produced fewer than 15 intelligence reports. Of the 39 detainees who were, according to CIA 

records, subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, nearly 20 percent produced 

no intelligence reports, while 40 percent produced fewer than 15 intelligence reports. While the 

CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program did produce significant amounts of disseminated 

intelligence reporting (5,874 sole-source intelligence reports), this reporting was overwhelmingly 

derived from a small subset of CIA detainees. For example, of the 119 CIA detainees identified 

in the Study, 89 percent of all disseminated intelligence reporting was derived from 25 CIA 

detainees. Five CIA detainees produced more than 40 percent of all intelligence reporting from 

the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. CIA records indicate that two of the five 

detainees were not subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.1273 

F. The Eight Primary CIA Effectiveness Representations—the Use of the CIA's Enhanced 

Interrogation Techniques "Enabled the CIA to Disrupt Terrorist Plots" and "Capture 

Additional Terrorists" 

From 2003 through 2009,1274 the CIA consistently and repeatedly 

represented that its enhanced interrogation techniques were effective and necessary to produce 

1269

 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Briefing by the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, on the Central 

Intelligence Agency Detention, Interrogation and Rendition Program, September 6, 2006 (SSCI #2007-1336). At 

the time this statement was made there had been at least 118 CIA detainees. 

1270

 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and 

Interrogation Program, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158). 

1271

 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and 

Interrogation Program, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158). 

1272

 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and 

Interrogation Program, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158). 

1273 See detainee intelligence reporting data in Volume TL 

127,1

 The CIA represented in 2002 that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were necessary and effective. 

The Committee analysis focuses on CIA representations^^ during which time the CIA 

11ii 11 III i BB^^^^MBM B im i imi i 

Page 217 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

217 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

critical intelligence that "enabled the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, 

and collect a high-volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida." The CIA further stated that the 

information acquired as a result of the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques could 

not have been acquired by the U.S. government in any other way ("otherwise unavailable").1275 

provided specific examples of counterterrorism "successes" the CIA attributed to the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques. 

1275 See list of 20 CIA representations included in this summary. From 2003 through 2009, the CIA's 

representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques included a specific set of 

examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that the CIA attributed to information obtained from 

the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained 

from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in 

"saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see: (1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office 

of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations 

on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their 

legality. The CIA representations referenced by the OLC include that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical," "vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was 

"essential" for the U.S. government to "detect and disrupt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states 

that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for 

preventing a subsequent attack within the United States." (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy 

General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of 

the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in die Interrogation of High Value al 

Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum 

dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Citing CIA documents and the President's September 6, 2006, speech 

describing the CIA's interrogation program (which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC 

memorandum states: "The CIA interrogation program—and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation 

techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities 

of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As die President explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us 

information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, the program has saved innocent lives.'" (See 

Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, 

Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War 

Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques 

that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for 

members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003 represented that "the use of Enhanced 

Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA 

professionals, saved lives," and warned policymakers that "[termination of this program will result in loss of life, 

possibly extensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of 

Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003; September 4, 

2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the 

Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The CIA's response to the Office of Inspector 

General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: "Information [the CIA] received... as a result of 

the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has almost certainly saved countless American lives 

inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to the fact that without the use of such techniques, 

we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." 

(See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) 

Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; 

date: February 27, 2004; attachment: Febmary 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism 

Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA Director Leon Panetta in February 

2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the [enhanced interrogation] techniques 

were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired 

from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other means." (See CIA briefing 

documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Ta" " " ' " ' 8FEB.2009" and graphic 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 218 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

218 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

The CIA also represented that the best measure of effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques was examples of specific terrorist plots "thwarted" and specific 

terrorists captured as a result of the use of the CIA's techniques. 

(TS^H^^^^^H^NF ) For example, in a December 2004 CIA memorandum prepared for 

the national security advisor, the CIA wrote that there was "no way to conduct" an 

"independent study of the foreign intelligence efficacy of using enhanced interrogation 

techniques," but stated, "[t]he Central Intelligence Agency can advise you that this program 

works and the techniques are effective in producing foreign intelligence." To illustrate the 

effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation techniques, the CIA provided 11 examples of "|k|ey 

intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques," nine of 

which referenced specific terrorist plots or the capture of specific terrorists.1276 Similarly, under 

the heading, "Plots Discovered as a Result of EITs," a CIA briefing prepared for President Bush 

in November 2007 states, "reporting statistics alone will not provide a fair and accurate measure 

of the effectiveness of EITs." Instead, the CIA provided eight "examples of key intelligence 

collected from CIA detainee interrogations after applying the waterboard along with other 

interrogation techniques," seven of which referenced specific terrorist plots or the capture of 

specific terrorists.1277 

(IS^m^F ) The Committee selected 20 CIA documents that include CIA 

representations about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques from 

2003 through 2009. The 20 CIA documents, which were consistent with a broader set of CIA 

representations made during this period, include materials the CIA prepared for the White 

attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," 

including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and Effectiveness," with associated 

documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence 

Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background on Key Captures and Plots 

Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on March 18, 2009, entitled, 

"[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258, which provides a list of 

"some of the key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from 

detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means." See Volume II for 

additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the CIA to obtain 

unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives." 

1276

 Italics in original document. See CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central 

Intelligence," Subject: "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterter^^ included in email 

from: IHHHH K

 t0 ;

 and subject: on 

value of interrogation techniques"; date: December 6,2004, at 5:06:38 PM. The email references the attached 

"information paper to Dr. Rice explaining the value of the interrogation techniques." The document includes the 

following: The "Karachi Plot," "The Heathrow Plot," The "Second Wave," "The Guraba Cell," "Issa al-Hindi," 

"Abu Talha al-Pakistani," "Hambali's Capture," "Jafaar al-Tayyar," "Dirty Bomb Plot," "Shoe Bomber," and 

"Shkai, Pakistan." 

1277 See CIA document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, 

with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." The document 

states, under the heading, "Plots Discovered as a Result of EITs," that "reporting statistics alone will not provide a 

fair and accurate measure of the effectiveness of EITs," and then provides a list of "examples of key intelligence 

collected from CIA detainee interrogations after applying the waterboard along with other interrogation 

techniques...The 'Second Wave'...Hambali's Capture...The Guraba Cell...Shoe Bomber...Issa al-Hindi...Jafaar 

al-Tayyar... The Karachi Plot...The Heathrov^lot^italic^dded)^^^^^^ 

M I 11 III I 11(>| 111111 

Page 219 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

219 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECREIW^^^^^^M^^^MFLNQFQR N 

House, the Department of Justice, the Congress, the CIA Office of Inspector General, as well as 

incoming members of President Obama's national security team, and the public. The Committee 

selected the following 20 CIA documents: 

1. July and September 2003: CIA Briefing Documents Seeking Policy Reaffirmation of the 

CLA Interrogation Program from White House Officials, "Review of Interrogation 

Program."1278 

2. February 2004: The CIA's Response to the Draft Inspector General Special Review, CIA 

"Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation 

Program,'" and attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and 

Interrogation Activities."1279 

3. July 2004: CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent 

Source on Al-Qa'ida.'"280 

4. December 2004: CIA Memorandum for the President's National Security Advisor, 

"Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques."1281 

5. March 2005: CIA Memorandum for the Office of Legal Counsel, "Effectiveness of the 

CIA Counterteirorist Interrogation Techniques."1282 

6. March 2005: CIA "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation 

Program."1283 

1278

 CIA memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA 

General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated 

July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials. Additional briefings are detailed in September 4, 2003, 

CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the 

Record from Scott Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program. 

1279

 CIA memorandum to the CIA Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, 

dated February 27, 2004, widi the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention 

and Interrogation Program' (2003-7123 IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and 

Interrogation Activities," dated February 24,2004. 

1280

 CIA Directorate of Intelligence, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida," dated July 13, 

2004; fax to the Department of Justice, April 22,2005, entitled, "Hi , Materials on KSM and Abu Zubaydah. |H " 

This report was widely disseminated in the Intelligence Community, and a copy of this report was provided to the 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on July 15, 2004. On March 31, 2009, former Vice President Cheney 

requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released with redactions on 

August 24,2009. 

1281

 CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence," Subject: 

"Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," included in email from: to: 

mHIHH i

 ar|d Hl^^^^^l B subject: on value 

techniques"; date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM. The email references the attached "information paper to Dr. 

Rice explaining the value of the interrogation techniques." 

1282

 CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, 

from m Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject: "Effectiveness of the CIA 

Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." 

1283

 CIA briefing for Vice President Cheney, dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: 

CIA Detention and Interrogation Program." 

11II 11111 I II III 

Page 220 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

220 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

7. March 2005: CIA Talking Points for the National Security Council, "Effectiveness of the 

High-Value Detainee Interrogation (HVD1) Techniques."1284 

8. April 2005: CIA "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting" provided to the 

Department of Justice for the OLC's assessment of the legality of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques.1285 

9. April 2005: CIA "Materials of KSM and Abu Zubaydah" and additional CIA documents 

provided to the Department of Justice for the OLC's assessment of the legality of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.1286 

10. June 2005: CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War 

Against Al-Qa'ida."1287 

11. December 2005: CIA Document entitled, "Future of CIA's Counterterrorist Detention 

and Interrogation Program," with the attachment, "Impact of the Loss of the Detainee 

Program to CT Operations and Analysis," from CIA Director Porter Goss to Stephen 

Hadley, Assistant to the President/National Security Advisor, Frances Townsend, 

Assistant to the President/Homeland Security Advisor, and Ambassador John 

Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence.1288 

12. May 2006: CIA Briefing for the President's Chief of Staff, "CIA Rendition, Detention 

and Interrogation Programs," on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques.1289 

1284

 CIA Talking Points entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DC1 Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the HighValue Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques." 

1285

 CIA "Briefing Notes on die Value of Detainee Reporting" faxed from the CIA to the Department of Justice on 

April 15, 2005, at 10:47AM. ^^^^^ ^ 

1286

 CIA fax to DOJ Command Center, dated April 22,2005, for HUGHS ' Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. 

Department of Justice, from ^ H Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, re: H , Materials 

of KSM and Abu Zubaydah, included CIA Intelligence Assessment "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent 

Source on Al-Qa'ida," and CIA document, "Materials of KSM and Abu Zubaydah." 

1287

 CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa'ida," June 2005, which 

CIA records indicate was provided to White House officials on June 1, 2005. The Intelligence Assessment at the 

SECRET//NOFORN classification level was more broadly disseminated on June 3, 2005. On March 31, 2009, 

former Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly 

released with redactions on August 24, 2009. 

1288

 CIA memorandum entitled, "Future of CIA's Counterterrorist Detention and Interrogation Program," dated 

December 23, 2005, from CIA Director Porter Goss to Stephen J. Hadley, Assistant to the President/National 

Security Advisor, Frances F. Townsend, Assistant to the President/Homeland Security Advisor, Ambassador John 

D. Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence, Attachment, "Impact of the Loss of the Detainee Program to 

CT Operations and Analysis." 

1289

 CIA briefing document dated May 2, 2006, entitled, "BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE 

PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 Briefing for Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and 

Interrogation Programs." 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 221 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

221 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

13. July 2006: CIA Memorandum for the Director of National Intelligence, "Detainee 

Intelligence Value Update."1290 

14. September 2006: CIA documents supporting the President's September 6, 2006, speech, 

including representations on the effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation program, 

including: "DRAFT Potential Public Briefing of CIA's High-Value Terrorist 

Interrogations Program," "CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy," and 

"Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program."1291 

15. April 2007: CIA Director Michael Hayden's Testimony to the Senate Select Committee 

on Intelligence describing the effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation program.1292 

16. October 2007: CIA Talking Points for the Senate Appropriations Committee, addressing 

the effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, entitled, "Talking 

Points Appeal of the Million Reduction in CIA/CTC's Rendition and Detention 

Program."1293 

17. November 2007: CIA Director Talking Points for the President, entitled, "Waterboard 06 

November 2007," on the effectiveness of the CIA's waterboard interrogation 

technique.1294 

18. January 2009: CIA Briefing for President-elect Obama's National Security Transition 

Team on the value of the CIA's "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)."1295 

19. February 2009: CIA Briefing for CIA Director Leon Panetta on the effectiveness of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program18FEB.2009," "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid 

Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," "EITs and Effectiveness," "Key Intelligence Impacts 

Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: 

1290

 CIA briefing document entitled, "Detainee Intelligence Value Update," dated 11 July 2006, internal document 

saved within CIA records as, "DNI Memo Intel Value July 11 2006...TALKING POINTS FOR DCI MEETING." 

1291

 CIA document dated July 16, 2006, entitled, "DRAFT Potential Public Briefing of CIA's High-Value Terrorist 

Interrogations Program," and "CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy," drafts supporting the September 6, 

2006, speech by President George W. Bush acknowledging and describing the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program, as well as an unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, "Summary of the 

High Value Terrorist Detainee Program." 

1292

 CIA classified Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael 

V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007; and accompanying Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12,2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central Intelligence Agency Detention and 

Interrogation Program." 

1293

 CIA fax from CIA employee [REDACTED] to U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on 

Defense, with fax cover sheet entitled, "Talking points," sent on October 26, 2007, at 5:39:48 PM. Document faxed 

entitled, "Talking Points Appeal of die Million reduction in CIA/CTC's Rendition and Detention Program." 

1294 "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007 with die notation the 

document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." 

1295

 CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including 

"Tab 7," named "RDG Copy-Briefing on "" * " " 1 "13 January 2009." 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 222 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

222 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

Attachment," and "Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted," among other CIA 

documents.1296 

20. March 2009: CIA Memorandum for the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence, including representations on the "Key Captures and Disrupted Plots Gained 

from HVDs in the RDI Program."1297 

(^SZ/HmiH^^B^^ ) Prom the 20 CIA documents, the Committee identified the CIA's 

eight most frequently cited examples of "thwarted" plots and captured terrorists that the CIA 

attributed to information acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques: 

Eight Most Frequently Cited Examples of Plots "Thwarted" 

and Terrorists Captured Provided by the CIA as Evidence for 

the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation 

Techniques 

Referenced X Number 

of Times in the 20 CIA 

Documents 

1 The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and 

the Capture of Jose Padilla 

17/20 

2 The Thwarting of the Karachi Plots 17/20 

3 The Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery 

of the al-Ghuraba Group 

18/20 

4 The Thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot 

and the Capture of Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi 17/20 

5 The Identification, Capture, and Arrest of lyman Faris 7/20 

6 The Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Sajid Badat 17/20 

7 The Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf 

Plotting 

20/20 

8 The Capture of Hambali 18/20 

(TS/T^^H^^^HpWF ) The Committee sought to confirm that the CIA's representations 

about the most frequently cited examples of "thwarted" plots and captured terrorists were 

consistent with the more than six million pages of CIA detention and interrogation records 

provided to the Committee. Specifically, the Committee assessed whether the CIA's 

representations that its enhanced interrogation techniques produced unique, otherwise 

unavailable intelligence1298 that led to the capture of specific terrorists and the "thwarting" of 

1296

 CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- 18FEB.2009" and 

graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykli Muhammad 

(KSM)," Includes "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "ElTs and Effectiveness," with 

associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key 

Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background on Key Captures and 

Plots Disrupted." 

1297

 CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on March 18, 2009, at 3:46 PM, entitled, 

"[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," which includes "Key Captures and Disrupted Plots Gained From HVDs in the RDI 

Program" (DTS #2009-1258). 

12S>8 p r o m 2003 through 2009, the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that 

the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of" its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA 

M I 11 III I IIIin n 

Page 223 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

223 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see: 

(1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, 

which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. The CIA representations referenced by the 

OLC include that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical," 

"vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect 

and disrupt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that 

the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United 

States." (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from 

Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: 

Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques 

that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the 

Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA 

representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

Citing CIA documents and the President's September 6, 2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation program 

(which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: 'The CIA interrogation program— 

and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security 

of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As the President 

explained [on September 6,2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, 

the program has saved innocent lives.'" (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central 

Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 

Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 

of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value 

al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003 

represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence 

information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives," and warned policymakers that "[t]ermination of 

this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from 

Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation 

Program, July 29,2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and 

September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The 

CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: 

"Information [the CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has 

almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to 

the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks 

involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, 

Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention 

and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum 

re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA 

Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the 

[enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of 

the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other 

means." (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid 

Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and 

Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," 

"Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background 

on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 

March 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258, 

which provides a list of "some of the key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence 

acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means." See 

Volume II for additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the 

CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives." 

11 ii 11 i i i i II i II 

Page 224 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

224 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

specific plots were accurate.1299 The Committee found the CIA's representations to be 

inaccurate and unsupported by CIA records. 

(^FS^mm^l^F ) Below are the summaries of the CIA's eight most frequently cited 

examples of "thwarted" plots and captured terrorists, as well as a description of the CIA's claims 

and an explanation for why the CIA representations were inaccurate and unsupported by CIA 

records.1300 

1. The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla 

Summary: The CIA represented that its enhanced interrogation 

techniques were effective and necessary to produce critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence, 

which enabled the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture terrorists, and save lives. Over a period 

of years, the CIA provided the thwarting of terrorist plotting associated with, and the capture of, 

Jose Padilla, as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

These CIA representations were inaccurate. The CIA first received reporting on the terrorist 

threat posed by Jose Padilla from a foreign government. Eight days later, Abu Zubaydah 

provided information on the terrorist plotting of two individuals, whom he did not identify by 

true name, to FBI special agents. Abu Zubaydah provided this information in April 2002, prior 

to the commencement of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in August 2002. The plots 

associated with Jose Padilla were assessed by the Intelligence Community to be infeasible. 

1299

 The CIA has represented that it has provided the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence with all CIA records 

related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. This document production phase lasted more than three 

years and was completed in July 2012. The records produced include more than six million pages of material, 

including records detailing the interrogation of detainees, as well as the disseminated intelligence derived from the 

interrogation of CIA detainees. The CIA did not provide—nor was it requested to provide-—intelligence records that 

were unrelated to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. In other words, this Study was completed without 

direct access to reporting from CIA HUMINT assets, foreign liaison assets, electronic intercepts, military detainee 

debriefings, law enforcement derived information, and other methods of intelligence collection. Insomuch as this 

material is included in the analysis herein, it was provided by the CIA within the context of documents directly 

related to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. For example, a requirements cable from CIA Headquarters 

to CIA interrogators at a CIA detention site could cite SIGNALS intelligence collected by NSA, or include a CIA 

HUMINT source report on a particular subject, with a request to question the CIA detainee about the reporting. 

While direct access to the NSA report, or the CIA HUMINT report, may not have been provided, it may still be 

included in this Study because it appeared in the CIA Headquarters requirements cable relating to the questioning of 

a CIA detainee. As such, there is likely significant intelligence related to the terrorist plots, terrorists captured, and 

other intelligence matters examined in this report, that is unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program 

and within the databases of the U.S. Intelligence Community, but which has not been identified or reviewed by the 

Select Committee on Intelligence for this Study. As is detailed in the near 6800-page Committee Study, the 

Committee found that there was significant intelligence in CIA databases to enable the capture of the terrorists cited, 

and "disrupt" the terrorist plots represented as "thwarted," without intelligence from the CIA interrogation program. 

Had the Committee been provided with access to all intelligence available in CIA and Intelligence Community 

databases, it is likely this finding would be strengthened further. Finally, as of March 2014, the White House had 

not yet provided approximately 9,400 documents related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program— 

equivalent to less than .2 percent of CIA detention and interrogation records—pending an Executive Privilege 

determination. The Committee requested access to these documents in three letters dated January 3, 2013, May 22, 

2013, and December 19, 2013. The White House did not respond to the requests. 

1300 See Volume II for additional information and analysis. 

llll II III I MIIIMIIII 

Page 225 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

225 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

Further Details: The Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings plotting refers to 

terrorist plotting involving U.S. citizen Jose Padilla. Padilla and his associate, Binyam 

Mohammed, conceived the "Dirty Bomb Plot" after locating information, derived from what the 

CIA described as "a satirical internet article" entitled "How to Make an H-bomb," on a computer 

at a Pakistani safe house in early 2002.1301 The article instructed would-be bomb makers to 

enrich uranium by placing it "in a bucket, attaching it to a six foot rope, and swinging it around 

your head as fast as possible for 45 minutes."1302 Padilla and Mohammed approached Abu 

Zubaydah in early 2002, and later KSM, with their idea to build and use this device in the United 

States.1303 Neither Abu Zubaydah nor KSM believed the plan was viable,1304 but KSM provided 

funding for, and tasked Padilla to conduct, an operation using natural gas to create explosions in 

tall buildings in the United States,1305 later known as the "Tall Buildings Plot."1306 

10090 (210703Z APR 02) and CIA Document, Subject: "CIA Statement Summarizing Significant 

Information About Jose Padilla (21:10 hrs.- 8 June 02}." For more information on the Internet article that 

recommended enriching uranium by "putting it into a bucket and twisting it around one's head to enrich it," see 

2^ow to Make an H-Bomb" and [REDACTED] 2281 (071658Z MAY 04). See also email from: [REDACTED!, 

|^MOTA/CTWG/CBRN Group; to: [REDACTED] and multiple ccs, including subject: "Re: 

[REDACTED]: Re: KSM homework on AQ nuke program"; date: April 22, 2003, at 03:30 PM, explaining CIA's 

CBRN group's position on Padilla and Mohammed's plotting. According to the email: "Padilla and 

Binyam/Zouaoui had pulled an article off a satirical web site called 'How to make an H-bomb' which is based on a 

1979 Journal of Irreproducible Results article. The article was intended to be humorous and included instructions 

such as enriching uranium by placing liquid uranium hexaflouride in a bucket, attaching it to a six foot rope, and 

swinging it around your head as fast as possible for 45 minutes. While it appears that Padilla and Zouaoui took the 

article seriously, Zubaydah recommended that they take their (cockamamie) ideas to (I believe) KSM in Karachi. It 

was at that point that KSM told them to focus on bringing down apartment buildings with explosives, (in other 

words: keep your day jobs)." U.K. courts noted "that I 

1302

 Email from: [REDACTED], CTC/OTA/CBRNB; subject: "Note to Briefers Updating Zubaydah 'Uranium 

Device' Information"; date: April 23, 2002, at 08:25:40 PM. The email states, "CIA and Lawrence Livermore 

National Lab have assessed that the article is filled with countless technical inaccuracies which would likely result in 

the death of anyone attempting to follow the instructions, and would definitely not result in a nuclear explosive 

device." See also [REDACTED] 2281 (071658ZMAY 04). 

1303

 ^^••1009 0 (210703Z APR 02) 

1304

 CIA^^ B (290925Z APR 02); 11086 (261140Z APR 02). See also Padilla statement noting Abu 

Zubaydah "chuckled at the idea," but sent Padilla and Muhammad to Karachi to present the idea to KSM. See fax 

from Pat Rowan, Department of Justice National Security Division, to [REDACTED], at CTC Legal, on August 15, 

2007, with subject line: "Jose Padilla." 

1305

 DIRECTOR • • (041637Z). See also CIA • • (290925Z APR 02); ^H H 10091 (210959Z APR 

02); [REDACTED] 2281 (071658Z MAY 04); and DIRECTOR (101725Z MAR 04). 

1306

 For additional background on the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plotting, see fax from Pat Rowan, Department of 

Justice National Security Division, to [REDACTED], at CTC Legal, on August 15, 2007, with subject line: "Jose 

Padilla." The document states: "Jose Padilla is a United States citizen who has been designated as an enemy 

combatant by the President and has been detained by the military since June 9, 2002. Padilla is commonly known as 

l\e 'dirty bomber' because early intelligence from a senior al Qaeda detainee [Abu Zubaydah] and Padilla's 

intended accomplice [Binyam Muhammad] indicated that he had proposed to senior al Qaeda leaders the use of a 

radiological dispersion device, or 'dirty bomb,' against United States targets, or interests, and he was detained by the 

.military partly on that basis. Based on later and more complete intelligence, including Padilla's own statements 

/ during military detention, it now appears that Padilla re-entered the United States after he accepted a mission from al 

Qaeda leaders, specifically from Klialid Sheikh Mohammad ('KSM'), the emir of the attacks of September 11, to 

destroy one or more high-rise apartment buildings in the United States through the use of natural gas explosions 

triggered by timing devices, and had received training, equipment and money for that mission." See also other 

records that describe the plotting as targeting tall apartment buildings, without reference to a radiological or "dirty" 

bomb. For example, a July 15, 2004, CIA intelligence report titled, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent 

m i 11 II I I ^BBiBMI^^^B^/NOFOR N 

Page 226 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

226 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRETfl^^^^^^^B^BMflNQFQR N 

The capture of, and the thwarting of terrorist plotting associated 

with Jose Padilla, is one of the eight most frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as 

evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Over a period of 

years, CIA documents prepared for and provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, 

and the Department of Justice represent the identification and/or the capture of Jose Padilla, 

and/or the disruption of the "Dirty Bomb," and/or the "Tall Buildings" plotting, as examples of 

how "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation 

techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots" and "capture additional terrorists."1307 

The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques was "otherwise unavailable" and "saved lives."1308 

Source on Al-Qa'ida," noted: "From late 2001 until early 2003, KSM also conceived several low-level plots, 

including an early 2002 plan to send al-Qa'ida operative and US citizen Jose Padilla to set off bombs in high-rise 

apartment buildings in an unspecified major US city." Similarly, an Intelligence Community report titled, "Khalid 

Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting—Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," noted: "Binyam 

Muhammad stated during his debriefings that his and Padilla's objective was to topple a high-rise building with a 

gas explosion in Chicago." (See Community Couiiterterrorism Board, Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat 

Assessment, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting—Precious Tmths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of 

Lies," Report Number IICT-2003-14, April 3, 2003.) The unclassified ODNI "Summary of the High Value 

Terrorist Detainee Program," released September 6, 2006, states that, "[w]orking with information from detainees, 

the US disrupted a plot to blow up tall buildings in the United States. KSM later described how he had directed 

operatives to ensure the buildings were high enough to prevent the people trapped above from escaping out of the 

windows, thus ensuring their deaths from smoke inhalation." 

1307

 Italics included in CIA Memorandum to the Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA 

Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," from March 2, 2005. See also CIA talking points for National Security 

Council entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee 

Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques," dated March 4, 2005, as well as multiple other CIA briefing records and 

memoranda described in Volume II. 

1308 p r o m 2003 through 2009, the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that 

the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA 

representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see: 

(1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, 

which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. The CIA representations referenced by die 

OLC include that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical," 

"vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect 

and disrupt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that 

the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United 

States." {Sec Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from 

Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: 

Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques 

that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the 

Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA 

representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

Citing CIA documents and the President's September 6, 2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation program 

(which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: "The CIA interrogation program— 

and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security 

of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ... As the President 

explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, 

the program has saved innocent lives."' (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central 

mi 11 ii 11 'bubbi^^^^bb 1 1 ii ii i hi 11 

Page 227 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

227 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

(TSiVl^^^m^^l^NF ) For example, a document prepared for Vice President Cheney in 

advance of a March 8, 2005, National Security Council principals meeting states, under a section 

entitled "INTERROGATION RESULTS," that: 

"Use of DOJ-authorized enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a 

comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled us to disrupt terrorist 

plots... 

.. .Dirty Bomb Plot: Operatives Jose Padilla and Binyam Mohammed planned 

to build and detonate a 'dirty bomb' in the Washington DC area. Plot 

disrupted. Source: Abu Zubaydah."1309 

Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 

Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 

of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value 

al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003 

represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence 

information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives," and warned policymakers that "[tjennination of 

this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from 

Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation 

Program, July 29, 2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and 

September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The 

CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: 

"Information [die CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has 

almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to 

the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks 

involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, 

Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention 

and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum 

re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA 

Director Leon Panetta in Febmary 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the 

[enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of 

the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other 

means." (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid 

Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and 

Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," 

"Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background 

on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 

March 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258, 

which provides a list of "some of the key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence 

acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means." See 

Volume II for additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the 

CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives." 

1309

 CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and 

Interrogation Program." The briefing document further represented that: (1) "Prior to the use of enhanced measures 

against skilled resistors [sic] like KSM and Abu Zubaydah- the two most prolific intelligence producers in our 

control- we acquired little threat information or significant actionable intelligence"; and (2) "[CIA] would not have 

succeeded in overcoming the resistance of KSM, Abu Zubaydah, and other equally resistant HVDs without the 

application of EITs." x 

TOP SECRETZ/I^^^^^^^MBM^OFOR N 

Page 228 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

228 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

Likewise, the July 20, 2007, Department of Justice Office of Legal 

Counsel (OLC) memorandum on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques used CIAprovided information on Jose Padilla to describe the threat posed by al-Qa'ida and the success of 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to date. The July 20, 2007, OLC memorandum 

states: 

"The CIA interrogation program—and, in particular, its use of enhanced 

interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security 

of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable 

intelligence. The CIA believes that this program 'has been a key reason why 

al-Qa'ida has failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West since 11 

September 2001'... We understand that use of enhanced techniques has 

produced significant intelligence that the Government has used to keep the 

Nation safe. As the President explained [in his September 6, 2006 speech],'by 

giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, the 

program has saved innocent lives'.. .For example, wc understand that enhanced 

interrogation techniques proved particularly crucial in the interrogations of 

Khalid Shaykh Muhammad and Abu Zubaydah... Interrogations of 

Zubaydah—again, once enhanced techniques were employed—revealed two 

al-Qaeda operatives already in the United Statesmo and planning to destroy a 

high rise apartment building and to detonate a radiological bomb in 

Washington, £>.C."1311 

On April 21, 2009, a CIA spokesperson confirmed the accuracy of the information in the OLC 

memorandum in response to the partial declassification of this and other memoranda.1312 

The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the 

thwarting of the Dirty Bomb plotting, the thwarting of the Tall Buildings plotting, and/or the 

capture of Jose Padilla in 17 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and the Department 

of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009.1313 

1310

 Italics added. CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah never provided information on "two operatives already 

in the United States." While neither Binyam Muhammad nor Jose Padilla was "already in the United States," die 

OLC description appears to be a reference to Jose Padilla and Binyam Mohammad, as the OLC then makes 

reference to the "Dirty Bomb" and "Tall Buildings" plotting. 

1311

 Italics added. See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from 

Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: 

Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 

to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees. 

1312 See "Waterboarding Saved L.A.," Washington Times, April 25, 2009. The CIA's June 2013 Response asserts 

that it "took [the CIA] until 2007 to consistently stop referring to [Padilla's] 'Dirty Bomb' plot—a plan [the CIA] 

concluded early on was never operationally viable." As noted, the CIA continued to refer to the "Dirty Bomb" 

plotting through 2007 and confirmed die information publicly in 2009. 

1313 See list of CIA prepared briefings and memoranda from 2003 through 2009 with representations on the 

effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques referenced in this summary and described in detail in 

Volume 11. 

iii i i i III i imiiHI i 

Page 229 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

229 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

(TS^H^^^^^^^i^NF) A review of CIA operational cables and other CIA records found 

that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the identification of 

"Jose Padilla" or the thwarting of the Dirty Bomb or Tall Buildings plotting. CIA records 

indicate that: (1) there was significant intelligence in CIA databases acquired prior to—and 

independently of—the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to fully identify Jose Padilla 

as a terrorist threat and to disrupt any terrorist plotting associated with him;1314 (2) Abu 

Zubaydah provided information on the terrorist plotting of two individuals who proposed an idea 

to conduct a "Dirty Bomb" attack, but did not identify their true names; (3) Abu Zubaydah 

provided this information to FBI special agents who were using rapport-building techniques,1315 

in April 2002, more than three months prior to the CIA's "use of DOJ-approved enhanced 

13.4 See, for example, ^^^BHHHIHil^^^^ B CIA document entitled, "CIA Statement Summarizing 

Significant Information About Jose Padilla {21:10 hrs.- 8 June 02)";1097 2 (12031Z APR 02); ALEC 

• H (23I837Z APR 02); and 10976 (120948Z APR 02); among other records. 

13.5

 Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu 

Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS# 

2010-2939). See also 10092 (211031Z APR 02). While Abu Zubaydah was subjected to sleep 

deprivation and nudity prior to this date by the CIA, he had been allowed to sleep shortly prior to being questioned 

on this matter by the FBI special agents, who were exclusively using rapport-building interrogation techniques when 

the information was acquired from Abu Zubaydah (who was covered with a towel). The sleep deprivation and 

nudity as implemented during this period differed from how sleep deprivation and nudity were implemented after 

the CIA developed, and the Department of Justice approved, the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques" in 

August 2002. Rather than being placed in a stress position during sleep deprivation, Abu Zubaydah was kept awake 

by being questioned nearly non-stop by CIA and FBI interrogators. Records further indicate that during breaks in 

the interrogations, Abu Zubaydah was allowed to briefly sleep. See also 10116 (250731Z APR 02), 

which describes this sleep deprivation as a period of "no sustained sleep" with "cat naps between interrogators." 

The cable further states: "Like many medical students, the subject appears to handle 76 plus hours of limited sleep 

with few problems" (italics added). The use of nudity during this period also differed from future uses of nudity, as 

Abu Zubaydah was covered when interrogated by the FBI. See also SSCI Staff interview of FBI Special Agent Ati 

Soufan, April 28, 2008, at 1:20 PM, Hart Senate Office Building (transcript at DTS #2008-2411). Ali Soufan 

described events prior to Abu Zubaydah's provision of information related to the "Dirty Bomb," stating: "He was 

injured, badly injured. He was dehydrated. I remember we were putting ice on his lips. And he didn't have any 

bowel control, so we were cleaning him. And the reason I'm telling you some of these disgusting things is because 

it helped build rapport with the guy in this short period of time." Later, Ali Soufan described the provision of 

information related to the Dirty Bomb plotting, stating: "When I was going in, he was totally naked. I refused to go 

and interview him naked. So I took a towel. And

 an d

 I ant l [REDACTED], every time we went in he had to 

be covered or I [wouldn't] go. It's as simple as that." See also section of transcript stating, "So we went back. And 

we start talking to him. We took some Coke, tea, and we start talking about different things. We flipped him about 

different things, and I and [REDACTED]. And then he came back to his senses and he started cooperating 

again. And this is when he gave us Padilla." (Abu Zubaydah provided information concerning the Dirty Bomb 

plotting and Jose Padilla's kunya, but did not provide the name "Jose Padilla." As described in this summary, Jose 

Padilla's name had already been provided to the CIA by a foreign government that identified Padilla as a U.S. 

citizen suspected of being engaged in possible terrorist activity.) See also Abu Zubaydah detainee review in 

Volume III. 

11 II II I I I — I III II 

Page 230 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

230 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

interrogation techniques";1316 and (4) the Intelligence Community internally assessed that the 

"Dirty Bomb"1317 and "Tall Buildings"1318 plots were infeasible as envisioned.1319 

1316

 The Department of Justice finalized its approval of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including 

walling, facial slaps, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation, and the waterboard, as well as other 

techniques, on August 1, 2002. See Volume I and Volume III for additional details. Beginning on August 4, 2002, 

and extending through August 20,2002, Abu Zubaydah was subjected to the non-stop concurrent use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques, including at least 83 applications of the waterboard. CIA records indicate that 

the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques ceased on August 30, 2002, when Abu Zubaydah received 

clothing. 

13,7 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, to include: (1) email from: [REDACTED], 

^•OTA/CTWG/CBR N Group; to: [REDACTED] and multiple ccs, including HH^Hf t subject: "Re: 

[REDACTED]: Re: KSM homework on AQ nuke program"; date: April 22, 2003, at 03:30 PM, explaining CIA's 

CBRN group's position on Padilla and Mohammed's plotting: "Padilla and Binyam/Zouaoui had pulled an article 

off a satirical web site called 'How to make an H-bomb' which is based on a 1979 Journal of Irreproducible Results 

article. The article was intended to be humorous..."; (2) email from: [REDACTED], CTC/OTA/CBRNB; subject: 

"Note to Briefers Updating Zubaydah 'Uranium Device' Information"; date: April 23, 2003, at 08:25:40 PM; and 

(3) U.K. court records relaying that "[Binyam Mohammed] at the outset said there was no Dirty Bomb plot (a 

position he has consistently maintained to his defense lawyers)" (UK Judgment, at 39). According to U.K. legal 

records, "[Binyam Mohammed] said ... that he had seen a file on a computer in Lahore and decided it was a joke -

part of the instruction included adding bleach to uranium 238 in a bucket and rotating it around one's head for 45 

minutes." (UK Judgment, at 11). On June 10, 2002, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft announced, "We have 

captured a known terrorist who was exploring a plan to build and explode a radiological dispersion device, or 'dirty 

bomb,' in the United States." The statement continued: "In apprehending A1 Muhajir as he sought entry into the 

United States, we have disrupted an unfolding terrorist plot to attack the United States by exploding a radioactive 

'dirty bomb.' Now, a radioactive 'dirty bomb' involves exploding a conventional bomb that not only kills victims in 

the immediate vicinity, but also spreads radioactive material that is highly toxic to humans and can cause mass death 

and injury. From infonnation available to the United States government, we know that Abdullah A1 Muhajir is an 

A1 Qaeda operative and was exploring a plan to build and explode a radioactive dirty bomb. Let me be clear: We 

know from multiple independent and corroborating sources that Abdullah Al Muhajir was closely associated with A1 

Qaeda and that as an Al Qaeda operative he was involved in planning future terrorist attacks on innocent American 

civilians in the United States. .. .1 commend the FBI, the CIA and other agencies involved in capturing Abdullah Al 

Muhajir before he could act on his deadly plan." See Transcript of the Attorney General John Ashcroft Regarding 

the Transfer of Abdullah Al Muhajir (Born Jose Padilla) to the Department of Defense as an Enemy Combatant, on 

June 10, 2002. 

1318 See Intelligence Community review of the Tall Buildings plotting included in CIA records with references to 

terrorist attacks in Russia in September 1999 against apartment buildings using traditional explosives and VBIEDs. 

See also U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives report entitled, "Use of 

Natural Gas as a Terrorist Weapon in Apartment Buildings," dated August 4, 2008. 

1319

 The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that the CIA "concluded early on" that the "dirty bomb" plot was 

"never operationally viable." The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "it took [the CIA] until 2007" to stop citing 

the "dirty bomb" plot in its representations about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

This is incorrect. The CIA referred to the disruption of this plotting in a representation to the Department of Justice 

in July 2007, in representations to Congress in late October 2007, and confirmed this information to the press in 

April 2009. See CIA fax from CIA employee [REDACTED] to U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, 

Subcommittee on Defense, with fax cover sheet entitled, "Talking points," sent on October 26, 2007, at 5:39:48 PM. 

Document faxed entitled, "Talking Points Appeal of the Million reduction in CIA/CTC's Rendition and 

Detention Program." See also the July 20, 2007, Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memorandum, which states that 

"interrogations of Zubaydah—again, once enhanced techniques were employed—revealed two al-Qaeda operatives 

already in the United States and planning to destroy a high rise apartment building and to detonate a radiological 

bomb in Washington, D.C." (italics added). As described elsewhere in this summary and in the full Committee 

Study, on April 21, 2009, in response to the partial declassification of OLC memoranda that month, a CIA 

spokesperson confirmed the CIA stood by the "factual assertions" in die OLC memoranda. See "Waterboarding 

Saved L.A.," Washington Times, April 25, 2009. The CIA's June 2013 Response further states "[d]espite the 

imprecision of our language, we continue to assess it was a good example of the importance of intelligence derived 

iiii 11 IIII BI^^^MBMBM i

 1111111111 

Page 231 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

231 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET// k/NOFORN 

Prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah on March 28, 2002, the CIA 

was alerted to the threat posed by Jose Padilla. In early 2001, U.S. government records indicated 

that a Jose Padilla came to the U.S. Consulate in Karachi to report a lost passport. These records 

indicated that Jose Padilla provided a "sketchy" story about overstaying his Pakistani visa and 

that he was "allegedly studying Islamic law in Egypt." A search of the State Department's 

Consular Lookout and Support System was conducted at the time, which resulted in "multiple" 

hits for "Jose Padilla."1320 State Department records confirmed that Jose Padilla had sought a 

new passport at the U.S. Consulate in Karachi in February 2001, and was subsequently provided 

with a replacement on March 21, 2001.1321 

(TSAm^^^^K'/NF ) On December 15, 2001, the CIA provided the FBI with documents 

obtained in Afghanistan from a purported al-Qa'ida-related safe house. Included in the binder 

were 180 terrorist training camp application forms entitled, "Mujahideen Identification Form / 

New Applicant Form." An application form for a then 33-year-old individual with the alias 

"Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir" from "America" was among the forms. "Al-Muhajir's" form—dated 

July 24, 2000—listed other identifying information, to include a "10/18/70" date of birth; 

language skills to include English, Spanish, and Arabic; travels to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and 

Yemen; and the individual's marital status.1322 

from the detainee program." As described in this summary and throughout the full Committee Study, in its efforts to 

obtain legal authorization and policy approval for the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA represented 

that the intelligence referenced was obtained "as a result" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques (not the 

"detainee program"), and that the information obtained was unique and otherwise unavailable. 

1320

 The Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) is used by State Department passport agencies, post, and 

border inspection agencies to perform name checks on visa and passport applicants to identify individuals who are, 

ineligible for issuance or require other special action. Source: www.state.gov 

1321

 A February 16, 2001, email entitled, "Lost passport case- Jose Padilla," states that a "Jose Padilla," with a date 

of birth of October 18, 1970, came to the U.S. Consulate in Karachi to report a lost passport. The email notes that 

"his story is really-sketchy-been traveling here long enough to overstay his Pakistani visa, but speaks no Urdu, and 

is allegedly studying Islamic law in Egypt." A March 5, 2001, email in CIA records, entitled, "The continuing Jose 

Padilla saga!" states that there are "multiple CLASS hits" (Consular Lookout and Support System) for a Jose 

Padilla. The author writes "[REDACTED] and I both agree there is something sketchy about the guy." On March 

21, 2001, State Department records indicate that Jose Padilla was provided with a replacement passport. See 

documents included in materials provided by the CIA to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, including 

email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]: cc: [REDACTED]; subject: "Lost passport case- Jose Padilla"; date: 

February 16,2001, at 4:46 AM, included in materials provided by the CIA to the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence; second email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: "The continuing 

Jose Padilla saga!"; date: March 5, 2001, at 10:09 AM; U.S. State Department travel records identified by the 

Department of Justice; letter from Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. Department of Defense, to James Comey, U.S. Department 

of Justice, dated May 28, 2004. 

1322

 Italics added. Jose Padilla's Fingerprints would later be found on the forms. See Jose Padilla U.S. court 

documents, which include the pledge form and a translation of the pledge form. See also FBI Washington 101514Z 

O0APR07)/|Summ^ on Jose Padilla," and email from: [REDACTED]; to: 

subject: "Pakistan Raid Evidence- Meeting with FBI SA in Pakistan at the 

time"; date: July 17, 2007, at 01:07 PM, which notes the raids recovered a copy of "Padilla's Muj pledge form." See 

also numerous open source articles, to include, "CIA Officer Testifies He Was Given Qaeda 'Pledge Form' Said to 

be Padilla's," New York Times, dated May 16, 2007; "Key Padilla evidence got to CIA in Afghan pickup," 

Associated Press, March 28, 2007; and "Terror Suspect's Path from Streets to Brig," New York Times, dated April 

24, 2004. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the CIA could not locate information on this form in CIA 

databases. According to testimony of a CIA officer at Jose Padilla's federal trial, the binder and other material were 

M I 11 III I BMBBI^B^B M I IM NM I 

Page 232 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

232 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET^ 1//NOFORN 

On April 10, 2002, the CIA disseminated a cable with intelligence 

derived from the exploitation of documents obtained during the raids in which Abu Zubaydah 

was captured. Included in the CIA cable is a translation of a letter from mid-March 2002 that 

references a 33-year-old English-speaking individual. The cable states that the CIA believed this 

individual might be involved in "a martyrdom operation." The translation disseminated states: 

"There is a brother from Argentina, he speaks Spanish, English and Arabic, he is 33 years old, he 

is married and has two little children. He is a great brother. He knows business and studies 

English language. He trains [in] self defense, he is a good looking man."1323 

(TS/ZI^^IHiHK^ ) The next day, April 11, 2002, the CIA was provided with 

information from Pakistani officials on a 33-year-old U.S. citizen named "Jose Padilla," with a 

date of birth of October 18, 1970, who was briefly detained by Pakistani officials on April 4, 

2002. The Pakistani government provided a copy of Jose Padilla's U.S. passport and relayed that 

Jose Padilla had overstayed his travel visa, and that there were inconsistencies with Jose 

Padilla's appearance and accent. The CIA's wrote that they would provide the 

information on "Jose Padilla" to the State Department's Regional Security Officer, and "would 

follow-up with [Pakistani officials] on this matter."

 1324

 The date of birth and travel information 

included with Jose Padilla's passport matched information on the "Mujahideen Identification 

Form" (33-year-old "American" referenced as "Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir") the CIA had 

provided to the FBI on December 15, 2001.1325 

(TS/JB^^^^^^^B/ZNF) On April 12, 2002, Pakistani officials provided additional 

information to the CIA's specifically that they had detained a U.S. passport holder 

named Jose Padilla and a British passport holder named "Fouad Zouaoui" (later identified as 

Binyam Muhammad), who had suspiciously attempted to depart Pakistan. According to the CIA 

cable, Pakistani authorities provided the information on the pair "due to concerns about possible 

terrorist activity."1326 The cable noted that Pakistani authorities had to release Padilla, but that 

Padilla's associate remained in detention.1327 (When questioned further, the Pakistani authorities 

provided by a CIA source to CIA officers in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The CIA officer testified at Jose Padilla's trial 

that, after he sorted through the material, the blue binder was placed in a sealed box and provided to the FBI in 

Islamabad, Pakistan. See referenced open source reporting. 

1323

 ALECj| M (102327Z APR 02) 

1324

 HH^^1097 2 (12031Z APR 02). As noted, the State Department already possessed information of concern 

related to Jose Padilla. 

1325 See Jose Padilla U.S. court documents, which include the pledge form and a translation of the pledge form. See 

also FBI Washington 101514Z (10APR 07), "Summary Chronology of Intelligence on Jose Padilla," and email 

from: [REDACTED]; to: subject: "Pakistan Raid Evidence- Meeting with 

FBI S A in Pakistan at the time"; date: July 17, 2007, at 01:07 PM, which notes the raids recovered a copy of 

"Padilla's Muj pledge form"; and numerous open source articles, to include, "CIA Officer Testifies He Was Given 

Qaeda 'Pledge Form' Said to be Padilla's," New York Times, dated May 16,2007. 

1326

 ^HI H 10976 (120948Z APR 02). The official cable states that the Pakistani official and his office "has not 

received the full details, and he is passing this onto [the CIA] H | due to concerns about possible terrorist activity." 

The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the reporting from the Pakistani government that a Pakistan-based U.S. 

citizen named Jose Padilla was engaged in possible terrorist activity was "unremarkable at the time," and that the 

CIA viewed the report as a "routine 'illegal traveler'" report. 

110972 (12031Z APR 02); {••llW76 ( 120948ZAPR(E) 

Page 233 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

233 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

stated that they suspected Jose Padilla of being "an al-Qa'ida member.")1328 The information 

identifyingJosePadilla and "Fouad Zouaoui" as potential terrorists had been provided by the 

CIA's to CIA Headquarters, several CIA Stations, and the State Department's 

Regional Security Officer (RSO) in Karachi by April 12, 2002.1329 Using the identifying 

information in Jose Padilla's passport, provided by the Pakistani government the CIA's f 

H requested that CIA Headquarters and the CIA's Station conduct "| 

database search) using th^iame^Jose Padilla" and the other identifying information 

provided.1330 The CIA's requested that CIA Headquarters and the CIA's | 

Station do the same for Padilla's associate, Fouad Zouaoui.1331 As a result, by April 12, 2002, 

the CIA was already alerted that a named U.S. citizen, "Jose Padilla," had spent significant time 

in Pakistan and was engaged in "possible terrorist activity."1332 

(TS/^^^^^^^Hp/NF ) Eight days after the CIA was informed that U.S. citizen Jose 

Padilla was engaged in "possible terrorist activity," on the evening of April 20, 2002, Abu 

Zubaydah told FBI special agents about two men who approached him with a plan to detonate a 

uranium-based explosive device in the United States (the "dirty bomb"). Abu Zubaydah stated 

he did not believe the plan was viable and did not know the true names of the two individuals, 

but did provide physical descriptions of the pair.1333 This information was acquired after Abu 

Zubaydah was confronted with emails that indicated Abu Zubaydah had sent two individuals to 

KSM.1334 The FBI special agents who acquired this information from Abu Zubaydah believed it 

was provided as a result of rapport-building interrogation techniques.1335 Abu Zubaydah would 

mfl See DIRECTOR (162003Z FEB 03), which details a follow-up exchange between | 

personnel and Pakistani officials. 

1329

 10972 (12031Z APR 02); •• • 10976 (12094SZ APR 02) 

1330

 There were no records identified to indicate that the CIA informed the FBI at this time that U.S. citizen "Jose 

Padilla" was engaged in "possible terrorist activity." As described in Volume II, once alerted, the FBI identified 

links between Jose Padilla and FBI counterterrorism subjects, including an individual who reportedly paid for Jose 

Padilla's travel to Pakistan to attend a terrorist training camp. 

110972 (12031Z APR 02); 10976 (120948Z APR 02) 

110976 (I20948Z APR 02). See additional reporting in the Volume II intelligence chronolog 

1333

 Abu Zubaydah provided the names of the individuals as Talha al-Kini and Abdallah al-Muhajir (| 

10090 (210703Z APR 02)). 

110063 (180515Z APR 02); 10096 (221545Z 

APR 02) 

1335 See FBI communications to FBI Headquarters in April 2002, as well as May 13, 2009, Senate Judiciary 

Committee testimony of FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan on the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. In the CIA's June 

2013 Response, die CIA states the CIA's representation that Abu Zubaydah provided the information after the "use 

of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques" was accurate because, "Abu Zubaydah revealed this 

information after having been subjected to sleep deprivation, which would be categorized as an enhanced 

interrogation technique once the program was officially underway." As described in detail in the Abu Zubaydah 

detainee review in Volume III, when Abu Zubaydah was discharged from a hospital in Country the CIA sought to 

deprive Abu Zubaydah of sleep and to cease Abu Zubaydah's interaction with the FBI special agents who had been 

interviewing Abu Zubaydah and acquiring information from him at the hospital. Days later, after this new CIA 

approach was implemented, the CIA reversed this decision and the FBI was allowed to question Abu Zubaydah 

again. Further, the use of sleep deprivation during this period differed from future uses of sleep deprivation and had 

ceased by the time of the referenced FBI interview, as the CIA had determined diat Abu Zubaydah's ability to focus 

onquestions and provide coherent answers appeared compromised. (See 10071 (190827Z APR 02) and 

• • H 10116 (250731Z APR 02).) Ali Soufan testified that Abu Zubaydah provided information about the 

"Dirty Bomb" plot only after he (Soufan) re-initiated a more traditional interrogation approach with Abu Zubaydah, 

stating, "We then returned to using the Informed Interrogation Approach. Within a few hours, Abu Zubaydah again 

IIII M III I ^MMMBB^BB I i MI inn i 

Page 234 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

234 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

not be subjected to the "use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques" until August 

2002, more than three months later.1336 

two hours of the dissemination of this information, CIA 

officenTmi^^^Biim^ l sent cables to CIA Headquarters and select CIA Stations 

calling attention to thc similarities between Abu Zubaydah's reporting and their request from 

April 12, 2002, for information on Jose Padilla and Fouad Zouaoui, which had not yet been acted 

upon by the receiving offices.1337 A travel alert was then initiated for Jose Padilla based on the 

previous information provided by the Pakistani government. Padilla was located and 

unknowingly escorted back to the United States by an FBI special agent on May 8, 2002,1338 

Upon his arrival in the United States Padilla was found to be carrying $10,526 in U.S. currency, 

an amount he failed to report.1339 Padilla was interviewed and taken into FBI custody on a 

started talking and gave us important actionable intelligence. This included the details of Jose Padilla, the so-called 

'dirty bomber.'" (See Senate Judiciary Testimony, transcript at: 

http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=38428wit_id=7906.) The assertion in the CIA's June 2013 

Response is incongruent with additional CIA records. See senior CIA analyst comments on the draft CIA Inspector 

General Special Review from February 10, 2004, stating: "Padilla and the dirty bomb plot was prior to enhanced and 

he never really gave us actionable intel to get them"; CIA draft response to Committee Questions for the Record 

concerning an OLC memorandum suggesting that information on Jose Padilla was acquirecHrom Abu Zubaydaji 

after enhanced interrogation techniques, with the CIA response stating that the CIA's Legal 

^ • l simply inadvertently reported this wrong. Abu Zubaydah provided information on Jose Padilla while 

being interrogated by the FBI 10091)"; CIA testimony from CIA Director Hayden on April 12, 2007, 

stating, "In August 2002, CIA began using these few and lawful interrogation techniques in the interrogation of Abu 

Zubaydah"; and the CIA-vetted speech by President Bush on September 6, 2006. See also SSCI Staff interview of 

FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan, April 28, 2008, at 1:20 PM, Hart Senate Office Building (Ali Soufan: "So we went 

back. And we start talking to him. We took some Coke, tea, and we start talking about different things. We flipped 

him about different things, H and I and [REDACTED]. And then he came back to his senses and he started 

cooperating again. And this is when lie gave us Padilla.") (DTS #2008-2411). 

1336 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III that details how, after Department of Justice approval in 

August 2002, die CIA began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah on August 4, 

2002, including the waterboard. See also^^JKM 10644 (201235Z AUG 02); and email from: [REDACTED]; 

to: ^^Hijl^ i

 an d

 [REDACTED]; subject: "Re: So it begins"; date: August 4, 2002, at 09:45 AM. 

1137 ^HH^036(220348 Z APR 02). See also ALEC • • (220238Z APR 02); 11041 (220802Z 

APR02)Tandl|HB I 11042(220921Z APR02). 

1338

 Among other documents, see letter from the CIA addressed to SSCI Staff Director Al Cumming, dated June 24, 

2002, and entitled, "Arrest of Jose Padilla." After being detained in Pakistan, Binyam Mohammad was rendered by 

the CIA July 2002, where he was held^^^^HH l government. On January 

2004, Binyam Mohammad was transferred to CIA custody 1 

••••• l 630 

1339

 Fax from Pat Rowan, Department of Justice National Security Division to [REDACTED], at CTC Legal, on 

August 15, 2007 with subject line: "Jose Padilla," includes a Department of Justice memorandum that is based 

primarily on 29 lIRs of the joint FBI-military interrogations of Padilla disseminated from May 5, 2003, to July 9, 

2003, a FBI document "Jose Padilla Debrief Summary, August 29, 2003," the FBI's 302s on Padilla (5/8/02) and 

Binyam Muhammad (6/4/02), an FBI EC on Padilla (5/14/02); a CIA Statement Summarizin^ignificant 

Information about Jose Padilla of 8 June 02 ['CIA Summary']; a D1A Info Memo from HBH H (11/13/03); and 

an FBI LHM "Jose Padilla Debrief Status" (11/11/03). See also SSCI Transcript "Detention of Jose Padilla," dated 

June 12, 2002 (DTS #2002-2603). 

m i 11 in i i "in i 

Page 235 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

235 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/M^^^BBB^^^B/^ofor n 

material witness warrant.1340 The exploitation of Jose Padilla's pocket litter1341 and phone 

revealed significant connections to known terrorists, including subjects of FBI terrorism 

investigations in the United States.1342 

In separate debriefings, Padilla and his associate, Binyam 

Mohammed, maintained they had no intention of engaging in terrorist plotting, but proposed the 

"Dirty Bomb" plot in order to depart Pakistan, avoid combat in Afghanistan, and return 

home.1343 

(IS^BII^B^ ) Over several years CIA officers identified errors in the CIA's 

representations concerning the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in 

relation to the Abu Zubaydah reporting pertaining to Jose Padilla and Padilla's alleged plotting. 

Ir^sponse to one such representation, the chief of the Abu Zubaydah Task Force wrote to Bf 

^^Hcr c Legal in 2002 that "AZ's info alone would never have allowed us to find [Jose 

Padilla and Binyam Mohammed]."1344 In 2004, she sought to correct inaccurate CIA 

representations again, telling colleagues: 

1340

 CIA Notification, "Arrest of Jose Padilla," dated June 24,2002 (DTS #2002-2866); WHDC • • (242226Z 

MAR 03). Discusses information obtained by FBI officials on March 20, 2003, and SSCI Transcript "Staff Briefing 

by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the Detention of Jose Padilla," dated June 11, 2002 (DTS #2002-2598). 

1341

 Pocket litter refers to material acquired on a person upon a search and may include notes, identification cards, 

tickets, phone numbers, computer tiles, photographs, or any other material in the person's possession. 

1342 See CIA Document, Subject "CIA Statemen^ummarizim^jignificant Information About Jose Padilla (21:10 

hrs.- 8 June 02}," email from [REDACTED] to August 2, 2002, at 3:54:17 PM, with the 

subject line: "Re: Padilla's travel history," and fax from Pat Rowan, Department of Justice National Security 

Division to [REDACTED], at CIA CTC Legal, on August 15, 2007, with subject line: "Jose Padilla." The fax 

includes a Department of Justice memorandum that is based primarily on 29 IJRs of the joint FBI-military 

interrogations of Padilla disseminated from May 5, 2003, to July 9, 2003, a FBI document "Jose Padilla Debrief 

Summary, August 29, 2003," the FBI's 302s on Padilla (5/8/02) and Binyam Muhammad (6/4/02), an FBI EC on 

Padilla (5/14/02); a CIA Statement Summarizing Significant Information about Jose Padilla of 8 June 02 ['CIA 

Summary']; a DIA Info Memo from BHH l U l/l 3/03); and an FBI LHM "Jose Padilla Debrief Status" 

(11/11/03). See also SSCI transcript "Detention of Jose Padilla," dated June 12,2002 (DTS #2002-2603), in which 

the CIA informs the SSCI that, based on his address book confiscated in ^^^^^B . Padilla "did have connections 

to Islamic extremists, both within the United States and outside the U.S." 

1343 See Department of Justice memorandum referenced in chronology in Volume II that is based primarily on 29 

IIRs of the joint FBI-military interrogations of Padilla disseminated from May 5, 2003, to July 9,2003; a FBI 

document "Jose Padilla Debrief Summary, August 29, 2003," the FBI's 302s on Padilla (5/8/02) and Binyam 

Muhammad (6/4/02), an FBI EC on Padilla (5/14/02); a CIA Statement Summarizing Significant Information about 

Jose Padilla of 8 June 02 ['CIA Summary']; a DIA Info Memo fromBBHH I (11/13/03); and an FBI LHM "Jose 

Padilla Debrief Status" (11/11/03). ^^^^^^ ^ 

1344 See CIA memorandum from: ^^I^^I^^H ; to: subject: "AZ information"; date: 

Jul^0^2002, at 01:18:50 PM. See also February 10, 2004, emailfom^^HB^IBB

 to:

 BB IBBBi:

 cc :

 [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], ^^^^^^^Bjohnl^tudd , [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ••Bl ; subject: Please 

Read - Re CTC Response to the Draft IG Report; date: February 10, 2004. In a SSCI transcript dated June 12, 

2002, entitled, "Detention of Jose Padilla" (DTS #2002-2603), the CIA acknowledged it had information on Jose 

Padilla prior to reporting from Abu Zubaydah. A CIA officer stated: "the Pakistani liaison felt it was important to 

bring [Padilla] to our attention, given the recent raids...there was enough information indicating that his travel was 

suspicious, to put us on alert. This suspicion was enhanced during the debriefings of Abu Zubaydah, which 

occurred on 21 April." This is the only known CIA representation that did not fully attribute information on Jose 

Padilla to CIA interrogations. 

11II I I III I ^^BHB^B^^^^B'VNOLOH M 

Page 236 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

236 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

"AZ never really gave 'this is the plot' type of information. He claimed every 

plot/operation he had knowledge of and/or was working on was only 

preliminary. (Padilla and the dirty bomb plot was prior to enhanced and he 

never really gave us actionable intel to get them)."1345 

( i) In October 2005, the chief of CTC's CBRN (Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear) Group wrote, under the heading, "Don't Put All Your 

Uranium in One Bucket": 

"Jose Padilla: we'll never be able to successfully expunge Padilla and the 

'dirty bomb' plot from the lore of disruption, but once again I'd like to go on 

the record that Padilla admitted that the only reason he came up with so-called 

'dirty bomb' was that he wanted to get out of Afghanistan and figured that if 

he came up with something spectacular, they'd finance him. Even KSM says 

Padilla had a screw loose. He's a petty criminal who is well-versed in US 

criminal justice (he's got a rap sheet as long as my arm). Anyone who believes 

you can build an IND or RDD by 'putting uranium in buckets and spinning 

them clockwise over your head to separate the uranium' is not going to 

advance al-Qa'ida's nuclear capabilities."1346 

(TS^HH^NF ) CIA and other U.S. government assessments also called into 

question the "Tall Buildings" plotting, which was loosely based on attacks that were conducted 

in Moscow in September 1999 using conventional explosives. The "Tall Buildings" plotting did 

not envision the use of conventional explosives.1347 Instead, the plotting envisioned using 

natural gas to destroy high-rise residential buildings. As planned, the Intelligence Community 

assessed the plotting was not viable.1348 An August 4, 2008, U.S. government assessment stated: 

"On the surface, the idea is simplistic, if not amateurish... the probability of an efficient fuel air 

explosion is low."1349 

Jose Padilla was detained on a material witness warrant from May 

8, 2002, to June 9, 2002, when he was transferred to U.S. military custody and designated an 

"enemy combatant." On January 3, 2006, Jose Padilla was transferred to U.S. law enforcement 

,34S

 Email from:HHMp ; to: •••••H ; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], ^^^^^^•^ohnRMudd ^ [RED ACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez, 

[REDACTED], [REDACTElTTl^^^^^H ; subject: Please Read - Re CTC Response to the Draft IG 

Report; date: February 10, 2004. 

1346 See email from: [REDACTED] C/CTC/OTA/CBRNG/RNTB; to: multiple recipients; subject: "Re: Urgent: 

Unclassified Fact Sheet for David Shedd"; date: October 6,2005, at 04:35 PM. 

1347 See additional details in Volume II. 

1348 See Intelligence Community review of the Tall Buildings plotting included in CIA records with references to 

terrorist attacks in Russia in September 1999 against apartment buildings using traditional explosives and VBIEDs. 

1349 See Intelligence Community review of the Tall Buildings plotting included in CIA records with references to 

terrorist attacks in Russia in September 1999 against apartment buildings using traditional explosives and VBIEDs. 

See also U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives report entitled, "Use of 

Natural Gas as a Terrorist Weapon in Apartment Buildings," dated August 4, 2008. The latter document states that: 

"If the idea of the plot is to cause death and destruction on the same scale as had occurred in Russia, then Padilla's 

methodology comes into question. The probability of causing this magnitude of death and destruction using natural 

gas [versus conventional explosives] wouf " 

TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN 

Page 237 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

237 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

custody and tried in federal court. On August 16, 2007, Jose Padilla and two co-defendants, 

Adham Hassoun and Kifah Jayyousi, were found guilty of three criminal offenses relating to 

terrorist support activities from October 1993 to November 1, 2001.1350 The case against Jose 

Padilla centered on his attendance at a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan in the fall of 

2000—specifically, the terrorist training camp application form acquired by the CIA and 

provided to the FBI in December 2001. The form was found to have Jose Padilla's fingerprints, 

as well as identifying data to include his date of birth, languages spoken, and travels.1351 On 

January 22, 2008, Jose Padilla was sentenced to 17 years in prison. On September 19, 2011, the 

U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the sentence was too lenient in part because it did not 

take in account Jose Padilla's prior criminal offenses,1352 

(TS^^^^^^^^^^B^NF ) After being detained in Pakistan, Jose Padilla's associate Binyam 

Mohammad was rendered by the CTaMB^^I o n July fl< 2002, where he was held by the 

government. On January 2004, Binyam Mohammad was rendered to CIA 

custody.1353 On May 2004, Binyam Mohammad was transferred to the custody of the U.S. 

military in Bagram, Afghanistan.1354 On September 21, 2004, he was transferred to Guantanamo 

Bay, Cuba.1355 Binyam Mohammad was then transferred from U.S. military custody to the 

United Kingdom on February 2009. 

l^^^mi^l^^^l. 135 6 Lawyers representing Binyam Mohammad sued the government 

of the United Kingdom to compel the release of documents relating to his whereabouts and 

treatment after his initial detention in April 2002.1357 In February 2010, a British court 

compelled the release "of a summary of the torture" to which Binyam Mohammed was subjected 

1350

 ALEC 

from 2001, 

May 17, 2002), with references to FBI WASH and CIA reporting 

[. Upon Jose Padilla's arrest, Padilla was found to be in possession of the phone 

number of Adham Hassoun, | 

|; and providing material support to terrorists. U.S. prosecutors focused on more 

than 70 intercepted phone calls between the defendants during the 1990s, but provided no information at the trial 

related to plotting in the United States. See U.S. District Criminal Court Docket, Florida Southern, for defendants, 

including Jose Padilla, as well as open source news reports, including "Without a plot, is Padilla guilty?," Christian 

Science Monitor, dated July 19, 2007; and "The others on trial in Padilla case," Christicui Science Monitor»dated 

May 29, 2007. 

1351

 An Assistant U.S. Attorney involved in the prosecution stated, "The narrative is fairly clear that Padilla was 

recruited to go overseas to participate in jihad." See U.S. District Criminal Court Docket, Florida Southern, for 

defendants, including Jose Padilla, as well as open source news reports, including "Without a plot, is Padilla 

guilty?," Christian Science Monitor, dated July 19, 2007; and 'The others on trial in Padilla case," Christian Science 

Monitor, dated May 29,2007. 

1352 See open sources, to include press articles such as, "Court Says Padilla Prison Sentence Too Lenient," Reuters, 

dated September 19,2011. 

1353 

1334 ^ 

1355

 ^^^^^^^^•1252 0 (281655Z SEP 04) 

1356

 Terrorism Watch, March 10, 2009, Guantanamo Detainee 's Torture Claims Could Impact Bilateral Relationship 

with UK. 

13,7

 [REDACTED] 3174 (311725Z JUL 08) 

11 ii 1111 1 i i m II 

Page 238 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

238 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

during his detention. In the fall of 2010, the British government awarded Binyam Mohammed a 

reported £1 million in compensation.1358 

2. The Thwarting of the Karachi Plots 

(TS/Z ^^^H^m ^NF ) Summary: The CIA represented that its enhanced interrogation 

techniques were effective and necessary to produce critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence, 

which enabled the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture terrorists, and save lives. Over a period 

of years, the CIA provided the thwarting of the Karachi Plot(s) as evidence for the effectiveness 

of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. These CIA representations were inaccurate. 

The Karachi Plot(s) was disrupted with the confiscation of explosives and the arrests of Ammar 

al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash in April 2003. The operation and arrests were conducted 

unilaterally by Pakistani authorities and were unrelated to any reporting from the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program. 

further Details: The Karachi Plot(s) refers to terrorist plotting that 

targeted a variety of U.S. and Western interests in the Karachi area, to include the U.S. 

Consulate, named hotels near the airport and beach, U.S. vehicles traveling between the 

Consulate and the airport, U.S. diplomatic housing, U.S. personnel subject to potential sniper 

attacks, as well as Pakistan's Faisal Army Base.1359 CIA records indicate the CIA became aware 

of the initial plotting as early as September 2002, and that it was disrupted in April 2003, when 

the remaining plot leaders were arrested in a unilateral operation by Pakistani authorities.1360 

While the plot leaders were captured in the process of procuring explosives, they maintained that 

they were still in the process of locating vehicles, a safe house, and suicide operatives at the time 

of their arrest.1361 

The thwarting of the Karachi Plot(s) is one of the eight most 

frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques.1362 Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and 

provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent 

the Karachi Plot(s) as an example of how "fk]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations 

after applying interrogation techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots" and capture 

1358

 Among other open sources, see "Compensation to Guantanamo detainees 'was necessary,"' BBC News UK, 

November 16, 2010. 

1359 See intelligence chronology in Volume II and 11454 (3017102Z APR 03). 

33804 (190956ZSEP02); [REDACTED] 34513 (052246ZMAR03);4502 8 

J; DIRECTOR B E 

1361 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including DIRECTOR MAY 03) and DIRECTOR 

IHfl i MAY 

1362

 The Karachi terrorist plots encompassed a variety of potential targets in the Karachi area associated with U.S. 

and Western interests. Although the plotting involved multiple targets, the plotting is most often referred to as the 

"Karachi Plot." 

11 II 1111 1 I II II I II I 

Page 239 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

239 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

additional terrorists.1363 The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "otherwise unavailable" and "saved lives."1364 

1363

 Italics included in CIA Memorandum to the Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA 

Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," from March 2, 2005. See also CIA talking points for National Security 

Council entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee 

Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques," dated March 4, 2005. 

1364 Fro m 2003 through 2009, the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that 

the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA 

representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see\ 

(1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, 

which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. The CIA representations referenced by the 

OLC include that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical," 

"vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect 

and disrupt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that 

the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United 

States." (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from 

Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: 

Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques 

that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the 

Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA 

representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

Citing CIA documents and the President's September 6, 2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation program 

(which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: "The CIA interrogation program— 

and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security 

of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As the President 

explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, 

the program has saved innocent lives.'" (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central 

Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 

Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 

of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value 

al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003 

represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence 

information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives," and warned policymakers that "[t]ermination of 

this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from 

Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation 

Program, July 29, 2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and 

September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The 

CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: 

"Information [the CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has 

almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to 

the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks 

involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, 

Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention 

and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: Februaty 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum 

re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA 

Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the 

[enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of 

the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other 

means." (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid 

Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," including * " la, CIA document "EITs and 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 240 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

240 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

For example, in November 2007, the CIA prepared and provided a 

set of talking points to the CIA director for an "upcoming meeting with the President regarding 

the Waterboard Enhanced Interrogation Technique."1365 The document includes a section 

entitled, "Plots Discovered as a Result of EITs," which states "reporting statistics alone will not 

provide a fair and accurate measure of the effectiveness of EITs." The document then provides a 

list of "Key Intelligence Derived through use of EITs," stating: 

"CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a 

comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist 

plots... The following are examples of key intelligence collected from CIA 

detainee interrogations after applying the waterboard along with other 

interrogation techniques: ...The Karachi Plot: This plan to conduct attacks 

against the US Consulate and other US interests in Pakistan was uncovered 

during the initial interrogations of Khallad Bin Attash and Ammar al-Baluchi 

and later confirmed by KSM."1366 

(TS/y^^l^^m^/NF ) Likewise, a CIA-prepared briefing for Vice President Cheney on 

die CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in March 2005, under a section of the briefing 

called, "INTERROGATION RESULTS," asserts: 

"Use of DOJ-authorized enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a 

comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled us to disrupt terrorist plots, 

capture additional terrorists.. .The Karachi Plot: Plan to conduct attacks 

against the US Consulate and other US interests in Pakistan. Plot disrupted. 

Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," 

"Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background 

on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 

March 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258, 

which provides a list of "some of tire key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence 

acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means." See 

Volume II for additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the 

CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives." 

1365

 On September 17, 2007, President Bush nominated Judge Michael Mukasey to be Attorney General of the 

United States. In October 2007, at his confirmation hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Mukasey 

declined to say whether he believed waterboarding as an interrogation technique was unlawful. On October 30, 

2007, Mukasey responded to written questions from the Senate Judiciary Committee on the issue of waterboarding, 

stating: "As described in your letter, these techniques seem over the line or, on a personal basis, repugnant to me, 

and would probably seem the same to many Americans. But hypothetical are different from real life, and in any 

legal opinion the actual facts and circumstances are critical." (See October 30, 2007, Letter from Michael B. 

Mukasey, to Senators Patrick J. Leahy, Edward M. Kennedy, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Herb Kohl, Dianne Feinstein, 

Russell D. Feingold, Charles E. Schumer, Richard J. Durbin, Benjamin L. Cardin, and Sheldon Whitehouse.) On 

November 6, 2007, days prior to a Senate vote to confirm Mukasey, the CIA provided a set of talking points to the 

CIA director for use with the President in a meeting about the CIA's use of the waterboard interrogation technique. 

See document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, with the 

notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." 

1366

 Italics added. See document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 

6, 2007, with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." 

IIII 11 III I B^^BMMM M I MI HIM I 

Page 241 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

241 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I //NOFOR N 

Sources: Khallad Bin Attash, Ammar al-Baluchi. KSM also provided info on 

the plot after we showed him capture photos of Ammar and Khallad."1367 

(TS/^^^^HI^^I^NF ) The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the 

thwarting of the Karachi Plot(s) in 17 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and the 

Department of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009.1368 

A review of CIA operational cables and other documents found 

that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—to include the waterboard—played no role in 

the disruption of the Karachi Plot(s). CIA records indicate that the Karachi Plot(s) was thwarted 

by the arrest of operatives and the interdiction of explosives by Pakistani authorities, specifically 

1369 

(^FS/JIH^^^^^B/ZNE) The CIA had information regarding the Karachi terrorist plotting as 

early as September 11, 2QQ2.1370 On that day, a raid conducted b> 

Pakistani °f

 a n

 al-Qaida safe 

in Karachi, Pakistan, uncovered the "perfume letter," named as such because the term 

"perfumes" is used as a code word. The letter, written in May 2002, was from KSM to Hamza 

al-Zubayr, a known al-Qa'ida member who was killed in the raids.1371 KSM's letter to al-Zubayr 

states, "Dear Brother, we have the green light for the hotels," and suggests "making it three 

instead of one."1372 By early October 2002, the CIA had completed a search of the names 

identified in the "perfume letter" in its databases and found many of the individuals who "had 

assigned roles in support of the operation" were arrested by Pakistani authorities during the 

l3fi7

 Italics added. CIA briefing for Vice President Cheney, dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice 

President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program." 

1368 See list of CIA prepared briefings and memoranda from 2003 through 2009 with representations on the 

effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques referenced in this summary and described in detail in 

Volume II. 

1369 45028

 an d

 DIRECTOR The CIA's June 2013 

Response concedes that the CIA "mischaracterized the impact of the reporting [the CIA] acquired from detainees on 

the Karachi plots," and acknowledges that the Karachi plotting was "thwarted by the arrest of the operatives and the 

interdiction of explosives by [Pakistani authorities]." The CIA does not dispute that Pakistani authorities arrested 

Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash independently, and that information from the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program played no role in die arrests. The CIA's June 2013 Response states, however, that CIA 

detainee reporting "revealed ongoing attack plotting against the US official presence in Karachi that prompted the 

Consulate to take further steps to protect its officers." This statement is incongruent with CIA records. In response 

to the reporting cited by the CIA, CIA personnel in Karachi wrote: "[wjhile reporting from both [al-Baluchi and bin 

Attash] was chilling- [CIA officers] had become aware of most of this reporting either through previous information 

or through interviews of al-Baluchi and [Khallad bin] Attash prior to their transfer out of Karachi." The CIA 

personnel in Karachi further reassured addressees that, in December 2002, the U.S. Consulate in Karachi took 

increased steps to protect U.S. Consulate personnel. See Volume II for additional information. 

1370 po r detailed information, see Volume II. 

1371

 ALEC • • (032142Z OCT 02) 

12535 (050557Z OCT 02); 11050 (101207Z OCT 02)J 

Page 242 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

242 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET// 1/7NOFOKN 

raids.1373 At least one person in the letter, Khallad bin Attash, a known al-Qa'ida operative, 

remained at large.1374 

What remained of the Karachi plotting was disrupted unilaterally 

by Pakistani authorities as a result of a criminal lead. On April 2003, Pakistani authorities, 

specifically H^H^I^^^HH K received a report that explosives and weapons were to 

be transported in a pickup truck to a specific location in Karachi.1375 Pakistani authorities made 

arrangements to intercede, and, on April 29, 2003, they intercepted the vehicle and confiscated 

explosives, detonators, and ammunition. The driver of the vehicle provided the location where 

the explosives were being delivered, leading to the capture of several operatives, including 

Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash, as well as to the discovery of another explosives 

cache. A third captured individual stated that the explosives had belonged to Hamza al-Zubayr, 

the known and now deceased al-Qa'ida operative, as well as others residing in the home raided 

on September 11, 2002, where the "perfume letter" was discovered.1376 

While being arrested, Ammar al-Baluchi was asked by a Pakistani 

officer about his intentions regarding the seized explosives. Al-Baluchi responded that he was 

planning to attack the U.S. Consulate in Karachi.1377 In foreign government custody—and prior 

to being rendered to CIA custody and subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques—Ammar al-Baluchi continued to provide information about the Karachi plotting to a 

foreign government officer who was using rapport-building interrogation techniques.1378 The 

information provided by Ammar al-Baluchi on the plotting included the surveillance conducted, 

the envisioned targets, and the exact method of attack that was considered for the U.S. Consulate 

in Karachi and other hard targets. Ammar al-Baluchi discussed the use of a motorcycle with a 

bomb to breach the perimeter wall of the consulate and then how the operatives would seek to 

exploit that breach with a vehicle filled with explosives.1379 Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin 

1373

 ALEC (0302054Z OCT 02). See also CIA paper dated January 11, 2002, entitled, "Threat Threads: 

Most 11 September Plotters Still Under the Radar." 

1374

 ALEC (0302054Z OCT 02). See also CIA paper dated January ] 1, 2002, entitled, "Threat Threads: 

MostUSeptember Plotter^til^nder the Radar." 

1375

 CIA records indicate the interdiction was the result of criminal leads and was 

unrelated to any reporting from CIA detainees. 

See DIRECTOR I 

1376 I 145028 DIRECTOR The CIA's June 2013 

Response maintains that KSM's reporting on die thwarted "perfume letter" plotting was separate from the "plots 

disrupted with the arrest and interrogation of Ammar and Khallad." Because CIA records did not make this 

distinction, and the fact that the operations, to at least some extent, shared targets, operatives, and the same set of 

explosives, the operations are linked in this Study. 

45028 DIRECTOR I 1377 1 

,378

 Given the threat to U.S. interests, CIA officers sought to participate in the interrogations. A May 2, 2003, CIA 

cable 4291) states that, because of Ammar al-Baluchi's "strong reticence towards the U.S.," CIA 

officers were observing the foreign government interrogations of Ammar al-Baluchi via video feed. The cable notes 

that a foreign government officer who had developed rapport with Ammar al-Baluchi was conducdng all the 

questioning and obtaining intelligence from Ammar al-Baluchi on the plotting against U.S. interests in Pakistan, as 

well as other matters. 

1379

 The CIA's June 2013 Response claims that "Ammar and Khallad provided new information on other attack 

plans in Karachi after entering CIA custody and undergoing enhanced interrogation techniques," and that "[d]uring 

his first interrogation in CIA custody and after enhanced techniques commenced, [Ammar] revealed diat the plan 

11II 1111 1 MMI^^^ M MI I II 

Page 243 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

243 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

Attash remained in foreign government custody for approximately H weeks, with Ammar alBaluchi—and to a lesser extent bin Attash1380—responding to questions on a variety of matters, 

including the Karachi plotting.1381 

(TS/iflH^^^I^^/NF ) On May 2003, Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash were 

rendered to CIA custody and immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques.1382 The next day, the CIA disseminated two intelligence reports on the Karachi 

Plot(s) from the interrogations of Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash.1383 The reporting 

relayed that: (1) al-Qa'ida was targeting Western interests in Karachi, including the U.S. 

Consulate and Western housing in a specific neighborhood of Karachi; and (2) the attack could 

have occurred as early as "late May/early June 2003," but the plotters were still in the process of 

finding vehicles, a safe house, and the suicide operatives at the time of their arrest.1384 These 

disseminated intelligence reports were used to support CIA representations in finished 

intelligence products,1385 talking points, briefing documents, and President Bash's September 6, 

was to use a motorcycle bomb and a car bomb in a single, coordinated attack at the end of May or early June, and he 

pointed to the location on the Consulate's perimeter wall where the attack would occur." The information in the 

CIA's June 2013 Response is inaccurate. Ammar al-Baluchi provided the referenced information while in foreign 

government custody, prior to entering CIA custody and being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques. G i venthethreat to U.S. interests, CIA officers sought to participate in the interrogations. A May 2, 

2003, CIA cable 14291) states that, because of Ammar al-Baluchi's "strong reticence towards the 

U.S.," CIA officers were observing the foreign government interrogations of Ammar al-Baluchi via video feed. The 

cable notes that a foreign government officer who had developed rapport with Ammar al-Baluchi was conducting all 

the questioning and obtaining intelligence from Ammar al-Baluchi. This included information about the 

motorcycle-car bomb plotting against the U.S. Consulate, as well as information on plans to potentially target 

Westerners in a specific housing area in Karachi. According to the information obtained, surveillance by the plotters 

"had confirmed a U.S. presence significant enough to warrant such an attack." Ammar al-Baluchi further stated that 

he had considered caijacking a U.S. Consulate vehicle and loading it with explosives to target the Consulate, and 

elaborated on the initial idea to attack the U.S. Consulate with a helicopter, stating that he did not follow through 

with this idea because he believed it would take too long to train an operative for that type of attack (see 

14291, May 2, 2003). Later, the foreign government officer described Ammar al-Baluchi as "more chatty" than 

Khallad bin Attash, and detailed how, while in foreign government custody Ammar al-Baluchi "acknowledged plans 

to attack U.S. Consulate officials at the airport, the Consul General's Residence and the Consulate itself." The 

foreign government officer explained that "both the Consulate and the CG's residence" required a "tiered attack of 

successive car bombs which would breach the perimeter" of the targets. The foreign government officer also stated 

that, based on Ammar al-Baluchi's comments on his casing efforts, it was inferred that Ammar al-Baluchi had 

sought to target Americans at their residences in specific areas of Karachi. See 19647 ^^^^^AP R 

04). ^^^^^^^ ^ 

Records indicate that Khallad bin Attash was less cooperative (Ammar 

al-Baluchi was described as "more chatty"), but nonetheless provided information in foreign government custody on 

the surveillance he conducte^gainst United States government vehicles in Karachi, among other information. 

1381

 ^•^^•4502 8 (•••AP R 03); DIRECTOR ^^•••AP R 03); •••I1429 1 (May 2, 

19647 04). CIA records indicate that Ammar al-Baluchi was providing 

significant information to the foreign government officer conducting the questioning who had developed rapport 

with Ammar al-Baluchi. 

1382

 [REDACTED] 38325 ; [REDACTED] 38389 

1383

 DIRECTOR ^^ M (^^•MAY03) ; DIRECTOR • • (^^•MAYCB ) 

1384

 DIRECTOR H i MAY 03); DIRECTOR MAY 03). DIRECTOR • • noted 

that Khallad bin Attash indicated that they had identified one suicide operative so far. 

1385 See CIA speech validation efforts for the President's September 6, 2006, speech acknowledging the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program. In the speech, President Bush stated that "Terrorists held in CIA custody... 

helped stop a planned attack on the U.S. consulate in Karachi using car bombs and motorcycle bombs." See also, 

Page 244 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

244 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

2006, speech that the Karachi Plot(s) was "thwarted," "disrupted," or "uncovered" as a result of 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. However, within 24 hours of the dissemination of 

these intelligence reports, CIA personnel in Karachi responded in an official cable that the 

information acquired from the CIA detainees and disseminated was already known to the CIA 

and U.S. Consulate officials. The cable stated: 

"[w]hile reporting from both [al-Baluchi and bin Attash] was chilling- [CIA 

officers] had become aware of most of this reporting either through previous 

information or through interviews of al-Baluchi and [Khallad bin] Attash prior 

to their transfer out of Karachi."1386 

CIA personnel in Karachi reassured addressees that, in 

the U.S. Consulate in Karachi took increased steps to 

protect U.S. Consulate personnel based on similar terrorist threat reporting. According to the 

cable, Americans in the referenced housing area had already been vacated from the "area for 

several months," the potential for "attacks targeting Americans at the airport" had been 

"recognized several months ago," and new procedures and security measures had been put in 

place to minimize the risks associated with the potential terrorist attacks.1387 

(TS/T^^^^I^^H^NF ) As noted, in November 2007, the CIA prepared and provided a set 

of talking points to the CIA director for an "upcoming meeting with the President regarding the 

Waterboard Enhanced Interrogation Technique." Under a section entitled, "Plots Discovered as 

a Result of EITs," the document lists the "Karachi Plot," stating the disruption was the result of 

"key intelligence collected from CIA detainee interrogations after applying the waterboard along 

with other interrogation techniques," and that the plotting was "uncovered during the initial 

interrogations of Khallad Bin Attash and Ammar al-Baluchi and later confirmed by KSM."1388 

While Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash were subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, there are no CIA records to indicate that either was ever subjected to 

the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique. KSM did provide information on the plotting, but 

was assessed by CIA personnel to be withholding information on the plotting, more than a month 

after the CIA stopped using its enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM. In late April 

2003, CIA interrogators confronted KSM with photographs demonstrating that Ammar alamong other documents, the June 2005 CIA Intelligence Assessment entitled, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the 

War Against Al-Qa'ida." CIA records indicate this document was provided to White House officials on June 1, 

2005. A slightly modified version of this Intelligence Assessment was broadly disseminated within the Intelligence 

Community on June 3, 2005. On March 31, 2009, former Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of 

this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released with redactions on August 24,2009. The assessment 

represents that "detainee reporting" resulted in the "[r]evealing of the Karachi Plots," stating: "When confronted 

with information provided by Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad admitted during debriefings that al-Qa'ida was planning 

to attack the US Consulate in Karachi, Westerners at the Karachi Airport, and Western housing areas." The footnote 

for this claim cites the May 2003, disseminated intelligence report detailingth^dmissioi^nade by Khallad bin 

Attash while being subjected to the CIA's enhanced inteirogation techniques (BBII^^B ) as its source. 

I38G 14510 This cable also stated, "As noted in several previous cables, in 

December 2002 ^^BConsulate became aware of the threat to Consulate officials." 

1387

 Hi m 14510 

1388

 Italics added. See document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 

6, 2007, with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." 

11 ii 11 i i i " i i II 

Page 245 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

245 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash had been captured. When the CIA interrogators asked what 

Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash were "up to" in Karachi, KSM provided information 

regarding potential targets in Karachi.1389 KSM's belated reporting prompted the CIA's ALEC 

Station to write a cable stating: 

"We were disappointed to see that KSM only made these new admissions of 

planned attacks in Pakistan after seeing the capture photographs of Ammar alBaluchi and Khallad. We consider KSM's long-standing omission of [this] 

information to be a serious concern, especially as this omission may well have 

cost American lives had Pakistani authorities not been diligent in following up 

on unrelated criminal leads that led to the capture of Ammar, bin Attash, and 

other probable operatives involved in the attack plans... Simply put, KSM has 

had every opportunity to come clean on this threat and, from our optic, he 

deliberately withheld the information until he was confronted with evidence 

that we already knew about it, or soon would know about it from Ammar and 

Khallad... KSM's provision of the Pakistan threat reporting - only after he 

was made aware of the capture of the attack planners - is viewed as a clear 

illustration of continued and deliberate withholding of threat information 

which he believed had not yet been compromised."

 1390 

( T S / I ^^^ H ^ W F ) Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad bin Attash, and KSM remained in CIA 

custody until their transfer to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in September 

2006.1391 All three remain in U.S. military custody. 

3. The Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group 

Summary: The CIA represented that its enhanced interrogation 

techniques were effective and necessary to produce critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence, 

which enabled the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture terrorists, and save lives. Over a period 

of years, the CIA provided the "discovery" and/or "thwarting" of the Second Wave plotting and 

the "discovery" of the al-Ghuraba group as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques. These representations were inaccurate. The Second Wave plotting was 

disrupted with the arrest and identification of key individuals. The arrests and identifications 

111448 (30114IZ APR 03); 11454 (301710Z APR 03). As described in detail in the 

intelligence chronology in Volume II, KSM was rendered to CIA custody on March | , 2003, and was immediately 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. On March 5, 2003, he was "confronted" with the 

"perfume letter," at which point he discussed the letter and its recipient, Hamza al-Zubayr. KSM had not yet been 

subjected to the waterboard. As described, Hamza al-Zubayr was killed in a September 2002 raid against al-Qa'idarelated safe houses. KSM stated that Khallad bin Attash had been responsible for obtaining operatives for the 

Hamza al-Zubayr operation. At the time KSM provided this information, a separate cable stated that KSM 

"continued to deny that he has any [knowledge of] ongoing operations." See [REDACTED] 34513 (052246Z MAR 

03); DIRECTOR (062312Z MAR 02); [REDACTED] 34575 (061929Z MAR 03); f 

SEP 06). 

34566 (061646Z MAR 03); | 

34513 (052246Z MAR03). 

(022012Z MAY 03) 

3425 (050726Z SEP 06); | 

TOP SECRET//! 

1345751 

11242 (050748Z SEP 06); | 12214 (050539Z 

y/NOFORN 

Page 246 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

246 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

were unrelated to any reporting acquired during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques against CIA detainees. Likewise, the al-Ghuraba group was identified 

by a detainee who was not in CIA custody. CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques provided significant fabricated information on both the Second Wave 

plotting and the al-Ghuraba group. 

Further Details: Al-Qa'ida's "Second Wave" plotting refers to 

two efforts by KSM to strike the West Coast of the United States with airplanes using non-Arab 

passport holders. While intelligence reporting often conflated the "Second Wave" plotting, KSM 

viewed the plotting as two separate efforts.1392 Neither of the two efforts was assessed to be 

imminent, as KSM was still engaged in the process of identifying suicide operatives and 

obtaining pilot training for potential participants when each effort was disrupted through the 

arrest or identification of the suspected operatives and operational planners.1393 

(^S/Z^H^BI^^^^/NE ) The al-Ghuraba student group was established in late 1999 by 

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) leaders primarily to educate the sons of jailed JT leaders and to groom the 

students for potential leadership and operational roles in JI. Some members of the al-Ghuraba 

group reportedly completed militant training in Afghanistan and Pakistan while enrolled at 

Islamic universities in Karachi.1394 Despite CIA representations to the contrary, intelligence and 

1592 See Second Wave / Al-Ghuraba Group intelligence chronology in Volume II, including, among other 

documents, DIRECTOR (20211Z JUN 03) and cable note on "Draft Intel: KSM Details his Thinking on 

and Efforts to Target California," included as an attachment to an email from to a distribution list 

for CIA OTA in the Directorate of Intelligence, dated June 30, 2003, at 06:25 PM. 

1393 See intelligence chronology in Volume II for detailed information. See also statements by United States 

government officials, such as a February 9, 2006, White House briefing on "the West Coast Terrorist Plot by 

Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism." At this briefing 

the White House emphasized how "collaboration with our international partners" had "disrupted terrorist networks 

around the world and serious al-Qaeda plots." Using the "West Coast" plot as an example, Townsend stated that: 

"Klialid Shaykh Mohammed was the individual who led this effort. .. .The cell leader was arrested in February of 

2002, and as we begin—at that point, the other members of the cell believed that the West Coast plot had been 

cancelled [and] was not going forward... the lead guy is arrested, which disrupts it in February of '02." When asked 

about whether this plotting could be accurately described as a disruption given the belief by some that "it never got 

far enough to be disrupted," Townsend stated, "there is no question in my mind that this is a disruption." See also 

May 23, 2007, White House Press Release, entitled, "Fact Sheet: Keeping America Safe From Attack," which states, 

"We Also Broke Up Other Post-9/11 Aviation Plots. In 2002, we broke up a plot by KSM to hijack an airplane and 

fly it into the tallest building on the West Coast." As described in the Study, KSM was not detained until March 1, 

2003. The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that "[t]he Study correctly points out that we erred when we 

represented that we 'learned' of the Second Wave plotting from KSM and 'learned' of the operational cell 

comprised of students from Hambali." The CIA's June 2013 Response describes the inaccurate representation as 

"imprecision" by the CIA, but nonetheless states that the CIA "continue(s) to assess this was a good example of the 

importance of intelligence derived from the detainee program"; and contends—for the first time—that Hambali's 

capture "was a critical factor in the disruption of al-Qa'ida's plan to conduct a 'Second Wave' attack." As described 

throughout the Committee Study, in its efforts to obtain legal authorization and policy approval for die CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA represented that the intelligence referenced was obtained "as a result" of 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques (not the "detainee program"), and that the information obtained was 

unique and otherwise unavailable. As detailed in this summary and in Volume II, the capture of Hambali was 

unrelated to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

139,1

 Reporting indicates that the al-Ghuraba group was similar to the Pan Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS)'s 

Masapakindo, aka Pakindo, organization. Masran bin Arshad was connected to Pakindo, and while in foreign 

government custody, explained that "in 19"" ' " ' la] established a secret Malaysian 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 247 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

247 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

open source reporting indicate the group was not "tasked with," witting, or involved in any 

aspect of KSM's Second Wave plotting.1395 

The "discovery" and disruption of the "Second Wave Plot" (also 

known as the "West Coast Plot" and the "Tallest Building Plot"),1396 along with the associated 

identification, discovery, and capture of the al-Ghuraba "cell," is one of the eight most frequently 

cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques.1397 Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and provided 

to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent the 

thwarting and discovery of the "Second Wave" plotting and the identification, discovery, or 

arrest of the al-Ghuraba group members as an example of how "[k]ey intelligence collected from 

HVD inteiTogations after applying interrogation techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt 

Student Association known as 'Masapakindo' to help facilitate a steady pipeline of PAS religious and military 

trainees traveling from Malaysia to Pakistan, sometimes continuing on to Afghanistan, but ultimately returning to 

Malaysia. This student association for children of PAS members also was intended to serve as a general support 

structure for PAS students who were undergoing Islamic religious training in Pakistan and India. Masapakindo's 

headquarters was based in Karachi, Pakistan." See also February 27, 2004, Memorandum for CIA Inspector 

General from James L. Pavitt, CIA Deputy Director for Operations, entitled "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 

Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program," which contains a February 24, 2004, attachment entitled, 

"Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities." See also CIA Intelligence Product 

entitled, "Jemaah Islaniiya: Counterterrorism Scrutiny Limiting Extremist Agenda in Pakistan," dated April 18, 

2008. Although this report makes numerous references to the al-Ghuraba group, it does not reference the group's 

potential engagement in KSM's Second Wave attack. As described in this summary, and in greater detail in 

Volume II, contrary to CIA representations, a wide body of intelligence reporting indicates that the al-Ghuraba 

group was not "discovered" as a result of KSM's reporting, nor was the al-Ghuraba group "tasked" with, or witting 

of, any aspect of KSM's "Second Wave" plotting. See also KSM and Hambali reporting from October 2003, and 

the intelligence chronology in Volume II, to include [REDACTED] 45915 (141431Z SEP 03). 

1395

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of 

United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be 

Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees. The memorandum states: "Use of enhanced 

techniques, however, led to critical, actionable intelligence such as the discovery of the Guraba Cell, which was 

tasked with executing KSM's planned Second Wave attacks against Los Angeles." 

1396

 References to the "Second Wave" attacks appeared in public news reports shortly after September 11, 2001, 

sometimes in reference to Zacarias Moussaoui. See, for example, The Washington Post, "Suspected Planner of 9/11 

Attacks Captured in Pakistan after Gunfight" (09/14/2002) ("Some investigators have theorized that Moussaoui, 

whose laptop computer contained information about crop dusting, may have been part of a second wave of terror 

attacks or a back-up plan instead."); The New York Post, "2nd Plot Tied to Moussaoui" (09/06/2002) ("French 

officials reportedly are claiming that Zacarias Moussaoui was never meant to be the '20lh hijacker' but was to be part 

of a 'second wave' of terror."); The Los Angeles Times, "Officials Skeptical as Detainees Say Sept. 11 was First in a 

Trio" (10/01/2002) ("The Sept. 11 attacks may have been planned as the first of three terrorist strikes in the United 

States, each progressively bigger and more devastating than the last, U.S. officials said Monday, citing recent 

interviews with captured Al Qaeda operatives Since days after Sept. 11, authorities have said they were 

concerned about a possible 'second wave' of attacks."). Similarly, on May 6, 2006, an affidavit filed by Moussaoui 

stated, "I was part of another al-Qaeda plot which was to occur after September 11, 2001." 

1397

 A November 21, 2005, Newsweek article entitled, "The Debate Over Torture," referenced a member of the 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence stating that "enhanced interrogation techniques" worked with KSM to 

thwart an al-Qa'ida terrorist plot, which the magazine indicated was the "Second Wave" plot. The article included 

the following: "A career CIA official involved with interrogation policy cautioned Newsweek not to put too much 

credence in such claims. 'Whatever briefing they got was probably not truthful,' said the official, who did not wish 

to be identified discussing sensitive matters/] 

11 ii 11 ii i i B^BBBI^^^^M^^FTn m 

Page 248 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

248 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I //NOFOR N 

terrorist plots" and "capture additional terrorists."1398 The CIA further represented that the 

intelligence acquired from the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "otherwise 

unavailable" and "saved lives."1399 

13,8

 Italics in original. March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from Legal Group, 

DCI Counterterrorist Center, document entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation 

Techniques." 

1399

 From 2003 through 2009, the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that 

the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA 

representations further asserted that tire intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see. 

(1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, 

which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. Hie CIA representations referenced by the 

OLC include that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical," 

"vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect 

and disrupt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that 

the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United 

States." (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from 

Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: 

Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques 

that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the 

Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA 

representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

Citing CIA documents and the President's September 6,2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation program 

(which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: "The CIA interrogation program— 

and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security 

of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As the President 

explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get any where else, 

the program has saved innocent lives."' (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central 

Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 

Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 

of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value 

al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003 

represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence 

information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives," and warned policymakers that "[t]ermination of 

this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from 

Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation 

Program, July 29, 2003; September 4,2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and 

September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The 

CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: 

"Information [the CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') lias 

almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to 

the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks 

involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, 

Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention 

and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24,2004, Memorandum 

re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA 

Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the 

[enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of 

the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other 

means." (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid 

IIII I I in 1 1 m > U N 

Page 249 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

249 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

For example, in November 2007, the CIA prepared a briefing for 

President Bush. Under a section entitled, "Plots Discovered as a Result of EITs," the CIA 

represented that the CIA "learned' about the "Second Wave" plotting and the al-Ghuraba group 

only "after applying the waterboard along with other interrogation techniques."1400 

(TSAfll^H^^B^NF ) Likewise, on March 2, 2005, the CIA provided the Department of 

Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) with a document entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA 

Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." The CIA memorandum stated that the "Central 

Intelligence Agency can advise you that this program works and the techniques are effective in 

producing foreign intelligence."1401 The CIA stated that "enhanced interrogation techniques... 

[have] enabled CIA to disrupt plots" and "capture additional terrorists." The document then 

listed 11 examples of "key intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying 

interrogation techniques,"1402 including: 

"The 'Second Wave': This was a KSM plot to use East Asian operatives to 

crash a hijacked airliner into the tallest building on the US West Coast (Los 

Angeles) as a follow-on to 9/11. We learned this during the initial 

interrogation of KSM and later confirmed it through the interrogation of 

Hambali and Khallad. 

.. .The Guraba Cell: We learned of this 17-member Jemaah Islamiyah cell 

from Hambali, who confirmed that some of the cell's operatives were 

identified as candidates to train as pilots as part of KSM's 'second wave' 

attack against the US.. .,"1403 

Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and 

Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," 

"Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background 

on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 

March 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1.258, 

which provides a list of "some of the key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence 

acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means." See 

Volume 11 for additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the 

CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives." 

1400

 Italics added. "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, with the 

notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." CIA records indicate that 

Hambali was not subjected to the CIA's waterboard technique. 

,

'">l March 2,2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury I^ H Legal Group, DCI 

Counterterrorist Center, document entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." 

Under a section entitled, "Results," the CIA "Effectiveness Memo" states that the "CIA's use of DOJ-approved 

enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt 

terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida. We 

believe that intelligence acquired from these interrogations has been a key reason why al-Qa'ida has failed to launch 

a spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001." 

1402

 Italics in original. 

1403

 Italics added. March 2,2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from H H Legal Group, 

DCI Counterterrorist Center, document entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation 

Techniques." The same representation can be found in multiple documents, including "Briefing for Chief of Staff to 

11ii II ii i i ^^^^BBH^^^^B/znofor n 

Page 250 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

250 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

( ') The ensuing May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum, now declassified 

and publicly available, states: 

"[The CIA has] informed us that the interrogation of KSM—once [enhanced] 

interrogation techniques were employed—led to the discovery of a KSM plot, 

the 'Second Wave'...and the discovery of the Ghuraba Cell, a 17-member 

Jemaah Islamiyah cell tasked with executing the 'Second Wave.'"1404 

(TSA^^^BIHH^NF ) The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the 

"discovery" and thwarting of the Second Wave plotting and/or the "discovery" of the al-Ghuraba 

Group in 18 of the 20 documents provided to senior policymakers and the Department of Justice 

between July 2003 and March 2009.1405 

A review of CIA operational cables and other documents found 

that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the "discovery" or thwarting 

of either "Second Wave" plot. Likewise, records indicate that the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques played no role in the "discovery" of a 17-member "cell tasked with executing the 

'Second Wave."'1406 

I

nte 'l'gcnc c

 Community records indicate that the initial "Second 

Wave" effort began in parallel with the planning for the September 11, 2001, attacks and 

included two operatives who were tasked with seeking pilot training. The thwarting of this 

plotting was unrelated to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The two 

operatives, Zacarias Moussaoui and Faruq al-Tunisi (aka Abderraouf Jdey), were known to be 

engaged in terrorist activity prior to any reporting from CIA detainees.1407 On August 16, 2001, 

the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Programs," dated May 2, 2006; as well as 

"Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Interrogation (HVDI) 

Techniques," dated March 2, 2005. 

1404

 Italics added. Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, 

from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: 

Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques 

that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees. The memorandum states: "It is this 

paramount interest [the security of the nation] that the Government seeks to vindicate through the interrogation 

program. Indeed, the program, which the CIA believes 'has been a key reason why al-Qa'ida has failed to launch a 

spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001,' directly furthers that interest, producing substantial 

quantities of otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence. As detailed above, ordinary interrogation techniques had 

little effect on either KSM or Zubaydah. Use of enhanced techniques, however, led to critical, actionable 

intelligence such as the discovery of the Guraba Cell, which was tasked with executing KSM's planned Second 

Wave attacks against Los Angeles." 

1405 See list of CIA prepared briefings and memoranda from 2003 through 2009 with representations on the 

effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques referenced in this summary and described in detail in 

Volume II. 

1406

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of 

United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be 

Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees. 

Page 251 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

251 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen, was arrested on immigration charges by the FBI in 

Minnesota.1408 At the time of his arrest, the FBI informed the CIA that the FBI considered 

Moussaoui to be a "suspected airline suicide attacker."1409 On January 17, 2002, the FBI 

publicly released a statement identifying Faruq al-Tunisi, aka Abderraouf Jdey, a Canadian 

citizen, as an al-Qa'ida operative possibly "prepared to commit future suicide terrorist 

attacks."1410 Intelligence indicates that al-Tunisi, who remains at large, withdrew from 

participating in al-Qa'ida operations.1411 His whereabouts remain unknown.1412 

(^SZ/H^HI^H^^ )

 Th e

 subsequent "Second Wave" effort began with KSM's tasking 

of several Malaysian nationals—led by Masran bin Arshad—in late 2001 to attack the "tallest 

building in California" using shoe-bomb explosive devices to gain access to a plane's cockpit.1413 

The thwarting of this plotting was also unrelated to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques. This plot was disrupted with the arrest of Masran bin Arshad in January 2002. This 

arrest was unrelated to CIA detainee reporting.1414 Bin Arshad claimed the effort had "not 

advanced beyond the initial planning stages" when KSM "shelve[dj the plan" in December 2001 

when Richard Reid exposed the "shoe bomb" explosive method.1415 Beginning in July 2002, 

while in the custody of a foreign government, and after the extensive use of rapport-building 

interrogation techniques,1416 bin Arshad provided detailed information on this "Second Wave" 

1408

 August 18, 2001, FBI Minneapolis Field Officer Memorandum referenced in Report of the Joint Inquiry into the 

Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate 

Select Committee on Intelligence. Zacarias Moussaoui was later convicted of terrorism-related offenses, and 

sentenced to life in prison. See Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, "A Review of the FBI's 

Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks," dated November 2004, and released 

publicly in June 2006, among other sources. See also other open source records, including November 20, 2007, 

Associated Press article entitled, "Judge in 9/11 Conspirator Moussaoui's Case Questions Government Evidence in 

Terrorism Trials." The article states: Judge "Brinkema said she no longer feels confident relying on those 

government briefs, particularly since prosecutors admitted last week that similar representations made in the 

Moussaoui case were false. In a letter made public Nov 13, [2007], prosecutors in the Moussaoui case admitted to 

Brinkema that the CIA had wrongly assured her that no videotapes or audiotapes existed of interrogations of certainhigh profile terrorism detainees. In fact, two such videotapes and one audio tape existed." 

1409

 August 25, 2001, CIA Headquarters cable referenced by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence investigations, as well as the Twelfth Public Hearing on the 

"National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States," June 16, 2004. 

1410

 January 17, 2002, Federal Bureau of Investigation public release. 

1411

 Zacarias Moussaoui was arrested on August 16,2001. Intelligence indicates Faruq al-Tunisi withdrew from alQa'ida operations. Faruq al-Tunisi remains a fugitive | 

""2 (1516.18Z OCT 03); | 

1413

 Although the operation was disrupted with his arrest, bin Arshad claimed to officers of a foreign government 

that the operation was halted prior to his detention, specifically, when Richard Reid's shoe-bomb explosive 

concealment method was uncovered in December 2001. See DIRECTOR |B | (270238Z FEB 03). 

1414 See intelligence chronology in Volume IT. 

CIA • • I^^^HH i 65902 

DIRECTOR | 

1416

 After bin Arshad was rendered from B^ H [Country 1] to ^ H [Country 2] for questioning, | 

[Count^^ officials^cquired a "negligible amount of intelligence" from bin Arshad, and he was eventually 

to HH H [Country 3]. The cable stated, "^HM H [Countr^^uthorities] indicate[d] that [Masran 

bin Arshad] was the toughest subject they had ever interrogated, including terrorists." In anticipation of the 

release of an August 8, 2002, CIA intelligence report describing new information Masran bin Arshad was providing, 

the CIA in [Country 3] sent a cable to CIA Headquarters, which stated: "In light of the attention 

n i l 11 i i i 

Page 252 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

252 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

plotting, the Malaysian operatives (details on Affifi, Lillie, and "Tawfiq"), and the proposed 

method of attack.1417 This information would later be corroborated by other intelligence 

collection, including, to a limited extent, reporting from CIA detainees in the spring of 2003.1418 

Another Malaysian national associated with Masran bin Arshad, Zaini Zakaria, was identified by 

a foreign government as a potential operative seeking pilot training as early as July 2002.1419 

Zakaria was tasked with obtaining such training by al-Qa'ida, but failed to follow through with 

the tasking.1420 Zakaria turned himself in to Malaysian authorities on December 18, 2002. 

Malaysian authorities released Zakaria in February 2009.1421 In 2006, in a White House briefing 

on the "West Coast Terrorist Plot," the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 

Counter-terrorism announced that the plot had been disrupted with the arrest of the cell leader, 

Masran bin Arshad.1422 

that this report is likely to generate among consumers, it probably warrants reiterating that the interrogation methods 

being used with Masran [by tlie HHfl^l^^^^ H Police I^^HI^HH l

 ar e

 somewhat 

unconventional... This has entailed having several [Country 3 officers] spend an enormous amount of time with 

Masran praying with him, eating with him, earning his trust, hstenin^^iim^n^liciting fron^iirr^Tiis^proach 

has yielded a significant amount of valuable intelligence." (See 659031 

65903HH^HB ; ••^•• H 65902 

CIA suspicions that "Tawfiq" may be identifiable with Mohd Farik bin Amin, aka Zaid, aka 

Zubair, ate found in ALEC • • (192004Z JUN 03). ^^ ^ 

1418 See Second Wave/al-Ghuraba Group intelligence chronology in Volume II, including DIRECTOR 

(082328Z JUL 03) and •^••• B ^^ ^ 

1419 See Second Wave/al-Ghuraba Group intelligence chronology in Volume II, including CIA (221647Z 

JUL 02). 

1420

 Among other reports, see DIRECTOR • • (082328Z JUL 03), CIA • • (221647Z 

JUL 02), and 45325 (051614Z SEP 03). According to KSM, an individual named "Mussa," which the CIA 

assessed was KSM's name for Zaini Zakaria, disappeared after receiving money that was intended for pilot training. 

Reporting indicates that Zakaria—a Malaysian—was to be the pilot for the group of Malaysian individuals that 

Masran bin Arshad sought to use in the Second Wave plotting. As noted in the text, Zakaria turned himself into 

Malaysian authorities on December 18,2002. Hambali—who was associated with these Malaysians—stated he "did 

not know why the operation was cancelled," but surmised it might be because of the September 11, 2001, attacks, or 

because Zaini Zakaria "got cold feet." Hambali reported in September 2003 that the head of the operation was 

Masran bin Arshad and diat Zaini Zakaria was the pilot selected to fly the airplane. Hambali corroborated Masran 

bin Arshad's reporting that the other members of the group were Molid Farik bin Amin (aka Zubair), Abd AlRahinan bin Mustapha Afifi, and Bashir bin Lap Nazri (aka Lillie). By the time of Hambali's capture, all three were 

in custody. See DIRECTOR (042340Z SEP 03)/| 

1421

 • • 10044 (260718Z AUG 04). See also DIRECTOR • • (181840Z MAY 07) and "Malaysia Frees 

Suspected Al Qaeda Pilot-Report," Reuters, dated February 14,2009. 

1422

 As described, on February 9, 2006, in a White House briefing on "the West Coast Terrorist Plot by Frances 

Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism," the White House 

emphasized how "collaboration with our international partners" had "disrupted terrorist networks around the world 

and serious al-Qaeda plots." Using the "West Coast" plot as an example, Townsend relayed that: "Khalid Shaykh 

Mohammed was the individual who led this effort. .. .The cell leader was arrested in February of 2002, and as we 

begin—at that point, the other members of the cell believed that the West Coast plot had been cancelled [and] was 

not going forward...the lead guy is arrested, which disrupts it in February of '02." When asked about whether this 

plotting could be credited as a disruption given the belief by some that "it never got far enough to be disrupted," 

Townsend stated, "there is no question in my mind that this is a disruption." See also May 23, 2007, White House 

Press Release, entitled, "Fact Sheet: Keeping America Safe From Attack," which states "We Also Broke Up Other 

Post-9/11 Aviation Plots. In 2002, we broke up a plot by KSM to hijack an airplane and fly it into the tallest 

building on the West Coast." The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that operatives involved in the "Second 

Wave" plot were arrested in 2002. The CIA's June 2013 Response nonetheless contends that "Hambali remained 

capable of directing the plot at die time of his arrest," and that, therefore, the arrest of Hambali "was a critical factor 

in the disruption of al-Qa'ida's plan." There are no CIA records indicating_tha^Hambali took any action in 

IIII 11 III I I MI HIM I 

Page 253 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

253 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

(^S/^^^^HHIHr^' O Contrary to CIA representations, the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques against KSM did not result in the "discovery" of KSM's "Second 

Wave" plotting. On March I, 2003, KSM was captured. He was rendered to CIA custody on 

March I, 2003, and was immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

While being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and in the weeks 

afterwards, KSM did not discuss the "Second Wave" plotting.1423 On April 19, 2003—24 days 

after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques had ceased—interrogators 

questioned KSM about Masran bin Arshad and his role in developing a cell for the "Second 

Wave" attacks. After being told that Masran bin Arshad had been arrested, KSM told his 

interrogators, "T have forgotten about him, he is not in my mind at all." KSM also denied that 

"he knew anything about a plot to take out the 'tallest building' in California."1424 KSM's 

reporting prompted ALEC Station to write in a cable that "we remain concerned that KSM's 

progression towards full debriefing status is not yet apparent where it counts most, in relation to 

threats to US interests, especially inside CONUS."1425 

According to a CIA cable, on May 5, 2003, KSM "eventually 

admitted to tasking Masran bin Arshad to target the tallest building in California."1426 KSM 

continued, however, to deny aspects of the plotting—such as denying the use of shoe-bombs in 

the operation, only to confirm the planned use of shoe-bombs in later interrogations.1427 On June 

23, 2003, an ALEC Station officer wrote that "[gjiven that KSM only admitted knowledge of 

this operation upon learning of Masran's detention, we assess he is not telling all he knows, but 

rather is providing information he believes we already possess."1428 KSM was asked about 

detained Malaysian national Zaini Zakaria for the first time on July 3, 2003. During the 

interrogation, the CIA debriefer stated that there was information suggesting that Zakaria was 

funded by al-Qa'ida to take flight lessons in September 2001.1429 KSM denied knowing the 

name Zaini Zakaria, but later described "Mussa." The CIA suspected this was an alias for 

Zakaria. CIA officers at the detention site where KSM was being interrogated then wrote in a 

cable, "[t]he core problem, once again, is the appearance that KSM gave up this critical 

information only after being presented with the idea that we might already know something 

about it."1430 

furtherance of the plotting. Further, a November 2003 cable states that CIA interrogators believed Hambali's role in 

al-Qa'ida terrorist activity was more limited than the CIA had assessed prior to his capture and that al-Qa'ida 

members did not consider Hambali "capable of leading an effort to plan, orchestrate and execute complicated 

operations on his own." (See H^H I 1113(111252Z NOV 03).) The claim in the CIA's June 2013 Response 

that the capture of Hambali "resulted in large part from information obtained from" KSM is inaccurate. Details on 

the capture of Hambali are described elsewhere in this summary and in greater detail in Volume II. 

1423 See 10983 (24232IZ MAR 03); 10972 (241122Z MAR 03); and the KSM detainee review 

in Volume III. 

1424

 ^•^•1131 9 (191445Z APR 03), disseminated as | 

1425

 ALECHH(222153 Z APR03) 

111513 (051120Z MAY 03) 

112068 (201407Z JUN 03); 12167 (301747Z J LIN 03), disseminated as | 

1428

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], | 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Highlight for Coord: KSM and Los Angeles Threat Reporting; 

date: June 23, 2003, at 02:21 PM. 

112208 (051545Z JUL 03), disseminated as I 

112208 (051545Z JUL 03), disseminated as | 

11 ii 11 1 1 i M — 1"

(

" 

Page 254 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

254 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

(TS^I^^IH^H^^ ) With regard to the al-Ghuraba group, contrary to CIA 

representations, a wide body of intelligence reporting indicates that the al-Ghuraba group was 

not "discovered" as a result of reporting from KSM or Hambali, nor was the al-Ghuraba group 

"tasked" with, or witting of, any aspect of KSM's "Second Wave" plotting.1431 Rather, while in 

foreign government custody, Hambali's brother, Gun Gun Ruswan Gunawan, identified "a group 

of Malaysian and Indonesian students in Karachi" witting of Gunawan's affiliation with Jemaah 

Islamiyah.1432 CIA records indicate that Gunawan stated that the students were in Karachi "at 

the request of Hambali."1433 In a cable conveying this information, CIA officers recalled 

intelligence reporting indicating KSM planned to use Malaysians in the "next wave of attacks," 

and stated Gunawan had just identified "a group of 16 individuals, most all of whom are 

Malaysians."1434 The cable closed by stating, "we need to question Hambali if this collection is 

part of his 'next wave' cell."

 1435

 (From July through December 2002, foreign government 

reporting described KSM's use of Malaysians in the "next wave attacks." The reporting 

1431

 March 2,2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from Legal Group, DCI 

Counterterrorist Center, document entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." 

The same representation can be found in multiple documents, including "Briefing for Chief of Staff to the President 

Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention, and Intenogation Programs" dated May 2, 2006, as well as "Talking Points 

for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques," dated 

March 2, 2005. As noted earlier, the CLA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that the CIA's representations on 

how the CIA first learned of the group were inaccurate. See intelligence chronology in Volume II for detailed 

information on this matter. 

1432

 15359 As detailed in Volume II, while still in foreign government custody, 

Hambali stated he had a brother named "Ruswan Gunawan" who attended Abu Bakr University in Karachi and lived 

in a dormitory on or near the campus. According to Hambali, his brother served as his "primary conduit for 

communications" with KSM and al-Qa'ida. The information that Hambali provided regarding the true name of his 

brother was relayed to CIA Headquarters and to CIA personnel in Pakistan and elsewhere on August 15, 2003. The 

cable stated that, while Hanibali was in foreign government custody, the CIA "learned that" Hambali had a 25-yearold-brother at Abu Bakr University in Karachi named "Rusman Gunawan." According to Hambali, the brotherlived 

in a dormitory near campus^^^^H^^^responded that this was "actionable intelligence that may help" 

locate Gunawan and that would check records of the students at Abu Bakr University for 

matches to Gunawan. Previous checks for names provided by KSM and other CIA detainees for Hanibali's brother 

("Abdul Hadi") did not result in matches or locational information. The Director of the CIA Counterterrorism 

Center subsequently authorized the capture and detention of Hambali's brother based on the information Hambali 

had provided in foreign government custody. Thereafter, CIA personnel in began working to facilitate the 

capture of Gunawan by Pakistani authorities. Days later, a CIA cable referenced information on the probable 

location of Ruswan Gunawan and described 

intelligence 

chronology in Volume II for details, including^^^^j8755 1 (1.50731Z 87552 

(150738Z AUG 03); ••••1510 8 (161148Z AUG 03); ALECM®(181711 Z ALiG^rBBB H 15173 

(2511T7ZAUG 03); ^^••(0H729 Z SEP 03); and •••^1524 3 (020259Z SEP 03). 

1433

 15359 The cable closes by stating that Gunawan suggested the interrogators ask 

Hambali about the 17-member group, "now that we can confront him with [Gunawan] having unmasked the group." 

The cable added that the Pakistani government would not allow the members of the student group to depart Pakistan 

and that "confronting Hambali with [die information on the 17-member group] should also be interesting." 

1434 ^^^^^ ^ 15359 Records indicate that it was this initial analysis that led the CIA to 

consider the group part of KSM's "Second Wave" "cell." It is unknown if these CIA officers were aware of Masran 

bin Arshad's reporting on his team of Malaysian nationals initially tasked with conducting an attack against the 

"tallest building in California" using shoe-bomb explosive devices to gain access to a plane's cockpit. See 

DIRECTORIES(270238Z FEB 03). 

1435

 ^^^11535 9 

11 ii 11 i i i MBBBBB^^^ B I II I H 

Page 255 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

255 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

included Masran bin Arshad's information, provided while he was in foreign government 

custody, on his four-person Malaysian cell tasked by KSM1436 to be part of an operation targeting 

the West Coast of the United States, as well as July 2002 reporting on Malaysian national Zaini 

Zakaria seeking pilot training.1437) 

(^S/i^^^flH^^H/lNF ) Contrary to CIA representations, the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques against Hambali did not result in the "discovery" of "the Guraba Cell" 

that was "tasked with executing the 'Second Wave'" plotting. As noted, in foreign government 

custody, Hambali's brother, Gun Gun Ruswan Gunawan, identified "a group of Malaysian and 

Indonesian students in Karachi" witting of Gunawan's affiliation with Jemaah Islamiyah.1438 

The cable conveying this information recommended "confronting Hambali" with this 

information.1439 While being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Hambali 

was questioned about the al-Ghuraba group and KSM's effort to use airplanes to attack the 

United States. Hambali told his CIA interrogators "that some of the members of [the al-Ghuraba 

group] were destined to work for al-Qa'ida if everything had gone according to plan," that one 

member of the group had "ambitions to become a pilot," that he (Hambali) was going to send 

three individuals to KSM in response to KSM's "tasking to find pilot candidates, but never got 

around to asking these people," and that "KSM told him to provide as many pilots as he 

could."1440 Months later, on November 30, 2003, after three weeks of being questioned by a 

11,36

 In October 2003, KSM informed the CIA that "he did not yet view the [al-Ghuraba] group as an operational pool 

from which to draft operatives," and noted even those who had received military training were not ready to be 

considered for "ongoing planning." See II^^IH 102 ^ (221317Z OCT 

'',37 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including CIA 

65903 and^^BHU^ H 65902 H^^^^^H H The four members of the Malaysian 

eel 1 were not members of the al-Ghuraba group. 

1438

 15359 

1439

 15359 As described, the cable closes by stating that Gunawan suggested the 

interrogators ask Hambali about the 17-member group, "now that we can confront him with [Gunawan] having 

unmasked the group." The cable added that the Pakistani government would not allow the members of the student 

group to depart Pakistan and that "confronting Hambali with [the information on the 17-member group] should also 

be interesting." 

1440 See [REDACTED] 45953 (151241ZSEP03) and [REDACTED] 1323 (161749Z SEP 03). CIA cables describe 

how Hambali was repeatedly questioned on this issue while being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques. A CIA cable states: "With the gradual ramp-up of intensity of the session and the use of the enhanced 

measures, [Hambali] finally stepped over the line and provided the information." Months later Hambali admitted to 

fabricating the information provided. A cable explained that Hambali "gave answers that were similar to what was 

being asked and what he inferred the interrogator or debriefer wanted, and when the pressure subsided or he was 

told that the information he gave was okay. [Hambali] knew that he had provided the answer that was being sought." 

(See 1142 (November 30, 2003), {^•^• j 1144 (010823Z DEC 03).) The CIA represented in the 

February 2004 Pavitt memo to the CIA Inspector General, among other documents, that "as a result of the lawful use 

of EITs, Hambali provided infonnation [on the al-Ghuraba group]... some of whom had been designated as the 

pilots" for the Second Wave attacks. The CIA's June 2013 Response indicates that the CIA continues to assess that 

multiple al-Ghuraba members had an "interest in aircraft and aviation." CIA records do not support this assertion. 

While one member of the al-Ghuraba group was interested in airplanes, I^HIi^HllMil H f a specific alGhuraba group member, Person 1], intelligence indicates that the interest was unrelated to terrorist activity. (See 

intelligence chronology in Volume II, including1560 8 describing 

[Personl's] interview while in foreign government custody.) A CIA cable states "after several heart-toheart chats, BI H [Person t] cried and pledged his full cooperation." Under questioning, [Person 1] 

stated that Gunawan encouraged H H [Person 1] to pursue his interest in aircraft and "attempted in late 2001 

and early 2002 to recruit him for pilot trainine/^e^hecable^^^^H[Person 1] deflected these requests from 

m i i i iii i"BMBMI^^^BI^M^hH'OH N 

Page 256 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

256 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

debriefer "almost entirely in Bahasa Indonesia," Hambali admitted to fabricating a number of 

statements during the period he was being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques, including information on efforts to locate pilots for KSM. Specifically, Hambali 

stated "he lied about the pilot because he was constantly asked about it and under stress, and so 

decided to fabricate." According to a cable, Hambali said he fabricated these claims "in an 

attempt to reduce the pressure on himself," and "to give an account that was consistent with what 

[Hambali] assessed the questioners wanted to hear."1441 The November 30, 2003, cable noted 

that CIA personnel "assesse[d] [Hambali]'s admission of previous fabrication to be credible."1442 

Hambali then consistently described "the al-Ghuraba organization" as a "development camp for 

potential future JI operatives and leadership, vice a JI cell or an orchestrated attempt by JI to 

Gunawan. Asked about his interest in aviation, [Person 1] stated that "he was the only member of the 

Ghuraba study group with an interest in aviation," and that "since he was about four years old he has 'been a big 

maniac for airplanes.'" [Person 1] told his interrogators that he purchased and read multiple magazines 

about aircraft from various book stores. A CIA officer wrote, "asked to provide details on die Boeing 747, [Person 

1] rattled off an impressive array of facts about the various series of 747s." [Person l's] claims were 

consistent with other intelligence in CIA databases. See intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional 

information. 

(301101Z NOV 03). This cable appears to have been retransmitted the following day as 

1144 (010823Z DEC 03). 

1442

 The CIA detention site wrote, "[Hambali]'s admission came after three weeks of daily debriefing sessions with 

[the case officer] carried out almost entirely in Bahasa Indonesia. [Hambali] has consistently warmed to [the case 

officer's] discussions with him, and has provided to [the case officer] additional information that he had avoided in 

the past... More tellingly, [Hambali] has opened up considerably to [the case officer] about his fears and 

motivations, and has taken to trusting [the case officer] at his word. [Hambali] looks to [the case officer] as his sole 

confidant and the one person who has [Hambali]'s interest in mind.... Given this, Base notes [Hambali]'s account 

of how, through statements read to him and constant repetition of questions, he was made aware of what type of 

answers his questioners wanted. [Hambali] said he merely gave answers that were similar to what was being asked 

and what he inferred the interrogator or debriefer wanted, and when the pressure subsided or he was told that the 

information he gave was okay, [Hambali] knew that he had provided the answer that was being sought." (See 

intelligence chronology in Volume II, including 1142 (November 30, 2003).) The CIA's June 2013 

Response states that "[w]e continue to assess [Hambali's] original revelation was correct, however, based on KSM's 

claim that he tasked Hambali to identify and train pilots, Hambali's verification of this claim in multiple instances, 

and the students' interest in aircraft and aviation." The CIA's June 2013 Response is incongraent with the 

assessment of CIA interrogators at the time—that the claim of fabrication was "credible"—as well as with a wide 

body of subsequent reporting. CIA records indicate that CIA officers confused intelligence reporting on the 

Malaysians involved in the "Second Wave" plotting—an apparent reference to Masran bin Arshad, Zaini Zakaria, 

and three other Malaysians—with the al-Ghuraba Malaysian student group. 

1111 111111 ' BBBB^BBBM M 1111111111 1 

Page 257 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

257 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRESW^^^B^^^^^^^BflNQFQR N 

initiate JI operations outside of Southeast Asia."1443 This description was corroborative of other 

intelligence reporting.1444 

(TSyV^B^^^^^B^^ ) An October 27, 2006, CIA cable states that "all of the members of 

the JI al-Ghuraba cell have been released,"1445 while an April 18, 2008, CIA intelligence report 

focusing on the Jemaah Islamiyah and referencing the al-Ghuraba group makes no reference to 

the group serving as potential operatives for KSM's "Second Wave" plotting.1446 

4. The Thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot and the Capture of Dhiren 

Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi 

Summary: The CIA represented that its enhanced interrogation 

techniques were effective and necessary to produce critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence, 

which enabled the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture terrorists, and save lives. Over a period 

of years, the CIA provided the capture of Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi, and the thwarting of 

Barot's United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques. These representations were inaccurate. The operation that 

resulted in the identification of a U.K.-based "Issa," the identification of "Issa" as Dhiren Barot, 

Dhiren Barot's arrest, and the thwarting of his plotting, resulted from the investigative activities 

of U.K. government authorities. Contrary to CIA representations, KSM did not provide the first 

reporting on a U.K.-based "Issa," nor are there records to support the CIA representation that 

reporting from CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques resulted 

in Dhiren Barot's arrest. After the arrest of Dhiren Barot, CIA officers prepared a document for 

U.K. authorities which stated: "while KSM tasked al-Hindi to go to the US to surveil targets, he 

was not aware of the extent to which Barot's planning had progressed, who Issa's coconspirators were, or that Issa's planning had come to focus on the UK." The plotting associated 

1443

 Hambali elaborated that the al-Ghuraba group was similar to the Pan Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS)'s 

Masapakindo, aka Pakindo, organization. Masran bin Arshad was connected to Pakindo, and, while in foreign 

government custody, explained that "in 1991, PAS [Pan Islamic Party of Malaysia] established a secret Malaysian 

Student Association known as 'Masapakindo' to help facilitate a steady pipeline of PAS religious and military 

trainees traveling from Malaysia to Pakistan, sometimes continuing on to Afghanistan, but ultimately returning to 

Malaysia. This student association for children of PAS members also was intended to serve as a general support 

structure for PAS students who were undergoing Islamic religious training in Pakistan and India. Masapakindo's 

headquarters was based in Karachi, Pakistan " See intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional information, 

including [REDACTED] 45915 (141431Z SEP 03) and CIA (160621Z DEC 02). See also February 27, 

2004, Memorandum for CIA Inspector General from James L. Pavitt, CIA Deputy Director for Operations, entitled 

"Comments to Draft IG Special Review," "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program," which contains 

a February 24, 2004, attachment entitled, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation 

Activities." See also CIA Intelligence Product entitled, "Jemaah Islamiya: Counterterrorism Scrutiny Limiting 

Extremist Agenda in Pakistan," dated April 18, 2008. See also KSM and Hambali reporting from October 2003. 

1444 See intelligence chronology in Volume II. Although NSA signals intelligence was not provided for this Study, 

an April 2008 CIA intelligence report on the Jemaah Islamiya noted that the al-Ghuraba group "consisted of the sons 

of JI leaders, many of whom completed basic militant training in Afghanistan and Pakistan while enrolled at Islamic 

universities in Karachi," and that this assessment was based on "signals intelligence and other reporting." See CIA 

Intelligence Product entitled, "Jemaah Islamiya: Counterterrorism Scrutiny Limiting Extremist Agenda in Pakistan," 

dated April 18, 2008. 

1445

 WASHINGTON DC (272113Z OCT 06) 

i44c Intelligence Product entitled, "Jemaah Islamiya: Counterterrorism Scrutiny Limiting Extremist Agenda in 

Pakistan," dated April 18, 2008. 

11 ii 11 ii i i ^^^^^^^^^BMjmoFon N 

Page 258 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

258 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET// 1//NQFQRN 

with Dhiren Barot was assessed by experts to be "amateurish," "defective," and unlikely to 

succeed. 

Further Details: Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi,1447 met with alQa'ida leaders in Pakistan in early 2004 to discuss potential terrorist attacks against targets in the 

United Kingdom.1448 Intelligence reporting indicates that Barot spent February and March 2004 

1447

 Dhiren Barot was referred to as "Issa," "Abu Issa," "Abu Issa al-Pakistani," and "Issa al-Britani." CIA records 

indicate that Dhiren Barot's most common alias, "Issa al-Hindi" (variant "Esa al-Hindi") - the name used to author 

the book, "The Army of Madinah in Kashmir" - was uncovered in May 2003 from FBI interviews of an individual 

in FBI custody, James Ujaama, aka Bilal Ahmed. Intelligence reporting indicated that Dhiren Barot's, aka Esa alHindi's, "The Army of Madinah in Kashmir" was a well-known book among the U.K. extremist community. 

Information on the book was prominently available online in 2002, on, among otlier internet sites, the website of the 

book store associated with Moazzem Begg, a U.K. extremist who was arrested and transferred to U.S. military 

custody at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 2002. The cover of the book lists "Esa Al-Hindi" as the author 

••^•H280438 Z (280746Z MAY 03)). 

1448

 Note on CIA records related to U.K.-based "Issas": Two United Kingdom-based al-Qa'ida associates, Dhiren 

Barot and Sajid Badat, were known by the same common aliases, Issa, Abu Issa, Abu Issa al-Britani ("[of] Britain") 

and/or Issa al-Pakistani. Both individuals were British Indians who had been independently in contact with senior 

al-Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan. Reporting indicated that the Issa(s) were located in the U.K. and engaged in terrorist 

targeting of the U.K. The investigation into their true identities was a U.K.-led operation. As a result, the CIA 

sometimes had limited insight into U.K.-based activities to identify and locate the Issas. Senior CIA personnel 

expressed frustration that the U.K. was not sharing all known information on its investigations, writing in August 

2003 that "[the FBI is] clearly working closely with the [U.K. service] on these matters and [the CIA is] at the 

mercy" of what it is told. Until the arrest of one of the Issas, Sajid Badat, on November 27, 2003, the U.S. 

Intelligence Community and U.K. authorities often confused the two al-Qa'ida associates. As a result, the quality 

and clarity of detainee reporting on the Issas (including reporting from detaineesinthecustodyof^e CIA, U.S. 

military, Department of Justice, and foreign services) varied. CIA personnel reported in 

September 2003 that there were "two (or three) Abu Issas" in intelligence reporting and that, because of their 

similarities, it was often "unclear which Issa the detainees [were] referring to at different stages." Once detained in 

the United Kingdom in November 2003, Sajid Badat (one of the Issas) cooperated with U.K. authorities and 

provided information about the other "Issa." Badat stated that "people often asked [Badat] about [the other] Issa, as 

they were both British Indians." According to Sajid Badat, "anyone who had been involved with jihad in Britain 

since the mid-90s" would know Issa al-Hindi (aka Dhiren Barot), to include Babar Ahmed, Moazzem Begg, Richard 

Reid, Zacarias Moussaoui, and KSM. Dhiren Barot (the other Issa), arrested on August 3, 2004, was found to have 

been especially well-known among the U.K. extremist community, having written a popular book in 1999 

expounding the virtues of jihad in Kashmir under the alias, "Esa al-Hindi." CIA records include a reference to the 

book and a description of its author ("a brother from England who was a Hindu and became a Muslim...[who] got 

training in Afghanistan ^/^asearly as December 1999. (Sec information disseminated by the CIA on 12/31/99 in 

|.) [A foreign partner] would later report that Dhiren Barot "frequently" appeared "in 

reporting of terrorist training" and "involvement in Jihad in occupied Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Malaysia, 

throughout the 1990s." As described, the Committee Study is based on more dian six million pages of material 

related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program provided by the CIA. Access was not provided to 

intelligence databases of the CIA, or any other U.S. or foreign intelligence or law enforcement agency. Insomuch as 

intelligence from these sources is included, it was, unless noted otherwise, found within the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program material produced for this Study. It is likely that significant intelligence unrelated to the 

CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program on Sajid Badat and Dhiren Barot exists in U.S. intelligence and law 

enforcement records and databases. (See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including: (112157Z 

JUN 03); •• • 19907 (231744Z APR 04); W^^ M 99093 (02093IZ SEP 03); ALEC ^^J(212117Z _ 

AUG 03); CIA WASHINGTON DC • • (162127Z JUN 03); and a series of emails between] 

and (with multiple ccs) on August 22,2003, at 9:24:43 AM.) In the context of the 

Capture/Identification of Sajid Badat, the CIA's June 2013 Response states that "KSM's reporting also clearly 

distinguished between, and thereby focused investigations of, two al-Qa'ida operatives known as Issa al-Britani." 

As detailed in the KSM detainee review in Volume III, KSM did discuss the two operatives, but he did not identify 

mi 11 in i MB^MBB^^^ M

 11111111111 

Page 259 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

259 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

in Pakistan with senior al-Qa'ida explosives expert 'Abd al-Rahman al-Muhajir, likely refining 

plans to use vehicle-based bombs against U.K. targets.1449 In July 2004, casing reports 

associated with "Issa" were recovered in a raid in Pakistan associated with the capture of Abu 

Talha al-Pakistani.1450 During questioning in foreign government custody, "Abu Talha stated the 

U.S. casing reports were from Abu Issa."1451 Further debriefings of Abu Talha revealed that 

Issa, aka Dhiren Barot, was the "operational manager" for al-Qa'ida in the United Kingdom.1452 

Additional information about Dhiren Barot's U.K. plotting was recovered from the hard drives 

confiscated during the raid that resulted in the arrest of Dhiren Barot. A document describing the 

plotting was divided into two parts. The first part included "the Gas Limos project," which 

envisioned parking explosives-laden courier vans or limousines in underground garages. The 

second part, the "radiation (dirty bomb) project," proposed using 10,000 smoke detectors as part 

of an explosive device to spread a radioactive element contained in the detectors. Dhiren Barot's 

plotting was referred to as the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot.1453 The U.K. Urban Targets 

either by name (or, in the case of Dhiren Barot, by his more common kunya, Issa al-Hindi) and provided no 

actionable intelligence that contributed to the eventual identification and location of either "Issa." 

1449 See email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED] at the Office of Director of National Intelligence; subject: 

"URGENT: Unclassified Fact Sheet for [REDACTED]"; date: October 6, 2005, at 2:39 PM. 

1450

 3924 ••H^HH ; CIA WASHINGTON DC HHjUHH . The CIA has 

represented that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques resulted in the identification and arrest of 

"Abu Talha al-Pakistani." The CIA's June 2013 Response states that Abu Talha's arrest and debriefing was 

"invaluable to our overall understanding of Issa's activities and the threat he posed," and claims that Abu Talha's 

arrest "would not have happened if not for reporting from CIA-held detainees." CIA records do not support this 

statement. CIA records indicate that Abu Talha was identified and located independent of information from CIA 

detainees. Abu Talha al-Pakistani, a Pakistani with links to U.K. extremists, was identified through information 

derived from British H [intelligence collection] and the U.K. investigation of U.K.-based extremist Baber 

Ahmed and his associates. These individuals were already under investigation by the H [foreign partner]. 

Further, Baber Ahmed was known to the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement authorities prior to any CIA 

detainee reporting. Foreign government authorities, relying on information provided by the United Kingdom and, to 

an extent, U.S. signals intelligence, ultimately located and arrested Abu Talha al-Pakistani. Because of the central 

role of U.K. authorities, CIA records do not include a comprehensive accounting of the investigation and operations 

that led to Abu Talha al-Pakistani\s detention. CIA records indicate, however, that Abu Talha al-Pakistani was 

identified by two detainees in foreign government custody, shortly after their capture. (Both detainees would later 

be transferred to CIA custody and subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.) The first of these two 

detainees was Majid Khan, who on March 6, 2003, discussed Ammar al-Baluchi's Karachi-based assistant, "Talha." 

Majid Khan provided a phone number for Talha, and used that number at the request of his captors in an effort to 

locate and capture Ammar al-Baluchi through Talha. This reporting, which Majid Khan provided while he was in 

foreign government custody, preceded any reporting from CIA detainees. The other detainee who reported on Abu 

Talha was Ammar al-Baluchi, who described him as "Suliman" and stated that he had been dispatched to the United 

Kingdom to recruit operatives suitable for hijacking and suicide operations. Ammar al-Baluchi was also in foreign 

government custody at the time of this disclosure. KSM's failure to mention Abu Talha/"Suliman," more than a 

month after the CIA had ceased using its enhanced interrogation techniques against him, prompted one of KSM's 

debriefers to state that "KSM could be in trouble very soon." KSM also fabricated that he had shown a sketch 

related to the Heathrow Airport plot to Ammar al-Baluchi, rather than to Abu Talha, until confronted with Ammar 

al-Baluchi's denials, more than three months after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against 

KSM had ceased. See Volume II and the KSM detainee review in Volume III for additional information. 

1451

 Email from: to: James Pavitt and others; subject: "Laptop docex from recent raid may yield 

pre-election threat information"; date: July B , 2004, at 7:35 AM. 

1431

 I^HH I 3disseminate d

 a s

 ^IHII^^^H ' 

1453 See DIRECTOR ^^g(032140ZAU G 04). See also intelligence chronology in Volume II, as well as email 

from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], at the Office of Director of National Intelligence; subject: "URGENT: 

Unclassified Fact Sheet for [REDACTED]"; date: October 6,2005, at 02:39 PM. The email includes a CIAM ii M i i i i ii i ii 

Page 260 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

260 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

Plot was disrupted when Dhiren Barot and his U.K.-based associates were detained in the United 

Kingdom in early August 2004.1454 On August 24, 2004, U.K. authorities informed the CIA that 

the criminal charges against Barot and his co-conspirators "were mainly possible owing to the 

recovery of terrorist-related materials during searches of associated properties and vehicles 

following their arrests."1455 In September 2004, an Intelligence Community assessment stated 

that Dhiren Barot was "in an early phase of operational planning at the time of his capture," and 

that there was no evidence to indicate that Barot had acquired the envisioned materials for the 

attacks.1456 In December 2005, an FBI assessment stated, "the main plot presented in the Gas 

Limos Project is unlikely to be as successful as described," concluding, "we assess that the Gas 

Limos Project, while ambitious and creative, is far-fetched."1457 On November 7, 2006, Dhiren 

Barot was sentenced to life in prison. On May 16, 2007, Barot's sentence was reduced from life 

in prison to 30 years after a British Court of Appeal found that expert assessments describing the 

plot as "amateurish," "defective," and unlikely to succeed were not provided to the sentencing 

judge.1458 

The thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot and the 

identification and/or capture of Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi, is one of the eight most 

frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques. Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and 

provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent 

the identification and/or arrest of Dhiren Barot, and/or the disruption of his U.K. plotting, as an 

example of how "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying 

interrogation techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots" and "capture additional 

terrorists."1459 In at least one document prepared for the president, the CIA specifically 

coordinated fact sheet and states the following regarding Dhiren Barot and his U.K. attack planning: "Issa alHindi—who previously traveled to and cased a number of financial targets in the US—met with al-Qa'ida leaders in 

Pakistan in early 2004 to discuss attack planning against targets in the UK. Issa spent February and March 2004 in 

Shkai, Pakistan, with senior al-Qa'ida explosives expert 'Abd al-Rahman al-Muhajir, probably refining plans to use 

vehicle bombs against UK targets. Issa's reports, which were recovered in a raid in mid-2004, discussed ramming a 

fuel tanker into a target and parking explosives-laden courier vans or limousines in underground garages. 

Disruption: Issa and members of his cell were detained in the UK in early August 2004—soon after the arrest of key 

Hamza Rabi'a subordinate Abu Talha al-Pakistani in Pakistan." 

1454

 CIA internal assessments concur with this analysis. See "disruption" text in an email from: [REDACTED]; to: 

[REDACTED], at the Office of Director of National Intelligence; subject: "URGENT: Unclassified Fact Sheet for 

[REDACTED]"; date: October 6, 2005, at 02:39 PM. 

14,5

 CIA • • (242144Z AUG 04) 

1456

 Disseminated intelligence product by the IICT, entitled, "Homeland: Reappraising al-Qa'ida's "Election 

Threat," dated September 10, 2004. 

1457

 FBI Intelligence Assessment, "The Gas Limos Project: An al-Qa'ida Urban Attack Plan Assessment," dated 

December 14, 2004. 

1455 See Royal Courts of Justice Appeal, Barot v R [2007], EWCA Crim 1119(16 May 2007). The expert 

assessments determined that the plotting involved "a professional-looking attempt from amateurs who did not really 

know what they were doing." See also June 15, 2007, Bloomberg news article entitled, "Terrorist Gang Jailed for 

Helping London and New York Bomb Plot." 

1455

 Italics included in CIA Memorandum to the Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA 

Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," from March 2, 2005. See also CIA talking points for National Security 

Council entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee 

Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques," dated March 4, 2005, as well as multiple other CIA briefing records and 

memoranda. 

Illl I Mil I I llll I III I I 

Page 261 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

261 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

highlighted the waterboard technique in enabling the "disruption of [Dhiren Barot's] sleeper 

cell."1460 The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques was "otherwise unavailable" and "saved lives."1461 

1460 See document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, with 

the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." 

1461

 From 2003 through 2009, the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that 

the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA 

representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see: 

(1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, 

which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. The CIA representations referenced by the 

OLC include that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical," 

"vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect 

and disrupt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [tire OLC] that 

the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United 

States." (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from 

Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: 

Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques 

that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the 

Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA 

representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

Citing CIA documents and the President's September 6,2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation program 

(which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: "The CIA interrogation program— 

and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security 

of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As the President 

explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, 

the program has saved innocent lives.'" (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central 

Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 

Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 

of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value 

al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of die National Security Council in July and September 2003 

represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence 

information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives," and waned policymakers that "[t]ermination of 

this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from 

Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation 

Program, July 29,2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and 

September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The 

CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: 

"Information [the CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has 

almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to 

the fact that without die use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks 

involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, 

Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention 

and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27,2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum 

re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA 

Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the 

[enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of 

the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other 

means." (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid 

Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," including "1 " ' " la, CIA document "EITs and 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 262 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

262 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

(IS^HHB^ ) For example, documents prepared in February 2009 for CIA 

Director Leon Panetta on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques state 

that the "CIA assesses. ..the techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and 

that "most, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would 

not have been discovered or reported by other means." The document provides examples of 

"some of the key captures, disrupted plots, and intelligence" attributed to CIA interrogations. 

The document includes the following: 

"Key Captures from HVD Interrogations: .. .arrest ofDhiren Barot (aka Issa 

al-Hindi) in the United Kingdom."1462 

The materials for Director Panetta also include a chart entitled, "Key Intelligence and Reporting 

Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad," that identifies two pieces of "key 

intelligence" acquired from KSM, one related to Majid Khan1463 and the other to Dhiren Barot: 

"KSM reports on an unidentified UK-based operative, Issa al-Hindi, which 

touches off an intensive CIA, FBI and [United Kingdom] manhunt."1464 

(^S/z^^imMf j Likewise, a December 2004 CIA memorandum prepared for 

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice responded to a request "for an independent study of 

the foreign intelligence efficacy of using enhanced interrogation techniques." The CIA 

responded, "[t]here is no way to conduct such a study," but stated that the "CIA's use of DOJEffectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," 

"Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background 

on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed to die Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 

March 18,2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," located in Committee databases (DTS #2009-1258), 

which provides a list of "some of the key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence 

acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any odier means." See 

Volume II for additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the 

CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives." 

1462

 Italics added. CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid 

Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)." The documents include "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document 

"EITs and Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and 

KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include 

"Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted." 

1463

 The reference in the document to KSM's reporting related to Majid Khan is inaccurate. The document asserts: 

"When confronted with KSM's information, Majid admits he delivered die money to Zubair...." As described in 

this summary, and more extensively in Volume II, Majid Khan provided information on the referenced money 

transfer while in foreign government custody, to an interrogator using rapport-building techniques, prior to any 

information from KSM. 

1464

 CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- 18FEB.2009" and 

graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad 

(KSM)." Includes "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and Effectiveness," with 

associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key 

Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background on Key Captures and 

Plots Disrupted." 

11 ii 1111 1 MBMI^BBII^^^ B i II i II 

Page 263 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

263 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, 

has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume 

of critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida." The document then provides examples of "[k]ey 

intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques,"1465 

including: 

"Issa al-Hindi: KSM first1466 identified Issa al-Hindi as an operative he sent to 

the US prior to 9/11 to case potential targetsinNYCandWashington. When 

shown surveillance photos provided by [foreign partner 

authorities], HVDs confirmed al-Hindi's identity. Al-Hindi's capture by the 

British resulted in the disruption of a sleeper cell and led to the arrest of other 

operatives."1467 

Similarly, CIA Director Michael Hayden represented to the 

Committee on April 12, 2007, that "KSM also provided the first lead to an operative known as 

'Issa al-Hindi,' with other detainees giving additional identifying information."1468 

The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the 

thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot and the identification and/or arrest of 

Dhiren Barot, aka Abu Issa al-Hindi, in 17 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and 

the Department of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009.1469 

(^fllllllHI^B^ ) A review of CIA operational cables and other documents found 

that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did not result in the unique intelligence that the 

1465

 Italics in original. 

1466

 The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the "CIA accurately represented that Khalid Shaykh Muhammad 

(KSM) provided the initial lead to a UK-based al-Qa'ida operative named Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi, whom 

KSM had tasked to case US targets. That information [from KSM] allowed us to identify this Issa as Barot and 

ultimately led British authorities to arrest him." As is described in this summary, and in greater detail in Volume II, 

this CIA representation is not supported by internal CIA records. 

1467

 CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence," Subject: 

"Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," included in email from: to: 

• H

 ar,d ••^• H subject: on value 

techniques"; date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM. The email references the attached "information paper to Dr. 

Rice explaining the value of the interrogation techniques." The document includes references to the following: The 

Karachi Plot, the Heathrow Plot, the "Second Wave" plots, the Guraba Cell, Issa al-Hindi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, 

Hambali's Capture, Jafaar al-Tayyar, the Dirty Bomb Plot, Sajid Badat, and Shkai, Pakistan. The document also 

asserts that "[pjrior to the use of enhanced measures" the CIA "acquired little threat information or significant 

actionable intelligence" from KSM. As detailed in the summary, KSM was subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques immediately upon entering CIA custody. 

1468

 CIA classified statement for the record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael 

V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007; and accompanying Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12, 2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central Intelligence Agency Detention and 

Interrogation Program" (DTS #2007-1563). 

1469 See list of CIA prepared briefings and memoranda from 2003 through 2009 with representations on the 

effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques referenced in this summary and described in detail in 

Volume II. 

II II 11111 ^BBMMI^BII^ B I II I II 

Page 264 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

264 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET// 1//NOFQRN 

CIA represented led to the arrest of Dhiren Barot or the thwarting of his plotting.1470 The review 

found that the intelligence that alerted security officials to: (1) the potential terrorist threat posed 

by one or more U.K.-based operatives with the alias "Issa"; (2) Issa's more common alias, "Issa 

al-Hindi"; (3) Issa al-Hindi's location; (4) Issa al-Hindi's true name, Dhiren Barot; and (5) 

information on Dhiren Barot's U.K. plotting, all came from intelligence sources unrelated to the 

CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.1471 Contrary to CIA representations, reporting from 

CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did not lead to the arrest 

of Dhiren Barot or the thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot, nor did KSM 

provide the first reporting on a U.K.-based "Issa." Rather, the disruption of the United Kingdom 

Urban Targets Plot and the identification and arrest of Dhiren Barot (aka Issa al-Hindi) was 

attributable to the efforts of U.K. law enforccmcnt^^^^^^Hjjjj^^^l , as well as | 

mm^ H [a review of computer hard drives], [collected 

communications], and reporting from detainees in the custody of the U.S. Department of Justice, 

the U.S. military, and a foreign government. While records indicate KSM did provide the initial 

information on "Issa's" tasking to conduct casings in the United States prior to the September 11, 

2001, attacks,1472 as well as information on an email address related to Issa,1473 this information 

was provided within a larger body of fabricated reporting KSM provided on Issa. The CIA was 

unable to distinguish between the accurate and inaccurate reporting, and KSM's varied reporting 

led CIA officers to conclude that KSM was "protecting" Issa1474 and "obstructing [the CIA's] 

ability to acquire good information" on the U.K.-based operative well after the CIA ceased using 

enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM.1475 

1470

 CIA records indicate that CIA detainees largely provided corroborative reporting on Abu Issa, aka Dhiren Barot, 

and that CIA representations that "most, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program 

would not have been discovered or reported by other means," is not supported by CIA records. See intelligence 

chronology in Volume II for additional details. 

1471

 Dhiren Barot's arrest by U.K. authorities was also unrelated to reporting from the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program. See information in this summary, as well as the intelligence chronology in Volume II. 

H72 when Issa's U.S. casing reports were found on Abu Talha al-Pakistani's computer, KSM stated that he did not 

know of any al-Qa'ida plans, by Abu Talha or anyone else, to target the Citigroup/Citibank building, Prudential 

Group building, or the United Nations building in New York. (See MI^I M 1477 ^^^^H^M- ) 

Nonetheless, KSM's reporting on Issa's travel to the U.S. was later corroborated by FBI reporting and individuals 

detained by foreign governments. See FBI IIR M^^M I (26 AUG 2004) and TTIC Special Analysis Report 

2004-28H, entitled, "Homeland: Threat Assessment for IMFAVorld Bank Annual Meeting, 2-3 October 2004," 

dated September 28,2004; and DIRECTOR • • •^•^HH * See also reissue, DIRECTOR 

1473

 10948 (222101Z MAR 03) 

1474

 A CIA officer's comment on talking points prepared for "ADC1 Tuesday Briefing of Kerry/Edwards" on Issa alHindi states that "KSM didn't decode die [phone] numbers for us (he just provided info on how he may have 

encoded the numbers—which when used didn't result in valid numbers) [an] address with the number didn't exist; it 

was a dead end, and it appears KSM was protecting [Issa] al-Hindi." See email from: [REDACTED]; to: 

[REDACTED], with multiple ccs; subject: "IMMEDIATE: al-Hindi TPs for ADCI Tuesday Briefing of 

Kerry/Edwards"; date: August 30,2004, at 02:51 PM, which contains comments onpreviou^^t^^alkingpoints. 

1475

 Email from:

 to: > 

subject: KSM and Khallad 

date: October 16,2003, at 5:25:13 PM. See also email from:

 to :

 [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED]; cc: ^I^MBM . [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Some things to 

ping Mukie on-cable coming; date: April 11,2003, at 5:00:12 PM; and ALEC M M (222153Z APR 03). 

11ii 1111 1 ^^^BBB^^MMT^'' 1 1 1 

Page 265 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

265 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

According to information provided to the CIA by the United 

Kingdom, Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi, appeared in reporting related to 

"terrorist training" and participation "in jihad in occupied Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and 

Malaysia throughout the 1990s."1476 Information concerning a book written by Dhiren Barot 

(under the alias "Esa al-Hindi") on jihad in Kashmir appeared in HI^I^Hf l

 an d

 CIA 

intelligence records as early as December 1999.1477 At that time U.K. authorities had a number 

of U.K.-based extremists under investigation, including Moazzem Begg.1478 Begg's Maktabah 

al-Ansar bookstore was described as "a known jihadist gathering place."1479 According to 

intelligence reports, in 1999, 'Abu Issa' stayed with Moazzem 

Begg at the Maktabah al-Ansar bookstore in Birmingham, U.K.," and that this "Issa" was in 

contact with other U.K. extremists.1481 According to reporting, Begg was associated with two 

"al-Qa'ida operatives" arrested in 1999 for their involvement in terrorist plotting and later 

released.1482 A report from August 1, 2000, stated that U.K. authorities raided Begg's bookstore 

and found an invoice for 5000 copies of a book entitled, "The Army of Madina in Kashmir."1483 

A search of computers associated with the two aforementioned "al-Qa'ida operatives" described 

the book as their "project" written by "a brother from England who was a Hindu and became a 

Muslim." According to the reporting, the U.K.-based author of the book "got training in 

Afghanistan" before fighting jihad in Kashmir.1484 (The book advocates for "worldwide jihad" 

and the author is listed on the cover of the book as "Esa al-Hindi."1485) Additional reporting on 

1476

 CIA^^B(2^144ZAUG04 ) 

1477 

l47S

 A June 25, 2004, CIA Serial Flyer entitled, "Guantanamo Bay Detainee Moazzem Begg's Links to Active 

Operatives," states that, after being captured in February 2002 and being held in U.S. military custody, "Begg has 

been cooperative in debriefings and has provided background information and descriptions of a number of his past 

associates that have helped shed light on the extent of the Islamic extremist network in the United Kingdom and its 

ties to al-Qa'ida." According to the CIA report, in June 2004, Begg's "description and resulting sketch of UK 

contact Issa al-Hindi"—whose true identity was then unknown—"was compared to a still shot of an unidentified 

man taken from a surveillance video of UK extremists." The comparison "revealed that the man in the video 

probably [was] the elusive Issa al-Hindi." Begg co-owned the Maktabah al-Ansar bookshop in Birmingham, United 

Kingdom, that would later be found to have published a book written by "Esa al-Hindi" that was well known among 

U.K. extremists, "The Army of Madinah in Kashmir." 

147'J

 See [REDACTED] 72330 and "Guantanamo Bay Detainee Moazzem Begg's Links to Active 

Operatives," June 2004 for intelligence referencing earlier reporting. See also open source reporting on U.K. raids 

of the bookstore in the year 2000, as well as subsequent raids, including, "Bookshop linked to Bin Laden's 

'General," The Telegraph, dated February 1, 2007. 

1480

 On April 2004,H[ | relayed information acquired from Sajid Badat, the other U.K. "Issa." Badat stated 

that "anyone who had been involved with jihad in Britain since the mid-90s" would know the other Issa, naming 

among other individuals, Moazzem Begg. See 19907 (231744Z APR 04). 

1481

 CIAj|^B(262213 Z SEP 03) (cable referencing information collected in 1999) 

1482

 ••^H J 49612 (281213Z JUL03) 

1483

 [REDACTED] 72330 ^I^^H^ H ( cabl e discusses historical reporting). See also "Bookshop linked to 

Bin Laden's 'General," The Telegraph, dated February 1, 2007. 

1485

 The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the "Study highlights and mischaracterizes" this intelligence because 

the author of "The Army of Madinah in Kashmir," is not identified in the intelligence report. The CIA Response 

states that the report "identifies the author only as 'an Afghanistan-trained British convert writing about Hindu 

atrocities in Kashmir.'" Notwithstanding the CIA's Response, the Committee found the intelligence report 

references the book, "The Army of Madinah in Kashmir," and describes the author as "a brother from England who 

was a Hindu and became a Muslim about six years ago" and who "got training in Afghanistan then went to fight in 

Kashmir." According to open sources, the 1999 book advocated "worldwide jihad" in order to bring nations "to 

11II II III I ^^^Mj^^BUBByN^FOR N 

Page 266 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

266 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

"Issa" appeared in CIA records again in July 2001. At that time the FBI reported that Ahmed 

Ressam, who was in a U.S. federal prison (arrested by U.S. border patrol with explosives in his 

vehicle in December 1999), reported that a U.K. national named "Issa" attended a terrorist 

training camp associated with al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan.1486 

In February 2002, Moazzem Begg was arrested at an al-Qa'ida safe 

house in Islamabad, Pakistan, and subsequently transferred to U.S. military custody at 

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.1487 While still in Pakistani custody, Begg provided reporting on U.K.-

based extremists in the context of terrorist training camps, including information on an individual 

who would play a key role in "Issa's" identification and capture, "Sulayman" (variant _____ 

Sulyman).1488 In May 2002, the CIA was seeking to learn more about "Sulyman."1489 H 

[foreign partner] authorities informed the CIA that Sulyman was a person of interest to U.K. 

authorities for his connections to U.K. extremists and his suspected travel to Kashmir multiple 

times for terrorist activity. The [foreign partner] further reported that Sulyman may have 

been involved BB^^^^H^^^^^B^HB^^^^^B^^^^^^^ B The same 

report providedby^^^^J[foreign partner] included Sulyman's likely true name, Nisar Jilal, as 

well as his date of birth and place of employment.1490 

Beginning in mid-2002, there was increasing intelligence reporting 

on one or more U.K.-based individuals referred to as "Issa" who were connected to KSM and 

possibly planning attacks in the United Kingdom.1491 This reporting resulted in efforts by U.K. 

authorities to identify and locate this "Issa."1492 In August 2002,1493 and again in October 2002, 

^^^ ^ [foreign partner] informed the CIA that it was seeking to identify a U.K.-based "Abu 

Issa" who was reportedly "an English speaker and trusted [terrorist] operative."1494 

(TSZ/II^H^^^^B^H^ ) I n September 2002, an email address ("Lazylozy") was recovered 

during raids related to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh that would later be found to be in 

their knees." An Internet archive search for the title of the book, "The Army of Madinah in Kashmir," found the 

book prominently advertised among the "Recommended Products" in 2002 on the website for the Maktabah alAnsar bookstore (www.maktabah.net/books/images/kashmir.jpg: internet archive 2002). The website archive from 

2002 states that the author "Esa al-Hindi" converted "to Islam at the age of 20" and recalls his "personal experience 

in occupied Kashmir fighting the Indian forces." The bookstore's website and related jihadi websites list the author 

of the book as "Esa Al-Hindi." CIA cables suggest it was not until June 2003 that the CIA conducted an internet 

search for "The Army of Madinah in Kashmir." When the search was conducted, the CIA found "it is one of the 

recommended reads featured" on the website of the Maktabah al-Ansar bookstore. See ALEC (052206Z 

JUN 03). As noted, the same information on the book was prominently listed on the same website more than a year 

earlier. 

,

'

,8e

 DIRECTOR (23JUL01); DIRECTOR (20JUL01) 

1487

 June 25, 2004, CIA Serial Flyer entitled, "Guantanamo Bay Detainee Moazzem Begg's Links to Active 

Operatives." 

1488

 DIRECTOR ^^BIHBBI^^ H DIRECTOR ^^ B 

1489

 DIRECTOR B^BI^^^^^^^B ; DIRECTOR 

1490 77599!1 ^ 

1491 See 2002 reporting detailed in the Volume II intelligence chronology. At this point it was still unknown how 

many Issas the reporting was referencing. In September 2003, however, a CIA officer assessed there were "two (or 

three) Abu Issas" in intelligence reporting. See M B 99093 (020931Z SEP 03). 

1492

 [REDACTED] 80508 f 

1493

 [REDACTED] 80508 

1494

 [REDACTED] 839171 

m i I I in i BI^^MI^^ B IIIIIIIIII I 

Page 267 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

267 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

contact with "Issa." Information on the email address was disseminated in intelligence 

reporting.1495 The same email address was found on March 1, 2003, during the raids that led to 

the capture of KSM. CIA records indicate that sought H coverage for the email 

account.1496 Within days, the Intelligence Community was collecting information from the 

account and had reported that the user of the account was in contact with other covered accounts 

and that the message content was in English.1497 

(^•••B/P ) KSM was captured on March 1, 2003. On March | , 2003, KSM 

was rendered to CIA custody and immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques—including at least 183 applications of the waterboard interrogation technique—until 

March 25, 2003.1498 During the month of March 2003, KSM provided information on a variety 

of matters, including on a U.K.-based Abu Issa al-Britani. The information provided by KSM on 

"Issa" included both accurate and inaccurate information. At the time, the CIA was unable to 

discern between the two. During interrogation sessions in March 2003, KSM first discussed an 

"Issa al-Britani" among a list of individuals who were connected to KSM's Heathrow Airport 

plotting.1499 On March 17, 2003, KSM stated that, prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks, he 

tasked Issa to travel to the United States to "collect information on economic targets " On March 

21, 2003, KSM was waterboarded for failing to confirm interrogators' suspicions that KSM 

sought to recruit individuals from among the African American Muslim community. KSM then 

stated that he had talked with "Issa" about contacting African American Muslim groups prior to 

September 11, 2001.1500 The next day KSM was waterboarded for failing to provide more 

information on the recruitment of African American Muslims. One hour after the waterboarding 

session, KSM stated that he tasked Issa "to make contact with black U.S. citizen converts to 

Islam in Montana," and that he instructed Issa to use his ties to Shaykh Abu Hamza al-Masri, a 

U.K.-based Imam, to facilitate his recruitment efforts.1501 KSM later stated that Issa's mission 

in the United States was to surveil forests to potentially ignite forest fires.1502 During this period, 

KSM was confronted with a series of emails that included the aforementioned "Lazylozy" email 

account and another email account KSM confirmed that the emails were 

established for communication between Issa al-Britani and Ammar al-Baluchi and stated that 

Issa used the "Lazylozy" account, and that al-Baluchi used the account.1503 (A 

month later the CIA reported that Issa did not use the "Lazylozy" email address, but the other 

email address.)1504 Over the next six months, KSM retracted or provided conflicting reporting on 

Issa. On June 22, 2003, CIA interrogators reported that "[KSM] nervously explained to 

1496

 ALGC^H(10223S Z MAR 03) 

H97 Update on E-mail Activity | 

Messages Derived from H Coverage, CIA L 

1498 See KSM detainee review in Volume III for additional details, 

"^fher e are no other records indicating that Dhiren Barot, aka Issa, was connected to KSM's Heathrow Plotting 

^^•1082 8 (1513I0Z MAR 03); H^B10815(141819 Z MAR03);HH | 10871 (172037Z MAR 03) 

1500

 10932 (212132Z MAR O^IB H 10921 (211046Z MAR 03) 

1501

 10942 (2216I0Z MAR 03). According to KSM, Shaykh abu Hamza al-Masri had contacts in 

Montana. 

'-02 DIRECTOR (312243Z MAR 03); 1^11094 2 (221521ZMAR 03); 11070 (30211SZ 

MAR 03), disseminated as 

110948 (222101Z MAR 03) 

1504

 ALEC^^B(182330 Z APR03) 

TOP SECRET//! 

Page 268 of 499 

I//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

268 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

debriefer that he was under 'enhanced measures' when he made these claims" about terrorist 

recruitment in Montana, and "simply told his interrogators what he thought they wanted to 

hear.'"505 A CIA Headquarters response cable stated that the CIA's ALEC Station believed 

KSM's fabrication claims were "another resistance/manipulation ploy" and characterized KSM's 

contention that he "felt 'forced' to make admissions" under enhanced interrogation techniques as 

"convenient excuses." As a result, ALEC Station urged CIA officers at the detention site to get 

KSM to reveal "who is the key contact person in Montana?"1506 By June 30, 2005, ALEC 

Station had concluded that KSM's reporting about African American Muslims in Montana was 

"an outright fabrication."1507 

(TSAflH^^HH/^ ) On April 4, 2003, the CIA provided reporting to the U.K. on 

"Issa," stating that "we realize that Abu Issa is a target of interest to your service." The 

information compiled by the CIA included an August 2002 report (unrelated to the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program) that stated that a U.K. national "Abu Issa Al-Pakistani" 

was slated by al-Qa'ida for "terrorist operations against foreign targets."1508 On April 18, 2003, 

a ^•cabletoth e U.K. relayed that the correct email for Abu Issa al-BritanUs 

('*^BI^BBB"). It further noted that "the Abu Issa account" is "under^BEjgverage 1 and J 

^ 

background. According to the cable, KSM originally stated Issa was of Pakistani origin, but now 

claimed that Issa was of Indian origin. The CIA wrote that KSM's reporting: 

"tracks with reporting from another detainee. As you are aware, Feroz Abbasi 

and other detainees at Guantanmo [sic] Bay have described an Abu Issa that 

worked for the al-Qa'ida media Committee run by KSM...Abassi [at] one time 

related that Abu Issa described himself as Indian."1509 

associated with Abu Issa ('j 

Wembley, a suburb of London.1510 

11, 2003, H f cable noted that the email address 

]") was used and tracked to a specific address in 

(T8//HHH//NF ) On May 28, 2003, a CIA cable documented intelligence obtained 

by the FBI from interviews of James Ujaama (aka Bilal Ahmed), who was in FBI custody. 

Ujaama, who had spent time in the U.K. extremist community, reported on an "Issa" in the U.K. 

who was known as "Issa al-Hindi" and was "good friends with a Pakistani male named 

Sulyman."1511 H had already disseminated intelligence indicating that Sulyman was 

1505 

1506

 ALEC 

12095 (222049Z JUN 03) 

(260043Z JUN 03). No individuals related to KSM's reporting were ever identified in Montana. 

KSM also retracted his statement connecting Issa to the Heathrow Airport plotting. There are no CIA records to 

indicate that either U.K.-based Issas (Sajid Badat or Dhiren Barot) was ever involved in the Heathrow Airport 

plotting. See intelligence chronology in Volume II and information on the Heathrow plotting in this summary for 

additional information. 

1507

 ALEC 

1508

 ALEC 

1509

 ALEC 

1510

 ALEC 

1511 

(302258Z JUN 03) 

(182330Z APR 03). The Committee did not have access to U.S. military detainee reporting. 

052206Z JUN 03). See also ALEC and 93759 (160919Z MAY 03). 

280438Z 

I (>r ''.I < • eI• I^^BBM^MBB^M 1' *H 

Page 269 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

269 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

likely Nisar Jalal, based on reporting from U.S military detainee Moazzem Begg.1512 Ujaama 

provided the FBI with the name of the U.K. law office where Sulyman (aka Nisar Jalal) worked, 

which matched reporting provided to the CIA by [foreign partner] authorities in | 

2002.1513 

On June 2, 2003, KSM was shown a sketch of Issa al-Hindi 

provided to the CIA by the FBI and based on reporting by James Ujaama. KSM stated that the 

sketch did not look like anyone he knew.1514 

A June 5, 2003, cable states that the FBI had "gleaned new clues 

about Issa in recent days from detainees, including [from Moazzem] Begg," who was in U.S. 

military custody. According to the cable, Begg told FBI special agents "that Issa is likely from 

Wembley, Alperton, or Sudbury/' A Hil l noted that | 

[technical collection indicated that Issa was located in 

Wembley].1515 U.K. officials highlighted that lssa's reported "good friend," Nisar Jilal (aka 

Sulyman), also had an address in Wembley.1516 

(TS/^^^^^^^^^^NF ) On September 13, 2003, KSM explained a coding system for 

telephone numbers for Issa that produced no results.1517 On October 16, 2003, KSM identified a 

picture of an individual known as "Nakuda," as Abu Issa al-Britani.'518 CIA relayed this 

information to U.K. officials, who responded that this identification was "extremely 

unlikely."1519 CIA detainee Khallad bin Attash was shown the same photograph and stated that 

the photo "definitely" was not Issa.1520 CIA officers wrote that KSM "is obstructing our ability 

to acquire good information" on Issa and noting that KSM has "misidentified photos when he 

knows we are fishing" and "misleads us on telephone numbers."1521 A cable from the CIA's 

ALEC Station stated that "KSM appears to have knowingly led us astray on this potentially 

1,2002 

[280438Z|280746Z MAY 03), •• • 77599, ^^^2002 1 Ujaama provided 

detailed information on Issa al-Hindi, including a description, biographical data, and information on Issa al-Hindi's 

contacts, which could be used to locate and identify Issa al-Hindi. 

111909 (022030Z JUN 03) 

1515

 ALEC (052206Z JUN 03) 

1516

 [REDACTED] 94931 IHH^^H . The U.K. also reported that, in June of 1999, an individual assessed 

to be Issa provided Moazzem Begg with telephone numbers for a lawyer known as Sulyman. See [REDACTED] 

95463 ALEC f 

| I2825 (131747ZSEP 03); ALEC (141942Z SEP 03); ALEC (210159Z OCT 03) 

1518

 Email from: ^ 

, [REDACTED]; cc: | 

date: October 16, 2003, at 5:25:13 PM. 

13,9

 ^•^•1005 3 

1520

 ALEC^^B(21015Q Z OCT03) 

321

 Emai 1 from: to: | 

[REDACTED]; cc^^^^^^ K subject: KSM and Khallad Issues; 

date: October 16, 2003, at 5:25:13 PM. See also email from: fll^Biil^H'to: [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED]; cc: •^••• H [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Some things to 

ping Mukie on-cable coming; date: April 11,2003, at 5:00:12 PM; and ALEC (222153Z APR 03). 

11 ii 11 i i i BMBBI^BMMM i mi H i m 

Page 270 of 499 

; subject: KSM and Khallad Issues; 

UNCLASSIFIED 

270 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET// 1//NOFORN 

important, albeit historical, lead [the phone numbers] to one of our most hotly pursued 

targets."1522 

0 

£) In October 2003, CIA officers wrote: 

"even with all we have learned from our on-going partnership with [the United 

Kingdom] and various detainees, we have not been able to obtain accurate 

locational information, including confirmed phone numbers and timely 

information on email addresses. Our latest information, based on [foreign 

partner reporting] and a detainee's assessment [Moazzem Begg in U.S. 

military custody], is that Issa is believed to currently be located in Wembley, a 

suburb of London.'0523 

c ) In January 2004, I^ H urged m [foreign partner] officials to 

|interview Nisar Jilal (aka Sulyman) "in light of Ujaama's reporting" from the FBI 

confirming a relationship between Issa al-Hindi and Nisar Jilal.1524 Instead, [foreign 

artner] officials began planning an operation | 

One individual personally 

saw Issa al-Hindi on June 2003, in the Wembley area of South London. Based on the FBI 

reporting and the email coverage, U.K. authorities continuously surveilled Nisar Jilal (aka 

Sulyman) and photographed his associates.1526 A specific series of photographs was passed by 

[foreign partner] officials to CIA officials depicting an individual whom CIA 

officials wrote "bears a striking resemblance" to the Issa al-Hindi sketch provided by Moazzem 

Begg, the detainee in U.S. military custody.1527 The CIA would later write that Moazzem Bcgg's 

"description and resulting sketch of U.K. contact Issa al-Hindi" was "compared to a still shot of 

an unidentified man taken from a surveillance video of UK extremists," and the comparison 

"revealed that the man in the video probably [was] the elusive Issa al-Hindi."1528 

?) With the suspicion that the photo was Issa al-Hindi, the CIA's 

| requested the photo be "shown to detainees" and requested "immediate 

feedback."1529 According to a CIA cable dated June 17, 2004, the suspected Issa al-Hindi 

1522

 ALEC • • (210159Z OCT 03) 

1523

 Draft cable included in an email from: [REDACTED]; to and ^^Bi^H^HH i subject: 

"Abu Issa al-Hindi Targeting Study"; date: October 22, 2003, at 6:49:41 PM. 

1524

 ALEC I 

1525

 ALECI 

1326

 22359 ^^^ M 22246 See also [REDACTED] email 

and others; subject: "For Immed. Coord: Al-Hindi ID Highlight"; date: June 17, 2004, at 

3:06:29 PM. 

1527

 [REDACTED] 22406 (04 9023184 I17/JUN/2004) 

1528

 A June 25, 2004, CIA Serial Flyer entitled, "Guantanamo Bay Detainee Moazzem Begg's Links to Active 

Operatives." 

1529

 [REDACTED] 22406 (04 9023184117/JUN/2004) 

11 ii 11 11 i i II i II 

Page 271 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

271 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

photograph was shown to KSM, who "confirmed that the unidentified photo depicts alHindi."1530 

By July 2,2004, [foreign partner] authorities had informed 

the CIA that they felt "confident" that Issa's true name was "Dhiren Barot." According to ||H _ 

reporting, while under surveillance, Issa was observed talking for an extended period of timc| | 

^ in the vicinity where James Ujaama (in FBI custody) had 

placed Issa.1531 H [foreign partner] authorities observed that Issa drove m t o a 

residence in Wembley. A record search of the address in Wembley by U.K. authorities identified 

a passport application with a photograph that matched the Issa under surveillance. The name on 

the passport application was Issa's true name, Dhiren Barot.1532 

Once identified, Dhiren Barot remained under U.K. surveillance as 

the U.K. collected additional information on Dhiren Barot and his activities. On July 2004, 

an al-Qa'ida associate named Abu Talha al-Pakistani was arrested and detained by Pakistani 

officials.1533 CIA records indicate that the arrest occurred after 

^^Hidentified when and where Abu Talha al-Pakistani wouldbeat^^^Hllf^^BT 5 3 4 On 

July®, 2004, after Abu Talha's capture, Pakistani authorities conducted a series of raids and 

seized a laptop computer that was shared with the U.S. government.1535 The computer was 

suspected of belonging to senior al-Qa'ida member, Hamza Rabi'a,1536 and contained a series of 

undated, English-language casing reports. In all, the computer contained over 500 photographs, 

maps, sketches, and scanned documents associated with apparent casings.1537 

(TS/^^^HI^^^Ip/NF ) On July 31, 2004, KSM was questioned about the casing reports. 

KSM stated that he did not know of any al-Qa'ida plans by Abu Talha or anyone else to target 

the Citigroup/Citibank building, Prudential Group building, or the United Nations building in 

1530

 CIA records indicate that other detainees also identified this individual as Issa al-Hindi. 

1531 See 280438Z (280746Z MAY 03) and •• • 77599 Ujaama 

provided detailed information on Issa al-Hindi, including a description, biographical data, and information on Issa 

al-Hindi's contacts, which could be used to locate and identify Issa al-Hindi. There are no specific CIA records of 

James Ujaama providing exact location data for Issa al-Hindi. As noted, however, senior CIA personnel expressed 

frustration that the U.K. was not sharing all known information on their investigations, writing in August 2003 that 

"[the FBI is] clearly working closely with the [U.K. service] on these matters and [the CIA is] at the mercy" of what 

it is told. As described in this summary, James Ujaama was in FBI custody. 

|23226| 

CIA WASHINGTON DC 

| email from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: DRAFT DCI SPECIAL ITEM -

14Jul04; date: July 14, 2004, at 03:48 PM. This information was obtained from sources unrelated to the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Prog 

1535

 38891 

1536

 Email from: BB^^^^Ktoljame s Pavitt, [REDACTED], Rodriguez, John 

P. Mudd, [REDACTED], | 

[REDACTED], cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Laptop docex from 

recent raid may yield pre-election threat ml I I ill llll J llll I at 07:35 AM. 

1537 See Terrorist Threat Integration Center, Terrorist Threats to US Interests Worldwide. See also I 

|; and | 

7NOFORN 

Page 272 of 499 

TOP SECRET// 

UNCLASSIFIED 

272 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRETflB^^^^^^^^^MflNQFQR N 

New York described in the documents.1538 On the same day, Abu Talha, who was in the custody 

of a foreign government, stated the "U.S. casing reports were from Abu Issa."1539 Issa, aka 

Dhiren Barot, was still under surveillance by U.K. authorities at this time.1540 

(T&V^HIH^^I^^ 1) On August 1, 2004, Abu Talha was shown a photograph of Dhiren 

Barot and "immediately identified him as Issa." Abu Talha—who was cooperating with foreign 

government authorities—described Issa's visit to Pakistan from February to April 2004, during 

which he stated "Issa" (aka Dhiren Barot) met with Hamza al-Rabi'a on multiple occasions to 

"discuss operations in the United Kingdom and targets already cased in the United States." Abu 

Talha stated that Issa believed his activities and identity were not known to the authorities.1541 

An August 3, 2004, cable stated that "analysis of information on 

[the] hard drive" of the computer seized "revealed a document... that is a detailed study on the 

methodologies to affect a terrorist attack." According to the cable, "the study describes the 

operational and logistics environment in the UK." The document is divided into two main parts. 

The first part includes seven chapters on the topic entitled "rough presentation for gas limo 

project." The second part is entitled "rough presentation for radiation (dirty bomb) project." 

The "gas limo project" section concludes that the most feasible option would be to use a 

limousine to deliver explosives, while the "dirty bomb" project section states that smoke 

detectors could be used to deliver the radioactive substance americium-147. The document 

proposes to use 10,000 smoke detectors as part of an explosive device to spread this radioactive 

element. In addition, the document discusses the vulnerabilities of trains and the possibilities of 

hijacking and utilizing gasoline tankers to conduct a terrorist attack.1542 

(TS^^^IHII^H^^ ) On the same day the analysis was disseminated, August 3, 2004, 

U.K. authorities arrested Dhiren Barot and 12 other individuals, and seized "over 100 harddrives."1543

 On August 7, 2004, the U.K. shared ^HH^^H^^^ I associated with Dhiren 

Barot with the U.S. government. The [information provided] included copies of casing 

reports related to the United States and the United Kingdom.1544 On August 17, 2004, U.K. 

authorities charged nine individuals in relation to the Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi, 

investigation.1545 U.K. authorities informed the CIA that "[d]espite intelligence about the 

activities of the network, the recent charges of the individuals involved or linked to this planning 

|; to: James Pavitt, [REDACTED], | Rodriguez, John P. 

1539

 Email from: | 

Mudd, [REDACTED], 

HHH L [REDACTED], cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Laptop docex from 

recent raid may yield pre-election threat information; date: July H . 2004, at 07:35 AM. 

1540

 Email from: BBBMMB - to: James Pavitt [REDACTED], Rodriguez, John P. Mudd, 

[REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], H^^I^^Hrcc : [REDACTED]; subject: Laptop docex from recent raid may 

yield pre-election threat information; date: July J . 2004, at 07:35 AM. 

1941

 DIRECTOR See also reissue, DIRECTOR | 

1542

 DIRECTOR (032I40Z AUG 04) 

1543

 CIA (261529Z AUG 04) / BHH ; [REDACTED] 25533 (231257Z AUG 04) 

1544

 CIA Operational Developments Against Al Qa'ida Worldwide, 09 August 2004, 1700 Hours. 

TOP SECRET/^ I//NOFORN 

Page 273 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

273 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

were mainly possible owing to the recovery of terrorist-related materials during searches of 

associated properties and vehicles following their arrests."1545 

(TS/Z^I^^^^^BVMF ) On August 23, 2004, the CIA received an update from H 

[foreign partner] authorities that noted the "research conducted by the [Barot] network into 

central London hotels and railway stations [is] likelyto be exploratory rather than representing a 

detailed operational plan."1547 A report from the H H [foreign partner] stated: 

"material that is emerging from [the United Kingdom] investigation, combined 

with detainee reporting from senior al-Qa'ida members [an apparent reference 

to Abu Talha al-Pakistani's reporting on U.K. targeting in Pakistani custody], 

strongly suggests that Barot's cell was planning a terrorist attack in the U.K., 

what is not yet clear is how close the cell was to mounting an attack or what, if 

any, targets had been finalized."1548 

(TS/^l^^^mH/^NF ) On August 30, 2004, talking points on the Dhiren Barot case were 

prepared by CIA officers. A CIA officer wrote that KSM's reporting on contact numbers for 

Issa was "a dead end" and "that it appears KSM was protecting al-Hindi."154y The talking points 

highlighted the cyber capabilities enabled by the USA PATRIOT Act in the investigation of 

Dhiren Barot, stating: 

"Probably the most important intelligence tool we used in breaking this 

[Dhiren Barot] case was our cyber capability enabled by the USA Patriot Act. 

From beginning to end cyber played a role, but it was not the only tool that was 

used. HUMINT and SIGINT threads were followed and contributed to our 

1546

 [REDACTED] 25533 (231257Z AUG 04). See also CIA (242144Z AUG 04). Internal CIA 

communications related to August 30, 2004, CIA talking points concerning Dhiren Barot state that a sketch of Issa 

al-Hindi, by U.S. military detainee Moazzem Begg, ultimately played a central role, as a surveillance photo of a 

suspected Issa al-Hindi "looked so much like the sketch." The CIA talking points identify H I [technical 

collection] capabilities as the CIA's primary contribution to the investigation, stating: "Probably the most important 

intelligence tool we used in breakin^hisrcase was our^^HIHH[ techl1 i

c a l

 collection] enabled by the USA 

Patriot Act. From beginning to [technical collection) played a role, but it was not the only tool that was 

used. HUMINT and SIGINT threads were followed and contributed to our understanding of the 

[technical collection] and also in finding new [technical collection] leads. Exploitation of computers and other 

information obtained in raids before and during the case also contributed significantly, as did surveillance. However, 

none of these tools are stand-alones. Good old fashioned hard targeting and analysis of these maddeningly vague 

and disparate and incomplete threads of information was the glue that put it all together." See "Capture of Al-Qa'ida 

Operative Abu Issa al-Hindi (aka Dhiren Barot, aka Abu Issa al-Britani)," multiple iterations of talking points, 

including the revised version cited, found in an email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], with multiple ccs; 

subject: "IMMEDIATE: al-Hindi TPs for ADCI Tuesday Briefing of Kerry/Edwards"; date: August 30, 2004, at 

02:51 PM. 

1547

 [REDACTED] 25533 (231257Z AUG 04) 

1548

 [REDACTED] 25533 (231257Z AUG 04) 

1349

 In an email, a CIA officer commented on talking points prepared for "ADCI Tuesday Briefing of 

Kerry/Edwards" on Issa al-Hindi, stating that "KSM didn't decode the numbers for us (he just provided info on how 

he may have encoded the numbers—which when used didn't result in valid numbers) and address with the number 

didn't exist; it was a dead end, and it appears KSM was protecting al-Hindi." See email from: [REDACTED]; to: 

[REDACTED], with multiple ccs; subject: "IMMEDIATE: al-Hindi TPs for ADCI Tuesday Briefing of 

Kerry/Edwards"; date: August 30,2004, at 02:51 PM, which contains comments on previous drafts of talking points. 

11 ii 11 ii 1 1 

Page 274 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

274 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

understanding of the cyber messages and also in finding new cyber leads. 

Exploitation of computers and other information obtained in raids before and 

during the case also contributed significantly, as did surveillance. However, 

none of these tools are stand-alones. Good old fashioned hard targeting and 

analysis of these maddeningly vague and disparate and incomplete threads of 

information was the glue that put it all together."1550 

{^S/^fBBI^HH^^ ) O" September 10, 2004, the Interagency Intelligence Committee 

on Terrorism (IICT) disseminated a report entitled, "Homeland: Reappraising al-Qa'ida's 

Election Threat," which states: 

"We do not know the projected timeframe for any attacks Issa was planning to 

execute in the UK, but it is unlikely he would have been ready to strike in the 

near term. Upon returning to the UK in mid-2004, Issa attempted to gather 

materials to build explosives for future attacks in the UK... [U.K.] authorities 

have been unable to locate any explosives precursors, and it is possible he had 

not yet acquired the necessary materials at the time of his detention. The 

detainee [Abu Talha al-Pakistani] also noted that some of Issa's operatives 

required further training—most likely in explosives—and that [Issa] intended 

to send an associate to Pakistan for three months to receive instruction from 

senior al-Qa'ida explosives experts."1551 

The assessment adds, "Issa appears to have been in an early phase of operational planning at the 

time of his capture."1552 

(TS^m^HHIH^^ 1) l n November 2004, ^ ^ authorities informed the CIA that "it was 

largely through the investigation of Nisar Jalal's associates that [the U.K.] was able to identify 

Dhiren Barot as being [identifiable] with Issa al-Hindi."1553 

A December 14, 2004, FBI Intelligence Assessment entitled, "The 

Gas Limos Project: An al-Qa'ida Urban Attack Plan Assessment," evaluated "the feasibility and 

lethality of this plot" based on "documents captured during raids" against "al-Qa'ida operatives 

in Pakistan and the United Kingdom in July and August 2004, and on custodial interviews 

conducted in the weeks following these raids." The FBI concluded that "the main plot presented 

in the Gas Limos Project is unlikely to be as successful as described." The report continued: 

"We assess that the Gas Limos Project, while ambitious and creative, is far-fetched."1554 

1550

 "Capture of Al-Qa'ida Operative Abu Issa al-Hindi (aka Dhiren Barot, aka Abu Issa al-Britani)" multiple 

iterations of talking points, including the revised version cited, found in an email from: [REDACTED]; to: 

[REDACTED], with multiple ccs; subject: "IMMEDIATE: al-Hindi TPs for ADCI Tuesday Briefing of 

Kerry/Edwards"; date: August 30,2004, at 02:51 PM. 

1551

 Disseminated intelligence product by the IICT entitled, "Homeland: Reappraising al-Qa'ida's "Election 

Threat," dated September 10, 2004. 

1552

 Disseminated intelligence product by the IICT entitled, "Homeland: Reappraising al-Qa'ida's "Election 

Threat," dated September 10, 2004. 

1333

 [REDACTED] 29759 ••••• 1 

1554 p B I intelligence Assessment, "The Gas Limos Project: An al-Qa'ida Urban Attack Plan Assessment," dated 

December 14, 2004. 

TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN 

Page 275 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

275 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

On December 12, 2005, the CIA assessed that "while KSM tasked 

al-Hindi to go to the US to surveil targets, he was not aware of the extent to which Barot's 

planning had progressed, who Issa's co-conspirators were, or that Issa's planning had come to 

focus on the UK."1555 

On November 7, 2006, Dhiren Barot was sentenced to life 

imprisonment in the United Kingdom. On May 16, 2007, Dhiren Barot's sentence was reduced 

to 30 years after a British Court of Appeal found that expert assessments describing the plot as 

"amateurish," "defective," and unlikely to succeed were not provided to the sentencing judge.1556 

5. The Identification, Capture, and Arrest of lyman Faris 

(^nS/^^^H^I^^/NE) Summary: The CIA represented that its enhanced interrogation 

techniques were effective and produced critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence, which 

thwarted plots and saved lives. Over a period of years, the CIA provided the "identification," 

"arrest," "capture," "investigation," and "prosecution" of lyman Faris as evidence for the 

effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. These representations were 

inaccurate. Iyman Faris was identified, investigated, and linked directly to al-Qa'ida prior to any 

mention of Iyman Faris by KSM or any other CIA detainee. When approached by law 

enforcement, Iyman Faris voluntarily provided information and made self-incriminating 

statements. On May 1, 2003, lyman Faris pled guilty to terrorism-related charges and admitted 

"to casing a New York City bridge for al Qaeda, and researching and providing information to al 

Qaeda regarding the tools necessary for possible attacks on U.S. targets." 

Further Details: Iyman Faris was an Ohio-based truck driver 

tasked by KSM with procuring "tools and devices needed to collapse suspension bridges," as 

well as tools that could be used to derail trains.1557 Faris had met KSM through his selfdescribed "best friend," Maqsood Khan,1558

 who was a Pakistan-based al-Qa'ida facilitator and 

Majid Khan's uncle.1559 

(T&V^^^^^^^^^^VNF) The identification and arrest of Iyman Faris is one of the eight most 

frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques. Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and 

provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent 

the identification, capture, and/or arrest of Iyman Faris as an example of how "Ikjey intelligence 

1555

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED] and others; subject: "Re: need answer: request for any info 

deemed operationally sensitive be passed to brits concerning Dhiren Barot (aka Issa al-Hindi)"; date: December 12, 

2005, at 6:08:01 PM, in preparation of a document entitled, "Addendum in Respect of Disclosure - Al Hindi.pdf." 

1556 See Royal Courts of Justice Appeal, Barot v R [2007], EWCA Crim 1119(16 May 2007). The expert 

assessments determined that the plotting involved "a professional-looking attempt from amateurs who did not really 

know what they were doing." See also June 15,2007, Bloomberg news article entitled, "Terrorist Gang Jailed for 

Helping London and New York Bomb Plot." 

1557

 WHDC 

1558

 ALEC 

1559

 ALEC 

(242226Z MAR 03) (includes information acquired by the FBI on March 20, 2003) 

(261745Z MAR 03) 

(180200Z MAR 03). See also \ 

TOP SECRETZ/BT^^MB^^^^^pWOFOR N 

Page 276 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

276 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques" had "enabled CIA to 

disrupt terrorist plots" and "capture additional terrorists."1560 The CIA further represented that 

the intelligence acquired from the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "otherwise 

unavailable" and "saved lives."1561 

1560

 Italics included in CIA Memorandum to the Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA 

Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," from March 2, 2005. 

1561 p r o m 2003 dirough 2009, the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that 

the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA 

representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see: 

(1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, 

which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. The CIA representations referenced by the 

OLC include that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical," 

"vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect 

and disrupt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[die CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that 

the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United 

States." (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from 

Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: 

Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques 

that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the 

Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA 

representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

Citing CIA documents and the President's September 6,2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation program 

(which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: "The CIA interrogation program— 

and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security 

of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As the President 

explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, 

the program has saved innocent lives."' (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central 

Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 

Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of die War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 

of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value 

al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003 

represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence 

information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives," and warned policymakers that "[t]ermination of 

this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from 

Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation 

Program, July 29, 2003; September 4,2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and 

September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The 

CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: 

"Information [the CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has 

almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to 

the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks 

involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, 

Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention 

and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27,2004; attachment: February 24,2004, Memorandum 

re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA 

Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the 

[enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of 

the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other 

means." (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid 

TOP SECRETflBBBB^^BBl^MflNQgQR N 

Page 277 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

277 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

F o r

 example, in a July 2003 CIA briefing for White House officials 

on the CIA interrogation program, the CIA represented that "[m]ajor threats were countered and 

attacks averted," and that "[tjermination of this [CIA] program will result in loss of life, possibly 

extensive." The CIA further represented that "the use of the [CIA's enhanced interrogation] 

techniques has produced significant results" and "saved lives."1562 Under the heading, 

"RESULTS: MAJOR THREAT INFO," a briefing slides states: 

"KSM: Al-Qa'ida Chief of Operations... - Identification of Iyman Faris"1563 

(TS/Zl^HHHII^B^P ) Similarly, on February 27, 2004, DDO James Pavitt responded to 

the CIA Inspector General's draft Special Review and included a representation related to Iyman 

Faris. Pavitt stated that the Inspector General's Special Review should have come to the 

"conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives," and that "EITs (including the 

water board) have been indispensable to our successes."1564 Pavitt provided materials to the OIG 

that stated: 

"Specifically, as a result of the lawful use of EITs, KSM identified a truck 

driver who is now serving time in the United States for his support to alQa'ida."1565 

The final CIA Inspector General Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation 

Program," published in May 2004, states: 

Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and 

Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," 

"Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background 

on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted") (6) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 

March 18, 2009, entitled, "SWIGERT and DUNBAR," located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258, which 

provides a list of "some of the key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence 

acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means." See 

Volume II for additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the 

CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives." 

1562

 CIA memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA 

General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program." dated 

July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials. 

1563

 Italics added. CIA memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared 

by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CIA Interrogation Program," 

dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials. 

1564

 Memorandum to the Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, dated 

February 27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and 

Interrogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and 

Interrogation Activities," dated February 24,2004. 

1565 Memorandum to the Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, dated 

February 27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and 

Interrogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and 

Interrogation Activities," dated February 24, 2004. 

11 II 11111 ^^B^BBUI^^ B II II I II 

Page 278 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

278 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

"Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's information also led to the investigation and 

prosecution of Iyman Faris, the truck driver arrested in early 2003 in 

Ohio."1566 

This passage in the CIA Inspector General Special Review was declassified and publicly 

released on August 24, 2009.1567 

(^^•••^•^NF ) Likewise, information prepared by the CIA for CIA Director Leon 

Panetta in February 2009 on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 

states that the "CIA assesses... the techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," 

and that "most, if not all, of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program 

would not have been discovered or reported by other means." The document provides examples 

of "some of the key captures, disrupted plots, and intelligence gained from HVDs interrogated," 

including the "arrest of Iyman Faris."1568 In March 2009, the CIA provided a three-page 

document to the chairman of the Committee stating, "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the 

timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or 

reported by any other means," before listing "Iyman Faris" as one of the "key captures" resulting 

from the CIA interrogation program.1569 

The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the 

identification and capture of Iyman Faris in nine of the 20 documents and briefings provided to 

policymakers and the Department of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009.1570 

1566

 Italics added. CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review - Counterterrorisin Detention and Interrogation 

Program, (2003-7123-IG), May 2004. 

I

'

fl7

 The relevant sections of the Special Review were also cited in the OLC's May 30, 2005, memorandum, which 

stated that "we understand that interrogations have led to specific, actionable intelligence," and that "[w]e 

understand that the use of enhanced techniques in the interrogations of KSM, Zubaydah and others... has yielded 

critical information." (see memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence 

Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 

2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain 

Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees, p. 9 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 

11), citing Special Review at 86, 90 91). Like the Special Review, the OLC memorandum has been declassified 

with redactions. 

1508

 Italics added. CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid 

Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)." The documents include "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document 

"EITs and Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and 

KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include 

"Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted." 

1569

 CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on March 18, 2009, at 3:46 PM, entitled, 

"[SWIGERT and DUNBAR]" (DTS #2009-1258). 

1570 See list of CIA prepared briefings and memoranda from 2003 through 2009 with representations on the 

effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques referenced in this summary and described in detail in 

Volume II. 

Ill l I I III I I INI III I 

Page 279 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

279 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECREgfl^^M^^^^^MflNQgQR N 

(TSZ/^^^^^^^^lp/NF ) A review of CIA operational cables and other records found that 

the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 

played no role in the identification and capture of Iyman Faris.1571 

CIA records indicate that Iyman Faris was known to the U.S. 

Intelligence Community prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001. On March 2001, the FBI 

opened an international terrorism investigation targeting Iyman Faris.1572 According to CIA 

records, the "predication of the [FBI] Faris investigation was information provided by [foreign] 

authorities that [revealed] Faris' telephone number had been called by Islamic extremists 

operating in France, Belgium, Turkey and Canada," including "millennium bomber" Ahmad 

Ressam.1573 Ressam, currently serving a 65-year U.S. prison term, was arrested on December 

14, 1999, en route to Los Angeles International Airport with explosives in the trunk of his car. 

According to CIA records, as "a result of a post 9/11 lead," the FBI interviewed Iyman Faris 

shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001.1574 On November 2001, the FBI closed its 

investigation of Iyman Faris for unknown reasons.1575 

(T^/^^^HHI^^B^^ ) On March 5, 2003, Majid Khan was taken into Pakistani 

custody.1576 That same day, FISA coverage of Majid Khan's residence in Maryland indicated 

that Majid Khan's made a suspicious phone call to an individual at a 

residence associated with Iyman Faris.1577 The call included discussion of Majid Khan's 

possible arrest and potential FBI surveillance of^^^Hj^H , who asked the individual in Ohio 

if he had been approached and questioned.1578 ^^^^^^^^arnedth e Ohio-based individual 

not to contact anyone using his phone.1579 Thatsameday7^^^B|||^H informed FBI special 

agents that the other party to the intercepted conversation was Iyman Faris.1580 By March 6, 

2003, the FBI had officially reopened its international terrorism investigation of Iyman Faris.1581 

1571

 The CJA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that "we incorrectly stated or implied that KSM's information 

led to the investigation of Faris." Elsewhere, the CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[CIA] imprecisely 

characterized KSM's information as having 'led' to the investigation of Iyman Faris, rather than more accurately 

characterizing it as a key contribution to the investigation." As described in more detail in Volume II, the CIA and 

FBI had significant information on Iyman Faris prior to any reporting from KSM. The CIA's June 2013 Response 

also states that the CIA's inaccurate statements that KSM's reporting "led" to the investigation of Iyman Faris were 

only made "[i]n a few cases," and "[i]n a small number of... representations." As described in the full Committee 

Study, the CIA repeatedly represented that KSM's reporting "led" to the investigation of Iyman Faris, and was 

responsible for the "identification" and "capture" of Iyman Faris. 

1572

 Information provided by the FBI to the Committee on November, 30, 2010. Records do not provide an 

explanation for the closing of the investigation. 

1573

 WHDC^H(102129 Z MAR 03). See also ALEC(180200 Z MAR03). 

1374

 ALEC (261725Z MAR 03) 

1575

 Information provided to the Committee by the FBI on November, 30, 2010. 

1576

 |HH H 13658 (050318Z MAR 03). See the section on the capture of Majid Khan in this summary and in 

Volume II. 

1577

 ALEC 

1578

 ALEC 

1579

 ALEC 

(060353Z MAR 03) 

(060353Z MAR 03) 

(060353Z MAR 03) 

1580 pg j information relayed in ALEC 

1581 pg j information confirmed for the Committee on November, 30, 2010. 

11 ii 1111 1 

Page 280 of 499 

I//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

280 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

(TS^f^HI^H^NF ) While U.S. law enforcement investigations of Iyman Faris moved 

forward, Majid Khan, in foreign government custody, was being questioned by foreign 

government interrogators. According to CIA records, the interrogators were using rapportbuilding techniques, confronting Khan with inconsistencies in his story and obtaining 

information on Majid Khan's al-Qa'ida connections.1582 On March 11, 2003, Majid Khan 

identified a photo of Iyman Faris.1583 Majid Khan stated that he knew Faris as "Abdul Raof," 

and claimed Faris was a 35-year-old truck driver of Pakistani origin who was a "business partner 

of his father."1584 In addition to describing business deals Iyman Faris was involved in with 

Khan's family, Majid Khan stated that Faris spoke Urdu and excellent English and had a 

"colorful personality."1585 The next day, while still in foreign government custody, Majid Khan 

stated that Iyman Faris was "an Islamic extremist."1586 According to CIA cables, on March 14, 

2003, Majid Khan provided "more damning information" on Iyman Faris, specifically that Faris 

was a "mujahudden during the Afghan/Soviet period" and was a close associate of his uncle, 

Maqsood Khan. Maqsood was a known al-Qa'ida associate whom Majid Khan had already 

admitted was in contact with senior al-Qa'ida members. Majid Khan told foreign government 

interrogators that it was Maqsood who provided the money for Majid Khan's al-Qa'ida-related 

travels.1587 Majid Khan further stated that "after the KSM arrest became public knowledge," 

Iyman Faris contacted Majid Khan's family and requested the family pass a message to Maqsood 

Khan regarding the status of KSM.1588 This information on Iyman Faris was acquired prior to— 

and independently of—any reporting from the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.1589 

(TS^^^m^^^^^/NF ) On March 10, 2003, in response to a requirements cable from CIA 

Headquarters reporting that al-Qa'ida was targeting U.S. suspension bridges,1590 KSM stated that 

any such plans were "theoretical" and only "on paper." He also stated that no one was currently 

pursuing such a plot.1591 KSM repeated this assertion on March 16, 2003,1592 noting that, while 

UBL officially endorsed attacks against suspension bridges in the United States, he "had no 

planned targets in the US which were pending attack and that after 9/11 the US had become too 

hard a target."1593 On neither occasion did KSM reference Iyman Faris. 

13678 (070724Z MAR 03). The cable states: "a [foreign government officer] talked quietly to 

[Majid Khan] alone for about ten minutes before the interview began and was able to establish an excellent level of 

rapport. The first hour and [a] half of the interview was a review of bio-data and information previously [reported]. 

When [foreign government interrogators] started putting pressure on [Majid Khan] by pulling apart his story about 

his 'honeymoon' in Bangkok and his attempt to rent an apartment, safehouse, for his cousin [Mansoor Maqsood, aka 

Iqbal, aka Talha, aka Moeen, aka HabibJ, at 1400, [Majid Khan] slumped in his chair and said he would reveal 

everything to officers...." 

1583

 •• • 13758 FBI information later relayed in ALEC | 

and information provided to the Committee by the FBI on November, 30, 2010. See FBI case file | 

137581 

13758 

13765 

1137851 13713 | 

1589 po r additional infonnation, see intelligence chronology in Volume II. 

1590

 ALEC ^^B(071757 Z MAR 03) 

110752 (102320Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR (122101Z MAR 03). See also \ 

10858 (170747Z MAR 03) 

110858 (170747Z MAR 03) 

11 ii 1111 1 ^MB^^B^BMB l " i i II 

Page 281 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

281 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

) On March 15, 2003, deputy chief of ALEC Station, 

the intelligence from the foreign government interrogations of Majid 

Khan, requested a photograph of Majid Khan and additional information to use with KSM.1594 

In response, CIA Headquarters sent the detention site photographs of Majid Khan's family and 

associates, including Iyman Faris.1595 

On March 17, 2003, eleven days after the FBI officially reopened 

its investigation of Iyman Faris, KSM was shown photographs of both Iyman Faris and Majid 

Khan.1596 According to CIA cables, KSM was also asked detailed questions based on email 

communications, which a cable stated served as "an effective means to convey to [KSM] the 

impression that the USG already possessed considerable information and that the information 

would be used to check the accuracy of his statements.'"597 In this context, KSM identified the 

photograph of Iyman Faris as a "truck driver" and a relative of Majid Khan. KSM claimed that 

he could not remember the truck driver's name. KSM described the "truck driver" as a "colorful 

character who liked to drink and have girlfriends and was very interested in business."1598 The 

next day, March 18, 2003, KSM stated that in February 2002 he tasked the "truck driver" to 

procure specialized machine tools that would be useful to al-Qa'ida to loosen the nuts and bolts 

of suspension bridges in the United States. According to KSM, in March 2002, the "truck 

driver" asked Mansour Khan [son of Maqsood Khan]1599 to inform KSM that he (the "truck 

driver") could not find such tools. KSM stated that he made no further requests of thc "truck 

driver."1600 

According to a CIA cable, on the evening of March 20, 2003, the 

FBT informed the CIA that "Ohio police had been following [Iyman] Faris for 'some time,' and 

had stopped him and questioned him about his relationship to Shoukat Ali Khan [Majid Khan's 

, who was reading 

l5!M Memorandum for: [REDACTED]; from: [REDACTED],OFFICE: DETENTION 

SITE BLUE]; subieOj3altimoreboy and KSM; date: 15 March 2003, at 07:08:32 PM. 

1595

 Email from: to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Baltimore boy and KSM; 

date: March 15, 2003, at 2:32 PM; ALEC ^M('52212 Z MAR 03). 

1596 j-[aving rea( j reporting from the interrogations of Majid Khan, one of KSM's debriefers at the CIA's 

DETENTION SITE BLUE, deputy chief of ALECStation^^^B^H H requested the photographs to "use 

witl^Csm [sic] et al." (See Memorandum for H1H^^B[RE D ACTED]; from [REDACTED],OFFICE: 

^•^[DETENTIO N SITE BLUE]; subject: Baltimore boy and KSM; date: 15 March 2003, at 07:08:32 PM.) 

The photographs were sent to DETENTION SITE BLUE shortly thereafter. See ALEC H B (152212Z MAR 

03). 

Vl

 ^^^•1086 5 (171648Z MAR 03), disseminated as IHBBB K HH i

 1086 6

 (171832Z MAR 

03);^^^Bl087 0 (172017Z MAR 03) 

1598 10866 (171832Z MAR 03). KSM explained that Majid Khan was married to Maqsood Khan's 

niece, and that "another Maqsood Khan relative was a truck driver in Ohio." KSM stated that he had met him "on at 

least one occasion" at die home of Maqsood Khan in Karachi in approximately 1999 or 2000. This information was 

also sent on March 18, 2003, in ALEc||^ | (180200Z MAR 03). See also BHBIHB -

1599

 ALEC^^ P (261745Z MAR 03) ^^ ^ 

1600 ^^^^^1088 6 (182219Z MAR 03); ALEC (180200Z MAR 03). In assessing the session for CIA 

Headquarters, personnel at DETENTION SITE BLUE wrote that "KSM will selectively lie, provide partial truths, 

and misdirect when he believes he will not be found out and held accountable." On the other hand, they wrote that 

"KSM appears more inclined to make accurate disclosures when he believes people, emails, or other source material 

are available to the USG for checking his responses." See^^^ B 10884 (182140Z MAR 03). 

mi 111 III i B^BIi^^^BB^B i iiii mi 

Page 282 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

282 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

father] of Baltimore."1601 According to a CIA officer, "[wjhen the FBI approached Faris he 

talked voluntarily."1602 Records indicate that Faris "initially claimed to know Shoukat Ali Khan 

though the gas station business" and agreed to take a polygraph examination. According to FBI 

records, prior to the polygraph, Faris admitted to being associated with KSM and provided 

details on his relationships with al-Qa'ida members in Pakistan.1603 Specifically, Iyman Faris 

told FBI and Ohio police that he had met KSM twice and had been "tasked with procuring 

items." Faris detailed how KSM had a plan "to cut the suspension cables on the Brooklyn 

Bridge to cause its collapse using gas cutters."1604 Faris maintained that he "thought that the task 

to take down the bridge was impossible"1605 and did not take further action.1606 

lf,m See WHDC (242226Z MAR 03), which discusses information obtained by FBI officials on March 20, 

2003; and FBI case file _ _ 

1602

 CIA Office of Inspector General interview of Chief of the Branch of die UBL Group at 

CTC, by Office of the Inspector General, July 30, 2003. The interview report states: "CIA initiated 

the lead (not from detainees) to an individual believed to live in Baltimore - Majid Khan. He was believed to be in 

contact with a nephew of [KSM]. The FBI initiated trash coverage (using their special authorities tt^amwnail) on 

the Baltimore residence where Khan had lived and family members still lived. Meanwhile, using 

FISA coverage the Agency, with the help of [a foreign government], located 

[Majid] Khan. The Baltimore house placed a call to Ohio (to Iyman Faris) which became another FBI lead. When 

the FBI approached Faris he talked voluntarily." 

16(11 See FBI case file WHDC (211522Z MAR 03) and WHDC (242226Z MAR 03). 

Faris described Maqsood Khan as "the 'right foot' of Usama bin Ladin (UBL)." 

1604 See WHDC • • (242226Z MAR 03); and WHDC H (211522Z MAR 03) (discusses information obtained 

by FBI officials on March 20, 2003). 

1005

 ALEC (261745Z MAR 03). A senior CIA counterterrorism official, who had previously served as chief 

of the Bin Ladin Unit, commented on the intelligence obtained from Iyman Faris on die Brooklyn Bridge plotting, 

stating: "i guess we have to take these guys at their word, but if these are the types of attacks ksm was planning, 

[KSM] was more of a nuisnace [sic] than a threat and you have to wonder how he ever thought of anything as 

imaginative as the 11 sept attacks, i wonder if he had two tracks going: ops like 11 sept and a whole other series 

half-baked, secular palestinian-style ops like those majid khan, faris, and the other yahoos are talking about, perhaps 

he believe [sic] if we caught the yahoos, we would relax a bit and they would be better able to hit us withan 

effective attack? the other alternative, is that ksm himself is a yahoo, strange stuff." (See email from: 

to: ^••• H ^^^•••i-^^MH^Hf l [REDACTED]; 

subject: attacks in conus; date: March 25, 2003, at 6:19:18 AM, referencing cable WHDC B M(242226 Z MAR 

03), with the subject line, "EYES ONLY: Majid Khan: Imminent al-Qa'ida Plots to Attack NYC and WDC Targets 

Aborted by KSM Capture.") In a separate email, the senior official wrote: "again, odd. ksm wants to get 'machine 

tools' to loosen the bolts on bridges so they collapse? did he think no one would see or hear these yahoos trying to 

unscrew the bridge? that everyone would drive by and just ignore the effort to unbolt a roadway? and what about 

opsec: 'yup, we were just going to recruit a few of the neighbors to help knock down the brooklyn bridge.'" See 

email from: I 

; date: March 25, 2003, at 6:35:18 AM. 

1606

 ALEC (261745Z MAR 03). During this period, the CIA was receiving updates from the FBI debriefings 

of Iyman Faris. See TRRS-03-03-0610, referenced in 10984 (242351Z MAR 03). On March 20, 2003, 

KSM confirmed that he had tasked "the truck driver. ..to procure machine tools that would be useful to al-Qa'ida in 

its plan to loosen the nuts and bolts of suspension bridges," but stated he had "never divulged specific targeting 

information to the truck driver." (See 10910 (202108Z MAR 03).) A CIA cable from March 24, 

2003, noted that KSM's CIA interrogators were "reviewing latest HiHreadou t on Majid Khan debriefs [who was 

in foreign government custody] and FBI [intelligence reports] from debriefings of the truck driver Faris Iyman 

[sic]," and that the CIA team was therefore "focused entirely on sorting out the information on Majid's claim.. .as 

well as truck driver details on the threat." (See 10984 (242351Z MAR 03).) According to another cable, 

KSM indicated that while the original plan was to sever the cables, he determined that it would be easiertoacquire 

machine tools that would allow the operatives to "loosen the large nuts and bolts of the bridges." (See 

10985 (242351Z MAR 03).) The disseminated intelligence report from this interrogation added that KSM stated his 

m i 11 111 1 ^BBBJ^ B 1 m i mi l 

Page 283 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

283 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

Over several weeks Iyman Faris continued to voluntarily cooperate 

with law enforcement officials and engaged in efforts to assist in the capture of Maqsood 

Khan.1607 Faris provided additional details on his activities related to the Khan family, KSM, his 

meeting with UBL, and two extremists in the United States who had discussed wanting "to kill 

Americans in a Columbus area shopping mall with a Kalashnikov automatic rifle."1608 On April 

22, 2003, "Faris had accepted a plea agreement"1609 and continued to cooperate, including by 

sending email messages to al-Qa'ida members in Pakistan for the purposes of intelligence 

collection.1610 On May 1, 2003, Faris was transported from Quantico, Virginia, where he was 

voluntarily residing and working with the FBI, to a federal court in Alexandria, Virginia, where 

he pled guilty to material support to terrorism charges.1611 He was subsequently sentenced to 20 

years in prison.1612 

On April 3, 2003, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on 

Terrorism (IICT) assessed that the use of tools to loosen the bolts of suspension bridges were 

"methods that appear to be unrealistic."1613 

6. The Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Saj id Badat 

(TSA ^^H^^^H ^VNF ) Summary: The CIA represented that its enhanced interrogation 

techniques were effective and produced critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence, which 

thwarted plots and saved lives. Over a period of years, the CIA provided the identification, 

discovery, capture, and arrest of Sajid Badat as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques. These representations were inaccurate. U.K. domestic 

investigative efforts, reporting from foreign intelligence services, international law enforcement 

efforts, and U.S. military reporting resulted in the identification and arrest of Sajid Badat. 

last communication with Iyman Faris was shortly before his capture on March 1, 2003, and that he (KSM) was 

"severely disappointed to learn that Iyman had not yet been successful in his mission to purchase the necessary 

materials." (See DIRECTOR (25111Z MAR 03).) Later, on April 10, 2003, a CIA cable stated that KSM 

told CIA interrogators that al-Qa'ida members had "cased" the Brooklyn Bridge and that KSM had discussed 

attacking suspension bridges with other senior al-Qa'ida operatives. See HEADQUARTERS (( J (100928Z APR 

03). 

1,1 See FBI case file •^••H , ALEC ^H f (261725Z MAR 03), and Department of Justice release dated 

October 28, 2003, entitled, "Iyman Faris Sentenced for Providing Material Support to Al Qaeda." During these 

interviews Iyman Faris provided detailed information on a variety of matters, including his ongoing relationship 

with Maqsood Khan; the aliases he used in Pakistan ("Mohmed Rauf' and "Gura"); how he became acquainted with 

KSM and al-Qa'ida; as well as his interaction with the Majid Khan family, lyman Faris further provided 

information on his initial meeting with UBL and how he helped Maqsood Khan obtain supplies "for usage by 

Usama Bin Ladin" when he was in Pakistan. 

1608

 ALEC^H(022304 Z APR 03); ALEC^H(030128 Z APR 03); ALEC^^1(022304 Z APR 03); 

WHDC 857Z APR 03). See also ALECflH B 1725Z MAR 03); ALEC^ H (010200Z APR 

03); ALECBBi(261933 Z MAR 03). 

1609

 WHDC^H(232240 Z APR 03) 

1610 See Department of Justice comments in "The Triple Life of a Qaeda Man," Time Magazine, June 22, 2003. 

See FBI case file 

1612 See Department of Justice release dated October 28, 2003, entitled, "Iyman Faris Sentenced for Providing 

Material Support to Al Qaeda." 

ion "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT, 

April 3, 2003. ^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^ 

11 ii 1111 1

 1 "1

" 

Page 284 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

284 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

Further Details: Sajid Badat1614 was sclectcd by al-Qa'ida leaders, 

including Abu Hafs al-Masri and Sayf al-'Adl, to cany out an attack against a Western airliner 

with Richard Reid using a shoe bomb explosive device in December 2001.1615 Sajid Badat 

returned to the United Kingdom in late 2001 and sent a message to his al-Qa'ida handler, Ammar 

al-Baluchi, stating that he was withdrawing from the operation.1616 On December 22, 2001, 

1614

 Note on CIA records related to U.K.-based "Issas": Two United Kingdom-based al-Qa'ida associates, Dhiren 

Barot and Sajid Badat, were known by the same common aliases, Issa, Abu Issa, Abu Issa al-Britani ("[of| Britain") 

and/or Issa al-Pakistani. Both individuals were British Indians who had been independently in contact with senior 

al-Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan. Reporting indicated that the Issas were located in the United Kingdom and engaged in 

terrorist targeting of the U.K. The investigation into their true identities was a U.K.-led operation. As a result, the 

CIA sometimes had limited insight into U.K.-based activities to identify and locate the Issas. Senior CIA personnel 

expressed frustration that the U.K. was not sharing all known information on its investigations, writing in August 

2003 that "[the FBI is] clearly working closely with the [U.K. service] on these matters and [the CIA is] at the 

mercy" of what it is told. In June 2003, the CIA informed the FBI that die CIA had "no electronic record of 

receiving any transcripts or summaries from your agency's interviews with [Richard] Reid, and would appreciate 

dissemination of summaries of questioning for the purposes of [CIA] analysis." Until the arrest of one of the Issas, 

Sajid Badat, on November 27, 2003, the U.S. Intelligence Community and U.K. authorities often confused the two 

al-Qa'ida associates. As a result, the quality and clarity of detainee reporting on the Issas (including reporting from 

detainees in die custody of the CIA, U.S. military, Department of Justice, and foreign services) varied. CIA 

personnel [mreporte d in September 2003 that there were "two (or three) Abu Issas" in 

intelligence reporting and that because of their similarities, it was often "unclear which Issa the detainees [were] 

referring to at different stages." Once detained in the United Kingdom in November 2003, Sajid Badat (one of the 

Issas) cooperated with U.K. authorities and provided information about the other "Issa." Badat stated that "people 

often asked [Badat] about [the other] Issa, as they were both British Indians." According to Sajid Badat, "anyone 

who had been involved widi jihad in Britain since the mid-90s" would know Issa al-Hindi (aka Dhiren Barot), to 

include Babar Ahmed, Moazzem Begg, Richard Reid, Zacarias Moussaoui, and KSM. The other Issa, Dhiren Barot, 

arrested on August 3, 2004, was found to have been especially well-known among the U.K.-based extremist 

community, having written a popular book in 1999 expounding the virtues of jihad in Kashmir under the alias, "Esa 

al-Hindi." CIA records include a reference to the book and a description of its author ("a brother from England who 

was a Hindu and became a Muslim...[who] got training in Afghanistan...") as early as December 1999 

(disseminated by the CIA on 12/31/99 in HHUHHHH - The [foreign partner] would later 

report that Dhiren Barot "frequently" appeared "in reporting of terrorist training" and had "involvement in Jihad in 

occupied Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Malaysia, throughout the 1990s." The Committee Study is based on 

more than six million pages of material related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program provided by the 

CIA. Access was not provided to intelligence databases of the CIA or any other U.S. or foreign intelligence or law 

enforcement agency. Insomuch as intelligence from these sources is included, it was, unless noted otherwise, found 

within the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program material produced for this Study. It is likely that significant 

intelligence unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program on Sajid Badat and Dhiren Barot exists in 

U.S. intelligence and law enforcement records and databases. See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including: 

ALEC mjt m (V 121^7Z JUN 03); 19907 (231744Z APR 04); 99093 (020931Z SEP 03); 

ALEC ^^B£12117ZAU G 03)jCIAWASHINGTON DC (162127Z JUN 03); and a series of emails 

between^H^^^^ I

 and ^H^P^I H ( wit h

 multiple ccs) on August 22, 2003, at 9:24:43 AM. 

1615

 Among other documents, ,ice^^Bl9760(251532 Z JUN 0""- I I AUG 02); CIA 

• H (311736Z OCT 02), ^^^^^^^^^Hi^^l^^Bandll^^ H 99093 

03). The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "KSM's reporting also clearly distinguished between, and thereby 

focused investigations of, two al-Qa'ida operatives known as Issa al-Britani." As detailed in the KSM detainee 

review in Volume III, KSM did discuss the two operatives, but he did not identify either by name (or, in the case of 

Dhiren Barot, by his more common kunya, Issa al-Hindi), and provided no actionable intelligence that contributed to 

the eventual identification of, or locational information for, either individual. 

1616

 Among other documents, see CIA Headquarters document, entitled, "OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 

AGAINST GLOBAL SUNNI EXTREMIST TERRORISM," dated, "14 January 2002 1630 Hours"; CIA 

Headquarters document, entitled, "OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AGAINST GLOBAL SUNNI 

llll I Mil I Hill Hill I 

Page 285 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

285 
IJNCLASSIFIED^ _ 

I ' 1 —/,Hl > II 

Richard Reid attempted to detonate a shoe bomb on a flight from Paris, France, to Miami, 

Florida. The plane was diverted to Boston, Massachusetts, and Reid was taken into custody.1617 

The discovery, identification, capture, and arrest of Sajid Badat, 

"the shoe bomber," is one of the eight most frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as' 

evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Over a period of 

years, CIA documents prepared for and provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, 

and the Department of Justice represent the discovery, identification, capture, and/or arrest of ' 

Sajid Badat as an example of how "[kjey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after 

applying interrogation techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots" and "capture 

additional terrorists."1618 In at least one CIA document prepared for the president, the CIA 

specifically highlighted the waterboard interrogation technique in enabling the CIA to learn "that 

Sajid Badat was the operative slated to launch a simultaneous shoe bomb attack with Richard 

Retd in 2001."I519 The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques was "otherwise unavailable" and "saved lives."1620 

gggJISTJanuar y 2002 1630 Hours"; ALEC • • (I42334Z MAY 03); and 

16.7 See intelligence chronology in Volume II and multiple open source reports, as well as Department of Justice 

materials, including United States v. Richard Reid Indictment, U.S. District Court, District of Massachusetts 

January 16, 2002. According to a CIA operational update, in early December 2001, a unilateral CIA source reported 

that a known extremist "indicated there would be an attack on either an American or British airliner originating in 

France, Germany, or Britain, with the use of explosives concealed in shoes." According to CIA records, an 

unclassified notice distributed to airlines concerning information from the CIA source in early December 2001 "is 

credited with having alerted flight crew personnel and their having reacted so swiftly to Reid's actions" aboard 

Flight 63. See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including CIA Headquarters document entitled 

"OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AGAINST GLOBAL SUNNI EXTREMIST TERRORISM "dated "9 April 

2002 1630 Hours." ' ' 

16.8

 Italics included in CIA Memorandum to the Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA 

Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," from March 2, 2005. 

16.9 See document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6 2007 with 

the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." 

1620

 From 2003 through 2009, the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that 

the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques CIA 

representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations see-

(1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30 2005 

which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the'use of 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. The CIA representations referenced by the 

OLC include that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical " 

"vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect 

and disrupt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that 

the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United 

States." {See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency from 

Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel May 30 2005 ReApplication of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques 

that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the 

Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA 

representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 

Citing CIA documents and the President's September 6,2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation program 

(which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: 'The CIA interrogation program— 

"»II < N II HI 

Page 286 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

286 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ 1//NOFORN 

As an example, on October 26, 2007, the CIA faxed a document to 

the Senate Appropriations Committee appealing a proposed elimination of funding for the CIA's 

Rendition and Detention Program. The CIA appeal states that "[m]ost, if not all, of the 

intelligence acquired from high-value detainees in this program would likely not have been 

discovered or reported in any other way." Representing the success of the CIA interrogation 

program, the document states: 

"Detainees have... permitted discovery of terrorist cells, key individuals 

and the interdiction of numerous plots, including... the discovery of an 

and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security 

of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otiierwise unavailable intelligence. ...As the President 

explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, 

the program has saved innocent lives.'" (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central 

Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 

Counsel July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 

of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value 

al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003 

represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence 

information that had, in die view of CIA professionals, saved lives," and warned policymakers that "[t]ermination of 

this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from 

Scott Muller Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation 

Program, July 29,2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and 

September 26 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The 

CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: 

"Information [die CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has 

almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to 

the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks 

involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, 

Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention 

and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24,2004, Memorandum 

re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA 

Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the 

[enhanced intenogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of 

the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other 

means." (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program18FEB 2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid 

Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and 

Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," 

"Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background 

on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted ") (6) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 

March 18 2009 entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258, 

which provides 'a list of "some of the key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the 

CIA's enhanced inteirogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence 

acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means." See 

Volume II for additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the 

CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailableintelligenc^haTjsara 

mi 11 iii i MB^BB^ B

 11111111111 

Page 287 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

287 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

operative who was preparing another attack1621 like that attempted by 

'shoe bomber' Richard Reid."1622 

(TS/ifll^^^^^mVNF ) Similarly, in early March 2005, the CIA compiled talking points on 

the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques for use in a meeting with the 

National Security Council. The document states, "[t]he Central Intelligence Agency can advise 

you that this program works and the techniques are effective in producing foreign intelligence." 

The document states that"after applying interrogation techniques," the CIA "learned from KSM 

and Ammar that Sajid Badat was the operative slated to launch a simultaneous shoe bomb attack 

with Richard Reid in December 2001."1623 A month later, on April 15, 2005, the CIA faxed an 

eight-page document to the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel entitled, "Briefing 

Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting" which contained similar information.1624 The Office 

of Legal Counsel used the information to support its May 30, 2005, legal opinion on whether 

certain "enhanced interrogation techniques" were consistent with United States obligations under 

Article 16 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or 

Degrading Treatment or Punishment.1625 The CIA-provided document states: 

"Identifying the 'other' shoe bomber. Leads provided by KSM in November 

2003 led directly to the arrest of shoe bomber Richard Reid's one-time partner 

Sajid Badat in the UK. KSM had volunteered the existence of Badat—whom 

1621

 As detailed in the intelligence chronology in Volume II, there is no evidence to support the CIA assertion in 

October 2007 that Sajid Badat was "preparing another attack like that attempted by 'shoe bomber' Richard Reid." A 

body of intelligence collected after the December 22, 2001, attempted shoe bomb attack by Richard Reid indicated 

that the proposed partner "backed out of the operation." This information was corroborated by signals intelligence. 

Once detained on November 27,2003, Sajid Badat cooperated with U.K. authorities and described how he withdrew 

from the operation. See, among other CIA records, CIA Headquarters document, entitled, "OPERATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENTS AGAINST GLOBAL SUNNI EXTREMIST TERRORISM," dated "14 January 2002 1630 

Hours." 

1622

 Italics added. CIA fax from CIA employee [REDACTED] to U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, 

Subcommittee on Defense, with fax cover sheet entitled, "Talking points," sent on October 26, 2007, at 5:39:48 PM; 

document faxed entitled, "Talking Points Appeal of the $ H Million reduction in CIA/CTC's Rendition and 

Detention Program." As detailed in the intelligence chronology in Volume II, there is no evidence that Sajid Badat 

was "preparing another attack like that attempted by 'shoe bomber' Richard Reid." All intelligence collected after 

the December 22, 2001, attempted shoe bomb attack by Richard Reid indicated that his proposed partner "backed 

out of the operation." See, for example, CIA Headquarters document, entitled, "OPERATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENTS AGAINST GLOBAL SUNNI EXTREMIST TERRORISM," dated, "14 January 2002 1630 

Hours." 

1623

 Italics in original. CIA Talking Points entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC: 

Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques." 

1624

 CIA "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting" faxed from the CIA to the Department of Justice on 

April 15, 2005, at 10:47AM. See also a CIA document dated December 20, 2005, and entitled, "Examples of 

Detainee Reporting Used by Our CT Partners to Thwart Terrorists, 2003-2005," which includes four columns: 

"Detainees," "What They Told Us," "Actions Taken By Our CT Partners," and "Results." Under the heading of 

KSM and Ammar al-Baluchi, the document states: "What They Told Us..." "Provided lead information to Issa alBritani, a.k.a. Sajid Badat in the United Kingdom, November 2003. KSM said Badat was an operative slated to 

launch a shoe-bomb attack simultaneously with Richard Reid in December 2001. Ammar al-Baluchi provided 

additional information on Badat...Results...Disrupted a shoe-bomb attack." 

1625 po r additional information, see Volume I and Volume II. 

Page 288 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

288 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

he knew as 'Issa al-Pakistani'1626—as the operative who was slated to launch a 

simultaneous shoe bomb attack with Richard Reid in December 2001."1627 

(TSyVBf^^H^^BVNE) The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the 

purported role of KSM and Ammar al-Baluchi1628 in the discovery, identification, capture, and 

arrest of Sajid Badat in 16 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and the Department of 

Justice between July 2003 and March 2009.1629 However, in an additional case, a March 4, 

2005, CIA briefing for Vice President Cheney, the CIA credited Abu Zubaydah with identifying 

Sajid Badat,1630 despite a lack of any reporting on Sajid Badat from Abu Zubaydah.1631 

1620 There are no records of KSM identifying Sajid Badat as "Issa al-Pakistani." CIA records indicate that KSM 

stated he did not know Richard Reid's partner's true name, but referred to him only as "Abu Issa al-Britani" 

(described in CIA cables as "Abu Issa the Britain" [sic]), or as "Issa Richard." See intelligence chronology in 

Volume II, including ALEC • • (112157Z JUN 03). 

1627

 CIA "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting" faxed from the CI A to the Department of Justice on 

April 15, 2005, at I0:47AM. As detailed in Volume II, there are no CIA records of KSM providing any reporting in 

November 2003 contributing to Sajid Badat's arrest. 

1628

 CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)," including 

"Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009": ",..[L]eads provided by KSM and Ammar 

al-Baluchi in November 2003 led directly to the arrest in the United Kingdom of Sajid Badat the operative who was 

slated to launch a simultaneous shoe-bomb attack with Richard Reid in December 2001." Ammar al-Baluchi, while 

still in foreign government custody, and prior to being transferred to CIA custody and subjected to the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques, stated that he had contacted "Abu Issa" on behalf of KSM, but the CIA believed 

that Ammar al-Baluchi was providing inaccurate information. (See ALEC | H 

[foreign partner] authorities later indicated that theybelievedthatAmmar al-Baluchi was providing accurate 

reporting on Abu Issa. (See B^ H 10054 ^B^ H Later, in CIA custody, Ammar al-Baluchi 

described Issa's connection to the Richard Reid plot. The CIA credited confronting Ammar al-Baluchi with emails 

as "key in gaining Ammar's admissions." (See ALEC II^^^^^^^^HIH- ) As detailed in Volume II, 

Ammar al-Baluchi, like KSM, was unable, or unwilling, to identify Sajid Badat by name. 

1629 See list of CIA prepared briefings and memoranda from 2003 through 2009 with representations on die 

effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques referenced in this summary and described in detail in 

Volume II. 

1630 CI A briefing for Vice President Cheney, dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: 

CIA Detention and Intenogation Program." The briefing document states: "Shoe Bomber: Sajid Badat, an 

operative slated to launch a simultaneous shoe bomb attack with Richard Reid in December 2001, identified and 

captured. Source: Abu Zubaydah." There are no CIA records to support this statement. On August 17, 2003, Abu 

Zubaydah was shown a picture of Sajid Badat that a CIA officer stated "looks an awful lot like the sketches" from a 

detainee in foreign government custody. Abu Zubaydah stated he did not recognize the person in the photo. On 

August 22, 2003, sketches of Badat were shown to Abu Zubaydah, who did not recognize the individual depicted 

See email from: (multiple ccs); subject: "Re: Meeting with 

date: August 17, 2003, at 1:04 PM; ^//^mmJmiA Z AUG 03); •• • 12713 (231932Z AUG 03). 

1631

 The CIA also credited Abu Zubaydah, who was captured in March 2002, widi identifying Richard Reid, who 

was arrested in December 2001. This inaccurate information was presented to select National Security Council 

principals, Secretary of State Powell and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and Assistant Attorney General Jack 

Goldsmith. See CIA briefing slides entitled, "CIA Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior 

White House officials (Memorandum for the Record; subject: CIA Interrogation Program; September 27, 2003 

(OGC-F0-2003-50088); Slides, CIA Interrogation Program, 16 September 2003). The Memorandum for the Record 

drafted by John Bellinger refers to a "detailed handout" provided by the CIA. See John B. Bellinger III, Senior 

Associate Counsel to the President and Legal Advisor, National Security Council; Memorandum for the Record; 

subject: Briefing of Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld regarding Interrogation of High-Value Detainees; date: 

September 30, 2003. See also Scott W. Muller; Memorandum for the Record; Interrogation briefing for Jack 

Goldsmith; date: 16 October 2003 (OGC-FQ-2003-50097). 

mi 11 ii 11 BBBB^MMBB B

 111"111111 

Page 289 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

289 
UNCLASSIFIED 

11II I I I I I III III 

(TS/^H^^^^^^^/NF ) Contrary to CIA representations, a review of CIA operational 

cables and other documents found that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did not 

result in otherwise unavailable intelligence leading to the discovery, identification, capture, or 

arrest of Sajid Badat. According to CIA records and the U.K.'s own investigative summary,1632 

the investigation of Sajid Badat was a United Kingdom-led operation, and the intelligence that 

alerted security officials to: (1) a U.K.-based "Issa" (aka, Sajid Badat); (2) a potential second 

"shoe bomber" related to Richard Reid;1633 (3) a suspected U.K. terrorist named "Sajid 

Badat";1634 (4) Sajid Badat's connection to Richard Reid; (5) Sajid Badat's physical description; 

(6) Sajid Badat's location; and (7) the initial identification of a U.K. surveillance photo of Sajid 

Badat, the "shoe bomber,"1635 was unrelated to information acquired from CIA detainees during 

or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA records indicate that the 

information that led to Sajid Badat's arrest and U.K. criminal prosecution was also not derived 

from the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.1636 

Prior to any reporting from CIA detainees, and as early as January 

14, 2002, the FBI informed the CIA that Richard Reid "had an unidentified partner who 

allegedly backed out of the operation at the last minute."1637 This information was later 

1632

 13I65| 

1(533

 The CIA's June 2013 Response maintains that "KSM was the first to tell [the CIA] there was a second shoe 

bomber and that he remained at large." The Committee found this statement to be incongruent with CIA records. 

There were multiple reports that Richard Reid had an unidentified partner prior to the provision of any information 

from KSM (captured on March 1, 2003). The CIA's June 2013 Response addresses only one of two documented 

efforts by the FBI in January 2002 to inform the CIA that Richard Reid had "an unidentified partner who allegedly 

backed out of the operation at the last minute." The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that this FBI 

information was provided to senior CIA leadership in writing, but states that, on one of the two days the information 

was provided, "the Reid investigation came on page 10 of 15 pages of updates that day," and that the information 

did not "exist in any searchable CIA data repositories." The CIA's June 2013 Response also does not address the 

CIA's own source reporting on "another operative" who existed alongside Richard Reid. In April 2002, a reliable 

CIA source—who had warned of the Richard Reid shoe-bomb attack weeks before it occurred—reported that, in 

addition to Richard Reid, "another operative existed." The source stated that, instead of an airliner departing from 

Paris, as had Richard Reid's flight, "this attack would occur against an airliner originating from Heathrow 

International Airport in London." Once captured, Sajid Badat would confirm this reporting. Despite acknowledging 

evidence to the contrary, and without further explanation, the CIA stated in meetings with the Committee in 2013 

that the CIA stands by its representations that "KSM was the first to tell [the CIA] there was a second shoe bomber 

and that he remained at large." 

1634 See Volume II, including FBI WASHINGTON DC • • (160429Z JUL 02). The CIA's June 2013 

Response acknowledges that there was intelligence reporting that Sajid Badat was involved in terrorist activities and 

"targeting American interests," but defends its past assertions highlighting the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques in obtaining otherwise unavailable intelligence by asserting that, at the time of this 

reporting, there "was nothing at the time on Badat to lead [the CIA] to prioritize him over others." 

1635

 The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "KSM was the first person to provide—in March 2003, after having 

undergone enhanced interrogation techniques in CIA custody—a detailed and authoritative narrative of al-Qa'ida 

development of and plans to use shoe bombs operationally." The CIA's June 2013 Response does not acknowledge 

intelligence acquired by the Intelligence Community on these matters prior to any reporting from KSM and does not 

address the significant amount of fabricated reporting KSM provided. See Volume II for additional information. 

1636 See Volume II for additional information. 

1637

 The FBI information was provided to the CIA. See CIA Headquarters document, entitled, "OPERATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENTS AGAINST GLOBAL SUNNI EXTREMIST TERRORISM," dated, "14 January 2002 1630 

Hours." The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges the existence of this CIA document and that the information 

in the document was "compiled... for counterterrorism seniors at CIA." The CIA's June 2013 Response nonedieless 

states that "[t]here is no reference to this possibility [of a possible second operative] in official communications 

m i 11 ii1 1 i m i I IIII 

Page 290 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

290 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I //NOFOR N 

corroborated by a credible CIA source prior to any reporting from the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program.1638 In July 2002, a foreign government reported that pre-paid phone 

cards recovered by the FBI from Richard Reid upon his arrest were used by an individual named 

Sajid Badat to call a known terrorist, Nizar Trabelsi.1639 FBI interviews of Trabelsi—officially 

relayed to the CIA in July 2002—reported that "L. Badad Sajid" was "involved in operations 

targeting American interests."1640 The CIA highlighted in a July 2002 cable that this information 

matched previous reporting from a European government that identified a "Saajid Badat," of 

Gloucester, United Kingdom, with a date of birth of March 28, 1979, as a person suspected of 

being involved in terrorist activity.1641 Additional analysis of the phone card connecting Badat 

and Reid—as well as other intelligence—placed Sajid Badat and Richard Reid together in 

Belgium in September 2001.1642 

According to Sajid Badat was linked to other 

well-known extremists in the United Kingdom who were already under investigation. 

Specifically, Badat was known to ^BHB^^ I as "a member of Babar Ahmad's group," 

and was a "particularly close associate of Mirza Beg." reporting also determined that Badat 

had attended a jihad training camp in Afghanistan."1643 

(TS^^IBH^ ) Concurrent with the emergence of information linking Sajid Badat 

to Richard Reid, there was an ongoing international effort to identify one or more U.K.-based alQa'ida operatives known as "Issa."1644

 As early as June 2002, CIA records indicate that an 

between FBI and CIA, nor did it exist in any searchable CIA data repositories prior to KSM's reporting." The CIA 

expressed concern that the FBI was not sharing information from the debriefings of Richard Reid. Additional FBI 

information about Sajid Badat, including any information obtained from Richard Reid, was not available to the 

Committee. See CIA WASHINGTON DC • • (162127Z JUN 03). 

1638 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including U.S. military detainee reporting detailed in CIA 

Headquarters document, entitled, "OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AGAINST GLOBAL SUNNI 

EXTREMIST TERRORISM," dated, "9 April 2002 1630 Hours." This CIA document included reporting from a 

CIA source who stated diat, in addition to Richard Reid, "another operative existed" who was planning an attack 

"against an airliner originating from Heathrow International Airport in London." The same source had provided 

reporting on an "attack... against an airliner originating in France, Germany, or Britain, with the use of explosives 

concealed in shoes" just prior to Richard Reid's attempted use of explosives concealed in shoes on December 21, 

2001. Despite corroborated intelligence reporting acquired prior to the provision of information from CIA 

detainees, the CIA represented, as late as October 2007, that "[m]ost, if not all, of the intelligence acquired from 

high-value detainees in [the CIA] program would likely not have been discovered or reported in any other way," 

crediting CIA detainees with "the discovery of an operative who was preparing another attack like that attempted by 

'shoe bomber' Richard Reid." See CIA fax from CIA employee [REDACTED] to U.S. Senate Committee on 

Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, with fax cover sheet entitled, "Talking points," sent on October 26, 

2007, at 5:39:48 PM. Document faxed entitled, "Talking Points Appeal of the Million reduction in 

ClA/CTC's Rendition and Detention Program." 

1639 FB I WASHINGTON DC H^ H (130706Z JUL 02) 

1640

 FBI WASHINGTON DC (160429Z JUL 02) 

1641

 CIA ••^•^•^•jHRECTO R 

1042 FBI WASHINGTONDC^^ ^ (130706Z JUL 02); FBI WASHINGTON | 

I13165| 

1643

 See^ B [foreign partner] summary of the Sajid Badat investigation and | 

| [foreign partner] authorities relayed to the CIA that there were "two (or three) Abu Issas" in 

terrorist threat reporting who were described as from the U.K. and engaged in suspected al-Qa'ida terrorist 

operations. CIA Headquarters informed ^^^^^HinAueus^OO^ha^ther e are (at least) two/two important 

11 ii 1111 1 ^^MMBBI^B^M I i II i HI 

Page 291 of 499 

| (290315Z AUG 02); 

13165 

UNCLASSIFIED 

291 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

individual in the custody of a foreign government, Abu Zubair al-Ha'ih, repeatedly referenced an 

"Abu Issa al-Pakistani" as a British-born Pakistani associated with Richard Reid and engaged in 

plotting in the United Kingdom at the behest of KSM.1645 This information was corroborative of 

other intelligence reporting.1646 In May 2003, this detainee met with CIA officers to produce 

several sketches that were described as having "achieved a 95% likeness" of this individual.1647 

Ot^ugust 17, 2003, CIA officers noted that a photograph of Sajid Badat provided by 

^ • B [a foreign partner] looked "an awful lot like the sketches" of the Richard Reid 

associate made with the assistance of the detainee in foreign government custody.1648 

(TS/^^^^^^^^^/NF ) CIA Headquarters requested that the photograph be shown to CIA 

detainees. According to CIA records, on August 18, 2003, "KSM viewed the picture for a while, 

but said he did not recognize the person in the photo." When KSM was asked if Issa's name 

could be Sajid Badat, "KSM shrugged and said that the Badat name was not the name he 

recalled." Pressed further, KSM stated, "he was confident that the name Sajid Badat was not 

Issa's name."1649 On August 22, 2003, emails among CIA officers stated that "CTC believes that 

Abu Issa's true name is Sajid Badat... KSM says that Badat is not Abu Issa—but he might be 

lying."1650 On August 23, 2003, the detailed sketches derived from interviews of the detainee in 

fugitives known as Issa and carrying UK. passports (those both are known at times as Issa al-Britani), and both have 

strong links to KSM." See intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional details. 

1645

 Among other documents, see j^ m 19712 m 19744^^H||mH^an d 

119780 •l^l^^lfl^a/.v o April 4, 2003, cable from the CIA 

I providing information on a U.K. "Issa" in which the CIA acknowledges ^^^Hinvestigation 

already underway, writing "we realize that Abu Issa is [a subject of interest] of interest [your government]." Abu 

Zubair al-Ha'ili is also known by the variant, Abu Zubayr al-Ha'ili. Abu Zubair al-Ha'ili was never in CIA custody. 

1646 See intelligence chronology in Volume II. 

1647

 24237^HHI^H | 

Email from: I^^^^I^^^Hto : (multiple ccs); subject: "Re: Meeting with I^^H f 

date: August 17, 2003, at 1:04 PM. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[t]he fact that the [foreign partner] 

as late as August 2003 was only able to locate a poor quality photo of Sajid Badat belies the notion that Badat was 

well on his way to being identified as important and disrupted in advance of KSM's reporting. However, the 

Committeefound when CIA officers received what they described as a "crummy" photo of Sajid Badat from the 

they nonetheless wrote, "it sure looks to me like Sajid is die shoe bomber Issa," noting the body of 

intelligence compiled to date and the fact that "the photo [of Sajid Badat] looks an awful lot like the sketches of 

'Issa al-Britani/Pakistani'" the CIA had obtained from the detainee in foreign government custody, Abu Zubair alHa'ili. Of note to CIA officers was that al-Ha'ili "was asked, 'what is Abu Issa's most striking feature or 

features?'" Abu Zubair replied, "his eyes, thick frame eye glasses, and Pakistani hat." Abu Zubair stated that Issa 

always wore a unique, irregularly shaped checkered hat that has the front center cut out of it and is only worn in 

Pakistan. In a discussion of the photo of Sajid Badat, a CIA officer wrote: "Sajid appears to have the same goofy 

hat on that Zubair went to lengths to describe." See email from: HHH^flhtf; t o : [REDACTED] (multiple 

ccs); subject: "Re: photo of Sajid badat, suspected as iden with Issa al-Hindi: some possible confusion"; date: 

August 15, 2003, at 7:20:40 PM. 

1649

 12679 (181124Z AUG 03). Khallad bin Attash and Abu Zubaydah were also shown the picture of 

Sajid Badat. Both detainees stated they did not recognize the person in the photo. 

1650

 Series of emails, including email from: ^^^HHIH ; to: (multiple ccs); August 22, 

2003, at 9:24:43 AM. The CIA's June 2013 Response states, "no one had suggested Badat could be a candidate for 

this Issa until KSM's reporting." CIA records indicate that KSM never identified Sajid Badat by name. Moreover, 

on March 20, 2003, while being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM inaccurately 

identified Richard Reid's U.K. associate as "Talha." (See H^ m 10912 (202110Z MAR 03), disseminated as 

•••••. ) On May 11, 2003, a month and a half after the CIA ceased using its enhanced interrogation 

techniques against KSM, KSM stated that Talha was actually "Issa," and that lie had provided the name Talha under 

11 ii 1111 1 i II i II 

Page 292 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

292 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I //NOFOR N 

foreign custody, Abu Zubair al-Ha'ili—the sketches CIA officers stated so closely resembled the 

m [foreign partner]-provided photos of Sajid Badat—were shown to KSM. KSM stated he 

did not recognize the individual in the sketches.1651 

Meanwhile, on August 21, 2003, a CIA cable noted that the 

[foreign partner] had informed the CIA that joint interviews by the FBI and [ H [foreign 

partner] authorities of an individual in FBI custody, James Ujaama, led investigators in the U.K. 

to a home "formerly occupied by both Mirza [Beg] and Sajid [Badat]."1652 The H [foreign 

partner] authorities relayed to the CIA that "at least one of these men was known by the alias 

Issa," and that the subjects were related to a separate ongoing terrorism investigation.1653 On 

September 2, 2003, [foreign partner] authorities informed the CIA that "secret and 

reliable" reporting indicated that Sajid Badat is the Richard Reid associate and shoe bomber. 

According to the [foreign partner] report, 

linked Badat to a larger 

larger aforementioned 

[foreign partner information] 

network in the United Kingdom, which was part of the 

[foreign partner] investigation.1654 

(TS/Vlll^BHII^H^^ 1) September 9, 2003, a detainee in U.S. military custody at 

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, identified a photograph of Sajid Badat to a visiting U.K. official as Abu 

Issa the "shoe bomber."1655 The next day, KSM identified a photograph of Sajid Badat as "Issa 

al-Britani, aka Issa Richard"—the associate of Richard Reid. Other detainees in U.S. military 

custody subsequently identified the same photograph of Sajid Badat as "Abu Issa" the 

"shoebomber."1656 

pressure and had now remembered the right name - Issa - after he had time to think about the question. See 

|Hi|lI58 4 (111753Z MAY 03); DIRECTOR (121729Z MAY 03). 

12713 (231932Z AUG 03) 

1652

 Ujaama had pled guilty to terrorism-related charges on April 14, 2003, and had agreed to continue cooperating 

with FBI officials on terrorism investigations. Earnest James Ujaama entered a guilty plea to a charge of conspiracy 

to provide goods and services to the Taliban on April 14,2003. See U.S. Department of Justice press release dated 

April 14, 2003, and entitled, "Earnest James Ujaama Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Supply Goods and Services to 

the Taliban, Agrees to Cooperate widi Terrorism Investigations." 

1653

 ALEC ••(212117 Z AUG 03). CIA records state that sometimeMjriortc^ugust 21, 2003, the FBI had 

entered Sajid Badat, with the correct identifying information, into databases. 

1655

 DIRECTOR[REDACTED] . See also CIAH i 

DEC 03), which includes a "Comment" that "during a 9 September 2003 interview of [Feroze Ali] Abassi at 

Guantanamo Bay, Abbasi identified Badat as a participant in the 'information gathering course' at al-Faruq" terrorist 

training camp, about which Abassi had previouslyprovideddetailed information. 

1556 See Hil l 12806 (101910Z SEP 03) and 54986 (300927Z OCT 03). The CIA's June 2013 

Response acknowledges that a U.S. military detainee first identified Sajid Badat, but argues that CIA representations 

on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in producing otherwise unavailable intelligence 

in diis case were nonetheless accurate. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that KSM "did provide unique 

intelligence," and that "KSM's identification of Badat [in the photo] was more important than others who also 

recognized the photograph—including one who identified the photo a day before KSM did—because only KSM at 

the time had characterized this Issa as a partner to Reid and as a would-be shoe bomber." As detailed in this 

summary and in greater detail in Volume 11, the CIA's 2013 Response is incongruent with internal CIA records. 

After the arrest of Sajid Badat, U.K. authorities described their investigatiot^^aji^adat^^^l^HH^H i 

The United Kingdom highlighted information from a [specific U.K. intelligence 

collection on Sajid Badat] not further identified in CIA records. The U.K. record of investigation makes no 

reference to KSM's photo identification, but rather states: "reporting on 9 September 2003 confirmed that a U.S. 

military detainee had positively identified Saajid Badat as Abu Issa. We assess that Sajid Badat is identical with both 

iii i i IIII i i m i ur n i 

Page 293 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

293 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NQFORN 

(^FS/^^^m^ff ) After conducting extensive surveillance of Sajid Badat, U.K. 

authorities arrested Badat on November 27, 2003.1657 Badat immediately cooperated with U.K. 

investigators and confirmed he withdrew from a shoe bomb operation with Richard Reid in 

December 2001.1658 On November 28, 2003, the United Kingdom provided a detailed account to 

the CIA on how investigative efforts in the United Kingdom led to the identification of Sajid 

Badat, noting that "key aspects" of reporting acquired from CIA, U.S. military, and foreign 

government detainees matched those of a "^B^Ji^MBi^BB " [specific U.K. intelligence 

collection on Sajid Badat]. The U.K. intelligence collection 

on Sajid Badat] was not previously referenced in U.K. investigative updates to the CIA.1659 

(rFS^^^I^^^^^y/NF ) After pleading guilty in a U.K. court on February 28, 2005, to 

terrorism-related charges, Sajid Badat was sentenced to 13 years in prison. 

Sajid "Badat was voluntarily cooperative throughout much of his pre-sentencing 

incarceration."1660 On November 13, 2009, Sajid Badat's 13-year prison sentence was reduced 

to 11 years. In March 2010, approximately five years after his sentencing, Sajid Badat was 

released under an agreement whereby Badat became a cooperating witness for U.S. and U.K. 

authorities.1661 The legal agreement came to light when Sajid Badat testified against Adis 

Medunjanin, a U.S. terrorism suspect on trial in New York, via a video-link from the United 

Kingdom in April 2012.1662 

7. The Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf Plotting 

OV 03); DIRECTOR 

EC 03). See also the intelligence chronology in 

13120 

Sajid and Abu Issa the shoebomber." See 

03)HHmB ; [REDACTED]; CIA 

Volume II. 

1657

 ALECH | 

1658 ^ 3 | 2 0 

1659 13165 ^^^^^NO V 03). The^ H [foreign partner] report highlights how the "[a named foreign 

government] reported that on the 13 September 2001 Nizar [Trabelsi] was arrested for his alleged involvement in 

planning a terrorist attack against the American Embassy in Paris" and how Trabelsi was connected to a phone card 

"recovered from Richard Colvin Reid" but found to have been used by Sajid Badat. The report references a larger 

U.K. investigation, stating that Badat was found to be "a member of Babar Ahmad's group" and to have "attended a 

jihad training camp in Afghanistan." The B [foreign partner] report closes by stating: "Further reporting on 9 

September 2003 confirmed that a U.S. military detainee had positively identified Saajid Badat as Abu Issa. We 

assess that Sajid Badat is identical with both Sajid and Abu Issa the shoebomber." 

1660

 Email from: H^HBHt t o : [REDACTED], with multiple ccs; subject: "Re: Profile on Saajid Badat for 

coord by 6pm, 19 October 2005; date: October 19, 2005, at 3:14:29 PM. 

1661 See open source reporting, including "Secret Life of Shoe Bomb Saajid Badat Funded By The Taxpayer," U.K. 

Telegraph, dated April 23, 2012; "US court hears Bin Ladin testimony from UK bomb plotter," BBC News, dated 

April 24, 2012; "Operative Details Al Qaeda Plans to Hit Planes in Wake of 9/11," CNN, dated April 25, 2012; and 

"'Convention' of Convicted Terrorists at NY Trial," NPR News, dated April 24, 2012. 

1662 See open source reporting, including "Secret Life of Shoe Bomb Saajid Badat Funded By The Taxpayer," U.K. 

Telegraph, dated April 23, 2012; "US court hears Bin Ladin testimony from UK bomb plotter," BBC News, dated 

April 24, 2012; "Operative Details Al Qaeda Plans to Hit Planes in Wake of 9/11," CNN, dated April 25, 2012; 

"'Convention' of Convicted Terrorists at NY Trial," NPR News, dated April 24, 2012; and "Man Convicted of a 

Terrorist Plot to Bomb Subways Is Sent to Prison for Life," New York Times, dated November 16, 2012. 

11 ii M ii 11 ^^MBBM^^M M i II i H I 

Page 294 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

294 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I //NOFOR N 

( :

) Summary: The CIA represented that its enhanced interrogation 

techniques were effective and produced critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence, which 

thwarted plots and saved lives. Over a period of years, the CIA provided the identification and 

thwarting of the Heathrow Airport Plot as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques. These representations were inaccurate. A review of records indicates 

that the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf plotting had not progressed beyond the initial 

planning stages when the operation was fully disrupted with the detentions of Ramzi bin alShibh, KSM, Ammar-al-Baluchi, and Khallad bin Attash. None of these individuals were 

captured as a result of reporting obtained during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques against CIA detainees. 

(TS /ZflHIH ^^^^/NF ) Further Details: After the September 11, 2001, attacks against the 

United States, KSM sought to target the United Kingdom using hijacked aircraft and surmised 

that Heathrow Airport and a building in Canary Wharf, a major business district in London, were 

powerful economic symbols.1663 The initial plan was for al-Qa'ida operatives to hijack multiple 

airplanes departing Heathrow Airport, turn them around, and crash them into the airport itself. 

Security was assessed to be too tight at Heathrow Airport and the plan was altered to focus on 

aircrafts departing from mainly Eastern European airports to conduct attacks against Heathrow 

Airport. Al-Qa'ida was unable to locate pilots to conduct these attacks.1664 Once KSM was 

detained in Pakistan on March 1, 2003, responsibility for the planning was passed to Ammar alBaluchi and Khallad bin Attash, who were at the time focused on carrying out attacks against 

Western interests in Karachi, Pakistan.1665 

The thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf plotting 

is one of the eight most frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the 

effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Over a period of years, CIA 

documents prepared for and provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, and the 

Department of Justice represent the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf plotting as an example 

of how "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation 

techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots" and "capture additional terrorists."1666 

The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques was "otherwise unavailable" and "saved lives."1667 

1563

 While the CIA refers to "Canary Wharf" as a potential target of KSM's plotting, intelligence records suggest the 

actual target was likely "One Canada Square," die tallest building in the United Kingdom at the time of the plotting, 

which is located in Canary Wharf, a major business district in London. 

1664 See detailed intelligence chronology in Volume II. 

1005 See the Karachi Plots section in this summary, as well as additional details in Volume II. 

1666

 Italics included in CIA Memorandum to the Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA 

Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," from March 2, 2005. 

1667 p r o m 2003 through 2009, the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that 

the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA 

representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see: 

(1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, 

which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of 

die CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. The CIA representations referenced by the 

OLC include that the use of the CIA's enh ' ' " ;cessary" to obtain "critical," 

TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN 

Page 295 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

295 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

(TS^^^HHI^HV^^ ) P°r example, on December 23, 2005, CIA Director Porter Goss 

explained in a letter to National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, Homeland Security Advisor 

Frances Townsend, and Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte, that he was 

"vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect 

and disrupt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that 

the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the Uni ted 

States." (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from 

Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30,2005, Re: 

Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques 

that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the 

Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA 

representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

Citing CIA documents and die President's September 6, 2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation program 

(which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: "The CIA interrogation program— 

and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security 

of the nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ... As the President explained 

[on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, the program 

has saved innocent lives.'" (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence 

Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 

2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva 

Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda 

Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003 

represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence 

information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives," and warned policymakers that "[t]ermination of 

this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from 

Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation 

Program, July 29, 2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and 

September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The 

CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: 

"Information [the CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has 

almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to 

the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks 

involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, 

Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention 

and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum 

re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA 

Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the 

[enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of 

the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other 

means." (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid 

Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and 

Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," 

"Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background 

on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 

March 18, 2009, entitled, "SWIGERT and DUNBAR," located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258, which 

provides a list of "some of the key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence 

acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means." See 

Volume II for additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the 

CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives." 

Illl II I I I ^^^^^^^^^^^BiVNOFOT m 

Page 296 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

296 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I //NOFOR N 

suspending the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques because of the passage of the 

Detainee Treatment Act (the "McCain amendment"). The letter stated: 

"...only 29 [CIA detainees] have undergone an interrogation that used one or 

more of the 13 [CIA enhanced interrogation] techniques.1668 These 

interrogations produced intelligence that allowed the U.S., and its partners, to 

disrupt attacks such as 911-style attacks planned for the U.S. West Coast and 

for Heathrow airport. I can inform you with confidence that this program has 

allowed the U.S. to save hundreds, if not thousands, of lives."166'

3 

Similarly, the CIA informed the CIA inspector general on 

February 27, 2004, that: 

"As a result of the lawful use of EITs, KSM also provided information on an 

al-Qa'ida plot for suicide airplane attacks outside of the United States that 

would have killed thousands of people in the United Kingdom. .. .Of note, even 

after KSM reported that al-Qa'ida was planning to target Heathrow, he at first 

repeatedly denied there was any other target than the airport. Only after the 

repeated lawful use of EITs did he stop lying and admit that the sketch of a 

beam labeled Canary Wharf in his notebook was in fact an illustration that 

KSM the engineer drew himself in order to show another AQ operative that the 

beams in the Wharf - like those in the World Trade Center would likely melt 

and collapse the building, killing all inside.... We are still debriefing detainees 

and following up on leads to destroy this cell, but at a minimum the lawful use 

ofElT's on KSM provided us with critical information that alerted us to these 

threats...:'1610 

The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the 

Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plotting in 20 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and 

the Department of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009.1671 

(TSZ/jll^^^^^^^B^NF ) A review of CIA operational cables and other documents found 

that contrary to CIA representations, information acquired during or after the use of the CIA's 

1668 -pj^j information was incorrect. CIA records indicate that by December 23, 2005, at least 38 CIA detainees had 

been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

1669

 Italics added. "Impact of the Loss of the Detainee Program to CT Operations and Analysis," prepared to support 

a letter from CIA Director Goss to Stephen J. Hadley, Assistant to the President/National Security Advisor, Frances 

F. Townsend, Assistant to the President/Homeland Security Advisor, and Ambassador John D. Negroponte, dated 

December 23, 2005. 

1670

 Italics added. CIA memorandum to the CIA Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for 

Operations, dated Febmary 27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 

'Coiinteitenorism Detention and Interrogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's 

Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities," dated February 24, 2004. 

1671 See list of CIA prepared briefings and memoranda from 2003 through 2009 with representations on the 

effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques referenced in this summary and described in detail in 

Volume II. 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 297 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

297 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in "alert[ing]" the CIA to the threat to—or 

"disrupting]" the plotting against—Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf.1672 

Prior to the detention and interrogation of the CIA detainees 

credited by the CIA with providing information on the plot, the CIA and other intelligence 

agencies were already "alerted" to al-Qa'ida's efforts to target Heathrow Airport. Specifically, 

the CIA knew that: (1) KSM and al-Qa'ida were targeting "a national symbol in the United 

Kingdom" and that this symbol was the "Heathrow airport";1673 (2) the attack plan called for 

hijacking commercial aircraft and crashing them directly into Heathrow airport;1674 (3) no pilots 

had been identified by al-Qa'ida and the planned attack was not imminent;1675 (4) KSM, Ammar 

1673

 As described in this Study, the CIA consistently represented from 2003 through 2009 that the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques resulted in "disrupted plots," listed the "Heathrow Plot" as disrupted "as a result 

of the EITs," and informed policymakers that the information acquired to disrupt the plotting could not have been 

obtained from other intelligence sources or methods available to the U.S. government. In at least one CIA 

representation to White House officials that highlighted the Heathrow plotting, the CIA represented that "the use of 

the [CIA's enhanced interrogation] techniques has produced significant results," and warned policymakers that 

"[t]ermination of this [CIA] program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." The CIA's June 2013 Response 

states: "CIA disagrees with the Study's assessment that [the CIA] incorrectly represented that information derived 

from interrogating detainees helped disrupt al-Qa'ida's targeting of Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf in London, 

including in President Bush's 2006 speech on the Program. Detainee reporting, including some which was acquired 

after enhanced intenogation techniques were applied, played a critical role in uncovering the plot, understanding it, 

detaining many of the key players, and ultimately allowing us to conclude it had been disrupted. It is a complex 

story, however, and we should have been clearer in delineating the roles played by different partners." As described 

in this summary, past CIA representations concerning the Heathrow Airport plotting and intelligence acquired "as a 

result of' the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were inaccurate. (See, among other records, the September 

6, 2006, speech by President Bush, based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, which describes the CIA's use 

of "an alternative set" of interrogation procedures and stating: "These are some of the plots that have been stopped 

because of the information of this vital program. Terrorists held in CIA custody...have helped stop a plot to hijack 

passenger planes and fly tliein into Heathrow or Canary Wharf in London.") Contrary to the CIA's June 2013 

assertion, CIA records indicate that information related to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 

played no role in "detaining many of the key players" and played no role in "uncovering the [Heathrow] plot." CIA 

records indicate the Heathrow Airport plotting had not progressed beyond the initial planning stages when the 

operation was fully disrupted with the detention of Ramzi bin al-Shibh (detained on September 11, 2002), KSM 

(detained on March I, 2003), Ammar-al-Baluchi (detained on April 29, 2003), and Khallad bin Attash (detained on 

April 29, 2003). The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[b]y all accounts, KSM's arrest was the action that 

most disrupted the [Heathrow] plot." As detailed in this summary and in greater detail in Volume II, the capture of 

these detainees—including KSM—was unrelated to any reporting from CIA detainees. CIA records further indicate 

that details on al-Qa'ida's targeting of Heathrow Airport were acquired prior to any reporting from CIA detainees. 

For example, prior to receiving any information from CIA detainees, the CIA acquired detailed information about 

al-Qa'ida's targeting of Heathrow Airport, to include, but not limited to, the al-Qa'ida senior leaders involved, the 

method of the planned attack, the status of the operation, and the kimycis of two potential unwitting operatives in the 

United Kingdom. Finally, the CIA's June 2013 Response claims that its past CIA representations were accurate and 

that CIA "detainee reporting, including some which was acquired after enhanced interrogation techniques were 

applied, played a critical role" in providing information, "ultimately allowing [CIA] to conclude it had been 

disrupted." Prior to June 2013, the CIA had never represented that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques produced information "allowing [CIA] to conclude [the Heathrow Plot] had been disrupted." Rather, as 

detailed in this summary and more fully in Volume II, the CIA represented that the information acquired "as a result 

of EITs" produced unique, otherwise unavailable "actionable intelligence" that "saved lives" and disrupted the 

plotting itself. As detailed, these representations were inaccurate. 

1673

 DIRECTOR m^ H (172132Z OCT 02) 

1674

 DIRECTOR (172132Z OCT 02) 

1675

 DIRECTOR (172132Z OCT 02) 

11ii i i i i i iIIiII 

Page 298 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

298 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I //NOFOR N 

al-Baluchi, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh were involved in or knowledgeable about the plotting;1676 

(5) al-Qa'ida was seeking to recruit numerous operatives, but potentially already had two 

operatives in place in the United Kingdom named "Abu Yusif' and "Abu Adel," although the 

two operatives were unwitting of the plot;1677 and (6) KSM was seeking Saudi and British 

passport holders over the age of 30 for the attack.1678 

A review of records indicates that the Heathrow Airport plotting 

had not progressed beyond the initial planning stages when the operation was fully disrupted 

with the detentions of Ramzi bin al-Shibh (detained on September 11, 2002),1679 KSM (detained 

on March 1, 2003),1680 Ammar-al-Baluchi (detained on April 29, 2003), and Khallad bin Attash 

(detained on April 29, 2003,).1681 There are no CIA records to indicate that any of the 

individuals were captured as a result of CIA detainee reporting. A draft National Terrorism 

Bulletin from March 2006 states: "the [Heathrow Airport] operation was disrupted mid-cycle, 

around the spring of 2003, when several of the key plotters, including KSM, were detained."1682 

Foreign government intelligence analysis came to the same conclusion.1683 

While each of these four detainees provided information on the 

plotting during their detentions, none of this information played any role in the disruption of the 

plot. A wide body of intelligence reporting indicated that no operatives were informed of the 

1676

 [REDACTED] 20901 (301117ZSEP 02). See also CIA | 

1677

 CIA HIHHH ' I" October 2002, months prior to KSM's capture, Ramzi bin al-Shibh (RBS), 

who had not yet been rendered to CIA custody and therefore not yet subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques, identified Abu Yusef and Abu Adil as potential U.K.-based Heathrow operatives. RBS described how 

the two English-speaking "al-Qa'ida suicide operatives" were dispatched to the United KingdonibyKSM^RBS 

provided a detailed description of the two potential operatives, as well as their travel. (See CIA 

hHH >

 KS M wa s caPture d o n

 March I, 2003. The CIA's June 2013 Response nonetheless asserts that "KSM 

also was responsible for helping us identify two potential operatives—known only as Abu Yusef and Abu Adil— 

whom al-Qa'ida had deployed to the United Kingdom by early 2002 and whom KSM wanted to tap for a role in a 

future Heathrow operation." U.K. investigative efforts led to the identification of Abu Yusef, who then identified 

Abu Adil—who was already an investigative target of the U.K. government. In February 2004, the CIA reported 

that no CIA detainee was able to identify a photograph of Abu Yusif. See ALEC (262236Z FEB 04). 

1678

 DIRECTOR • • (172132Z OCT 02) 

1679 See section of this summary and Volume II on the "Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh." The CIA's June 2013 

Response states that "the information provided by Abu Zubaydah played a key role in the capture of Ramzi Bin alShibh." As described in the "Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh" in this summary and in greater detail in Volume II, 

Ramzi bin al-Shibh was not captured as a result of information acquired during or after the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah. 

1680 See section of this summary and Volume II on the Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM). The CIA's 

June 2013 Response acknowledges that "[b]y all accounts, KSM's arrest was the action that most disrupted die 

[Heathrow] plot." The CIA's June 2013 Response asserts, however, that "[Abu] Zubaydah's reporting also 

contributed to KSM's arrest." As described in the "Capture of KSM" in this summary and in more detail in Volume 

II, the capture of KSM was not attributable to any information obtained from the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program. 

1681

 As described in the section of this summary related to the "Karachi Plot(s)" and in more detail in Volume II, 

information from CIA detainees played no role in the arrests of Ammar al-Baluchi or Khallad bin Attash. 

1682 See series of emails dated March 22, 2006, with the subject line, "RE: Abu Adel NTB Coord: Please Respond by 

14:00 Today (3/22). See also series of emails dated March 22, 2006, with the subject line, "RE: Abu Adel NTB 

Coord: Please Respond by 14:00 Today (3/22). 

1683

 DIRECTOR ^H I 

TOP SECRET// RN 

Page 299 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

299 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I //NOFOR N 

plot, no pilots were ever identified by al-Qa'ida for the attacks, and only schedules of potential 

flights were collected for review.1684 

(^^S^miH^^H^H 2) CIA detainee records indicate that reporting from CIA detainees on 

aspects of the Heathrow plotting was often unreliable and not believed by CIA officers. For 

example, KSM retracted information he provided while being subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, including information linking Jaffar al-Tayyar to the Heathrow Plot.1685 

On May 20, 2003, nearly two months after the CIA ceased using its enhanced interrogation 

techniques against KSM, a CIA analyst wrote that KSM had provided three different stories 

related to the Heathrow plotting, writing to CIA colleagues: "Bottom Line: KSM knows more 

about this plot than he's letting on."1686 By late June 2004, KSM had retracted much of the 

varied reporting he had provided on the Heathrow plotting, most importantly the information 

KSM provided on tasking potential operatives to obtain flight training.1687 KSM stated that 

during March 2003—when he was being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques—"he may have given false information," and that, in many cases, the information he 

provided was "just speculation."1688 The value of other CIA detainee reporting was also 

questioned by CIA officers.1689 In July 2003, a cable from the CIA's ALEC Station stated that 

"HQS/ALEC remains concerned with what we believe to be paltry information coming from 

detainees about operations in the U.K."1690 

In addition, KSM withheld information linking Abu Talha alPakistani to the Heathrow plotting. According to CIA interrogation records, KSM discussed 

Canary Wharf the first time he was shown his notebook, in which the words "Canary Wharf" 

were written.1691 KSM stated, however, that he had drawn the sketch for Ammar al-Baluchi. In 

1684 Among other documents, see DIRECTOR | 

1685 See CIA WASHINGTON DC | 

10828(1513102 MAR 03); | 

| (172132Z OCT 02). 

|(122310Z MAR 03) 

11717 (201722Z MAY 03); 

cc: 

10883 (182127Z MAR 03); | 

10778 (121549Z MAR 03). 

1686 See email from: [REDACTED]; to: cc: subject: 

"KSM on Heathrow"; date: May 20, 2003, at 03:44 PM. 

Ifi87

 22939 (03I541Z JUL 04) 

1688

 22939 (031541Z JUL 04) 

1689

 In March 2003, after Ramzi bin al-Shibh had been rendered to CIA custody and subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, CIA officers wrote that they did "not believe [Ramzi] bin al-Shibh" was "being completely 

honest" about potential Heathrow operatives. (See ALEC ^^H^^HI^HH^I- )

 A June 2003 CIA cable 

states that "KSM, Ammar, and Khallad remain loathe to reveal details of the Heathrow plot," and that the CIA 

believed the detainees were withholding information that could lead to the capture of Abu Talha al-Pakistani, noting 

specifically that the CIA detainees had "so far clung to such information" and "deflected questions." By diis time 

KSM, Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash had all been rendered to CIA custody and subjected to the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques. See ALEC ^H l (172242Z JUN 03) and Volume III for additional 

information 

1690

 ALEC^ H (161821Z JUL 03) 

1691 m^i07g 7 (130716Z MAR 03). As described, the CIA represented that KSM "First repeatedly denied 

there was any other target than the airport," and "[o]nly after the repeated lawful use of EITs did [KSM] stop lying 

and admit that the sketch of a beam labeled Canary Wharf in his notebook was in fact an illustration that KSM the 

engineer drew himself in order to show another AQ operative that the beams in the Wharf- like those in the World 

Trade Center would likely melt and collapse the building, killing all inside" (See CIA memorandum to the CIA 

Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, dated February 27, 2004, with the 

subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program' 

(2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities," dated 

m i M III i i^^BBBH B Ii"i"iii i 

Page 300 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

300 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFOR N 

June 2003, after being confronted with contradictory reporting from Ammar al-Baluchi, KSM 

admitted that he had actually shown the sketch to "Talha," whom KSM had not previously 

mentioned.1692 

8. The Capture of Hambali 

(TS^ HUHHHr^^ ) Nummary: The CIA represented that its enhanced interrogation 

techniques were effective and produced critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence, which 

thwarted plots and saved lives. Over a period of years, the CIA provided the capture of Hambali 

as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Specifically, 

the CIA consistently represented that, as a result of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, 

KSM provided the "first" information on a money transfer by Majid Khan that eventually led to 

Hambali's capture. These CIA representations were inaccurate. Majid Khan, who was in 

foreign government custody, provided this information prior to any reporting from KSM. CIA 

records indicate that the intelligence that led to Hambali's capture in Thailand was based on 

signals intelligence, a CIA source, and Thai investigative activities. 

February 24, 2004). As described, KSM discussed the sketch the first time it was shown to him. See \ 

10787 (130716Z MAR 03). ^^^ ^ 

1092 See ||^^Hl442 0 ALECjH| | (192314Z MAY 03); H 11717 (201222Z 

12141 (272231Z JUN03);MBBl079 8 (131816ZMAR03), disseminated as • 

The CIA's June 2013 Response asserts that Abu Talha was "the individual managing the [Heathrow] 

plot." Contrary to CIA assertions, CIA records indicate that Abu Talha served as an assistant to Ammar al-Baluchi 

and KSM and played no leadership or managerial role in the plotting. KSM reported that Abu Talha's "primary 

skill [was] his ability to gather information," and that Abu Talha would not have been able to take over the 

Heathrow plotting after the arrest of Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash, "stress[ing] that Talha was not well 

trained or particularly well connected to al-Qa'ida," did not know all of the components of the Heathrow plotting, 

and had no links to the unwitting Saudi operatives KSM was considering using in the plotting. KSM stated that after 

the arrest of Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash, Abu Talha "would have known that the plot was 

compromised and over." (See •• • 12141 (272231Z JUN 03); 20525 (141731Z FEB 04). For 

additional information on the two potential Saudi Arabia-based operatives, Ayyub and Azmari, who were 

investigative targets of a foreign government prior to detainee reporting, unwitting of the Heathrow plotting, and 

assessed by the CIA to have been killed or detained as a result of terrorist activity unrelated to the aforementioned 

plotting, see Volume II.). The CIA's June 2013 Response further states that "CIA lacked reporting on Abu Talha 

prior to March 2003 and first learned of his specific role in the plot from debriefing KSM." A review of CIA 

records found that on March 6, 2003, prior to any reporting from KSM or any other CIA detainee, Majid Khan, in 

foreign government custody, discussed Ammar al-Baluchi's Karachi-based assistant, "Talha." Majid Khan provided 

a phone number for Talha, and used that number at the request of his captors in an effort to locate and capture 

Ammar al-Baluchi through Talha. (See ••••1367 8 (070724Z MAR 03); {^•^•1371 0 (081218ZMAR 

03); ALEC M B (081830Z MAR 03)nHH i

 1369 5

 (080611Z MAR 03);H^B | 11092 ^H H 

HH. ) Ammar al-Baluchi, when he was in foreign government custody, provided a description of Talha, whom 

he called "Suliman," and stated that he had dispatched Talha, aka Suliman, to the United Kingdom to identify 

operatives "suitable for hijacking or suicide operations." Ammar al-Baluchi also identified an email address used by 

Talha. I MB M 1 1 1 " 1 JJiJIll^^M i 14478|^HBHH ; •• • 14420 

114304 HHH^^BaLE C |^^|(142334ZMA Y 03).) As KSM had 

B

ntioned Abu Talha, Ammar al-Baluchi's reporting prompted Deputy ChiefofALECStationJ 

to note that "KSM could be in trouble very soon." (See email from: to: f 

, B^HI H [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: action detainee 

branch - Re: ammar and KSM).) In the context of the U.K. Urban Targets Plot, the CIA's June 2013 Response 

states: "Abu Talha's arrest - a case CIA frequently cited as a success of the detainee program - would not have 

happened if not for reporting from CIA-held detainees." As described elsewhere in this summary, and in greater 

detail in Volume 11, CIA records do not support this statement. 

m i 11 III i 11 ("""i i 

Page 301 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

301 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I //NOFOR N 

(^^IHII^m ^NF ) Further Details: Riduan bin Isomuddin, aka Hambali, was a senior 

member of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a Southeast Asia-based terrorist group, and served as an 

interface between the JI and al-Qa'ida. Hambali was linked to terrorist activity prior to the 

September 11, 2001, attacks. Shortly after those attacks, Hambali was described as the CIA's 

"number one target" in Southeast Asia.1693 When the Octobcr 12, 2002, terrorist attacks 

occurred on the Indonesian island of Bali, killing more than 200 individuals, Hambali was 

immediately suspected of being the "mastermind" of the attacks and was further described as 

"one of the world's most wanted terrorists."1694 

(TS/^^^^^B^H^^ ) capture of Hambali is one of the eight most frequently cited 

examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques. Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and provided to 

senior policymakers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent the capture of 

Hambali as an example of how "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after 

applying interrogation techniques" had "enabled CIA to dismpt terrorist plots" and "capture 

additional terrorists."1695 The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "otherwise unavailable" and "saved lives."1696 

1693

 DIRECTOR ^H i (241921Z MAR 02) 

1694

 Among other news sources, see "The Secret Mastermind Behind the Bali Horror," The Observer, 19 October 

2002. 

1695

 Italics included in CIA Memorandum to the Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA 

Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," from March 2,2005. 

1696

 From 2003 through 2009, the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that 

the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA 

representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see: 

(1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, 

which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. The CIA representations referenced by the 

OLC include that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical," 

"vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect 

and disrupt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that 

the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United 

States." (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from 

Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: 

Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques 

that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the 

Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA 

representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

Citing CIA documents and the President's September 6, 2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation program 

(which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: "The CIA interrogation program— 

and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security 

of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ... As the President 

explained [on September 6,2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, 

the program has saved innocent lives.'" (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central 

Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 

Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 

of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value 

11 ii 111 1 i ^^BB^^MtM^B^oro' ^ 

Page 302 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

302 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

(T&T^B^I^IHw'^^) AS an example, in a briefing prepared for the president's chief of 

staff, Josh Bolten, on May 2, 2006, the CIA represented that the "[u]se of the DOJ-authorized 

enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has 

enabled us to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of 

critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida."1697 The briefing document represents that "[assessing the 

effectiveness of individual interrogation techniques is difficult," but provides 11 specific 

examples of "Key Intelligence Collected from HVD Interrogations," including: 

"Hambali's Capture: During KSM's interrogation we acquired information 

that led to the capture of Hambali in August 2003 and to the partial 

dismantling of the Jemaah Islamiyah leadership in SE Asia. KSM first told us 

about Majid Khan's role in delivering $50,000 to Hambali operatives for an 

attack KSM believed was imminent. We then confronted Khan with KSM's 

admission and [signals intelligence] confirming the money transfer and Khan's 

travel to Bangkok. Khan admitted he delivered the money to an operative 

named 'Zubair,' whom we subsequently identified and captured. Zubair's 

capture led to the identification and subsequent capture of an operative named 

al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003 

represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence 

information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives," and warned policymakers that "[t]ermination of 

tliis program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from 

Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation 

Program, July 29,2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and 

September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The 

CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: 

"Information [the CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has 

almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to 

the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks 

involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, 

Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention 

and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum 

re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA 

Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the 

[enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of 

the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other 

means." (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid 

Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and 

Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," 

"Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background 

on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 

March 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258, 

which provides a list of "some of the key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence 

acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means." See 

Volume II for additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the 

CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives." 

mi See May 2, 2006, Briefing for the Chief of Staff to the President: Briefing for Chief of Staff to the President Josh 

Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Interragatioi^rocrams^^^^^^^^^ iiii i IIII i BI^^^B^B^B^ B i II II i mi i 

Page 303 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

303 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECREiW^^^^Bi^^^BM^NOgQR N 

Lilie who was providing forged passports to Hambali. Lilie identified the 

house in Bangkok where Hambali was hiding."1698 

Similarly, on July 13, 2004, the CIA disseminated an Intelligence 

Assessment entitled, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida."1699 On 

April22i2005, the paper, as well as other materials on CIA detainee reporting, was faxed from 

WmmCT C Legal, to the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice, to support 

the OLC's legal review of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.1700 The document 

states: 

"...information that KSM provided on Majid Khan in the spring of 2003 

was the crucial first link in the chain that led us to the capture of 

prominent JI leader and al-Qa'ida associate Hambali in August 2003, 

and more than a dozen Southeast Asian operatives slated for attacks 

against the US homeland. KSM told us about [Majid] Khan's role in 

delivering $50,000 in December 2002 to operatives associated with 

Hambali. ... [Majid] Khan—who had been detained in Pakistan in early 

2003—was confronted with KSM's information about the money and 

acknowledged that he delivered the money to an operative named 

'Zubair.' ...Based on that information, Zubair was captured in June 

2003.1701 

On August 24, 2009, this document was declassified with redactions and publicly released with 

the inaccurate information unredacted.1702 

(TS/Z^^^^^^^^I^&tF ) The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the 

capture of Hambali in 18 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and the Department of 

1698

 Italics added. See May 2,2006, Briefing for Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, 

Detention and Interrogation Programs. The CIA's June 2013 Response maintains that the chronology in this passage 

and similar representations are correct. The CIA's June 2013 Response describes the following as "standard 

language" and the CIA's "typical representation" of Hambali's capture: "KSM provided information about an alQa'ida operative, Majid Khan, who he was aware had recently been captured. KSM—possibly believing the 

detained operatives was 'talking' admitted to having tasked Majid with delivering a large sum of money to 

individuals working for another senior al-Qa'ida associate. In an example of how information from one detainee 

can be used in debriefing another detainee in a 'building block' process, Khan—confronted with KSM's information 

about the money—acknowledged that he delivered the money to an operative named Zubair and provided Zubair's 

physical description and contact number" (italics added). The CIA's June 2013 Response states that this 

chronology is "accurate." As detailed in this summary, and in greater detail in Volume II, this June 2013 CIA 

representation is inaccurate. Majid Khan—who was in foreign government custody—first provided information on 

the money exchange and Zubair, prior to any reporting from KSM. 

1699

 CIA, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source On Al-Qa'ida," was authored by [REDACTED], 

CTC/UB LD/AQPO/AQLB. 

1100

 CIA fax to the Department of Justice, entitled, "|H > Materials on KSM and Abu Zubaydah. |H>"

 date d 2 2 

April 2005. For background on the intelligence product, see DTS #2004-3375. 

1701

 Italics added. CIA Directorate of Intelligence, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida," 

dated July 13, 2004, faxed to the Department of Justice, April 22, 2005, entitled, Materials on KSM and Abu 

Zubaydah. This report was widely disseminated in the Intelligence Community and provided to the Senate 

Select Committee on Intelligence on July 15,2004. 

1702 See www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/Khalid_Shayhk_Mohammad.pdf. 

11ii 11 i i i UMBJjj^ B im m 

Page 304 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

304 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

Justice between July 2003 and March 2009.1703 In these representations, the CIA consistently 

asserted that "after applying" the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM provided "the 

crucial first link" that led to the capture of Hambali.1704 

(WJMmmmWZ ) A review of CIA operational cables and other records found that 

information obtained from KSM during and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques played no role in the capture of Hambali. A review of CIA records further found that 

prior to reporting from CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, 

the CIA had intelligence on: (1) Hambali's role in the Jemaah Islamiyah; (2) funding by alQa'ida and KSM of Hambali's terrorist activities; (3) the operative to whom Majid Khan 

delivered the money, Zubair, and Zubair's links to terrorism, Jemaah Islamiyah, and Hambali; 

and (4) Majid Khan's $50,000 money transfer from al-Qa'ida to Zubair in December 2002. CIA 

records indicate that the intelligence that led to Hambali's capture was based on signals 

intelligence, a CIA source, and Thai investigative activities in Thailand.1705 

Prior to his capture, Hambali was known to have played a 

supporting role in the KSM and Ramzi Yousef "Bojinka Plot," an effort in early 1995 to place 

explosives on 12 United States-flagged aircraft and destroy them mid-flight.1706 By the end of 

2001, Hambali was suspected of playing a supporting role in the September 11, 2001, terrorist 

attacks, as well as helping to enroll Zacarias Moussaoui in flight school.1707 By early 2002, a 

body of intelligence reporting unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program 

indicated that KSM was providing Hambali with funding to conduct terrorist operations in 

Southeast Asia.1708 In March 2002, Hambali was described as the CIA's "number one target" in 

1703 See list of CIA prepared briefings and memoranda from 2003 through 2009 with representations on the 

effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques referenced in this summary and described in detail in 

Volume II. 

1704

 Among other documents, see CIA Directorate of Intelligence, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source 

on Al-Qa'ida," dated July 13, 2004, faxed to die Department of Justice, April 22, 2005, fax entitled, "H| , 

Materials on KSM and Abu Zubaydah. H. " This Intelligence Assessment was widely disseminated in the 

Intelligence Community and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on July 15, 2004. On March 

31, 2009, former Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was 

publicly released with redactions on August 24, 2009. See also CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of 

Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2,2005, from HUGHS ' Legal Group, DCI 

Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques" and Classified 

Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden, 

Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007 (DTS #2007-1563). 

1705 See intelligence chronology in Volume II for detailed infonnation. 

l7M See United States Court of Appeals, August Term, 2001, U.S. v Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, and DIRECTOR ^ H 

JAN 02). also BHHH^ H CIA H M AR 02). 

171)7

 December 15, 2001, CIA Briefing Document, "DCI Highlights." See also ALEC (262150Z APR 02) and 

email from: REDACTED; to: REDACTED, HHHfll - H^H^^^ H H^^H^^^f t and others; 

subject: "Debriefing results of Omani al-Qa'ida cell leader yields further connections between possibly Khalid 

Shaykh Muhammed and the East Asia al-Qa'ida network"; date: April 16, 2002, at 9:56:34 AM. See also 9/11 

Commission Report. 

1708 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including ALEC (262150Z APR 02). See also email from: 

[REDACTED]; to [REDACTED], HflHH > HHHI^^ H HHHHH <

 an d

 others; subject: 

"Debriefing results of Omani al-Qa'ida cell leader yields further connections between possibly Khalid Shaykh 

Muhammed and the East Asia al-Qa'ida network'\date^^^ AM. 

11 ii 11 i i i BMB^^WMI^^ B i II i II 

Page 305 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

305 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

Southeast Asia.1709 That same month, the FBI provided information to the CIA stating that 

foreign government detainee reporting indicated that KSM reimbursed terrorism-related 

expenditures made by Hambali for the JI.1710 By June of 2002, the CIA had entered into 

discussions with representatives of the government regarding their willingness to 

accept custody of Hambali once he was captured.1711 On September 25, 2002, the CIA reported 

that an individual in FBI custody since May 2002, Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, reported that in 

November 2001, he collected $50,000 from KSM for a Hambali-directed terrorist operation 

targeting U.S. interests, as well as at least one other $10,000 payment.1712 On the same day, 

September 25, 2002, a CIA cable stated that Masran bin Arshad, while in the custody of a 

foreign government, had detailed his connections to Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and KSM.1713 

According to bin Arshad, after KSM's "Second Wave" plotting was "abandoned" in late 2001, 

bin Arshad was tasked by KSM to meet with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in Pakistan and to deliver 

$50,000 to Hambali for terrorist operations. Bin Arshad stated he was unable to deliver the 

money.1714 When the October 12, 2002, terrorist attacks occurred on the Indonesian island of 

Bali, killing more than 200 individuals, Hambali was immediately suspected of being the 

"mastermind" of the attacks and was further described as "one of the world's most wanted 

terrorists."1715 Open source information in October 2002 identified the funding for the Bali 

bombings as flowing through Hambali from al-Qa'ida leadership in Pakistan. Through 

November 2002, news reports highlighted links between senior al-Qa'ida leadership—including 

KSM—and JI in the context of the Bali bombings. Hambali continued to be identified as a 

potential mastermind of the bombing and likely residing in Thailand. These same reports 

identified a Malaysian named "Zubair" as one of three individuals sought by security officials for 

the Hambali-linked Bali bombings.1716 

(TS/Z^^^^m^^^/NF ) In early January 2003, coverage of a known al-Qa'ida email 

account uncovered communications between that account and the account of a former Baltimore, 

Maryland, resident, Majid Khan. The communications indicated that Majid Khan traveled to 

Bangkok, Thailand, in December 2002 for terrorist support activities and was in contact there 

1709

 DIRECTORIE S (241921Z MAR 02) 

1710

 ALEC HHV(22130 Z APR 02) 

1711 

1712 See also "Terror Informant for FBI Allegedly Targeted Agents," 

Washington Post, dated January 19,2008, and Department of Justice documents on Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, 

including Jabarah's "Sentencing Memorandum." 

1713 See section of this summary and Volume II on the "Information on the Facilitator That Led to the UBL 

Operation" for additional information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. Masran bin Arshad was in the custody of the 

government of at this time. 

1714

 DIRECTOR^M(251938 Z SEP02);••6590 3 ^^HAUG02) ; CIAAU G 02); 

• • 65903 (iHHAUG02);65902(HHft\UG02 ) 

17,5

 Among other open sources, see "The Secret Mastermind Behind the Bali Horror," The Observer, 19 October 

2002. 

1716

 Among other open source reporting, see "The Sadness of Bali is the Sadness of the World," The Strait Times, 

dated November 16, 2002; "Jemaah Islamiyah Still Capable of Major Terrorist Attacks," Philippine Headline News, 

dated November 27, 2002; "Police Arrest 13 Linked to Bali Bombers, Uncovers Plot to Blow Up Bank," AFP, dated 

November 26,2002; "Bali Friends Have Arabia Link," New York Post, dated December 2, 2002; "Finger Is Pointed 

At Bomber," AFP-Hong Kong, dated November 26, 2002; and "Mastermind of Bali Bomb Arrested," The Strait 

Times, dated November 22,2002. 

i < ii 11 i i i 

Page 306 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

306 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I //NOFOR N 

with a "Zubair."1717 By this time, the CIA had significant information—prior to KSM's 

capture—indicating that a "Zubair" played a central supporting role in the JI, was affiliated with 

al-Qa'ida figures like KSM, had expertise in in Southeast Asia, and was 

suspected of playing a role in Hambali's October 12, 2002, Bali bombings.1718 This information 

was derived from traditional intelligence collection, open source reporting, and FBI debriefings 

of Abu Zubaydah (prior to Abu Zubaydah being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques).1719 On March 4, 2003, the day before Majid Khan's capture, the FBI requested 

additional information from the CIA on the "Zubair" referenced in Majid Khan's emails.1720 

On March 6, 2003, the day after Majid Khan was captured in 

Pakistan, and while being questioned by foreign government interrogators using rapport-building 

techniques,1721 Majid Khan described how he traveled to Bangkok in December 2002 and 

17,7

 ALEC (170117Z JAN 03). At this time open source reporting also placed Hambali in Thailand. See, for 

example, "FBI Report Pointed to Bali Bombing," The Age, dated January 23, 2003; "Thailand's Denial of Threat 

Fails to Convince," AFP, dated November 15, 2002; "We'll Hit You: Pre-Bali Alert," Herald (Australia), dated 

November 16, 2002; "JI Terror Group Still Major Threat Despite Arrests," Agence France Presse (AFP), dated 

November 26, 2002; "Indonesia Arrests a Top Suspect in Southeast Asia Terror Network," New York Times, dated 

December 4, 2002; and "Inside the Bali Plot: A TIME Inquiry Unearths the Roots of the Bombings and Shows How 

the Masterminds Remain at Large," Time Magazine, dated December 9, 2002. 

1718

 The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that the CIA "had some other information linking Zubair to alQa'ida's Southeast Asia network," but states "that it was KSM's information that caused us to focus on [Zubair] as 

an inroad to Hambali." The CIA's June 2013 Response further asserts: "KSM provided information on an alQa'ida operative named Zubair, we shared this information with Thai authorities, they detained Zubair, and he gave 

actionable intelligence information that helped us identify Hambali's location." This statement in the CIA's June 

2013 Response is inaccurate. On October 25, 2013, the CIA acknowledged the inaccuracy. Confirming information 

in the Committee Study, the CIA stated that an additional review of CIA records by the CIA found that "No, KSM 

did not name Zubair in his debriefings." 

1719

 In May 2002, prior to the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah identified 

"Zubair" as a Malaysian national who was associated with KSM and who could be used by KSM to conduct attacks 

in Thailand. According to Abu Zubaydah, Zubair also "assisted Abu Zubaydah in ob t a i ninRpassportsfrom a printer 

facility in either Thailand or Malaysia." (See DIRECTOR ^H f (271937Z MAY 02)HHHHH H ) l n 

June 2002, Abu Zubaydah told an FBI interrogator that he sent a Canadian who sought to "help defend Muslims" in 

Indonesia to a Malaysian named Abu Zubair. (See HH i 10475 (141605Z JUN 02).) In July 2002, a U.S. 

military detainee stated that "Zubair" was a member of die Jemaah Islamiyah and was connected to Jemaah 

Islamiyah senior leaders. (See 11691 (141712Z JUL 02). For odier intelligence identifying "Zubair" as one 

of several individuals suspected of being connected to the October 2002 Bali bombings, see 95612 

(290615Z OCT 02); DIRECTOR (202057Z OCT 02); and DIRECTOR ^^ B ) Open 

source news reports highlighted links between senior al-Qa'ida leadership—including KSM—and Jemaah Islamiyah 

in the context of the Bali bombings. Hambali continued to be identified as a potential mastermind of the bombing— 

and likely residing in Thailand. These same reports identified a Malaysian named "Zubair" as one of three 

individuals sought by security officials for Hambali's Bali bombings. Among other open source reporting, see "The 

Secret Mastermind Behind die Bali Horror," The Observer, 19 October 2002; "The Sadness of Bali is the Sadness of 

the World," The Strait Times, dated November 16, 2002; "Jemaah Islamiyah Still Capable of Major Terrorist 

Attacks," Philippine Headline News, dated November 27, 2002; "Police Arrest 13 Linked to Bali Bombers, 

Uncovers Plot to Blow Up Bank," AFP, dated November 26,2002; "Bali Friends Have Arabia Link," New York 

Post, dated December 2, 2002; "Finger Is Pointed At Bomber," AFP-Hong Kong, dated November 26, 2002; "Inside 

the Bali Plot: A TIME Inquiry Unearths the Roots of the Bombings and Shows How the Masterminds Remain at 

Large," Time Magazine, dated December 9, 2002; and "Mastermind of Bali Bomb Arrested," The Strait Times, 

dated November 22, 2002. See intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional detailed information. 

1720

 SeeW/RK R 89601 (042006Z MAR 03). 

1721

 |m^Hl367 8 (070724Z MAR 03). According to CIA records, "a [foreign government officer] talked 

quietly to [Majid Khan] alone for about te n d was able to establish an 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 307 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

307 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I //NOFOR N 

provided $50,000 USD to "Zubair" at the behest of al-Qa'ida. Khan also stated that he updated 

KSM's nephew, Ammar al-Baluchi, via email about the money exchange. Majid Khan's 

physical description of Zubair matched previous intelligence reporting already collected on 

Zubair.1722 On March 10, 2003, the requested that information about 

Majid Khan's travel to Thailand and his delivery of money to "Zubair" be shared with Thai 

authorities, along with the physical description of "Zubair" and a phone number for Zubair 

provided by Majid Khan. proposed that it inform the Thais that "[w]e 

are very concerned that the money mentioned may be funding terrorist activities, as well as the 

individuals in question," and that^^| H request the Thai government "provide any details 

regarding these individuals and phone numbers."1723 

On March 11, 2003, after being confronted with information that 

confirmed KSM's financial support to Hambali, KSM admitted to providing Hambali with 

$50,000 to conduct a terrorist attack "in approximately November 2002." KSM made no 

reference to Majid Khan or Zubair.1724 On March 17, 2003, after being confronted with Majid 

Khan's reporting and a photograph of Majid Khan, KSM confirmed that Majid Khan—whom he 

stated he knew only as "Yusif'—was involved in the money transfer to Hambali.1725 KSM 

denied knowing Zubair—who would be the critical link to Hambali's capture—or any other 

Hambali representative in Thailand.1726 

2003, the CIA had learned that a source the CIA had been 

developing received a call from a phone number 

associated with Zubair. When the source was contacted by the CIA, he described a Malaysian 

excellent level of rapport. The first hour and [a] half of the interview was a review of bio-data and information 

previously [reported]. When [foreign government interrogators] started putting pressure on [Majid Khan] by pulling 

apart his story about his 'honeymoon' in Bangkok and his attempt to rent an apartment, safehouse, for his cousin 

[Mansoor Maqsood, aka Iqbal, aka Talha, aka Moeen, aka Habib], at 1400, [Majid Khan] slumped in his chair and 

said he would reveal everything to officers...." 

1722

 13678^070724^1A^3^Records indicate that this information was also disseminated in FBI 

channels. See ALEC For previous intelligence on Zubair's physical description, see 

I^^HH^f l 1DIRECTO R • • ^^/gggg/g////^^ . 

intelligence chronology in Volume II for detailed information. 

81553 (101010Z MAR 03). The request was approved by CIA Headquarters on March 12, 2003 

(DIRECTORIE S (March 12,2003)). _ _ 

|l0755 (111455Z MAR 03). See also DIRECTOR (112152Z MAR 03). ALEC Station had 

sent interrogators at the CIA's DETENTION SITE BLUE at least two "requirements" cables with inforrmition to use 

in the interrogation of KSM specifically about Hambali and KSM's money transfers to Hambali. See ALEC 

(072345Z MAR 03); ALEC (090015Z MAR 03). KSM was rendered to CIA custody on March | , 2003, 

and immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques through March 25, 2003. 

1725

 KSM was told the CIA had "stacks and stacks of emails," and that CIA officers were going to do a "test of his 

honesty" by asking him a series of questions. See |H^|l086 5 (171648Z MAR 03). 

1726

 The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "KSM provided information on an al-Qa'ida operative named Zubair, we 

shared this information with Thai authorities, they detained Zubair, and he gave actionable intelligence information 

that helped us identify Hambali's location." This statement in the CIA's June 2013 Response is inaccurate. In a 

document submitted to the Committee on October 25, 2013, the CIA acknowledged the inaccuracy. Confirming 

information in the Committee Study, the CIA stated that an additional review of CIA records by the CIA found that, 

"No, KSM did not name Zubair in his debriefings." See DTS #2013-3152. 

1727

 84783 Hl ^ 

Page 308 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

308 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I //NOFOR N 

suspected this individual was the "Zubair" associated with Hambali and Majid Khan.1728 | 

| later, the source alerted the CIA that the person suspected of being Zubair would be 

When Zubair arrived at I^IH^^H^^^I^^ H he was 

photographed and followed by Thai authorities.1729 A detainee in foreign government custody 

confirmed the individual in the surveillance photo was Zubair.1730 On June 8, 2003, Zubair was 

detained by the government of Thailand.1731 While still in Thai custody, Zubair was questioned 

about his efforts to obtain fraudulent I B documents, as well as his phone contact 

[Business Q].1732 Zubair admitted to seeking 

documents on behalf of Hambali, as well as using [Business Q] 

Signals intelligence had alerted the CIA that a phone number associated with 

Zubair had been in frequent contact with ^BB i [Business Q].1734 After being transferred 

to CIA custody and rendered to the CIA's COBALT detention site, Zubair was immediately 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.1735 Days later, Zubair was asked 

about his efforts to obtain illepl ill n mm nl Ini Hambali, at which point he again 

acknowledged using [Business Q] | 

^|. 173 6 When Thai authorities unilaterally approached a "contact" at ^^HH I [Business 

84257 

84783 

31768 

84854 

184854 

84908 

84837 

84783 84837 

|. The detainee was in the custody of the government of 

|84876 87617 

|. The Committee has used "Business Q" to refer to a specific 

184854| 84876 87617 

184908 It is unclear what specific actions the CIA or local authorities engaged in 

as a result of die information Zubair provided on IBHH 1 [Business Q] while in foreign government custody. 

CIA records indicate that Thai authorities were engaged in their own unilateral efforts to track and identify leads 

related to Hambali and Zubair. A June 28, 2003, CIA cable states that local authorities were investigating Zubair's 

links to various [businesses]. Later, in July 2003, the CIA learned that Thai authorities had 

approached a "contact" who worked at [Business Q]. 

H^B^Hl^^BI . Hie CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that prior to being transferred to CIA 

custody, "[d luring [foreign government] debriefings, Zubair reported on the | 

and corroborated reporting on I^^^BBHB I [Business Q] This information 

when combined with reporting from other sources to form a complete picture of Hambali's status was critical in 

helping identify Hambali's general location and led to his arrest on 11 August by Thai [authorities]." A review of 

CIA records found that the reporting referenced was obtained prior to Zubair's rendition to CIA custody. 

\40568I 

In response to this 

information, ^^^^^^^^^•wrote , "Wow..this is just great... you guys are soooo closing in on Hmabali [sic]. 

(See email fromTH^^H^^H ; to: and others; subject: "wohoo—liilite for EA team 

pls....aliases for Hambali"; date: June 2003, at 9:51:30 AM.) As noted, CIA records indicate that Thai 

authorities were unilaterally following investigative leads related to Hambali and Zubair. It is unknown what 

specific investigative steps were taken by Thai authorities (or by the CIA) between early June 2003 and July 16, 

I I II I I I I I I | | I II 

Page 309 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

309 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I //NOFOR N 

Q], they obtained 

^|. 173 7 An operatioiUareeting ^HIII^IHillBIHHHi H

 wa s

 developed that focused 

on surveillance of^^^^H H [Business Q], As a result of this surveillance, and the 

cooperation of associate Amer was arrested on August 11, 2003.1738 

Amer was immediately cooperative and assisted in an operation that led to the arrest of Lillic, 

aka Bashir bin Lap, that same day.1739 Lillie was found to have a key fob in his possession 

imprinted with an address of an apartment building in Ayutthaya, Thailand. In response to 

questioning, "within minutes of capture," Lillie admitted that the address on the key fob was the 

address where Hambali was located. Fewer than four hours later, an operation successfully led 

to Hambali's capture at the address found on the key fob.1740 

On November 28, 2005, the chief of the CTC's Southeast Asia 

Branch explained how Hambali was captured in an interview with the CIA's Oral History 

Program, stating: 

"Frankly, we stumbled onto Hambali. We stumbled onto the [the source] 

licking up the phone and calling his case officer to say there's 

[related to Zubair], ...we really stumbled over it. It wasn't police 

work, it wasn't good targeting, it was we stumbled over it and it yielded up 

Hambali. What I tell my people is you work really, really hard to be in a 

position to get lucky."1741 

2003, to investigate [BusinessQ]. On July 16, 2003, the CIA learned that Thai 

audiorities had been independently in contact with [Business Q], After being transferred to CIA 

custody and rendered to the CIA's COBALT detention site, Zubair was immediately subjected to the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques. Days later, on June 25, 2003, Zubair was asked again about his efforts to obtain 

locuments for Hambali, at which point Zubair again acknowledged using 

Qj As n<)tcd. Zubair had prcvMOHsly identified | 

[Business Q] while in foreign government custody | 

IHH . The CIA has never claimed to policymakers that information obtained from Zubair after the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques led to Hambali's capture. Nor are there any internal CIA records crediting 

the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Zubair as leading to Hambali's capture. As noted, 

the CIA's June 2013 Response states: "During [foreign government] debriefings, Zubair reported on the | 

| and corroborated reporting on ^^^^HHH H [Business Q] | 

|. This information when combined with reporting from other sources to form a complete picture of 

Hambali's status was critical inhelpineidentify Hambali's general location and led to his arrest on 11 August by 

Thai [authorities]." See also 1 

. Amer was detained by a 

86449 

187409 

foreign government. 

1739

 ••^^8741 4 87617 

9518761 7 87414 

and ^^^^^^^^^^^^•^lambal i Capture." Lillie was later rendered to CIA custody. 

1741

 Lillie had not yet been rendered to CIA custody. CIA Oral History Program Documenting Hambali capture, 

interview of [REDACTED], interviewed by [REDACTED], on November 28, 2005. 

m i M ii i 11 BB^MB^BBI^ I II II i m i i 

Page 310 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

310 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRfeTY/jj^^M^^^^^^^^KyNOFOR N 

(TS/^^^^^^^IB^^ ) Hambali was rendered to CIA custody on August 2003, and 

almost immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.1742 On September 

4, 2006, he was transferred to U.S. military custody.1743 

G. CIA Secondary Effectiveness Representations—Less Frequently Cited Disrupted Plots, 

Captures, and Intelligence that the CIA Has Provided As Evidence for the Effectiveness 

of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 

In addition to the eight most frequently cited "thwarted" plots and 

terrorists captured, the Committee examined 12 other less frequently cited intelligence successes 

that the CIA has attributed to the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques.1744 

These representations are listed below: 

Additional Intelligence the CIA Has Attributed to the Effectiveness of the CIA's 

Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 

1 The Identification of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) as the Mastermind 

of the September 11, 2001, Attacks 

2 The Identification of KSM's "Mukhtar" Alias 

3 The Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh 

4 The Capture of KSM 

5 The Capture of Majid Khan 

6 The Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting 

7 The Assertion That Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Help Validate 

Sources 

8 The Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha 

9 Critical Intelligence Alerting the CIA to Jaffar al-Tayyar 

10 The Identification and Arrest of Saleh al-Marri 

11 The Collection of Critical Tactical Intelligence on Shkai, Pakistan 

12 Information on the Facilitator That Led to the UBL Operation 

1742

 ^HH^ H 1241 

1743

 (050744Z SEP 06); 2215 (05124SZ SEP 06) 

1744

 The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "our review showed that the Study failed to include examples of 

important information acquired from detainees that CIA cited more frequently and prominently in its representations 

than several of the cases the authors chose to include." This is inaccurate. The CIA's June 2013 Response provided 

three examples: the "Gulf shipping plot" (which is addressed in the full Committee Study and in this summary in the 

context of the interrogation of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri), "learning important information about al-Qa'ida's anthrax 

plotting and the role of Yazid Sufaat" (which is addressed in the full Committee Study and in this summary in the 

context of the interrogation of KSM), and "the detention of Abu Talha al-Pakistani" (which is addressed in the full 

Committee Study and in this summary in the section on the "Thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot 

and the Capture of Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi."). 

IIII 11 I I I IIIII I 

Page 311 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

311 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ [//NOFQRN 

1. The Identification of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) as the Mastermind of the 

September 11, 2001, Attacks 

The CI A represented that CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah provided 

"important" and "vital" information by identifying Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM) as the 

mastermind behind the attacks of September 11, 2001.1745 CIA Director Hayden told the 

Committee on April 12, 2007, that: 

".. .it was Abu Zubaydah, early in his detention, who identified KSM as the 

mastermind of 9/11. Until that time, KSM did not even appear in our chart of 

key al-Qa'ida members and associates."1746 

On at least two prominent occasions, the CIA represented, 

inaccurately, that Abu Zubaydah provided this information after the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques. On May 30, 2005, the Office of Legal Counsel wrote in a nowdeclassified memorandum: 

"Interrogations of [Abu] Zubaydah—again, once enhanced interrogation 

techniques were employed—furnished detailed information regarding al 

Qaeda's 'organization structure, key operatives, and modus operandi' and 

identified KSM as the mastermind of the September 11 attacks."1747 

1745

 For example, in the September 6, 2006, speech validated by the CIA, President George W. Bush stated that: 

"[Abu] Zubaydah disclosed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, or KSM, was the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks and 

used the alias Mukhtar. This was a vital piece of the puzzle that helped our intelligence community pursue KSM." 

See also CIA document dated July 16, 2006, entitled, "DRAFT Potential Public Briefing of CIA's High-Value 

Terrorist Interrogations Program," and "CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy" drafts supporting the 

September 6, 2006, speech by President George W. Bush. See also unclassified Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence release, entitled, "Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program," as well as CIA classified 

Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden, 

Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007 (DTS #2007-1563). 

1746

 CIA classified Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael 

V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007; and accompanying Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12,2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central Intelligence Agency Detention and 

Interrogation Program." (See DTS #2007-1563 and DTS #2007-3158.) This testimony contradicted statements 

made in 2002 to the Joint Inquiry by in which she indicated that an operative arrested in 

February 2002 in prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah, provided "proof... that KSM was a senior al-Qa'ida 

terrorist planner." (See interview by the Joint Inquiry of [REDACTED], 

••••[ , [REDACTED]; subject: Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM); date: 12 August 2002 (DTS #2002-

4630).) 

1747

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of 

United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be 

Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees. 

11ii ii 111 l^^^^BBMBB I

 111(11 

Page 312 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

312 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

The OLC memorandum cited a document provided by the CIA to 

support the statement.1748 The OLC memorandum further stated that the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques provide the U.S. government with "otherwise unavailable actionable 

intelligence," that "ordinary interrogation techniques had little effect on...Zubaydah," and that 

the CIA had "reviewed and confirmed the accuracy of [the OLC's] description of the 

interrogation program, including its purposes, methods, limitations, and results."1749 

In November 2007, the CIA prepared a set of documents and 

talking points for the CIA director to use in a briefing with the president on the effectiveness of 

the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique. The documents prepared assert that Abu 

Zubaydah identified KSM as the "mastermind" of the September 11, 2001, attacks after the use 

of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.1750 

(TSfjj^^^^^^MF ) While Abu Zubaydah did provide information on KSM's role in 

the September 11, 2001, attacks, this information was corroborative of information already in 

CIA databases and was obtained prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

There is no evidence to support the statement that Abu Zubaydah's information—obtained by 

FBI interrogators prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and while Abu 

Zubaydah was hospitalized—was uniquely important in the identification of KSM as the 

"mastermind" of the 9/11 attacks. 

(U) The following describes information available to the CIA prior to the capture of Abu 

Zubaydah: 

• (U) Both the Congressional Joint Inquiry Into the Intelligence Community Activities 

Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, and the CIA Office of the 

Inspector General Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks 

include lengthy chronologies of the Intelligence Community's interest in KSM prior to 

the attacks of September 11, 2001. The timelines begin in 1995, when the United States 

determined that KSM was linked to the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, 

leading to the determination by the National Security Council's Policy Coordination 

1748 See CIA Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting, faxed to die OLC in April 2005. The "Briefing 

Notes" state: "Within months of his arrest, Abu Zubaydah provided details about al-Qa'ida's organization structure, 

key operatives, and modus operandi. It also was Abu Zubaydah, early in his detention, who identified KSM as the 

mastermind of 9/11." As described in detail in Volume II, this CIA document did not specifically reference the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques; however, it was provided to the OLC to support the OLC's legal analysis 

of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The document included most of the same examples the CIA had 

previously provided as examples of the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. There are no 

records to indicate that the CIA, in reviewing draft versions of the OLC memorandum, sought to correct the 

inaccurate OLC statements. 

1749

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of 

United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be 

Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees. 

1750 "dq a Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," and supporting materials, dated November 6, 2007, 

with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." 

mi ii III i BMMIMBBU I iiniiiii 

Page 313 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

313 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRfeTY/jj^^M^^^^^^^^KyNOFOR N 

Group that KSM was a top priority target for the United States.17S1 The Congressional 

Joint Inquiry further noted that information obtained prior to the September 11, 2001, 

attacks "led the CTA to see KSM as part of Bin Ladin's organization.'0752 There was also 

CIA reporting in 1998 that KSM was "very close" to UBL.1753 On June 12, 2001, it was 

reported that "Khaled" was actively recruiting people to travel outside Afghanistan, 

including to the United States where colleagues were reportedly already in the country to 

meet them, to carry out terrorist-related activities for UBL. According to the 9/11 

Commission Report, the CIA presumed this "Khaled" was KSM.1754 

• (TSyV^^m^^^Jz/NF ) On September 12, 2001, a foreign government source, 

described as a member of al-Qa'ida, stated "the 11 September attacks had been 

masterminded from Kabul by three people," to include "Shaykh Khalid," who was related 

to Ramzi Yousef.1755 

• (TS/fl^^m^/NF ) Also on September 12, 2001, a CTA officer familiar with 

KSM wrote a cable stating that "|o]ne of the individuals who has the capability to 

organize the kind of strikes we saw in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon is Khalid 

Shaykh Mohammad."1756 

• (TS/^^^^^HI^B^^ ) 0 ° September 15, 2001, a CIA officer wrote to a number of 

senior CTC officers, "I would say the percentages are pretty high that Khalid Sheikh 

Mohammad is involved [in the September 11, 2001, attacks]."1757 

• (T&THHII^^^A^ )

 0 n

 October 16, 2001, an email from a CTC officer who had 

been tracking KSM since 1997, stated that although more proof was needed, "I believe 

KSM may have been the mastermind behind the 9-11 attacks."1758 

1751

 Joint Inquiry Into the Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 

11, 2001, Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on 

Intelligence, December 2002, pp. 325 - 331 (DTS #2002-5162); CIA Office of the Inspector General Report on CIA 

Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, June 2005, pp. xi, 100-126 (DTS #2005-3477). 

1752

 Joint Inquiry Into the Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 

11, 2001, Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on 

Intelligence, December 2002, p. 329 (DTS #2002-5162). 

1753

 DIRECTOR (IHHSE P 98), disseminated as Office of the Inspector General 

Report on CIA Central Intelligence Agency Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusions of the Report of the 

Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 

(DTS #2005-3477), pp. 105-107. 

1754

 The 9/11 Commission Report; Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 

States, p. 211. 

1755

 •• • 64626 (131842Z SEP 01); 64627 (131843Z SEP 01) 

1756

 CIA Office of the Inspector General Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, June 2005, 

p. 113 (DTS #2005-3477). ^^^^^^ ^ 

from: to: cc: 

[REDACTED], BBHBHri^EDACTED] ; subject: Re: RAMZI LEADS...; date: September 15, 2001, at 

5:04:38 AM. 

1758

 CIA CTC internal email from: [REDACTED]; to multiple [REDACTED]; date: October 16, 2001, at 09:34:48 

AM. 

11 ii 11 ii i i MB^^^^^^^^MvNQFm m 

Page 314 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

314 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

December 2001, 

(TS/y^^^^^^^^^HZ/NF) A foreign government informed the CIA that in late 

source, IHHUI^fl^^HHUII^^^^^^^ I 

|, provided information on the attacks of September, 11, 2001, and 

stated, "Khalid Shayk Muhammad, the maternal uncle of Ramzi [Yousef]... was the 

person who supervised the 'final touches' of the operation."1759 

Other reporting prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah stated 

that KSM was: "one of the individuals considered the potential mastermind";1760 "one of 

the top candidates for having been involved in the planning for the 11 September attacks" 

and one of "the masterminds";1761 and "one of the leading candidates to have been a 

hands-on planner in the 9/11 attacks."1762 

2. The Identification of KSM's "Mukhtar" Alias 

(TS^HfWF ) The CIA represented that CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah provided 

"important" and "vital" information by identifying Khalid Shaykh Mohammed's (KSM) alias, 

"Mukhtar."1763 In at least one instance in November 2007, in a set of documents and talking 

points for the CIA director to use in a briefing with the president on the effectiveness of the 

CIA's waterboard interrogation technique, the CIA asserted that Abu Zubaydah identified KSM 

as "Mukhtar" after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.1764 

(TS/^H^^^^^JH^^ ) While Abu Zubaydah did provide information on KSM's alias, this 

information was provided by Abu Zubaydah to FBI interrogators prior to the initiation of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—and while Abu Zubaydah was still in the intensive 

care unit of a hospital recovering from a gunshot wound incurred during his capture. 

Further, the information was corroborative of information already in CIA databases.1765 Prior to 

the information provided by Abu Zubaydah, the CIA had intelligence, including a cable from 

August 28, 2001, indicating that KSM was now being called "Mukhtar."1766 

16218 1759 I 

1760 DIRECTOR HHHHH^^^H - The cable added "KSM is an ally of Usama bin Ladin and has been 

reported at facilities clearly associated with UBL." 

1761

 DIR HH^^H H NOV 01). The cable referenced reporting that KSM, along with one other individual, 

"were the masterminds of the 11 September attacks." 

1762

 DIR HHHHJA N 02) 

1763 po r exam p i e > i n the September 6, 2006, speech validated by the CIA that publicly acknowledged the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program, President George W. Bush stated that: "[Abu] Zubaydah disclosed Khalid 

Sheikh Mohammed, or KSM, was the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks and used the alias Mukhtar. This was a 

vital piece of the puzzle that helped our intelligence community pursue KSM." 

new " dci a Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," and supporting materials, dated November 6, 2007 

with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." 

1765 See Volume II, the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, and Federal Bureau of Investigation 

documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaidah" provided to the Senate 

Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20,2010 (DTS #2010-2939). 

1766 93972 (281153Z AUG 01). See also the 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National 

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon die United States, p. 277. The cable was directed to the CIA's UBL Station, 

where it was viewed by the chief of Station and chief of targeting, and to the analytic unit responsible for UBL, 

where two analysts saw it. (See Office of the Inspector General Report on CIA Central Intelligence Agency 

Accountability Regarding Findings and Conclusions of the Report of the Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community 

m i i i III i 'lim n 

Page 315 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

315 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

3, The Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh 

The CIA has represented that information acquired from CIA 

detainee Abu Zubaydah, as a result of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, led to the 

capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. This CIA representation was included in President Bush's 

September 6, 2006, speech on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The speech, 

which was based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, stated that the intelligence provided 

by CIA detainees "cannot be found any other place," and that the nation's "security depends on 

getting this kind of information."1767 The speech included the following: 

"Zubaydah was questioned using these procedures [the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques], and soon he began to provide information on key alQa'ida operatives, including information that helped us find and capture more 

of those responsible for the attacks on September the 1 llh.

176f!

 For example, 

Zubaydah identified one of KSM's accomplices in the 9/11 attacks, a terrorist 

named Ramzi bin al-Shibh. The information Zubaydah provided helped lead 

to the capture of bin al-Shibh. And together these two terrorists provided 

information that helped in the planning and execution of the operation that 

captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed."1769 

(TS/t^H^^^^^^^/NF ) While the speech provided no additional detail on the capture of 

bin al-Shibh, an internal email among senior CIA personnel provided additional background for 

Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (DTS #2005-3477), p. 112.) The CIA's 

June 2013 Response states that "[wje continue to assess that Abu Zubaydah's information was a critical piece of 

intelligence." The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges the August 28, 2001, cable identifying KSM as 

"Mukhtar," but states that CIA officers "overlooked" and "simply missed" die cable. 

1767 See President George W. Bush, Speech on Terrorism and the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, 

September 6, 2006; and CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, September 6, 2006, Draft #3 

(validating speech received on August 29,2006); email from: [REDACTED]; to: 

I^^H ; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], |^HHHH > 

[REDACTED]; subject: "Speechwriter's Questions on Monday"; date: September 5, 2006, at 10:30:32 AM. 

1768

 Italics added. As described in this summary and in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume 111, this 

statement was inaccurate. Abu Zubaydah provided information on al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and 

relationships, in addition to information on its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making 

processes, training, and tactics prior to, during, and after the utilization of die CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques. Abu Zubaydah's inability to provide information on the next attack in the United States and operatives 

in the United States was the basis for CIA representations that Abu Zubaydah was "uncooperative" and the CIA's 

determination that Abu Zubaydah required the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to become 

"compliant" and reveal the information the CIA believed he was withholding—the names of operatives in the 

United States or information to stop the next terrorist attack. At no point during or after the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques did Abu Zubaydah provide this type of information. 

1769

 Italics added. See President George W. Bush, Speech on Terrorism and the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program, September 6, 2006; and CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, September 6, 2006. 

Draft #3 (validating speech received on August 29, 2006); email from: [REDACTED]; to: 

cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

IH^^^^H , [REDACTED]; subject: "Speechwriter's Questions on Monday"; date: September 5, 2006, at 

10:30:32 AM. 

m i i i iii i ^M^^Bj^^^^^Bz/hiimmh i 

Page 316 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

316 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

why the CIA included "the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh" in the president's speech as an 

example of the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. After the speech, 

the chief of the Department in CTC, an email to the chief of 

CTC, ^•^•CT C Lega^^^^^^^H ,

 an d

 two the 

CIA Office of Public Affairs, among others. The email addressed press speculation that the 

intelligence successes attributed to CIA detainees and the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques in the president's speech were not accurate. Defending the accuracy of the speech, 

the chief of the H| i Department in CTC wrote: "The NY Times has posted a story 

predictably poking holes in the President's speech." Regarding the CIA assertion that Abu 

Zubaydah provided information after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that 

led to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the chief explained: 

"...we knew Ramzi bin al-Shibh was involved in 9/11 before AZ was captured; 

however, AZ gave us information on his recent activities that -when added 

into other information—helped us track him. Again, on this point, we were 

very careful and the speech is accurate in what it says about bin al-Shibh."1770 

In addition, on February 17, 2007, the deputy chief of the 

B^aitmen t in CTC, testified to the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence that Abu Zubaydah "led us to Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who in kind of [sic] started the 

chain of events" that led to the capture of KSM.1771 

See from: to: Mark Mansfield, 

Gimigliano, and others; subject: "Questions about Abu Zubaydah's Identification of KSM as 'Mukhtar'"; date: 

September 7, 2006. A September 7, 2006, article (published September 8,2006) in the New York Times, by Mark 

Mazzetti, entitled, "Questions Raised About Bush's Primary Claims of Secret Detention System" included 

comments by CIA officials defending the assertions in the President's speech: "Mr. Bush described the 

interrogation techniques used on the C.I.A. prisoners as having been 'safe, lawful and effective,' and he asserted that 

torture had not been used. ...Mr. Bush also said it was the interrogation of Mr. Zubaydah that identified Mr. bin alShibh as an accomplice in the Sept. 11 attacks. American officials had identified Mr. bin al-Shibh's role in the 

attacks months before Mr. Zubaydah's capture. A December 2001 federal grand jury indictment of Zacarias 

Moussaoui, die so-called 20th hijacker, said that Mr. Moussaoui had received money from Mr. bin al-Shibh and that 

Mr. bin al-Shibh had shared an apartment with Mohamed Atta, the ringleader of the plot. A C.I.A. spokesman said 

Thursday [September 7, 2006] that the agency had vetted the president's speech and stood by its accuracy. ...[CIA] 

spokesman, Paul Gimigliano, said in a statement... 'Abu Zubaydah not only identified Ramzi Bin al-Shibh as a 9/11 

accomplice — something that had been done before — he provided information that helped lead to his capture." 

For additional news accounts on this subject, see former CIA Director Michael Hayden's interview with the New 

York Times in 2009, in which former Director Hayden "disputed an article in the New York Times on Saturday 

[4/18/2009] that said Abu Zubaydah had revealed nothing new after being waterboarded, saying that he believed that 

after unspecified 'techniques' were used, Abu Zubaydah revealed information that led to the capture of another 

terrorist, Ramzi Binalshibh." See "Waterboarding Used 266 Times on 2 Suspects," New York Times, dated April 20, 

2009. ^^^^^^ ^ 

1771

 CIA Testimony of Transcript, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 14, 2007 

(DTS #2007-1337). See also Memorandum to the Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for 

Operations, dated February 27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 

'Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's 

Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities," dated February 24, 2004. Pavitt states: "Abu Zubaydah -

a master al-Qa'ida facilitator - was similarly arrogant and uncooperative before the lawful use of EITs. .. .His 

information is singularly unique and valuable from an intelligence point of view, but it also has produced concrete 

results that have helped saved lives. His knowledge of al-Qa'ida lower-level facilitators, modus operandi and 

11 II 1111 1 i II II I HI i 

Page 317 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

317 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

A review of CIA records found no connection between Abu 

Zubaydah's reporting on Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Ramzi bin al-Shibh's capture. CIA records 

indicate that Ramzi bin al-Shibh was captured unexpectedly—on September 11, 2002, when 

Pakistani authorities, were conducting raids targeting Hassan Ghul in 

Pakistan.1772 

(TSi^M^mB^/NF ) While CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah provided 

information on Ramzi bin al-Shibh, there is no indication in CIA records that Abu Zubaydah 

provided information on bin al-Shibh's whereabouts. Further, while Abu Zubaydah provided 

information on bin al-Shibh while being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques, he provided similar information to FBI special agents prior to the initiation of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.1773 Prior to the application of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, during interrogation sessions on May 19, 2003, and May 20, 2003, Abu 

Zubaydah reviewed photographs of individuals known by his interrogators to be associated with 

safehouses, which he shared with us as a result of the use of EITs, for example, played a key role in (he ultimate 

capture of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh" (italics added). 

1772

 Among other records, seeC {AllSE P 02) CIA ^H(HHISEP02 ) 

•••^•H ; ALEC ••(111551 Z SEP 02). 

1773 See additional information below, as well as the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, and Federal 

Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaidah" 

provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS# 2010-2939). 

The CIA's June 2013 Response includes the following: ". ..the Study states that Abu Zubaydah 'provided similar 

information to FBI interrogators prior to the initiation of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.' This is 

incorrect. Abu Zubaydah's unique information concerning his contact with Hassan Gul was collected on 20 August 

2002, after he had been subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques." This assertion in the CIA's June 2013 

Response contains several errors: First, as described, the statement in the December 13, 2012, Committee Study 

pertains to Abu Zubaydah's reporting on Ramzi bin al-Shibh, not Hassan Ghul. As detailed in this summary and in 

other areas of the full Committee Study, while Abu Zubaydah provided information on Ramzi bin al-Shibh after the 

use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, he provided similar information on bin al-Shibh to FBI 

interrogators prior to the use and approval of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Second, as detailed in 

the full Committee Study, Abu Zubaydah provided considerable information on Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. (Some of this reporting has been declassified; for example, see the 9/11 

Commission Report, specifically the Staff Report, "9/11 and Terrorist Travel," which highlights reporting by Abu 

Zubaydah on Hassan Ghul that was disseminated by the CIA on June 20, 2002.) Third, in referencing information 

that Abu Zubaydah provided on Hassan Ghul on August 20,2002, the CIA's June 2013 Response asserts that this 

was "unique information." The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "Abu Zubaydah stated that if he personally 

needed to reach Hassan Gul, he would contact [a well-known 

associate of Hassan Ghul], We provided this information to Pakistani authorities, who then interviewed [the wellknown associate] and^^^^m m [a specific family member of the well-known associate]—which 

ultimately led them to an apartment linked to Gul." The CIA's June 2013 Response adds that die "unique 

information concerning his contact with Hassan Gul was collected on 20 August 2002, after [Abu Zubaydah] had 

been subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques." CIA records indicate, however, that the information 

described in the CIA's Response was not unique. Pakistani authorities had raided the home and interviewed | 

M H f'he same well-known associate] more than a month earlier on July 2002, based on similar reporting 

from a cooperating detainee in foreign government custody. The CIA had specific and detailed knowledge of this 

raid and the resulting interview of [the well-known associate]. Pakistani authorities remained in 

contact with [the well known associate], the primary person interviewed, who was cooperative and 

sent ^ m to help Pakistani authorities identify a possible al-Qa'ida safe house—which the CIA noted was 

"extremely close to (if not an exact match)" for a safe house the FBI connected KSM to weeks earlier on June 18, 

2002. 

11 II 11111 MH^^MBI^^^ B III I II 

Page 318 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

318 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

the bombing of the USS Cole, as well as the September 11, 2001, attacks. Abu Zubaydah 

identified a picturc of Ramzi bin al-Shibh as "al-Shiba" and "noted that he is always with" 

KSM.1774 Another record of this interrogation stated that showing Abu Zubaydah the photos: 

"was done to gauge his willingness to cooperate and provide details about 

people, the last times he saw them, where they were going, etc. He appeared to 

be very cooperative, provided details on people that we expected him to know, 

the collective groups when they departed Afghanistan, where he thinks they 

may now be, etc."1775 

(^S^^^BHI^^^B^^ ) Shortly thereafter, on June 2, 2002, an FBI special agent showed 

Abu Zubaydah the FBI "PENTTBOM photobook"1776 which contained photographs numbered 1-

35. A cable states that Abu Zubaydah was volunteering information and was "forthcoming and 

responding] directly to questioning." Abu Zubaydah, who was not asked any "preparatory 

questions regarding these photographs," identified photograph #31, known to the interrogators as 

Ramzi bin al-Shibh, as a man he knew as al-Shiba, and stated al-Shiba was with KSM in 

Qandahar circa December 2001. Abu Zubaydah stated that al-Shiba spoke Arabic like a Yemeni 

and noted that al-Shiba was in the media after the September 11, 2001, attacks.1777 

In early June 2002, Abu Zubaydah's interrogators recommended 

that Abu Zubaydah spend several weeks in isolation while the interrogation team members 

traveled m i "as a means of keeping [Abu Zubaydah] off-balance and to allow the team needed 

time off for a break and to attend to personal matters

 a s we ' l a s t o

 discuss "the 

endgame" of Abu Zubaydah with officers from CIA Headquarters.1778 As a result, on 

June 18, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation.1779 Abu Zubaydah spent the remainder of 

June 2002 and all of July 2002, 47 days in total, in solitary detention without being asked any 

questions. During this period, Abu Zubaydah's interrogators The 

FBI special agents never returned to the detention site.1780 

(TS/^^^^^^^^^^/NF ) When CIA officers next interrogated Abu Zubaydah, on August 4, 

2002, they immediately used the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah, 

including the waterboard.1781 On August 21, 2002, while Abu Zubaydah was still being 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, a CIA cable noted that Abu Zubaydah 

See the Abn Zubaydah detainee review in 1774

 DIRECTOR • • (271905Z MAY 02)| 

Volume III for additional details. 

1775

 Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu 

Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS 

#2010-2939). 

1776

 Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu 

Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS 

#2010-2939). 

1777

 10428 (071058Z JUN 02) 

1778

 ^^^ H 10424 (070814Z JUN 02) 

]TM 10487 (181656Z JUN 02) 

1780 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details. 

1781

 HI^ H 10644 (201235Z AUG 02) and email from: [REDACTED]; to: ••^•• H and 

[REDACTED]; subject: "Re: So it begins."; date: August 4, 2002, at 09:45:09 AM. 

11II 1111 1 III I II 

Page 319 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

319 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

was shown several photographs and "immediately recognized the photograph of Ramzi bin alShibh."1782

 Abu Zubaydah described bin al-Shibh as having "very dark, almost African looking" 

skin and noted that he first met bin al-Shibh after the 9/11 attacks in Kandahar, but added that he 

"did not have in-depth conversations with him."1783 A cable stated that, after being shown the 

photograph of bin al-Shibh, Abu Zubaydah told interrogators that he was told bin al-Shibh stayed 

at the same safe house that KSM "had established for the pilots and others destined to be 

involved in the 9/11 attacks."1784 An accompanying intelligence cable stated that Abu Zubaydah 

informed interrogators that he did not know—and did not ask—whether bin al-Shibh had been 

involved in the attacks of September 11, 2001, but did state that he believed that bin al-Shibh 

was "one of the operatives working for Mukhtar aka Khalid Shaykh Mohammad."1785 

The information Abu Zubaydah provided while being subjected to 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was described by CIA interrogators as "significant 

new details."1786 However, the information provided by Abu Zubaydah was similar to 

information Abu Zubaydah provided prior to the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques, or was otherwise already known to the CIA. CIA records indicate that as early as 

September 15, 2001, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was identified as an associate of the September 11, 

2001, hijackers who attempted to obtain flight training in Florida.1787 A July 27, 2002, cable 

from the CIA's ALEC Station provided "background information" on bin al-Shibh and stated 

that he was "suspected of being the original '20th hijacker,' whose participation in the 11 

September attacks was thwarted by his inability to obtain a visa to enter the United States."1788 

Ramzi bin al-Shibh was also identified as "a member of the Hamburg cell that included hijacker 

Mohammed Atta,"1789 and bin al-Shibh was featured in one of "five suicide testimonial videos 

found in December 2001 at the residence of former UBL [Usama bin Ladin] lieutenant 

Mohammad Atef in Afghanistan."1790 

(^nS^fl^HIH^^B^NF ) None of the above information resulted in Ramzi bin al-Shibh's 

capture. As detailed below, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was captured unexpectedly during raids in 

Pakistan on September 11, 2002, targeting Hassan Ghul.1791 

Prior to Abu Zubaydah's capture, the CIA considered Hassan Ghul 

a "First Priority Raid Target," based on reporting that: 

10656 (211349Z AUG 02) 

10656 (211349Z AUG 02) 

10656 (211349Z AUG 02) 

110656 (211349Z AUG 02) 

|92557 (15SEP01) 

10654 (211318Z AUG 02); 

10654 (211318Z AUG 02); | 

[10654 (211318Z AUG 02); 

1785

 DIRECTOR • • (261338Z AUG 02) 

l786 |^^^HH)65 4 (211318Z AUG 02); T 

1787

 ALEC^B | (222334Z SEP 01); 

1788

 ALEC (270132Z JUL 02) ^^ ^ 

1789

 ALEC (270132Z JUL 02). See also •• • 97470 (281317Z MAR 02) ("In November 1998, 

[Muhammad] Atta, [Ramzi] Binalshibh, and [Said] Bahaji moved into the 54 Marienstrasse apartment in Hamburg 

that became the hub of the Hamburg cell."). 

1790

 ALEC (270132Z JUL 02). See also •• • 62533 (information from a foreign 

government concerning the al-Qa'ida suicide operatives portrayed on videotapes found in Afghanistan). 

1791

 ALEC (292345Z AUG 02); ALEC^^ M (111551Z SEP 02) 

11II I I III I ^^^^^^^^^^^B/ZNOFOR N 

Page 320 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

320 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

"Ghul has been a major support player within the al-Qa'ida network and has 

assisted al-Qa'ida and Mujahadin operatives by facilitating their travel. He is a 

senior aide to Abu Zubaydah who was heavily involved in fund raising for a 

terrorist operation in spring 2001."1792 

Additional reporting noted that Hassan Ghul's phone number had 

been linked to a terrorist operative who "was ready to conduct a 'surgical operation' at any 

time,"1793 while other reporting indicated that Hassan Ghul was working on a "program" 

believed to be related to terrorist activity.1794 

(I^A^mH^^ ) According to CIA cables, once captured, and prior to the initiation 

of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah confirmed that Hassan Ghul was 

a high-level al-Qa'ida facilitator who had contact with senior al-Qa'ida members, including 

Hamza Rabi'a and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.1795 Abu Zubaydah also corroborated intelligence in 

CIA databases that Ghul was involved in al-Qa'ida fundraising efforts.1796 During this same 

period, the CIA continued to receive additional intelligence on Ghul from foreign governments, 

including that Ghul was responsible for facilitating the movement of Saudi fighters through 

Pakistan.1797 As noted, on June 18, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation and was not 

asked any questions for 47 days.1798 

£) In early July 2002, Pakistani authorities and the CIA were 

continuing their efforts to locate and capture Hassan Ghul. A detainee in Pakistani custody, 

was providing detailed 

information to Pakistani authorities on Hassan Ghul.1/99 [the detainee in Pakistani 

custody] had been arrested with in on May 2002, during 

^^BHHHHi H government raids on multiple residences thought to be associated with 

al-Qa'ida.1800 During interviews with Pakistani authorities concerning how to locate and capture 

Hassan Ghul, HH^^^ H [the detainee in Pakistani custody] identified I 

Umi^ l [a well-known associate of Hassan Ghul] and the location of the [ 

[well-known associate's] home.1801 

On July | , 2002, seeking to capture Hassan Ghul, Pakistani 

authorities raided the home of | 

[the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul]. When the raid occurred, present at the home 

1792

 ALEC 

1793

 ALEC 

1794 

1795 

02); 

JAN 04) 

1796 

(241447Z MAR 02) 

(261712Z MAR 02) 

17369 (131519Z APR 02 

10091 (210959Z APR 02); 

10271 (151654Z MAY 02); 

10102 (230707Z APR 02); 

1295 (^•|JAN04) ; 

10091 (210959Z APR 02); 

' 10271 (151654Z MAY 02); ALEC 

1797

 DIRECTOR • • (102312Z MAY 02) 

1798

 10487 (181656Z JUN 02) 

_1174 6 

1800

 11336 AY 02) 

11746 

TOP SECRET/, 

Page 321 of 499 

10102 (230707Z APR 02); 

(241447Z MAR 02) 

10144 (271949Z APR 

1308 (H | 

10144 (271949ZAPR 

7NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

321 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFOKN 

[the well-known associate], | 

[and family members of the well-known associate]. A providing 

details on the raid states that " H [the well-known associate] was interviewed on the spot 

and was fully cooperative with [Pakistani authorities J." ^J^JJ^^J U [the well-known 

associate] stated that he had not seen Hassan Ghul or HHHB m 

since June 3, 2002, but that he believed they were still in Karachi. Accordingto^^H[th e 

well-known associate], he had already informed Pakistani authorities that Hassan Ghul was an 

al-Qa'ida member. According to a cable H^^^HHHHH I lt h e well-known associate] 

stated that, as a result of his reporting on Ghul to Pakistani officials, he received "a death threat 

from Hassan Ghul," causing Ghul to "cease coming to the ^^^^^^^ ^ [the well-known 

associate's] house."1802 

CIA records indicate that Pakistani authorities continued to 

interviewtheB^^^^^ I [the well-known associate] in an effort to acquire information and 

capture Hassan Ghul. A CIA cable dated July | , 2002, states that the Pakistani government "is 

keying on any information which could get B closer to bagging [Hassan] Ghul," specifically 

"through o f [the 

well-known associate of Hassan Ghul]." According to the cable, during one of the interviews, 

^ H [the well-known associate] told Pakistani authorities about an address where Hassan 

Ghul used to reside circa December 2001. IB I [the well-known associate] sent with 

the Pakistani officers to identify the home.1803 The CIA officers wrote that the location "is 

extremely close to (if not an exact match)" to a location where KSM once resided, according to a 

June 18, 2002, report from the FBI.1804 The identified home was raided, but found empty. The 

CIA wrote "f l are hitting the right places [safe houses], albeit at the wrong time. Our efforts 

have got us closer than ever to at least Hassan Ghul."1805 During the meetings between the 

Pakistani authorities and [tli e well-known associate], [the 

well-known associate] provided the Pakistani authorities with a copy ofa^^^^B^eportedly 

belonging to Hassan Ghul" ^I^IHIH^^^^^HHI^Bft " I" ^ e same cable, die 

CIA reported tha^^^ M [the well-known associate] had "approached the police for assistance 

in retrieving who was l a specific family member of the wellknown associate].1806 

On July|^002^TC^>fficers at CIA Headquarters wrote that they 

were reading the cables from theCIAflj^^^^^H , noting they were "particularly interested 

in the intervie^^i^argeJH^^^^^^^mthewell-know n associate of Hassan Ghul], 

who admitted ^^^HHI^^^^HI^^^^Bl^^^ l to his knowledge of Ghul's 

involvement in al-Qa'ida activities." The cable stated: 

"[r]ecognize that HH H [the well-known associate] claims his contact with 

Ghul stopped approximately one month ago, when he reported Ghul to the 

Pakistani authorities. However, given HH^^^^^ H [his close 

Referenced cable is ALEC |(181900Z JUN 02). 

1806 See references to prior acquisition of passport in I I ill II11 III AUG 02). 

m i 11 in i WBBBBBBI ^ B i ini IIIII i 

Page 322 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

322 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

association] to one of our high interest targets, request | 

initiate technical surveillance of [the well-known associate's] 

telephone... to determine if they may yield any information on Ghul's current 

whereabouts."1807 

CIA records do not indicate if "technical surveillance" 

associate's] telephone was conducted.1808 

[the well-known 

According to CIA records, once captured, and prior to the initiation 

of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah confirmed that Hassan Ghul was 

a high-level al-Qa'ida facilitator who had contact with senior al-Qa'ida members, including 

Hamza Rabi'a and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Abu Zubaydah also corroborated intelligence in CIA 

databases that Ghul was involved in al-Qa'ida fundraising efforts.1809 As noted, on June 18, 

2002, Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation and therefore was not questioned on the July 2002 

raids on associate's] home or the information 

acquired from the interviews of^m H [the well-known associate] conducted by 

Pakistani authorities.1810 On August 4, 2002, after Abu Zubaydah spent 47 days in isolation, 

CIA interrogators entered his cell and immediately began subjecting Abu Zubaydah to the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques, including the waterboard.1811 As he had before the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, when asked questions, Abu Zubaydah continued to 

provide intelligence, including on Hassan Ghul, On August 20, 2002—while still being 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—Abu Zubaydah was asked 

specifically how he would find Hassan Ghul. There are no records indicating that Abu Zubaydah 

had previously been asked this question. In response, Abu Zubaydah provided corroborative 

S

" ig: that Hassan Ghul could possibly be located through | 

[the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul].1812 There are no CIA records indicating that 

Abu Zubaydah provided information on the location of jH^I^H I t^ c well-known 

1907

 ALEC | 

1808

 As noted throughout this Study, CIA produced more than six million pages of material, including records 

detailing the interrogation of CIA detainees, as well as the disseminated intelligence derived from the interrogation 

of CIA detainees. The CIA did not provide—nor was it requested to provide—intelligence records that were 

unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. In other words, this Study was completed without 

direct access to reporting from CIA HUMINT assets, foreign liaison assets, electronic intercepts, military detainee 

debriefings, law enforcement-derived information, and other methods of intelligence collection. Insomuch as this 

material is included in the analysis herein, it was provided by the CIA within the context of documents directly 

related to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. As such, there is likely significant intelligence related to 

the tenorist plots, terrorists captured, and other intelligence matters examined in this Study that is within the 

databases of the U.S. Intelligence Community, but which has not been identified or reviewed by the Committee for 

this Study 

110091 (210959Z APR 02); ^H|Hl010 2 (230707Z APR 02);

 1014 4

 (271949Z APR 

] 10271 (151654Z MAY 02)~ALEcl^ M (241447Z MAR 02) 

110487 (181656Z JUN 02) ^^^^^^ ^ 

110644 (201235Z AUG 02) and email from: [REDACTED]; to: B^^^HH I and 

[REDACTED]; subject: "Re: So it begins."; date: August 4, 2002, at 09:45:09 AM. 

1812

 ALEC • • (292345Z AUG 02) 

lll l I I III I ^^BIMM B I III! I III I 

Page 323 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

323 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

associate's] home, which, as noted, had been raided weeks earlier, on July | , 2002, and was 

already known to the CIA and Pakistani authorities.1813 

Nine days after Abu Zubaydah referenced | 

| [the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul], on August 29, 2002, CIA Headquarters asked 

| to request that Pakistani authorities "reinterview H H [the well-known 

associate] for additional intelligence on Hassan Ghul."1814 The next day, August 30, 2002, 

| informed CIA Headquarters that Pakistani authorities were "in contact with the 

[the well-known associate]," but that would nonetheless ask the Pakistani 

authorities to question associate] again about Hassan Ghul's 

Location.1815 On August3l72002^^HHj^ | relayed that Pakistani authorities and 

believed it was possible that well-known associate] was not being full\ 

truthful in his interviews with Pakistani authorities.1816 On September 3, 2002,1 

reported that Pakistani authorities had re-interviewed ^^^HHH^m^^ l [the wellknown associate] an unknown number of times, and that the Pakistani authorities noted that at 

times [the well-known associate] contradicted himself.1817 Approximately one 

week later, on September 9, 2002, Pakistani authorities returned again to ^^H^M H [the 

well-known associate's] home and interviewed family member of 

the well-known associate], who had recently returned [the well-known 

associate's home].1818 

11746 ^^HHI^^^^ I The CIA's June 2013 Response highlights the following statement in 

the December 13, 2012, Committee Study: "It is possible that the sourcing for CIA claims that 'as a result of the use 

of EITs' Abu Zubaydah provided information that 'played a key role in the ultimate capture of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh,' 

are related to Abu Zubaydah's information indicating that Hassan Ghul could be located through 

[the well-known associate]." The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "It is true that Abu Zubaydah provided no 

information specifically on Bin al Shibh's whereabouts, but as the Study explicitly acknowledges, he did provide 

information on another al-Qa'ida facilitator that prompted Pakistani action that netted Bin al-Shibh." The 

Committee could find no CIA records of the CIA ever making this claim externally, or internally within the CIA, 

prior to the CIA's June 2013 Response. Rather, as described, the CIA claimed both before and after the President's 

September 2006 speech that Abu Zubaydahprovided inforroatioin^latecU^in al-Shibh that resulted in bin alIn an email from ^^^^HB H to and dated 

September 7, 2006, IB H states: "... AZ gave us information on his recent activities that -when added into other 

information—helped us track him." The CIA's June 2013 Response asserts that the information Abu Zubaydah 

provided—that Hassan Ghul could possibly be located through H^^^^I H [a well-known associate of Hassan 

Ghul]—was "unique information" and that bin al-Shibh's "capture would not have occurred" "without Abu 

Zubaydah's information," which was collected "after he had been subjected to the enhanced interrogation 

techniques." As detailed in this summary, and in greater detail in Volume II, the statement provided by Abu 

Zubayah was not unique, but corroborative of information already collected and acted upon by government 

authorities. 

| (292345Z AUG 02) 

112148 (300601Z AUG 02) 

12151 (301107Z AUG 02) 

112207 (050524Z SEP 02) 

i8is wjjjie [(is unc iear from CIA records how Pakistani authorities learned [the specific family 

member of the well-known associate] had returned home^^^^H^^^^lfith e well-known associate] had 

sought the help of Pakistani authorities in retrieving |^^^^^[thespecifi c family member of the well-known 

associate]. Further, the CIA in early July 2002 had requested "technical surveillance" of [the 

well-known associate's] telephone, and CIA records indicate that Pakistani authorities were maintaining regular 

contact with [the well-known associate] after the initial July 2002 raid. 

11 ii H ii 11 "BHBMMBBMB" 1 1 ( 111 >|M i 

Page 324 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

324 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

'

n

 interviews with Pakistani authorities, [the 

specific family member of the well-known associate] was cooperative and told the Pakistani 

authorities where Hassan Ghul's last apartment was located.1819 Based on the information 

provided on Ghul's apartment, Pakistani authorities conducted a raid, but found the apartment 

empty.1820 

Pakistani authorities then located and interviewed | 

[a third individual at the apartment complex]. From the 

interview [of the third individual], Pakistani authorities learned that while Hassan Ghul had 

vacated the apartment, he was scheduled to return to the complex 

Based on this information, 

Pakistani authorities placed the complex under surveillance and waited for Hassan Ghul to 

return.1821 On September 10, 2002, Pakistani authorities arrested two individuals believed to be 

Hassan Ghul and his driver outside of the apartment complex.1822 A CIA cable noted that "Ghul 

had returned to the apartment to ^^^^^IH^^H^^^^^HH , however, he got more 

than he bargained for."1823 Another CIA cable stated: 

"Interestingly, he denies being Hassan Ghul - claiming Hassan Ghul is 

someone else. While are fairly certain we do in fact have 

Hassan Ghul in custody, we would like to make every effort to verify."1824 

By September 11, 2002, it was determined that an individual 

named Muhammad Ahmad Ghulam Rabbani, aka Abu Badr, and his driver were arrested, not 

Hassan Ghul.1825 Abu Badr's driver, Muhammad Madni, was immediately cooperative and told 

the arresting officers that Abu Badr was a "major al-Qa'ida [facilitator]." He then proceeded to 

provide Pakistani authorities with information about al-Qa'ida-affiliated residences and safe 

houses in Karachi.1826 

•) Based on the information provided by Muhammad Madni, 

Pakistani authorities conducted raids in Karachi over the next two 

days.1827 Raids of the initial sites resulted in the recovery of "a number of modified electrical 

switch type mechanisms, modified circuit and 'game' boards and other miscellaneous wires with 

alligator clips and battery attachments."1828 On September 11, 2002, additional raids resulted in 

1819 

1820 I 

1821 

1822 

1823 

1824 

1825 

18261 

,s27

 ALEC I 

12249 (091259Z SEP 02) 

12249 (091259Z SEP 02) 

112249 (091259Z SEP 02) ____ _ 

12251 SEP 02); CIA (^H H SEP 02)1 

12251 SEP 02); CIA ifl^ H SEP 02 J 

|_12254 (100510Z SEP 02) 

133363 (111226Z SEP 02) ^ ^ ^^ ^ 

12251 SEP 02); CIA dH H

 SE P 02 1 

| (111551Z SEP 02). The CIA's June 2013 Response states that Muhammad Ahmad Ghulam 

Rabbani, aka Abu Badr, provided the information on the "safe houses in Karachi." This is inaccurate. Multiple CI A 

records state this information was provided by Abu Badr's driver, Muhammad Madni, who was cooperating with 

Pakistani authorities and providing information for the raids. 

1828

 ALEC (101749Z SEP 02) 

IIII 'III III I 1,1111111 1 

Page 325 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

325 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

the arrest of 11 individuals, including Ramzi bin al-Shibh.1829 According to CIA records, bin alShibh initially identified himself as 'Umar Muhammad 'Abdullah ba-'Amr, aka "Abu 

'Ubyadah," but the CIA noted: 

"This individual strongly resembled pictures of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. When 

asked if he was videotaped in al-Qa'ida videos, he answered yes."1830 

Shortly thereafter the CIA confirmed Ramzi bin al-Shibh was the 

individual in Pakistani custody.1831 

(TS/jmi^^^^^l^NF ) Hassan Ghul was ultimately captured by foreign authorities in the 

Iraqi Kurdistan Region, on January 2004.1832 Hassan Ghul's capture was unrelated to any 

reporting from the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.1833 

4. The Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) 

(TSZ/B^^^HH^/NF ) On September 6, 2006, President Bush delivered a speech based on 

information provided by the CIA, and vetted by the CIA, that included the following statement: 

"Zubaydah was questioned using these procedures [the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques], and soon he began to provide information on key alQa'ida operatives, including information that helped us find and capture more 

of those responsible for the attacks on September the 11th. For example, 

Zubaydah identified one of KSM's accomplices in the 9/11 attacks, a terrorist 

named Ramzi bin al-Shibh. The information Zubaydah provided helped lead 

to the capture of bin al-Shibh. And together these two terrorists provided 

information that helped in the planning and execution of the operation that 

captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,"1834 

IR3-2 | 

1833

 On January 2004, Hassan Ghul was transferred to U.S. military custody. On January 

was transferred to CIA custody. On August 2006, Ghul was rendered to On Ma 

,8M ALECBMI(111551ZSEP02 ) 

1830

 CIA SEP 02) 

1831

 ALECHH|(130206 Z SEP02). The CIA's June 2013 Response does not dispute the narrative described by 

the Committee, and states the "[CIA] should have more clearly explained the contribution [Abu Zubaydah's] 

reporting made to this operation." 

1753BHHH 1 

2004, Hassan Ghul 

released Hassan Ghul See 

HEADQUARTERS ^ 

173426HBHI^^^HTim d Committee Notification from the CIA 

dated (DTS #2012-3802). 

183,1

 Italics added. President George W. Bush, Speech on the CIA's Terrorist Detention Program, (September 6, 

2006). See also CIA officer February 14, 2007, testimony to the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence in which she stated that Abu Zubaydah "really pointed us towards Khalid Shaykh Mohammad and how 

to find him," adding "[h]e led us to Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who in kind of [sic] started the chain of events." See 

transcript, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 14, 2007 (DTS #2007-1337). 

m i i i in i B^^B^B B i mi inn i 

Page 326 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

326 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

Contrary to CIA representations, there are no CIA records to 

support the assertion that Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, or any other CIA detainee played 

any role in the "the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh 

Mohammed." CIA records clearly describe how the capture of KSM was attributable to a 

unilateral CIA asset ("ASSET X"1835) who gained access to KSM through ^^HliHI , with 

whom the CIA asset had prior independent connections. ASSET X's possible access to KSM 

through was apparent to the CIA as early as the fall of 2001, prior to his formal 

recruitment. The CIA had multiple opportunities to exploit ASSET X's access to KSM's 

in 2001, and in 2002, after he was recruited, but did not. In February-March 2003, 

ASSET X led the CIA directly to KSM. The contemporaneous documentary record of this 

narrative is supported by numerous after-action interviews conducted by the CIA's Oral History 

Program. As the CIA officer who "handled" ASSET X and who was directly involved in the 

capture of KSM stated, "[t]he operation] was a HUMINT op pretty much from start to 

finish."1836 

Within days after the attacks of September 11, 2001, CTC officers 

suspected KSM of playing a key role in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.1837 Shortly 

thereafter, CTC officers also noted the "striking similarities" between the September 11, 2001, 

attacks, and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing by KSM's nephew, Ramzi Yousef, 

^HHBI^^^^^ H On September 26, 2001, the CIA's ALEC 

Station issued a cable on KSM and Ramzi Yousef that described extensive derogatory 

information on 

Hi^^^^^^^^^^H 183 9 The CIA officer who drafted the September 26, 2001, 

1835

 CIA records provided to the Committee identify the pseudonym created by the CIA for the asset. The Study 

lists the asset as "ASSET X" to further protect his identity. 

•836 T D INTERVIEW, CIA ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM, SEPTEMBER 14, 2004], Presentation to the CTC 

14 September 2004 by^^^BHHi l

 Se e ats o

 Interview of [REDACTED], by 

[REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 

September 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 3 December 2004, 

CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 30 November 2004, CIA Oral History 

Program; Interview of by [REDACTED], 25 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of 

[REDACTED], by [REDACTED]; 24 November & 15 December 2004, ClAOralHistoiyFVngi'am. 

1837 See, for example, the September 15, 2001, email from a CIA officer to of ALEC Station, in 

which the officer wrote, "1 would say the percentages are pretty high that Khalid Sheikh Mohammad is involved [in 

the September 11, 2001, attacks]." See email to: cc: H I 

[REDACTED], |^^^^ K R EDACTED ] ; subject: Re: RAMZI LEADS...; 

date: September 15, 2001, at 5:04:38 AM). See also DIRECTOR ^^>(132018 Z SEP 01), disseminated as H 

1838

 ALEC (231718Z SEP 01). Ramzi Yousef is ser vingjnifesent ^ . 

1839

 A CIA source from 1995 reported that "all members are acting 

together on behalf of a largerandwellorganized group." J^B^Hll n mini nil in Inn Ii IIIII I I and 

villains." (See WHDC H^^^^^JOC T 95).) Reporting from 1998 indicated that "Sheikh Khalid" (KSM), 

along with had "switched their allegiance" and were "part of the bin Ladin organization in 

Afghanistan." (See DIRr""T"P II I I ilisseminated as ^^^^^^^M). ) CIA cables 

describe 

1 [specific intelligence collected on KSM's ^^^H l 

See 1WHDC •••••OCT95) ; •• • 89173 

miii^BBBB ^ I^Mn "

 1 i i i 11 i i | 

M I 11 III I ^^^BBMB^B W I HII IIN 

Page 327 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

327 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ //NOFORN 

wrote an email were 

with terrorists," and that ^^^B^^^^^B^probabl y is a close associate of KSM."'840 In a 

separate email, the CIA officer wrote that, "at a minimum, we should go 

Both emails were sent to CIA officers who, a few days later, would consider! 

ASSET X, a potential CIA source whose access to KSM through | 

was readily apparent.1841 

ASSET X came to the CIA's attention in the spring of 2001 1 

However, CIA officers did not meet 

with ASSET X until after the September 11, 2001, attacks.1842 On September 28, 2001, ALEC 

Station sent a cable | 

H^^^HH , noting that "[g]iven the events of 11 September... [w]e are very interested in 

exploring whatever information [ASSET X] may have with regard to terrorist plans by 

[UBL]."1843 The CIA held its tirsUneetm^tl^SSETXml^^^BI ' 2001, at which time 

ASSET X indicated that he knew ^I^H^^H^^^^H^^Th e cable desciibing the first 

meeting states that "[ASSET X's] knowledge^^^^^^^^^^Happears to check out and 

demonstrates some degree of access/knowledgeH||^^^^^^^^H." 184 5 On BHIH > 2001, 

the cable describing the first meeting with ASSET X was forwarded by the drafter of the 

September 26, 2001, cable on the derogatory information concerning to a 

number of CTC officers in an email with the subject line: "Re: [ASSET X] Information Re 

91147 | AUG 

69789 

70158 

ALEC 

95): ; DIRECTOR 

EB 95); 

|MAR 95); 

lAPR 

|FEB 96), disseminated as | 

85526 •^•FEB95) ; ALEC | 

88666^^^HJU N 95); DIRECTOR 

1840

 Email i 

[REDACTED]; subjgctMhgjrousef cohorts^^M ; date: September 25,2001, at 6:58:17 PM. 

1841

 EmaiUrom^^^H^^^HH B

 cc :

 H^^^HI^^ k subject: 

Re: ^^^^^•^^Hdate : October 4, 2001, at 12:52:46 PM. The CIA's June 2013 Response states 

that the Study "claims it was [ASSET X], not detainees, who first identified KSM's HB H for us." This is 

inaccurate. The Committee Study does not claim it was ASSET X who first identified KSM's ^H H

 fo r tll e

 CIA. 

The Committee Study details how the CIA had extensive information on KSM's as early as 1995; and how 

in^^^H2001 , prior to CIA detainee reporting, ASSET X highlighted how KSM's | 

to locating and capturing KSM. 

subjecUrfth^able from the CIA was "possible lead to UBL target." (See 

[spring] 01). Seealso^//^HBl4149 5 HHHH^H B Interview 

[REDACTED], by [REDACIEDW^ctobei^004 ^ X 

would further irn I II ill ^^H^BBi^^^BHi^BmBB^^HH^^B^^M^^B^B^^B I See 

|; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History 

Program. 

1843

 ALEC | 

1844

 ••66193 1 

ASSET X's I 

[282144Z SEP 01) 

I. ASSET X identified 

66193 | 

; DIRECTOR| 

|. The CIA cable also describes 

[66m l 

137701 

T O P SECRET/ / 7NOFOR N 

Page 328 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

328 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

j »i846 j^g following day, the cable was forwarded again to CTC officers 

with the subject line: "Access to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad."1847 

On 2001, ASSET X held his second meeting with CIA 

officers, who described ASSET X as "very willing to clandestinely assist the USG as 

directed."1848 At the same meeting, ASSET X identified a photograph | 

^^HHHHHH- 184 9 On^^^^H ' 2001, CIA Headquarters wrote that the 

CIA would be "keenly interested" if ASSET X "can dig into the [KSMj^^^^^^^^ H 

"1850 

In 2001, ASSET X proposed multiple times to the CIA 

that he use his contacts to locate KSM through | 

—the same approach that would lead the CIA to KSM more than 15 months later.1851 

ASSET X also argued for "a more aggressive and proactive approach | 

| " but was eventually convinced by CIA officers to | 

|, instead.1852 After ALEC Station rejected the CIA case officer's 

recommended financial compensation for ASSET X, ASSET X declined to work with the CIA as 

a CIA source.1853 Over the next nine months, the CIA continued to believe that ASSET X had 

the potential to develop information on KSM and his location, and sought, but was unable to 

reestablish contact with ASSET X.1854 During this time, the CIA continued to collect 

I to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED],! 

Tbcc^^^^HHHIH ; subject: Re: [REDACTED] | 

|; date: ,at 3:59:00PM. 

|; toT^^llHH ; cc: [REDACTED], 

|, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ^^^^^BTsubject : Access to Khalid Shaykh 

Muhammad; date: 2001, at 6:12:17 AM. See also ••66193l|jH||||) . The CIA's June 

2013 Response states that "detainees gave us the critical information on KSM's^^Hthatallowed us to understand 

that our source knew | 

access to KSM through | 

IMS

 664461 

I M)

 664871 

1850

 DIRECTOR | 

1851

 ASSET X's proposal-I 

This is inaccurate. As detailed, ASSET X's potential 

I was apparent to the CI A in 2001, prior to any CIA detainee reporting. 

presaged the 2003 operation. See 

01). 

66586 i |). See 

166530 

"166586 

1853

 ASSET X considered the CIA's initial offer of $| 

CIA 

[REDACTED]; included in response email from: 

| to be insufficient 

I urged that ASSET X be offered 

166586 H^^^^^H) ; email from 

I; to: [REDACTED]; cc: | 

|, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], | 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: [ASSET X]; date: November 15, 2001, 

at 6:54:40 AM.) Hie Station's appeal was denied by ALEC Station. See ALEC | 

~l66660^H^HHH ; 68881 j 

1854

 ^H^^^^^^^^^^fcontinue d to stress that ASSET X was a "financial risk worth taking." (See | 

Station remained interested in ASSET X, but continued to oppose the 

compensation package proposed by B^^B^^B^B . See ALEC See also \ 

68881 ^^•••Hll^ H WHDC^If^^^^^^B ; ^H H 67522 

T O P SECRET/ / I//NOFORI S 

Page 329 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

329 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET// Y/NOFORN 

intelligence on and sought other opportunities to gain access to 

KSM through a detainee in foreign government custody provided 

extensive information on KSM's and confirmed that KSM was "very close" to " 

I who "should know how to contact KSM."1857 

When the CIA finally located and met again with ASSET X on 

|, 2002, ASSET X stated that "he could j 

within a few weeks," and was "willing to travel HHH^H^^^H I to locate | 

T ' m 8 ASSET X was recruited as a source by the CIA, but, despite his offer to track 

KSM's ASSET X was dispatched by the CIA to | 

1855 See CIA disseminated as | 

1856

 CIA officers proposed recontacting a 1995 asset with possible access to KSM through | 

|. (See email from: [REDACTED]; to: Jose Rodriguez, 

|, [REDACTED!, [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Finding Khalid Sheikh Muhammad; date: 

2002, at 06:49:13 PM.) The email was resent, on 2002, to additional addressees. (See email from: 

[REDACTED]; to: [REDACTEDUREDACTED], [REDACTED], HHH^^H ; cc: subject: Finding 

Khalid Sheikh Muhammad; date: HI , 2002, at 3:46:13 PM.) At this point, the nefarious activities of KSM's 

| were of significant interest to the Intelligence Community and policymakers. KSM's H 

|terrorism were briefed to the President and were the subject of a direct tasking by the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense. ALEC \ 

1857

 The detainee was [DETAINEE SI. 

, disseminated as 

time, the CIA offered a compensation package that was increased from die CIA's previous offer. 

•••IH^^^B^H^OlH^^^IHr^Hl^ H 41495 

of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by 

[REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History Program. During this time period, ASSET X reported that he 

made contact with KSM's (See 

during this period, CIA i il I I I in note that ASSET X 

had offered to locate KSM'sMHHBI^W - (See 

. At this 

; DIR 

; Interview 

J 4810961 

cc: [REDACTED], 

2002, at 4:14:24 PM. 

60

 37701 

TOP SECRET/; 

See email from:

 to :

 [REDACTED]; 

|; subject: another for the highlights; date: | 

1414951 

Page 330 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

7NOFORN 

330 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

his previous CIA case officer "handler" there had departed for another CIA assignment 

ASSET X was thus handled by a new CIA officer who was unfamiliar with ASSET X's potential 

utility in tracking KSM.1852 Seeking guidance on how to proceed with ASSET X, the new CIA 

case officer sent several cables to CIA Headquarters, which he later described as disappearing 

into a "black hole." According to an interview of a CIA officer involved in the operation, the 

cables were being sent to a special compartment at CIA Headquarters which had been previously 

used by the With the dispersal of that CIA 

team, however, the compartment was idle and no one at CIA Headquarters was receiving and 

reading the cables being sent to the special compartment.1863 When the CIA case officer 

received no response to the cables he was sending to CIA Headquarters, he made preparations to 

terminate the CIA's relationship with ASSET X. According to interviews, in HIHI2002 , 

the CIA officer and was on his way to meet ASSET X to 

terminate the asset's relationship with the CIA. By chance, a CIA officer who had previously 

ASSET X ^^^IHH^^^ H was visiting IHI^^^^HH - This 

visiting CIA officer overheard the discussion between the chief of Base and thc CIA case officer 

concerning the CIA's termination of ASSET X as a CIA source. The discussion included names 

that ASSET X had been discussing with the case officer ^—name s that the visiting 

officer recognized mH^HHH H The visiting CIA officer interceded and recommended 

that the CIA Base delay the termination of ASSET X as a CIA source.1H6,1 At the next meeting, 

ASSET X again demonstrated that he had direct access to KSM's ^^^^^^^^HI^HH H 

H^^^HBI^H- 186 5 A s a resu,t>

tli e

 CIA decided not to terminate ASSET X's work as a 

CIA source.1865 

1801 ^ ^ 377Q 1 

1862

 Interview of [REDACTED] 

41495 24261 

by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program. See \ 

DIRECTOR • • ••••H^H . 

1863

 Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program. 

,864

 ASSET X had been using the same names since 2001. See interview of 

[REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by 

[REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History Program. 

1865 [TP INTERVIEW, CIA ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM, SEPTEMBER 14, 2004] Presentation to the CTC 

IHHH^^I 1 4 September 2004. 

1866

 Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program. The CIA's June 

2013 Response claims that the "CIA correctly represented that detainee reporting helped us capture [KSM]." This 

CIA assertion is based on an indirect chain of causation purporting to connect the reporting of Abu Zubaydah to the 

intervention of the visiting CIA officer and the subsequent capture of KSM. This account, which the CIA 

represented for the first time in June 2013, is inaccurate in numerous ways: (1) The CIA represents that 

"information provided by Abu Zubaydah... helped lead to the capture of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh [RBS]." The 

inaccuracies of this representation are described in this summary and in greater detail in Volume II. (2) The CIA 

represents that reporting from Ramzi bin al-Shibh (who was not in CIA custody at the time) regarding Ammar alBaluclii was key to capturing KSM. This too is inaccurate. As detailed in the Study, Ammar al-Baluchi played no 

role in the operation that captured KSM, which centered around ASSET X and 

The CIA represents that bin al-Shibh's reporting on Ammar al-Baluchi was "used... to debrief | 

[DETAINEE R]," who was in foreign government custody, and that as a result, DETAINEE R 

discussed This statement not supported by CIA records. CIA 

records related to DETAINEE R's intenogation in foreign government custod^ndicat^ha^ETAWE^R's 

reporting was prompted using a photograph and a letter. (See 1012 0 

10158 WASHINGT •WHIHQ H 

(4) The CIA represents that DETAINEE R's informationoii^^^^B^H^Ilowe d 

mi 11 iii i BBl^BII^MMBl 1111111111 1 

Page 331 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

331 
TOP SECRET//^ 

UNCLASSIFIED 

I//NOFORN 

Shortly thereafter, in i^ M 2003, ASSET X traveled on his own 

volition, and without prior discussion with the CIA, 

I'

 an d

 ^^^ ^ a face-to-face meeting with KSM. When ASSET 

X later informed CIA officers about his trip, | 

direct access to KSMl 

1869

 The internal debate within the CIA continued, however, with 

v .. . ——^an d ASSET X and his CIA handlers urging the CIA to delay action and wait for an opportunity for ASSET X 

to locate KSM.1870 ALEC Station initially supported immediate action to capture any KSM 

associate ASSET X could lead them to, before reversing its position on February 2003.'871 

The next day, ASSET X arrived in Islamabad 

|, where he was surprised to find KSM 

27781 

CIA to understand the value of the access [ASSET X| had to This is also inaccurate As 

detailed in the Study, the value of ASSET X's access to KSM^s^^Bwasapparen t to the CIA in 2001 (5) The 

CIA states thaUh^sihngCIA officer who intervened to forestall the termination of ASSET X did so because 

having been he was familiar with DETAINEE R's reporting on KSM's This 

representationomitsthe fact that the visiting CIA officer was a member of the team that handled ASSET X while 

ASSET X That team received information concerning ASSET X's stated access to KSM through 

^h^nformation was provided to the team prior to the capture of DETAINEE R. (See 

) (6) The CIA asserts that DETAINEE R's reporting "helped CIA to redirect [ASSET X] 

1

m a n effor t t o

 locate KSM." This is inaccurate. As detailed in the Study, ASSET X had 

beenindicat.ng that he had access to KSM through since 2001 and, as detailed, contacted KSM's 

^ ^ m on his own. CIA records indicate that the detainees who provided corroborating information about KSM's 

DETAINEE S and DETAINEE R, were in foreign government custody at the time they provided the 

information. DETAINEE R would later be rendered to CIA custody and approved for the use of the CIA's 

enhanced intenogation techniques, although there are no CIA records indicating that he was subjected to the 

techniques. 

1867

 DIR • • Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral 

History Program; ^ — 

1868

 Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program- Interview of 

[REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 3 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program 

1869

 Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program 

1870

 Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program- Interview of 

[REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED] by 

[REDACTED]; 24 November & 15 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of fREDACTRDl bv 

[REDACTED], 30 November 2004. See •••j |^|4103 4 •••• • '' " 

^ntervie^nREDACTED] , by [REDACTED], 3 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; DIRECTOR 

T O P SECRET//! 

Page 332 of 499 

y/NOFOR N 

UNCLASSIFIED 

332 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

| ASSET X | 

"I M W KSM."1872 

I sent a text message to his CIA handler stating: 

contacted the CIA and conveyed what had just occurred.1875 

In an interview with the CIA's Oral History Program, the 

CIA case officer described what happened: 

"We went know, 

m . \ASSET XI turns around to me and says, look I don't know, I guess 

I'm nervous, ^^HflHHHH '

 1 said< 'Look brothe^here are 

twenty five million frigging reasons why you need to find HB^ ' That's 

what the reward was. He looks at me and says, 'I understand. I 

understand."'1877 

_ C) Shortly thereafter, ASSET X found and, in the early 

morning hours of March 1, 2003, Pakistani authorities conducted a raid and captured KSM.1878 

On March | , 2003, KSM was rendered to CIA custody.1879 

1872

 Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program. 

1873

 Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral Histor^rogtwUnterview of 

IREDACTEDI. bv [REDACTED], 3 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; 41490 

^^••llBV ; Interview of by [REDACTED], 25 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; 

Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History Program. 

1874 interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral Histor^rogram^nterview of 

[REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 3 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; 41490 

1875

 Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral Histor^rogram^nterview of 

[REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 3 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; 41490 

41490 (•••^•H ) 

1877

 Interview of IREDACTEDI, by [REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History Program. 

141351 ^••• H 41490 ALEC 

1879 ( 

in Volume III. 

41490 

10983 (242321Z MAR 03); f 

TOP SECRET//I 

110972 (241122Z MAR 03); and the KSM detainee review 

I//NOFORN 

Page 333 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

333 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

5. The Capture of Majid Khan 

(TiS/^^H^H^^V/NF ) The CIA represented that intelligence derived from the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against CIA detainee KSM led to the capture of Majid 

Khan. These representations were inaccurate. 

(^^/^HHI^B^^/NF ) I n multiple interviews with the CIA Office of Inspector General, 

CIA officers stated that "information from KSM led to the capture of [Majid] Kahn [sic]," and 

that "KSI^gav^i^MaiicnChan."1880 The deputy chief of ALEC Station and former KSM 

debriefer represented that KSM "provided information that helped lead to the 

arrest of... Majid Khan, an operative who could get into the U.S. easily."1881 The draft OIG 

Special Review repeated the representations of and others, stating that KSM "provided 

information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including... Majid Khan, an operative 

who could enter the United States easily and was tasked to research attacks against U.S. water 

reservoirs."1882 On February 27, 2004, DDO James Pavitt submitted the CIA's formal response 

to the draft Inspector General Special Review. Pavitt's submission represented that Majid Khan 

was in custody "because of the information we were able lawfully to obtain from KSM."1883 The 

final, and now declassified, CIA Inspector General Special Review states that KSM "provided 

information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including... Majid Khan, an operative 

who could enter the United States easily and was tasked to research attacks... ,"1884 In its 

analysis of the legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the OLC relied on 

passages of the Inspector General's Special Review that included this inaccurate 

representati on.1885 

mW^amH m Ju'y 29, 2003, CIA leadership met with select members of the 

National Security Council to obtain reaffirmation of the CIA interrogation program. The CIA 

stated that "detainees subjected] to the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had 

produced significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved 

1880

 Interview of JohjJi^cLaughlin, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 

September 5, 2003; Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, 

Counterterrorist Center Al-Qa'ida Department; date: 28 July 2003; Interview of HHHiMHi , by 

|, Office of die Inspector General, August 18, 2003. 

|, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center 

ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003. 

1882

 CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG), 

January 2004. 

1883 Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) 

Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); 

date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism 

Detention and Interrogation Activities. 

1884

 CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review - Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program, 

(2003-7123-IG), May 2004. 

1385 

Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of 

United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques diat May be 

Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees, pp. 10-11, citing CIA Office of Inspector General, 

Special Review, pp. 85-91. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^ 

11 ii 1111 1 "ii' i 

Page 334 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

334 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRETfl^^^MM^^^^MflNQEQR N 

lives."1886 Briefing slides provided by the CIA stated that "major threat" information was 

acquired, providing the "Identification of... the Majid Khan Family" by KSM as an example.1887 

The same slides were used, at least in part, for subsequent briefings.1888 On September 16, 2003, 

a briefing was conducted for Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald 

Rumsfeld, the content of which was described as "virtually identical" to the July 29, 2003, 

briefing.1889 The slides were also used in an October 7, 2003, briefing for Assistant Attorney 

General Jack Goldsmith.1890 

(TS/^^^B^HIB^NF ) CIA records indicate that Majid Khan was identified and located 

prior to any reporting from KSM. There is no indication in CIA records that reporting from 

KSM—or any other CIA detainee—played any role in the identification and capture of Majid 

Khan.1891 

(TS^flHHH^A/NF ) On January 10, 2003, the FBI's Baltimore Field Office opened a 

full field international terrorism investigation on the email account "BobDesi(@)hotmail.com." 

According to FBI investigative records, the investigation was "predicated upon information 

received through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning" a known al-Qa'ida email 

account that was already "under FISA coverage Six days later, on January 16, 

2003, open source research related to the "BobDesi" email account "revealed a personal website 

1886 <2iA Memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA 

General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CIA Interrogation Program, " dated 

July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials. 

1887 See briefing slides entitled, "CIA Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House 

officials. Those attending the meeting included Vice President Richard Cheney, National Security Advisor 

Condoleezza Rice, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General John Ashcroft, Acting Assistant 

Attorney General Patrick Philbin, and counsel to the National Security Council, John Bellinger. 

1888 The cia' s June 2003 Response states that "CIA mistakenly provided incorrect information to the Inspector 

General (IG) that led to a one-time misrepresentation of this case in the IG's 2004 Special Review." The CIA's June 

2013 Response adds that, "[tjhis mistake was not, as it is characterized in the 'Findings and Conclusions' section of 

the Study, a 'repeatedly represented' or 'frequently cited' example of the effectiveness of CIA's enhanced 

interrogation program." The CIA's June 2013 assertion that this was a "one-time misrepresentation" is inaccurate. 

As described, the inaccurate information was provided numerous times to the Inspector General, in multiple 

interviews and in the CIA's official response to the draft Special Review. Afterwards, the CIA relied on the section 

of the Special Review that included the inaccurate information on the capture of Majid Khan in obtaining legal 

approval for the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques from the Department of Justice. This 

information was also provided by the CIA to the CIA's Blue Ribbon Panel for their review of the CIA's Detention 

and Interrogation Program. The CIA also included the inaccurate representation about the identification of Majid 

Khan and his family to the National Security Council principals on multiple occasions. Further, as noted, the 

inaccurate information in the CIA OIG Special Review was declassified and has been used in multiple open source 

articles and books, often as an example of the effectiveness of the CIA program. 

1889

 Memorandum for die Record; subject: CIA Interrogation Program; September 27, 2003 (OGC-F0-2003-50088). 

Slides, CIA Interrogation Program, 16 September 2003. John B. Bellinger III, Senior Associate Counsel to the 

President and Legal Advisor, National Security Council; Memorandum for the Record; subject: Briefing of 

Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld regarding Interrogation of High-Value Detainees; date: September 30, 2003. 

1890

 Scott W. Muller; Memorandum for the Record; Interrogation briefing for Jack Goldsmith; date: 16 October 2003 

(OGC-FO-2003-50097). 

1891

 For additional details, see Volumes II and Volume III. 

1892 See FBI 302 on FBI case file and 88793 I 

TOP SECRET/. 7NOFORN 

Page 335 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

335 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

for the user, Majid Khan."1893 In February 2003, B i

 wa s

 tracking Majid Khan's Internet 

activity and was confident he was located at his brother's house in Karachi, Pakistan.1894 On 

March 4, 2003, ALEC Station noted that activity on an al-Qa'ida email account—associated with 

Khallad bin Attash—that was in contact with Majid Khan, had been dormant. ALEC Station 

recommended that ^HIHHHII^HIi^HII^HHH^ I move to capture Majid Khan 

in the hope that Majid Khan could lead CIA officers to Khallad bin Attash.1895 The following 

morning, March 5, 2003, officers from PakistanB^^^|^m| | carried out a raid on Majid 

Khan's brother's house, detaining Majid Khan.1896 

) On March 15, 2003, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station | 

sent an email to CIA Headquarters noting that she had read the reporting from Majid 

Khan's foreign government interrogations and was requesting photographs of Majid Khan and 

his associates to use in the KSM interrogations.1897 CIA Headquarters provided the photographs 

the same day.1898 On March 17, 2003, KSM was shown the photograph of Majid Khan and 

discussed the person he stated he knew as "Yusif," for the first time.1899 

6. The Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting 

(TS/^^^mi^^^l^/NF ) The CIA represented that intelligence derived from the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques thwarted plotting against the U.S. military base, Camp 

Lemonier, in Djibouti. These representations were inaccurate. 

(U) In the September 6, 2006, speech, acknowledging the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program, which was based on CIA-provided information and vetted by the CIA, President 

George W. Bush stated: 

"This is intelligence that cannot be found any other place. And our security 

depends on getting this kind of information." 

The speech continued: 

"These are some of the plots that have been stopped because of information 

from this vital program. Terrorists held in CIA custody have also provided 

| (050459Z 

|/[DETENTION 

1893

 ALEC 

1894 

1895

 ALEC 

1896 I 

(160141Z JAN 03) 

13571 (260330Z FEB 03) 

(040329Z MAR 03) 

13658 (050318ZMAR03);1365 9 (050459ZMAR 03);DIRECTOR| 

MAR 03). 

1897

 Memorandum for: [REDACTED]; from: [REDACTED],OFFICE: 

SITE BLUE]; subject: Baltimore boy and KSM; date: 15 March 2003, at 07:08:32 PM. 

1898

 ALEC Station sent DETENTION SITE BLUE photographs for use with KSM and other detainees. They 

included Majid Khan, Muhammad Khan, Sohail Munir, Iyman Faris, Majid Khan's cousin (Mansour), Fayyaz 

Kamran, Aydinbelge, Khalid Jamil, and Aafia Siddiqui. See ALEC H H (152212Z MAR 03). 

1899 10g6 5 (]7i648Z MAR 03); 10886 (182219Z MAR 03); •• • 10870 (172017Z 

MAR 03) 

/NOFORN 

Page 3 36 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

336 
UNCLASSIFIED 

11ii 11 i i i '"i n 

information that helped stop the planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp 

Lemonier in Djibouti.'"900 

An Office of the Director of National Intelligence public release 

accompanying the September 6, 2006, speech, states that "the CIA designed a new interrogation 

program that would be safe, effective, and legal." The document asserts: "In early 2004, shortly 

after his capture, al-Qa'ida facilitator Gouled Hassan Dourad revealed that in mid-2003 alQa'ida East Africa cell leader Abu Talha al-Sudani sent him from Mogadishu to Djibouti to case 

the US Marine base Camp Lemonier, as part of a plot to send suicide bombers with a truck 

bomb."1901 

(zsmmmmrn* ) Similarly, in a prepared briefing for the chairman of the House 

Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, John Murtha, on October 30, 2007, the CIA represented 

that the CIA could not conduct its detention operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, because 

"interrogations conducted on US military installations must comply with the Army Field 

Manual." The CIA presentation stated that the CIA program was "critical to [the CIA's] ability 

1900 See "CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy," drafts supporting the September 6, 2006, speech by 

President George W. Bush acknowledging and describing the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, as well as 

an unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, "Summary of the High Value 

Terrorist Detainee Program." In October 2007 CIA officers discussed a section of the President's speech, which 

was based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, related to Camp Lemonier. Addressing die section of the 

speech that states, "[tjerrorists held in CIA custody have also provided information that helped stop the planned 

strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti," a senior CIA officer highlighted that the plotting had not 

been stopped, but in fact was ongoing. The officer wrote: "1 have attached the cable from Guleed that was used to 

source the Sept '06 speech as well as a later cable from a different detainee affirming diat as of mid-2004, AQ 

members in Somalia were still intent on attacking Camp Lemonier... As of 2004, the second detainee indicates that 

AQ was still working on attacking the base." The CIA officer explained that the "reasoning behind validation of the 

language in the speech—and remember, we can argue about whether or not 'planning' consistitutes [sic] a 'plot' and 

about whether anything is ever disrupted—was that the detainee reporting increased our awareness of attack plotting 

against the base, leading to heightened security." (See email from: to: subject: 

"More on Camp Lemonier"; date: October 22, 2007, at 5:33 PM), The President's reference to Camp Lemonier in 

die context of "this vital program" came immediately after the passage of the speech referencing the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM and immediately before statements about the thwarting of the 

Karachi and Heathrow Airport plots, both of which have been explicitly attributed by the CIA to the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The disruption of the Camp Lemonier plotting was also referenced as an 

intelligence success in the context of the March 2008 presidential veto of legislation that would have effectively 

banned the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques. See "Text: Bush on Veto of Intelligence Bill," The New York 

Times, dated March 8, 2008, which states, the "main reason this program has been effective is that it allows the CIA 

to use specialized interrogation procedures... limiting the CIA's inten-ogation methods to those in the Army field 

manual would be dangerous...." 

1901

 Italics added. Unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, "Summary of the 

High Value Ten'orist Detainee Program." CIA records indicate that the CIA had intelligence that al-Qa'ida 

affiliated individuals were targeting Camp Lemonier with an "explosives-laden track" in early 2003. The CIA 

sought to detain Gouled because of the intelligence already collected, indicating that in 2003—at the likely behest of 

Abu Talha al-Sudani—Gouled was conducting casings of Camp Lemonier. Once captured, and prior to being 

transferred to CIA custody, Gouled confirmed that he cased Camp Lemonier for a potential tenorist attack. Despite 

the use of the term "revealed" in the 2006 document, the CIA's June 2013 Response states: "We did not represent 

that we initially learned of the plot from detainees, or that it was disrupted based solely on information from 

detainees in CIA custody." The CIA's June 2013 Response further states that the CIA "agree[s] with the Study that 

[the CIA] had threat reporting against Camp Lemonier prior to the March 2004 detention and rendition" of Guleed 

Hassan Dourad. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^ 

IIII 1111 1 Hi m 

Page 337 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

337 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

to protect the American homeland and US forces and citizens abroad from terrorist attack," that 

"[m]ost, if not all, of the intelligence acquired from high-value detainees in this [CIA] program 

would likely not have been discovered or reported in any other way," that the CIA program "is in 

no way comparable to the detainee programs run by our military," and that the CIA used 

information derived from the program "to disrupt terrorist plots—including against our 

military."1902 The CIA presentation then stated: 

"[A CIA detainee] informed us1903 of an operation underway to attack the U.S. 

military at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. We believe our understanding of this 

plot helped us to prevent the attack."1904 

A review of CIA records found that: (1) the detainee to whom the 

CIA's representations refer—Guleed (variant, Gouled) Hassan Dourad—was not subjected to the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques; (2) the CIA was aware of and reported on the terrorist 

threat to Camp Lemonier prior to receiving any information from CIA detainees;1905 (3) Guleed 

provided corroborative reporting on the threat prior to being transferred to CIA custody; and (4) 

contrary to CIA representations, the plotting did not "stop" because of information acquired from 

CIA detainee Guleed in 2004, but rather, continued well into 2007.1906 

1902

 Emphasis in original. See CIA Talking Points dated October 30, 2007, entitled, "DCIA Meeting with Chairman 

Murdia re Rendition atid Detention Programs" and attachments. 

1903

 The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "We did not represent that we initially learned of the plot from detainees, 

or that it was disrupted based solely on information from detainees in CIA custody." The CIA's October 30, 2007, 

talking points for the chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, John Murtha, make no 

reference to the CIA receiving intelligence on the Camp Lemonier plotting from other intelligence sources prior to 

CIA detainee reporting. Nor do the talking points indicate that the CIA detainee initially provided information on 

the plotting prior to being transferred to CIA custody. In addition, as described, an Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence public release on the CIA's Detention and Interrogaton Program from September 6,2006, 

states that "the CIA designed a new interrogation program that would be safe, effective, and legal;" and that "alQa'ida facilitator Gouled Hassan Dourad revealed" that he had been sent to "case the US Marine base Camp 

Lemonier." 

1904 See CIA Talking Points dated October 30, 2007, entitled, "DCIA Meeting with Chairman Murdia re Rendition 

and Detention Programs" and attachments. The talking points further state that the "Presidentially-mandated 

detention program is critical to our ability to protect the American homeland and US forces and citizens abroad from 

teiTorist attack." The attachment to the document, labeled "points from CTC," further asserts that while CIA 

rendition activities "did yield intelligence, it did not do so in a timely, efficient, and thorough way, raising 

unacceptable risks," and that the CIA "experience has shown that exclusive control by CIA, in a Agency designed, 

built, and managed facility, allows us complete oversight and control over all aspects of detention, to include 

conditions of confinement, approved interrogation activities, humane standards, medical treatment, detainee 

engagement, security, hygiene, and infrastructure." The document references a U.S. House of Representatives 

Appropriations bill providing a reduction in funding for the Covert Action CT Program and states: "Had the mark 

been directed against the rendition and detention programs specifically, the CIA would have recommended a 

Presidential veto. In its appeal, CIA detailed the impact of a $H | million cut to the CA CT Program. The Agency 

also made it clear that it would continue the rendition and detention program because of the high value of these 

activities." 

1905 See aforementioned CIA representations that: (1) "This is intelligence that cannot be found any other place. And 

our security depends on getting this kind of information," and (2) "Most, if not all, of the intelligence acquired from 

high-value detainees in this [CIA] program would likely not have been discovered or reported in any other way." 

As noted, the CIA's June 2013 Response states that the CIA "agree[s] with the Study that [the CIA] had threat 

reporting against Camp Lemonier prior to the March 2004 detention and rendition" of Guleed. 

1906 See intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional information. 

11 ii 11 ii 1 1 MMBJBII^^^ n 

Page 338 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

338 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFOR N 

(mmmmm^ ) March 4, 2004, Guleed was captured in Djibouti based on 

information obtained from a foreign government and a CIA source.1907 Prior to entering CIA 

custody, Guleed was confronted with information acquired from signals intelligence, and he 

confirmed that he cased Camp Lemonier for a potential terrorist attack.1908 CIA sought to render 

Guleed to CIA custody in order to question Guleed about senior al-Qa'ida East Africa members 

Abu Talha al-Sudani and Saleh ali Saleh Nabhan. A CIA cable states: 

"Guleed represents the closest we have come to an individual with first hand, 

face-to-face knowledge of Abu Talha [al-Sudani] and Nabhan, and our hope is 

that Guleed will provide key intelligence necessary for the capture of these 

senior al-Qa'ida members."1909 

(TS/^HHHHIH''"'^ ) ^ rio r t 0 Guleed's rendition to CIA custody, he provided detailed 

information on his casing of Camp Lemonier to CIA officers.1910 On March 2004, Guleed 

was rendered to CIA custody.1911 There are no records to indicate that Guleed was subjected to 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, nor are there any CIA records to indicate that 

Guleed provided the information that was the basis for his rendition to CIA custody— 

information leading to the capture of Abu Talha al-Sudani or Saleh ali Saleh Nabhan. 

While in CIA custody, Guleed continued to provide information on 

his targeting of Camp Lemonier. Guleed stated that Abu Talha al-Sudani had not yet picked the 

operatives for the attack against Camp Lemonier,1912 that the attack was "on hold while they1313 (041624Z MAR 04); HEADQUAR | (041935Z 

15623. 

1907

 HEADQUAR | 

MAR 04). See also \ 

1908

 • • 93364 (January 8, 2008) ^ ^ 

1909

 HEADQUAR^^H^^^^I^^B;HI9336 4 (January 8, 2008). 

1329 The CIA' S June 2013 Response states: "In March 2004, | 

| based [on] information from a clandestine source-detained and rendered to CIA custody the primary 

facilitator for al-Qa'ida's Camp Lemonier plot, Guleed Hassan Ahmed, who had cased the Camp on behalf of alQa'ida. Guleed provided details about the plot and al-Qa'ida's Somali support network, which drove CIA's targeting 

efforts." As described in this summary and in greater detail in Volume 11, Guleed confirmed intelligence reporting 

already collected on his casing of Camp Lemonier prior to being rendered to CIA custody. See reference to material 

on recorded interrogations of Guleed Hassan Dourad in the cable, 93364 (January 8, 2008). 

1 15431 

1912 1573 (160217Z MAR 04), later reissued as CIA 

used to support the president's speech on September 6, 2006 

TOP SECRET/; 

Page 339 of 499 

(021549Z APR 04)/1 

//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

339 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ I//NQFQRN 

raised the necessary funds via the bank robbery operation,"1913 and that "he [Guleed] was not 

informed of the operational plan."1914 

Neither the detention of Guleed, nor the information he provided, 

thwarted terrorist plotting against Camp Lemonier; and CIA records indicate that attack planning 

against Camp Lemonier continued well after Guleed's capture in March 2004, to include a time 

period beyond the president's September 6, 2006, speech. In March 2005, the CIA sought 

approval to render an associate of Guleed whom the CIA stated was "planning terrorist attacks 

on U.S. targets in East Africa, particularly against Camp Lemonier in Djibouti."1915 In October 

2005, a cable stated, "a body of reporting indicates that East Africa al-Qa'ida network operatives 

are currently planning attacks on U.S. interests in the region, particularly... the U.S. military 

base Camp Lemonier in Djibouti."1916 In April 2007, the continued terrorist threat reporting 

against Camp Lemonier resulted in a request for the Camp to further "alter their security 

practices."1917 

(TS/^^^^^^^^^V/NF ) In October 2007, in light of the ongoing threat reporting related to 

Camp Lemonier, CIA officer attempted to explain the CIA-validated 

statement in the president's September 6, 2006, speech that "[terrorists held in CIA custody 

"helped stop the planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti."1918 

1913 The CIA's June 2013 Response links the "disruption]" of the Canip Lemonier plotting to 

the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program via the arrest of KSM, stating: "According to Khalid Shaykh 

Muhammad (KSM), his arrest in March 2003 (which we note in Example 12 resulted in part from information 

provided by Ramzi Bin al-Shibh) prevented him from transferring 30,000 euros from al-Qa'ida in Pakistan to alQa'ida in East Africa leaders, some of whom were plotting the Camp Lemonier attack. Funding shortages were cited 

repeatedly by detainees and in ^Bl^ l [technical collection] as a reason for the Camp Lemonier plot's 

delays." Prior to the CIA's June 20.13 Response, there were no CIA records attributing the delay or disruption of the 

plotting to the capture or detention of KSM. While a body of intelligence reporting indicated that funding shortages 

contributed to delays in the targeting of Camp Lemonier, no CIA intelligence records were identified that cite any 

deficit of expected funds resulting from KSM's capture. As detailed in this Study, KSM was captured on March 1, 

2003. Intelligence reporting indicates that Abu Talha al-Sudani sent Guleed to case the security at Camp Lemonier 

more than six months later, in September 2003. In early March 2004, the CIA reported 

[technical collection] revealed that "Abu Talha and Guleed were working together in search of funding necessary to 

carry out planned operations." In late March 2004, after Guleed's detention, several associates were detained after 

an attack on a German aid delegation, which was suspected of being an attempt to kidnap individuals for ransom. A 

cable reporting this information stated that [technical collection] "indicated Abu Talha continues to 

press forward on plans to target Western interests in Djibouti." Several days later, CIA officers surmised that the 

kidnapping attempt was likely an attempt "by Abu Talha to raise the operational funds for his plan to attack Camp 

Lemonier." (See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including reporting referenced in HEADQUARTERS 

H I (101756Z MAR 04) and connected to I^^HHHlii^lriH B ALEC fl|^(222122Z MAR 

04); and ALEC ^Hf l (292353Z MAR 04).) As detailed in the section of this summary and Volume II on the 

Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM), the capture of KSM did not result from information provided by 

Ramzi bin al-Shibh. 

1914 | 

Draft cable an from: HH^^^^ R

 to : an d

 M^^B B subject: " m 

DDO Approval to render Somali Jihadist and al-Qa'ida facilitator Ahmed Abdi Aw Mohammad to [CIA] control"; 

date: May 11, 2005, at 5:42:50 PM. 

1916

 HEADQUARTERS (252044Z OCT 05) 

19,7

 HI^^ H 10555 (101434Z APR 07) 

1918 See "CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy," drafts supporting the September 6, 2006, speech by 

President George W. Bush acknowledging and describing the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, as well as 

TOP SECRET/^ y/NOFORN 

Page 340 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

340 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECREiW^^^M^l^^^^MflNQEQR N 

who was involved in vetting of the speech, wrote to a CIA colleague tracking the ongoing threats 

to Camp Lemonier that: 

"The reasoning behind [the CIA] validation of the language in the speech-and 

remember, we can argue about whether or not 'planning' consistitutes [sic] a 

'plot' and about whether anything is ever disrupted—was that the detainee 

reporting increased our awareness of attack plotting against the base, leading to 

heightened security."1919 

A review of CIA records, however, found no indication that CIA 

detainee reporting from Guleed, or any other CIA detainee, alerted the CIA or the U.S. military 

to increased terrorist targeting of Camp Lemonier. To the contrary, CIA records indicate that the 

CIA was in possession of substantial threat reporting demonstrating that Camp Lemonier in 

Djibouti was being targeted by al-Qa'ida and al-Qa'ida affiliated extremists prior to the detention 

of Guleed on March 4, 2004.1920 For example, on January 28, 2003, a foreign government report 

disseminated by the CIA stated that al-Qa'ida operatives were planning "to ram an explosivesladen truck into a military base, probably Camp Lemonier."1921

 On March 10, 2003, a "Terrorist 

Advisory" was issued, which stated that "U.S. forces stationed at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti... 

could be targeted."1922 Similar reporting continued through 2003, and by the end of the year, the 

CIA had H coverage1923 indicating that Guleed and other identified operatives were being 

an unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, "Summary of the High Value 

Terrorist Detainee Program." 

1919 See email from: to and others; subject: "More on Camp Lemonier"; October 

22, 2007, at 5:33 PM. In a reply email, a CIA officer wrote that Guleed's statement was only "that the plan was 

suspended while Abu Talha tried to acquire the necessary funds," and continued, "I don't want anyone to walk away 

from this thinking that the POTUS speech from 2006 is the only language/view we are allowed to hold, especially 

since most or all of us were not involved in the original coordination" of the President's September 6, 2006, speech. 

See email from: to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]; cc: subject: "Camp 

Lemonier"; date: October 24,2007, at 1:22:44 PM. 

1920 1313 (041624Z MAR 04) 

1921 See January 28, 2003, CIA Presidential Daily Brief, entitled, "Al-Qa'ida Planning Attack in Djibouti." The 

CIA's June 2013 Response states that the CIA "agree[s] with the Study that [the CIA] had threat reporting against 

Camp Lemonier prior to the March 2004 detention and rendi tion" of Guleed, but argues that the threat reporting 

provided to the President on January 28, 2003, had "no relation to [al-Sudani's] plot," and was "later recalled after 

being revealed to be a fabrication." The CIA did not provide a date for the recall. The reporting, which indicated alQa'ida operatives were planning "to ram an explosives-laden truck into a military base, probably Camp Lemonier," 

would later be corroborated by other intelligence reporting, including by Guleed in his description of al-Sudani's 

plotting. See intelligence chronology in Volume 11. 

1922

 CIA WASHINGTON DC !• • (110056Z MAR 03). See also 17366 (121355Z MAR 03). The 

CIA's June 2013 Response asserts that the March 2003 reporting was "an analytical assessment that Djibouti was a 

potential target given its US Military presence," was "not based on specific intelligence," and was analysis related to 

"a different al-Qa'ida cell." The CIA's June 2013 Response also disputes the relevance of the May 2003 reporting 

that al-Qa'ida affiliates were "waiting for the right time to cany out large-scale attacks, possibly involving suicide 

bombers, against a U.S. military base or U.S. naval ship in or near Djibouti." The CIA's June 2013 Response states 

that this threat reporting "was later found to be unrelated." Notwithstanding these assertions, the CIA's June 2013 

Response states that the CIA "agree[s] with the Study that [the CIA] had threat reporting against Camp Lemonier 

prior to the March 2004 detention and rendition" of Guleed. 

1923

 ALEC (021825Z OCT 03) 

IIII i i i 1 1 MMBBBI^^^^ M "iii i 

Page 341 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

341 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

directed by Abu Talha al-Sudani to target Camp Lemonier.1924 By the end of December 2003, 

Djiboutian authorities confirmed that Guleed had cased Camp Lemonier and that Guleed 

appeared to have "formulate[d] a complete targeting package, which included an escape 

route."1925 It was this reporting that led Hllt o capture Guleed on March 4, 2004.1926 

7. The Assertion that CIA Detainees Subjected to Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Help 

Validate CIA Sources 

(^^^^I^^HIH^F ) In addition to CIA claims that information produced during or after 

the use of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques led to the disruption of terrorist plots and the 

capture of specific terrorists, the CIA also represented that its enhanced interrogation techniques 

were necessary to validate CTA sources. The claim was based on one CIA detainee—Janat 

Gul—contradicting the reporting of one CIA asset. 

(^HHBH^NE ) The CIA repeatedly represented to policymakers that information 

acquired after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques helped to "validate" CIA 

sources. For example, CIA Director Michael Hayden provided testimony to the Committee on 

April 12, 2007, that: 

"Detainee information is a key tool for validating clandestine sources. In fact, 

in one case, the detainee's information proved to be the accurate story, and the 

clandestine source was confronted and subsequently admitted to embellishing 

or fabricating some or all [of] the details in his report."1927 

Similarly, in January 2009, the CIA compiled a detailed briefing 

book for a planned three-hour briefing of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program for 

President-elect Obama's national security staff. Included in the materials was a document that 

stated, "[k]ey intelligence [was] collected from HVD interrogations after applying [the CIA's 

enhanced] interrogation techniques." After this statement, the CIA provided examples, including 

that the "most significant reporting" acquired from CIA detainee Janat Gul after applying the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was information that helped the CIA "validate a CIA 

asset."1928 The document states: 

1924

 Referenced in HEADi 

See also 

(101756Z MAR 04) and connected to | 

1925

 CIA WASHINGTON DC (302034Z DEC 03) / SERIAL: 

1926

 W^Kt M 1313 (041624Z MAR 04) 

1927

 CIA classified Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael 

V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007; and accompanying Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12, 2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central Intelligence Agency Detention and 

Interrogation Program" (DTS #2007-1563). See also CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for 

the War Against Al-Qa'ida," June 2005, which CIA records indicate was provided to White House officials on June 

1, 2005, and was broadly disseminated on June 3,2005, as an Intelligence Assessment. On March 31, 2009, former 

Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released 

with redactions on August 24,2009. 

1928

 Italics in original. CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team - "Renditions, Detentions, and 

Interrogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009." Referenced 

materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect 

Barrack [sic] Obama National Security Team Tuesday, 13 January 2009; 8:30 - 11:30 a.m." Expected participants 

11ii MU M ^^BBii^BI^BBB^^^Tt N 

Page 342 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

342 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ I//NOFORN 

"Pakistan-based facilitator Janat Gul's most significant reporting helped us 

validate a CIA asset who was providing information about the 2004 preelection threat. The asset claimed that Gul had arranged a meeting between 

himself and al-Qa'ida's chief of finance, Shaykh Sa'id, a claim that Gul 

vehemently denied. Gul's reporting was later matched with information 

obtained from Sharif al-Masri and Abu Talha al-Pakistani, captured after Gul. 

With this reporting in hand, CIA HHI H the asset, who subsequently 

admitted to fabricating his reporting about the meeting."1929 

The CIA representation that the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques produced information that allowed the CIA to identify the reporting of a CIA asset as 

fabricated lacked critical contextual information. The CIA representations did not describe how 

the CIA asset's reporting was already doubted by CIA officers prior to the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul. Nor did the CIA representations acknowledge 

that the asset's fabricated reporting was the reason that Janat Gul was subjected to the techniques 

in the first place. The CIA concluded that Janat Gul was not a high-level al-Qa'ida figure and 

did not possess threat information, but this conclusion was not included in CIA representations. 

I

n

 March 2004, the CIA received reporting from a CIA asset, 

"ASSET Y,"1930 that Janat Gul was planning with senior al-Qa'ida leaders to conduct attacks 

inside the United States. The attacks were reportedly planned to occur prior to the U.S. elections 

in November 2004.1931 ASSET Y, who cited Janat Gul as the source of the information, stated 

that Gul was going to facilitate a meeting between Abu Faraj al-Libi and ASSET Y in support of 

the operation.1932 As noted, CIA officers expressed doubts about ASSET Y's reporting at the 

included, "Senator Boren, Mr. McDonough, Mr. Brennan, General Jones, MrCraiCjMrLippertjMr. Smith, 

Senator Hagel," as well as several CIA officials, including Director Hayden, John Rizzo, 

[REDACTED], and IBCT C Legal The briefing book includes the document "Briefing Notes 

on the Value of Detainee Reporting," dated 15 May 2006, which provided the same intelligence claims found in the 

document of the same name, but dated April 15, 2005. The "Briefing Notes" document was provided to the 

Department of Justice in April 2005, in the context of the Department's analysis of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques. 

1929

 Italics added. CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team - "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations 

(RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009." Referenced materials 

attached to cover memorandum with the title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect Barrack 

[sic] Obama National Security Team Tuesday, 13 January 2009; 8:30 - 11:30 a.m." Expected participants included, 

"Senator Boren, Mr. McDonough, Mr. Brennan, General Jones, Mr. Craig, Mr. Lippert, Mr. Smith, Senator Hagel," 

as well as several CIA officials, including Director Hayden, John Rizzo, [REDACTED], and 

Legal The briefing book includes the document "Briefing Notes on the Value of 

Detainee Reporting," dated 15 May 2006, which provided the same intelligence claims found in the document of the 

same name, but dated April 15, 2005. The "Briefing Notes" document was provided to the Department of Justice in 

April 2005, in the context of the Department's analysis of the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques. 

1930

 CIA records provided to the Committee identify the pseudonym created by the CIA for the asset. The Study 

r • " . 

AR 04) 

04) 

7NOFORN 

Page 343 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

343 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

time it was received.1933 A senior CIA officer, who formerly served as chief of 

the Bin Ladin Unit, raised questions about the reliability of the asset's reporting on March 

2004, stating that the reporting was "vague" and "worthless in terms of actionable intelligence," 

and that al-Qa'ida "loses nothing" by disclosing the information. He further stated that, given an 

al-Qa'ida statement emphasizing a lack of desire to strike before the U.S. election, and alQa'ida's knowledge that "threat reporting causes panic in Washington" and "leaks soon after it is 

received/^h^epor^would be an easy way [for al-Qa'ida] to test" ASSET Y.1934 ALEC Station 

officer HH^HH I expressed similar doubts about the source's reporting in response to 

the email.1935 

Less than three months later, Janat Gul was captured in on 

June 2004.1936 On June 2004, CIA's ^^Bll i proposed that Gul be rendered to 

CIA custody, citing ASSET Y's reporting.1937 During this period, however, the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques had been suspended by the CIA director.1938 On June 29, 

2004, a draft memorandum from DCI Tenet to National Security Adviser Rice sought special 

approval from the National Security Council Principals Committee to use the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques against Janat Gul to learn more about the threat reporting from ASSET 

Y 1939 Th e memorandum referenced ASSET Y's reporting and stated that if the CIA could use 

the techniques, "the Agency would be in an optimum position to obtain from Gul critical 

intelligence necessary to save American lives by disrupting the pre-election plot, locating senior 

al-Qa'ida leaders still at large, and learning how Usama Bin Laden communicates with his 

operatives." The memorandum further stated that "[g]iven the magnitude of the danger posed by 

Ema.il from: | 

2004, at 06:55 AM. 

1934

 Email from: 

to: ••^•H^H , [REDACTED], 

, subject: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and [Source Name REDACTED]?; date: March| 

to: [REDACTED], 

[; subject: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and [Source Name REDACTED]?; date: MarcliL 

2004, at 06:55 AM. The email references a March 17, 2004, al-Qa'ida statement. Speaking of a second source 

iroviding threat reporting, noted that "i [sic] have always been concerned that [the asset] | 

1935

 Email from: 

[REDACTED] 

REDACTED]?; date: March 

1936

 ^Hih m 

1937

 3633 

to

 cc ; 

; subject: Re: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and [Source Name 

|, 2004, at 7:52:32 AM. 

31111 

04), which states "Gul is the source of [ASSET Y's] pre-election threat 

information. This information forms a substantial part of the USG's current pre-election threat assessment. Station 

believes that if Gul has pre-election threat information, we must exploit him using our best resources. Those 

resources do not exist in Station has interrogated many al-Qa'ida members and while we have 

been successful at times, our best information is obtained when the detainee is interrogated in a CIA controlled 

facility ([DETENTION SITE COBALT] or blacksite)." 

1938

 Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Director of Central Intelligence, June 4,2004, subject, 

"Suspension of Use of Interrogation Techniques." Memorandum for the National Security Advisor from DCI 

George Tenet, June 4, 2004, re Review of CIA Interrogation Program. 

1939

 Draft memorandum from George Tenet to National Security Advisor re Counterterrorist Interrogation 

Techniques, attached to email from: |||HHH||^H>t°jJ oll n Moseman, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

Stanley Moskowitz, Scott Muller, John RizzoT^^^^H^ H and HHHHHH ' subject: Draft Documents 

for Friday's NSC Meeting; date: June 29, 2004. 

i i ii 1111 1 BBI^MBBI^BB I " i i n 

Page 344 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

344 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

the pre-election plot, and [Janat] Gul's almost certain knowledge of any intelligence about that 

plot, I request the fastest possible resolution of the above issues."1940 

(TS^j^^^HHB/ZNF ) On July 2, 2004, the day that CIA Headquarters approved the 

rendition of Janat Gul to CIA custody,1941 the CIA represented to select members of the National 

Security Council that Janat Gul was one of the "most senior radical Islamic facilitators in 

Pakistan," and noted that he was "assessed by a key source on [the] pre-election plot to be 

involved in or [to] have information on the plot."1942 On July 15, 2004, based on the reporting of 

ASSET Y, the CIA represented to the chairman and vice chairman of the Committee that Janat 

Gul was associated with a pre-election plot to conduct an attack in the United States.1943 On July 

20, 2004, select National Security Council principals met again, and according to CIA records, 

agreed that, "| g]iven the current threat and risk of delay, CIA was authorized and directed to 

utilize the techniques with Janat Gul as necessary."1944 On July 22, 2004, Attorney General 

Ashcroft approved the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul 

based on ASSET Y's reporting.1945 

1940 £)raft memorandum from George Tenet to National Security Advisor re Counterterrorist Interrogation 

Techniques, attached to email from: ^^HI^^^^^HtojJoh n Moseman^REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

Stanley Moskowitz, Scott Muller, John RizzoT^^^^^^^ I and subject: Draft Documents 

for Friday's NSC Meeting; date: June 29, 2004. 

1941

 DIRECTOR (022300Z JUL 04) ^^ ^ 

1942

 The CIA briefing slides further asserted that debriefings of Janat Gul by m [foreign government] 

officials were "not working." (See CIA briefing slides, CIA Request for Guidance Regarding Interrogation 

of Janat Gul, July 2, 2004). National Security Advisor Rice later stated in a letter to the CIA Director that "CIA 

briefers informed us that Gul likely has information about preelection terrorist attacks against the United States as a 

result of Gill's close ties to individuals involved in these alleged plots." See July 6,2004, Memorandum from 

Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to the Honorable George Tenet, Director 

of Central Intelligence, re Janat Gul. 

1943

 According to handwritten notes of the briefing, CIA briefers described Janat Gul as "senior AQ" and a "key 

facilitator" with "proximity" to a suspected pre-election plot. Committee records indicate that CIA briefers told the 

chairman and vice chairman that, given the pre-election threat, it was "incumbent" on the CIA to "review [the] need 

for EITs," following the suspension of "EITs." (See Handwritten notes of Andrew Johnson (DTS #2009-2077); CIA 

notes (DTS #2009-2024 pp. 92-95); CIA notes (DTS #2009-2024, pp. 110-121).) ••^•CT C Legal • • 

later wrote that the "only reason" for the chairman and vice chairman briefing on Janat Gul was the 

"potential gain for us" as "the vehicle for briefing the committees on our need for renewed legal and policy support 

for the CT detention and interrogation program." See email from: |m| ; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: 

Priority: congressional notification on Janat Gul; date: July 29, 2004. 

1944

 July 29, 2004, Memorandum for the Record from CIA General Counsel Scott Muller re Principals Meeting 

relating to Janat Gul on 20 July 2004. 

1945

 Letter from Attorney General Ashcroft to Acting DCI McLaughlin, July 22, 2004 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 4). 

Attorney General Ashcroft, who attended the July 2, 2004, meeting, had opined earlier on the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul. See letter from Assistant Attorney General Ashcroft to 

General Counsel Muller, July 7, 2004 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 3); July 2, 2004, CIA Memorandum re Meeting with 

National Security Advisor Rice in the White House Situation Room, Friday 2 July re Interrogations and Detainee 

Janat Gul; July 6, 2004, Memorandum from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security 

Affairs to George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence re Janat Gul; Memorandum from to Jose 

Rodriguez, John P. Mudd, [REDACTED], re standard interrogation techniques 

- DOJ limits, July 2, 2004. 

11 ii 1111 1

 11111 1 

Page 345 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

345 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ 1//NOFOR N 

(TS^^^m^^^^NF ) Janat Gul was rendered to CIA custody on July 2004.1946 On 

August 2, 2004, Janat Gul denied knowledge of any imminent threats against the United States 

homeland. Gul's denial was deemed a "strong resistance posture" by CIA detention site 

personnel.1947 Janat Gul was then subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques from 

August 3, 2004, to August 10, 2004, and then again from August 21, 2004, to August 25, 

2004.1948 

On August 19, 2004, CIA personnel wrote that the interrogation 

"team does not believe [Gul] is withholding imminent threat information."1949 On August 25, 

2004, CIA interrogators sent a cable to CIA Headquarters stating that Janat Gul "may not possess 

all that [the CIA] believes him to know." The interrogators added that the interrogation "team 

maintains a degree of caution in some areas, as many issues linking [Gul] to al-Qaida are derived 

from single source reporting," a reference to the CIA source, ASSET Y.1950 

That same day, August 25, 2004, the CIA's associate general 

counsel provided a letter to the DOJ seeking approval to use additional CIA enhanced 

interrogation techniques against Janat Gul: dietary manipulation, nudity, water dousing, and the 

abdominal slap. The letter asserted that Janat Gul had information concerning "imminent threats 

to the United States" and "information that might assist in locating senior al-Qa'ida operatives 

whose removal from the battlefield could severely disrupt planned terrorist attacks against the 

United States." The letter stated: 

"In addition, CIA understands that before his capture, Gul had been working to 

facilitate a direct meeting between the ^ H CIA source reporting 

on the pre-election threat [ASSET Y] and Abu Faraj himself; Gul had arranged 

a previous meeting between [ASSET Y] and al-Qa'ida finance chief Shaykh 

Sa'id at which elements of the pre-election threat were discussed."1951 

The letter from the CIA's associate general counsel asserted that 

Janat Gul's "resistance increases when questioned about matters that may connect him to alQa'ida or evidence he has direct knowledge of operational terrorist activities."1952

 The letter 

stated that the CIA sought approval to add four enhanced interrogation techniques to Janat Gul's 

104^Se^olum e II and III for additional information. 

11574 Notwithstanding this assessment, on August 21, 2004, a cable from CIA 

Headquarters stated that Janat Gul "is believed to possess information about risks to the citizens of the United States 

or other nations," that the "use of enhanced techniques is appropriate in order to obtain that information," and that 

CIA Headquarters was therefore approving the resumed use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against 

Janat Gul. See HEADQUARTERS ^M l 04). 

1950 162 2 

1951

 August 25, 2004, Letter Associate General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (DTS #2009-1809, Tab 10). 

1952

 August 25, 2004 Letter from H^^^H , Associate General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (DTS #2009-1809, Tab 10). 

Page 346 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

MVOFORN 

375 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I //NOFOR N 

interrogation plan "in order to reduce markedly Gul's strong resistance posture and provide an 

opportunity for the interrogation team to obtain his cooperation."1933 On August 26, 2004, 

Acting Assistant Attorney General Dan Levin informed CIA Acting General Counsel Rizzo that 

the use of the four additional enhanced interrogation techniques did not violate any U.S. statutes, 

the U.S. Constitution, or U.S. treaty obligations. Levin's letter stated that "[w]e understand that 

[Janat] Gul is a high-value al Qaeda operative who is believed to possess information concerning 

an imminent terrorist threat to the United States."1954 

On August 27, 2004, Gul's CIA interrogators reported that "in 

terms of overt indications of resistance, [Gul's] overall resistance is currently judged to be 

minimal."1955 Nonetheless, on August 31, 2004, the CIA interrogators asked CIA Headquarters 

to approve an extension of all CIA enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul.1956 The 

CIA's associate general counsel objected, writing: 

"In the end, its [sic] going to be an operational call. I just want to be sure that 

the record is clear that we're not acting precipitously and are taking into 

consideration everything we're learning about this guy. We open ourselves up 

to possible criminal liability if we misuse the interrogation techniques. I 

reflect again on the cable or cables from the interrogation team that opines that 

physical EITs (facial slap, walling, etc.) do not work on him. I would strongly 

encourage, then, HQS not to approval [sic] the use of physical interrogation 

techniques because if they don't work, then our motives are questionable. If 

our motives might be questioned, then we get ourselves in trouble."1957 

Despite these concerns, on September 3, 2004, CIA Headquarters 

released a cable extending approval for sleep deprivation for 30 days. CIA records indicate, 

however, that Gul was not subjected to sleep deprivation, or any other enhanced interrogation 

technique, following this approval.1958 

On September 7, 2004, more than a month after Janat Gul was 

rendered to CIA custody, a CIA officer who had observed the interrogations of Gul prepared a 

memorandum for the leadership of the CIA's Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations Group, 

stating: 

"The definition of an HVD has probably become blurred over the past year as 

[CIA] began to render a higher number of MVDs [medium value detainees], 

but [Janat Gul] would not be considered an HVD when compared to Abu 

1933

 August 25, 2004 Letter from Associate General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (DTS #2009-1809, Tab 10). 

1954

 Letter to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, CIA; from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, 

August 26,2004 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 6). 

11631 (271859Z AUG 04) 

11650 (311620Z AUG 04) 

1957 See email from: HHIHIHI> t o :

 l~ 

[REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject: "Req to extend authorization to use EITs"; date; 

September 1, 2004. _ _ 

1958

 HEADQUARTERS • • (032155ZSEP 04) 

m i i t II i BB^MB^BBB l ni m 

Page 347 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

347 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I //NOFOR N 

Zubaydah, KSM, and similar level HVDs. [Janat Gul] should likewise not be 

considered an operational planner or even an operator. It is very likely that 

[Janat Gul] came into contact with operational information, but we lack 

credible information that ties him to pre-election threat information or direct 

operational planning against the United States, at home or abroad. Likewise, 

we lack any substantive information that connects [Janat Gul] to UBL, 

Zawahiri, and Abu Faraj Al-Libi."1959 

O

n

 September 16, 2004, CIA detention site personnel wrote that 

Janat Gul's reporting directly contradicted information from ASSET Y from March 2004, and 

stated that, "[m]uch of our derogatory information on [Gul] came from [ASSET Y] reporting, as 

did much of our pre-election threat information."1960 

(T^S/JIIIIHi^^^^B^ 1) On September 17, 2004, following the reports about the 

discrepancies between the comments made by Janat Gul and ASSET Y, as well as similar denials 

from Sharif al-Masri, who was in foreign government custody, the CIA undertook a 

counterintelligence review of ASSET Y to assess the validity of ASSET Y's reporting.1961 

(TS^^^^^^H^NF ) On October |^004^n d October | , 2004, CIA officers provided a 

assessment of ASSET Y. Thatj^^^B I assessment indicated that ASSET Y was 

deceptive in response to questions regarding his alleged meeting with a senior al-Qa'ida official, 

Shaykh Sa'id, at which ASSET Y claimed to have learned about the pre-election threat. ASSET 

Y then admitted to having fabricated the information about the meeting.1962 

Despite the recantation of reporting from ASSET Y, officers from 

the CIA's ALEC Station continued to assess that Janat Gul "was one of the highest-ranking 

facilitators in Pakistan with long-standing access to senior leaders in al-Qa'ida" and other 

groups.1963 This assessment was not shared by CIA personnel involved in Gul's interrogation. 

On November 10, 2004, the CIA's chief of Base at DETENTION SITE BLACK, the CIA 

detention site hosting Gul, wrote that the words used by ALEC Station to describe Janat Gul: 

1959

 Rather than a "high value detainee," the memo characterized Janat Gul as a "senior facilitator." The CIA officerconcluded that Gul was likely "not directly included in operational planning and operations." See September 7, 

2004, CIA Document EYES ONLY - written by | 

1960

 •H^ H 1706 (161749Z SEP 04). The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "Janat Gul's claim that 

[ASSET Y] never met the al-Qa'ida finance chief—who [ASSET Y] said told him about the pre-election threat— 

was vital to CIA's assessment and handling of the case. CIA officers assessed Gul was cooperating during his 

interrogations by that time, leading CIA to jHH H [ASSET Y] on the meeting and the plot, which he ultimately 

recanted." As described earlier, CIA records indicate that Janat Gul denied knowledge of any imminent threats 

against the United States homeland, which had been reported by ASSET Y, prior to the use of the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interroeatiot^echniques againstGuLAtthe time, Gul's denial was deemed a "strong resistance posture" 

by the CIA. 1 1 4 9 7 (j^MB^B04) . 

1961

 04) 

1962 ^^^^ ^ 1411 cahl e states: "Arter^||^Bdeceptior i on the question 

of meeting Sa'id, [ASSET Y] quickly confessed to [the CIA officer] that he had fabricated his meeting and blamed 

pressure from his handling [CIA] officer to produce leads as the catalyst for his lies." ASSET Y continued to assert 

that he discussed the pre-election threat with Janat Gul, who, as noted, had denied to CIA interrogators that he had 

any knowledge of imminent threats to die United States. 

1963

 ALEC i H (092126Z NOV 04) 

TOP SECRET/^ y/NOFORN 

Page 348 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

348 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I //NOFOR N 

".. .fly in the face of what is now a rather long history of debriefings which, I 

would assert, paint a very different picture of him. While [Janat Gul] was 

certainly a facilitator, describing him as 'highest-ranking' gives him a stature 

which is undeserved, overblown and misleading. Stating that he had 'long 

standing access to senior leaders in al-Qa'ida' is simply wrong.... To put it 

simply, [Janat Gul] is not the man we thought he was. While he no doubt had 

associations and interactions with people of interest, [Janat Gul] is not the 

pivotal figure our pre-detention descriptions of him suggest. We do a 

disservice to ourselves, the mission and even [Janat Gul] by allowing 

mispcrceptions of this man to persist."1964 

(TSAHiH/^F ) On November 22, 2004, a CIA officer noted the discrepancy 

between the CIA's description of Janat Gul as a "potential source of intelligence information 

regarding an attack by al-Qa'ida" in a draft OLC memorandum and the current assessment of 

Janat Gul.1965 In an email, the CIA officer indicated that he had spoken to the CIA's associate 

general counsel, who had informed him that "the state of our knowledge about 

Gul had evolved since he was captured." The email noted that, "[a]t first, we believed he had 

attack information of a more imminent nature," but "[n]ow it appears that he does not have such 

information." The email indicated that HU H would talk to personnel at OLC about the issue 

to "[amend] the draft opinion to reflect the state of our knowledge."1966 The OLC memorandum 

was not updated. 

On December 19, 2004, CIA detention site personnel wrote again 

that Janat Gul was "not/not the man [CIA Headquarters] made him out to be," and that "[h]e is a 

very simple man who, no doubt, did a capable job as a facilitator but he is not the link to senior 

AQ leaders that [CIA Headquarters] said he was/is."1967 

1,64

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: 

subject: re ALEC ^^B ; date: November 10, 2004. 

1965 See email from: | 

November 22, 2004, at 8:25 AM. 

|; subject: re Gul and 

|; subject: re Gul and 

Report; date: 

Report; date: 1966 See email from: | 

November 22, 2004, at 8:25 AM. 

1967

 CIA "Comments on Detainees," December 19,2004, notes from DETENTION SITE BLACK. In April 2005, 

the chief of Base where Janat Gul was held emailed that "[Janat Gul] was never the person we thought he was. He 

is not the senior Al-Qa'ida facilitator that he has been labeled. He's a rather poorly educated village man with a 

very simple outlook on life. He's also quite lazy and it's the combination of his background and lack of initiative 

that got him in trouble. He was looking to make some easy money for little work and he was easily persuaded to 

move people and run errands for folks on our target list. While he openly admits that he helped move people, it's 

pretty well established that the vast majority of his work involved seeking medical care and providing housing for 

family members of Taliir Jan's Uzbek organization. There simply is no 'smoking gun' that we can refer to that 

would justify our continued holding of [Janat Gul] at a site such as [DETENTION SITE BLACK], It should be 

noted, however, that [Janat Gul] has made what I think is great progress. He fingered [ASSET Y] as a fabricator 

and has been generally responsive to requirements though, it must be said, he never had access to most of the 

information we seek from him." See email from: [REDACTEDHCOB DETEOTIO^SIT^B^ACK); to: 

cc: HHHHI^HI^H ; subject: re date: 

2005. 

Ill l II III I I lll l I III I I 

Page 349 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

349 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I //NOFOR N 

O

n APr

il 6, 2005, as the OLC approached completion of its 

analysis of the legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the OLC asked the CIA 

about the interrogation of Gul using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically, 

"what [the CIA] got from Janat Gul, was it valuable, [and] did it help anything.. ,."1968 The CIA 

didnotimmediatcly respond to this request and the CIA's Associate General Counsel 

noted that OLC personnel had "taken to calling [him] daily" for information.1969 On 

April 14, 2005, a CIA officer emailed talking points stating that: 

"Pakistan-based facilitator Janat Gul's most significant reporting helped us 

validate a CIA asset who was providing information about the 2004 preelection threat. The asset claimcd that Gul had arranged a meeting between 

himself and al-Qa'ida's chief of finance, Shaykh Sa'id, a claim that Gul 

vehemently denied. 

Gul's reporting was later matched with information obtained from Sharif alMasriandAbu Talha, captured after Gul. With this reporting in hand, CIA 

HI^^^ H the asset, who subsequently admitted to fabricating his reporting 

about the meeting."1970 

(fS^I^^HHr^ ) May 10, 2005, the OLC issued a formal memorandum that 

included a discussion of the legality of the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 

against Janat Gul.1971 Citing information provided in the CIA's August 25, 2004, letter, the OLC 

memorandum stated: 

"You asked for our advice concerning these interrogation techniques in 

connection with their use on a specific high value al Qaeda detainee named 

Janat Gul. You informed us that the CIA believed Gul had information about 

al Qaeda's plans to launch an attack within the United States. According to 

CIA's information, Gul had extensive connections to various al Qaeda leaders, 

members of the Taliban, and the al-Zarqawi network, and had arranged 

meetings between an associate and al Qaeda's finance chief to discuss such an 

attack. .. .Our conclusions depend on these assessments."1972 

1968

 Email from:

 to :

 I 

[REDACTED]; subject: questions from OLC for Art 16 opinion; date: April 6, 2005. 

1969

 Email from: ••••• ; to: | 

[REDACTCD]^ubie^questio^ nion; date: April 12, 2005; email from: 

to: ^•••MK^HI^B , and 

questions from OLCJorArt 16 opinion; date: April 14, 2005. 

""^maiUrom^^^^HIH ; to: l > ^H^^HH . and 

H^^HH^Vsubject : response to no. 5 request fram^^HB^^To T A1 s Detainee Reporting Brief; date: 

April 14, 2005. 

1971

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda 

Detainee. 

1972

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application of 

IIII 11 III I BB^^MB B 11"1 ""I I 

Page 350 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

350 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET// //NO PORN 

On May 30, 2005, the OLC issued a memorandum concluding that 

the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against CIA detainees did not violate 

Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture.1973 In the memorandum, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General Steven G. Bradbury used the example of Janat Gul as a detainee who 

was "representative of the high value detainees on whom enhanced techniques have been, or 

might be, used."1974 

Citing information from the CIA's August 25, 2004, letter, 

Bradbury wrote: 

"the CIA believed [that Janat Gul] had actionable intelligence concerning the 

pre-election threat to the United States... Gul had extensive connections to 

various al Qaeda leaders, members of the Taliban, and the al-Zarqawi network, 

and intelligence indicated that 'Gul had arranged a... meeting between [a 

I^^^^H I source] and al-Qa'ida finance chief Shaykh Sa'id at which 

elements of the pre-election threat were discussed.'"1975 

A S noted, the CI A had represented that the use of the CIA' S 

enhanced interrogation techniques was necessary for Janat Gul to provide information on an 

imminent threat to the United States, the pre-election threat. As further noted, Gul did not 

provide this information and records indicate that the threat was based on fabricated CIA source 

reporting. When the OLC requested the results of using the CIA' s enhanced interrogation 

techniques against Janat Gul, the CIA represented that "Gul has provided information that has 

helped the CIA with validating one of its key assets reporting on the pre-election threat." This 

information was included in the May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum, which also stated that Gul's 

information "contradicted the asset's contention that Gul met with Shaykh Sa'id," and that, 

"[a]rmed with Gul's assertions, the CIA the asset, who then admitted that he had 

lied about the meeting."1976 There are no indications in the memorandum that the CIA informed 

18 U.S.C. §§ 2340 2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda 

Detainee. 

1973

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of 

United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be 

Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees. 

1974

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of 

United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be 

Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees. 

1975

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of 

United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be 

Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (brackets in the original). The OLC memorandum also 

cited an "Undated CIA Memo, 'Janat Gul' ('Janat Gul Memo'). The OLC also relied on CIA representations that 

Janat Gul's interrogations "greatly increased the CIA's understanding of our enemy and its plans." 

1976

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of 

Page 351 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

351 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I //NOFOR N 

the OLC that CIA officers had concluded that Gul had no information about the pre-election 

threat and had determined that Gul was "not the man we thought he was."1977 As noted, after the 

May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum, the CIA continued to represent that the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques allowed the CIA to validate sources.1978 

8. The Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha 

The CIA represented that information obtained through the use of 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced otherwise unavailable intelligence that led 

to the identification and/or arrest of Uzhair Paracha and his father Saifullah Paracha (aka, Sayf 

al-Rahman Paracha). These CIA representations include inaccurate information and omit 

significant material information—specifically a body of intelligence reporting acquired prior to 

CIA detainee reporting that linked the Parachas to al-Qa'ida-related activities. 

(^TS/^^^HIH^I^NF ) CIA representations also credit the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques with the identification of a plot to smuggle explosives into die United 

States involving the Parachas.1979 CIA records indicate that the plotting was denied by the 

supposed participants, and that at least one senior CIA counterterrorism official questioned the 

plausibility of the explosives smuggling plot given the relative ease of acquiring explosive 

material in the United States.1980 

(f^^^mBW ) The CIA provided information to the CIA Office of Inspector 

General that "EITs (including the water board) have been indispensable to our successes," and 

stated that the CIA OIG Special Review should have come to the "conclusion that our efforts 

have thwarted attacks and saved lives."1981 The CIA further represented to the OIG that KSM 

United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be 

Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees. 

1977

 The OLC relied on CIA representations that Janat Gul had information, but that he withheld it. In describing the 

interrogation process, the OLC stated that Janat Gul's resistance increased as questioning moved to his '"knowledge 

of operational terrorist activities.'" The OLC also wrote that "Gul apparently feigned memory problems (which CIA 

psychologists ruled out through intelligence and memory tests) in order to avoid answering questions." The OLC 

further conveyed that the "CIA believes that Janat Gul continues to downplay his knowledge." See Memorandum 

for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, 

Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United 

States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in 

the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees. 

1978

 As described elsewhere, on April 21, 2009, a CIA spokesperson confirmed the accuracy of the information in 

the OLC memorandum in response to the partial declassification of this memorandum and others. 

1979

 Among odier documents, see Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for 

Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation 

Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of 

CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities. 

1980 See details in the intelligence chronology in Volume II. 

1981

 CIA memorandum to the CIA Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, 

dated February 27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention 

and Interrogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and 

Interrogation Activities," dated February 24, 2004. 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 352 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

352 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I //NOFOR N 

"provided information that helped lead to the arrest of... Uzair Paracha, a smuggler,"1982 and that 

"as a result of the lawful use of EITs": 

"KSM identified a mechanism for al-Qa'ida to smuggle explosives into the US 

via a Pakistani businessman and textile merchant who shipped his material to 

the US. The businessman had agreed to use this method to help al-Qa'ida 

smuggle in explosives for follow-on attacks to 9/11."1983 

(TS/tflUHHB^^ ) Similarly, on July 29, 2003, the CIA made a presentation to a 

select group of National Security Council principals, including Vice President Cheney, seeking 

policy reaffirmation of the CIA interrogation program. The CIA briefing materials state that "the 

use of the [CIA interrogation] techniques has produced significant results," and warned that 

"[termination of this [CIA] program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." The CIA 

conveyed that "[m]ajor threats were countered and attacks averted," and under a briefing slide 

entitled "RESULTS: MAJOR THREAT INFO," represented that information obtained from 

KSM after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques led to the "identification" of 

Saifullah Paracha.1984 

(TSy/B^HHi^B^F )

 A widely disseminated CIA Intelligence Assessment, entitled 

"Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa'ida," that was described in internal CIA 

emails as being "put together using past assessments" and initially intended for the White House 

only, with "marching orders" to "throw everything in it,"1985 states: 

"Since 11 September 2001, detainee reporting has become a crucial pillar of 

US counterterrorism efforts, aiding... operations to capture additional 

terrorists, helping to thwart terrorist plots... KSM's revelation in March 2003 

1982 Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center 

ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003. These representations were included in the final, and now declassified Special 

Review of the Inspector General, which states that KSM "provided information that helped lead to the arrests of 

terrorists including Sayfullah Paracha and his son Uzair, businessmen whom Khalid Shaykh Muhammad planned to 

use to smuggle explosives in New York." (See CIA Inspector General Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention 

and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), 7 May 2004). The statements in the 

Special Review regarding the purported effectiveness of the program, including the reference to the Parachas, were 

cited by the Office of Legal Counsel in its analysis of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. See 

Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of 

United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be 

Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees, pp. 10-11, citing IG Special Review, pp. 85-91. 

1983

 Email from: to: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

; subject: re Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9,2004. Memorandum for: 

Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG 

Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; 

attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation 

Activities. 

1984 q a memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA 

General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "C/A Interrogation Program, " dated 

July 29,2003, presented to senior White House officials. 

1985 See email from: [REDACTED]; to: multiple addresses; subject: "Draft of 1A on 'Detainee Reporting Pivotal to 

the War on Terrorism'"; date: May 16, 2005, at 2:08 PM. 

11ii 1111 1 ^BH^^BBMBBB I "in n 

Page 353 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

353 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

that he was plotting with Sayf al-Rahman Paracha—who also used the name 

Saifullah al-Rahman Paracha—to smuggle explosives into the United States 

for a planned attack in New York prompted the FBI to investigate Paracha's 

business ties in the United States ,"1986 

(T&V^^I^^^^^^/NF ) CIA representations related to the "identification" of the Parachas 

and/or the arrest of Uzair Paracha—as well as the identification of an explosives smuggling 

plot—omit significant information acquired by the Intelligence Community prior to any 

reporting from CIA detainees. Specifically, prior to KSM's reporting, the Intelligence 

Community had already collected and acted upon significant information related to the Paracha 

family's connections to al-Qa'ida and international terrorism: 

• Information on Saifullah Paracha was found in documents seized during a March 28, 

2002, raid against al-Qa'ida targets associated with Hassan Ghul, which resulted in the 

capture of Abu Zubaydah. The documents identified "Saifullah Piracha" (the spelling 

found in the document seized during the raid) and phone numbers, which would be 

associated with his Karachi-based business, International Merchandise Pvt Ltd, as early 

as April 2002. An address associated with the business was also identified.1987 

• The name "Saifullah Piracha" was provided to Pakistani officials by the CIA in 

December 2002. The CIA wrote: "Information below leads us to believe that the 

following individual and phone numbers may have a connection to al-Qa'ida and 

international terrorism.... We request your assistance in investigating this individual to 

determine if he is involved in terrorist activity." The request included three phone 

numbers found in the documents seized on March 28, 2002, one of which was associated 

with Saifullah Paracha's Karachi-based company, International Merchandise Pvt Ltd.1988 

• In April 2002, the FBI opened an investigation on another at a 

New York-based business associated with Saifullah Paracha. During the course of the 

investigation, the FBI interviewed an employer at a New York address and acquired 

additional information on the business and the Parachas. business 

card, identifying him as an employee of International Merchandise Limited, was found 

among documents seized during the April 2002 Karachi raid.1989 

1986

 Italics added. CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa'ida," June 

2005, which CIA records indicate was provided to White House officials on June 1,2005. The Intelligence 

Assessment at the SECRET//NOFORN classification level was more broadly disseminated on June 3,2005. On 

March 31, 2009, former Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which 

was publicly released with redactions on August 24, 2009. 

1987

 DIRECTOR (221835Z APR 02); ALEC • • (222235Z DEC 02); DIRECTOR • • (221835Z 

APR 02) ____ _ 

1988

 ALEC H I (222235Z DEC 02) ^^ ^ 

1989

 FBI WASHINGTON DC (271623Z MAR 03); ALEC i^ H (191630Z MAY 03) (cables explaining previous 

FBI investigative action on Paracha). On March 28, 2003, the FBI would return to the same employer and the same 

address, leading to the apprehension of Uzhair Paracha, who would voluntarily provide significant reporting to the 

FBI. 

III! II III I Iluiihi 

Page 354 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

354 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

• Months later, financial documents seized during the September 11, 2002, raids that 

resulted in the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh identified an email address attributed to 

International Merchandise Pvt Ltd., with the same contact—Saifullah A. Paracha—as 

well as the same address and phone number as the business identified after the March 

2002 raid.1990 

• Based on the information obtained during the September 2002 raids, the CIA informed 

the FBI, the NSA, and the Department of Treasury that they suspected "Saifullah 

Paracha" was engaged in terrorist financing activities, specifically for al-Qa'ida. The 

cable included detailed information on Saifullah Paracha and International Merchandise 

Pvt Ltd in Karachi, and noted the CIA's ongoing interest in, and analysis of, the 

information.1991 

• FBI investigative activity of terrorism subject Iyman Faris found that Faris was linked to 

Paracha Imports via his Ohio-based housemates.1992 

• Majid Khan, who was in foreign government custody, provided reporting that "Uzhair" 

ran the New York branch of his father's Karachi-based import-export business. 

According to the reporting, Uzhair was assisting Majid Khan and Ammar al-Baluchi in 

their efforts to resettle Majid Khan in the United States for terrorism-related purposes. 

Khan provided a detailed physical description of both Uzhair and his father.1993 

(T&flHHIKS M was captured on March 1, 2003. On March | , 2003, KSM 

was rendered to CIA custody and immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques.1994 A CIA interrogation report from March 24, 2003, states that during the 

afternoon, KSM continued to be subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, 

including the waterboard, for failing to provide information on operations in the United States 

and for having "lied about poison and biological warfare programs,"1995 That evening, KSM's 

interrogators received reports on information being provided by Majid Khan,1996 who was in 

foreign government custody and being interviewed by FBI special agents and foreign 

government officers. The information included details on a U.S.-based individual associated 

with al-Qa'ida named Uzhair. According to Khan, this Uzhair ran the New York branch of his 

See also I 

See also and 

1990

 CIA (040123Z DEC 02)/1 

1991

 CIA^^ P (040123Z DEC 02)/1 

ALEC ^^^222235 Z DEC 02). 

1992 See FBI investigative file | 

i9» 13890 HHHI^^HI . The cable describing Majid Khan's foreign government interrogation 

also included Khan's reporting on how Ammar al-Baluchi intended to have Uzhair use Majid Khan's credit card to 

create the appearance that Majid Khan was already in the United States. As described in the full Committee Study, 

the cable further detailed Khan's two meetings with Uzhair and his father, and a subsequent phone call with Uzhair 

(following Uzhair's return to the United States), all of which were facilitated by Ammar al-Baluchi. 

m4 See Bl^ l 10983 (242321Z MAR 03); fl^HI10972 (241122Z MAR 03); and the KSM detainee review 

in Volume III. ^^^^ ^ 

1995 1098 3 (24232IZ MAR 03); •• • 10972 (241122Z MAR 03) 

1996

 Majid Khan was detained in Pakistani on March 5, 2003. See^^^J l 13658 (050318Z MAR 03); 

113659 (050459Z MAR 03); I II I I Ml

 /AC"459Z MAR 03). 

11 ii 1111 1 MB^MMMBM i i II i II 

Page 355 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

355 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I//NOFORN 

father's Karachi-based import-export business.1997 CIA cables describe KSM as being "boxed 

in" by reporting from Majid Khan1998 before providing the following information on the 

Parachas and a smuggling plot: 

• KSM corroborated reporting from Majid Khan that Ammar al-Baluchi and Majid Khan 

approached Uzhair Paracha for assistance in resettling Majid Khan in the United 

States.1999 

• KSM stated that he was closc to Uzhair's father, Sayf al-Rahman Paracha, who provided 

assistance through his business and by helping to find safe houses in Karachi.2000 

• KSM claimed that Ammar al-Baluchi and Majid Khan approached Sayf al-Rahman 

Paracha with a plan to use Sayf al-Rahman Paracha's textile business to smuggle 

explosives into the United States. KSM stated that Paracha agreed to this plan and was 

arranging the details with Ammar al-Baluchi and Majid Khan at the time of his (KSM's) 

capture.2001 A later CIA cable provided additional background, stating: "KSM did not 

volunteer [the explosives plot] information on Paracha. He provided this reporting only 

when confronted with details on his role and other information on the plot, which had 

been provided by detainee Majid Khan," who was in foreign government custody.2002 

(T&V^^H^^I^NF ) According to CIA records, on March 28, 2003, at a FBI field 

office, Uzhair Paracha provided significant information to interviewing FBI special agents on his 

father's links to al-Qa'ida and his own efforts to assist Majid Khan's reentry to the United States. 

Uzhair denied knowing anything about an explosives smuggling plot.2003 

On April 29, 2003, Ammar al-Baluchi was detained by Pakistani 

authorities as a result of reporting unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. 

Records indicate Ammar al-Baluchi provided significant information prior to being transferred to 

CIA custody.2004 On May 2003, Ammar al-Baluchi was rendered to CIA custody and 

13890 H^ H 10984 (242351Z MAR 03) 

10983 (242321Z MAR 03). The CIA's June 2013 Response asserts that "[reporting from 

interrogations of KSM was directly and uniquely responsible for the arrests of Saifullah Paracha and his son Uzhair 

Paracha." The CIA Response also asserts that Majid Khan's reporting "was disseminated just after KSM provided 

the information that allowed us to identify Paracha" (emphasis in the original). This is inaccurate. The cable 

describing KSM's interrogation specifically references the cable describing Majid Khan's detailed reporting from 

interrogations in foreign government custody and how KSM was "boxed in" by the information provide by Majid 

Khan. 

10984 (242351Z MAR 03), disseminated as I 

10984 (242351Z MAR 03), disseminated as 

10984 (242351Z MAR 03), disseminated as | 

(052230Z MAY 03) 

(012248Z APR 03) 

2004 See section of this summary on the Karachi Plots, including 14291 (021645Z MAY 03) and ALEC 

(142334Z MAY 03). A CIA cable describes a CIA officers meeting with the foreign government officer 

who used rapport-building techniques to acquire information from Ammar al-Baluchi. The officer stated that 

Ammar al-Baluchi was "more chatty" than Khallad bin Attash (who was also in foreign government custody at the 

time), and that Ammar "acknowledged plans to attack U.S. Consulate officials at the airport, the Consul General's 

Residence and the Consulate itself." See 

TOP^ECRE^^ HBHHHIHH V'^^ ^ 

Page 356 of 499 

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002

 ALEC 

2003

 ALEC 

UNCLASSIFIED 

356 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I //NOFOR N 

immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.2005 The CIA stopped 

using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Ammar al-Baluchi on May 20, 2003.2006 

A June 18, 2003, cable states that Ammar al-Baluchi denied that he and Sayf al-Rahman Paracha 

agreed to smuggle explosives into the United States. Ammar al-Baluchi stated he only asked 

Sayf al-Rahman Paracha questions and made inquiries about how explosives shipping could be 

done. Ammar al-Baluchi maintained that he did not take any action based on the discussion.2007 

On July 5, 2003, Saifullah Paracha was detained in in an 

operation orchestrated by the FBI.2008 Shortly thereafter, Saifullah Paracha was rendered to U.S. 

military custody at Bagram Air Force Base.2009 At Bagram, Saifullah Paracha was questioned by 

an FBI special agent.2010 A CIA cable from July 17, 2003, relays that Saifullah Paracha stated 

that Ammar al-Baluchi had asked if he knew a forwarding agent who could ship garments and 

"materials" to Europe, which Saifullah Paracha inferred were either explosives or chemicals. 

Paracha stated he had no information to provide to Ammar al-Baluchi on this topic and that no 

further action was taken on the matter.2011 

(fS/BHHH^ 1) With regards to the explosives smuggling reporting, a senior CIA 

counterterrorism official commented: 

"again, another ksm op worthy of the lamentable knuckleheads... why 

'smuggle' in explosives when you can get them here? neither fertilizer for 

bombs or regular explosives are that hard to come by. ramzi yousef came to 

2005

 Ammar al-Baluchi was detained in PakislanonApril29,2003, and transferred to Cl^ustod y on May U . 2003. 

14282 \ 

38325] 

2006 po r additional details, see detainee review for Ammar al-Baluchi in Volume ILL 

2007

 DIRECTOR (181929Z JUN 03), disseminated as 39239 

(301600Z MAY 03) ^^^^^ ^ 

2008

 Email from: •••^•1 ; to: [REDACTE^subject^o^ooidination - DCI Highlight on 

Paracha; date: July 7,2003, at 11:10 AM; email from: to: cc: [REDACTED] 

subject: Re: For coordination - DCI Highlight on Paracha; date: July 7, 2003, at 11:18:39 AM. 

| (See interview of by Office of the Inspector General, August 5, 2003). The 

CIA originally sought to take direct custodyofSaifullah Parach^0i^la^^003 , CTC's chief of operations, 

f, sent an email to BBB|CT C Legal, ^miH ' and CTC attorney m 

I, with a proposal for the CIA to detain Saifullah Paracha and interrogate him using the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, writing: "we MUST have paracha arrested without delay and transferred to cia custody for 

inteixogation using enhanced measures, i understand that paracha's us person status makes this difficult, but this is 

dynamite and we have to move forward with alacrity, what do you needtodothatTwhatdo we need to do that?" 

See CIA for: from: date: 6 May 

According to CIA records noted above, Saifullah Paracha's eventual capture and rendition to U.S. military custody 

was complicated by According to emails within CTC 

Legal, Paracha was' 

20, 0

 Email from: to: [REDACTED]; subject: For coordination - DCI Highlight on 

Paracha; date: July 7,2003, at 11:10 AM; email from: HIHHI^f t

 ,o :

 ^BH B

 cc :

 [REDACTED]; 

subject: Re: For coordination - DCI Highlight on Paracha; date: July 7, 2003, at 11:18:39 AM. 

13588 (171505Z JUL 03) 

11 ii 11 i i i iII i II 

Page 357 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

357 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

conus with a suitcase and hundred bucks and got everything he needed right 

here, this may be true, but it just seems damn odd to me."2012 

9. Critical Intelligence Alerting the CIA to Jaffar al-Tayyar 

(TS^^^mm^NF ) The CIA made repeated claims that the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques resulted in "key intelligence" from Abu Zubaydah and KSM on an 

operative named Jaffar al-Tayyar,2013 later identified as Adnan el-Shukrijumah.2014 These CIA 

representations frequently asserted that information obtained from KSM after the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques resulted in an FBI investigation that prompted alTayyar to flee the United States. These representations were inaccurate. KSM was captured on 

March 1, 2003. Jaffar al-Tayyar departed the United States in May 2001.2015 

(^S/^H^^^^I^NF ) CIA representations also omitted key contextual facts, including 

that: (1) the Intelligence Community was interested in the Florida-based Adnan el-Shukrijumah 

prior to the detention of the CIA's first detainee;2016 (2) CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah provided a 

description and information on a KSM associate named Jaffar al-Tayyar to FBI special agents in 

^^maiHrom^llli^^H ; to: | 

HI^HBIflrsubject : see highlight: again, another ksm op worthy of the lamentable; date: March 25, 2003, at 

6:29:08 AM. 

2013

 Also known as (aka) Adnan Gulshair Muhammad el-Shukrijumah, Jafaar al-Tayyar, and Abu Jafar al-Tayer. 

Spelling used throughout the Committee Study reflects, to the extent possible, the spelling found within intelligence 

records. 

201'1

 CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, 

from Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness of the CIA 

Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." See also CIA classified Statement for the Record, Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 

April 2007 (DTS #2007-1563). See also CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War 

Against Al-Qa'ida," June 2005, which CIA records indicate was provided to White House officials on June 1, 2005. 

The Intelligence Assessment at the SECRET//NOFORN level was more broadly disseminated on June 3, 2005. On 

March 31, 2009, former Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which 

was publicly released with redactions on August 24, 2009. See also CIA graphic attachment to several CIA 

briefings on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, entitled, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from 

Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)." See also CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta 

entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- 18FEB.2009." 

2015

 The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "there were cases in which we either made a factual error or used 

imprecise language, but these mistakes were not central to our representations and none invalidates our assessment 

that detainee reporting provided key intelligence on this important terrorist." As one of two examples, the CIA's 

June 2013 Response acknowledges that the "[CIA] incorrectly stated al-Tayyar fled the United States in response to 

the FBI investigation, although he had in fact already departed the United States by this time." The Committee 

found that this inaccurate statement was central to the CIA's representations. The CIA asserted that "Ja'far alTayyar" fled the United States because of KSM's reporting after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques in the context of representations that the use of the techniques "has been a key reason why al-Qa'ida has 

failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West." 

2016

 ALEC (210218Z MAR 03). Extensive open source records include "Broward Man Sought as Terror 

Suspect," Miami Herald, dated March 21, 2003; "Pursuit of al-Qaeda keeps coming back to Fla.," USA Today, dated 

June 15, 2003; and "A Hunt for 'The Pilot,'" U.S. News and World Report, dated March 30, 2003. For context, see 

also United States District Court Southern District Florida, Case No. 02-60096, United States of America v. Imran 

Mandhai and Sltueyb Mossa Jokhan, filed May J 6, 2002. 

TOP SECRElY/^^^^^^^MBUflNQFQR N 

Page 358 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

358 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRETfl^^BB^^^^^^MflNQFQR N 

May 2002, prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques;2017 (3) CIA 

personnel distrusted KSM's reporting on Jaffar al-Tayyar—stating that KSM fabricated 

information and had inserted ai-Tayyar "into practically every story, each time with a different 

role";2018 (4) other CIA detainee reporting differed from KSM's reporting in significant 

ways;2019 and (5) CIA records indicate that KSM did not identify al-Tayyar's true name and that 

it was Jose Padilla—in military custody and being questioned by the FBI—who provided alTayyar' s true name as Adnan el-Shukrijumah.2020

 Finally, the CIA attributed to KSM the 

characterization of al-Tayyar as the "next Mohammed Atta," despite clarifications from KSM to 

the contrary.2021 

(TS/Z^^^^H^^H/INF ) For example, in a March 2, 200S, CIA memorandum with the 

subject line, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," the CIA 

responded to a request from the Office of Legal Counsel "for the intelligence the Agency 

obtained from detainees who, before their interrogations, were not providing any information of 

intelligence [value]." Under a section entitled, "Results," the CIA stated: 

"CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a 

comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist 

plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical 

intelligence on al-Qa'ida. We believe that intelligence acquired from these 

interrogations has been a key reason why al-Qa'ida has failed to launch a 

spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001. Key intelligence 

2017 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III andl 

2018

 10884 (182140Z MA R 03); email from: to [REDACTED] ; cc: [REDACTED]; 

subject: Re: Reissue/Correction: CT: Comments on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad on imminent threats to U.S. targets 

in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philipines; date: March 12, 2003, at 9:36:57 AM; 42247 

(210357Z JUL 03); email frnnv ^BMB I In |l I H LCTED] , 

|. [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; 

subject: RATHER PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS... Anunar al-Baluchi's Comments on Jaffar al-Tayyar-If Ammar 

is Correct, then KSM Appears to Have a Focused Us on Jaffar in a Extended Deception Scheme-and His Deception 

Capabilities are Not Broken Down; date: 07/21/03 11:24 AM. 

2019

 Email from: ^^••H ; to [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: REISSUE/CORRECTION: 

CT: CT: Comments on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad on imminent threats to U.S. targets in Thailand, Indonesia, and 

the Philipines; date: March 12,2003, at 9:36:57 AM; National Counterterrorism Center, REFLECTIONS, "Ja'far alTayyar: An Unlikely Al-Qa'ida Operational Threat," 22 December 2005; 42247 

(210357Z JUL 03); email from: MBMl^^^H- . to: [REDACTED],] 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; 

subject: RATHER PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS... Anunar al-Baluchi's Comments on Jaffar al-Tayyar-lf Ammar 

is Correct, then KSM Appears to Have a Focused Us on Jaffar in a Extended Deception Scheme—and His Deception 

Capabilities are Not Broken Down; date: 07/21/03 11:24 AM. 

2020

 CIA "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting" faxed from the CIA to the Department of Justice on 

April 15, 2005, at 10:47AM. For KSM's inability to identif^name^jee^BIH

 1074 1

 (100917Z MAR 03); 

110740 (092308Z MAR 03), disseminated as \ " 

110787 (130716Z MAR 03); 10863 (171028Z MAR 03). For example, November 6, 2006, 

talking points prepared for a briefing with the President stated that "KSM described Tayyar as the next Muhammad 

Atta." See CIA document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 

2007, with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." 

Page 359 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

359 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I//NOFORN 

stating: 

collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation 

techniques:"2022 

The CIA then listed "Jafaar al-Tayyar" as one of 11 examples, 

"Jafaar al-Tayyar: Tayyar is an al-Qa'ida operative who was conducting 

casing in the US for KSM prior to 9/11, according to KSM and other HVDs. 

KSM confirmed that he recruited Tayyar—who is still at large—to conduct a 

major operation against US interests. KSM described Tayyar as the next 

Muhammad Atta. Tayyar's family is in Florida and we have identified many 

of his extremist contacts. Acting on this information, the FBI quickly 

publicized Tayyar's true name and aggressively followed up with his family 

and friends in the United States, causing Tayyar to flee the United States. 

I and we are actively pursuing his capture. 

I" January 2009, the CIA compiled a detailed briefing book—and 

CIA Director Hayden produced his own prepared remarks—for a three-hour briefing on the 

CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program for President-elect Obama's national security 

staff.2024 Included in the materials was a document entitled, "Key Impacts," which states: 

"Results: CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as 

part of a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt 

terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical 

intelligence on al-Qa'ida. We believe that intelligence acquired from these 

interrogations has been a key reason why al-Qa'ida has failed to launch a 

spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001. Key intelligence 

collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques:2025 

2022

 Emphasis in original document. CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department 

of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject 

"Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." 

2023

 CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, 

from I H Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness of the CIA 

Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." 

3024

 CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team - "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including 

"Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009." Referenced materials attached to cover 

memorandum with the title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect Barrack [sic] Obama 

National Security Team Tuesday, 13 January 2009; 8:30 - 11:30 a.m." The briefing book includes the previously 

mentioned "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting" dated 15 May 2006, which provided the same 

intelligence claims found in the document of the same name, but dated April 15, 2005. Expected participants 

included "Senator Boren, Mr. McDonough, Mr. Brennan, General Jones, Mr. Craig, Mr. Lippert, Mr. Smith, Senator 

Hagel," as well as several CIA officials, including Director Hayden, I^^HHHfl^f t John Rizzo, 

[REDACTED], and Wtl^B M Legal, | 

2025

 Emphasis in original. 

m i 11 iii i in i MI 11 

Page 360 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

360 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ [//NO FOR N 

... Jafaar al-Tayyar: Tayyar is an al-Qa'ida operative who was conducting 

casing in the US for KSM prior to 9/11, according to KSM and other HVDs. 

KSM confirmed that he recruited Tayyar—who is still at large—to conduct a 

major operation against US interests. KSM described Tayyar as the next 

Muhammad Atta. Tayyar's family is in Florida and we have identified many 

of his extremist contacts. Acting on this information, the FBI quickly 

publicized Tayyar's true name and aggressively followed up with his family 

and friends in the United States, causing Tayyar to flee the United States.2026 

and we are actively pursuing his capture. 

Prior to receiving information from the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program, the U.S. Intelligence Community was interested in Adnan elShukrijumah. According to CIA and open source records, the FBI interviewed the parents of 

Adnan el-Shukrijumah several times between September 2001 and October 2002 concerning 

their son and his suspected contact with a known extremist. The family provided no significant 

information on their son, except to alert the FBI that he had departed the United States circa May 

2001.2028 

CIA representations that Jaffar al-Tayyar fled the United States in 

2003 in response to an investigation prompted by reporting from KSM were incongruent with 

CIA records at the time of the representations, which indicated that al-Tayyar had already 

relocated to Pakistan. In March 2003, when Jose Padilla identified Jaffar al-Tayyar as Adnan alShukrijumah, he stated that he had last seen al-Tayyar at a KSM safehouse in Karachi, Pakistan, 

in March 2002.2029 Other reporting indicated al-Tayyar's presence in Pakistan in 2002 and 2003, 

as well. For example, KSM consistently reported that al-Tayyar was not in the United States and 

noted during a 2004 interrogation that al-Tayyar "would not return to the United States because 

2026 f| l e CJA's June 2013 Response states that "[i]n some of the early representations, we incorrectly stated alTayyar fled the United States in response to the FBI investigation, although he had in fact already departed the 

United States by this time" (italics added). As noted, this representation was made by the CIA as late as January 

2009, to President-elect Obama's national security team. 

2027

 Emphases in original. CIA Briefing forObama National Security Team - "Renditions, Detentions, and 

Interrogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009." Referenced 

materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect 

Barrack [sic] Obama National Security Team Tuesday, 13 January 2009; 8:30 - 11:30 a.m." The briefing book 

includes the previously mentioned "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting" dated 15 May 2006, which 

provided the same intelligence claims in the document of the same name, but dated April 15,2005. See "RDI Key 

Impacts." 

2028

 ALEC (210218Z MAR 03). Extensive open source records include "Pursuit of al-Qaeda keeps coming 

back to Fla.," USA Today, dated June 15, 2003; "Broward Man Sought as Terror Suspect," Miami Herald, dated 

March 21, 2003; and "A Hunt for 'The Pilot,'" U.S. News and World Report, dated March 30, 2003. The FBI 

confirmed for the Committee that Adnan el-Shukrijumah departed the United States in May 2001. See DTS #2013-

0391. 

2019

 Email from: to: ^[REDACTED] ; cc: •• • 

subject: Padilla Breaks; date: May 1, 2003, at 08:51 AM; CIA "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee 

Reporting" faxed from the CIA to the Department of Justice on April 15, 2005, at 10:47 AM; ALEC 

(210218Z MAR 03). ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^ 

11 ii 1111 1 I II I II 

Page 361 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

361 
UNCLASSIFIED 

On May 20, 2002, prior to the initiation of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques—and while being questioned by FBI special agents—CIA detainee Abu 

Zubaydah provided information on "Abu Jafar al-Tayer" in the context of discussing associates 

of KSM. Abu Zubaydah provided a detailed description of "Abu Jafar al-Tayer" and stated that 

he was an English speaker who had studied in the United States. Abu Zubaydah stated that he 

first met "Abu Jafar al-Tayer" in Birmal, Afghanistan, circa January 2002, and that "Abu Jafar 

al-Tayer" was at that time seeking to travel to Pakistan. Abu Zubaydah repeated that "Abu Jafar 

al-Tayer" spoke "very good English" and was "short and stocky with black hair and dark 

skin."2032 Abu Zubaydah did not provide significant additional information on Abu Jaffar alTayyar after the CIA used its enhanced interrogation techniques against him in August 2002.2033 

{^Si^ll^H^^^H^^ ) On September 11, 2002, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was captured in 

Karachi, Pakistan.2034 During the capture operation, a letter referencing Jaffar al-Tayyar was 

seized. According to a translation of the letter, it stated "tell an unidentified pilot named Ja'far 

that he should be ready for travel."2035 Shortly after his capture, bin al-Shibh was rendered to 

foreign government custody.2036 In November 2002, while still in foreign government custody, 

bin al-Shibh was questioned on "Ja'far the Pilot" and provided a physical description of 

"Ja'far."2037 

I^MRECTOlJM I (210549Z SEP 04); 24533 (171207Z SEP 04). See also 

114425 describing reporting on Jaffar al-Tayyar front the interrogation of Ammar alBaluchi in foreign government custody. 

| and Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee 

Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated 

July 20, 2010, (DTS #2010-2939). See also 10092 (211031Z APR 02); ^BM B 10022 (1212I6Z 

APR 02); HHIIH ; 10321 (231427Z MAY( 

2033 See HEADQUARTERS ^^B(250239 Z JAN 03); | 

For example, in January 2003, a CIA cable stated that Abu Zubaydah repeated that al-Tayyar studied in the 

United States. The only new information provided by Abu Zubaydah was that al-Tayyar's nickname, "the pilot," 

did not necessarily mean that al-Tayyar could fly an airplane. Abu Zubaydah explained to CIA officers that the term 

"the pilot" also means someone who is righteous. 

2034

 ALECMH(111551ZSEP02 ) 

2035

 CIA ^H072303 Z NOV 02). See "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, 

Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT, April 3,2003. For more on the letters that were seized during the 

September 11, 2002, raids in Pakistan, see ALEC (110154Z JAN 03). See also DIRECTOR | 

(I72117Z SEP 02). 

See H^ H 22507 ^Hlj^^ K H^ H 22508 20744 

'CIA (072303Z NOV 02) 

T O P SECRET//! k/NOFOR N 

Page 362 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

362 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

(TS^^^^^^^^^^/NF ) On March 1, 2003, KSM was captured. A notebook associated 

with KSM retrieved during the capture operation included the name "Jafar al-TAYYAR."2038 

After his capture, KSM was rendered to CIA custody, and immediately subjected to the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques.2039 

On March 7, 2003, CIA Headquarters sent information on Jaffar alTayyar to the CIA's DETENTION SITE BLUE, where KSM was located, for use in the 

interrogation of KSM.2040 The documents included the following: 

• a "targeting study" on Jaffar al-Tayyar completed by the CIA in January 2003;2041 

• a letter from KSM to bin al-Shibh referencing "Jafar the Pilot" and indicating that 

"Jafar" "ought to prepare himself' to smuggle himself from Mexico into an unspecified 

country; 

• a letter from Jaffar al-Tayyar to Ramzi bin al-Shibh asking for clarification of KSM's 

letter; and 

• additional background and reporting information on Jaffar al-Tayyar.2042 

The requirements cable from CIA Headquarters to the detention 

site included numerous specific questions, relying on the information already known about Jaffar 

al-Tayyar.2043 

According to CIA records, on March 9, 2003—while KSM was 

being interrogated using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, but before he was 

subjected to the waterboard interrogation technique—the CIA interrogation team used two letters 

referencing al-Tayyar as the "interrogation vehicle" to elicit information from KSM on Jaffar alTayyar.2044

 CIA cables state that KSM did not provide—and claimed not to know—Jaffar alTayyar's true name. However, KSM stated that Jaffar al-Tayyar's father lived in Florida and 

was named "Shukri Sherdil."2045 This information was not accurate. Open source reporting 

indicates that Jaffar al-Tayyar's father's true name was "Gulshair El Shukrijumah.2046 

2038 Aprii 2003, Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment regarding KSM threat reporting, entitled 

"Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting—Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies." 

2039 See KSM detainee review in Volume III. 

2040

 ALEC • • (072215Z MAR 03) 

2M1

 ALEC (110209Z JAN 03) 

2042

 ALEC ^^ H (072215Z MAR 03) 

2043

 ALEC H (072215Z MAR 03). For more on the letters that were seized during the September 11, 2002, 

raids in Pakistan, and Abu Zubaydah's reporting, see ALEC ^••(1101 5 4Z JAN 03); DIRECTOR! 

(172117Z SEP 02); 10092 (211031Z APR 10022 (121216Z APR 02); f 

I ; I^IH I 10321 (231427Z MAY 02); ^^•nHHf ; Federal Bureau of Investigation 

documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate 

Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20,2010 (DTS #2010-2939). 

2944HH | 1074 1 (100917Z MAR 03) ^^^^ ^ 

kms ^ ^ H 10741 (100917Z MAR 03); 10740 (092308Z MAR 03), disseminated as • 

2046 Among other open source news reports, see "Father denies son linked to terror," St. Petersburg Times, published 

March 22, 2003. 

11 ii 11111 MM^^BBBIMB I mn >n 

Page 363 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

363 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ I//NOFQR N 

Over the course of the next two weeks, during the period when 

KSM was being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—including the 

waterboard—KSM referred to Jaffar al-Tayyar as being engaged in multiple terrorist operations. 

As a result, the CIA's detention site began describing Jaffar as the "all-purpose" al-Tayyar whom 

KSM had "woven... into practically every story, each time with a different role."2047 CIA 

records confirm that KSM made numerous statements about Jaffar al-Tayyar's terrorist plotting 

that were deemed not to be credible by CIA personnel,2048 including, but not limited to, 

statements that: 

• al-Tayyar was engaged in terrorist plotting with Jose Padilla;2043 

• al-Tayyar was engaged in terrorist plots against Heathrow Airport;2050 

• al-Tayyar was involved in terrorist plotting with Majid Khan;2051 and 

• al-Tayyar was engaged in an assassination plot against former President Jimmy 

Carter.2052 

(TS^^^H^BI^V^ 1) March 12, 2003, when KSM was confronted with a page in his 

notebook about al-Tayyar, KSM stated that he "considered al-Tayyar to be the 'next 'emir' for 

an attack against the US, in the same role that Muhammad Atta had for 11 September."2053 On 

March 16, 2003, KSM stated that the only comparison between Atta and al-Tayyar was their 

education and experience in the West.2054 

An email exchange the afternoon of March 18, 2003, between CIA 

personnel expressed the views of interrogators and officers at CIA Headquarters with regard to 

KSM and Jaffar al-Tayyar. The email from KSM debriefer stated: 

"we've finally gotten [KSM] to admit that al-Tayyar is meant for a plan in the 

US, but I'm still not sure he's fessing up as to what Jafar's role/plan really is. 

Today he's working with Majid Khan, yesterday the London crowd, the day 

2047 

2048 

(182140Z MAR 03) 

142247 (210357Z JUL 03); email from: 

108841, 

' ; to: [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], 

[REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: RATHER PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS... Ammar al-Baluchi's 

Comments on Jaffar al-Tayyar—If Ammar is Correct, then KSM Appears to Have a Focused Us on Jaffar in a 

Extended Deception Scheme-and His Deception Capabilities are Not Broken Down; date: 07/21/03, at 11:24 AM. 

See also CIA •• • (072303Z NOV 02) and "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, 

Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT, April 3, 2003. 

10741 (100917Z MAR 03); W^K M 11377 (231943Z APR 03), disseminated as I 2049 

110778 (121549Z MAR 03), disseminated as ^^^ ^ 10883 i 

03), disseminated as 1717 (201722Z MAY 03), disseminated as | 

110894 (191513Z MAR 10902 (201037Z MAR 03) 

10959 (231205Z MAR 03); 10950(2221272 MAR 03) 

10787 (130716Z MAR 03) 

110863 (171028Z MAR 03). It is unclear if KSM made the comparison in the first instance, or if the 

March 13, 2003, cable provided an inaccurate account of KSM's statements. The CIA's June 2013 Response states 

that "KSM did not call al-Tayyar 'the next Muhammad Atta.'" The CIA's June 2013 Response characterizes the 

inaccuracy as "an imprecise paraphrase of KSM." 

11 ii iiiii i j^BMMBI^^MB^^FTM N 

Page 364 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

364 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I / / NOFOR N 

before Padilla - you get the point. Anyway, I'm still worried he might be 

misdirecting us on Jafar."2055 

An officer from CIA Headquarters responded, "1 agree.. .KSM is 

yanking our chain about Jafar... really trying hard to throw us off course... suggesting whatever 

Jafar really is up to must be baaaad [sic]." The officer noted that "[a]nother big hole is Jafar's 

true name," and relayed that KSM's use of "another Abu name... Abu Arif... doesn't get us 

far."2056 When KSM was confronted with the reporting he had provided on Jaffar al-Tayyar, 

KSM claimed that he had been forced to lie about al-Tayyar because of the pressure he was 

under from his CIA interrogators, who had been subjecting KSM to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques since his rendition to CIA custody.2057 

(l^V^m^^l^^^F ) Additional CIA records from this period indicate that, while KSM 

claimed not to know Jaffar al-Tayyar's true name, KSM suggested that Jose Padilla, then in U.S. 

military custody, would know his name. According to CIA records, the "FBI began participating 

in the military debriefings [of Jose Padilla] in March 2003, after KSM reported Padilla might 

know the true name of a US-bound al-Qa'ida operative known at the time only as Jaffar alTayyar. Padilla confirmed Jaffar al-Tayyar's true name as Adnan El Shukrijumah."2058 

I

n

 March 2003, a senior CTC officer noted differences between 

KSM's reporting and reporting from Ramzi bin al-Shibh.2059 In April 2003, an Intelligence 

Community assessment concluded, based on comments from other detainees—including those 

not in CIA custody—that "[i]t seemed obvious that KSM was lying with regard to Jaffar alTayyar."2060

 In July 2003, after Ammar al-Baluchi stated that Jaffar al-Tayyar was not suited to 

be an operative and was "not doing much of anything," the deputy chairman of the Community 

Counterterrorism Board warned: 

"If [KSM] has pulled off focusing us on a person who is actually no threat, it 

would mean that our interrogation techniques have not/not broken down his 

resistance to any appreciable extent - and that we will have to doubt even more 

strongly anything he says."2061 

2055

 Note for: [REDACTED]; from: [REDACTED!. OFFICE: [DETENTION SITE BLUE]; Subject: JAFAR 

REQUEST; date: March 18, 2003, at 08:16:07 PM. 

21)56

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: JAFAR REQUEST; date: March 18, 2003, at 

03:49:33 PM. ^^^ ^ ^^^ ^ 

2M7 ajBH I 10902 (201037Z MAR 03); H^ l 10959 (231205ZMAR 03); 10950 (222127Z MAR 

03);1HH [ 11377 (231943Z APR 03), disseminated 

2058

 CIA "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting" faxed from die CIA to the Department of Justice on 

April 15, 2005, at 10:47 AM. On March 21, 2003, CIA records state that a photograph of Gulshair El Sliukiijuinah's 

son was obtained from the FBI and shown to KSM, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Abu Zubaydah, who all identified the 

photograph as that of al-Tayyar. See ALEC (210218Z MAR 03). 

2059

 Email from: ^^HU n to [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: REISSUE/CORRECTION: 

CT: COMMENTS OF KHALID SHAYKH MUHAMMAD ON IMMINENT THREATS TO U.S. TARGETS IN 

THAILAND, INDONESIA, AND THE PHILIPPINES; date: March 12, 2003, at 9:36:57 AM. 

2060 "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT, 

April 3, 2003. 

|42247 (210357Z JUL 03); email from: [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], 

mi 11 in i i mi i mi i 

Page 365 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

365 
TOP SECRET//! 

UNCLASSIFIED 

I//NOFORN 

In December 2005, an NCTC Red Team report, entitled "Ja'far alTayyar: An Unlikely Al-Qa'ida Operational Threat," highlighted the possibility that the 

information provided by KSM on al-Tayyar's capabilities and terrorist plotting was simply 

"deception." The report described a large body of other detainee reporting—from Abu Faraj alLibi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, 'Abd al-Rahim Ghulam Rabbani, and Ammar al-Baluchi— 

consisting of largely dismissive statements about Jaffar al-Tayyar's capabilities and role in alQa'ida. 

10. The Identification and Arrest of Saleh al-Marri 

The CIA represented to the CIA Office of Inspector General that 

"as a result of the lawful use of EITs,"2063 KSM "provided information that helped lead to the 

arrests of terrorists including... Saleh Almari, a sleeper operative in New York."2064 This 

information was included in the final version of the OIG's May 2004 Special Review under the 

heading, "Effectiveness."2065 This CIA representation is inaccurate. KSM was captured on 

March 1, 2003.2066 Saleh al-Marri was arrested in December 2001.2067 

The inaccurate statements about al-Marri to the OIG began with 

the July 16, 2003, OIG interview of Deputy Chief of ALEC Station 2068 an d 

[REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: RATHER PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS; subject- RATHER 

PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS... Ammar al-Baluchi's Comments on Jaffar al-Tayyar-If Ammar is Correct then 

KSM Appears to Have a Focused Us on Jaffar in a Extended Deception Scheme-and His Deception Capabil'ities are 

Not Broken Down; date: 07/21/03, at 11:24 AM. 

2052

 National Counterterrorism Center, REFLECTIONS, "Ja'far al-Tayyar: An Unlikely Al-Qa'ida Operational 

Threat," 22 December 2005. While NCTC's "mainline analytic group" disagreed with the Red Team's analytical 

conclusions, records do not indicate that the Red Team's account of the contrary detainee reporting was challenged 

Draft MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE from the Office of the Director 

of National Intelligence General Counsel; SUBJECT: 

2063 See CIA memorandum to the CIA Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations 

dated February 27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention 

and Intenogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and 

Interrogation Activities." dated February 24, 2004. 

1, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center 

ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003; and CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review - Counterterrorism 

Detention and Interrogation Program, (2003-7123-IG), May 2004. 

(20(B 712^1(3 °MnSP2004

 Ge"eral ' SpCda l Revie w

 ~ Counterterrorism Detention and Intenogation Program, 

iM 41351 

2067

 Information on ALI SALEH M K AL-MARRI, provided by the FBI to the Committee, March 26, 2002 (DTS 

#2002-.1819). 

2068

 OiUuhM^CXB, informed the OIG that KSM's information "helped lead to the arrest of' al-Marri 

(

S e e

 Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center 

ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003). Two days later, wrote an email with information intended for CIA 

leadership that stated, accurately, that al-Marri "had been detained on a material witness warrant based on 

information linking him to the 911 financier Hasawi." (See email from: •^••••f t toITREDACTED] 

[REDACTED], 

2003, at 2:30:09 PM). 

TOP SECRET/ 

I, [REDACTED], 

Page 366 of 499 

| subject: value of detainees; date: July 18, 

I//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

366 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I//NOFORN 

were repeated in DDO Pavitt's formal response to the draft OIG Special Review.2069 The 

inaccurate statements were then included in the final May 2004 Special Review.2070 The 

"Effectiveness" section of the Special Review was used repeatedly as evidence for the 

effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including in CIA representations 

to the Department of Justice. The passage in the OIG Special Review that includes the 

inaccurate CIA representation that KSM provided information helping to lead to the arrest of alMarri was referenced in the May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum analyzing the legality of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.2071 The portion of the Special Review discussing alMarri has been declassified, as has the OLC memorandum.2072 

The CIA also represented, in Pavitt's formal response to the OIG, 

that prior to reporting from KSM, the CIA possessed "no concrete information" on al-Marri.2073 

20£M The January 2004 draft OIG Special Review included the inaccurate information provided by HH> tlla t 

KSM "provided information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including... Saleh Almery, a sleeper 

operative in New York." (See CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and 

Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG) January 2004). CTC's response to the draft Special Review was likewise 

prepared by HUH , who wrote: "KSM also identified a photograph of a suspicious student in New York whom 

die FBI suspected of some involvement with al-Qa'ida, but against whom we had no concrete information." After 

describing KSM's reporting M wrote, "[t]his student is now being held on a material witness warrant." (See 

from- cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

^^^J ; subject" Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004.) DDO Pavitt s formal 

response to the OIG draft Special Review included this representation, adding that the information was provided "as 

a result of the lawful use of EITs." Pavitt's memo to the OIG did not acknowledge that the "student now being held 

on a material witness warrant" had been arrested more than a year prior to the capture of KSM. Nor did it correct 

the inaccurate information in the OIG's draft Special Review that KSM's information "helped lead to the arrest" of 

al-Marri. See memorandum for Inspector General from James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) 

Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-1G); 

date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24,2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism 

Detention and Interrogation Activities. 

2070

 CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review - Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program, 

(2003-7123-IG), May 2004. . 

2071

 In its May 30,2005, memorandum, the OLC wrote, "we understand that interrogations have led to specific, 

actionable intelligence," and "[w]e understand that the use of enhanced techniques in the interrogations of KSM, 

Zubaydah and others... has yielded critical information" (Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General 

Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 

Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the 

Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda 

Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11), citing IG Special Review at 86,90-91. 

2072

 The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "CIA mistakenly provided incorrect information to the Inspector General 

(IG) that led to a one-time misrepresentation of this case in the IG's 2004 Special Review." The CIA's June 2013 

Response states that "[t]his mistake was not, as it is characterized in the 'Findings and Conclusions' section of the 

Study a 'repeatedly represented' or 'frequently cited' example of the effectiveness of CIA's interrogation program " 

The Committee found that, in addition to the multiple representations to the CIA OIG, the inaccurate information in 

the final OIG Special Review was, as noted above, provided by the CIA to the Department of Justice to support the 

Department's analysis of the lawfulness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The OIG Special Review 

was also relied upon by the Blue Ribbon Panel evaluating the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques, and later was cited in multiple open source articles and books, often in the context of the "effectiveness" 

^fCfi^H H to: I^HH ; cc: M H [REDACTED], 

subject: re Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004. Memorandum for: 

Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG 

Special Review "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; 

mmHHHBNo m 

Page 367 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

367 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ 1//NOFORN 

This representation is incongrnent with CIA records. CIA records indicate that prior to the 

CIA's detention of KSM, the CIA possessed significant information on al-Marri, who was 

arrested after making attempts to contact a telephone number associated with al-Qa'ida member 

and suspected 9/11 facilitator, Mustafa al-Hawsawi.2074 CIA records indicate that al-Marri had 

suspicious information on his computer upon his arrest,2075 that al-Marri's brother had travelled 

to Afghanistan in 2001 to join in jihad against the United States,2076 and that al-Marri was 

directly associated with KSM, as well as with al-Hawsawi.2077 

The FBI also had extensive records on al-Marri. On March 26, 

2002, a year before any reporting from KSM, the FBI provided the Committee with biographical 

and derogatory information on al-Marri, including al-Marri's links to Mustafa al-Hawsawi, 

suspicious information found on al-Marri's computer, and al-Marri's connections to other 

extremists. 

2078 

11. The Collection of Critical Tactical Intelligence on Shkai, Pakistan 

(TS/Z^^^H^^^H^/NI 2) In the context of the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, the CIA represented to policymakers over several years that "key 

intelligence" was obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that 

revealed Shkai, Pakistan, to be "a major al-Qa'ida hub in the tribal areas," and resulted in 

"tactical intelligence ^HH^M^HHI^^H 1 1 1 Shkai, Pakistan."2079 These CIA 

attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation 

Activities. 

2074

 ALEC (292319Z APR 03) 

2075

 The laptop contained files and Internet bookmarks associated with suspicious chemicals and chemical 

distributors, as well as computer programs typically used by hackers. See WASHINGTON (122314Z MAR 

03); ALEC (292319Z APR 03). 

2076

 CIA WASHINGTON DC (260018Z MAR 03) 

2077 Prjo r , 0 th e captur e 0 f K s m , Abd al-Rahim Ghulam Rabbani told the FBI that al-Marri had called KSM and bad 

been seen with KSM at an al-Qa'ida guesthouse. In addition, email accounts found on a computer seized during the 

raid that captured KSM revealed links to accounts associated with al-Marri. See ALEC |^BH(292319Z APR 03); 

WASHINGTON • • (122314Z MAR 03); ALEC • • (031759Z MAR 03); ALEC|| H (052341Z MAR 

03). 

2078 Th e p B j i n f orm ation included that al-Marri's brother "traveled to Afghanistan in 1997-1998 to train in Bin -

Laden camps." It also indicated that al-Marri's computer revealed bookmarks to websites associated with religious 

extremism and various criminal activities, as well as hacking tools (See FBI document on Ali Saleh MK Al-Marri, 

provided to the Committee, March 26, 2002 (DTS #2002-1819)). Despite the extensive derogatory information on 

al-Marri in the possession of both the CIA and FBI, the CIA's June 2013 Response repeats previous CIA 

representations that prior to KSM's reporting, the CIA had "no concrete information" on al-Marri. The CIA's June 

2013 Response also states that the previously obtained information was "fragmentary," and that while the CIA and 

FBI were aware of al-Marri's links to al-Qa'ida and "strongly suspected him of having a nefarious objective," "both 

agencies... lacked detailed reporting to confirm these suspicions...." 

2079

 Among other documents, see. (1) CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central 

Intelligence," Subject: "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," included in email 

from: to:

 an d subject: on 

value of interrogation techniques"; date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM. The email references the attached 

"information paper to Dr. Rice explaining the value of the interrogation techniques," (2) CIA Memorandum for 

Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from 

Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation 

Techniques," (3) CIA Talking Points entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of 

lll l I I III I '^^BBj^^^^^^Ji'/NOFOR N 

Page 368 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

368 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I / / NOFOR N 

representations were based on the CIA's experience with one CIA detainee, Hassan Ghul. While 

CIA records indicate that Hassan Ghul did provide information on Shkai, Pakistan, a review of 

CIA records found that: (1) the vast majority of this information, including the identities, 

activities, and locations of senior al-Qa'ida operatives in Shkai, was provided prior to Hassan 

Ghul being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques; (2) CIA's m 

m assessed that Ghul's reporting prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques contained sufficient detail to press the Pakistani and (3) 

die CIA assessed that the information provided by Ghul corroborated earlier reporting that the 

Shkai valley of Pakistan served as al-Qa'ida's command and control center after the group's 

2001 exodus from Afghanistan.2080 

AS an example of one of the CIA'S representations on Shkai, 

Pakistan, and the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, on March 2, 

2005, the CIA responded to a request from the OLC "for the intelligence the Agency obtained 

from detainees who, before their interrogations, were not providing any information of 

intelligence [value]." The resulting CIA memorandum, with the subject line "Effectiveness of 

the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," included the following under the heading, 

"Results": 

"CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a 

comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist 

plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical 

intelligence on al-Qa'ida. We believe that intelligence acquired from these 

interrogations has been a key reason why al-Qa'ida has failed to launch a 

spectacular attack in the West since 11 September 2001. Key intelligence 

collected from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation 

techniques:"2081 

The CIA then listed "Shkai, Pakistan" as an example, stating: 

"Shkai, Pakistan: The interrogation of Hassan Ghul provided detailed tactical 

intelligence showing that Shkai, Pakistan was a major Al-Qa'ida hub in the 

tribal areas. Through use of during the Ghul 

the High-Value Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques," (4) CIA briefing document dated May 2, 2006, 

entitled, "BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 Briefing for Chief of Staff to the 

President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Programs," (5) CIA classified Statement for the 

Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central 

Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007 (DTS #2007-1563), and accompanying Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

hearing transcript for April 12, 2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation 

Program" (DTS #2007-3158), and (6) CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team - "Renditions, Detentions, 

and Interrogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009, " 

prepared "13 January 2009." 

TMu Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Detainee Profile on Hassan Ghul for coord; date: 

December 30, 2005, at 8:14:04 AM. 

2081

 Italics in original document. CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of 

Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from ^^^HH ^ m Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject 

"Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." 

Page 369 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

369 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I//NOFOR N 

interrogation, we mapped out and pinpointed the residences of key AQ leaders 

in Shkai. This intelligence was provided | 

>82 

(^VS/^^^^^H^^lp/NF ) The CIA representation that the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques produced otherwise unavailable tactical intelligence related to Shkai, 

Pakistan, was provided to senior policymakers and the Department of Justice between 2004 and 

2009.2083 

Hassan Ghul was captured on January 2004, by foreign 

authorities in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.2084 Ghul was reportedly First interrogated by | 

H

208 S

 then transferred to U.S. military custody and questioned, and then rendered to CIA 

custody on January 2004

 2086

 Hassan Ghul spent two days at DETENTION SITE COBALT 

before being transferred to the CIA's DETENTION SITE BLACK on January 2004. Prior to 

his capture, the CIA assessed that Ghul possessed substantial knowledge of al-Qa'ida facilities 

and procedures in Wana and Shkai, Pakistan.2087 

(TSZ/^H^^HB'/NF ) During Hassan Ghul's two days at DETENTION SITE COBALT, 

CIA interrogators did not use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul. Instead, 

CIA cables state that upon his arrival at the CIA detention site, Hassan Ghul was "examined, and 

2082

 CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, 

from W M Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness of the CIA 

Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." In its June 2013 Response, the CIA states: "We never represented that 

Shkai was previously unknown to us or that Gul only told us about it after he was subjected to enhanced 

interrogation techniques. We said that after these techniques were used, Gul provided 'detailed tactical 

intelligence.' That intelligence differed significantly in granularity and operational utility from what he provided 

before enhanced techniques." As described in this summary, CIA representations about intelligence on Shkai were 

used as evidence of the necessity and effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Tire CIA did 

not inform policymakers or the Department of Justice about the extensive information provided by Hassan Ghul on 

Shkai prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

2083 See, for example, CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence," 

Subject: "Effectiveness of die CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," included in email from: 

^Hl ; to: •••• H and BHH K subject: on value 

interrogation techniques"; date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM; CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office 

of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from IHf l Legal Group, DCI 

Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness of the CTA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." 

20M ^^^^^^ ^ 21753 HEADQUARTERS • • •••JA N 04) 

3085

 On April 16, 2013, the Council on Foreign Relations hosted a forum in relation to the screening of the film, 

"Manhunt." The forum included former CIA officer Nada Bakos, who states in the film that Hassan Ghul provided 

critical information on Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti's connection to UBL to Kurdish officials prior to entering CIA 

custody. When asked about the interrogation techniques used by the Kurds, Bakos stated: ".. .honestly, Hassan 

Ghul...when he was being debriefed by the Kurdish government, he literally was sitting there having tea. He was in 

a safe house. He wasn't locked up in a cell. He wasn't handcuffed to anything. He was—he was having a free 

flowing conversation. And there's—you know, there's articles in Kurdish papers about sort of their interpretation of 

the story and how forthcoming he was." See www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/film-screening-manhunt/p30560. 

121815 

HEADQUARTERS 

| JAN 04) 

11308 (•^•JA N 04); 

04); 1313 J AN 04); 

TOP SECRET// 

21753 

1642 AN 04); DIRECTOR 

JAN 04); | 

" FEB 04) 

/NOFORN 

308i JAN 

Page 370 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

370 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRETfl^^^^^^^BiBMflNQgQR N 

placcd in a ccll, given adequate clothing, bedding, water and a waste bucket."2088 During this 

two-day period (January 2004, and January 2004) 2089 Ghul provided information for at 

least 21 intelligence reports.2090 As detailed below, Ghul's reporting on Shkai, Pakistan, and alQa'ida operatives who resided in or visited Shkai, was included in at least 16 of these 

intelligence reports.2091 The reports included information on the locations, movements, and 

operational security and training of senior al-Qa'ida leaders living in Shkai, Pakistan, as well as 

the visits of leaders and operatives to the area, The information provided by Ghul included 

details on various groups operating in Shkai, Pakistan, and conflicts among the groups. Hassan 

Ghul also identified and decoded phone numbers and email addresses contained in a notebook 

seized with him, some of which were associated with Shkai-based operatives.2092 

Hassan Ghul described the origins of al-Qa'ida's presence in 

Shkai, including how Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi became the original group's military commander and 

its al-Qa'ida representative.2093 He discussed tensions between al-Hadi and others in Shkai, the 

2088 

2089 

16421 

54195| 

DETENTION SITE COBALT to a | 

2050

 HHHHHH^ H 541941 

later released as HEADQUARTERS | 

04), later released as HEADQU ARTERS | 

JAN 04), later released as HEADQUARTERS | 

[AN 04) 

IAN 04). CIA records state that Hassan Ghul was removed fiom 

facility for portions of his interrogations. 

jjAN 04), 

1645 ••^•lA N 

i 647 

JAN 04), later released as HEADQUARTERS | 

1650 

16521 

JAN 04); 

JAN 04), later released asl 

11657 •^•JA N 04); f 

11679 ^H J AN 04); j 

| JAN 04) 

(IAN 04); | 

JAN 04), later released as | 

1654 04); | 

:IA| 

16771 

1680 

|CIA 

1651 

|FEB 04); 

|TAN 04); 

JAN 04); 

JAN 04), later released as | 

JAN 04), later released as | 

1687 04), later released as | 

[l688j|^^ W JAN 04), later released as I 

J 1656 As the dissemination 

of 21 intelligence reports suggests, information in CIA records indicates Hassan Ghul was cooperative with CIA 

personnel prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced inteirogation techniques. In an interview with die CIA 

OIG, a CIA officer familiar with Ghul stated, "He sang like a tweetie bird. He opened up right away and was 

cooperative from tire outset." See December 2,2004, interview with [REDACTED], Chief, DO, CTC UBL 

Department, 

JAN I 

JAN 04); 

JAN 04); 

JAN 04); 

JAN 04); 

JAN 04); 

JAN 04); 

JAN 04); | 

JAN 04) 

2093

 Hassan Ghul also described the roles of 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kanadi, aka Ahmed Sai'd al-Khadr, and Abu Hamza 

al-Jawfi 1685 ^^^BlA N 04)). 

M I I I I I I BMMBBBBMBB I IIIMI 

Page 371 of 499 

JAN 04); 

04); 

AN 04); 

AN 04); 

AN 04); 

AN 04); 

(JAN 04); 

AN 04) 

UNCLASSIFIED 

371 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I//NOFOR N 

mediating role of Abu Faraj al-Libi, and the role of Khalid Habib.2094 Hassan Ghul explained 

how he moved to Shkai due to concerns about Abu Musa'b al-Baluchi's contacts 

how he traveled to Shkai to make contact with Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, and how Abu 

Faraj mediated between Ghul and Hamza Rabi'a.2095 Ghul stated that he last saw Abu Faraj in 

the summer of 2003, when Ghul was seeking Abu Faraj's assistance in moving money from 

Saudi Arabia to deliver to al-Hadi for support of their community in Shkai.2096 

(TS/^HH^^^^H^^ ) According to Hassan Ghul, Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi moved 

periodically among various houses within the village, including that of Abu Hussein and H H 

whom he described as "senior media people for al-Qa'ida."2097 Elaborating on alHadi's location, Hassan Ghul described the importance of both a madrassa and a guesthouse in 

Shkai known as the "bachelor house," where unaccompanied men stayed. Ghul stated that he 

last saw al-Hadi in December 2003 when al-Hadi came to the "bachelor house" to visit with 

other Arabs.2098 Ghul also identified other permanent and transient residents of the "bachelor 

house."2099 He stated that al-Hadi, who he believed was seeking another safehouse in Shkai at 

which to hold meetings, had approximately 40 to 50 men under his command. Hassan Ghul also 

identified a phone number used to contact al-Hadi.2100 

2094

 1685 •^• j AN 04) 

20i>5

 ^^^H^HIH H

 167 7

 HitlA N 04) 

2096

 Hassan Gul stated that Abu Faraj was with his associate, Mansur Khan, aka Hassan. (See \ 

1654 B^^BlA N 04).) Hassan Ghul's reporting on Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi and Abu Faraj al-Libi 

included discussion of Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti's links to UBL. According to Ghul, during his time in Shkai in 2003, 

al-Hadi would periodically receive brief handwritten messages from UBL via Abu Faraj, which he would share with 

their group. Ghul stated that this did not necessarily mean that Abu Faraj knew the location of UBL, but rather that 

he had a window into UBL's courier network. It was at this point that Hassan Ghul described the role of Abu 

Ahmed al-Kuwaiti and his connections to UBL. See 

See 1679 ••• p AN 04). 

2D98

 Hassan Ghul stated that al-Hadi, who did not travel with a security detail, visited the madrassa every few days, 

but less frequently of late due to the deteriorating security condition in Waziristan for Arabs. Ghul stated that when 

he last saw al-Hadi, he was accompanied by an Afghan assistant named Sidri, aka S'aid al-Rahman. He also 

identified Osaid al-Yemeni as an individual who assisted al-Hadi. See 16541 

JAN 04). 

21)99

 Hassan Ghul identified Yusif al-Baluchi, Mu'awiyya al-Baluchi, a Kurd named Qassam al-Surri, Usama alFilistini, and Khatal al-Uzbek i as living in the "bachelor house." See 1654 H^ H 

JAN 04). The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "After being subjected to enhanced techniques, [Hassan Glinlj 

provided more granular information." According to the CIA Response, it was in this context that Hassan Ghul 

identified the "bachelor house," where he had met al-Hadi, and where "several unmarried men associated with alQa'ida" lived, including HH^H^i - A review of CIA records found that Hassan Ghul provided this 

information prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

2100

 Hassan Ghul identified a phone number in his phone book that he said had been provided to him by Hamza alJawfi to pass messages to al-Hadi in emergencies. The phone number was under the name Baba Jan, aka Ida Khan. 

Ghul also identified a number for Major, aka Ridwan, aka Bilal, who, he said, brought equipment to Pakistan. See 

11654 1646 •• • JAN 04)). 

IIII I I III I I II II I III I 

Page 372 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

372 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I//NOFORN 

According to Hassan Ghul, as of December 2003, approximately 

60 Arab males and between 150 and 200 Turkic/Uzbek males were living in Shkai, along with a 

"significant population" of Baluchis who assisted the Arabs and Uzbeks.2101 Ghul described alQa'ida training, including an electronics course taught in the fall of 2003 by Abu Bakr al-Suri at 

the house of Hamza Rabi'a where, he believed, individuals were being trained for an ongoing 

operation.2102 Ghul discerned from the training and Rabi'a's statements that al-Qa'ida operatives 

in Shkai were involved in an assassination attempt against Pakistani President Pervez 

Musharraf.2103 Ghul stated Hamza Rabi'a was also likely planning operations into Afghanistan, 

but had no specifics.2104 

(T^miBWP ) Hassan Ghul elaborated on numerous other al-Qa'ida operatives he 

said resided in or visited Shkai, Pakistan, including Shaikh Sa'id al-Masri,2105 Sharif al-Masri,2106 

2101

 ^^^HHI^H^ I 1655 HHfrA N 04) 

2102

 Hassan Ghul stated that Abu Jandal and anodier Saudi of African descent took part in the electronics course. 

{See 1654^^^|jA N 04); 1 1655 •• • JAN 

As described in a separate cable, Ghul stated that he had seen 10-15 Pakistanis training with Rabi'a and Abu Bakr 

al-Suri, whom lie described as an al-Qa'ida explosives expert, in early to mid-October 2003. (See^^^^^^^ B BBBH 1656 HfllA N 04).) The CIA's June 2013 Response states that Hassan Ghul reported that Hamza 

Rabi'a "was using facilities in Shkai to train operatives for attacks outside Pakistan," without noting Ghul's 

reporting, prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, on Rabi'a's training of operatives. 

2IM Ghul explained that he was in Shkai following a previous assassination attempt, in early December 2003, when 

there was "frequent talk among the brothers" about who might have been responsible. When Ghul asked around, 

"diere was a lot of talk" that Rabi'a was involved in planning a subsequent operation. Rabi'a's statement diat there 

would be an unspecified operation soon, combined with the training conducted by Rabi'a and al-Suri, led Ghul to 

believe that the second assassination attempt was conducted by al-Qa'ida. 1656 

••JA N 04). 

2104

 Hassan Ghul stated that it was unlikely that Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi had any planned operations, although al-Hadi 

would likely assist if there were any. See IBI^^I^^^^^^^ B 1654 ^^^^^yA N 04). 

2105

 Hassan Ghul stated that Shaikh Sa'id al-Masri, aka Mustafa Ahmad (Abu al-Yazid), came to Shkai around 

November 2003 and currently resided there. Ghul stated that Shaikh Sa'id's son, Abdullah, travelled between Shkai 

and a location in the greater Dera Ismail Khan area, where the rest of Shaikh Sa'id's family lived. See 

1679 JAN 

2 m

 Hassan Ghul stated that Sharif al-Masri, who came to Shkai around October/November 2003 for a brief visit, 

was handling operations in Qandahar while living just outside Quetta. Ghul identified two of Sharif al-Masri's 

See 1679j[BM i JAN 04). 

T O P SECRE^MBBMBBWIM^nofor n 

Page 373 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

373 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I//NOFORN 

Abu Maryam,2107 Janat Gul,2108 Khalil Deek,2J09 Abu Talha al-Pakistani,2110 Finis,21,1 and 

others.2112 

(^S/^ll^^mi^mp/NF ) Finally, Hassan Ghul described his interactions with Abu Mus'ab 

al-Zarqawi, which also related to al-Qa'ida figures in Shkai, in particular Abd al-Hadi alIraqi.2113

 Ghul described al-Zarqawi's request to al-Hadi for money, explosive experts, and 

electronic experts, and provided details of his own trip to Iraq on behalf of al-Hadi

 2114

 Hassan 

2107

 Hassan Ghul was asked about Tariq Mahmoud, whom he thought might be Abu Maryam, a British citizen of 

Pakistani descent whom Ghul met in Pakistan. According to Ghul, Maryam had been inside Afghanistan and had 

1679 K 1646 

lin training in Shkai, but was apprehended in Islamabad. (See \ 

AN 04).) Ghul identified a phone number for Abu Maryam. See \ 

AN 04). 

2108

 Hassan Ghul stated that he last saw Janat Gul in December 2003 in Shkai, when Janat Gul was delivering three 

Arabs who had come from Iran. Janat Gul came to the "bachelor house" accompanied by Khatal. Ghul also 

described a discussion from September/October 2003 at Hamza al-Jawfi's house in Shkai with al-Hadi and Abu 

'Abd al-Rahman BM in which Janat Gul claimed to know Russians who could provide anti-aircraft missiles. Gul 

asked for money, but al-Hadi was reluctant to make the commitment and did not want to work with Gul. According 

to Hassan Ghul, Janat Gul left and subsequent conversations revealed that Janat Gul likely made the story up. 

Hassan Ghul provided a phone number for Janat Gul. See 1679 04); 

11646 JAN 

2109

 Hassan Ghul also discussed Abu Bilal al-Suri, aka, Shafiq, who was the father-in-law of Khalil Deek, aka Joseph 

Jacob Adams, aka Abu 'Abd al-Rahman BM, aka Abu Ayad al-Filistini. While Ghul did not know where Abu Bilal 

was located, he had recently seen Abu Bilal's son preparing a residence in Shkai. See ^IHIH^^^^^^HI 

1679 JAN 04). 

2110

 Hassan Ghul stated that he knew Talha al-Pakistani, aka Suleiman, peripherally, through KSM and Ammar alBaluchi. Ghul last saw Talha in Shkai around October/November 2003 at the residence of Hamza Rabi'a with a 

group that was undertaking unspecified training. Ghul stated that he was not sure if Talha was a participant or 

simply an observer. See 1679 I M111 

2111

 Hassan Ghul was shown photos of individuals apprehendedby (d^^Mfc i on | October 2003 | 

and identified one as a Yemeni named Firas, "a well-trained fighter and experienced killer, who was known to be an 

excellent shot." Ghul reported that, when he first arrived in Shkai, Firas was living there. Prior to hearing about 

Firas' arrest, Ghul's understanding was that Firas was in Angorada with Khalid Habib, which Ghul characterized as 

the "front line." The other photo identified by Ghul was that of an Algerian named Abu Maryam, whom helped 

"hide out" in Shkai. See HI^H^^^MH i

 167 8

 ^^^H-'A N 04). 

21,2

 For Hassan Ghul's reporting on Abu Umama, aka Abu Ibrahim al-Masri, see HI^HHii^^HHi 1687 

MWBJA N 04). ^^^ ^ 

1644 HH I

 ja n 04 ; 04

-

,; 

DIRECTOR^^H^^B B JAN disseminated as^^^^^^^B^HH^^^^^H5419 5 

•§A N 04) 

2114

 Hassan Ghul stated that in the late summer of 2003, al-Zarqawi made die request through Luay Muhammad Hajj 

Bakr al-Saqa (aka Abu Hamza al-Suri, aka Abu Muhammad al-Turki, aka Ala' al-Din), but that al-Hadi had not 

wanted to assist. According to Ghul, al-Hadi had previously sent Abdullah al-Kurdi to Iraq, but al-Kurdi did not 

want to engage in any activities and was rumored to be "soft." This led al-Hadi to send Ghul to Iraq to speak with 

al-Zarqawi regarding the possibility of select al-Qa'ida members traveling to Iraq to fight. According to the cable, 

"Ghul claimed that the Arabs in Waziristan were tired, and wanted change," and that Ghul "was tasked to both 

discuss this issue with Zarqawi, and to recon the route." (See 1644 ^HHJA N 04).) 

Ghul also describe the roles of Yusif al-Baluchi, Mu'awiyya al-Baluchi, and Wasim aka Ammar aka Little Ammar 

aka Ammar Choto, in facilitating Ghul's trip out of Pakistan, as well as his exact route. Ghul identified Yusif's 

phone number in his notebook and described how Yusif had come to Shkai to gain al-Hadi's approval for a plan to 

kidnap Iranian VIPs to gain the release of senior al-Qa'ida Management Council members in Iranian custody. (See 

11690 ^^^BlA N 04).) 

11 ii 1111 1 i II i II 

Page 374 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

374 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ 1//NOFOR N 

Ghul identified four email addresses for contacting al-Zarqawi directly,2115 and described a 

phone code he would use to communicate with al-Zarqawi

 2116

 Ghul also described his 

conversations with al-Zarqawi, interpreted the notes he had taken of the last of his conversations 

with al-Zarqawi, identified operatives whom al-Zarqawi and al-Hadi agreed to send to Iraq,2117 

and discussed strategic differences between al-Zarqawi and al-Hadi related to Iraq.2118 

On January 2004, after two days at DETENTION SITE 

COBALT, during which Hassan Ghul provided the aforementioned information about al-Qa'ida 

activities in Shkai and other matters, Ghul was transferred to the CIA's DETENTION SITE 

BLACK.2119 Ghul was immediately, and for the first time, subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques. He was "shaved and barbered, stripped, and placed in the standing 

position."2120 According to a CIA cable, Hassan Ghul provided no new information during this 

period and was immediately placed in standing sleep deprivation with his hands above his head, 

with plans to lower his hands after two hours.2121 In their request to use the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques on Ghul, CIA detention site personnel wrote: 

"The interrogation team believes, based on [Hassan Ghul's] reaction to the 

initial contact, that his al-Qa'ida briefings and his earlier experiences with U.S. 

military interrogators have convinced him there are limits to the physical 

contact interrogators can have with him. The interrogation team believes the 

approval and employment of enhanced measures should sufficiently shift 

21 15

 1646 ^HlA N 04) 

2110

 1645 ^^^VA N 04) 

21,7

 The notes, which Ghul intended to use to brief Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, had been seized during Ghul's capture. The 

topics included al-Zarqawi's willingness to provide missiles to al-Hadi, al-Zarqawi's offer to provide al-Hadi with 

an unspecified chemical weapon agent, al-Zarqawi's request to al-Hadi for walkie talkies, and al-Zarqawi's 

willingness to work out any disagreements with al-Hadi. According to Ghul, al-Zarqawi responded positively to alHadi's offer of al-Qa'ida personnel and discussed a number of specific, named individuals, including Khatal alUzbeki and a Palestinian named Usama al-Zargoi. Al-Zarqawi requested that al-Hadi facilitate the travel of an 

operative who could assist in training inexperienced operatives in proper operational security. Al-Zarqawi also 

identified a Jordanian explosives expert named 'Abd al-Badi, an Algerian explosives expert named al-Sur, and 

Munthir, a Moroccan religious scholar who was a close friend of al-Zarqawi. Ghul identified another operative, 

Abu Aisha, who explained to him that al-Zarqawi's reference to chemical weapons was likely a reference to a 

chemical agent affixed to howitzer 04); | 

[ 1657 BA N DIRECTOR | 

disseminated as^^^^^^^^BTII^^I^^H^^^H54195HHfljA N 

1650 

2118

 According to Hassan Ghul, al-Zarqawi told Ghul in January 2004 that he intended to assassinate senior Shi'ite 

scholars, attack Sh'ite gatherings with explosives, and foment civil war in Iraq. Ghul stated that Abd al-Hadi allraqi was opposed to any operations in Iraq tiiat would promote bloodshed among Muslims, and had counseled alZarqawi against undertaking such operations. Using Ghul as an envoy, al-Hadi had inquired with al-Zarqawi about 

whether he (al-Hadi) should travel to Iraq, but al-Zarqawi had responded that this was not a good idea, as operations 

in Iraq were far different dian those al-Hadi was conducting in Afghanistan. See 1651 

•iWA N 04)). See also 1652 •|H I A N 04), for Ghul's reporting on 

Zarqawi's plots in Iraq 

2119 I 

; in 

12831 JAN 04). 

21201 

2121 

11285 ^^HJAN04 ) 

11285 

TOP SECRET//! 1//NOFORN 

Page 375 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

375 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

[Hassan Ghul's] paradigm of what he expects to happen. The lack of these 

increasd [sic] measures may limit the team's capability to collect critical and 

reliable information in a timely manner."2122 

(TS/^^^UHm^F ) CIA Headquarters approved the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques against Hassan Ghul in order to "sufficiently shift [Ghul's] paradigm of 

what he can expect from the interrogation process, and to increase base's capability to collect 

critical and reliable threat information in a timely manner."2123 CIA records do not indicate that 

information provided by Ghul during this period, or after, resulted in the identification or capture 

of any al-Qa'ida leaders. After his arrival at DETENTION SITE BLACK, Ghul was asked to 

identify locations on and line drawings of Shkai provided to him, for the first 

time, by interrogators.2124 

Hassan Ghul's reporting on Shkai prior to the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques was compiled by the CIA for passage to the Pakistani 

government. On January 28, 2004, issued a cable stating that the information 

on Shkai provided by Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques, combined with reporting unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program, "moved Shkai to th^orefronJ^^^^^^M/^i ^ Station is 

currently its Shkai ^^^BH^^^^^^^HHHilHHIIH-" 212 5 On January 

29, 2004, ALEC Station I Hi il mill ill i ill I II with the Pakistanis 

on "possible Arabs in Shkai," and concurred with a tear-line that requests that Pakistan 

2122

 H^H I 1285 •|^HAN04 ) 

2123

 HEADQUARTERS^^K^H I JAN 04). On DDO Pavitt expressed liis personal 

congratulations to the interrogators at DETENTION SITE COBALT, who elicited information from Hassan Ghul 

prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Pavitt's message stated: "In the short time Ghul 

was at your location, [interrogators] made excellent progress and generated what appears to be a great amount of 

highly interesting information and leads. This is exactly the type of effort with a detainee that will win the war 

against al-Qai'da. With the intelligence Station has obtained from Ghul, we will be able to do much damage to the 

enemy." See DIRECTOR HH(HI H

 JA N

 04). 

2124

 Many of the questions for Hassan Ghul for more specific locational information were about sites Ghul had 

mentioned or described during his interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT. (See HEADQUARTERS 

20352 I JAN 04); 20353 

FEB 04)). See also email from: 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: 

^[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: HG on 

at 1:11:01 PM; and attachments.) The CIA's 

[(••^ H JAN 04); JAN 04); 

| JAN 04);2040 1 (HBHFEB04)j^ALE C 

[REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], 

Shkai. Please provide comments/requirements; date 

June 2013 Response states that while Hassan Ghul provided "some detail about the activities and general 

whereabouts of al-Qa'ida members in Shkai" prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, only 

afterwards did he "provide[] more granular information when, for example, he sat down with experts and 

pointed to specific locations where he met some of the senior al-Qa'ida members we were trying to find." A review 

of CIA records found that Hassan Ghul was not provided the opportunity to identify specific locations on 

H m and line drawings until after he was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

2,25

 The cable noted that "[b]efore Ghul's capture, the Shkai valley had already been an area of focus 

^^••• T The cable detailed Hassan Ghul's reporting prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, as well as information unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, 

including extensive information on Shkai from flHH sources, the locations in Shkai 

and exact geolocational coordinates for numerous sites in Shkai. See 60245 

\

04)-

m i i m i i B^^B^^MBMIB^ 0 TM ^ 

Page 376 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

376 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I / / NOFOR N 

"undertake to verify" the presence of "a large number of Arabs" in Shkai "as soon as 

possible."2126 

an extensive "tear-line" for Pakistan, much of it related to Shkai. The cable from m 

referenced nine cables describing Hassan Ghul's reporting prior to the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques,2127 and no cables describing Ghul's reporting after the use of 

the techniques.2128 The cable from Bl^^ H then stated that "Station sees the type of 

information coming from [Hassan Ghul's] interrogations as perfect fodder foij^ressim^^^ ^ 

[Pakistan] into action against associates of Hassan Ghul in Pakistan, i^B^JB^^ B 

and other terrorist ' n Pakistan 

T h e 

tear-line for Pakistan included extensive information provided by Hassan Ghul prior to the use of 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.2129 On February 3, 2004, CIA Headquarters 

requested that the tear-line be passed to the Pakistanis, but deferred to ^HHI B

 o n

 ^ c 

portions dealing with Shkai.2130 As CIA's HII^^HH l informed CIA Headquarters on 

February 9, 2004, it intended to hold the information on Shkai until the DCI's visit to Pakistan 

the following day. As Station noted, "this tearline will prove critical 

m^M 1 In the meantime and afterwards, additional tear-lines were prepared for the 

Pakistanis that were based primarily on reporting from Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques, combined with Ghul's subsequent reporting, and information 

from sources unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.2132 

(2901.57Z JAN 04) 

1681 

11679 

1677 

11654 

1644 

2128 

2129 

-J 04) 

JAN 04 

AN 04); 

AN 04); 

AN 04); 

AN 04). 

AN 04); 

AN 04); 

04); 

04), 

2714(3111462 JAN 04) 

2714 (311146Z JAN 04). The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "CIA continues to assess 

that the information derived from Hassan Gul after the commencement of enhanced techniques provided new and 

unique insight into al-Qa'ida's presence and operations in Shkai, Pakistan." The CIA's June 2013 Response also 

defends past CIA representations that "after these techniques were used, Gul provided 'detailed tactical 

intelligence,'" that "differed significantly in granularity and operational ^ H from what he provided before 

enhanced techniques." The CIA's Response then states that "|a]s a result of his information, we were able to make a 

case 

CIA records found that the CIA had previously determined that the information provided by Hassan Ghul prior to 

the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was the "perfect fodder for pressing [Pakistan] into action." 

2130

 HEADQUAR^ H (032357Z FEB 04) 

12742 (090403Z FEB 04) 

160796 (051600Z FEB 04); ALEC | H (•• • FEB 04); DIRECTOR 

FEB 04). The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[s]enior US officials during the winter and spring of 2004 

presented the Agency's analysis of Gul's debriefings and other intelligence about Shkai | 

As support, the CIA Response cites two cables that relied heavily on information 

provided by Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, as well as information 

from unrelated sources. (See ALEC M M (BU M FR B »

4

); DIRECTOR (^^ H FEB 04)). 

Page 377 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

377 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I//NOFOR N 

Qa'ida operatives are continuing with their 

activities and waiting for the situation to normalize in the tribal areas." In particular, "[a]lQa'ida's senior operatives who were in Shkai before the military's offensive remained in South 

Waziristan as of mid-June [2004],"2133 Later, in December 2005, a CIA detainee profile of 

Hassan Ghul assessed that the information provided by Ghul confirmed earlier reporting in 

CIA's possession that the Shkai valley of Pakistan served as al-Qa'ida's command and control 

center after the group's 2001 exodus from Afghanistan.2134 Hassan Ghul was | 

I, and later released.2135 

12. Information on the Facilitator that Led to the UBL Operation 

Shortly after the raid on the Usama bin Ladin (UBL) compound on 

May 1, 2011, which resulted in UBL's death, CIA officials described the role of reporting from 

the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in the operation—and in some cases connected 

the reporting to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.2137 The vast majority of 

1635 

2133

 Directorate of Intelligence, Al-Qa 'ida '.v Waziristan Sanctuary Disrupted but Still Viable, 21 July 2004 (DTS 

#2004-3240). 

Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Detainee Profile on Hassan Ghul for coord; date: 

December 30, 2005, at 8:14:04 AM. 

2135

 2441 HEAD' 

1775 

2136

 Congressional Notification (DTS #2012-3802). 

2137

 In addition to classified representations to the Committee, shortly after the operation targeting UBL on May 1, 

2011, there were media reports indicating that the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program had produced "the 

lead information" that led to Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, the UBL compound, and/or the overall operation that led to 

UBL's death. In an interview with Time Magazine, published May 4, 2011, Jose Rodriguez, the former CIA chief of 

CTC, stated that: "Information provided by KSM and Abu Faraj al-Libbi about bin Laden's courier was the lead 

information that eventually led to the location of [bin Laden's] compound and the operation that led to his death." 

See "Ex-CIA Counterterror Chief: 'Enhanced Interrogation' Led U.S. to bin Laden." Time Magazine, May 4, 2011 

(italics added). Former CIA Director Michael Hayden stated that: "What we got, the original lead information— 

and frankly it was incomplete identity information on the couriers—began with information from CIA detainees at 

the black sites." In another interview, Hayden stated: ".. .the lead information I referred to a few minutes ago did 

come from CIA detainees, against whom enhanced interrogation techniques have been used" (italics added). See 

Transcript from Scott Hennen Show, dated May 3, 2011, with former CIA Director Michael Hayden; and interview 

with Fareed Zakaria, Fareed Zakaria GPS, CNN, May 8, 2011. See also "The Waterboarding Trail to bin Laden," 

by Michael Mukasey, Walt Street Journal, May 6, 2011. Former Attorney General Mukasey wrote: "Consider how 

the intelligence that led to bin Laden came to hand. It began with a disclosure from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 

(KSM), who broke like a dam under the pressure of harsh interrogation techniques that included waterboarding. He 

loosed a torrent of information—including eventually the nickname of a trusted courier of bin Laden." The CIA's 

June 2013 Response confirms information in the Committee Study, stating: "Even after undergoing enhanced 

techniques, KSM lied about Abu Ahmad, and Abu Faraj denied knowing him." The CIA's September 2012 

"Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin," (DTS #2012-3826) compiled by the CIA's Center for the Study of 

Intelligence, indicates that the CIA sought to publicly attribute the UBL operation to detainee reporting months prior 

to the execution of the operation. Under the heading, "The Public Roll-Out," the "Lessons from the Hunt for Bin 

Ladin" document explains that the CIA's Office of Public Affairs was "formally brought into the [UBL] operation in 

late March 2011." The document states that the "material OPA prepared for release" was intended to "describe the 

11ii 11 i i i BI^H^MB^^B M Min i 

Page 378 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

378 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/J^^BM^^^^^M/^QfOR N 

the documents, statements, and testimony highlighting information obtained from the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, or from CIA detainees more generally, was inaccurate 

and incongruent with CIA records. 

(TS^Bi^mill^^^P ) CIA records indicate that: (1) the CIA had extensive reporting on 

Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti (variant Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti),2138 the UBL facilitator whose 

identification and tracking led to the identification of UBL's compound and the operation that 

resulted in UBL's death, prior to and independent of information from CIA detainees; (2) the 

most accurate information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti obtained from a CIA detainee was 

provided by a CIA detainee who had not yet been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques; and (3) CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques withheld and fabricated information about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. 

Within days of the raid on UBL's compound, CIA officials 

represented that CIA detainees provided the "tipoff'2139 information on Abu Ahmad alKuwaiti.2140

 A review of CIA records found that the initial intelligence obtained, as well as the 

hunt and the operation," among other matters. The document details how, prior to the operation, "agreed-upon 

language" was developed for three "vital points," the first of which was "the critical nature of detainee reporting in 

identifying Bin Ladin's courier." 

2138

 CIA documents and cables use various spellings, most frequently "Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti" and "Abu Ahmad 

al-Kuwaiti." To the extent possible, the Study uses the spelling referenced in the CIA document being discussed. 

2,39

 Testimony from the CIA to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services 

Committee on May 4, 2011. In testimony, CIA Director Leon Panetta referenced CIA "interviews" with 12 CIA 

detainees, and stated that "I want to be able to get back to you with specifics.. .But clearly the tipoff on the couriers 

came from those interviews." The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "CIA has never represented that information 

acquired through its interrogations of detainees was either the first or the only information that we had on Abu 

Ahmad." Former CIA Director Michael Hayden provided similar public statements. See transcript of Scott Hennen 

talk-radio show, dated May 3, 2011. Hayden: "What we got, the original lead information—and frankly it was 

incomplete identity information on the couriers—began with information from CIA detainees at the black sites. And 

let me just leave it at that" (italics added). 

2H0 See CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated May 5, 2011, which includes a document 

entitled, "Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," with an accompanying six-page chart 

entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti" (DTS #2011-2004). 

11 II M I I I BBBHBBBBI M innni 

Page 379 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

379 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

information the CIA identified as the most critical—or the most valuable—on Abu Ahmad alKuwaiti,2141

 was not related to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.2142 

The CIA did not receive any information from CIA detainees on 

Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until 2003. Nonetheless, by the end of 2002, the CIA was actively 

targeting Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and had collected significant reporting on Abu Ahmad alKuwaiti—to include reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's close links to UBL. CIA records 

indicate that prior to receiving any information from CIA detainees, the CIA had collected: 

• Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's Telephonic Activity: A phone number associated with 

Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was under U.S. government intelligence collection as early as 

January 1, 2002.2143 In March 2002, this phone number would be found in Abu Zubaydah's 

address book under the heading "Abu Ahmad K."2144 In April 2002, the same phone number 

was found to be in contact with UBL family members

 2145

 In June 2002, a person using the 

identified phone number and believed at the time to be "al-Kuwaiti" called a number 

2141

 The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the December 13, 2012, Committee Study "incorrectly characterizes 

the intelligence we had on Abu Ahmad before acquiring information on him from detainees in CIA custody as 

'critical.'" This is incorrect. The Committee uses the CIA's own definition of what infonnation was important and 

critical, as conveyed to the Committee by the CIA. In documents and testimony to the Committee, the CIA 

highlighted specific information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti that the CIA viewed as especially valuable or critical to 

the identification and tracking of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. For example, in May 4, 2011, CIA testimony, a CIA 

officer explained how "a couple of early detainees" "identified]" Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti as someone close to UBL. 

The CIA officer stated: "I think the clearest way to think about this is, in 2002 a couple of early detainees, Abu 

Zubaydah and an individual, Riyadh the Facilitator, talked about the activities of an Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. At this 

point we don't have his true name. And they identify him as somebody involved with AQ and facilitation and some 

potential ties to bin Ladin." As detailed in this summary, CIA records confirm that Riyadh the Facilitator provided 

information in 2002 closely linking al-Kuwaiti to UBL, but these records confirm that this information was acquired 

prior to Riyadh the Facilitator being rendered to CIA custody (the transfer occurred more than a year later, in 

January 2004). Abu Zubaydah provided no information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002. According to CIA 

records, Abu Zubaydah was not asked about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until July 7, 2003, when he denied knowing the 

name. As an additional example, see CIA documents and charts provided to the Committee (DTS #2011-2004) and 

described in this summary, in which the CIA ascribes value to specific intelligence acquired on al-Kuwaiti. 

2142

 In other words, the information the CIA cited was acquired from a detainee not in CIA custody, obtained from a 

CIA detainee who was not subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, obtained from a CIA detainee 

prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, or acquired from a source unrelated to detainee 

reporting. As described, the information contained herein is based on a review of CIA Detention and Interrogation 

Program records. Although the CIA has produced more than six million pages of material associated with CIA 

detainees and the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, the Committee did not have direct access to other, 

more traditional intelligence records, to include reporting from CIA HUMINT assets, foreign government assets, 

electronic intercepts, military detainee debriefings, law enforcement derived information, and other methods of 

collection. Based on the information found in the CIA detainee-related documents, it is likely there is significant 

intelligence on "Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti" acquired from a variety of intelligence collection platforms that the 

Committee did not have access to for this review. 

214^ClArccord ("Call Details Incoming and Outgoing") relating to calling activity for phone number 

A CIA document provided to the Committee on October 25, 2013, (DTS #2013-3152), states that the 

CIA was collecting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's phone (#H^H ) as early as November 2001, and that it was 

collection from this time that was used to make voice comparisons to later collection targeting Abu Ahmad alKuwaiti. 

2,4 4

 CIA (032031Z APR 02) 

2145

 CIA (102158Z APR 02) ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^ 

11 ii 1111 1 ^MBMI^^^MB B i i n II 

Page 380 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

380 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I//NOFOR N 

associated with KSM.2146 All of this information was acquired in 2002, prior to any 

reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from CIA detainees. 

• Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's Email Communications: In July 2002, the CIA had 

obtained an email address believed to be associated with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,2147 As early 

as August 24, 2002, the CIA was collecting and tracking al-Kuwaiti's email activity. A cable 

from that day states that an email account associated with KSM "intermediary Abu Ahmed 

al-Kuwaiti" remained active in Karachi.2148 On September 17, 2002, the CIA received 

reporting on al-Kuwaiti's email address from a detainee in the custody of a foreign 

government. The detainee reported that al-Kuwaiti shared an email address with Ammar alBaluchi, and that al-Kuwaiti was "coordinating martyrdom operations."2149

 When KSM was 

captured on March 1, 2003, an email address associated with al-Kuwaiti was found on a 

laptop believed to be used by KSM.2150 All of this information was acquired prior to any 

reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from CIA detainees. 

• A Body of Intelligence Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's Involvement in Operational 

Attack Planning with KSM—Including Targeting of the United States: On June 10, 2002, the 

CIA received reporting from a detainee in the custody of a foreign government indicating 

that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was engaged in operational attack planning with KSM.2151 On 

June 25, 2002, the CIA received reporting from another detainee in the custody of a foreign 

government corroborating information that al-Kuwaiti was close with KSM, as well as 

reporting that al-Kuwaiti worked on "secret operations" with KSM prior to the September 11, 

2001, teiTorist attacks.2152 By August 9, 2002, the CIA had received reporting from a third 

detainee in the custody of a foreign government indicating that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was 

supporting KSM's operational attack planning targeting the United States.2153 By October 

20, 2002, the CIA had received reporting from a fourth detainee in the custody of a foreign 

government indicating that a known terrorist—Hassan Ghul—"received funding and 

instructions primarily from Abu Ahmad, a close associate of KSM."2154 All of this 

2146

 Included in several cables and repeated in ALEC ^^^^HJU L 02). 

2,47

 ^^^BIHI3104 9 (IBHI 2002 ) '

 Th e CIA 'S Jun e 201 3

 Response downplays the importance of die 

email address and phone numbers collected on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, stating that the accounts were later 

discontinued by Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and were "never linked" to bin Ladin's known locations. However, on 

October 25, 2013, the CIA (DTS #2013-3152) acknowledged that the "voice cuts" from Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti 

were acquired during this period (2001-2002) from the (H ) phone number cited in the Committee Study. 

According to CIA records, in February 2009 and September 2009, the voice samples collected from the Abu Ahmad 

al-Kuwaiti (^B ) phone number (under collection in 2002) were compared to voice samples collected against 

which led the Intelligence Community to that whowasgeolocated to a specific area of Pakistan, was likely Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. In August 2010, Abu Ahmad 

| and tracked to the UBL compound. See intelligence chronology in Volume II for 

additional details. 

2148

 ALEC HB( 240057 Z AUG 02) _ _ 

2149

 [REDACTED] 64883 (171346Z SEP 02). This information was repeated in ALEC (302244Z SEP 02). 

2150

 ALEC^^B(102238ZMA R 03) 

2151

 ^Hil944 8 (10]509Z JUN 02) 

2132

 DIRECTOR M M (251833Z JUN 02) ___ _ 

2153

 [REDACTED] 65902 (080950Z AUG 02); ALEC (092204Z AUG 02) 

2154

 DIRECTOR • • (202147Z OCT 02) 

11ii i i i i i BBMB^B^^B U "iii i 

Page 381 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

381 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

information was acquired in 2002, prior to any reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from 

CIA detainees. 

• Significant Corroborative Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's Age, Physical Description, 

and Family—Including Information the CIA Would Later Cite As Pivotal: In September 

2001, the CIA received reporting on al-Kuwaiti's family that the CIA would later cite as 

pivotal in identifying al-Kuwaiti's true name.2155 From January 2002 through October 2002, 

the CIA received significant corroborative reporting on al-Kuwaiti's age, physical 

appearance, and family from detainees held in the custody of foreign governments and the 

U.S. military.2156 All of this information was acquired prior to any reporting on Abu Ahmad 

al-Kuwaiti from CIA detainees. 

• Multiple Reports on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's Close Association with UBL and His Frequent 

Travel to See UBL:

2157 As early as April 2002, CIA had signals intelligence linking a phone 

number associated with al-Kuwaiti with UBL's family, specifically al-Qa'ida member Sa'ad 

Bin Ladin.2158 On June 5, 2002, the CIA received reporting from a detainee in the custody of 

a foreign government indicating that "Abu Ahmad" was one of three al-Qa'ida associated 

individuals—to include Sa'ad bin Ladin and KSM—who visited him. The detainee—Ridha 

al-Najjar—was a former UBL caretaker.2159 On June 25, 2002, the CIA received reporting 

from another detainee in the custody of a foreign government—Riyadh the Facilitator— 

suggesting al-Kuwaiti may have served as a courier for UBL. Riyadh the Facilitator 

2155 See intelligence chronology in Volume n, specifically dated 17 September 2001, 

[REDACTED] 60077 (09/17/2001). See also foreign government reporting from September 27, 2002, describing 

information from a detainee who was not in CIA custody (CIA (271730Z SEP 02)). That reporting is also 

highlighted in a CIA document, entitled, "Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," dated May 

4, 2011 (DTS #2011-2004). The document highlights that "Detainee Abdallah Falah al-Dusari provided what he 

thought was a partial true name for Abu Ahmad—Habib al-Rahman—whom [CIA] ultimately identified as one of 

Abu Ahmad's deceased brothers. However, this partial tnie name for his brother eventually helped [CIA] map out 

Abu Ahmad's entire family, including the true name of Abu Ahmad himself." The CIA document did not identify 

that Abdallah Falah al-Dusari was not a CIA detainee. In June 2002, the CIA also obtained another alias for Abu 

Ahmad al-Kuwaiti—"Hamad al-Kuwaiti"—that included a component of his true name. This infonnation was 

provided by foreign government and was unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. See 

DIRECTOR • • (251833Z JUN 02). ^^^ ^ 

2,56 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including 63211 (30 JAN 2002); DIRECTOR | 

(251833Z JUN 02); ^^•••^••Tul y 25,2002; Mil l 11II J J f- r 10Z AUG 02); CIA | 

(271730Z SEP 02); DIRECTOR819 Z OCT 02); | " 

2157

 In testimony on May 4, 2011, the CIA informed the Committee that "From the beginning, CIA focused on the 

inner circle around bin Ladin, the people that were around him, as a way to try and go after bin Laden." See DTS 

#2011-2049. 

2158

 CIA (102158Z APR 02). Sa'ad bin Ladin was a known senior al-Qa'ida member and had been 

associated with individuals engaged in operational planning targeting the United States. See, for example, ALEC 

I H I (062040Z MAR 02) for his association with KSM operative Masran bin Arshad, who was involved in 

KSM's "Second Wave" plotting. Phone number(s) associated with Sa'ad bin Ladin were under intelligence 

collection and resulted in the identification of other al-Qa'ida targets. See 293363 (05112IZ 

inn ii iB^M H

 1111111 ' II ' ^^BTM221I2 41945 Z JA N 04)

-

|[REDACTED] 11515, June 5, 2002. As detailed in this summary and in Volume III, Ridha al-Najjar was 

later rendered to CIA custody and subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

m i I I in 

Page 382 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

382 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I / / NOFOR N 

highlighted that al-Kuwaiti was "actively working in secret locations in Karachi, but traveled 

frequently" to "meet with Usama bin Ladin."2160 Months earlier the CIA disseminated 

signals intelligence indicating that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and Riyadh the Facilitator were in 

phone contact with each other

 2161

 In August 2002, another detainee in the custody of a 

foreign government with known links to al-Kuwaiti2162—Abu Zubair al-Ha'ili—reported that 

al-Kuwaiti "was one of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin."2163 All of this 

information was acquired in 2002, prior to any reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from 

CIA detainees.2164 

(TS/yfl^BI^^^/NF ) Within a day of the UBL operation, the CIA began providing 

classified briefings to Congress on the overall operation and the intelligence that led to the raid 

and UBL's death.2165 On May 2, 2011, CIA officials, including CIA Deputy Director Michael 

Morell, briefed the Committee. A second briefing occurred on May 4, 2011, when CIA Director 

Leon Panetta and other CIA officials briefed both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

and the Senate Armed Services Committee. Both of these briefings indicated that CIA detainee 

information—and the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—played a substantial role in 

developing intelligence that led to the UBL operation. The testimony contained significant 

inaccurate information. 

(^S/Z^Bimm^NF ) For example, in the May 2, 2011, briefing, the CIA informed the 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that: 

"However, there remained one primary line of investigation that was proving 

the most difficult to run to ground, and that was the case of a courier named 

Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. Abu Ahmed had totally dropped off our radar in 

about the 2002-2003 time frame after several detainees in our custody had 

highlighted him as a key facilitator for bin Ladin."2166 

2160 See intelligence chronology in Volume IT, including DIRECTOR (251833Z JUN 02). Riyadh the 

Facilitator was eventually rendered into the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in January 2004. CIA 

records indicate he was not subjected to the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques. The referenced information 

was provided while Riyadh the Facilitator was in foreign government custody. 

2162

 DIRECTOR • • (251833Z JUN 02) 

2163

 DIRECTOR (221240Z AUG 02). Abu Zubair al-Ha'ili never entered the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program. 

2164

 The CIA's June 2013 Response ignores or minimizes the extensive reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti listed in 

the text of this summary (as well as additional reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in the intelligence chronology in 

Volume II), describing this intelligence as "insufficient to distinguish Abu Ahmad from many other Bin Ladin 

associates" before crediting CIA detainees with providing "additional information" that "put [the previously 

collected reporting] into context." While the Committee could find no internal CIA records to support the assertion 

in the CIA's June 2013 Response, as detailed, the most detailed and accurate intelligence collected from a CIA 

detainee on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and his unique links to UBL was from Hassan Ghul, and was acquired prior to 

the use of the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques against Ghul. 

2165

 A series of public statements by members of Congress linking the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program 

and the UBL operation appeared in the media during the time of the congressional briefings. The statements reflect 

the inaccurate briefings provided by the CIA. 

2166

 Italics added. CIA testimony of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing on May 2, 2011 (DTS 

#2011-1941). 

2,61

 CIA (102158Z APR 02) 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 383 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

383 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET// I//NOFOK N 

The information above is not fully congruent with CIA records. As 

described, the CIA was targeting Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to any reporting from CIA 

detainees. Al-Kuwaiti was identified as early as 2002 as an al-Qa'ida member engaged in 

operational planning who "traveled frequently" to see UBL.2167 No CIA detainee provided 

reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002. While CIA detainees eventually did provide some 

information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti beginning in the spring of 2003, the majority of the 

accurate intelligence acquired on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was collected outside of the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program, either from detainees not in CIA custody, or from other 

intelligence sources and methods unrelated to detainees, to include human sources and foreign 

partners.2168 The most accurate CIA detainee-related intelligence was obtained in early 2004, 

from a CTA detainee who had not yet been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques.2169 That detainee—Hassan Ghul—listed Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti as one of three 

individuals likely to be with UBL,2170 stated that "it was well known that [UBL] was always with 

Abu Ahmed [al-Kuwaiti],"2171 and described al-Kuwaiti as UBL's "closest assistant,"2172 who 

"likely handled all of UBL's needs."2173 The detainee further relayed that he believed "UBL's 

security apparatus would be minimal, and that the group likely lived in a house with a family 

somewhere in Pakistan."2174 

In the May 4, 2011, briefing, CIA Director Leon Panetta provided 

the following statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed 

Services Committee (which mirrored similar statements by a "senior administration official" in a 

White House Press Briefing from May 2,2011)2175: 

"The detainees in the post-9/11 period flagged for us that there were 

individuals that provided direct support to bin Ladin... and one of those 

identified was a courier who had the nickname Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. That 

was back in 2002."7116 

2167 See intelligence chronology in Volume II. 

2168 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including ALEC •••(240057 Z AUG 02); CIA record ("Call 

Details Incoming and Outgoing") relatingto calling activity for^^^Bjphonenumbe r [REDACTED] 

65902 (080950Z AUG 02); ALEC (092204Z AUG dated 17 September 2001; 

[REDACTED] 60077 (09/17/2001); DIRECTOR ••(221240 Z AUG 02); and DIRECTOR (251833Z 

JUN 02). 

AN 04) and intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional 2,69 See HEADQUARTERS 

details. 

2170 

2,71

 HEADQUARTERS 

2172 

2,73

 HEADQUARTERS 

2174

 HEADQUARTERS 

Pakistan with minimal security. 

2,75 See May 2, 20.11, 12:03AM, White House "Press Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on the Killing of 

Osama bin Laden." The transcript, posted on the White House website (www.wliiteliouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/5/02/press-briefing-senior-administration-officials-killing-osama-bin-laden). 

2176

 Italics added. Testimony of CIA Director Panetta, transcript of the May 4, 2011, briefing of the Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee (DTS #2011-2049). 

11 ii 1111 1 ^MM^M^BH^ M 1 "

1

" 

Page 384 of 499 

AN 04) 

JAN 04) 

AN 04) 

AN 04) 

AN 04). UBL was eventually located in a home with a family in 

UNCLASSIFIED 

384 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET// 1//NOFQHN 

AS previously detailed, no CIA detainees provided information on 

Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002. As such, for the statement to be accurate, it can only be a 

reference to detainees in foreign government custody who provided information in 2002.2177 As 

noted, prior to any reporting from CIA detainees, the CIA was targeting Abu Ahmad alKuwaiti—to include al-Kuwaiti's phone number and email address.2178

 Further, prior to 2003, 

the CIA possessed a body of intelligence reporting linking Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to KSM and 

UBL and to operational targeting of the United States, as well as reporting that Abu Ahmad alKuwaiti was "one of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin"2179

 and "traveled frequently" to 

"meet with Usama bin Ladin."2180 

In the same May 4, 2011, briefing, a CIA officer elaborated on the 

previously provided statements and provided additional detail on how "a couple of early 

detainees" "identified]" Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti as someone close to UBL: 

"I think the clearest way to think about this is, in 2002 a couple of early 

detainees, Abu Zubaydah and an individual, Riyadh the Facilitator, talked 

about the activities of an Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. At this point we don't have 

his true name. And they identify him as somebody involved with AQ and 

facilitation and some potential ties to bin Ladin ,"2181 

This testimony is inaccurate. There are no CIA records of Abu 

Zubaydah discussing Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002.2182 The first reference to Abu Zubaydah 

2177

 As described in this summary, the CIA provided documents to the Committee indicating that individuals 

detained in 2002 provided "Tier One" information—linking "Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin." The document did not 

state when the information was provided, or when the detainee entered CIA custody. Internal CIA records indicate 

that no CIA detainee provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002. See CIA six-page chart entitled, 

"Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," which lists 12 detainees in "CIA CustodyjWDTS #2011-2004). 

2178

 CIA record ("Call Details Incoming and Outgoing") relating to calling activity for^^^ H phone number 

#•• ; ALEC • • (240057Z AUG 02). 

2179 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including [REDACTED! 65902 (080950Z AUG 02); ALEC 

(092204Z AUG 02); DIRECTOR (221240Z AUG 02); and DIRECTOR (251833Z JUN 02). 

2180 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including DIRECTOR (251833Z JUN 02). 

2181

 Italics added. CIA testimony from CIA officer [REDACTED] and transcript of the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee briefing on May 4, 2011. (See DTS #2011-2049.) As 

discussed in this summary and in greater detail in Volume II, the CIA provided additional information to the 

Committee on May 5, 2011, that listed Riyadh the Facilitator as a detainee in "CIA custody," who was "detained 

February 2002," and provided the referenced information. The CIA document omitted that Riyadh the Facilitator 

was not in CIA custody when he provided the referenced information in June 2002. Riyadh the Facilitator was not 

rendered to CIA custody until January 2004. See Volume III and DTS #2011-2004. 

2182

 The CIA's June 2013 Response does not address the Committee Study finding that Abu Zubaydah did not 

provide reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002. However, on October 25, 2013, the CIA responded in writing 

that the December 13, 2012, Committee Study was correct, and confirmed that the "first report from Abu Zubaydah 

discussing Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was in 2003." (See DTS #2013-3152.) As described in the intelligence 

chronology in Volume II, on June 13, 2002, the CIA's ALEC Station sent a cable requesting that Abu Zubaydah be 

questioned regarding his knowledge of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, whom the CIA believed was then in Pakistan. 

Despite this request, CTA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah was not asked about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti at this 

time. (See ALEC (130117Z JUN 02).) Days later, on June 18, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was placed in 

isolation, without any questioning or contact. On August 4,2002, the CIA resumed contact and immediately began 

using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, including the waterboard. CIA records 

indicate that Abu Zubaydah was not asked ahout Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until July 7, 2003, when he denied 

11 ii 1111 1

 11111 1 

Page 385 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

385 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I / / NOFOR N 

providing information related to al-Kuwaiti is on July 7, 2003, when Abu Zubaydah denied 

knowing the name.2183 CIA records indicate that the information in 2002 that the CIA has 

represented as the initial lead information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was not obtained from the 

CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, but was collected by the CIA from other 

intelligence sources, including from detainees in foreign government custody. Riyadh the 

Facilitator provided substantial information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002, including 

information suggesting al-Kuwaiti may have served as a courier, as al-Kuwaiti reportedly 

"traveled frequently" to see UBL.2184 Consistent with the testimony, CIA records indicate that 

the information provided by Riyadh the Facilitator was important information; however, Riyadh 

the Facilitator was not in CIA custody in 2002, but was in the custody of a foreign 

government.2185 Riyadh the Facilitator was not transferred to CIA custody until January | , 

2004.2186 As noted, in 2002, the CIA received additional reporting from another detainee in the 

custody of a foreign government, Abu Zubair al-Ha'ili, that "Ahmad al-Kuwaiti" was "one of a 

few close associates of Usama bin Ladin."2187 

(TS/fl^^^B W At the May 4, 2011, briefing, a Senator asked, "I guess what we're 

trying to get at here, or certainly I am, was any of this information obtained through [enhanced] 

interrogation measures?" A CIA officer replied: 

"Senator, these individuals were in our program and were subject to some 

form of enhanced interrogation. Because of the time involved and the 

relationship to the information and the fact that I'm not a specialist on that 

program, I would ask that you allow us to come back to you with some 

detail."2188 

The information above is not fully congruent with CIA records. As 

is detailed in the intelligence chronology in Volume II, the vast majority of the intelligence 

knowing the name. (See 12236 (072032Z JUL 03).) As is detailed in the intelligence chronology in 

Volume II, on April 3,2002, the CIA sent a cable stating that on page 8 of a 27-page address book found with Abu 

Zubaydah, there was the name "Abu Ahmad K." with a phone number that was found to be already under U.S. 

intelligence collection. See CIA (032031Z APR 02). 

2183 12236 (072032Z JUL 03) 

2,184

 DIRECTOR (251833Z JUN 02) 

2185

 Riyadh the Facilitator, aka Sharqawi Ali Abdu al-Hajj, was captured on February 7, 2002. (See \ 

10480 FEB 02).) Al-Hajj was transferred to HH H custody on February 2002. 

18265 FEB 02).) On January | , 2004, al-Hajj was rendered to CIA custody. (See [ 

[JAN 04).) Al-Hajj was transferred to U.S. military custody on May 2004. See 

2186

 1591^|^^PAN04) . Documents provided to the Committee on "detainee 

reporting" related to the UBL operation (incorrectly) indicate that Riyadh the Facilitator was in CIA custody. See 

May 5,2011, six-page CIA chart entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti"(DTS #2011-2004). 

2187

 DIRECTOR • • (221240Z AUG 02). Abu Zubair al-Ha'ili never entered the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program. 

2188

 Italics added. CIA testimony from CIA officer [REDACTED] and transcript of the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee briefing on May 4, 2011 (DTS #2011 -2049). The CIA 

subsequently provided the Committee with a letter dated May 5, 2011, which included a document entitled, 

"Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," with an accompanying six-page chart entitled, 

"Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti" (DTS #2011-2004). See also a similar, but less detailed CIA 

document entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's Historic Links to Usama Bin Laden." 

III I 1 1 III I 

Page 386 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

386 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I / / NOFOR N 

acquired on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was originally acquired from sources unrelated to the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program, and the most accurate information acquired from a CIA 

detainee was provided prior to the CIA subjecting the detainee to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques.2189 As detailed in CIA records, and acknowledged by the CIA in 

testimony, information from CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques—to include CIA detainees who had clear links to Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti based on a 

large body of intelligence reporting—provided fabricated, inconsistent, and generally unreliable 

information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti throughout their detention.2190 

2189

 On May 5, 2004, the CIA provided several documents to the Committee, including a chart entitled, "Detainee 

Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," described in this summary. For additional details, see intelligence 

chronology in Volume II. 

2150

 Below are specific details on the reporting of Abu Zubaydah, KSM, Khallad bin Attash, Ammar al-Baluchi, and 

Abu Faraj al-Libi related to Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti: 1) Abu Zubaydah was captured on March 28, 2002, with a 27-

page address book that included a phone number for "Aha Ahmad K," which matched a mobile 

phone number that was already under intelligence collection by the U.S. Intelligence Community. (As early as July 

2002, the CIA associated the phone number with al-Kuwaiti.) As detailed in the Study, Abu Zubaydah provided 

significant intelligence, primarily to FBI special agents, from the time of his capture on March 28, 2002, through 

June 18, 2002, when he was placed in isolation for 47 days. On June 13, 2002, less than a week before he was 

placed in isolation, CIA Headquarters requested that interrogators ask Abu Zubaydah about his knowledge of Abu 

Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, who was believed to be in Pakistan, according to the request from CIA Headquarters. There are 

no CIA records indicating that the interrogators asked Abu Zubaydah about al-Kuwaiti. Instead, as described, Abu 

Zubaydah was placed in isolation beginning on June 18, 2002, with the FBI and CIA interrogators departing the 

detention site. The FBI did not return. On August 4, 2002, CIA interrogators reestablished contact with Abu 

Zubaydah and immediately began to subject Abu Zubaydah to the non-stop use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques for 17 days, which included at least 83 applications of the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique. 

According to CIA records, Abu Zubaydah was not asked about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until July 7, 2003, when he 

denied knowing the name. On April 27, 2004, Abu Zubaydah again stated that he did not recognize die name "Abu 

Ahmed al-Kuwaiti." In August 2005, Abu Zubaydah speculated on an individual the CIA stated might be 

"identifiable with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, aka Abu Ahmad al-Pakistani," but Abu Zubaydah stated the person in 

question was not close with UBL. 2) KSM was captured on March 1, 2003, during a raid in Pakistan. An email 

address associated with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was found on a laptop that was assessed to be associated with KSM. 

Once rendered to CIA custody on March 2003, KSM was immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, which continued through March 25, 2003, and included at least 183 applications of die 

CIA's waterboard interrogation technique. On March 5, 2003, KSM provided information concerning a senior alQa'ida member named "Abu Khalid," whom KSM later called "Abu Ahmad al-Baluchi." The information KSM 

provided could not be corroborated by other intelligence collected by the CIA, and KSM provided no further 

information on the individual. On May 5, 2003, KSM provided his first information on an individual named "Abu 

Ahmed al-Kuwaiti" when he was confronted with reporting from a detainee not in CIA custody, Masran bin Arshad. 

KSM confirmed bin Arshad's reporting regarding Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, specifically that bin Arshad was 

originally tasked by KSM to get money from Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in Pakistan. KSM further relayed that Abu 

Ahmad al-Kuwaiti worked with Hassan Ghul helping to move families from Afghanistan to Pakistan. On May 22, 

2003, KSM was specifically asked about a UBL courier named Abu Ahmed. KSM again described a courier for 

UBL whose name was Abu Ahmed al-Baluchi, but noted that this Abu Ahmed was more interested in earning 

money than in serving al-Qa'ida. According to KSM, Abu Ahmed was working with Hassan Ghul in April or May 

2002, but speculated that Abu Ahmed was in Iran as of early March 2003. In July 2003, KSM stated that Abu 

Ahmad al-Kuwaiti worked with Abu Zubaydah's group prior to September 2001 and later with Abu Sulayman alJaza'iri. In September 2003, KSM was confronted with reporting from another detainee in foreign government 

custody on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. KSM confirmed that he had told Hambali to work with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti 

as he transited Pakistan, but KSM downplayed al-Kuwaiti's importance, claiming to have contacted Abu Ahmad alKuwaiti only three to four times when he was in Peshawar and stating that Abu Ahmad worked "primarily with 

lower level members" and appeared to have a higher status than he actually had in al-Qa'ida because KSM relied on 

al-Kuwaiti for travel facilitation. InJanua

 1 • - • • Hassan Ghul—provided prior to the 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 387 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

387 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—that it was "well known" that UBL was always with alKuwaiti, CIA Headquarters asked CIA interrogators to reengage KSM on the relationship between al-Kuwaiti and 

UBL, noting the "serious disconnect" between Ghul's reporting linking UBL and Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and 

KSM's "pithy" description of al-Kuwaiti. CIA Headquar ters wrote that unlike Hassan Ghul, KSM had made "no 

reference to a link between Abu Ahmed and al-Qa'ida's two top leaders" and that KSM "has some explaining to do 

about Abu Ahmed and his support to UBL and Zawahiri." On May 31, 2004, KSM claimed that al-Kuwaiti was 

"not very senior, nor was he wanted," noting that al-Kuwaiti could move about freely, and might be in Peshawar. In 

August 2005, KSM stated that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was not a courier and that he had never heard of Abu Ahmad 

transporting letters for UBL. Instead, KSM claimed that al-Kuwaiti was focused on family after he married in 2002. 

3) Khallad bin Attash was arrested with Ammar al-Baluchi in a unilateral operation by Pakistani authorities resulting 

from criminal leads on April 29, 2003. On May 2003, he was rendered to CIA custody and immediately 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques from May 16, 2003, to May 18, 2003, and then again from 

July 18, 2003, to July 29,2003. On June 30, 2003, bin Attash stated that al-Kuwaiti was admired among the men. 

On July 27, 2003, bin Attash corroborated intelligence reporting that al-Kuwaiti played a facilitation role in alQa'ida and that al Kuwaiti departed Karachi to get married. In January 2004, bin Attash stated that al-Kuwaiti was 

not close to UBL and not involved in al-Qa'ida operations, and that al-Kuwaiti was settling down with his wife in 

the summer of 2003. In August 2005, bin Attash stated that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was not a courier, that he had 

never heard of Abu Ahmad transporting letters for UBL, and that Abu Ahmad was instead focused on family after 

he married in 2002. In August 2006, bin Attash reiterated that al-Kuwaiti was not a courier, but rather focused on 

family life. 4) Ammar al-Baluchi was arrested with Khallad bin Attash in a unilateral operation by Pakistani 

authorities resulting from criminal leads on April 29, 2003. Upon his arrest, Ammar al-Baluchi was cooperative and 

provided information on a number of topics while in foreign government custody, including information on Abu 

Ahmad al-Kuwaiti that the CIA disseminated prior to al-Baluchi being transferred to CIA custody on May 2003. 

After Ammar al-Baluchi was transferred to CIA custody, the CIA subjected Ammar al-Baluchi to the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques from May 17, 2003, to May 20, 2003. On May 19, 2003, al-Baluchi stated he 

fabricated information while being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques the previous day, but in 

response to questioning, stated that he believed UBL was on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border and that a brother of 

al-Kuwaiti was to take over courier duties for UBL. In June 2003, al-Baluchi stated that there were rumors that alKuwaiti was a courier. In January 2004, al-Baluchi retracted previous reporting, stating that al-Kuwaiti was never a 

courier and would not have direct contact with UBL or Ay man al-Zawahiri because "unlike someone like Abu Faraj, 

[al-Kuwaiti] was too young and didn't have much experience or credentials to be in that position." In May 2004, alBaluchi stated that al-Kuwaiti may have worked for Abu Faraj al-Libi. 5) Abu Faraj al-Libi was captured in 

Pakistan on May 2, 2005. On May 2005, Abu Faraj al-Libi was rendered to CIA custody. Abu Faraj al-Libi was 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques from May 28, 2005, to June 2, 2005, and again from June 

17, 2005, to June 28, 2005. It was not until July 12,2005, that CIA Headquarters sent a set of "Tier Three 

Requirements Regarding Abu Ahmad Al-Kuwaiti" to the detention site holding Abu Faraj al-Libi. Prior to this, 

interrogators had focused their questioning of Abu Faraj on operational plans, as well as information on senior alQa'ida leadership, primarily Hamza Rab'ia and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. On July 13, 2005, Abu Faraj al-Libi denied 

knowledge of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, or any of his aliases. On July 15, 2005, CIA Headquarters noted they did not 

believe Abu Faraj was being truthful and requested CIA debriefers confront Abu Faraj again regarding his 

relationship with al-Kuwaiti. CIA records indicate that CIA debriefers did not respond to this request. On August 

12, 2005, having received no response to its previous request, CIA Headquarters again asked Abu Faraj's debriefers 

to readdress the issue of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. CIA analysts noted that they "[found Faraj's] denials of even 

recognizing his name difficult to believe," and suggested that "one possible reason why [Faraj] lied about not 

recognizing Abu Ahmad's name] is [an attempt] to protect him - leading us to request that base readdress this issue 

with [Faraj] on a priority basis." Two days later, on August 14, 2005, after being questioned again about Abu 

Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, Abu Faraj al-Libi "swore to God" that he did not know al-Kuwaiti, or anybody who went by any 

of his aliases, insisting he would never forget anybody who worked for him. Abu Faraj did suggest, however, that 

an "Ahmad al-Pakistani" had worked with Marwan al-Jabbur to care for families in the Lahore, Pakistan, area, but 

said he (Abu Faraj) had no relationship with this al-Pakistani. On August 17, 2005, CIA Headquarters requested 

that debriefers reengage certain detainees on the role of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. In response, KSM and Khallad bin 

Attash claimed that al-Kuwaiti was not a courier and that they had never heard of Abu Ahmad transporting letters 

for UBL. KSM and Khallad bin Attash claimed that al-Kuwaiti was focused on family after he married in 2002. 

However, Ammar al-Baluchi indicated that al-Kuwaiti worked for Abu Faraj al-Libi in 2002. A September 1,2005, 

11 ii 1111 1 i II i II 

Page 388 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

388 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I//NOFOR N 

At the May 4, 2011, briefing, a Senator asked, "of the people that 

you talked about as detainees that were interrogated, which of those were waterboarded and did 

they provide unique intelligence in order to make this whole mission possible?"2191 CIA Director 

Panetta responded: 

"I want to be able to get back to you with specifics, but right now we think 

there were about 12 detainees that were interviewed}m and about three of 

them were probably subject to the waterboarding process.

2193 Now what came 

from those interviews, how important was it, I really do want to stress the fact 

that we had a lot of streams of intelligence here that kind of tipped us off there, 

but we had imagery, we had assets on the ground, we had information that 

came from a number of directions in order to piece this together. But clearly 

the tipofj2194 on the couriers came from those interviews."2*

95 

AS previously detailed, the "tipoff" on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 

2002 did not come from the interrogation of CIA detainees and was obtained prior to any CIA 

detainee reporting. The CIA was already targeting Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and collecting 

intelligence on at least one phone number and an email address associated with al-Kuwaiti in 

2002.2196 No CIA detainee provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002, and prior 

to receiving any information from CIA detainees, the CIA possessed a body of intelligence 

reporting linking Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to KSM and UBL and to operational targeting of the 

United States, as well as reporting that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was "one of a few close 

CIA report states that Abu Faraj al-Libi identified an "Abu 'Abd al Khaliq Jan," as his "go-between with Bin Ladin 

since mid-2003," but there was no other CIA reporting to support this assertion. In May 2007, a CIA targeting study 

concluded that the reporting from KSM and Abu Faraj al-Libi was "not credible," and "their attempts to downplay 

Abu Ahmad's importance or deny knowledge of Abu Ahmad are likely part of an effort to withhold information on 

UBL or his close associates." A September 28,2007, CIA report concluded that "Abu Faraj was probably the last 

detainee to maintain contact with UBL—possibly through Abu Ahmad," but noted that "Abu Faraj vehemently 

denied any knowledge of Abu Ahmad." See intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional details. 

2191

 Italics added. 

2192

 Italics added. For a listing of the 12 detainees, see CIA's six-page chart entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu 

Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," which lists 12 detainees, all of whom are listed as being in "CIA Custody" (DTS #2011 -2004). 

2193

 Italics added. CIA records indicate that none of the three CIA detainees known to have been subjected by the 

CIA to the waterboard interrogation technique provided unique intelligence on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. To the 

contrary, there is significant evidence that two of the three detainees—Abu Zubaydah and KSM—failed to provide 

accurate information likely known to them about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and/or fabricated information to protect alKuwaiti. The third CIA detainee known to have been subjected to the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique, 

'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, provided no information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. See intelligence chronology in 

Volume 11 for additional information. 

2194

 Italics added. The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "CIA has never represented that information acquired 

through its interrogations of detainees was either the first or the only information that we had on Abu Ahmad." 

2195

 Italics added. CIA testimony from CIA Director Panetta, and transcript of the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 4, 2011 (DTS #2011-2049). 

21 % CIA record ("Call Details Incoming and Outgoing") relating to calling activity for Bi^ H phone number 

ALEC • • (240057Z AUG 02). 

11 ii 1111 1

 1111 1 1 

Page 389 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

389 
UNCLASSIFIED 

m i M 111 I'^B^BBM^BBB'iHHIHII I 

associates of Usama bin Ladin"2197 and "traveled frequently" to "meet with Usama bin 

Ladin."2198 

The day after the classified briefing, on May 5, 2011, the CIA 

provided the Committee with a six-page chart entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad alKuwaiti," which accompanied a one-page document compiled by the CIA's CTC, entitled 

"Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti."2199 In total, the CIA chart 

identifies 25 "mid-value and high-value detainees" who "discussed Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's 

long-time membership in al-Qa'ida and his historic role as courier for Usama Bin Ladin." The 

25 detainees are divided into two categories. The chart prominently lists 12 detainees—all 

identified as having been in CIA custody—"who linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin," which the 

CIA labeled as the most important, "Tier 1" information. The document states that nine of the 

12 (9/12: 75 percent) CIA detainees providing "Tier 1" information were subjected to the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques, and that of those nine detainees, two (2/9: 20 percent) were 

subjected to the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique. The chart then includes a list of 13 

detainees "who provided general information on Abu Ahmad," labeled as "Tier 2" information. 

The CIA document states that four of the 13 (4/13: 30 percent) "Tier 2" detainees were in CIA 

custody and that all four (4/4: 100 percent) "CIA detainees" were subjected to the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques.2200 

(^^S/^^B^^Hl/NF ) O" October 3, 2012, the CIA provided the Committee with a 

document entitled, "Lessons for the Hunt for Bin Ladin," completed in September 2012 by the 

21,7 See intelligence chronology in Volume n, including CIA recorcH"Call Details Incoming and Outgoing") relating 

to calling activity for HH^hon e number#•§• ; ALEC^^H(24p057Z AUG02); [REDACTED] 65902 

(080950Z AUG02); ALEC(092204 Z AUG02), ^^^^^^^Jdate d 17 September2001; 

[REDACTED] 60077 (09/17/2001); DIRECTOR (221240Z AUG 02); and DIRECTOR • • (251833Z 

JUN 02). 

21,8 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including DIRECTOR (251833Z JUN 02). As described 

above, Riyadh the Facilitator was eventually rendered into the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 

January 2004, but CIA records indicate he was not subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The 

referenced information was provided in June 2002, while Riyadh the Facilitator was not in U.S. custody, but in the 

custody of a foreign government. 

2 m

 Senator McCain and other members requested information on the use of die CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques in the UBL operation at the previous day's hearing and the CIA committed to provide additional 

information to the members. Senator McCain: "I'm also interested in this whole issue of the 'enhanced 

interrogation,' what role it played. Those who want to justify torture seem to have grabbed hold of this as some 

justification for our gross violation of the Geneva Conventions to which we are signatory. I'd be very interested in 

having that issue clarified. I think it's really important." See transcript of the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee briefing on May 4, 2011 (DTS #2011-2049). 

2200 See CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated May 5,2011, which includes a document 

entitled, "Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," with an accompanying six-page chart 

entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti" (DTS #2011 -2004). See also a similar, but less detailed 

CIA document entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's Historic Links to Usama Bin Laden." 

The CIA's September 2012 "Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin," compiled by the CIA's Center for the Study of 

Intelligence (See DTS #2012-3826), appears to utilize the same inaccurate information, stating: "In sum, 25 

detainees provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, his al-Qa'ida membership, and his historic role as a 

courier for Bin Ladin. Nine of the 25 were held by foreign governments. Of the 16 held in CIA custody, all but 

three had given information after being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs), although of the 13 

only two (KSM and Abu Zubaydah) had been waterboarded" (italics added). As described, die information in this 

CIA "lessons" report is inaccurate. 

11II I I III I ^^^^^^^^^^^BrYNOFOi m 

Page 390 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

390 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I / / NOFOR N 

CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence. The CIA Lessons Learned document states, "[i]n 

sum, 25 detainees provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, his al-Qa'ida membership, 

and his historic role as a courier for Bin Ladin." The CIA document then states that ] 6 of the 25 

detainees who reported on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti were in CIA custody, and that "[o]f the 16 

held in CIA custody, all but three [13] had given information after being subjected to enhanced 

interrogation techniques (EITs)," before noting that "only two (KSM and Abu Zubaydah) had 

been waterboarded."

 2201 

A review of CIA records found that these CIA documents 

contained inaccurate information and omitted important and material facts. 

• The May 5, 2011, CIA chart represents that all 12 detainees (12/12: 100 percent) providing 

"Tier 1" intelligence—information that "linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin"2202—were 

detainees in CIA custody. A review of CIA records found that the CIA document omitted the 

fact that five of the 12 listed detainees (5/12: 41 percent) provided intelligence on Abu 

Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to entering CIA custody.2203 In addition, other detainees—not in 

CIA custody—provided information that "linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin," but were not 

included in the CIA list. For example, the first detainee-related information identified in CIA 

records indicating a close relationship between UBL and Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was 

acquired in July 2002, from a detainee in the custody of a foreign government, Abu Zubair 

al-Ha'ili (Zubair). According to CIA records, Zubair provided a detailed physical description 

of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, information on Abu Ahmad's family, his close connection to 

KSM, and that "Ahmad al-Kuwaiti: was a one of a few close associates of Usama bin 

Ladin."2204 This information would be used to question other detainees, but was omitted in 

the CIA's "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti" chart. 

• The May 5, 2011, CIA chart also states that nine of the 12 (9/12: 75 percent) "CIA 

detainees" providing "Tier 1" intelligence were subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques. A review of CIA records found that of the nine detainees the CIA 

identified as having been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and 

providing "Tier 1" information on links between Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and UBL, five of 

the 9 (5/9: 55 percent) provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to being 

2201

 Italics added. "Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin," dated September 2012, compiled by the CIA's Center for 

the Study of Intelligence, and provided on October 3, 2012 (DTS #2012-3826). 

2202

 The CIA document identified "Tier 1" intelligence as information that "linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin," but 

inaccurately included CIA detainees under the "Tier 1" detainee reporting list who did not provide information 

linking "Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin." For example, the CIA identified Abu Zubaydah and KSM as providing "Tier 

1" intelligence that "linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin," despite both detainees denying any significant connection 

between al-Kuwaiti and UBL. 

2203

 Riyadh the Facilitator (information on June 25, 2002 [prior to CIA custody]; CIA custody January 2004), 

Ammar al-Baluchi (information on May 6, 2003 [prior to CIA custody]; CIA custody MayB|, 2003), Ahmed 

Ghailani (information on August 1, 2004 [prior to CIA custody]; CIA custody September 2004), Sharif al-Masri 

(information on September 16,2004 [prior to CIA custody]; CIA custody September 2004), and Muhammad 

Rahim (information on July 2, 2007 [prior to CIA custody]; CIA custody July 2007). There are reports that a 

sixth detainee, Hassan Ghul, also provided extensive information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to being 

transferred to CIA custody. See intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional information. 

2204

 DIRECTOR H I (221240Z AUG 02) 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 391 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

391 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRETflB^^^^^^^i^MflNQEQR N 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.22 This information was omitted 

from the CIA document. Of the remaining four detainees who did not provide information 

on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until after being subjected to the CIA's enhanced intenogation 

techniques, three were not substantially questioned on any topic prior to the CIA's use of 

enhanced interrogation techniques.2206 All three provided information the CIA assessed to be 

fabricated and intentionally misleading.2207 The fourth, Abu Zubaydah, who was detained on 

March 28, 2002, and subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in August 

2002, to include the waterboard technique, did not provide information on Abu Ahmad alKuwaiti until August 25, 2005, intelligence that was described by CIA officers at the time as 

"speculative."2208 These relevant details were omitted from the CIA documents.2209 

• The May 5, 2011, CIA chart also states that of the 13 detainees "who provided general 

information on Abu Ahmad," labeled as "Tier 2 " information, four of the 13 (4/13: 30 

percent) detainees were in CIA custody and that all four (4/4:100 percent) were subjected to 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.2210 A review of CIA records found the CIA 

document omitted that two of the four (2/4: 50 percent) "CIA detainees" who were described 

as subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques provided intelligence on Abu 

Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to entering CIA custody, and therefore prior to being subjected to 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.2211 Finally, there were additional detainees in 

2205

 Ammar al-Baluchi, Hassan Ghul, Ahmad Ghailani, Sharif al-Masri, and Muhammad Rahim. 

1206

 Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, Khalid bin Attash, and Abu Faraj al-Libi. 

2207

 Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, Abu Faraj al-Libi, and Khalid bin Attash. See intelligence chronology in Volume II 

and CIA testimony from May 4, 2011. CIA officer: "... with the capture of Abu Faraj al-Libi and Khalid Shaykh 

Mohammed, these are key bin Ladin facilitators, gatekeepers if you will, and their description of Abu Ahmed, the 

sharp contrast between that and the earlier detainees. Abu Faraj denies even knowing him, a completely uncredible 

position for him to take but one that he has stuck with to this day. KSM initially downplays any role Abu Ahmed 

might play, and by the time he leaves our program claims that he married in 2002, retired and really was playing no 

role." CIA records indicate Khallad bin Attash also downplayed the role of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, stating several 

times that Abu Ahmad was focused on family and was not close to UBL, and that he had never heard of Abu Ahmad 

al-Kuwaiti servine^j^i courier for UBL. 

3208

 DIRECTOR (8/25/2005). On July 7,2003, and April 27, 2004, Abu Zubaydah was asked about "Abu 

Ahmed al-Kuwaiti" and denied knowing the name. 

2209 See CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated May 5, 2011, which includes a document 

entitled, "Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," with an accompanying six-page chart 

entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti" (DTS #2011-2004). See also a similar, but less detailed 

CIA document entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's Historic Links to Usama Bin Laden." See 

intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional details. 

2210 See CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated May 5, 2011, which includes a document 

entitled, "Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," with an accompanying six-page chart 

entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti" (DTS #2011 -2004). See also a similar, but less detailed 

CIA document entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's Historic Links to Usama Bin Laden." 

The CIA's September 2012 "Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin," compiled by the CIA's Center for the Study of 

Intelligence (DTS #2012-3826), appears to utilize the same inaccurate information, stating: "In sum, 25 detainees 

provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, his al-Qa'ida membership, and his historic role as a courier for Bin 

Ladin. Nine of the 25 were held by foreign governments. Of the 16 held in CIA custody, all but three had given 

information after being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs)..." (italics added). As described, the 

information in this CIA "Lessons Learned" report is inaccurate. 

3211

 Ridha al-Najjar/al-Tunisi, who was detained in May 2002, first provided intelligence on al-Kuwaiti on June 4/5 

2002, and was subsequently transferred to CIA custody on June|, 2002; and subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

IIII i i III i 'BBBBBIMBB M 'i llll Hill i 

Page 392 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

392 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I / / NOFOR N 

foreign government custody "who provided general information on Abu Ahmad" that were 

not included in the list of 13 detainees. For example, in January 2002, the CIA received 

reporting from a detainee in the custody of a foreign government who provided a physical 

description of a Kuwaiti named Abu Ahmad who attended a terrorist training camp.2212 

• The October 3, 2012, "Lessons for the Hunt for Bin Ladin" document states that "[i]n sum, 

25 detainees provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, his al-Qa'ida membership, 

and his historic role as a courier for Bin Ladin." This is incorrect. As described, additional 

detainees—not in CIA custody—provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, including 

2002 reporting that al-Kuwaiti "was one of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin."2213 

• The October 3, 2012, "Lessons for the Hunt for Bin Ladin" document also states that 16 of 

the 25 (16/25: 65 percent) detainees who reported on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti were in CIA 

custody. This is incorrect. At least seven of the 16 detainees (7/16: 45 percent) that the CIA 

listed as detainees in CIA custody provided reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to 

being transferred to CIA custody.2214 

• The October 3, 2012, "Lessons for the Hunt for Bin Ladin " document also states that "[ojf 

the 16 held in CIA custody, all but three [13] had given information after being subjected to 

enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs). "22J5 This is incorrect. Seven of the 13 detainees 

that the CIA listed as having been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 

provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to being subjected to the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques.2216 Of the remaining six detainees who did not provide 

information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until after being subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, five were not substantially questioned on any topic prior to the 

CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques.2217 (Of the five detainees, three provided 

information the CIA assessed to be fabricated and intentionally misleading.2218 The 

interrogation techniques in October 2002. Hambali, who was detained on August 11, 2003, first provided 

information on al-Kuwaiti on August 13, 2003. Later, Hambali was rendered to CIA custody on August 2003. 

2212 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including 63211 (30 JAN 2002). 

22.3

 DIRECTOR • • (221240Z AUG 02) 

22.4 See intelligence chronology in Volume 11, including reporting from Riyadh the Facilitator, Aminar al-Baluchi, 

Ahmad Ghailani, Sharif al-Masri, Muhammad Rahim, Ridha al-Najjar/al-Tunisi, and Hambali. As detailed, a 

former CIA officer stated publicly that Hassan Ghul provided reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to being 

transferred to CIA custody. 

2215

 "Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin," dated September 2012, compiled by the CIA's Center for the Study of 

Intelligence, and provided on October 3, 2012 (DTS #2012-3826). 

2216 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including reporting from Ammar al-Baluchi, Ahmad Ghailani, Sharif 

al-Masri, Muhammad Rahim, Ridha al-Najjar/al-Tunisi, Hambali, and Hassan Ghul. 

2217

 Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, Khalid bin Attash, Abu Yasir al-Jaza'iri, Samir al-Barq, and Abu Faraj al-Libi. 

2218

 Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, Abu Faraj al-Libi, and Khalid bin Attash. See intelligence chronology in Volume II 

and CIA testimony from May 4, 2011. CIA officer: "... with the capture of Abu Faraj al-Libi and Khalid Shaykh 

Mohammed, these are key bin Ladin facilitators, gatekeepers if you will, and their description of Abu Ahmed, the 

sharp contrast between that and the earlier detainees. Abu Faraj denies even knowing him, a completely uncredible 

position for him to take but one that he has stuck with to this day. KSM initially downplays any role Abu Ahmed 

might play, and by the time he leaves our program claims that he married in 2002, retired and really was playing no 

role." CIA records indicate Khallad bin A " Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, stating several 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 393 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

393 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

remaining two provided limited, non-unique, corroborative reporting.2219) The sixth, Abu 

Zubaydah, who was detained on March 28, 2002, and subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques in August 2002, did not provide information on Abu Ahmad alKuwaiti until August 25, 2005, intelligence that, as noted, was described by CIA officers at 

the time as "speculative."2220 

• The October 3, 2012, "Lessons for the Hunt for Bin Ladin" document also states that "only 

two [detainees] (KSM and Abu Zubaydah) had been waterboarded. Even so, KSM gave false 

information about Abu Ahmad.... "2221 The CIA's May 5, 2011, Chart, "Reporting on Abu 

Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," states that Abu Zubaydah and KSM provided "Tier 1" intelligence that 

"linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin." CIA records indicate that both detainees denied any 

significant connection between al-Kuwaiti and UBL. CTA records further indicate that Abu 

Zubaydah and KSM, who were both subjected to the CIA's waterboard interrogation 

technique, withheld information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti: 

o Abu Zubaydah: "Abu Ahmad K." and a phone number associated with Abu Ahmad 

al-Kuwaiti was found on page 8 of a 27-page address book captured with Abu 

Zubaydah on March 28, 2002. In July 2003, Abu Zubaydah stated that he was not 

familiar with the name Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, or the description provided to him by 

CIA officers. In April 2004, Abu Zubaydah again stated that he did not recognize the 

name "Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti."2222 According to a CIA cable, in August 2005, Abu 

Zubaydah provided information on "an individual whose name he did not know, but 

who might be identifiable with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, aka Abu Ahmad alPakistani." According to the cable, Abu Zubaydah speculated that this individual 

knew UBL and al-Zawahiri, but did not think their relationship would be close. Days 

later a CIA cable elaborated that Abu Zubaydah had speculated on a family of 

brothers from Karachi that may have included Abu Ahmad.2223 

times that Abu Ahmad was focused on family and was not close to UBL, and that he had never heard of Abu Ahmad 

al-Kuwaiti serving as a courier for UBL. 

2219

 Abu Yasir al-Jaza'iri provided corroborative information in July 2003 that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was 

associated with KSM, was best known in Karachi, and appeared to be Pakistani. (See DIRECTOR HH I 

(111632Z JUL 03).) Samir al-Barq provided information in September 2003 that al-Kuwaiti had provided al-Barq 

with $1000 to obtain a house in Karachi that al-Qa'ida could use for a biological weapons lab. (See 47409 

(191324Z NOV 03), as well as the detainee review of Samir al-Barq in Volume II] that details al-Barq's various 

statements on al-Qa'ida's ambition to establish a biological weapons program.) Neither of these reports is cited in 

CIA records as providing unique or new information. In October 2003, both detainees denied having any 

information on the use of Abbottabad as a safe haven for al-Qa'ida. See ^^HH I 10172 (160821Z OCT 03); 

48444 (240942Z OCT 03). 

2220

 DIRECTOR (8/25/2005). On July 7, 2003, and April 27, 2004, Abu Zubaydah was asked about "Abu 

Ahmed al-Kuwaiti" and denied knowing the name. 

2221

 "Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin," dated September 2012, compiled by the CIA's Center for the Study of 

Intelligence, and provided on October 3,2012 (DTS #2012-3826). 

2222

 In addition to "Abu Ahmad K." being included in Abu Zubaydah's address book, there was additional reporting 

indicating that Abu Zubaydah had some knowledge of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. For example, on October 12, 2004, 

another CIA detainee explained how he met al-Kuwaiti at a guesthouse that was operated by Ibn Shaykh al-Libi and 

Abu Zubaydah in 1997. See intelligence chronology in Volume n. 

2223 See DIRECTOR (252024Z AUG 05) and the intelligence chronology in Volume II. 

11II IMII I 

Page 394 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

394 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I / / NOFOR N 

o KSM: When KSM was captured on March 1, 2003, an email address associated with 

Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was found on a laptop believed to be used by KSM. As 

detailed in this review, KSM first acknowledged Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in May 

2003, after being confronted with reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from a 

detainee who was not in CIA custody. KSM provided various reports on Abu Ahmad 

that the CIA described as "pithy." In August 2005, KSM claimed that al-Kuwaiti was 

not a courier, and that he had never heard of Abu Ahmad transporting letters for 

UBL. In May 2007, the CIA reported that the denials of KSM and another detainee, 

combined with conflicting reporting from other detainees, added to the CIA's belief 

that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was a significant figure.2224 

The CIA detainee who provided the most accurate "Tier 1" 

information linking Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to UBL, Hassan Ghul, provided the information 

prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.2225 Hassan Ghul was 

captured on January 2004, by foreign authorities in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.2226 Ghul was 

reportedly first interrogated by IHHf c then transferred to U.S. military custody and 

questioned, and then rendered to CIA custody at DETENTION SITE COBALT on January 

2004.2227 From January 2004, to January 2004, Hassan Ghul was questioned by the CIA 

at DETENTION SITE COBALT. During this period the CIA disseminated 21 intelligence 

reports based on Ghul's reporting.2228 A CIA officer told the CIA Office of Inspector General 

1224 See intelligence chronology in Volume II, including ALEC^^•(102238 2 MAR 03); HEADQUARTERS 

(•Hf l JAN 04); • • 29986 (171741Z AUG 5594 (201039Z MAY 07). 

2225

 As the dissemination of 21 intelligence reports suggests, information in CIA records indicates Hassan Ghul was 

cooperative with CIA personnel prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques. In an 

interview with the CIA Office of Inspector General, a CIA officer familiar with Ghul stated, "He sang like a tweetie 

bird. He opened up right away and was cooperative from the outset." (See December 2,2004, interview with 

[REDACTED], Chief, DO, CTC UBL Department, ^^HHHHHH )

 Th e CIA 'S

 September 2012 

"Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin," compiled by the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence (DTS #2012-

3826), states that: "Ghul's tantalizing lead began a systematic but low profile effort to target and further identify 

Abu Ahmad." On April 16, 2013, the Council on Foreign Relations hosted a forum in relation to the screening of 

the film, "Manhunt." The forum included former CIA officer Nada Bakos, who states in the film that Hassan Ghul 

provided the critical information on Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti to Kurdish officials prior to entering CIA custody. 

When asked about the interrogation techniques used by the Kurds, Bakos stated: "...honestly, Hassan Ghul...when 

he was being debriefed by the Kurdish government, he literally was sitting there having tea. He was in a safe house. 

He wasn't locked up in a cell. He wasn't handcuffed to anything. He was—he was having a free flowing 

conversation. And there's—you know, there's articles in Kurdish papers about sort of their interpretation of the 

story and how forthcoming he was." See www.cfr.org/countertenorism/film-screening-manhunt/p30560. When 

asked by the Committee to comment on this narrative, the CIA wrote on October 25, 2013: "We have not identified 

Page 395 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

395 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

that Hassan Ghul "opened up right away and was cooperative from the outset."2229 During the 

January 2004, to January 2004, sessions, Ghul was questioned on the location of UBL. 

According to a cable, Ghul speculated that "UBL was likely living in Peshawar area," and that 

"it was well known that [UBL] was always with Abu Ahmed [al-Kuwaiti]."2230 Ghul described 

Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti as UBL's "closest assistant"2231 and listed him as one of three 

individuals likely to be with UBL.2232 Ghul further speculated that: 

"UBL's security apparatus would be minimal, and that the group likely lived in 

a House with a family somewhere in Pakistan. Ghul commented that after 

UBL's bodyguard entourage was apprehended entering Pakistan following the 

fall of Afghanistan, UBL likely has maintained a small security signature of 

circa one or two persons. Ghul speculated that Abu Ahmed likely handled all 

of UBL's needs, including moving messages out to Abu Faraj [al-Libi]...."2233 

(T&VB^^^^^^B^NF ) The next day, January 2004, Hassan Ghul was transferred to 

the CIA's DETENTION SITE BLACK.2234 Upon arrival, Ghul was "shaved and barbered, 

stripped, and placed in the standing position against the wall" with "his hands above his head" 

for forty minutes.2235 The CIA interrogators at the detention site immediately requested 

permission to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Ghul, writing that, during 

the forty minutes, Ghul did not provide any new information, did not show the fear that was 

typical of other recent captures, and "was somewhat arrogant and self important." The CIA 

interrogators wrote that they "judged" that Ghul "has the expectation that in U.S. hands, his 

treatment will not be severe."2236 The request to CIA Headquarters to use the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques further stated: 

released as | 

O A ] 

I677| 

DIRECTOR 

|FEB 04); 

1652 

JAN 04), later released as | 

JAN 04), later 

JAN 04); 

JAN 04) 1679 

f 04), later released 

• released 

N 04), later 

04), later rrli i i il i I I II II11 Iii HI 

JAN 04); 

JAN 04). 

2229 See December 2, 2004, CIA Office of Inspector General with [REDACTED], Chief, DO, CTC UBL 

Department, in which a CIA officer involved with the interrogations of Hassan Ghul, 

states: "He sang like a tweetie bird. He opened up right away and was cooperative from the outset." 

2230

 HEADQUARTERS AN 04) 

2231 

2232 | 

1679 

1679 

2233

 HEADQUARTERS | 

12831 

JAN 04) 

| JAN 04) 

| JAN 04) 

DETENTION SITE BLACK 

2235 

2236 

1285 ^HJA N 04) 

11285

 04> 

TOP SECRET//I 

Page 396 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

396 

I//NOFORN 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I / / NOFOR N 

"The interrogation team believes, based on [Hassan Ghul's] reaction to the 

initial contact, that his al-Qa'ida briefings and his earlier experiences with U.S. 

military interrogators have convinced him there are limits to the physical 

contact interrogators can have with him. The interrogation team believes the 

approval and employment of enhanced measures should sufficiently shift 

[Hassan Ghul's] paradigm of what he expects to happen. The lack of these 

increasd [sic] measures may limit the team's capability to collect critical and 

reliable information in a timely manner."2237 

(TS/^HH^H^H^^ ) CIA Headquarters approved the request the same day, stating that 

the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques would "increase base's capability to 

collect critical and reliable threat information in a timely manner."2238 During and after the use 

of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Ghul provided no other information of 

substance on al-Kuwaiti.2239 Hassan Ghul was 

later released.2240 

JAN 04) 2237

 ^^••.1285 1 

2238

 HEADQUARTERS JAN 04) 

2239 See intelligence chronology in Volume II. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[a]fter undergoing 

enhanced interrogation techniques," Hassan Ghul provided information that became "more concrete and less 

speculative, it also corroborated information from Ammar that Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) was lying when 

he claimed Abu Ahmad left al-Qa'ida in 2002." The assertion in the CIA's June 2013 Response that information 

acquired from Hassan Ghul "[a]fter undergoing enhanced interrogation techniques" "corroborated information from 

Ammar that Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) was lying when he claimed Abu Ahmad left al-Qa'ida in 2002" is 

incorrect. First, the referenced information from Hassan Ghul was acquired prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques. A CIA cable, HEADQUARTERS

 JA N

 04), explains that based on 

Hassan Ghul's comments that it was "well known" that UBL was always with al-Kuwaiti (acquired prior to the use 

of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques), CIA Headquarters asked interrogators to reengage KSM on the 

relationship between al-Kuwaiti and UBL, noting the "serious disconnect" between Hassan Ghul's comments and 

KSM's "pithy" description of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. The cable notes that KSM had made "no reference to a link 

between Abu Ahmed and al-Qa'ida's two top leaders, nor has he hinted at all that Abu Ahmed was involved in the 

facilitation of Zawahiri in/around Peshawar in February 2003," and that KSM "has some explaining to do about Abu 

Ahmed and his support to UBL and Zawahiri." Second, as the intelligence chronology in Volume II details, there 

was a significant body of intelligence well before Hassan Ghul's pre-enhanced interrogation techniques reporting in 

January 2004 indicating that KSM was providing inaccurate information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. See detailed 

information in Volume II intelligence chronology. Third, as detailed in CIA-provided documents (DTS #2011-

2004), the CIA described Hassan Ghul's reporting as "speculat[ivej" both during and after theuse of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques. Finally, as noted earlier, the CIA's June 2013 Response ignores or minimizes a 

large body of intelligence reporting in CIA records—and documented in the Committee Study—that was acquired 

from sources and methods unrelated to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Nonetheless, the 

CIA's June 2013 Response asserts: "It is impossible to know in hindsight whether we could have obtained from 

Ammar, Gul, and others the same information that helped us find Bin Ladin without using enhanced techniques, or 

whether we eventually would have acquired other intelligence that allowed us to successfully pursue the Abu 

Ahmad lead or some other lead without the information we acquired from detainees in CIA custody" (italics added). 

As detailed in this summary, the most accurate intelligence from a detainee on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was acquired 

prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques provided inaccurate and fabricated information on al-Kuwaiti. See detailed information in 

the Volume II intelligence chronology. ^^^ ^ ^^^^^^^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^^ ^ 

2240 ^^^ ^ 2441 HEADQUARTERS ^HH^^HI^^H ; ^^^^H i 1635 

[1712 HHHHf t HEADQUARTERS I 

11775 H^^^Hrm ^ | 

2241 See Committee Notification from the CIAdated^^^^M I (DTS #2012-3802). 

M I I I I II I 1 IIIIIIIII I 

Page 397 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

397 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

that Hassan Ghul provided the detailed information linking Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to UBL prior 

to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was omitted from CIA documents and 

testimony.2242 

While CIA documents and testimony highlighted reporting that the 

CIA claimed was obtained from CIA detainees—and in some cases from CIA detainees 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—the CIA internally noted that 

reporting from CIA detainees—specifically CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques—was insufficient, fabricated, and/or unreliable. 

(^S/^^^^lflfll^^^^IF ) A September 1, 2005, CIA report on the search for UBL states: 

"Bin Ladin Couriers: Low-level couriers who wittingly or unwittingly facilitate 

communications between Bin Ladin and his gatekeepers remain largely 

invisible to us until a detainee reveals them.2243 Even then, detainees provide 

few actionable leads, and we have to consider the possibility that they are 

creating fictitious characters to distract us or to absolve themselves of direct 

knowledge about Bin Ladin. We nonetheless continue the hunt for Abu 

Ahmed al-Kuwaiti—an alleged courier between Bin Ladin and KSM—and 

Abu 'Abd al Khaliq Jan, who[m] Abu Faraj identified as his go-between with 

Bin Ladin since mid-2003, in order to get one step closer to Bin Ladin."2244 

A May 20, 2007, CIA "targeting study" for Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti 

states: 

"Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) described Abu Ahmad as a relatively 

minor figure and Abu Faraj al-Libi denied all knowledge of Abu Ahmad. 

Station assesses that KSM and Abu Faraj's reporting is not credible on this 

topic, and their attempts to downplay Abu Ahmad's importance or deny 

knowledge of Abu Ahmad are likely part of an effort to withhold information 

on UBL or his close associates. These denials, combined with reporting from 

other detainees2245 indicating that Abu Ahmad worked closely with KSM and 

Abu Faraj, add to our belief that Abu Ahmad is an HVT courier or 

facilitator."2246 

2242 See CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated May 5, 2011, which includes a document 

entitled, "Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," with an accompanying six-page chart 

entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti" (DTS #2011-2004). See also a similar, but less detailed 

CIA document entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's Historic Links to Usama Bin Laden." 

2243

 Significant information was acquired on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti independent of CIA detainees. See intelligence 

chronology in Volume II. 

2244

 Italics added. CIA analysis entitled, "Overcoming Challenges To Capturing Usama Bin Ladin, 1 September 

2005." CIA records indicate that Abu Faraj al-Libi fabricated information relating to '"Abd al Khaliq Jan." 

2245

 Italics added. As detailed, the reporting that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti "worked closely with KSM" and was "one 

of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin," who "traveled frequently" to "meet with Usama bin Ladin," was 

acquired in 2002, from sources unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. 

224<i

 Italics added. 5594 (201039Z MAY 07). Reporting from CIA detainees Ammar al-Baluchi and 

Khallad bin Attash—both subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—included similar inaccurate 

11 ii 1111 1

 (

» i 

Page 398 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

398 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I / / NOFOR N 

( P) Additional CIA documents contrasted the lack of intelligence 

obtained from CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques with the 

value of intelligence obtained from other sources. A November 23, 2007, CIA intelligence 

product, "Al-Qa'ida Watch," with the title, "Probable Identification of Suspected Bin Ladin 

Facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," details how a: 

"review of 2002 debriefings of a [foreign government] detainee who claimed 

to have traveled in 2000 from Kuwait to Afghanistan with an 'Ahmad alKuwaiti' provided the breakthrough leading to the likely identification of 

Habib al-Rahman as Abu Ahmad. The [foreign government] subsequently 

informed [the CIA] that Habib al-Rahman currently is living in Pakistan, 

probably in the greater Peshawar area—according to our analysis of a body of 

reporting."2247 

This CIA intelligence product highlighted how reporting from Abu 

Faraj al-Libi, who was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and denied 

knowing Abu Ahmad, differed from that of Hassan Ghul, who—prior to thc application of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—stated that "Bin Ladin was always with Abu Ahmad," 

and that Abu Ahmad had delivered a message to senior al-Qa'ida leaders in late 2003, "probably 

through Abu Faraj." The document further states that KSM "has consistently maintained that 

Abu Ahmad 'retired' from al-Qa'ida work in 2002." The CIA document states that the CIA will 

be working with and the government, as well as utilizing a database 

information. Kliallad bin Attash was arrested with Ammar al-Baluchi in a unilateral operation by Pakistani 

authorities resulting from criminal leads on April 29, 2003. On May 2003, bin Attash was rendered to CIA 

custody and immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques from May 16, 2003, to May 18, 

2003, and then again from July 18, 2003, to July 29,2003. On June 30,2003, bin Attash stated that al-Kuwaiti was 

admired among the men. On July 27, 2003, bin Attash corroborated intelligence reporting that al-Kuwaiti played a 

facilitation role in al-Qa'ida and that al-Kuwaiti departed Karachi to get married. In January 2004, bin Attash stated 

diat al-Kuwaiti was not close to UBL and not involved in al-Qa'ida operations, and diat al-Kuwaiti was settling 

down with his wife in the summer of 2003. In August 2005, bin Attash stated that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was not a 

courier, that he had never heard of Abu Ahmad transporting letters for UBL, and that Abu Ahmad was instead 

focused on family after he married in 2002. In August 2006, bin Attash reiterated that al-Kuwaiti was not a courier, 

but rather focused on family life. Ammar al-Baluchi was anested with Khallad bin Attash in a unilateral operation 

by Pakistani authorities resulting from criminal leads on April 29, 2003. Upon his arrest in Pakistan, Ammar alBaluchi was cooperative and provided information on a number of topics to foreign government interrogators, 

including information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti that the CIA disseminated prior to al-Baluchi being transferred to 

CIA custody on May 2003. After Ammar al-Baluchi was transferred to CIA custody, the CIA subjected Ammar 

al-Baluchi to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques from May 17,2003, to May 20, 2003. On May 19, 2003, 

al-Baluchi admitted to fabricating information while being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 

die previous day, and in response to questioning, stated that he believed UBL was on the Pakistan/Afghanistan 

border and that a brother of al-Kuwaiti was to take over courier duties for UBL. In June 2003, al-Baluchi stated that 

there were rumors that al-Kuwaiti was a courier. In early 2004, al-Baluchi acknowledged that al-Kuwaiti may have 

worked for Abu Faraj al-Libi, but stated that al-Kuwaiti was never a courier and would not have direct contact with 

UBL. See intelligence chronology in Volume II and detainee reviews of Khallad bin Attash and Ammar al-Baluchi 

for additional information. 

2247 See CIA CTC "Al-Qa'ida Watch," dated November 23, 2007. 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 399 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

399 
UNCLASSIFIED 

lll l I I III I I llll Mill I 

of| 

and date of birth.2248 

| to follow-up on an individual traveling within Pakistan with a similar name 

(TS/^^^^^^^^y/NF ) CIA cable records from early 2008 highlight how the discovery 

and exploitation of phone numbers associated with al-Kuwaiti|^K | had been critical in 

collecting intelligence and locating the target2249 and state: 

. .debriefings of the senior most detainees who were involved in caring for 

bin Ladin have produced little locational information, and it is the final nugget 

that detainees hold on to in debriefings (over threat info and even Zawahiri 

LOCINT) given their loyalty to the al-Qa'ida leader. We assess that Abu 

Ahmad would likely be in the same category as Khalid Shaykh Muhammad 

and Abu Faraj al-Libi, so we advocate building as much of a targeting picture 

of where and when Habib/Abu Ahmad travels to flesh out current leads to bin 

Ladin."2250 

(^SA^HI^^^^^^^^ )

 0 n

 May 1, 2008, a CIA Headquarters cable entitled, "targeting 

efforts against suspected UBL facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," documents that the CIA had a 

number of collection platforms established to collect intelligence on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 

order to locate UBL. The cable closes by stating: 

"although we want to refrain from addressing endgame strategies, HQS judges 

that detaining Habib should be a last resort, since we have had no/no success in 

eliciting actionable intelligence on bin Ladin's location from any 

detainees."2251 

(TS/^^^^^^^^^W^F ) While the aforementioned CIA assessments highlight the 

unreliability of reporting from senior al-Qa'ida leaders in CIA custody, specifically "that KSM 

and Abu Faraj's reporting" was assessed to be "not credible"—and that their denials "add fed] to 

[the CIA's] belief that Abu Ahmad is an HVT courier or facilitator"2252—the CIA assessments 

also highlight that "reporting from other detainees indicating that Abu Ahmad worked closely 

with KSM and Abu Faraj" was useful.2253 As documented, the initial detainee-related 

information linking Abu Ahmad to UBL and KSM did not come from CIA detainees, but from 

detainees who were not in CIA custody.2254 

2248 See CIA CTC "Al-Qa'ida Watch," dated November 23, 2007. 

wo 380 g (2H420Z JAN 08); HEADQUARTERS 

(240740Z JAN 08)j||M556 8 (081633Z FEB 08) 

22, 0

 Italics added. ^^^H B 9044 (240740Z JAN 08). 

2251

 HEADQUARTERS^^H(011334Z MAY 08) 

15594 (201039Z MAY 07) 

15594 (201039Z MAY 07) 

2254 See information in Volume II intelligence chronology for additional details. 

(232217Z JAN 08); | 9044 

TOP SECRET// 1//NOFORN 

Page 400 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

400 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I//NOFOR N 

IV. Overview of CIA Representations to the Media While the Program Was 

Classified 

A. The CIA Provides Information on the Still-Classified Detention and Interrogation 

Program to Journalists Who then Publish Classified Information; CIA Does Not File 

Crimes Reports in Connection with the Stories 

(TS/f^^^^^mHw/NF ) In seeking to shape press reporting on the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program, CIA officers and the CIA's Office of Public Affairs (OPA) provided 

unattributed background information on the program to journalists for books, articles, and 

broadcasts, including when the existence of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was 

still classified.2255 When the journalists to whom the CIA had provided background information 

published classified information, the CIA did not, as a matter of policy, submit crimes reports^ 

For example, as described in internal emails, the CIA's | 

never opened an investigation related to Ronald Kessler's book 

The CIA at War, despite the inclusion of classified information, because "the book contained no 

first time disclosures," and because "OPA provided assistance with the book."2256 Senior Deputy 

General Counsel John Rizzo wrote that the CIA made the determination because the CIA's 

cooperation with Kessler had been "blessed" by the CIA director.2257 In another example, CIA 

officers and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence raised concerns that an 

article by Douglas Jehl in the New York Times contained significant classified information.2258 

|CTC Legal wrote in an email that "part of this article was based on 'background' 

provided by OPA. That, essentially, negates any use in making an unauthorized disclosure 

[report]."2259 

Both the Kessler book and the Jehl article included inaccurate 

claims about the effectiveness of CIA interrogations, much of it consistent with the inaccurate 

information being provided by the CIA to policymakers at the time. For example, Kessler's 

book stated that the FBI arrest of Iyman Faris was "[b]ased on information from the CIA's 

2255

 On October 28, 2013, the CIA informed the Committee that "CIA policy is to conduct background briefings 

using unclassified or declassified information" (DTS #2013-3152). 

2256

 Email to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: 

I; subject: CIA at War; date: January 20, 2004, at 11:13 AM; email from: IH^^^^^HH; t o : 

I cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTEDjJU^^BB , [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Cl^^ar ; 

date: January 21, 2004, at 02:11 PM; email from: W. Muller, John A. Rizzo, |H H 

^H^H -

 cc :

 HIHHH B subject: Re: CIA at Warjdate^anuary21, 2004, at 02:27 P^^^^^^ ^ 

2257

 Email John A. Rizzo; to: cc: HH^^^I , Scott W. Muller, 

[REDACTED]; subject: Re: CIA at War; date: January 22,2004, at 09:28 AM. 

2258 «Ru] e Change Lets C.I.A. Freely Send Suspects Abroad to .Tails," by Douglas Jehl and David Johnston, The New 

York Times, March 6,2005; email from: ^HH^H ; to: BHH '

 cc :

 ^^^I^HIH : 

|; subject: Question on 06 March New York Times revelations; date: April 22, 2005, at 01:38 

PM; email from: to: cc: 

|; subject: Re: Question on 06 March New York Times 

revelations; dateiApril28;2005, at 

22f®Emailfrom: to: cc: 

^•••1 ; subject: Re: Question on 06 March New York Times revelations; date: April 28, 2005, at 8:25:23 

AM. 

nil 1 i i i i I IIIII I 

Page 401 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

401 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

interrogation of [KSM]," and that the arrest of Khallad bin Attash was the "result" of CIA 

interrogations of KSM.2260 The Jehl article stated that a "secret program to transfer suspected 

terrorists to foreign countries for interrogation has been carried out by the Central Intelligence 

Agency... according to current and former government officials." The article stated that a 

"senior United States official" had "provid[ed] a detailed description of the program," and 

quoted the official as claiming that "[t]he intelligence obtained by those rendered, detained and 

interrogated ha[d] disrupted terrorist operations." The senior official added, "[i]t has saved lives 

in the United States and abroad, and it has resulted in the capture of other terrorists."2261 

B. Senior CIA Officials Discuss Need to "Put Out Our Story" to Shape Public and 

Congressional Opinion Prior to the Full Committee Being Briefed 

asked CTC officers to compile information on the success of the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program in preparation for interviews of CIA officers by Tom Brokaw of NBC 

News.2262 As remarked in a Sametime communication with Deputy CTC Director 

Philip Mudd, during World War II, the Pentagon had an Office of War Information (OWI), 

whereas the CIA's predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), did not. then 

noted that "we need an OWI, at least every now and then.. ,."2263 According to Mudd, concerns 

within the CIA about defending the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in the press were 

misplaced:2264 

"maybe people should know we're trying to sell their program, if they 

complain, they should know that we're trying to protect our capability to 

continue, we're not just out there to brag... they don't realize that we have 

few options here, we either get out and sell, or we get hammered, which has 

implications beyond the media, congress reads it, cuts our authorities, messes 

2260 The CIA at War, Ronald Kessler, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2003. As detailed elsewhere, Iyman Faris was 

already under investigation and Majid Khan, who was then in foreign government custody, had discussed Faris, 

prior to any mention of Faris by KSM. Likewise, the capture of Khallad bin Attash in April 2003 was unrelated to 

the reporting from KSM or any other CIA detainee. Kessler's book also stated that Abu Zubaydah "soon began 

singing to the FBI and CIA about other planned plots," and that "intercepts and information developed months 

earlier after the arrest of Ramzi Binalshibh... allowed the CIA to trace [KSM]." (See Ronald Kessler, The CIA at 

War, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2003.) As detailed elsewhere, Abu Zubaydah did not provide intelligence on alQa'ida "planned plots," and KSM's capture was unrelated to information provided by Ramzi bin Al-Shibh. Finally, 

Kessler's book stated that KSM "told the CIA about a range of planned attacks - on U.S. convoys in Afghanistan, 

nightclubs in Dubai, targets in Turkey, and an Israeli embassy in the Middle East. Within a few months the 

transcripts of his interrogations were four feet high." These statements were incongruent with CIA records. 

2261 "RU[e Change Lets C.I. A. Freely Send Suspects Abroad," by Douglas Jehl and David Johnston, The New York 

Times, March 6, 2005. 

2262

 Email from: ^^•^^•^Htoj[REDACTED] , [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTEDL^^^^^M , [REDACT^DT^^I^^BJREDACTEDI,^^^^ B 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; ccTB^^^B , ^^^BMjjBsubjecTFO R IMMEDIATE 

COORDINATION: Summary of impact of detainee program; date: April 13, 2005, at 5:21:37 PM. 

2263

 Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and April 13, 2005, from 19:23:50 to 

.19:56:05. 

2264

 As detailed in this summary, this exchange occurred the day before an anticipated Committee vote on a 

proposed Committee investigation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. 

Page 402 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

402 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I//NOFOR N 

up our budget, we need to make sure the impression of what we do is 

positive... we must be more aggressive out there, we either put out our story 

or we get eaten, there is no middle ground."2265 

(I^S/il^^BH^F ) Mudd counseled not to "advertise" the discussions between CIA 

personnel and the media with the CIA "workforce," because "they'd misread it."2266 After 

promised to keep the media outreach "real close hold," Mudd wrote: 

"most of them [CIA personnel] do not know that when the w post/ny times 

quotes 'senior intel official,' it's us... authorized and directed by opa."2267 

K B sent a draft compilation of plot disruptions to 

|CT C Legal to determine whether the release of the information would pose any "legal 

problems."2268 According to CIA attorneys, information on Issa al-Britani posed no problems 

because it was sourced to the 9/11 Commission. They also determined that information about 

Iyman Faris and Sajid Badat that was sourced to press stories posed no legal problems because 

Faris had already pled guilty and Badat was not being prosecuted in the United States.2269 On 

April 15, 2005, a CIA officer expressed concerns in an email to several CIA attorneys about the 

CIA releasing classified information to the media. There are no CIA records indicating a 

response to the CIA officer's email.2270 

That day, April 15, 2005, the National Security Council Principals 

Committee discussed a public campaign for the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. 

After the meeting, ALEC Station personnel informed ||H^^|CT C Legal that scheduled 

interviews with NBC News of Director Porter Goss and Deputy CTC Director Philip Mudd 

, April 13, 2005, from 19:23:50 to 

j, April 13, 2005, from 19:23:50 to 

April 13, 2005, from 19:23:50 to 

2265

 Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and | 

19:56:05. 

2266

 Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and | 

19:56:05. 

2267

 Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and | 

19:56:05. ^^^^^ ^ 

2268

 Email from: Chief of Operations. ALEC Station: to: | 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

I, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], I^HHK H 

|; cc: subject: Brokaw interview: Take one; date: 

April 13, 2005, at 6:46:59 PM; email&om^^^^l^^Etor^^lH^Hcci J 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], ^HBI^^»[REDACTED] J 

[REDAcrrr ] 1 111 1 1 1111 1 J 111 1 1 1111 1 (Z 

| [REDACTEDh^^^^H ; subject|ReJ3rokaw interview: 

Take one; date: April 13, 2005, at 6:50:28 PM; email from: Mj^^^Kto : [REDACTED], 

I, cc: John A. Rizzo, [REDACTED]; 

subject: Re: Brokaw interview: Take one; date: April 13,2005,7:24:50 PM. 

2269

 Email frorcK^^^HHntc^ H [REDACTED], John 

A. Rizzo, subject: Re: Brokaw interview: Take 

date: April 14, 2005, at 9:22:32 AM. 

^Emai l from: cc: [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED]7^^^^|^^|r^^^||HI^Hrsubject : Re: Brokaw interview: Take one; date: 

April 14,2005, at 8:08:00 AM. 

m i i i III i 'BMH^^BI^BB^ l iniiiiiii i 

Page 403 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

403 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

should not proceed so that "we don't get a head [sic] of ourselves...."2271 On June 24, 2005, 

however, Dateline NBC aired a program that included on-the-record quotes from Goss and 

Mudd, as well as quotes from "top American intelligence officials."2272 The program and 

Dateline NBC's associated online articles included classified information about the capture and 

interrogation of CIA detainees and quoted "senior U.S. intelligence analysts" stating that 

intelligence obtained from CIA interrogations "approaches or surpasses any other intelligence on 

the subject of al-Qaida and the construction of the network."2273 The Dateline NBC articles 

stated that "Al-Qaida leaders suddenly found themselves bundled onto a CIA Gulfstream V or 

Boeing 737 jet headed for long months of interrogation," and indicated that Abu Zubaydah, 

KSM, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Abu Faraj al-Libi were "picked up and bundled off to 

interrogation centers." The articles also stated that the capture of bin al-Shibh led to the captures 

of KSM and Khallad bin Attash.2274 This information was inaccurate.2275 There are no CIA 

records to indicate that there was any investigation or crimes report submitted in connection with 

the Dateline NBC program and its associated reporting. 

C. CIA Attorneys Caution that Classified Information Provided to the Media Should Not 

Be Attributed to the CIA 

(^^^H^H^H^NF )

 Afte r th e APTM' '5, 2005, National Security Council Principals 

Committee meeting, the CIA drafted an extensive document describing the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program for an anticipated media campaign. CIA attorneys, discussing aspects of 

the campaign involving off-the-record disclosures, cautioned against attributing the information 

to the CIA itself. One senior attorney stated that the proposed press briefing was "minimally 

acceptable, but only if not attributed to a CIA official." The CIA attorney continued: "This 

should be attributed to an 'official knowledgeable' about the program (or some similar 

obfuscation), but should not be attributed to a CIA or intelligence official." Referring to CIA 

efforts to deny Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for previously acknowledged 

3271

 Email from: to: subject: Brokaw interview: Take one; date: April 15, 2005, at 

1:00:59 PM. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[w]ith regard to information related to covert action, 

authorization [to disclose information to the media] rests with the White House." CIA records made available to the 

Committee, however, do not indicate White House approval for the subsequent media disclosures. In the summer of 

2013, the Committee requested the CIA provide any such records should they exist. No records were identified by 

the CIA. 

2272 See "The Long War; World View of War on Terror," Dateline NBC, June 24, 2005. In April 2005, Mudd stated 

that the program would likely be aired in June. See email from: John P. Mudd; to: subject: Re: 

Brokaw interview: Take one; date: April 18,2005, at 08:31 AM. 

2273 "The frightening evolution of al-Qaida; Decentralization has led to deadly staying power," Dateline NBC, June 

24, 2005. 

2274 frightening evolution of al-Qaida; Decentralization has led to deadly staying power," Dateline NBC, June 

24, 2005; "Al-Qaida finds safe haven in Iran," Dateline NBC, June 24, 2005. Notwithstanding this content, the 

CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[a] review of the NBC broadcast, cited by the Study, shows that it contained 

no public disclosures of classified CIA information; indeed, the RDI program wax not discussed" (emphasis in the 

original). In addition to the information described above included in the online articles associated with the 

broadcast, the broadcast itself described the role of a CIA asset in the capture of KSM and the capture of Abu Faraj 

al-Libi in "joint US/Pakistani actions" ("The Long War; World View of War on Terror," Dateline NBC, June 24, 

2005). 

2275

 As described elsewhere in this summary and in more detail in the full Committee Study, the captures of KSM 

and Khallad bin Attash were unrelated to the capture and interrogation of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. 

nil Mil l 1111 I»111 I 

Page 404 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

404 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I //NOFOR N 

information, the attorney noted that, "[o]ur Glomar figleaf is getting pretty thin."2276 Another 

CIA attorney noted that the draft "makes the [legal] declaration 1 just wrote about the secrecy of 

the interrogation program a work of fiction. ..."2277 HH^HCT C Legal urged that CIA 

leadership needed to "confront the inconsistency" between CIA court declarations "about how 

critical it is to keep this information secret" and the CIA "planning to reveal darn near the entire 

program.' '.2278 

D. The CIA Engages with Journalists and Conveys an Inaccurate Account of the 

Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah 

In late 2005, the CIA decided to cooperate again with Douglas Jehl 

of the New York Times, despite his intention to publish information about the program. A CIA 

officer wrote about Jehl's proposed article, which was largely about the CIA's detention and 

interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, "[t]his is not necessarily an unflattering story."2279 Jehl, who 

provided the CIA with a detailed outline of his proposed story, informed the CIA that he would 

emphasize that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques worked, that they were approved 

through an inter-agency process, and that the CIA went to great lengths to ensure that the 

interrogation program was authorized by the White House and the Department of Justice.2280 

CIA records indicate that the CIA decided not to dissuade Jehl from describing the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques because, as ^HHBCT C Legal ^^^^^^^^^noted , 

"[t]he EITs have already been out tfiere."2281 The CIA's chief of ALECStationT^^H 

|, who wondered whether cooperation with Jehl would be "undercutting our complaint 

subject: ProgramGoing Public Draft Talking Points-Comments Due to ^^HmebyCO B TODAY. Thanks.; date: April 20, 2005, 

at 5:58:47 PM. 

2277 See email from: to: HH^^ B cc :

 [REDACTED], | 

[REDACTED]; subject: Re: Interrogation Program-Going Public Draft Talking Points—Comments Due to 

•^•m e by COB TODAY. Thanks.; date: April 21,2005, at 07:24 AM. was referring to the assault 

case against David Passaro. The Committee Study does not include an analysis of the accuracy of declarations to 

U.S. courts by senior CIA officials. 

; cc: | 

^[REDACTED]; subject: Re: Interrogation Program—Going Public 

me by COB TODAY. Thanks.; date: April 25, 2005, at 11:41:07 

2278

 Email from: 

•••I , [REDACTED], 

Draft Talking Points-Comments Due to 

AM. 

2279

 Email from: Hjjj^^^^^H ; to John A. Rizzo, | 

[REDACTED], Robert L. Grenier; subject: Doug Jehl - Comprehensive Story on the Capture of Abu Zubaydah and 

Conception of EITs; date: December 15, 2005, at 02:04 PM. 

22so g m a j| fVom: to: |HH , John A. Rizzo, 

[REDACTED], Robert L. Grenier; subject: Doug Jehl - Comprehensive Story on the Capture of Abu Zubaydah and 

Conception of EITs, date: December 15, 2005, at 02:04 PM. 

2281

 Email from:to : [REDACTED], [REDACTED]J 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: Doug Jehl -

Comprehensive Story on the Capture of Abu Zubaydah and Conception of EITs; date: December 15, 2005, at 02:10 

PM. Another CIA officer added "I don't like so much talk about EIT's, but that particular horse has long left the 

barn...." See email from: ^^••^^Kto : ^M^^^B ; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTEDL^^^^HH , [REDACTED]7MBHBH , IHH^H - subject: Re: 

Doug Jehl - Comprehensive Story on the Capture of Abu Zubaydah and Conception of EITs; date: December 15, 

2005, at 03:03 PM. 

11ii 1111 1 ^MBMB^M^B B m m 

Page 405 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

405 
UNCLASSIFIED 

T O P SECRET// ! I//NOFOR N 

against those leakers," nonetheless suggested informing Jehl of other examples of CIA "detainee 

exploitation success."2282 

(fS/flH^H^F ) While the New York Times did not publish Jehl's story, on 

September 7, 2006, the day after President Bush publicly acknowledged the program, David 

Johnston of the New York Times called the CIA's OPA with a proposed news story about the 

interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. In an email with the subject line, "We Can't Let This Go 

Unanswered," the CIA's director of public affairs in OPA, Mark Mansfield, described Johnston's 

proposed narrative as "bullshit" and biased toward the FBI, adding that "we need to push 

back."2283 While it is unclear if Mansfield responded to Johnston's proposed story, Mansfield 

later wrote in an email that there was "[n]o need to worry."2284 On September 10, 2006, the New 

York Times published an article by Johnston, entitled, "At a Secret Interrogation, Dispute Flared 

Over Tactics," that described "sharply contrasting accounts" of the interrogation of Abu 

Zubaydah. The article cited officials "more closely allied with law enforcement," who stated 

that Abu Zubaydah "cooperated with F.B.I, interviewers," as well as officials "closely tied to 

intelligence agencies," who stated that Abu Zubaydah "was lying, and things were going 

nowhere," and that "[i]t was clear that he had information about an imminent attack and time 

was of the essence." The article included the frequent CIA representation that, after the use of 

"tougher tactics," Abu Zubaydah "soon began to provide information on key Al Qaeda operators 

to help us find and capture those responsible for the 9/11 attacks."2285 This characterization of 

Abu Zubaydah's interrogation is incongruent with CIA interrogation records.2286 CTC stated 

that the article resulted in questions to the CIA from the country 

and assessed that "[disclosures of this nature could adversely [have 

an] impact on future joint CT operations with... H H partners."2287 There are no indications 

that the CIA filed a crimes report in connection with the article.2288 

In early 2007, the CIA cooperated with Ronald Kessler again on 

another book. According to CIA records, the purpose of the cooperation was to "push back" on 

Kessler's proposed accounts of intelligence related to the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the 

2282

 Email from: I I; to: [REDACTED]; cc: | 

|; subject: Re: Doug Jehl - Comprehensive Story on the 

Capture of Abu Zubaydah and Conception of EITs; date: December 15, 2005, at 8:50:36 PM. 

2283

 Email from: Mark Mansfield; to:

 cc : Pau l 

Gimigliano, ^HB^I^^I^H ; subject: We Can't Let This Go Unanswered; date: September 7, 2006, at 01:12 

PM. 

2284

 Email from: Mark Mansfield; to: cc: M^^MHI^M . [REDACTED], 

H H , •^^^^•^•imB^bjecrRe : re Abu 

- Re: Fw: We Can't Let This Go Unanswered; date: September 7, 2006, at 3:14:53 PM. 

22 85 i^t a Secret Interrogation, Dispute Flared Over Tactics," New York Times, David Johnston, September 10, 2006. 

2280 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III and sections on CIA claims related to the "Capture of Ramzi 

bin al-Shibh" in this summary and Volume II. 

2287 C Y 2005 & CY 2006 CTC Media Leaks; September 21, 2006. The document described "the more serious CTC 

media leaks that occurred in CY 2005 and 2006." 

2288

 Senior Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo urged that his colleagues determine whether OPA cooperated with 

the aiticle "[b]efore we get DOJ or FBI too cranked up on this." See email from: John A. Rizzo; to: | 

cc: [REDACTEDL [REDACTED], [REDACTED], | 

[REDACTED],

 : Re: Fw: Request for Crimes Reports on NYT and Time 

Magazine Leaks on Interrogation Activities [REDACTED]; date: September 12, 2006, at 5:52:10 PM. 

Page 406 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

406 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I //NOFORN 

inteiTOgation of Abu Zubaydah,2289 which a CIA officer noted "give undue credit to the FBI for 

CIA accomplishments/'2290 After another CIA officer drafted information for passage to 

Kessler,2291 Legal, ^^H^^Hwrote , "|o]f course being the lawyer, I 

would recommend not telling Kessler anything." then wrote that if, "for policy 

reasons," the CIA decided to cooperate with the author, there was certain information that should 

not be disclosed. then suggested that "if we are going to do this," the CIA could 

provide information to Kessler that would "undercut the FBI agents," who m stated had 

"leaked that they would have gotten everything anyway" from Abu Zubaydah.2292 

After Kessler provided a draft of his book to the CIA and met with 

CIA officers, the CIA's director of public affairs, Mark Mansfield, described what he viewed as 

the problems in Kessler's narrative. According to Mansfield, Kessler was "vastly overstating the 

FBI's role in thwarting terrorism and, frankly, giving other USG agencies—including CIA— 

short shrift." Moreover, "[t]he draft also didn't reflect the enormously valuable intelligence the 

USG gleaned from CIA's intenogation program" and "had unnamed FBI officers questioning 

our methods and claiming their own way of eliciting information is much more effective." 

According to Mansfield, the CIA "made some headway" in its meeting with Kessler and that, as 

a result of the CIA's intervention, his book would be "more balanced than it would have 

been."2293 

(T^^m^^^^^l^/NF ) Later, in an email to Mansfield, Kessler provided the "substantive 

changes" he had made to his draft following his meeting with CIA officials. The changes 

included the statement that Abu Zubaydah was subjected to "coercive interrogation techniques" 

after he "stopped cooperating." Kessler's revised text further stated that "the CIA could point to 

a string of successes and dozens of plots that were rolled up because of coercive interrogation 

techniques." The statements in the revised text on the "successes" attributable to the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques were similar to CIA representations to policymakers and were 

incongment with CIA records.2294 

, 28/Feb/07 09:51:10 to 19:00:42. 

|; subject: Fact Check on 

2289

 Sametime communication between | 

2290

 Email from: to: cc: 

Ron Kessler draft; date: March 13, 2007, at 05:59 PM. 

2291

 Email from:

 lo :

 BBBBBBi c c : 

mUm , Fact Check on Ron Kessler draft; date: March 14,2007, 

at 6:03:45 PM. ^^^ ^ 

2292

 Email from: to:cc : 

^^^^^^^psubject: Re: Fact Check on Ron Kessler draft; date: March 15, 

2007, at 7:07:52 AM. ^^^^^^^ ^ 

2293

 Email from: Mark Mansfield; to: Michael V. Hayden, Stephen R.KappesJMichael J. 

Morell, Hi^ H J°se Rodriguez, bcc: 

subject: Session with Author Ron Kessler; date: March 15, 2007, at 6:54:33 PM. 

2294

 Kessler's changes repeated the representation made in the president's September 6, 2006, speech, which was 

based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, that Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh "provided information 

that would help in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed." With 

regard to the Second Wave plotting, Kessler stated that "[i]f it had not been for coercive interrogation techniques 

used on Abu Zubaydah, CIA officials suggest, the second wave of attacks might have occurred and KSM could be 

free and planning more attacks." As detailed in this summary, and in greater detail in Volumes II and III, the 

thwarting of the Second Wave plotting and the capture of KSM were unrelated to reporting from Abu Zubaydah. 

Kessler's changes also included statements about the training and expertise of CIA interrogators, the Department of 

11 ii 1111 1 MBMBBBMB B I II I II 

Page 407 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

407 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

officials included the statement that many members of Congress and members of the media 

"have made careers for themselves by belittling and undercutting the efforts of the heroic men 

and women who are trying to protect us." Kessler's revised text contended that, "[wjithout 

winning the war being waged by the media against our own government, we are going to lose the 

war on terror because the tools that are needed will be taken away by a Congress swayed by a 

misinformed public and by other countries unwilling to cooperate with the CIA or FBI because 

they fear mindless exposure by the press." Finally, Kessler's changes, made after his meeting 

with CIA officers, included the statement that "[t]oo many Americans are intent on demonizing 

those who are trying to protect us."2295 

Justice review of the CIA's interrogation techniques, and congressional oversight of the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program. For example, Kessler wrote, "[b]efore confronting a terrorist, each interrogator was given 

250 hours of specialized training." This statement is incongruent with the history of the CIA program. Email from: 

Ronald Kessler; to: Mark Mansfield; subject: follow-up; date: March 16, 2007, at 10:52:05. 

2295

 Email from: Ronald Kessler; to: Mark " ^ " •• <••' * i^ch 16, 2007, at 10:52:05. 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 408 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

408 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRKIV/BUB^^^^^^BflNQgQR N 

V. Review of CIA Representations to the Department of Justice 

A. August 1, 2002, OLC Memorandum Relies on Inaccurate Information Regarding Abu 

Zubaydah 

(ISAHHBH ) The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Department of Justice 

wrote several legal memoranda and letters on the legality of the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program between 2002 and 2007. The OLC requested, and relied on, information 

provided by the CIA to conduct the legal analysis included in these memoranda and letters. 

Much of the information the CIA provided to the OLC was inaccurate in material respects. 

On August 1, 2002, the OLC issued a memorandum advising that 

the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah would not violate 

prohibitions against torture found in Section 2340A of Title 18 of the United States Code.2296 

The techniques were: (1) attention grasp, (2) walling, (3) facial hold, (4) facial slap (insult slap), 

(5) cramped confinement, (6) wall standing, (7) stress positions, (8) sleep deprivation, (9) insects 

placed in a confinement box, and (10) the waterboard. The memorandum relied on CIA 

representations about Abu Zubaydah's status in al-Qa'ida, his role in al-Qa'ida plots, his 

expertise in interrogation resistance training, and his withholding of information on pending 

terrorist attacks.2297 The OLC memorandum included the following statement about OLC's 

reliance on information provided by the CIA: 

"Our advice is based upon the following facts, which you have provided to us. 

We also understand that you do not have any facts in your possession contrary 

to the facts outlined here, and this opinion is limited to these facts. If these 

facts were to change, this advice would not necessarily apply."2298 

2236

 Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 1). Also on August 1, 2002, OLC issued an unclassified, but non-public, opinion, from Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General John Yoo to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales analyzing whether certain interrogation 

methods violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. 

2297

 Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 1). 

2298

 Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 1). During a 2008 hearing of die Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, dien-Acting Assistant Attorney 

General Steven Bradbury stressed that the OLC's opinions relied on factual representations made by the CIA. As 

Bradbury testified, "all of our advice addressing the CIA's specific interrogation methods has made clear that OLC's 

legal conclusions were contingent on a number of express conditions, limitations and safeguards adopted by the CIA 

and designed to ensure that the program would be administered by trained professionals with strict oversight and 

controls, and that none of the interrogation practices would go beyond the bounds of the law." When asked whether 

information could be elicited from detainees using techniques authorized by the Army Field Manual, Bradbury 

responded, "I will have to defer, because on those kinds of questions in terms of the effectiveness and the 

information obtained I have to rely on the professional judgment of the folks involved at the agency, and General 

[Michael] Hayden I think has spoken to this issue before this Committee." (See transcript of hearing of the Senate 

Select Committee on Intelligence, June 10, 2008 (DTS #2008-2698).) General Hayden's representations to the 

Committee are described elsewhere in this summa^an^i^re|itei^etm me II. 

mi 11 in i j^H^Mj^B^MBz/TvioFon n 

Page 409 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

409 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

(TS/VHIII^H^^^W^^ )

 Th e

 f act s provided by the CIA, and relied on by the OLC to 

support its legal analysis, were cited in the August 1, 2002, memorandum, and many were 

repeated in subsequent OLC memoranda on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Much 

of the information provided by the CIA to the OLC was unsupported by CIA records. Examples 

include: 

• Abu Zubaydah's Status in Al-Qa'ida: The OLC memorandum repeated the CIA's 

representation that Abu Zubaydah was the "third or fourth man" in al-Qa'ida.2299 This 

CIA assessment was based on single-source reporting that was recanted prior to the 

August 1, 2002, OLC legal memorandum. This retraction was provided to several senior 

CIA officers, including m^HCT C Legal, to whom the information was emailed on 

July 10, 2002, three weeks prior to the issuance of the August 1, 2002, OLC 

memorandum.2300 The CIA later concluded that Abu Zubaydah was not a member of alQa'ida.2301 

• Abu Zubaydah's Role in Al-Qa'ida Plots: The OLC memorandum repeated the CIA's 

representation that Abu Zubaydah "has been involved in every major terrorist operation 

carried out by al Qaeda,"2302 and that Abu Zubaydah "was one of the planners of the 

September 11 attacks."2303 CIA records do not support these claims. 

• Abu Zubaydah's Expertise in Interrogation Resistance Training: The OLC memorandum 

repeated the CIA's representation that Abu Zubaydah was "well-versed" in resistance to 

interrogation techniques, and that "it is believed Zubaydah wrote al Qaeda's manual on 

resistance techniques."2304 A review of CIA records found no information to support 

these claims. To the contrary, Abu Zubaydah later stated that it was his belief that all 

2299

 Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 1). 

2300

 Email from: to: with multiple cc's; subject: AZ information; date: July 

10, 2002, at 1:18:52 PM. This claim was included in subsequent OLC memoranda. See Memorandum for John A. 

Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations 

Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of 

High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11). 

3301

 CIA Intelligence Assessment, August 16, 2006, "Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in 

Afghanistan, 1990-2001." 

2302

 Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 1). This claim was included in subsequent OLC memoranda. See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior 

Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under 

Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High 

Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11). 

2303 Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 1). 

2304

 Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1,2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 1). 

11 II M 111 J^MMM^BBM M I H M M 

Page 410 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

410 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ WNOFORN 

individuals provide information in detention, and that captured individuals should 

"expect that the organization will make adjustments to protect people and plans when 

someone with knowledge is captured."2305 

• Abu Zubaydah's Withholding of Information on Pending Terrorist Attacks: The OLC 

memorandum repeated CIA representations stating that "the interrogation team is certain" 

Abu Zubaydah was withholding information related to planned attacks against the United 

States, either within the U.S. homeland or abroad.2306 CIA records do not support this 

claim. Abu Zubaydah's interrogation team was not "certain" that Abu Zubaydah was 

withholding "critical threat information." To the contrary, the interrogation team wrote 

to CIA Headquarters: "[o]ur assumption is the objective of this operation [the 

interrogation of Abu Zubaydah] is to achieve a high degree of confidence that [Abu 

Zubaydah] is not holding back actionable information concerning threats to the United 

States beyond that which [Abu Zubaydah] has already provided."2307 

B. The CIA Interprets the August 1, 2002, Memorandum to Apply to Other Detainees, 

Despite Language of the Memorandum; Interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and Other 

Detainees Diverge from the CIA's Representations to the OLC 

The CIA broadly interpreted the August 1, 2002, OLC 

memorandum to allow for greater operational latitude. For example, the memorandum stated 

that the legal advice was specific to the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah and the specific CIA 

representations about Abu Zubaydah; however, the CIA applied its enhanced interrogation 

techniques to numerous other CIA detainees without seeking additional formal legal advice from 

the OLC. As detailed elsewhere, the other detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques varied significantly in terms of their assessed role in terrorist activities 

and the information they were believed to possess. CIA records indicate that it was not until July 

29, 2003, almost a year later, that the attorney general stated that the legal principles of the 

August 1, 2002, memorandum could be applied to other CIA detainees.2308 

The August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum also included an analysis 

of each of the CIA's proposed enhanced interrogation techniques with a description of how the 

110496 (162014Z FEB 03) 

2306

 Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 1). 

2307

 [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02); email from: HI^^^^H ; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

subject: Addendum from [DETENTION SITE GREEN], [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02); 

July 23, 2004, at 07:56:49 PM. See also email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: [SWIGERT 

and DUNBAR]: date: August 8, 21,2002, at 10:21 PM. 

2308

 Letter from Assistant Attorney General Jack L. Goldsmith III to Director Tenet, June 18, 2004 (DTS #2004-

2710). In an August 2003 interview with the OIG.^^HCT C Legal, stated that "every 

detainee interrogated is different in that they are outside the opinion because the opinion was written for Zubaydah." 

The context for BUBBU' s statement was the legality of the waterboarding of KSM. See interview of H H 

by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 20, 

2003. _ _ 

11 ii 11 i i i IMBMII^ B

 11111 1 

Page 411 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

411 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

CIA stated the techniques would be applied.2309 However, in the interrogations of Abu 

Zubaydah and subsequent CIA detainees, the CIA applied the techniques in a manner that a 

Department of Justice attorney concluded "was quite different from the [description] presented in 

2002."2310 As reported by the CIA's inspector general, the CIA used the waterboarding 

technique against Abu Zubaydah, and later against KSM, in a manner inconsistent with CIA 

representations to the OLC, as well as the OLC's description of the technique in the August 1, 

2002, memorandum. In addition, the CIA assured the OLC that it would be "unlikely" that CIA 

detainees subjected to sleep deprivation would experience hallucinations, and that if they did, 

medical personnel would intervene.2311 However, multiple CIA detainees subjected to prolonged 

sleep deprivation experienced hallucinations, and CIA interrogation teams did not always 

discontinue sleep deprivation after the detainees had experienced hallucinations.2312 The CIA 

further represented to the OLC that Abu Zubaydah's recovery from his wound would not be 

impeded by the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.2313 However, prior to the 

OLC memorandum, DETENTION SITE GREEN personnel stated, and CIA Headquarters had 

confirmed, that the interrogation proccss would take precedence over preventing Abu 

Zubaydah's wound from becoming infected.2314 Other CIA detainees were also subjected to the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, notwithstanding concerns that the interrogation 

techniques could exacerbate their injuries.2315 The CIA also repeatedly used interrogation 

techniques beyond those provided to the OLC for review, including water dousing, nudity, 

abdominal slaps, and dietary manipulation.2316 

At the July 29, 2003, meeting of select National Security Council 

principals, Attorney General John Ashcroft expressed the view that "while appropriate caution 

should be exercised in the number of times the waterboard was administered, the repetitions 

2309 Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab I). 

2310

 Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility; Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal 

Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced 

Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected Terrorists, July 29, 2009, pp. 140-41 (DTS #2010-1058). 

2311

 Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 1). ^^^^ ^ 

(^^•JAN04) ; W^^KM 1308 

iMiA^^ B 1312^^HJAN04)~^^H B 1530 04) 

2313

 Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 1). 

10536 (151006Z JUL 02); AUECj^ H (I82321Z JUL 02). After the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah, reported that "[d]uring the most aggressive portions of [Abu 

Zubaydah's] interrogation, the combination of a lack of hygiene, sub-optimal nutrition, inadvertent trauma to the 

wound secondary to some of the stress positions utilized at that stage and the removal of formal, obvious medical 

care to further isolate the subject had an overall additive effect on the deterioration of the wound." See 

10679 (250932Z AUG 02). 

2315 See Volume IE, including detainee reviews of Abu Hazim and Abd al-Kurim. 

2316

 As described later, the CIA sought OLC approval for these techniques on July 30, 2004, almost two years after 

the August 1,2002, memorandum. See letter from Legal IHH^^^ I to Acting Assistant 

Attorney General Levin, July 30, 2004 (DTS #2009-1809). 

iii i 1111 1 MBBBBM I

 1"1

" 

Page 412 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

412 
UNCLASSIFIED 

T O P secret//M^MI^M^^BBB//NOFOR N 

described do not contravene the principles underlying DOJ's August 2002 opinion."-317 Records 

do not indicate that the attorney general opined on the manner (as opposed to the frequency) with 

which the waterboard was implemented, or on interrogation techniques not included in the 

August 2002 opinion. The differences between the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, as 

described by the CIA to the OLC in 2002, and the actual use of the techniques as described in the 

CIA Inspector General May 2004 Special Review, prompted concerns at the Department of 

Justice. On May 27, 2004, Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith sent a letter to the CIA 

general counsel stating that the Special Review "raises the possibility that, at least in some 

instances and particularly early in the program, the actual practice may not have been congruent 

with all of these assumptions and limitations." In particular, Goldsmith's letter highlighted the 

statement in the Special Review that the use of the waterboard in SERE training was "so 

different from subsequent Agency usage as to make it almost irrelevant."2318 

C. Following Suspension of the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, the 

CIA Obtains Approval from the OLC for the Intenogation of Three Individual Detainees 

(TS^^^^^^^^^I^NF ) The May 2004 CIA Inspector General Special Review 

recommended that the CIA's general counsel submit in writing a request for the Department of 

Justice to provide the CIA with a "formal, written legal opinion, revalidating and modifying, as 

appropriate, the guidance provided" in the August 1, 2002, memorandum. It also recommended 

that, in the absence of such a written opinion, the DCI should direct that the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques "be implemented only within the parameters that were mutually 

understood by the Agency and DoJ on 1 August 2002."2319 After receiving the Special Review, 

Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith informed the CIA that the OLC had never formally 

opined on whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques would meet constitutional 

standards.2320 On May 24, 2004, DCI Tenet, Deputy Director John McLaughlin, General 

Counsel Scott Muller, and others met to discuss the Department of Justice's comments, after 

which DCI Tenet directed that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, as well as 

the use of the CIA's "standard" techniques, be suspended

 2321

 On June 4, 2004, DCI Tenet 

2317

 Letter from Assistant Attorney General Jack L. Goldsmith, 111 to Director George Tenet, June 18, 2004 (DTS 

#2004-2710). As described above, the CIA's presentation to the NSC principals undercounted the frequency with 

which KSM and Abu Zubaydah were subjected to the waterboard. 

2318

 Letter from Assistant Attorney General Goldsmith to CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, May 27, 2004. 

2319

 CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review - Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program, 

(2003-7123-IG), May 2004. 

2320

 May 25, 2004, Talking Points for DC! Telephone Conversation widi Attorney General: DOJ's Legal Opinion 

Re: CIA's Counterterrorist Program (CT) Interrogation. This position was confirmed in a June 10, 2004, letter 

(Letter from Assistant Attorney General Jack L. Goldsmith III, to Scott Muller, General Counsel, Central 

Intelligence Agency, June 10,2004). 

2321

 May 24, 2004, Memorandum for the Record from Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorism 

Center, Subject: Memorandum of Meeting with the DCI Regarding DOJ's Statement that DOJ has Rendered No 

Legal Opinion on Whether the CIA's Use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques would meet Constitutional 

Standards; email from: C/RDG; to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], 

B l ' [REDACTED], [REDACTED], i^HHHHil ; subject: Interim Guidance for Standard and 

Enhanced Interrogations; date: May 25, 2004. 

11 ii 11 i i i i II i II 

Page 413 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

413 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

issued a formal memorandum suspending the use of the techniques, pending policy and legal 

2322 review. 

(TS/^^^m^^^^^^tE ) As described in this summary, on July 2, 2004, Attorney General 

Ashcroft and Deputy Attorney General James Comey attended a meeting of select National 

Security Council principals, the topic of which was the proposed CIA interrogation of Janat 

Gul.2323 According to CIA records, the attorney general stated that the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul would be consistent with U.S. law and treaty 

obligations, although Ashcroft made an exception for the waterboard, which he stated required 

further review, "primarily because of the view that the technique had been employed in a 

different fashion than that which DOJ initially approved."2324 On July 20, 2004, Ashcroft, along 

with Patrick Philbin and Daniel Levin from the Department of Justice, attended a National 

Security Council Principals Committee meeting at which Ashcroft stated that the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques described in the August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum, 

with the exception of the waterboard, would not violate U.S. statutes, the U.S. Constitution, or 

U.S. treaty obligations. The attorney general was then "directed" to prepare a written opinion 

addressing the constitutional issues, and the CIA was directed to provide further information to 

the Department of Justice with regard to the waterboard.2325 On July 22, 2004, Attorney General 

Ashcroft sent a letter to Acting DCI John McLaughlin stating that nine interrogation techniques 

(those addressed in the August 1, 2002, memorandum, with the exception of the waterboard) did 

not violate the U.S. Constitution or any statute or U.S. treaty obligations, in the context of the 

CIA interrogation of Janat Gul.2326 

On July 30, 2004, anticipating the interrogation of Janat Gul, the 

CIA provided the OLC for the first time a description of dietary manipulation, nudity, water 

dousing, the abdominal slap, standing sleep deprivation, and the use of diapers, all of which the 

CIA described as a "supplement" to the interrogation techniques outlined in the August 1, 2002, 

memorandum.2327 The CIA's descriptions of the interrogation techniques were incongruent with 

how the CIA had applied the techniques in practice. The CIA description of a minimum calorie 

intake was incongruent with the history of the program, as no minimum calorie intake existed 

prior to May 2004 and the March 2003 draft OMS guidelines allowed for food to be withheld for 

2322

 June 4, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Director of Central Intelligence Re: 

Suspension of Use of Interrogation Techniques. On June 2, 2004, George Tenet informed the President that he 

intended to resign from his position on July 11, 2004. The White House announced the resignation on June 3, 2004. 

2323

 Janat Gul's interrogation is detailed in Volume III and more briefly in this summary. 

2324

 Letter from Assistant Attorney General Ashcroft to General Counsel Muller, July 7,2004 (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 3); July 2, 2004, CIA Memorandum re Meeting with National Security Advisor Rice in the White House 

Situation Room, Friday 2 July Re: Interrogations and Detainee Janat Gul; July 6, 2004, Memorandum from 

Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to George Tenet, Director of Central 

Intelligence, Re: Janat Gul. 

2325

 July 29, 2004, Memorandum for the Record from CIA General Counsel Scott Muller Re: Principals Meeting 

relating to Janat Gul on 20 July 2004. 

2326

 The one-paragraph letter did not provide legal analysis or substantive discussion of the interrogation techniques. 

(See letter from Attorney General John Ashcroft to Acting DCI John McLaughlin, July 22, 2004 (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 4).) 

:

' Letter from m^CT C Legal to Acting Assistant Attorney General Daniel Levin, July 30, 

2004 (DTS #2009-1809). 

m i 11 in i gBMMMIIMI^B^wFTre N 

Page 414 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

414 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

one to two days.

 328

 The CIA represented to the OLC that nude detainees were "not wantonly 

exposed to other detainees or detention facility staff," even though nude detainees at the CIA's 

DETENTION SITE COBALT were "kept in a central area outside the interrogation room" and 

were "walked around" by guards as a form of humiliation.2329 The CIA's description of water 

dousing made no mention of cold water immersion, which was used on CIA detainees and taught 

in CIA interrogator training.2330 The CIA representation describing a two-hour limit for the 

shackling of detainees' hands above their heads is incongruent with rccords of CIA detainees 

whose hands were shackled above their heads for extended periods, as well as the draft March 

2003 OMS guidelines permitting such shackling for up to four hours

 2331

 The CIA further 

represented to the OLC that the use of diapers was "for sanitation and hygiene purposes," 

whereas CIA records indicate that in some cases, a central "purpose" of diapers was "[t]o cause 

humiliation" and "to induce a sense of helplessness."2332 

On August 13, 2004, CIA attorneys, medical officers, and other 

personnel met with Department of Justice attorneys to discuss some of the techniques for which 

the CIA was seeking approval, in particular sleep deprivation, water dousing, and the 

waterboard. When asked about the possibility that detainees subjected to standing sleep 

deprivation could suffer from edema, OMS doctors informed the Department of Justice attorneys 

that it was not a problem as the CIA would "adjust shackles or [the] method of applying the 

technique as necessary to prevent edema, as well as any chafing or over-tightness from the 

shackles." With regard to water dousing, CIA officers represented that "water is at normal 

temperature; CIA makes no effort to 'cool' the water before applying it." With respect to the 

waterboard, CIA officers indicated that "each application could not last more than 40 seconds 

2328

 OMS GUIDELINES ON MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO DETAINEE RENDITION, 

INTERROGATION, AND DETENTION, May 17, 2004, OMS Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support 

to Detainee Interrogations, First Draft, March 7, 2003. The evolution of OMS Guidelines is described in Volume III 

of the Committee Study. 

2329

 Interview Report, 2003-7123-1G, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, | 

April 14,2003. 

2330

 Email from: [REDACTED] (^••^HHft ; to: H^HH^^^ ; subject: Memo; date: March 15, 2004. 

See detainee reviews of Abu Hudhaifa and Muhammad Umar 'Abd al-Rahman aka Asadallah. 

2331

 OMS Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee Interrogations, "First Draft," March 7, 

2003; ^^Hi^HH i

 2824 6 lmervie w

 Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of 

Interrogations for Counterterrorism PiirposesT^^^^^^K April 5,2003; Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, 

Review of Interrogations for CoLinterterrorism PurposesT^B^^^^^B, April 30, 2003; Memorandum for 

[REDACTED] from [REDACTED] November | , 2002, Subject: 

Legal Analysis of [REDACTED] Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in 

'[DETENTION SITE COBALT]"). For example, Ridha al-Najjar was reported to 

have undergone "hanging," described as "handcuffing one or both of his wrists to an overhead horizontal bar" for 22 

hours each day for two consecutive days. See Memorandum for [REDACTED], November | , 2002, Subiect^egal 

Analysis of [REDACTED] Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in 

(aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]". See also •• • 10171 (101527Z J AN 03), indicating that 

Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri "remained in the standing position, with hands tied overhead, overnight." 

2332 interview of I^^^^H^ I [CIA OFFICER 1], December 19, 2002; CIA Interrogation 

Program Draft Course Materials, March 11, 2003, pg. 28; CTC/RDG Interrogation Program, December 15,2003, 

pg. 10. DIRECTOR ^M i (251609Z JUL 02). See also "Standard Interrogation Techniques," attachment to email 

from: ^^^^HHftoTScot t W. Muller, John Rizzo, [REDACTED], HHBIHf c subject: revised 

interrogation discussion; date: July 19,2004. 

m i 11 i M ^B^^M^BMBM 1"

1

" 

Page 415 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

415 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ WNOFORN 

(and usually only lasted about 20 seconds)."2333 As detailed in the full Committee Study, each of 

these representations was incongnient with the operational history of the CIA program. 

£

) On August 25, 2004, the CIA's Associate General Counsel 

a letter to the OLC stating that Janat Gul, who had been rendered to CIA custody 

on July 2004, had been subjected to the attention grasp, walling, facial hold, facial slap, wall 

standing, stress positions, and sleep deprivation. The letter further stated that CIA interrogators 

"assess Gul not to be cooperating, and to be using a sophisticated counterinterrogation strategy," 

and that the further use of the same enhanced interrogation techniques would be "unlikely to 

move Gul to cooperate absent concurrent use" of dietary manipulation, nudity, water dousing, 

and the abdominal slap. The letter referenced the reporting from a CIA source,2334 stating: "CIA 

understands that before his capture, Gul had been working to facilitate a direct meeting between 

the CIA source reporting on the pre-election threat and Abu Faraj [al-Libi] 

himself."2335 

(TSl/^^^^^^^^^y/NF ) The following day, August 26, 2004, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General Daniel Levin informed CIA Acting General Counsel John Rizzo that the use of the four 

additional interrogation techniques did not violate any U.S. statutes, the U.S. Constitution, or 

U.S. treaty obligations. Levin's advice relied on the CIA's representations about Gul, including 

that "there are no medical and psychological contraindications to the use of these techniques as 

you plan to employ them on Gul."2336 At the time, CIA records indicated: (1) that standing sleep 

deprivation had already caused significant swelling in Gul's legs; (2) that standing sleep 

deprivation continued despite Gul's visual and auditory hallucinations and that Gul was "not 

oriented to time or place";2337 (3) that CIA interrogators on-site did not believe that "escalation to 

enhanced pressures will increase [Gul's] ability to produce timely accurate locational and threat 

5333

 August 11, 2004, Letter from [REDACTED], Assistant General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel; August 27,2004, Memorandum for the Record from [REDACTED] Re: 

Meeting with Department of Justice Attorneys on 13 August, 2004, Regarding Specific Interrogation Techniques, 

Including the Waterboard. 

2334

 As described in this summary, and in more detail in the Committee Study, the source later admitted to 

fabricating information related to the "pre-election" threat. 

2335

 Letter from IHli^^l^ K Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General, August 25,2004 (DTS #2009-1809). For Gul's rendition, see 1512 04). 

According to an August 16, 2004, cable, a CIA interrogator did "not believe that escalation to enhanced measures 

will increase [Gul's] ability to produce timely accurate locational and threat information." (See 1567 

•^•••04). ) On August 19, 2004, a cable from DETENTION SITE B^CIOioted that theintorogaUon 

team "does not believe [Gul] is withholding imminent threat information." See 11574 

04). 

2336

 Letter to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, CIA; from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, 

August 26, 2004 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 6). In May 2005, the OLC again accepted the CIA's representations that a 

psychological assessment found that Gul was "alert and oriented and his concentration and attention were 

appropriate," that Gul's "thought processes were clear and logical; there was no evidence of a thought disorder, 

delusions, or hallucinations," and that there "were not significant signs of depression anxiety or other mental 

disturbance." See memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, 

from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: 

Application of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May be Used in the Interrogation of a 

High Value al Qaeda Detainee (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 9). 

2337 ^^^^ ^ 153 0 (081633Z AUG 04); 1541 (101228Z AUG 04) 

11 II 11111 JMIMBBIMI M "MI I 

Page 416 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

416 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

information";2338 and (4) that CIA interrogators did not believe that Gul was "withholding 

imminent threat information."2339 

Levin's August 26, 2004, letter to Rizzo was based on the premise 

that "[w]e understand that [Janat] Gul is a high-value al Qaeda operative who is believed to 

possess information concerning an imminent terrorist threat to the United States."2340 Levin's 

understanding was based on the CIA's representation that "Gul had been working to facilitate a 

direct meeting between the CIA HU H source reporting on the pre-election threat 

and Abu Faraj [al-Libi]."2341 This information later proved to be inaccurate. As detailed 

elsewhere in this summary, the threat of a terrorist attack to precede the November 2004 U.S. 

election was found to be based on a CIA source whose information was questioned by senior 

CTC officials at the time.2342 The same CIA source admitted to fabricating the information after 

a in October 2004.2343 In November 2004, after the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques on Janat Gul, CIA's chief of Base at DETENTION SITE BLACK, 

where Janat Gul was interrogated, wrote that "describing [Gul] as 'highest ranking' gives him a 

stature which is undeserved, overblown and misleading." The chief of Base added that "[s]tating 

that [Gul] had 'long standing access to senior leaders in al-Qa'ida' is simply wrong."2344 In 

December 2004, CIA officers concluded that Janat Gul was "not the link to senior AQ leaders 

that [CIA Headquarters] said he was/is,"2345 and in April 2005 CIA officers wrote that "[t]here 

simply is no 'smoking gun' that we can refer to that would justify our continued holding of 

[Janat Gul]."2346 

(TS^^^^^^^^^BVNF ) By April 2005, as the OLC ncarcd completion of a new 

memorandum analyzing the legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the OLC 

sought information from the CIA on "what [the CIA] got from Janat Gul, was it valuable, [and] 

did it help anything...." The CIA did not immediately respond to this request, and the CIA's 

Associate General Counsel noted that DOJ personnel had "taken to calling 

[him] daily" for additional information.2347 Subsequently, on April 15, 2005, the CIA informed 

1567 (161730Z AUG 04) 

11574 (191346Z AUG 04) 

2340

 Letter to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, CIA; from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, 

August 26, 2004 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 6). 

2341

 Letter from Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General, August 25,2004 (DTS #2009-1809). 

from: I^^I^H ; to: [REDACTED], | 

I; subject: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and [Source Name REDACTED]?; date: March | 

2004, at 06:55 AM; email to BBBB B

 cc :

 IBHBflB < H i 

BBB > [REDACTED], ^H|HHEsubject : Re: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and [Source Name 

REDACTED]?; date: MarchH>20047at7-52i32 AM. The fabricated source reporting is described elsewhere in 

this summary. ^^^^^^ ^ 

2343

 1411 (••••OI L 

2344

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: | 

subject: re ALEC •! ; November 10, 2004. 

2345

 CIA "Comments on Detainees," December 19, 2004, Notes from a CD from [DETENTION SITE BLACK]. 

2346

 Email from: [REDACTED] (COB DETENTION SITE BLACK); to: B^^^^^^ B cc: | 

••^^^B K subject: re ^^^^^^Bf r date: April 30,2005. 

to: MBI^^^IBnBBiB E IH^HB^^B - Bi^^^^^BiiiS d 

[REDACTED]; subject: questions from OLC for Art 16 opinion; date: April 12, 2005; email from: | 

TOP 

Page 417 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

417 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECllETZ/M^B^Mii^^^^^M/NOFOR N 

the OLC that "during most of Gul's debriefings, he has sought to minimize his knowledge of 

extremist activities and has provided largely non-incriminating information about his 

involvement in their networks."2348 On May 10, 2005, the OLC issued a memorandum that 

stated, "[y]ou informed us that the CIA believed Gul had information about al Qaeda's plans to 

launch an attack within the United States... [o]ur conclusions depend on these assessments." 

The OLC referenced I^H' s August 25, 2004, letter on Gul and the pre-election threat.2349 In 

a May 30, 2005, memorandum, the OLC referred to Janat Gul as "representative of the high 

value detainees on whom enhanced techniques have been, or might be used," and wrote that "the 

CIA believed [that Janat Gul] had actionable intelligence concerning the pre-election threat to 

the United States."2350 In the same memorandum, the OLC conveyed a new CIA representation 

describing the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Janat Gul, which 

stated: 

"Gul has provided information that has helped the CIA with validating one of 

its key assets reporting on the pre-election threat."2351 

(TS/^^^mHI^^^^/NF ) There are no indications in the memorandum that the CIA 

informed the OLC that it had concluded that Gul had no information about the pre-election 

threat, which was the basis on which the OLC had approved the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques against Gul in the first place, or that CIA officers had determined that 

Gul was "not the man we thought he was." In September 2004, the OLC advised the CIA that 

the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani and 

Sharif al-Masri was also legal, based on the CIA representations that the two detainees were alQa'ida operatives involved in the "operational planning" of the pre-election plot against the 

United States.2352 This CIA assessment was based on the same fabrications from the same CIA 

to: and 

questions from OLC for Art 16 opinion; date: April 14,2005. 

2348

 April 15, 2005ifaxtoDOJ Command Center, for H - Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of 

Justice, from HIHH , |H | Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, re: Janat Gul. 

2349

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application of 

18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al 

Qaeda Detainee. 

2350

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of 

United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be 

Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11). 

2351

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of 

United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be 

Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11), citing Janat Gul Memo 

pp. 1-2. See April 15. 2005, fax to DO J Command Center, for Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. 

Department of Justice, from H I Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, re: Janat Gul. 

2352

 Letter to John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, CIA; from Daniel Levin, September 6,2004 (DTS #2009-

1810, Tab 7); Letter to John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, CIA; from Daniel Levin, September 20, 2004 (DTS 

#2009-1810, Tab 8). 

M I 11 III I ^BBBJJJ^B^BBMIMOROR N 

Page 418 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

418 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1 //NOFOR N 

source.-3 Like Janat Gul, Ghailani and al-Masri were subjected to extended sleep deprivation 

and experienced hallucinations.2354 

D. May 2005 OLC Memoranda Rely on Inaccurate Representations from the CIA 

Regarding the Interrogation Process, the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, and 

the Effectiveness of the Techniques 

On May 4, 2005, Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven 

Bradbury faxed to CIA Associate General Counsel HH^^HI a se t °f questions related to 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, in which Bradbury referenced medical journal 

articles. The following day, |^ H sent a letter to Bradbury stating that the CIA's responses 

had been composed by the CIA's Office of Medical Services (OMS). The CIA response stated 

that any lowering of the threshold of pain caused by sleep deprivation was "not germane" to the 

program, because studies had only identified differences in sensitivity to heat, cold, and pressure, 

and the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "do not involve application of heat, cold, 

pressure, any sharp objects (or indeed any objects at all)."2355 With regard to the effect of sleep 

deprivation on the experience of water dousing, the CIA response stated that "at the temperatures 

of water we have recommended for the program the likelihood of induction of pain by water 

dousing is very low under any circumstances, and not a phenomenon we have seen in detainees 

subject to this technique."2356 In response to Bradbury's query as to when edema or shackling 

would become painful as a result of standing sleep deprivation, the CIA responded, "[w]e have 

not observed this phenomenon in the interrogations performed to date, and have no reason to 

believe on theoretical grounds that edema or shackling would be more painful," provided the 

shackles are maintained with "appropriate slack" and "interrogators follow medical officers' 

recommendation to end standing sleep deprivation and use an alternate technique when the 

medical officer judges that edema is significant in any way." The CIA response added that the 

medical officers' recommendations "are always followed," and that "[d]etainees have not 

complained about pain from edema." Much of this information was inaccurate.2357 

11411(| 

2334

 [REDACTED) 3242 (HH^ H ° 4) 

2355

 Letter from Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Steve Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 4, 2005. Multiple interrogation plans for CIA detainees called for 

"uncomfortably" cool temperatures along with sleep deprivation. See 10361 

1758 H H 10654 (030904Z MAR 03). 

2356

 Letter from Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Steve Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 4, 2005. The CIA had subjected detainees to cold water baths during periods 

of sleep deprivation. As a CIA psychologist noted, "I heard [Abu Hudhaifa] gasp out loud several times as he was 

placed in the tub." (See email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Memo; date: March 15, 2004.) The 

inspector general later reported that, as a result of being bathed in ice water, Abu Hudhaifa was "shivering" and 

interrogators were concerned about his body temperature dropping (2005-8085-IG, at 12). See also 

2357

 Letter from ^^^HH^Assoc i ate General Counsel, CIA, to Steve Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 4, 2005. Numerous detainees subjected to standing sleep deprivation 

suffered from edema. (SeeJMHBl^^^^^M 34098 ^^^H^^KHH B (12502 1309Z 

AUG 03); (251619Z JUN 1246 (171946Z AUG 

03); ^^^T049^161529 Z FEB 03); H^ H 10429 (101215ZFEB03)nM^Ml0 9 0 9 (201918Z MAR 

03); 42206 (191513Z JUL 03).) Detainees sometimes complained of pain and swelling 

Page 419 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

419 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/d 1//NOFQRN 

(TS/^HBB^ ) Bradbury further inquired whether it was "possible to tell reliably 

(e.g. from outward physical signs like grimaces) whether a detainee is experiencing severe pain." 

The CIA responded that "all pain is subjective, not objective,"

 2358

 adding: 

"Medical officers can monitor for evidence of condition or injury that most 

people would consider painful, and can observe the individual for outward 

displays and expressions associated with the experience of pain. Medical 

officer [sic] can and do ask the subject, after the interrogation session has 

concluded, if he is in pain, and have and do provide analgesics, such as Tylenol 

and Aleve, to detainees who report headache and other discomforts during 

their interrogations. We reiterate, that an interrogation session would be 

stopped if, in the judgment of the interrogators or medical personnel, medical 

attention was required."

 2359 

(TS/^^I^^^^I^NF ) As described elsewhere, multiple CIA detainees were subjected to 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques despite their medical conditions.2360 

(TSZ/HI^^HW ) Bradbury's fax also inquired whether monitoring and safeguards 

"will effectively avoid severe physical pain or suffering for detainees," which was a formulation 

of the statutory definition of torture under consideration. Despite concerns from OMS that its 

assessments could be used to support a legal review of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques,2361 the CIA's response stated: 

in their lower extremities. (See, for example^^^H i 2615 (201528Z AUG 2619 (211349Z AUG 

OT^^P H 2620 (221303Z AUG 07)j|^H262 3 (231234Z AUG 07);H|^H262 9 (251637Z AUG 07); 

•^B264 2 (27134IZ AUG 07); ^(^^264 3 (271856Z AUG 07).) As noted, standing sleep deprivation was 

not always discontinued with the onset of edema. 

2358

 Letter from Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Steve Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General, Office ofLegalCounsel, May 4, 2005. 

2355

 Letter from |HHHH > Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Steve Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 4, 2005. 

2360 See, for example,JH^^ H 10536 (151006Z JULY 02);ALEC^^ H (182321Z JUL 02); 10647 

(201331Z AUG 02); 10618 (121448Z AUG 02); BMjl067 9 (250932Z AUG 02); DIRECTOR 

38161 (131326ZMAY 03); DIRECTOR^^B^^BBMA Y 03); DIRECTOR 

134098 34294P ^ 

134310 See also detainee reports and reviews in Volume HI. 

2361

 On April 11, 2005, after reviewing a draft OLC opinion, OMS personnel wrote a memorandum 

that stated, "[s]imply put, OMS is not in the business of saying what is acceptable in causing discomfort to 

other human beings, and will not take on that burden.... OMS did not review or vet these techniques prior to their 

introduction, but rather came into this program with the understanding of your office and DOJ that they were already 

determined as legal, permitted and safe. We see this current iteration [of the OLC memorandum] as a reversal of 

that sequence, and a relocation of those decisions to OMS. If this is the case, that OMS has now the responsibility 

for determining a procedure's legality through its determination of safety, then we will need to review all procedures 

in that light given this new responsibility." See email from: to i^^BI^^^B ; cc: 

[REDACTED], ^^•BB B ^flfeB^ B BflHl^lHrHBBI^BlHflHH : subject: 

8 April Draft Opinion from DOJ - OMS Concerns; date: April 11,2005, at 10:12 AM. 

IIII 11 III i ^^^^MMBBM M 'I m i "iii i 

Page 420 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

420 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

"[i]t is OMS's view that based on our limited experience and the extensive 

experience of the military with these techniques, the program in place has 

effectively avoided severe physical pain and suffering, and should continue to 

do so. Application of the thirteen techniques2362 has not to date resulted in any 

severe or permanent physical injury (or any injury other than transient 

bruising), and we do not expect this to change."2363 

In May 2005, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Steven 

Bradbury signed three memoranda that relied on information provided by the CIA that was 

inconsistent with CIA's operational records. On May 10, 2005, Bradbury signed two 

memoranda analyzing the statutory prohibition on torture with regard to the CIA's enhanced 

inteiTogation techniques and to the use of the intenogation techniques in combination.2364 On 

May 30, 2005, Bradbury signed another memorandum examining U.S. obligations under the 

Convention Against Torture.2365 The memoranda approved 13 techniques: (1) dietary 

manipulation, (2) nudity, (3) attention grasp, (4) walling, (5) facial hold, (6) facial slap or insult 

slap, (7) abdominal slap, (8) cramped confinement, (9) wall standing, (10) stress positions, (11) 

water dousing, (12) sleep deprivation (more than 48 hours), and (13) the waterboard. The three 

memoranda relied on numerous CIA representations that, as detailed elsewhere, were 

incongruent with CIA records, including: (1) the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 

would be used only when the interrogation team "considers them necessary because a detainee is 

withholding important, actionable intelligence or there is insufficient time to try other 

techniques," (2) the use of the techniques "is discontinued if the detainee is judged to be 

consistently providing accurate intelligence or if he is no longer believed to have actionable 

intelligence," (3) the "use of the techniques usually ends after just a few days when the detainee 

begins participating," (4) the interrogation techniques "would not be used on a detainee not 

reasonably thought to possess important, actionable intelligence that could not be obtained 

otherwise," and (5) the interrogation process begins with "an open, non-threatening approach" to 

discern if the CIA detainee would be cooperative.2366 

2362 -pjle OLC was, at the time, analyzing the legality of 13 techniques, including the 10 techniques outlined in the 

OLC's August 1, 2002, memorandum, and additional techniques for which die CIA sought OLC approval in 2004. 

2363

 Letter from Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Steve Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 4, 2005. 

2364

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10,2005, Re: Application of 

18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al 

Qaeda Detainee (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 9); Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, 

Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of 

Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to the Combined Use of Certain 

Techniques in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 10). 

2365

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30,2005, Re: Application of 

United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be 

Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11). 

23<i6 ah Qf t jles e asse i-ti o n s wer e inaccurate. See Volume III for examples of CIA detainees being immediately 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including 34491 (051400Z 

MAR 03). See also Volume III for details on other interrogations in 2003, when at least six detainees that year were 

stripped and shackled, nude, in the standing stress position for sleep deprivation or subjected to other enhanced 

interrogation techniques prior to being qui RECTOR FEB 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 421 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

421 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ I//NOFQR N 

(TSvV^^I^^^^^BWP ) The OLC memoranda also relied on CIA representations regarding 

specific interrogation techniques that were incongruent with the operational history of the 

program. For example, the CIA informed the OLC that it maintained a 75 degree minimum 

room temperature for nude detainees as "a matter of policy," with a minimum of 68 degrees in 

the case of technical problems. This information was inconsistent with CIA practice both before 

and after the CIA's representations to the OLC.2367 The OLC relied on the CIA representation 

that standing sleep deprivation would be discontinued in the case of significant swelling of the 

lower extremities (edema), whereas in practice the technique was repeatedly not stopped when 

edema occurred.2368 The OLC also repeated CIA representations that constant light was 

necessary for security, even though the CIA had subjected detainees to constant darkness.2369 

Additional CIA representations accepted by the OLC—and found to be inconsistent with CIA 

practice —related to: (1) the exposure of nude detainees to other detainees and detention facility 

staff,2370 (2) the use of water dousing—specifically the inaccurate representation that the 

technique did not involve immersion, (3) the use of shackles in standing sleep deprivation, (4) 

the likelihood of hallucinations during sleep deprivation, (5) the responsibility of medical 

personnel to intervene when standing sleep deprivation results in hallucinations, and (6) the 

purpose and the use of diapers on CIA detainees.2371 

The OLC repeated the CIA's representations that "the effect of the 

waterboard is to induce a sensation of drowning," that "the detainee experiences this sensation 

even if he is aware that he is not actually drowning," and that "as far as can be determined, [Abu 

03)); Abu Yasir al-Jaza'iri 

~| 35787 (1 

Abu Hudhaifa 

| and Majid Khan 

39077 (271719Z MAY 03)). 

2367

 Letter from ^^Hfcl C Legal 

2004 (DTS #2009-1809). See, for example, 

131429(1613032 DEC 02); 

03); 

I I Abdullah 

38576^^HmA Y 03)); HambTli^^l^^^^B^ H 1241 

46471 (241242Z MAY 03)71 

| to Acting Assistant Attorney General Levin, December 30, 

131118 

110006 (070902Z DEC 02); [REDACTED] 33962 (211724Z FEB 

134031 (231242ZFEB 03);^^^^^•^^^•3457 5 

134354 03); I HI I I IIII I I 03). Email to: 

yromOREDACTED]; subject: Medical Evaulation/UpdateHB(047);date: March|, 2004. 

Email to: I^^^^^^^Kfrom . [REDACTED]; subject: Medical Evaluation/Update (047); date: March 8, 

2004. EmailtcK^^^^^^^I ; from: [REDACTED]; subject: Medical Evaluation/Update H (047); date: 

March 9, 2004. ®|^^H2347(300624 Z MAY 05); ^•••179 7 (021612Z DEC 05). 

2368 See, for exampleTHH l 109 ° 9 (201918Z MAR 03X^^^262 2 (230851Z AUG 07). 

2369

 According to a CIA cable, cells at DETENTION SITE COBALT were "blacked out at alHime^ising curtains 

plus painted exterior windows. And double doors. The lights are never turned on." (See 

28246 Upon finding Ramzi bin al-Shibh "cowering in the corner, shivering" when 

the light in his cell burned out, interrogators decided to use darkness as an interrogation technique. He was then 

placed in sleep deprivation "standing, shackled feet and hands, with hands over his head, naked, in total darkness." 

See M B 10521 (191750Z FEB 03)J|^^Bl052 5 (200840Z FEB 03). 

| interview of Bfl^HlH i [CIA OFFICER 1], December 19, 2002. CIA Interrogation 

Program Draft Course Materials, March 11, 2003, p. 28. CTC/RDG Interrogation Program, December 15, 2003. 

DlRECTORl M (251609Z JUL 02). See also "Standard Interrogation Techniques," attachment to email from: 

^B^^^^Eto : Scott W. Muller, John Rizzo, [REDACTED], subject: revised interrogation 

discussion; date: July 19, 2004. 

| to Acting Assistant Attorney General Levin, December 30, 

2371

 Letter from •^•CT C Legal | 

2004 (DTS #2009-1809). 

TOP SECRET//! I//NOFORN 

Page 422 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

422 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECREiW^^^M^^M^NQFQR N 

Zubaydah and KSM] did not experience physical pain or, in the professional judgment of 

doctors, is there any medical reason to believe they would have done so." The OLC further 

accepted that physical sensations associated with waterboarding, such as choking, "end when the 

application ends."2372 This information is incongruent with CIA records. According to CIA 

records, Abu Zubaydah's waterboarding sessions "resulted in immediate fluid intake and 

involuntary leg, chest and arm spasms" and "hysterical pleas."2373 A medical officer who 

oversaw the interrogation of KSM stated that the waterboard technique had evolved beyond the 

"sensation of drowning" to what he described as a "series of near drownings."2374 Physical 

reactions to waterboarding did not necessarily end when the application of water was 

discontinued, as both Abu Zubaydah and KSM vomited after being subjected to the 

waterboard.2375 Further, as previously described, during at least one waterboard session, Abu 

Zubaydah "became completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth." 

He remained unresponsive after the waterboard was rotated upwards. Upon medical 

intervention, he regained consciousness and expelled "copious amounts of liquid."2376 The CIA 

also relayed information to the OLC on the frequency with which the waterboard could be used 

that was incongruent with past operational practice.2377 

The May 10, 2005, memorandum analyzing the individual use of 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques accepted the CIA's representations that CIA 

interrogators are trained for "approximately four weeks," and that "all personnel directly 

engaged in the interrogation of persons detained... have been appropriately screened (from the 

2372

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application of 

18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al 

Qaeda Detainee (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 9); Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, 

Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of 

Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to the Combined Use of Certain 

Techniques in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 10); Memorandum for 

John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States 

Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the 

Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11). 

2373 10643^^^BAU G 

See from: ^^^^^^Bfll' t 0 : cc : HI^^^HMf c subject: More; 

April 10, 2003, at 5:59: 27 PM. 

2375 10644 (201235Z AUG 02); email from: [REDACTED]; to: •••• • and [REDACTED]; 

subject: Re: So it begins; date: August 4, 2002, at 09:45:09 AM; HH H 10803(131929Z MAR 03). 

2376 See Abu ZubaydahandKSM detainee reviewsinVolume 111, including HH I 1080 3

 (131929Z MAR 03). 

See email from: QMS; to: and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Departure; date: March 6, 

2003, at 7:11:59 PM; email from: ^^^HflHToMS ; to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]^ubiect: Re: 

Acceptable lower ambient temperatures; date: March 7, 2003, at 8:22 PM; email from: HHHH , OMS; to: 

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Talking Points for review and comment; date: August 13, 2004, at 

10:22 AM; email from: to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and 

[REDACTED]; subject: Re: DiscussionwithDanLevin- AZ; date: October 26, 2004, at 6:09 PM. 

2377

 Letter from m^|CT C Legal to Acting Assistant Attorney General Dan Levin, August 19, 

2004 (DTS# 2009-1809). The OLC, having been informed by the CIA that 40 seconds was the maximum length of 

a single waterboard application, noted that "you have informed us that this maximum has rarely been reached." This 

is inaccurate. KSM was subjected to 40-second exposures at least 19 times. 

Page 423 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

423 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

medical, psychological and security standpoints)."2378 The CIA representations about training 

and screening were incongruent with the operational history of the CIA program. CIA records 

indicate that CIA officers and contractors who conducted CIA interrogations in 2002 did not 

undergo any interrogation training. The first interrogator training course did not begin until 

November 12, 2002, by which time at least 25 detainees had been taken into CIA custody.2379 

Numerous CIA interrogators and other CIA personnel associated with the program had either 

suspected or documented personal and professional problems that raised questions about their 

judgment and CIA employment. This group of officers included individuals who, among other 

issues, had engaged in inappropriate detainee interrogations, had workplace anger management 

issues, and had reportedly admitted to sexual assault.2380 

2378

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application of 

18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al 

jaeda Detainee (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 9). As described in this summary, when |Hj^HcT C Legal, • • 

|, insisted that CTC Legal vet and review the background of CIA personnel involved in the CIA's 

interrogations, he directly linked this review to the legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

wrote: "we will be forced to Disapprove [sic] the participation of specific personnel in the use of 

enhanced techniques unless we have ourselves vetted them and are satisfied with their qualifications and suitability 

for what are clearly unusual measures that are lawful only when practiced correctly by personnel whose records 

clearly demonstrate their suitability for that role." The chief of CTC, Jose Rodriguez, objected to this proposal. Sec 

email from: ^^^^^^^•JCTC/LGL ; to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], 

[REDACTEDT^^^^^B^Bsubiect : EYES ONLY; date: November 2002, at 03:13:01 PM; email 

from: Jose Rodriguez^o^^^^^Pfl H BCTC/LGL; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], ••^^H^Esubject : EYES ONLY; date: November!, 2002, at 04:27 PM. 

2379 Yj l e finin g to conduct the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques required only approximately 65 hours of 

classroom and operational instruction. December 4, 2002, Training Report, High Value Target Interrogation and 

Exploitation (HVTIE) Training Seminar 12-18 Nov 02, (pilot running). 

2380 /\ mon g other abuses, ^HH^ H had engaged in "Russian Roulette" with a detainee. (See Memorandum for 

Chief, Staff and Operations Branch from [REDACTED],

 A Pr i l

 '980, Subject: 

|l984, Memorandum for Inspector General from [REDACTED], Inspector, via Deputy 

Inspector General, re ^ ^ [CIA OFFICER 2], who threatened 'Abd alRahim al-Nashiri with a gun and a power drill, I 

[REDACTED], | 

| See email from: 

[REDACTED]; to [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject: | 

11 ii m i i i i II i H I 

Page 424 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

424 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

(^FSA^^^^^^^^BZ/NF) Finally, the OLC accepted a definition of "High Value Detainee" 

conveyed by the CIA2381 that limited the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to 

"senior member[s]" of al-Qa'ida or an associated terrorist group who have "knowledge of 

imminent terrorist threats" or "direct involvement in planning and preparing" terrorist actions, 

However, at the time of the OLC opinion, the CIA had used its enhanced interrogation 

techniques on CIA detainees who were found neither to have knowledge of imminent threats nor 

to have been directly involved in planning or preparing terrorist actions. Some were not senior 

al-Qa'ida members,2382 or even members of al-Qa'ida.2383 Others were never suspected of 

having information on, or a role in, terrorist plotting and were suspected only of having 

information on the location of UBL or other al-Qa'ida figures,2384 or were simply believed to 

have been present at a suspected al-Qa'ida guesthouse.2385 A year later, Legal 

wrote to Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury suggesting a new standard that 

more closely reflected actual practice by allowing for the CIA detention and interrogation of 

detainees to be based on the belief that the detainee had information that could assist in locating 

senior al-Qa'ida leadership.2386 The OLC modified the standard in a memorandum dated July 

20, 2007.2387 By then, the last CIA detainee, Muhammad Rahim, had already entered CIA 

custody.2388 

(ISfHUI^I^ ) The May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum analyzing U.S. obligations 

under the Convention Against Torture relied heavily on CIA representations about the 

intelligence obtained from the program. Many of these representations were provided in a 

March 2, 2005, CIA memorandum known as the "Effectiveness Memo," in which the CIA 

advised that the CIA program "works and the techniques are effective in producing foreign 

intelligence." The "Effectiveness Memo" stated that "|w]e assess we would not have succeeded 

in overcoming the resistance of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), Abu Zubaydah, and other 

equally resistant high-value terrorist detainees without applying, in a careful, professional and 

[ [REDACTED], ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^ 

For more information, see Volume III. 

2381

 Fax to Acting Assistant Attorney General Levin from January 4, 2005 (DTS #2009-1809). 

2582 See detainee reviews for Suleiman Abdullah and Janat Gul in Volume III for additional information. 

2383 See detainee review for Rafiq bin Bashir bin Halul Al-Hami in Volume III for additional information. 

2384 See detainee review for Ridha Ahmad al-Najjar in Volume 111 for additional information. 

2385 See detainee reviews for Tawfiq Nasir Awad al-Bihani and Arsala Khan in Volume III for additional 

information. 

2386

 Letter from Legal ^HH H to Acting Assistant Attorney General Bradbury, May 23, 2006 

(DTS #2009-1809). 

2387

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of 

the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain 

Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 14). 

238B ^ ^ 6439 (IHBHHft ; •HHi^HI 751 6 t^HHi ' Muhammad 

Rahim entered CIA i n iml nn lul J 'INI 

11 II 11111 I II I IN 

Page 425 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

425 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

safe manner, the full range of interrogation techniques."2389 The CIA "Effectiveness Memo" 

further stated that "[p]rior to the use of enhanced techniques against skilled resistors [sic] like 

KSM and Abu Zubaydah—the two most prolific intelligence producers in our control—CIA 

acquired little threat information or significant actionable intelligence information." As 

described in this summary, the key information provided by Abu Zubaydah that the CIA 

attributed to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was provided prior to the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. KSM was subjected to CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques within minutes of his questioning, and thus had no opportunity to divulge information 

prior to their use. As described elsewhere, CIA personnel concluded the waterboard was not an 

effective interrogation technique against KSM.2390 

(TSZ/^l^^^^^^lk/NF ) Under a section entitled, "Results," the CIA "Effectiveness Memo" 

represented that the "CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a 

comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture 

additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida." It then 

listed 11 examples of "critical intelligence" acquired "after applying enhanced interrogation 

techniques":2391 the "Karachi Plot," the "Heathrow Plot," the "Second Wave," the "Guraba 

Cell," "Issa al-Hindi," "Abu Talha al-Pakistani," "Hambali's Capture," "Jafaar al-Tayyar," the 

"Dirty Bomb Plot," the "Shoe Bomber," and intelligence obtained on "Shkai, Pakistan." These 

representations of "effectiveness" were almost entirely inaccurate and mirrored other inaccurate 

information provided to the White House, Congress, and the CIA inspector general.2392 In 

addition, on April 15, 2005, the CIA provided the OLC with an eight-page document entitled, 

"Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting." The CIA "Briefing Notes" document 

repeats many of the same CIA representations in the "Effectiveness Memo," but added additional 

inaccurate information related to the capture of Iyman Faris.2393 

The OLC's May 30, 2005, memorandum relied on the CIA's 

inaccurate representations in the "Effectiveness Memo" and the "Briefing Notes" document in 

determining that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did not violate the Fifth 

Amendment's prohibition on executive conduct that "shocks the conscience," indicating that this 

analysis was a "highly context-specific and fact-dependent question." The OLC also linked its 

2389

 CIA Memorandum for Sieve Bradbury at die Department of Justice, dated March 2,2005, from H H 

H Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist 

Interrogation Techniques." 

2390

 Interview of •^^^^^^Rb y [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 

15,2003; Intervie^f^^^^^^M , by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 

October 22, 2003; 1715 (201047Z MAY 03); Sametime Communication, ^HHl^ H

 an d

 H 

15/Aug/06, 10:28:38 to 10:58:00; Interview of •^^•••UWREDACTED ] and [REDACTED], 

Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 2003; Sametime CommunicationTU^^^^^^ I and [REDACTED], 

02/May/05, 14:51:48 to 15:17:39; Interview of by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and 

[REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 20, 2003. 

2391

 Emphasis in the original. 

2392 See list of 20 CIA representations included in this summary and additional details in Volume II. Representations 

regarding Abu Talha al-Pakistani. which were less frequent, are also described this summary and in greater detail in 

Volumes II and III. 

2393

 April 15, 2005,10:47AM, fax to DOJ Command Center for Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. 

Department of Justice, from Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center. Cover note: "H| , 

Answers to some of your questions," with attachment entitled "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting." 

11 ii 11 ii 1 1 

Page 426 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

426 
UNCLASSIFIED 

t o p secret ; 7NOFORN 

analysis of whether the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "constitutionally 

arbitrary" to the representation by the CIA that its interrogation program produced "substantial 

quantities of otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence."2394 The CIA's representations to the 

OLC that it obtained "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" from the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques were inaccurate.2395 

(^S^^^m^^^^/NF ) The OLC memorandum repeated specific inaccurate CIA 

representations, including that the waterboard was used against Abu Zubaydah and KSM "only 

after it became clear that standard interrogation techniques were not working"; that the 

information related to the "Guraba Cell" in Karachi was "otherwise unavailable actionable 

intelligence"; that Janat Gul was a "high value detainee"; and that information provided by 

Hassan Ghul regarding the al-Qa'ida presence in Shkai, Pakistan, was attributable to the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques.2396 Citing CIA information, the OLC memorandum also 

stated that Abu Zubaydah was al-Qa'ida's "third or fourth highest ranking member" and had 

been involved "in every major terrorist operation carried out by al Qaeda," and that "again, once 

enhanced techniques were employed," Abu Zubaydah "provided significant information on two 

operatives... who planned to build and detonate a 'dirty bomb' in the Washington DC area." 

The OLC repeated additional inaccurate information from the CIA related to KSM's reporting, 

including representations about the "Second Wave" plotting, the Heathrow Airport plotting, and 

the captures of Hambali, Iyman Faris, and Sajid Badat.2397 The OLC relied on CIA 

representations that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against 'Abd alRahim al-Nashiri produced "notable results as early as the first day," despite al-Nashiri providing 

reporting on the same topics prior to entering CIA custody. The OLC also repeated inaccurate 

CIA representations about statements reportedly made by Abu Zubaydah and KSM

 2398 

2354

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of 

United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be 

Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees. 

2395 See specific CIA examples of the "Results" of using the "CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation 

techniques" in March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from Legal Group, DCI 

Counterterrorist Center, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." The specific 

representations in the "Briefing Notes" document were similar to those in the CIA's "Effectiveness Memo" and 

included references to detainee reporting on Jose Padilla, Hambali, Dhiren Barot, Sajid Badat, Iyman Faris, Jaffar alTayyar, the Heathrow Airport plotting, and the Karachi plotting. 

2396 po r example, as detailed elsewhere in this review, Hassan Gul provided detailed information on al-Qa'ida's 

presence in Shkai, Pakistan, prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

2397

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30,2005, Re: Application of 

United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be 

Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees. 

2398

 The OLC memorandum stated that "[b]oth KSM and Zubaydah had 'expressed their belief that the general US 

population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to 'do what was necessary' to prevent the terrorists 

from succeeding in their goals.'" As described elsewhere in this summary, and in more detail in the full Committee 

Study, CIA records indicate that KSM and Abu Zubaydah did not make these statements. The memorandum also 

repeated CIA representations about KSM's comment, "Soon, you will know," and Abu Zubaydah's reported 

statements about being "permitted by Allah" to provide information. As described in this summary, these 

representations are not supported by CIA records. 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 427 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

427 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

) Finally, the May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum referenced the CIA 

Inspector General May 2004 Special Review, stating: "wc understand that interrogations have 

led to specific, actionable intelligence as well us a general increase in the amount of intelligence 

regarding al Qaeda and its affiliates."2399 The OLC memorandum cited pages in the Special 

Review that included inaccurate information provided by CIA personnel to the CIA's OIG, 

including representations related to Jose Padilla and Binyam Muhammad, Hambali and the "AlQa'ida cell in Karachi," the Paruchas, Iyman Faris, Salch al-Marri, Majid Khan, the Heathrow 

Airport plotting, and other "plots."2400 

E. After Passage of the Detainee Treatment Act, OLC Issues Opinion on CIA Conditions of 

Confinement, Withdraws Draft Opinion on the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation 

Techniques After (he U.S. Supreme Court Case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 

On December 19, 2005, anticipating the passage of the Detainee 

Treatment Act. Acting CIA General Counsel John Rizzo requested that the OLC review whether 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, as well as the conditions of confinement at CIA 

detention facilities, would violate the Detainee Treatment Act.2401 In April 2006, attorneys at 

OLC completed initial drafts of two legal memoranda addressing these questions.2402 In June 

2006, however, the U.S. Supreme Court case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld prompted the OLC to 

withdraw its draft memorandum on the impact of the Detainee Treatment Act on the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques. As ^^^^H^T C Legal explained, the OLC would 

prepare "a written opinion 'if we want'... but strongly implied wc shouldn't seek it"2403 As 

described in a July 2009 report of the Department of Justice Office of Professional 

Responsibility, the Administration determined that, after the Hamdan decision, it would need 

new legislation to support the continued use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques

 2404 

Even as it withdrew its draft opinion on the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, the OLC continued to analyze whether the CIA's conditions of 

confinement violated the Detainee Treatment Act. To support this analysis, the CIA asserted to 

the OLC that loud music and white noise, constant light, and 24-hour shackling were all for 

2399

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General. Office of Legal Counsel, May 30.2005, Re: Application of 

United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be 

Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees. 

2400

 Memorandum for John A, Rizzo. Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury. Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of 

United States Obligations Under Article 1 ft of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be 

Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees, pp. 10-11, citing 1G Special Review, pp. 85-91. 

-

4PI

 The Detainee Treatment Act passed on December 30, 2005. Letter from Senior Deputy General Counsel John 

Rizzo to Acting Assistant Attorney General Bradbury, December 19, 2005 (DTS #2009-1809). 

-

4n2

 April 19,2006, Fax from H N Legal Group, CIA Counterterrorism Center to DOJ Command 

Center for Steve Bradbury {DTS #2009-1809). 

2401

 Email from: to: [REDACTED]; cc:Joh n Rizzo; subject: FW: Summary 

of Hamdan Decision; date: June 30, 2006, ut 4:44 PM. 

J4(M Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility; Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal 

Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced 

Interrogation Techniques'on Suspected T ~ )58). 

T O P SECRET / 7NOFOR N 

Page 428 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

428 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

security purposes, that shaving was for security and hygiene purposes and was conducted only 

upon intake and not as a "punitive step," that detainees were not exposed to an "extended period" 

of white noise, and that CIA detainees had access to a wide array of amenities.2405 This 

information is incongruent with CIA records. Detainees were routinely shaved, sometimes as an 

aid to interrogation; detainees who were "participating at an acceptable level" were permitted to 

grow their hair and beards.2406 The CIA had used music at decibels exceeding the 

representations to the OLC. The CIA had also used specific music to signal to a detainee that 

another interrogation was about to begin.2407 Numerous CIA detainees were subjected to the 

extended use of white noise.2408 The CIA further inaccurately represented that "[mjedical 

personnel will advise ending sleep deprivation in the event the detainee appears to be 

experiencing hallucinations, transient or not."2409 In a May 18, 2006, letter, 

Legal, IH^^^^^ H wrote to the Department of Justice that "some of these conditions 

provide the additional benefit of setting a detention atmosphere conducive to continued 

intelligence collection from the detainee." While the letter referred generally to "constant light 

in the cells, use of white noise, use of shackles, hooding, and shaving/barbering," it described an 

intelligence collection purpose only for shaving, which "allows interrogators a clear view of the 

terrorist-detainee's facial clues."2410 

On August 31, 2006, the OLC finalized two legal analyses on the 

conditions of confinement at CIA detention sites. The first was a memorandum that evaluated 

whether six detention conditions in the CIA's detention program were consistent with the 

Detainee Treatment Act.2411 The second, provided in the form of a letter, concluded that those 

same six conditions did not violate the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 

2405

 Letter from Senior Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo to Acting Assistant Attorney General Bradbury, 

December 19, 2005 (DTS #2009-1809). January 25, 2006, Lette^oStev^mdbury^cting Assistant Attorney 

General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, from ^MMCT C Legal, CIA (DTS 

#1809-2009). 

2406 See, forexample^^^^^^HH^^I3136 9 (151028ZDEC02); 103611 

HEADQUARTERS ^^B(151955 Z SEP 05); HEADQUARTERS (212005Z JUN 05); 

HEADQUARTERS (202036Z JUN 05). 

2407

 As one example, CIA records indicate that in the CIA interrogation of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the "the Blues 

Brothers rendition of 'Rawhide' [was] played." CIA records state diat bin al-Shibh's reaction to hearing the song 

was evidence of his conditioning, as bin al-Shibh "knows when he hears the music where he is going and what is 

going to happen." (See 10602 (262020Z FEB 03); 10591 (252002Z FEB 03); [REDACTED] 

1889 (091823Z MAR 03); [REDACTED] 1924 (151729Z MAR04)i^^^ H 10361 ^•••I^H- ) "Loud 

noise" was also used to "prevent concentrating, planning, and derailing of the exploitation/interrogation process widi 

interrogation countermeasures (resistance)." See, for example, detainee reviews detailing the detention and 

interrogations of Lillie and Hambali in Volume III. 

2408 See, for example, 2505 (272059Z JUN 05). The amenities described by the CIA to the OLC were 

not available to detainees duringeariienter^ion^nhe program. 

2409

 April 23, 2006, Fax from H Legal Group, CIA Counterterrorism Center to DOJ Command 

Center for Steve Bradbury (DTS #2009-1809). 

2410

 May 18. 2006, Letter to Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, from 

BH^I ' •B:T C Legal, CIA, re: Request for Information on Security Measures (DTS # 2009-1809). 

2411

 Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, 

Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 31, 2006, Re: Application of the Detainee 

Treatment Act to Conditions of Confinement at Central Intelligence Agency Detention Facilities (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 13). 

11 ii i M I i ^^^^BBBBBI^ B I II I III 

Page 429 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

429 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRETZ/MMIM^^^Mj^^^/NQfOR N 

Conventions.2412 The OLC relied on the CIA's representations related to conditions of 

confinement for its analysis.2413 The OLC wrote that "underlying our analysis of all these 

methods [conditions of confinement] is our understanding that the CIA provides regular and 

thorough medical and psychological care to the detainees in its custody."2414 As detailed in this 

summary, the lack of emergency medical care for CIA detainees was a significant challenge for 

the CIA.2415 

(TSZ/HmiHiH^^ ) The August 31, 2006, OLC memorandum applying the terms of the 

Detainee Treatment Act to the conditions of confinement at CIA detention facilities stated that 

"over the history of the program, the CIA has detained a total of 96 individuals." This was based 

on a representation made by IHHflCT C Legal on April 23, 2006.2416 As of the date of the 

OLC memorandum, the CIA had detained at least 118 individuals. The OLC memorandum also 

stated that "we understand that, once the CIA assesses that a detainee no longer possesses 

significant intelligence value, the CIA seeks to move the detainee into alternative detention 

arrangements." CIA records indicate that detainees had remained in CIA custody long after the 

CIA had determined that they no longer possessed significant intelligence. Finally, the OLC 

memorandum repeated a number of earlier inaccurate CIA representations on the effectiveness of 

the program, citing both the CIA's "Effectiveness Memo" and its own May 30, 2005, 

memorandum. Notably, the August 31, 2006, OLC memorandum repeated the same inaccurate 

representation, which first appeared in an August 2002 OLC memorandum, that Abu Zubaydah 

was al-Qa'ida's "third or fourth highest ranking member" and had been involved "in every major 

terrorist operation carried out by al Qaeda." As described, CIA records as early as 2002 did not 

support these representations, and two weeks prior to the issuance of the August 2006 

memorandum, the CIA had published an intelligence assessment stating that Abu Zubaydah had 

been rejected by al-Qa'ida and explaining how the CIA had come to "miscast Abu Zubaydah as a 

'senior al-Qa'ida lieutenant.'"2417 

2412

 Letter for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Acting 

Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 31,2006 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 12). 

2413

 The OLC did not apply the Detainee Treatment Act or Common Article 3 to the use of shaving or other 

conditions of confinement in terms of their use as an interrogation technique. The OLC stated that while "the 

primary purpose of the conditions of confinement we consider here is to maintain the security of the CIA's detention 

facilities... [m]any of these conditions may also ease the obtaining of crucial intelligence information from the 

detainees." Nonetheless, the OLC concluded that "the security rationale alone is sufficient to justify each of the 

conditions of confinement in question." See memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central 

Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 

31,2006, Re: Application of the detainee Treatment Act to Conditions of Confinement at Central Intelligence 

Agency Detention Facilities (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 13). 

2414

 Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, 

Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 31, 2006, Re: Application of the Detainee 

Treatment Act to Conditions of Confinement at Central Intelligence Agency Detention Facilities (DTS #2009-1810 

Tab 13). 

2415

 For additional detailed information, see Volume I and Volume III. 

24^April 23, 2006, Fax to DOJ Command Center for Steve Bradbury, Office of Legal Counsel, from 

[HUH , Legal Group, CIA Counterterrorism Center. 

2417

 CIA Intelligence Assessment, August 16, 2006, "Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in 

Afghanistan, 1990-2001." For additional details, see the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III. 

Page 430 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

430 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

F. July 2007 OLC Memorandum Relics on Inaccurate CIA Representations Regarding CIA 

Interrogations and the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; 

CIA Misrepresents Congressional Views to the Department of Justice 

(U) On July 20, 2007, the OLC issued a memorandum applying the War Crimes Act, the 

Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques. The memorandum noted that, while the Hamdan decision 

"was contrary to the President's prior determination that Common Article 3 does not apply to an 

armed conflict across national boundaries with an international terrorist organization such as al 

Qaeda," this challenge to the CIA program was resolved by the Military Commissions Act, 

which "left responsibility for interpreting the meaning and application of Common Article 3, 

except for the grave breaches defined in the amended War Crimes Act, to the President."2418 

The OLC memorandum determined that six proposed interrogation 

techniques were legal: dietary manipulation, extended sleep deprivation, the facial hold, the 

attention grasp, the abdominal slap, and the insult (or facial) slap. The memorandum accepted 

the CIA's representation that, over the life of the program, the CIA had detained 98 individuals, 

of whom 30 had been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.2419 At the time 

of the OLC memorandum the CIA had detained at least 119 individuals, of whom at least 38 had 

been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.2420 The inaccurate statistics 

provided by the CIA to the OLC were used to support OLC's conclusion that the program was 

"proportionate to the government interest involved," as required by the "shocks the conscience" 

test. The OLC also noted that "careful screening procedures are in place to ensure that enhanced 

techniques will be used only in the interrogations of agents or members of al Qaeda or its 

affiliates who are reasonably believed to possess critical intelligence that can be used to prevent 

future terrorist attacks against the United States and its interests."2421 In practice, numerous 

individuals had been detained by the CIA and subjected to the CIA's enhanced intenogation 

2418

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of 

the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain 

Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in die Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 14). 

2419

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of 

the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain 

Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 14). 

2420

 Although all 119 known CIA detainees had entered CIA custody by July 20, 2007, Muhammad Raliim, the last 

detainee, had not yet been subjected to the CLA's enhanced interrogation techniques by the time of the OLC 

memorandum. Muhammad Raliim was rendered to CIA custody on July 2007. (See 6439 

(jmm|) ; 7516 (^^^^^^^^B ) Interrogators began using the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques on Rahim on July 21, 2007; the day after die OLC Memorandum was issued. See 

• • • 2467 (211341Z JUL 07). 

2421

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of 

the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain 

Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 14). ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^ 

11 ii 1111 1 i II i HI 

Page 431 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

431 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

techniques, despite doubts and questions surrounding their knowledge of terrorist threats and the 

location of senior al-Qa'ida leadership. Examples include, among others: Asadullah,2422 Mustafa 

al-Hawsawi,2423 Abu Hudhaifa,2424 Arsala Khan,2425 ABU TALHA AL-MAGREBI and ABU 

BAHAR AL-TURKI,2426 Janat Gul,2427Ahmed Ghailani,2428 Sharif al-Masri,2429 and Sayyid 

Ibrahim.2430 

2422

 Interrogators had asked CIA Headquarters for the assessments supporting the decision to subject Asadullah to 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, noting that "it would be of enormous help to the interrogator to know 

wh at i^onojetefoctandwhati s good analysis." (See ^B^^^^BB^^^^B i 33963 

also ^^HBHBH^ H 34098 BBfelHI^H^^^^^^^^^^ H 

In response, ALEC Station acknowledged that "[t]o be sure, our case that Asadullah should have a good sense of bin 

Ladin's location is circumstantial." (See ALECBi^H^HB^I' ) The following day, interrogators 

commented that "it may be that he simply does not know the [locational information on AQ leaders]." See 

i^^HHH H 343101

 — ^^^^ ^ 

2423

 Following al-Hawsawi's first interrogation session, Chief of Interrogations asked CIA 

Headquarters for information on what al-Hawsawi actually "knows," saying: "he does not appear to the [sic] be a 

person that is a financial mastermind. However, we lack facts with which to confront [al-Hawsawi], What we need 

at this point is substantive information vice supposition." See ^^^Hi^^l^HI^ I 34757 (101742Z MAR 

03). 

2424

 Although CIA records include no requests or approval cables, Abu Hudhaifa was subjected to ice water baths 

and 66 hours of standing sleep deprivation. He was released because the CIA discovered he was likely not the 

person he was believed to be. See WASHINGTON DC ^ H • • 513031 

2425

 CIA Headquarters initially resisted approving Arsala Khan's capture because of a lack of information 

confirming that he was a "continuing tiireat." (See 169986 email from: 

HflHH ; to: HHHH^^IHHH . and 

Approval to Capture i il 11 Inn III BBB^^^^B'

 111

 I"1'

 Iiim|11

 that Arsala Khan was the individual 

sought by the CIA, interrogators subjected him to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "to make a better 

assessment regarding [his] willingness to start talking, or assess if our subject is, in fact the man we are looking for." 

See 1373 

2426

 The true names of diese detainees have been replaced with the capitalized pseudonyms AL-MAGREBI and ALTURKI. At the time the two detainees were rendered to CIA custody, the CIA was aware that they were then 

working for a foreign partner government. (See ALEC [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] 43773 

[REDACTED].) They were subjected to sleep deprivation and dietary manipulation until the CIA confirmed that 

the detainees had been trying to contact the CIA for weeks to inform the CIA of what they believed were pending alQa'ida terrorist attacks. (See BBB^^^B^^^ M 2227 [REDACTED]; 223 3 

[REDACTED]; HEADQUARTERS^|H|J^DACrF.D]; 

12232 [REDACTED].) After the CIA had determined that AL-MAGREBI and ALTURKI should not be in CIA custody, the two detainees were held for Bi^^^^^^^ H additional months before 

they were released. See [REDACTED] 2025 [REDACTED]. 

2427

 The case of Janat Gul is described above in the context of OLC advice in 2004 and afterwards. As Gul's 

interrogators noted, "Team does not believe [Gul] is withholding imminent threat information, however team will 

continue to press [Gul] for that during each session." See BBHH H ' ^74 (^^^^^^^ B 04). 

2428

 The CIA's assessment of Ghailani's knowledge of terrorist threats was speculative. As one official noted, 

"[ajlthough Ghailani's role in operational planning is unclear, his respected role in al-Qa'ida and presence in Shkai 

as recently as October 2003 may have provided him some knowledge about ongoing attack planning against the 

United States homeland^ndtheoperatives involved." See email from: HflBBBH> CTC/UBLD B^HBB H 

(formerly ALEClBBI^HH w to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: 

derog information for ODDO on Talha, Ghailani, Hamza Rabi'a and Abu Faraj; date: August 10, 2004. 

2429

 As noted above, the credibility of the source implicating Sharif al-Masri, Janat Gul, and Ghailani's connections 

to a pre-election plot was questioned by CIA officials prior to the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques against them. The source was later determined to have fabricated the information. 

2430

 Five days after interrogators began using enhanced interrogation techniques against Sayyid Ibrahim, 

interrogators cabled CIA Headquarters requesting information that would "definitively link [Ibrahim] to nefarious 

Page 432 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

432 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

(TSZ/I^^^^^BV^ )

 Th e

 July 20, 2007, OLC memorandum also stated that the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques "are not the first option for CIA interrogators confronted even 

with a high value detainee."2431 As described in this summary, numerous CIA detainees were 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced or "standard" interrogation techniques on their first day of CIA 

custody,2432 while other detainees provided significant information prior to the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques. The OLC memorandum also accepted the CIA 

representation that "[t]he CIA generally does not ask questions during the administration of the 

techniques to which the CIA does not already know the answers," that the CIA "asks for already 

known information" during the administration of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, 

and that when CIA personnel believe a detainee will cooperate, "the CIA would discontinue use 

of the techniques and debrief the detainee regarding matters on which the CIA is not definitely 

informed." As the memorandum concluded, "[t]his approach highlights the intended 

psychological effects of the techniques and reduces the ability of the detainee to provide false 

information solely as a means to discontinue their application."2433 This description of the 

program was inaccurate. As described in this summary, and in more detail in the full Committee 

Study, CIA interrogators always questioned detainees during the application of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques seeking new information to which the CIA did not have 

answers, and numerous detainees fabricated information while being subjected to the 

interrogation techniques. 

The July 20, 2007, OLC memorandum repeated CIA 

representations that "many, if not all, of those 30 detainees" who had been subjected to CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques received counterinterrogation training, and that "al Qaeda 

operatives believe that they are morally permitted to reveal information once they have reached a 

certain limit of discomfort."2434 Neither of these representations is supported by CIA records. 

• or knowledge by [Ibrahim] of known nefarious activities of al-Qa'ida members, if this is possible." (See 

11324 HHIfE B 04).) Without recei ving a response, they continued to subject Ibrahim to the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA Headquarters, which rejected an assessment from two debriefers that 

Ibrahim was, "at best... a low-level facilitator," would later indicate that it was "uncertain" he would meet the 

requirements for U.S. military or H H detention. See HEADQUARTERS 

HEADQUARTERS ••••^Hl^H . 

2431

 The OLC further stated that "enhanced techniques would be used only as less harsh techniques fail or as 

interrogators ran out of time in the face of an imminent threat, so that it would be unlikely that a detainee would be 

subjected to more duress than is reasonably necessary to elicit the information sought." See Memorandum for John 

A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20,2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the 

Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May be 

Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 14). 

2432 See Volume 111 for additional details. 

2433

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of 

the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain 

Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 14). 

2434

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of 

the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of die Geneva Conventions to Certain 

11ii 111 1 i MBBBBBBBB i m m 

Page 433 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

433 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

The memorandum also repeated CIA representations that 

interrogators were "highly trained in carrying out the techniques," and "psychologically screened 

to minimize the risk that an interrogator might misuse any technique." These presumptions were 

central to the OLC's determination that the limitations on interrogations contained in the Army 

Field Manual were not "dispositive evidence" that the CIA's interrogation program fell outside 

"traditional executive behavior and contemporary practice," an analysis required as part of the 

substantive due process inquiry. Specifically, the OLC distinguished U.S. military interrogations 

from the CIA program by stating that the CIA program "will be administered only by trained and 

experienced interrogators who in turn will apply the techniques only to a subset of high value 

detainees."2435 As described in this summary, and in greater detail in the full Committee Study, 

the CIA's representations to the OLC were incongruent with the history of the CIA's Detention 

and Interrogation Program with regard to the training, screening, and experience of interrogators, 

and the detainees against whom the CIA used its enhanced interrogation techniques. 

The July 2007 OLC memorandum based its legal analysis related 

to the six interrogation techniques under consideration on CIA representations that were 

incongruent with the operational history of the program. In reviewing whether standing sleep 

deprivation was consistent with the War Crimes Act, the OLC noted that its understanding that 

the technique would be discontinued "should any hallucinations or significant declines in 

cognitive functioning be observed" was "crucial to our analysis." The memorandum repeated 

CIA representations that diapers employed during standing sleep deprivation "are used solely for 

sanitary and health reasons and not to humiliate the detainee," and that, more generally, "[t]he 

techniques are not intended to humiliate or to degrade."2436 The OLC's understanding, which, as 

described, was not consistent with the operational history of the CIA program, was part of its 

analysis related to the prohibition on "outrages upon personal dignity" under Common Article 3. 

(TS^^^H^^^B^^ )

 A s in

 the May 30, 2005 OLC memorandum, the July 20, 2007, 

OLC memorandum conducted an analysis of the "shocks the conscience" test under the Fifth 

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the analysis. Citing 

both the CIA's March 2005 "Effectiveness Memo" and the president's September 6, 2006, 

speech describing the interrogation program, the July 2007 OLC memorandum repeated the CIA 

assertion that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced "otherwise unavailable 

intelligence." It also repeated CIA representations related to KSM's reporting on the "Second 

Wave" plotting and Abu Zubaydah's reporting on Jose Padilla, both of which were 

Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 14). 

2433

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of 

the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain 

Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 14). 

2436

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of 

the War Crimes Act, die Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain 

Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 14). ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^ 

11 ii 11 i i i MBMWMMMM i MI ii i in i 

Page 434 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

434 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

inaccurate.2437 The OLC memorandum also stated that the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques had "revealed plots to blow up the Brooklyn Bridge and to release mass 

biological agents in our Nation's largest cities."2438 

(fS^HHIHl^^ ) Finally, the July 20, 2007, OLC memorandum asserted—based on 

CIA representations—that members of Congress supported the CIA interrogation program, and 

that, by subsequently voting for the Military Commissions Act, those members effectively 

endorsed an interpretation of the Act that would be consistent with the continued use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. This interpretation of congressional intent also 

supported the OLC's constitutional analysis, which stated that there could be "little doubt" that 

the Act "reflected an endorsement" from Congress that the CIA program "was consistent with 

contemporary practice, and therefore did not shock the conscience."2439 Specifically, the OLC 

memorandum noted that according to CIA representations, prior to the passage of the Military 

Commissions Act, "several Members of Congress, including the full memberships of the House 

and Senate Intelligence Committees and Senator McCain, were briefed by General Michael 

Hayden, director of the CIA, on the six techniques," and that "in those classified and private 

conversations, none of the Members expressed the view that the CIA interrogation program 

should be stopped, or that the techniques at issue were inappropriate."2440 This representation 

was inaccurate. For example, according to CIA records, during a briefing on September 11, 

2006, Senator John McCain informed the CIA that he believed the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques, including sleep deprivation and the waterboard, were "torture."2441 On September 

2437

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of 

the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of die Geneva Conventions to Certain 

Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 14). 

2438 •pj1js js a re f erenc e to the CIA's representation that KSM, "as a result of EITs," provided critical and unique 

reporting on Iyman Faris and Majid Khan. As described briefly in this summary, and in greater detail in the full 

Committee Study, Iyman Faris was already under investigation, and Majid Khan was already in custody, before 

KSM mentioned them. Khan himself revealed a discussion about poisoning reservoirs prior to his rendition to CIA 

custody. (See ALEC (210015Z MAR 03).) When Faris, who was likewise not in CIA custody, discussed a 

plot against the Brooklyn Bridge, the former chief of CTC's Bin Ladin Unit described it as "half-baked," and "more 

of a nuisnance [sic] than a threat." See WHDCj^B(242226Z MAR 03) and email from: to : 

^ | , [REDACTED]; 

attacks in conus; date: March 25, 2003, at 6:19:18 AM). 

243'' Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of 

the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain 

Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 14). 

2440

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of 

the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain 

Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 14). 

2441

 Email from: cc: ••I^HI , [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED ]!HHBHB[REDACTED] , [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Briefing for Senator John S. McCain (R-AZ); date: 

September 11, 2006, at 5:51 PM ("[Senator McCain] asked if I thought 'sleep deprivation' was torture. I responded 

that I did not and he then added that he had talked with a Marine Colonel friend of his and the Colonel had indicated 

m i 11 in i BB^BMBMU i i mi m n i 

Page 435 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

435 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

27, 2006, Senator Dianne Feinstein, a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 

wrote a letter to CIA Director Hayden stating that she was "unable to understand why the CIA 

needs to maintain this program."2442 On September 6, 2006, when the CIA provided its first and 

only briefing to the full Committee on the CIA program prior to the vote on the Military 

Commissions Act, Committee staff access was limited to the two Committee staff directors.2443 

In May 2007, shortly after the CIA allowed additional Committee staff to be briefed on the 

program, other members of the Committee prepared and provided letters to Director Hayden. On 

May 1, 2007, Senator Russ Feingold wrote that "I cannot support the program on moral, legal or 

national security grounds."2444 On May 11, 2007, Senators Chuck Hagel, Dianne Feinstein, and 

Ron Wyden wrote a letter expressing their long-standing concerns with the program and their 

"deep discomfort with the use of EITs."2445 

it was and he believed his friend."). In another exchange, the officer who briefed Senator McCain was asked about 

the Senator's position. CIA officer "so, is the senator on board?..." CIA officer ^H^^^ H 

"not totally." "if he's moved in our direction at all, you are a miracle worker... was it painful?" 

"Very much the issue the EITs still?" "Yep." (See Sametime 

communication between HH^lHI and ^H^^H ' 11/Sep/06,15:47:27 to 18:43:29.) The OLC 

specifically cited statements from Senator McCain that the Military Commissions Act "will allow the CIA to 

continue interrogating prisoners within the boundaries established in the bill." Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, 

Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee 

Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May be Used by the 

CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 14). The OLC did not mention 

that McCain had specifically objected to the use of sleep deprivation. 

2442

 Letter from Senator Dianne Feinstein to Director Hayden, September 27, 2006 (DTS #2006-3717). 

2443

 Transcript of hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, September 6, 2006 (DTS #2007-1336). 

2444

 Letter from Senator Russ Feingold to Director Hayden, May 1, 2007 (DTS #2007-1858). 

2445

 Letter from Senators Chuck Hagel, Di "" ' "" '1,2007 (DTS #2007-2102). 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 436 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

436 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

VI. Review of CIA Representations to the Congress 

A. After Memorandum of Notification, the CIA Disavows Torture and Assures the 

Committee Will Be Notified of Every Individual Detained by the CIA 

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the signing 

of the September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification (MON), the Senate Select Committee 

on Intelligence ("the Committee") held a series of hearings and briefings on CIA covert actions, 

including the new authority to detain terrorists. At a November 13, 2001, briefing for Committee 

staff, Legal, described the CIA's new detention authorities 

as "terrifying" and expressed the CIA's intent to "find a cadre of people who know how to run 

prisons, because we don't."2446 Deputy Director of Operations (DDO) James Pavitt assured the 

Committee that it would be informed of each individual who entered CIA custody. Pavitt 

disavowed the use of torture against detainees while stating that the boundaries on the use of 

interrogation techniques were uncertain—specifically in the case of having to identify the 

location of a hidden nuclcar weapon.2447 

(^S/^HIH^^I^B^F ) LI meetings with the CIA in February 2002, the month before the 

capture and detention of Abu Zubaydah, Committee staff expressed concern about the lack of 

any legal review of the CIA's new detention authorities. BHUHI i noted that the discussion 

with Committee staff was "the only peer review" the CIA lawyers had engaged in with regard to 

the MON authorities, and that the discussion helped refine the CIA's understanding of what 

MON-authorized activity was in fact legally permissible and appropriate.2448 

B. The CIA Notifies Committee of the Detention of Abu Zubaydah, but Makes No 

Reference to Coercive Interrogation Techniques; the CIA Briefs Chairman and Vice 

Chairman After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; the CIA 

Discusses Strategy to Avoid the Chairman's Request for More Information 

°

n

 April 18, 2002, the CIA informed the Committee that it "has no 

current plans to develop a detention facility."2449 At the time of this representation, the CIA had 

already established a CIA detention site in Country | and detained Abu Zubaydah there. On 

April 24, 2002, the CIA notified the Committee about the capture of Abu Zubaydah with the 

understanding that the location of Abu Zubaydah's detention was among the "red lines" not to be 

divulged to the Committee.2450 The notification and subsequent information provided to the 

2446

 Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff briefing, November 13, 2001 (DTS #2002-0629). 

2447

 "We're not going to engage in torture. But, that said, how do I deal with somebody I know may know right now 

that there is a nuclear weapon somewhere in the United States that is going to be detonated tomorrow, and I've got 

the guy who I know built it and hid it? I don't know the answer to that." (See transcript of Senate Select Committee 

on Intelligence MON briefing, November 7, 2001 (DTS #2002-0611); see also transcript of Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence staff briefing, December 11, 2001 (DTS #2002-0615). 

2448

 Email franr^H^HHH . SSCI Staff; to: H Cleared SSCI staff; subject: Meeting yesterday with CIA 

lawyers on ^B^^^Edat^Februar y 26, 2002 (DTS #2002-0925). 

2449

 CIA responses to Questions for the Record (hearing, March 6, 2002), April 18, 2002 (DTS #2002-1800). 

2450

 Email from: ^H^HHH; t o : HH^f t subject: Issues for SSCI and HPSCI biweekly update on CT; 

date: April 9, 2002; Transcript of "Update on War on Terrorism," April 24, 2002 (DTS #2002-1993). Committee 

notifications of the capture of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri likewise omitted reference to his location and the use of the 

III I 1 1 III i MWMBMBI^ B

 111 "1

 '"ii 

Page 437 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

437 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

Committee included representations that Abu Zubaydah was a "member of Bin Ladin's inner 

circle" and a "key al-Qa'ida lieutenant."2451 These representations were inaccurate. Briefings to 

the Committee in the spring of 2002 emphasized the expertise of FBI and CIA interrogators 

engaged in the Abu Zubaydah interrogations and provided no indication that coercive techniques 

were being used or considered, or that there was significant disagreement between the CIA and 

the FBI on proposed interrogation approaches.2452 In early August 2002, after the Department of 

Justice determined that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah 

would be legal, the CIA considered briefing the Committee on the CIA's interrogation 

techniques, but did not.2453 

#NF) In early September 2002, the CIA briefed the House Permanent 

Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) leadership about the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques. Two days after, the CIA's Legal, excised from a 

draft memorandum memorializing the briefing indications that the HPSCI leadership questioned 

the legality of the program by deleting the sentence: "HPSCI attendees also questioned the 

legality of these techniques if other countries would use them."2454 After blindcopied Jose Rodriguez on the email in which he transmitted the changes to the memorandum, 

Rodriguez responded to email with: "short and sweet."2455 The first briefing for 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Bob Graham and Vice Chairman Richard 

Shelby—and their staff directors—occurred on September 27, 2002, nearly two months after the 

CIA first began subjecting Abu Zubaydah to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The 

only record of the briefing is a one-paragraph CIA memorandum stating that the briefing 

occurred.2456 The Committee does not have its own records of this briefing. 

(TS/^H^H^^^^/NF ) Shortly thereafter, in late 2002, Chairman Graham sought to 

expand Committee oversight of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, including by 

having Committee staff visit CIA interrogation sites and interview CIA interrogators.2457 The 

CIA rejected this request. An internal CIA email from Legal 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. (See Congressional Notification, November 20, 2002 (DTS #2002-

4910).) On November 2002, the CIA notified the Committee of the death of Gul Rahman at a "detention facility 

in [Country ^H l operated by die [Country | government] and funded by CIA." This description, as well as 

subsequent representations to the Committee, understated the role of the CIA in managing DETENTION SITE 

COBALT. See Congressional Notification, November 2002 (DTS #2002-5015); Responses to 

Counterterrorism Questions for the Record, Question 3 (DTS #2002-5059). 

2451

 Congressional Notification, April 15, 2002 (DTS #2002-1710); CIA responses to Questions for the Record 

(hearing, March 6,2002), April 18, 2002 (DTS #2002-1800). 

2452

 Transcript of "Update on War on Terrorism," April 24, 2002 (DTS #2002-1993). 

2453

 Email from: John Moseman; to: Stanley Moskowitz, et al.; subject: Abu Zubaydah Interrogation; date: August 3, 

2002, at 11:34:13 AM. 

|; bcc: Jose Rodriguez; subject: Re: immediate coord; 

(101607Z SEP 02). 

|; subject: Re: immediate coord; date: September 6, 2002, at 

2454Email from: to ; 

date: September 6,2002. See also ALECj 

2455

 Email from: Jose Rodriguez; to: | 

2:52 PM. 

2456

 DIRECTOR (252018Z OCTO2) 

2457

 Email from: Stanley Moskowitz; to: John Moseman, Scott Muller, James Pavitt; subject: Graham request for 

oversight into interrogation; date: December 4, 2002, at 05:58:06 PM; Stanley Moskowitz, Memorandum for the 

Record, February 4, 2003, "Subject: Sensitive Notification." See also email from: Scott W. Muller; to: John A. 

Rizzo; cc: [REDACTED); date: December 19, 2002. 

11 ii 1111 1 ' II I II 

Page 438 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

438 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

indicated that the full Committee would not be told about "the nature and scope of the 

interrogation process," and that even the chairman and vice chairman would not be told in which 

country or "region" the CIA had established its detention facilities.2458 Other emails describe 

efforts by the CIA to identify a "strategy" for limiting the CIA's responses to Chairman 

Graham's requests for more information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, 

specifically seeking a way to "get off the hook on the cheap."2459 The CIA eventually chose to 

delay its next update for the Committee leadership on the CIA's program until after Graham had 

left the Committee.2460 At the same time, the CIA rejected a request for the Committee staff to 

be "read-in" and provided with a briefing on the CIA program.2461 

C. No Detailed Records Exist of CIA Briefings of Committee Leadership; the CIA Declines 

to Answer Questions from Committee Members or Provide Requested Materials 

(TS^^^IBBIH^P ) On February 4, 2003, the CIA briefed the new chairman, Senator 

Pat Roberts, and the two staff directors. Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV was not present. 

The only record of the briefing, a two-page CIA memorandum, states that CIA officers: 

"described in great detail the importance of the information provided by [Abu] 

Zubayda[h] and ['Abd al-Rahim al-] Nashiri, both of whom had information of 

on-going terrorist operations, information that might well have saved 

American lives, the difficulty of getting that information from them, and the 

importance of the enhanced techniques in getting that information."2462 

As described in this summary, and in greater detail in the full Committee Study, Abu Zubaydah 

and al-Nashiri did not provide actionable intelligence on ongoing plotting, and provided 

significant reporting prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The CIA 

declined to provide information pursuant to a request from Chairman Roberts on the location of 

the CIA's detention site. Finally, the CIA memorandum states that Chairman Roberts "gave his 

assent" to the destruction of interrogation videotapes; however, this account in the CIA 

Email from: to: and subject: Sensitive Matters 

the SSCI Quarterly CA Briefing; date: November 19, 2002. This email included the text of the CIA cables 

documenting the September 4,2002, briefing to HPSCI leadership. See ALEC (101607Z SEP 02), and the 

September 27, 2002, briefing to SSCI leadership, DIRECTOR (252018Z OCTO2). 

2459

 Email from: Stanley Moskowitz; to: John Moseman, Scott Mueller, James Pavitt; subject: Graham request for 

oversight into interrogation; date: December 4, 2002, at 05:58:06 PM; email from: Stanley Moskowitz; to: John H. 

Moseman; cc: Scott Muller and James Pavitt; subject: [attached document] Re: Graham request on interrogations; 

date: December 9, 2002, at 05:46:11 PM. 

2460

 Memorandum of December 26, 2002; FOR: Director of Central Intelligence; FROM: Scott W. Muller, General 

Counsel; SUBJECT: Disposition of Videotapes. 

2461

 Memorandum to: Stanley Moskowitz; from: Steven A. Cash; subject: Briefing: Interrogation and Debriefing of 

individuals in custody related to counterterrorism operations, January 2,2003 (DTS #2003-0266); Lotus Notes dated 

January 2 - January 3, between OCA, ODDO, CTC personnel; email correspondences between [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], HI^Hi^lH H subject: "SSCI's Request for Staff Briefing on Terrorism 

Interrogation/Debriefing Techniques." 

2462 Moskowitz Memorandum for the Reci ' " ' J "" ' ' ' " 'ive Notification." 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 439 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

439 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

memorandum was later disputed by Chairman Roberts.2463 The Committee has no independent 

record of this briefing. 

CFS/fll^^^^^^/NF ) Throughout 2003, the CIA refused to answer questions from 

Committee members and staff about the CIA interrogations of KSM and other CIA detainees.2464 

The CIA produced talking points for a September 4, 2003, briefing on the CIA interrogation 

program exclusively for Committee leadership; however, there are no contemporaneous records 

of the briefing taking place. The CIA talking points include information about the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, their effectiveness, and various abuses that occurred in 

the program.2465 Many of the CIA representations in the talking points were inaccurate.2466 The 

CIA continued to withhold from the Committee, including its leadership, any information on the 

location of the CIA's detention facilities. On more than one occasion the CIA directed CIA 

personnel at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, not to brief a visiting Committee member about the CIA 

detention facility there, including during a July 2005 visit by Chairman Roberts.2467 

(TS/Z^^^^^^^^I^/NF ) In 2004, the Committee conducted two hearings on the CIA's role 

in interrogating U.S. military detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. CIA witnesses stressed that 

the CIA was more limited in its interrogation authorities than the Department of Defense, but 

declined to respond to Committee questions about the interrogation of KSM or press reports on 

CIA detention facilities.2468 During the first briefing, on May 12, 2004, Committee members 

requested Department of Justice memoranda addressing the legality of CIA interrogations. 

2463

 Moskowitz Memorandum for the Record, February 4, 2003, "Subject: Sensitive Notification." For information 

on Senator Roberts's objections, see "Destroying C.I.A. Tapes Wasn't Opposed, Memos Say," by Scott Shane, The 

New York Times, dated February 22, 2010. 

2464

 Transcript of CIA briefing for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 5, 2003 (DTS #2003-1156); 

Transcript of "Intelligence Update," April 30, 2003 (DTS #2003-2174); Transcript of Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence briefing, September 3,2003 (DTS #2004-0288); email from: ^HflHI^^fl ;

 to :

 [REDACTED]; 

subject: Re: EYES ONLY Re: Question Regarding Interrogations from SSCI Member Briefing on KSM Capture; 

date: March 17, 2003. 

2465

 CIA Interrogation Program: DDO Talking Points, 04 September 2003. 

2466 po r example, the talking points included inaccurate data on die waterboarding of Abu Zubaydah and KSM; 

stated that two unauthorized techniques were used with a detainee, whereas 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was subjected 

to numerous unauthorized techniques; and inaccurately stated that the offending officers were removed from the 

site. The talking points also stated that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "has produced 

significant results," and that the "[information acquired has saved countless lives...." See CIA Interrogation 

Program: DDO Talking Points, 04 September 2003. 

2467

 Because the Committee was not informed of the CIA detention site at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, no member of 

the Committee was aware that the U.S. Supreme Court decision to grant certiorari in the case of Rasul v. Bush, 

which related to the habeas corpus rights of detainees at Guantanamo Bay, resulted in the transfer of CIA detainees 

from the CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay to other CIA detention facilities. See HEADQUARTERS 

subject "RESTRICTED ACCESS TO [DETENTION SITE COBALT] AND 

[DETENTION SITE ORANGE]"; email from: ^^^^^Rto^H^HH ; cc: Jose Rodriguez, 

[REDACTEDL^^H H [REDACTEDlHHHHn^EDACTEDr[REDACTED] ; subject: 

guidance to HHgitmoTdate~May 14,2004; forwarding final cable: HEADQUARTERS H | (141502Z MAY 

04), subject "Possible Brief to US Senator"; email from: Stanley Moskowitz; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; 

subject: Re: guidance to^^^itmo ; date: May 14, 2004; CIA responses to Questions for the Record, March 13, 

2008 (DTS #2008-1310); "CODEL Roberts to Miami/Guantanamo, 7-8 July 2005," dated 5 July, • • 902860. 

2468

 Transcript of hearing, May 12, 2004 (DTS #2004-2332); Transcript of hearing, September 13,2004 (DTS 

#2005-0750). 

IIII I I III I ^^M^^^^^^^MiVNOFOR N 

Page 440 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

440 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

Despite repeated subsequent requests, limited access to the memoranda was not granted until 

four years later, in June 2008, by which time the CIA was no longer detaining individuals.2469 

While the CIA continued to brief the Committee leadership on 

aspects of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, there are no transcripts of these 

briefings. One briefing, on July 15, 2004, discussed the detention of Janat Gul.2470 An email 

from f^miCT C Legal stated that the "only reason" the chairman and vice chairman were 

informed of the detention of Janat Gul was that the notification could serve as "the vehicle for 

briefing the committees on our need for renewed legal and policy support" for the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program.2471 At the July 2004 briefing, the minority staff director 

requested full Committee briefings and expanded Committee oversight, including visits to CIA 

detention sites and interviews with interrogators—efforts that had been sought by former 

Chairman Graham years earlier. This request was denied.2472 

D. Vice Chairman Rockefeller Seeks Committee Investigation 

On February 3, 2005, Vice Chairman Rockefeller began a formal 

effort to conduct a comprehensive Committee investigation of the CIA's detention, interrogation 

and rendition activities, including a review of the legality and effectiveness of CIA 

interrogations.2473 On March 3, 2005, a CIA official wrote that Vice Chairman Rockefeller was 

"convinced that we're hiding stuff from him" and that the CIA had planned a detailed briefing to 

"shut Rockefeller up."2474 The only Committee records of this briefing, which took place on 

March 7, 2005, are handwritten notes written by Vice Chairman Rockefeller and the minority 

staff director.2475 Shortly after this briefing, the vice chairman reiterated his call for a broad 

Committee investigation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, which he and the 

ranking member of the HPSCI, Jane Harman, described in a letter to Vice President Cheney.2476 

There is no Committee record of a response to the letter. 

2469

 Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, May 12, 2004 (DTS #2004-2332). Muhammad 

Rahim, the CIA's last detainee, was transferred to U.S. military custody on March 13, 2008. See 3445 

19754 8405 

2470

 Handwritten notes of SSCI Minority Staff Director Andrew Johnson (DTS #2009-2077); CIA notes (DTS 

#2009-2024, pp. 92-95); CIA notes (DTS #2009-2024, pp. 110-121). 

2471

 Email from: to: [REDACTED1; subject: Re: Priority: congressional notification on Janat Gul; 

date: July 29, 2004. 

2472

 Handwritten notes of SSCI Minority Staff Director Andrew Johnson (DTS #2009-2077); CIA notes (DTS 

#2009-2024, pp. 92-95); CIA notes (DTS #2009-2024, pp. 110-121). 

2473

 February 3, 2005, letter from Senator Rockefeller to Senator Roberts on "the Committee's upcoming agenda," 

(letter incorrectly dated February 3, 2004). 

2474

 Sametime message discussion between and [REDACTED], March 3, 2005. 

2475

 The notes indicate that CIA briefers provided inaccurate information. For example, the notes indicate that "f w]e 

screen carefully aU people who might have contact with detainees" (emphasis in the Vice Chairman's notes) and that 

"positive incentives" are used prior to "coercive measures." In a reference to the waterboard, the notes state, the 

detainee "thinks he's drowning, even though they are breathing." See handwritten notes of then-Committee 

Minority Staff Director Andrew Johnson (DTS #2009-2077, Image 1) and handwritten notes of Senator Rockefeller. 

2476

 Letter to Senator Roberts from minority SSCI members, March 10, 2005 (DTS #2005-1126); Letter to Vice 

President Cheney from Vice Chairman Rockefeller and Representative Harman, March 11, 2005; Letter from 

Senator Rockefeller, March 11, 2005. 

m i I I in i 

Page 441 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

441 
TOP SECRET//^ 

UNCLASSIFIED 

1//NOFOR N 

^^^BB^^HBP^® ) On April 13, 2005, the day before an anticipated Committee vote 

oiuh^ncediairman's proposed investigation of the CIA program, the chief of ALEC Station, 

and the deputy chief of CTC, Philip Mudd, discussed a press strategy to 

shape public and congressional views of the program. As previously detailed, Mudd wrote: 

"we either get out and sell, or we get hammered, which has implications 

beyond the media, congress reads it, cuts our authorities, messes up our 

budget, we need to make sure the impression of what we do is positive."2477 

The next day, CIA Inspector General John Helgerson briefed 

several members of the Committee on limited aspects of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program. According to Helgerson, Chairman Roberts' "motive was to have a presentation that 

made clear that CIA IG is looking at all appropriate detention and interrogation issues, as (he 

told me privately beforehand) the Committee will be voting today on whether to launch their 

own inquiry." Helgerson added that "Roberts said 'I know how that vote is going to come out, 

but I want the minority to go away knowing this is in good hands.'"2478 The proposed 

investigation was not approved by the Committee. The Committee nonetheless subsequently 

approved legislation requiring CIA reports on renditions and plans for the disposition of highvalue CIA detainees, as well as requesting expanded Committee staff access to the program 

beyond the Committee staff directors

 2479

 In addition, Vice Chairman Rockefeller requested full 

Committee access to over 100 documents related to the May 2004 Inspector General Special 

Review.2480 On January 5, 2006, after multiple rounds of negotiations with the CIA for the 

documents, the chief of staff to Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte wrote a letter 

reiectinMhe request. The letter had been prepared by the former HiHCT C Legal, 

HHHH > who was by then serving as a CIA detailee in the Office of the Dircctor'of National 

Intelligence.2481 

April 13, 2005, from 19:23:50 to 

2477

 Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and I 

19:56:05. 

2478 See email from: CIA Inspector General John Helgerson; to: subject: this afternoon's briefing; 

date: April 13,2005. There is no Committee transcript of the briefing. CIA records state that the briefing covered' 

"updates on the half dozen key abuse cases," ghost detainees, and renditions. The notes do not reference the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques. In response to a question from Vice Chairman Rockefeller, Helgerson explained 

that the CIA was "preparing a comprehensive briefing" on detention and interrogation activities for the Committee 

2479

 Compartmented Classified Annex to Report No. S. 109-142, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2006, as Reported by the Select Committee on Intelligence (DTS #2005-4028). 

2480 See Letter from Johr^OJizzo to John Rockefeller, August 16, 2005 (DTS #2005-3522). The DNI, pursuant to 

the advice of former |^|CT C Legal, ^•^••Ksupporte d the CIA's proposed limitations on 

Committe^ccess to the documents

 to :

 Michael Leiter; cc: David Shedd, 

a n d

 others; subject: Review of Documents Requested by Senator Rockefeller; date: December 16, 

2005; Letter from David Shedd to Andy Johnson, January 5, 2006 (DTS #2006-0373)). 

^^ette^ro m David Shedd to Andy Johnson, Januar^^006(DTS #2006-0373); email from: 

to: Michael Leiter; cc: David Shedd, HfcHl^ H and others; subject: Review of Documents 

Requested by Senator Rockefeller; date: December 16, 2005. 

• " i 'i n i n i"—MB^M^ M i 

Page 442 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

442 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

E. In Response to Detainee Treatment Act, the CIA Briefs Senators Not on the Committee; 

Proposal from Senator Levin for an Independent Commission Prompts Renewed Calls 

Within the CIA to Destroy Interrogation Videotapes 

in October and November 2005, after the Senate passed its version 

of the Detainee Treatment Act, the CIA, directed by the Office of the Vice President, briefed 

specific Republican senators, who were not on the Select Committee on Intelligence, on the 

CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. (The full membership of the Committee had not yet 

been briefed on the CIA interrogation program.)2482 The briefings, which were intended to 

influence conference negotiations,2483 were provided to Senator McCain;2484 Senators Ted 

Stevens and Thad Cochran, the chairmen of the Appropriations Committee and Defense 

Appropriations Subcommittee;2485 Majority Leader Bill Frist;2486 and Senator John Cornyn (CIA 

records state that Cornyn was not briefed on the CIA's specific interrogation techniques).2487 

Meanwhile, a proposal from Senator Carl Levin to establish an independent commission to 

investigate U.S. detention policies and allegations of detainee abuse resulted in concern at the 

CIA that such a commission would lead to thc discovery of videotapes documenting CIA 

interrogations. That concern prompted renewed interest at the CIA to destroy the videotapes.2488 

2482

 According to an email from John Rizzo, the subject of one such meeting was "how th^urrenMjersioi^f 

McCain potentially undercuts our legal position." (See email from: John A. Rizzo; to: 

• • ; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: IMMEDIATE HEADS UP: VP Meeting with Appropriations Committee 

Leadership Tomorrow re McCain Amendment; date: October 17, 2005, at 10:49:39 AM; email from: John Rizzo; to: 

___ _ c c IREDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], MBM^M ' [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

^SiiHH ' [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: IMMEDIATE: Re: Sen. Frist req for briefing on 

impact of McCain Amendment; date: October 31, 2005, at 10:53:16 AM. 

2

"3 Email from: John A. Rizzo; to: ^HlHi , cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: IMMEDIATE 

HEADS UP: VP Meeting with Appropriations Committee Leadership Tomorrow re McCain Amendment; date: 

October 17, 2005, at 10:49:39 AM. 

2484

 Email from: John Rizzo; to: cc: f RED ACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], , [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], ••••I , [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: 1MMEDWTC: Re: 

Sen. Frist req for briefing on impact of McCain Amendment; date: October 31, 2005, at 10:53:16 AM; 

Talking Points for OVP Sponsored Meeting with Sen McCain; Impact of McCain Amendment on Legal Basis for 

CTC's HVD Detention and Interrogation Program, 20 October 2005. 

2485

 Email from: John Rizzo; to: cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], IREDACTED1, fREDACTED], [REDACTED], Mjj^— , [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: IMMEDIATE: Re: 

Sen Frist req for briefing on impact of McCain Amendment; date: October 31,2005, at 10:53:16 AM. 

2486

 Email from: John Rizzo; cc: [REDACTED], fREDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], fREDACTED!, [REDACTED 1, [REDACTED], M^^^g , [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], ••••H , [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: IMMEDIATE: Re: 

Sen Frist req for briefing on impact of McCain Amendment; date: October 31, 2005, at 10:53:16 AM; email from: 

John A. Rizzo; to: David R. Shedd; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: BRIEF READOUT: 31 OCT FRIST 

BRIEFING; date: November 1,2005, at 2:53:40 PM. _ 

Email from: John A. Rizzo; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED]; subject: Re: Senator Cornyn; date: November 30,2005, at 12:50:11 PM. 

2488

 On October 31, 2005, John Rizzo wrote an email stating that "Sen. Levin's legislative proposal for a 9/11-type 

outside Commission to be established on detaineesseem^obegah ^ which obviously would serve 

I I II1 il I III 1 1 MIN I 

Page 443 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

443 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

Senator Levin's amendment to establish the commission failed on November 8, 2005.2489 The 

CIA destroyed the CIA interrogation videotapes the following day.2490 

F. CIA Director Goss Seeks Committee Support for the Program After the Detainee 

Treatment Act; CIA Declines to Answer Questions for the Rccord 

(^^•^•••^NF ) In March 2006, three months after passage of the Detainee 

Treatment Act, the CIA provided a briefing for five Committee staffers that included limited 

information on the interrogation process, as well as the effectiveness of the CIA interrogation 

program.2491 The briefings did not include information on the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques or the location of CIA detention sites.2492 A week later, on March 15, 2006, CIA 

Director Porter Goss briefed the full Committee on CIA detention matters, but did not provide 

the locations of the CIA's detention facilities, or a list or briefing on the CIA's enhanced 

to surface the tapes' existence." Rizzo then added that "I think I need to be the skunk at the party again and see if 

the Director is willing to let u^t^m^rior e time to get the right people downtown on board with the notion of our 

[sic] destroying the tapes." a senior CIA attome^who had viewed the videotapes, responded, 

"You are correct. The sooner we resolve this the better." ^^^^^IT C Legal, also agreed 

that "[a]pproaching the DCIA is a good idea," adding, "]c]ommissions tend to make very broad document 

production demands, which might call for these videotapes that should have been destroyed in the normal course of 

busines^years ago." See email from: John A. Rizzo; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: principals want PR plan to publicly roll the CTC program 

in some fashion; date: October 31, 2005, at 10:37 AM; email from: ^HIHIH ; to John A. Rizzo; cc: 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: Re: principals want PR plan to publicly 

roll the CTC program in some fashion; date: October 31, 2005, at 12:32 PM; email from: IHH^I E to: John 

A. Rizzo; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: 

principals want PR plarUTMublicl^x>ll the CTC program in some fashion; date: October 31, 2005, at 11:45 AM. 

See also interview of ^HHi^l , by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, June 

17,2003. 

2489 See Senate Roll Call Vote #00309, November 8, 2005, 5:37pm, on Amendment #2430. 

2490

 [REDACTED] 27089 (090627Z NOV 05) 

2491 A 

review of the Committee record of this briefing indicates much of the information provided by the CIA was 

inaccurate. For example, according to the Committee's Memorandum for the Record, CIA briefers stated "the plan 

divorces questioning from coercive measures." CIA records indicate, however, that questioning and the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were combined in practice. According to Committee records, CIA 

officials stated that Khalid al-Masri had and maintained connections to al-Qa'ida, and that he was released "when 

the CIA reached a point in debriefings that required [foreign government] assistance," which was not forthcoming. 

The CIA Inspector General would later determine that when CIA officers questioned al-Masri, "they quickly 

concluded that he was not a terrorist," and that there was "insufficient basis to render and detain al-Masri." CIA 

officers referenced the captures of Hambali, Sajid Badat, Jose Padilla, and Iyman Faris, as well as the disruption of 

the West Coast/Second Wave plotting, the Heathrow Airport plotting, and the Karachi plotting. As detailed in this 

summary, the CIA consistently provided inaccurate representations regarding the plotting and the capture of the 

referenced individuals. CIA briefers also compared the program to U.S. military custody, stating that "the CIA can 

bring far more resources - debriefers, analysts, psychologists, etc. - per detainee than is possible at large scale 

facilities such as Guantanamo Bay, Cuba." As described, the chief of Base at DETENTION SITE BLACK 

complained of "problem, underperforming" and "totally inexperienced" debriefers almost a year prior to this 

briefing. As further described, an inspector general audit completed three months after the briefing described the 

lack of debriefers at CIA detendon facilities as "an ongoing problem." (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 

Memorandum for the Record, "CIA Briefing on Detention Program," March 8, 2006 (DTS #2006-1182).) 

2492

 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Memorandum for the Record, "CIA Briefing on Detention Program " 

March 8, 2006 (DTS #2006-1182). 

M I M III I MMBWB^^^B I i IIII inn i 

Page 444 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

444 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

interrogation techniques.2493 At this hearing Director Goss explained to the Committee that "we 

cannot do it by ourselves," and that "|w]e need to have the support of our oversight 

committee."2494 Goss then described challenges to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program as a result of the Detainee Treatment Act, as well as strained relations with countries 

hosting CIA detention sites after significant press revelations.2495 Director Goss described the 

program as follows: 

"This program has brought us incredible information. It's a program that could 

continue to bring us incredible information. It's a program that could continue 

to operate in a very professional way. It's a program that I think if you saw 

how it's operated you would agree that you would be proud that it's done right 

and well, with proper safeguards."2496 

Contrasting the CIA program to the abuse of prisoners in U.S. 

military detention at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, Director Goss stated that the CIA program: 

"is a professionally-operated program that we operate uniquely.... We are not 

talking military, and I'm not talking about anything that a contractor might 

have done... in a prison somewhere or beat somebody or hit somebody with a 

stick or something. That's not what this is about."2497 

(TSZ/fl^^^^^HV^^ ) Addressing CIA interrogations, Director Goss testified that "we 

only bring in certain selected people that we think can give us intelligence information, and we 

treat them in certain specific ways" such that "they basically become psychologically 

disadvantaged to their interrogator." Explaining that the key to a successful interrogation was 

"getting a better psychological profile and knowing what makes someone tick," Director Goss 

stated, "just the simplest thing will work, a family photograph or something." Goss then 

represented that the CIA's interrogation program is "not a brutality. It's more of an art or a 

science that is refined."2498 

2493

 By the time of the briefing, press disclosures had resulted in widespread public discussion about some of the 

CIA's reported enhanced interrogation techniques, including the waterboard. Goss was thus asked by a member of 

the Committee whether the CIA had undertaken a "technique by technique" analysis of the effectiveness of the 

program. Goss responded that the problem with such an analysis is that the techniques were used "in combination." 

Asked by the member for a comparison of "waterboarding versus sleep deprivation," Goss responded that 

"waterboarding is not used in conjunction with anything else." As detailed elsewhere, this testimony was 

inaccurate. Goss then referred to sleep deprivation, dietary manipulation, and "environment control" as "alleged 

techniques." See transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-

1308). 

2494

 Director Goss stated: "I've had to seriously consider whether passage of the McCain amendment was a 

congressional disapproval of the CIA use of EITs. I don't think it was, and I don't think that was the message you 

sent me. But 1 have to at least get that assurance, that that's not what you were saying to me." See transcript of 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308). 

2495

 Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308). 

2496

 Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308). 

2497

 Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308). 

2498

 Transcript of Senate Select Committef ' " "106 (DTS #2006-1308). 

TOP SECRET/ r

/NOFORN 

Page 445 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

445 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

After the hearing, the Committee submitted official Questions for 

the Record related to the history, legality, and the effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program. The CIA did not respond.2499 

(TS^^^^^^^^^^y/NE ) In May 2006, the Committee approved legislation requiring the 

CIA to provide reports on the CIA's detention facilities (including their locations), the CIA's 

interrogation techniques, the impact of the Detainee Treatment Act on the CIA program, CIA 

renditions, and the CIA's plans for the disposition of its detainees. The legislation also called for 

full Committee access to the CIA May 2004 Inspector General Special Review, as well as 

expanded member and Committee staff access to information on the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program.2500 In July 2006, the new CIA director, General Michael Hayden, 

provided a briefing for the chairman and vice chairman in which he described the Detainee 

Treatment Act as a "safehaven" that potentially permitted the CIA to use its enhanced 

interrogation techniques.2501 

G. Full Committee First Briefed on the CIA's Interrogation Program Hours Before It Is 

Publicly Acknowledged on September 6, 2006 

(^fS/Bl^^mH^^ ) On September 6, 2006, President Bush publicly acknowledged the 

CIA program and the transfer of 14 CIA detainees to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay, 

Cuba. Hours prior to the announcement, CIA Director Hayden provided the first briefing on the 

CIA's "enhanced interrogation" program for all members of the Committee, although the CIA 

limited staff attendance to the Committee's two staff directors.2502 Due to the impending public 

acknowledgment of the program, the briefing was abbreviated. At the briefing, the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques were listed, but not described. Director Hayden stated that the 

techniques were developed at the Department of Defense SERE school and were "used against 

American service personnel during their training." He testified that "once [a detainee] gets into 

the situation of sustained cooperation," debriefings are "not significantly different than what you 

and I are doing right now." Hayden sought "legislative assistance" in interpreting Common 

Article 3, stated that he had not asked for an opinion from the Department of Justice, and 

represented that he had been informed informally that seven interrogation techniques "are 

viewed by the Department of Justice to be consistent with the requirements of the Detainee 

Treatment Act."2503 Director Hayden declined to identify the locations of the CIA's detention 

facilities to the members and stated that he personally had recommended not expanding 

2499

 Letter from Vice Chairman Rockefeller to Director Goss, containing Questions for the Record, May 10,2006 

(DTS #2006-1949); Letter from Chairman Roberts to Director Goss, May 4, 2006 (DTS #2006-1876). 

2500

 Classified Annex to Report No. S. 109-259, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (DTS 

#2006-2208). Compartmented annex (DTS #2006-2209). 

2501

 Hayden stated that Hamdan v. Rumsfeld had effectively prohibited the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques. He then described an "action" that would define Common Article 3 according to the Detainee 

Treatment Act, which was in turn "anchored" in the Convention Against Torture to "which the Senate expressfed] 

reservation." As described, two months later, the President sought Congressional approval of the Military 

Commissions Act. Based on handwritten notes by the Committee minority staff director. 

2502

 Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, September 6, 2006 (DTS #2007-1336). 

2503

 As described above, the CIA had sought the Department of Justice's opinion on the application of the Detainee 

Treatment Act to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The draft memorandum was withdrawn after the 

U.S. Supreme Court case in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 

11 ll l l I I I II II III 

Page 446 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

446 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

Committee staff access beyond the two staff directors already briefed on the CIA's Detention 

and Interrogation Program.2504 

(ZSUmmmm^ ) There were no other Committee briefings or hearings on the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program prior to the Senate's September 28, 2006, vote on the 

Military Commissions Act. As described, the Department of Justice later concluded that the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were consistent with the Military Commissions Act in 

part because, according to the CIA, "none of the Members [briefed on the CIA program] 

expressed the view that the CIA interrogation program should be stopped, or that the techniques 

at issue were inappropriate."2505 However, prior to the vote, Senator McCain—who had been 

briefed on the CIA program—told CIA officials that he could not support the program and that 

sleep deprivation, one of the interrogation techniques still included in the program, as well as 

waterboarding, were torture.2506 Members of the Committee also expressed their views in 

classified letters to the CIA. Senator Dianne Feinstein informed the CIA that Hayden's 

testimony on the CIA program was "extraordinarily problematic" and that she was "unable to 

understand why the CIA needs to maintain this program."2507 In May 2007, shortly after 

additional Committee staff gained access to the program, Senator Russ Feingold expressed his 

opposition to the program, while Senators Feinstein, Ron Wyden, and Chuck Hagel described 

their concerns about the CIA program and their "deep discomfort" with the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques.2508 

( T S / z H H ^ B W On November 16, 2006, CIA Director Hayden briefed the 

Committee.2509 The briefing included inaccurate information, including on the CIA's use of 

dietary manipulation and nudity, as well as the effects of sleep deprivation.2510 Before speaking 

2504

 Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, September 6, 2006 (DTS #2007-1336). The 

transcript includes the following exchange: Senator Feingold: ".. .you make it tougher on me and the members of 

the Committee by the decision to not allow staff access to a briefing like this. Was it your recommendation to deny 

staff access to this hearing?" CIA Director Hayden: "It was." 

2505

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of 

the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain 

Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 14). 

Email from: ••^•fttoJI^^^^^^I ; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTEDnH^^^^BT[REDACTED] , [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Briefing for Senator John S. McCain (R-AZ); date: 

September 11, 2006, at 5:51 PM. 

2507

 Letter from Senator Feinstein to Director Hayden, September 27, 2006 (DTS #2006-3717). 

2508

 Letter from Senator Feingold to Director Hayden, May 1, 2007 (DTS #2007-1858); Letter from Senators 

Feinstein, Wyden and Hagel to Director Hayden, May 11, 2007 (DTS #2007-2102). 

2509

 As in the September 6, 2006, briefing, only two staff members were permitted to attend. 

2510

 Director Hayden testified that detainees were never provided fewer than 1,000 calories a day. This is inaccurate. 

There were no calorie requirements until May 2004, and draft OMS guidelines from March 2003 indicated that 

"[b]rief periods in which food is withheld (1-2 days), as an adjunct to interrogations are acceptable." (See OMS 

GUIDELINES ON MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO DETAINEE RENDITION, 

INTERROGATION, AND DETENTION, May 17,2004; OMS Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support 

to Detainee Interrogations, First Draft, March 7, 2003.) Director Hayden testified that detainees were "not paraded 

[nude] in front of anyone," whereas a CIA interrogator told the inspector general that nude detainees were "kepHn a 

center area outside the interrogation room," and were '"walked around' hy guards." (See Interview Report, 

Page 447 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

447 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

about the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, however, Director Hayden asked to brief the 

Committee on the recent capture of the CIA's newest detainee, Abdul Hadi al-lraqi, who was not 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Vice Chairman Rockefeller and two 

other members of the Committee expressed frustration at the briefing that Director Hayden's 

description of Hadi al-Iraqi's capture was preventing what was expected to be an in-depth 

discussion of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.2511 

(^flUHB^ ) On February 14, 2007, during a hearing on CIA renditions, 

Director Hayden provided inaccurate information to the Committee, to include inaccurate 

information on the number of detainees held by the CIA. the deputy chief of 

the Department in CTC and the previous deputy chief of ALEC Station, provided 

examples of information obtained from the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program.2512 After 

providing the examples, ^^^ H closed her testimony with the statement that "[tjhere's no 

question, in my mind, that having that detainee information has saved hundreds, conservatively 

speaking, of American lives."2513 

(^FS/f^^^^H^^^/NF ) On March 15, 2007, in a speech to a gathering of ambassadors to 

the United States from the countries of the European Union, Director Hayden stated that 

congressional support for the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program assured the continuity 

of the program: 

"I mentioned earlier that it would be unwise to assume that there will be a 

dramatic change in the American approach to the war on terror in 2009. CIA 

got the legislation it needed to continue this program in the Military 

Commissions Act passed by our Congress last fall. And let me remind you 

that every member of our intelligence committees, House and Senate, 

Republican and Democrat, is now fully briefed on the detention and 

interrogation program. This is not CIA's program. This is not the President's 

program. This is America's program."2514 

|, April 14, 2003.) testified that standing sleep deprivation is discontinued when swelling 

or "any abnormality" appears. This was inaccurate. For example, KSM's standing sleep deprivation continued, 

notwithstanding pedal edema and abrasions on his ankles, shins and wrists, as well as the back of his head. (See 

• H 10916 (210845Z MAR 03); 10909 (201918Z MAR 03).) Director Hayden testified that 

"mental conditions that would be of normal concern do not present themselves until a person has experienced more 

dian 100 hours of sleep deprivation," however at least three detainees experienced hallucinations after being 

subjected to fewer than 96 hours of sleep deprivation. 1393 (201006Z OCT 03); 

2511

 Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, November 16, 2006 (DTS #2007-1422). 

2512

 This testimony included inaccurate information. For example, testified that KSM "identified sleeper 

cells inside the U.S., [and] the information allowed the FBI to identify that and take action." She further testified 

that KSM "identified the second wave of attacks against the U.S. that were planned after 9/11," that Abu Zubaydah 

"really pointed us towards [KSM] and how to find him," and that Abu Zubaydah "led us to Ramzi bin al-Shibh." 

See transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, February 14, 2007 (DTS #2007-1337). 

Additional information on the testimony is included in the full Committee Study. 

2513

 Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, February 14, 2007 (DTS #2007-1337). 

2514

 DIRECTOR • • (152227Z MAR 07) 

IIII 11111 ^^^MBBMBBB" 1 ^ "

1 " ' ! I 

Page 448 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

448 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

H. The CIA Provides Additional Information to the Full Committee and Staff, Much of It 

Inaccurate; Intelligence Authorization Act Passes Limiting CIA Interrogations to 

Techniques Authorized by the Army Field Manual 

On April 12, 2007, CIA Director Hayden testified at a lengthy 

hearing that was attended by all but one committee member, and for the first time, the CIA 

allowed most of the Committee's staff to attend. The members stated that the Committee was 

still seeking access to CIA documents and information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program, including Department of Justice memoranda and the location of the CIA's detention 

facilities.2515 Director Hayden's Statement for the Record included extensive inaccurate 

information with regard to Abu Zubaydah, CIA interrogators, abuses identified by the ICRC, and 

the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.2516 Director Hayden's 

Statement for the Record also listed five examples of captures and four examples of plots 

"thwarted" purportedly resulting from information acquired from CIA detainees, all of which 

included significant inaccurate information.2517 Director Hayden's Statement for the Record 

further included the following representation with regard to the effects of legislation that would 

limit interrogations to techniques authorized by the Army Field Manual: 

"The CIA program has proven to be effective... should our techniques be 

limited to the [Army] field manual, we are left with very little offense and are 

relegated to rely primarily on defense. Without the approval of EITs... we 

have severely restricted our attempts to obtain timely information from HVDs 

who possess information that will help us save lives and disrupt operations. 

Limiting our interrogation tools to those detailed in the [Army] field manual 

25,5

 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158). 

2516

 For example, the Statement for the Record claimed that Abu Zubaydah was "an up-and-coming lieutenant of 

Usarna Bin Ladin (UBL) who had intimate knowledge of al-Qa'ida's current operations, personnel and plans." It 

also stated that "[a]fter the use of these techniques, Abu Zubaydah became one of our most important sources of 

intelligence on al-Qa'ida, and he himself has stated that he would not have been responsive or told us all he did had 

he not gone through these techniques." The Statement claimed that CIA interrogators were "carefully chosen and 

screened for demonstrated professional judgment and maturity," and that "they must complete more than 250 hours 

of specialized training before they are allowed to come face-to-face with a terrorist." Claims made in the Statement 

refuting the abuses identified by the ICRC were repeated by Director Hayden during the hearing, and are described 

in an appendix to this summary. The Statement for the Record also included inaccurate information about past 

congressional oversight, claiming that "[ajs CIA's efforts to implement [new interrogation] authorities got underway 

in 2002, the majority and minority leaders of die Senate, the speaker and the minority leader of the House, and die 

chairs and ranking members of the intelligence committees were fully briefed on the interrogation program." See 

Witness Statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence from CIA Director Hayden, for April 12,2007, 

hearing (DTS #2007-1563). 

2517

 The Statement for the Record included claims of effectiveness similar to those made in otiier contexts by die 

CIA, related to the captures of Hambali (on which Director Hayden elaborated during the hearing), Issa al-Hindi 

("KSM also provided the first lead to an operative known as 'Issa al-Hindi'"), Sajid Badat ("[l]eads provided by 

KSM in November 2003 led directly to the arrest of [Badat]"), Jose Padilla ("Abu Zubaydah provided information 

leading to the identification of alleged al-Qa'ida operative Jose Padilla"), and Iyman Faris ("[s]oon after his arrest, 

KSM described an Ohio-based truck dri ver whom the FBI identified as Iyman Faris, already under suspicion for his 

contacts with al-Qa'ida operative Majid Khan"). The statement also described the "thwarting" and "disrupting" of 

the "West Coast Airliner Plot" (aka, the Second Wave plotting), the "Heathrow Airport plot," the "Karachi plots," 

and "Plots in the Saudi Peninsula." See Witness Statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence from 

CIA Director Hayden, for April 12, 2007, hearing(DTS#20aM563^^^ ^ 

Page 449 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

449 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

will increase the probability that a determined, resilient HVD will be able to 

withhold critical, time-sensitive, actionable intelligence that could prevent an 

imminent, catastrophic attack."2518 

(TSZ/jm^l^^^l^/NP ) At the April 12, 2007, hearing, Director Hayden verbally provided 

extensive inaccurate information on, among other topics: (1) the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, 

(2) the application of Department of Defense survival school practices to the program, (3) 

detainees' counterinterrogation training, (4) the backgrounds of CIA interrogators, (5) the role of 

other members of the interrogation teams, (6) the number of CIA detainees and their intelligence 

production, (7) the role of CIA detainee reporting in the captures of terrorist suspects, (8) the 

interrogation process, (9) the use of detainee reporting, (10) the purported relationship between 

Islam and the need to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, (11) threats against 

detainees' families, (12) the punching and kicking of detainees, (13) detainee hygiene, (14) 

denial of medical care, (15) dietary manipulation, (16) the use of waterboarding and its 

effectiveness, and (17) the injury and death of detainees. In addition, the chief of CTC's 

Department provided inaccurate information on the CIA's use of stress positions, while 

Acting General Counsel John Rizzo provided inaccurate information on the legal reasons for 

establishing CIA detention facilities overseas.2519 A detailed comparison of Director Hayden's 

testimony and information in CIA records related to the program is included in an appendix to 

this summary. 

(TS/i^^^^^^^^^B/ZNE) In responses to official Committee Questions for the Record, the 

CIA provided inaccurate information related to detainees transferred from U.S. military to CIA 

custody.2520 The Committee also requested a timeline connecting intelligence reporting obtained 

from CIA detainees to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The CIA 

declined to provide such a timeline, writing that "[t]he value of each intelligence report stands 

alone, whether it is collected before, during, immediately after or significantly after the use of 

[the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques]."2521 

2518

 Witness Statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence from CIA Director Hayden, for April 12, 

2007, hearing (DTS #2007-1563). 

2519

 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158). 

2520 j]l e Committee had asked for specifics related to the assertion in Director Hayden's written statement that the 

CIA program was effective in gaining intelligence after detainees successfully resisted interrogation under U.S. 

military detention. The CIA's response referenced only one detainee, Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi, stating that he was 

"unwilling to become fully cooperative given the limitations of the U.S. military's interrogation and detention 

regulations." The CIA's response to Committee questions then asserted that "[i]t was not until Abu Jaf'ar was 

subjected to EITS that he provided detailed information [about] his personal meetings with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi 

and Zarqawi's advisors," and that "[i]n addition, Abu Jaf'ar provided information on al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) 

finances, travel, and associated facilitation activities." The provided information was inaccurate. CIA records 

indicate that, while still in U.S. military custody, Abu Ja'far described multiple meetings with al-Zarqawi, other 

members of al-Qa'ida in Iraq, and individuals who were to serve as al-Zarqawi's connection to senior al-Qa'ida 

leadership. Abu Ja'far also provided insights into al-Zarqawi's beliefs and plans. See 1 

OCT05),3272 6 OCT05)H^B|3281 0 

(HHIOCT05)jlHB^B3294 4 (|Hfl 0 C T 05>-

2521

 CIA Response to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Questions for the Record, June 18, 2007 (DTS 

#2007-2564). 

11II 11 I I I BMMMMMM M MINI 

Page 450 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

450 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

In May 2007, the Committee voted to approve the Fiscal Year 

2008 Intelligence Authorization bill, which required reporting on CIA compliance with the 

Detainee Treatment Act and Military Commissions Act. In September 2007, John Rizzo 

withdrew his nomination to be CIA general counsel amid Committee concerns related to his role 

in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. On August 2, 2007, the Committee 

conducted a hearing that addressed the interrogation of Muhammad Rahim, who would be the 

CIA's last detainee, as well as the president's new Executive Order, which interpreted the 

Geneva Conventions in a manner to allow the CIA to use its enhanced interrogation techniques 

against Muhammad Rahim. At that hearing, the CIA's director of CTC, 

provided inaccurate information to the Committee on several issues, including how the CIA 

conducts interrogations.2522 Members again requested access to the Department of Justice 

memoranda related to the CIA program, but were denied this access.2523 

(TS^H^^IF ) On December 5, 2007, the conference committee considering the 

Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization bill voted to restrict the CIA's interrogation 

techniques to those authorized by the Army Field Manual. Opponents of the provision 

referenced Director Hayden's testimony on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques in acquiring critical information.2524 On December 6, 2007, the New York Times 

revealed that the CIA had destroyed videotapes of CIA interrogations in 2005.2525 The CIA 

claimed that the Committee had been told about the destruction of the videotapes at a hearing in 

November 2006.2526 A review of the Committee's transcript of its November 16, 2006, hearing 

found that the CIA's claim of notification was inaccurate. In fact, CIA witnesses testified at the 

hearing that the CIA did not videotape interrogations, while making no mention of past 

videotaping or the destruction of videotapes.2527 

252i po r example, the director of CTC, testified that detainees "are given ample opportunity to 

provide the information without the use of EITs" (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of heating, 

August 2,2007 (DTS #2007-3641). As detailed in this Study, numerous detainees were subjected to the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques immediately upon being questioned. 

2523

 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, August 2, 2007 (DTS #2007-3641). 

2524

 Transcript, Committee of Conference on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, December 5, 

2007 (DTS #2009-1279). 

2525 "c j a Destroyed Tapes of Interrogations," The New York Times, December 6, 2007 (published in the 

December 7,2007, edition of the newspaper). 

2526 pres s Release, entitled, "Chairman Rockefeller Says Intel Committee Has Begun Investigation Into CIA 

Detainee Tapes; Senator Expresses Concern that CIA Continues to Withhold Key Information," Office of Senator 

Rockefeller, December 7, 2007. 

2527

 Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, November 16,2006 (DTS #2007-1422). The 

CIA's June 2013 Response states only that "[w]e acknowledge that DCIA did not volunteer past information on 

CIA's process of videotaping the interrogation sessions or of the destruction of the tapes...." The Committee review 

found that in testimony to the Committee in November 2006, CIA witnesses responded to questions about 

videotaping in terms of current practice, while avoiding any reference to past practice. This was similar to what was 

conveyed in June 2003, to David Addington of the Office of the Vice President, by CIA General Counsel Scott 

Muller. In June 2003, the CIA's General Counsel Scott Muller traveled to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, with White 

House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, the Vice President's counsel David Addington, Department of Defense General 

Counsel Jim Haynes, Patrick Philbin from the Department of Justice, and NSC Legal Advisor John Bellinger. 

According to CIA records, during the trip, White House officials asked CIA General Counsel Muller about the CIA 

Inspector General's concerns regarding the waterboard technique and whether the CIA videotaped interrogations, as 

David Addington had heard tapes existed of the CIA's interrogations of Abu Zubaydah. In an email to CIA 

colleagues providing details on the trip, Muller wrote: "(David Addington, by the way, asked me if were [sic] 

M I 11 III I ^^MUBMB W 111"

 M " 

Page 451 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

451 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/d 1//NOFORN 

At the CIA briefing to the Committee on December 11, 2007, 

Director Hayden testified about: (1) the information provided to the White House regarding the 

videotapes, (2) what the tapes revealed, (3) what was not on the tapes, (4) the reasons for their 

destruction, (5) the legal basis for the use of the waterboard, and (6) the effectiveness of the 

CIA's waterboard interrogation technique. Much of this testimony was inaccurate or incomplete. 

Director Hayden also testified that what was on the destroyed videotapes was documented in 

CIA cables, and that the cables were "a more than adequate representation of the tapes." 

Director Hayden committed the CIA to providing the Committee with access to the cables.2528 

(^FS/^H^H^/N^ ) On February 5, 2008, after the House of Representatives passed the 

conference report limiting CIA interrogations to techniques authorized by the Army Field 

Manual, Director Hayden testified in an open Committee hearing against the provision. Director 

Hayden also stated, inaccurately, that over the life of the CIA program, the CIA had detained 

fewer than 100 people.2529 On February 13, 2008, the Senate passed the conference report.2530 

I. President Vetoes Legislation Based on Effectiveness Claims Provided by the CIA; CIA 

Declines to Answer Committee Questions for the Record About the CIA Interrogation 

Program 

(TS^^HIH^^^^/NF ) On March 8, 2008, President Bush vetoed the Intelligence 

Authorization bill. President Bush explained his decision to veto the bill in a radio broadcast that 

repeated CIA representations that the CIA interrogation program produced "critical intelligence" 

that prevented specific terrorist plots. As described in this summary, and in greater detail in 

Volume II, the statement reflected inaccurate information provided by the CIA to the president 

and other policymakers in CIA briefings.2531 Three days later, the House of Representatives 

taping interrogations and said he had heard that there were tapes of the Zubaydah interrogations. I told him that 

tapes were not being made)." See email from: Scott Muller; to: John Rizzo, and 

subject: Report from Gitmo trip (Not proofread as usual); date: June | , 2003, at 5:47 PM. 

2528

 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, December 11, 2007 (DTS #2007-4904). In the 

spring of 2008, after the Committee agreed on a bipartisan basis to continue investigating the destruction of the 

interrogation tapes, Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond pressed the CIA to provide the operational 

cables promised by Director Hayden. See April 21, 2008, letter from Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman 

Bond, to Director Hayden (DTS #2008-1798). See also May 8, 2008, letter from Chairman Rockefeller and Vice 

Chairman Bond, to Director Hayden (DTS #2008-2030). 

2529

 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, February 5, 2008 (DTS #2008-1140). 

2530

 U.S. Senate vote to adopt the conference report on February 13, 2008, 4:31 PM. H.R. 2082 (Intelligence 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008). 

2531

 The President's veto message to the House of Representatives stated that "[t]he CIA's ability to conduct a 

separate and specialized interrogation program for terrorists who possess the most critical information in the war on 

terror has helped the United States prevent a number of attacks, including plots to fly passenger airplanes into the 

Library Tower in Los Angeles and into Heathrow Airport or buildings in downtown London" (Message to the House 

of Representatives, President George W. Bush, March 8, 2008). The president also explained his veto in his weekly 

radio address, in which he referenced the "Library Tower," also known as the "Second Wave" plot, and the 

Heathrow Airport plot, while representing that the CIA program "helped us stop a plot to strike a U.S. Marine camp 

in Djibouti, a planned attack on the U.S. consulate in Karachi...." (See President's Radio Address, President George 

W. Bush, March 8, 2008). As detailed, CIA representations regarding the role of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques with regard to the Second Wave, Heathrow Airport, Djibouti, and Karachi plots were inaccurate. 

Page 452 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

452 
UNCLASSIFIED 

t o p secret ; 7NOFORN 

failed to override the veto.2532 On May 22, 2008, the CIA informed the Committee that the 

vetoed legislation "has had no impact on CIA policies concerning the use of EITs."2533 As noted, 

CIA Director Goss had previously testified to the Committee that "we cannot do it by ourselves," 

and that "[w]e need to have the support of our oversight committee."2534 As further noted, the 

OLC's 2007 memorandum applying the Military Commissions Act to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques relied on the CIA's representation that "none of the Members expressed 

the view that the CIA interrogation program should be stopped, or that the techniques at issue 

were inappropriate."2535 

(TStJ^mmmW ) J u n e 2008, the CIA provided information to the Committee in 

response to a reporting requirement in the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization Act. The 

CIA response stated that all of the CIA's interrogation techniques "were evaluated under the 

applicable U.S. law during the time of their use and were found by the Department of Justice to 

comply with those legal requirements." This was inaccurate. Diapers, nudity, dietary 

manipulation, and water dousing were used extensively by the CIA prior to any Department of 

Justice review. As detailed in the full Committee Study, the response included additional 

information that was incongruent with the history of the program.2536 

(TS/y^^l^^BIH^^ ) On June 10, 2008, the Committee held a hearing on the 

Department of Justice memoranda relating to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Programme) 

which the Committee had recently been provided limited access.2537 At the hearing, 

CTC Legal provided inaccurate information on several topics, including the use of sleep 

2532

 U.S. House of Representatives Roll Call Vote 117 of the 110,h Congress, Second Session, March 11, 2008, 7:01 

PM. 

2533

 CIA Responses to Questions for the Record from the 6 March 2008 SSCI Covert Action Hearing, May 22, 2008 

(DTS #2008-2234). 

2534

 Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308). 

2535

 Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of 

the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain 

Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 14). 

2536

 The CIA response stated that during sleep deprivation, the detainee is "typically... handcuffed in front of his 

body," and "will not be permitted to hang from [the handcuffs)," despite the practice of detainees being subjected to 

the technique with their hands above their heads, and reports of detainees hanging from their wrists at 

DETENTION SITE COBALT. The response stated that "adult diapers and shorts [are] for sanitary purposes," and 

that "caloric intake will always be at least 1,000 kcal/day," although CIA records indicate that the purpose of die 

diapers in several cases was humiliation and there were no caloric requirements until May 2004. The response 

stated that "[n]o sexual abuse or threats of sexual abuse are permitted," despite an insinuation that a family member 

of a detainee would be sexually abused. The response stated diat "[t]he detainee may not be intentionally exposed to 

detention facility staff," even though detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT were walked around nude by 

guards. The response stated that during water dousing, water "cannot enter the detainee's nose, mouth, or eyes," but 

did not acknowledge detainees being immersed in water. Finally, the CIA response described limitations on the use 

of the waterboard that were exceeded in the case of KSM. (See Response to Congressionally Directed Actions cited 

in the Compartmented Annex to Report 110-75, June 16,2008 (DTS #2008-2663).) This response was provided 

notwithstanding the presidential veto of this legislation on March 8, 2008. 

2537

 The Committee had been provided four copies of the memoranda for a limited time. See Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of 1 ~ 98). 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 453 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

453 
UNCLASSIFIED 

11 ii 11 ii 11 jbj^^^^^^B^/nofor n 

deprivation and its effects.2538 Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury also testified, 

noting that the Department of Justice deferred to the CIA with regard to the effectiveness of the 

CIA interrogation program.2539 The Committee then submitted official Questions for the Record 

on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and on the effectiveness of the program, 

including how the CIA assessed the effectiveness of its interrogation techniques for purposes of 

representations to the Department of Justice.2540 The CIA prepared responses that included an 

acknowledgment that Legal, had provided inaccurate 

information with regard to the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques.2541 The prepared responses were never provided to the Committee. Instead, on 

October 17, 2008, die CIA informed the Committee that it would not respond to the Committee's 

Questions for the Record and that instead, the CIA was "available to provide additional briefings 

on this issue to Members as necessary."2542 In separate letters to Director Hayden, Chairman 

Rockefeller and Senator Feinstein referred to this refusal to respond to official Committee 

questions as "unprecedented and... simply unacceptable,"2543 and "appalling."2544 

|CTC Legal repeated the representation that during sleep deprivation, detainees' hands were 

shackled "about chin to chest level," and stated that "[i]f there is any indication, such as the legs begin to swell, or 

things of that nature, that may terminate the sleep deprivation." Legal also stated, inaccurately, 

that "we cannot begin to implement any of die measures, absent first attempting to get information from the 

individual in an up front and non-coercive way." He added, also inaccurately, that "if the individual cooperates and 

begins to talk to you, you never go into the interrogation program." 

2539

 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, June 

10, 2008 (DTS #2008-2698). 

2540

 Questions for the Record submitted to CIA Director Michael Hayden, September 8, 2008, with a request for a 

response by October 10, 2008 (DTS #2008-3522). 

2541 See CIA document prepared in response to "Questions for the Record" submitted by the Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence on September 8, 2008. The Committee had inquired why information provided by Abu 

Zubaydah about Jose Padilla was included in the CIA's "Effectiveness Memo" for the Department of Justice, given 

that Abu Zubaydah provided the information to FBI Special Agents prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques. The CIA response, prepared but never sent to the Committee, stated that the CTC attorney 

who prepared the CIA "Effectiveness Memo," "simply inadvertently reported this wrong." The 

unsent CIA response added that "Abu Zubaydah provided information on Jose Padilla while being interrogated by 

the FBI," and cited a specific CIA cable, 10991. In contrast to the CIA's unsent response to Committee 

questions in 2008, the CIA's June 2013 Response states: "[t]he Study also claims Abu Zubaydah had already 

provided [Jose Padilla'sJ 'Dirty Bomb' plot information to FBI interrogators prior to undergoing CIA interrogation, 

but diis is based on an undocumented FBI internal communication and an FBI officer's recollection to the Senate 

Judiciary Committee seven years later." The CIA's June 2013 Response also represents that "[wjhile we have 

considerable information from FBI debriefings of Abu Zubaydah, we have no record that FBI debriefers acquired 

information about such an al-Qa'ida direat." As detailed in this summary, this is inaccurate. The CIA's June 2013 

Response further states that "CIA correctly represented Abu Zubaydah's description of Jose Padilla as an example 

of information provided after an individual had been subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques." The CIA's 

unsent response to Committee questions in 2008 acknowledged that "[d]uring the initial timeframe Abu Zubaydah 

(AZ) was waterboarded the interrogation team believed diat AZ was compliant and was not withholding actionable 

threat information," but ALEC Station "had additional information they felt linked AZ with more planned attacks," 

and that "[a]s a result, the interrogation team was instructed to continue with the waterboarding based on ALEC 

Station's belief." Finally, the unsent responses acknowledged that notwithstanding CIA representations to the 

Department of Justice regarding amenities available to CIA detainees, "[t]he amenities of today evolved over the 

first year and a half of the program," and that Abu Zubaydah was not initially provided those amenities. 

2542

 CIA Letter to Chairman John D. Rockefeller, IV, October 17, 2008 (DTS #2008-4131). 

2543

 Letter from Chairman John D. Rockefeller, IV to CIA Director Michael Hayden, October 29, 2008 (DTS #2008-

4217). 

2544

 Letter from Senator Feinstein to CIA DirectorMichaelHayden^ 2008 (DTS #2008-4235). 

Page 454 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

454 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

VII. CIA Destruction of Interrogation Videotapes Leads to Committee 

Investigation; Committee Votes 14-1 for Expansive Terms of Reference 

to Study the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program 

(TS^HI^I^BHH^P ) The Committee's scrutiny of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program continued through the remainder of 2008 and into the 111th Congress, in 2009. On 

February 11, 2009, the Committee held a business meeting at which Committee staff presented a 

memorandum on the content of the CIA operational cables detailing the interrogations of Abu 

Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri in 2002.2545 CIA Director Hayden had allowed a small 

number of Committee staff to review the cables at CIA Headquarters, and as noted, had testified 

that the cables provided "a more than adequate representation" of what was on the destroyed 

CIA interrogation videotapes.2546 The chairman stated that the Committee staff memorandum 

represented "the most comprehensive statement on the treatment of these two detainees, from the 

conditions of their detention and the nature of their interrogations to the intelligence produced 

and the thoughts of CIA officers and contractors in the field and Headquarters."2547 After the 

staff presentation, the vice chairman expressed his support for an expanded Committee 

investigation, stating, "we need to compare what was briefed to us by the Agency with what we 

find out, and we need to determine whether it was within the guidelines of the OLC, the MON, 

and the guidelines published by the Agency."2548 Other members of the Committee added their 

support for an expanded investigation, with one member stating, "these are extraordinarily 

serious matters and we ought to get to the bottom of it... to look at how it came to be that these 

techniques were used, what the legal underpinnings of these techniques were all about, and 

finally what these techniques meant in terms of effectiveness."2549 

The Committee held two subsequent business meetings to consider 

and debate the terms of the Committee's proposed expanded review of the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program. The first, on February 24, 2009, began with bipartisan support for a draft 

Terms of Reference.2550 The Committee met again on March 5, 2009, to consider a revised 

Terms of Reference, which was approved by a vote of 14-1.2551 

(TS/^^^^^^^^^^/NF ) On December 13, 2012, after a review of more than six million 

pages of records, the Committee approved a 6,300-page Study of the CIA's Detention and 

2545 See Committee business meeting records and transcript from February 11, 2009 (DTS #2009-1420). 

254C

 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of hearing, December 11, 2007 (DTS #2007-4904). In the 

spring of 2008, after the Committee agreed on a bipartisan basis to continue investigating the destruction of the 

interrogation tapes, Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond pressed the CIA to provide the operational 

cables promised by Director Hayden. See letter from Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond, to Director 

Hayden, April 21, 2008 (DTS #2008-1798); letter from Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond, to Director 

Hayden, May 8, 2008 (DTS #2008-2030). 

2547

 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript, business meeting, February 11, 2009 (DTS #2009-1420) 

2548

 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript, business meeting, February II, 2009 (DTS #2009-1420) 

2549

 Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR). Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript, business meeting, February 

11, 2009 (DTS #2009-1420). 

2550

 Transcript, business meeting, February 24, 2009 (DTS #2009-1913) 

2551

 Transcript, business meeting, March 5, 2009(DTS#2009 B 191(5)^_^ _ 

TOP SECRET//^—l^^^^M/ZNOFOR N 

Page 455 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

455 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN 

Interrogation Program.-552 On April 3, 2014, by a bipartisan vote of 11-3, the Committee agreed 

to send the revised findings and conclusions, and an updated Executive Summary of the 

Committee Study to the president for declassification and public release. 

2552

 After the receipt of the CIA's June 27, 2013, Response to the Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program, and subsequent meetings between the CIA and the Committee in the summer of 2013, the 

full Committee Study was updated. The final Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program 

exceeds 6,700 pages and includes approxi ' ' "" """ '' 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

Page 456 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

456 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

VIII. Appendix 1: Terms of Reference 

Terms of Reference 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Study of the 

Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program 

Adopted March 5, 2009 

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's study of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) detention and 

interrogation program consists of these terms of reference: 

• A review of how the CIA created, operated, and maintained its detention and interrogation program, 

including a review of the locations of the facilities and any arrangements and agreements made by the CIA 

or other Intelligence Community officials with foreign entities in connection with the program. 

• A review of Intelligence Community documents and records, including CIA operational cables, relating to 

the detention and interrogation of CIA detainees. 

• A review of die CIA's assessments that particular detainees possessed relevant information and how the 

assessments were made. 

• An evaluation of the information acquired from the detainees including the periods during which enhanced 

interrogation techniques (EITs) were administered. 

• An evaluation of whether information provided to the Committee by the Intelligence Community 

adequately and accurately described the CIA's detention and interrogation program as it was carried out in 

practice, including conditions of detention, such as personal hygiene and medical needs, and their effect on 

the EITs as applied. 

• An evaluation of the information provided by the CIA to the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel 

(OLC), including whether it accurately and adequately described: 

a. the implementation, effectiveness and expected effects of EITs; 

b. the value of information obtained through the use of EITs; and 

c. the threat environment at the time the EITs were being used or contemplated for use on CIA 

detainees. 

• An evaluation of whether the CIA's detention and interrogation program complied with: 

a. the authorizations in any relevant Presidential Findings and Memoranda of Notification; 

b. all relevant policy and legal guidance provided by the CIA; and 

c. the opinions issued by the OLC in relation to the use of EITs. 

• A review of the information provided by the CIA or other Intelligence Community officials involved in the 

program about the CIA detention and interrogation program, including the location of facilities and 

approved interrogation techniques, to U.S. officials with national security responsibilities. 

The Committee will use those tools of oversight necessary to complete a thorough review including, but not limited 

to, document reviews and requests, interviews, testimony at closed and open healings, as appropriate, and 

preparation of findings and recommendations. 

TOP SECRET// I//NOFORN 

Page 457 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

457 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

IX. Appendix 2: CIA Detainees from 2002 - 2008 

# CIA Detainees Date of 

Citstmly 

Days in CIA 

Ctiylfxly 

1 Abu Zubaydah ••12002 1.59| 

2 Zakariya ••20(1 2 

3 Jamal Eldin Boudraa •••200 2 62| 

4 Abbar al-Hawari, aba Abu Suliyan 36| 

5 Hassan Muhammad Abu Bakr Qa'id ^^12002 5 l | K E Y 

6 Kidlia Ahmad Najar, aka Najjar ^•|200 2 69| 

7 AyubMarshid Ali Salih 4 subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques. 

8 Bashir Nasir Ali al-Marwalah •HH200 2 4 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques. 

9 Ha'il Aziz Ahmad at-Milhali 4 Italics Text: Detainees in italics have not 

been previously acknowledged by the CIA 

10 Hassan bin Attash ••••H200 2 59| to the SSCI. 

11 Musab Umar Ali al-Mudwani ^•^•200 2 4 #: Detainee number on main detainee 

spreadsheet; based on date of CIA custody. 

Number is based on a designation inade by 12 Said Saleh Said, aka Said Salih Said ••••2OO 2 4 

#: Detainee number on main detainee 

spreadsheet; based on date of CIA custody. 

Number is based on a designation inade by 

13 Shawqi Awad 4 the Committee, not the CIA. 

14 Umar Faruq, aka Abu al-Faruq al-Kuwaiti •^^^•200 2 4>| Note on Redaction: The last digit of days 

in CIA custody is redacted. 

15 Abd al-Salam al-Hilah 59| 

Note on Redaction: The last digit of days 

in CIA custody is redacted. 

16 Kcri/n, aka Asai Sar Jan 4 

17 Akbar Zakaria, aka Zakaria Zeinetldin 4 

18 Rafiqbiu Bashir bin Halul al-IJami 4 

19 Tawfiq Nasir Awad a! Bihani 4 

20 Lutfi al-Arabi al-Gharisi ••••2OO 2 38| 

21 Dr. Hikmut Nafi Shaukat 4 

22 Yaqub al-Baluchi tikci Abu Talha 4 

23 Abd al Rahim Ghulam Rabbani 54 SOURC E INFORMATION 

24 Gul Rahman ^^^••200 2 4 C I A Fax to SSCI Committee Staff, 

25 Ghulam Rabhani aka Ahu Badr 54 entitled, "15 June Request for Excel 

Spreadsheet," June 17, 2009. DTS #2009-

26 Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri 1,37| 2529. 

entitled, "15 June Request for Excel 

Spreadsheet," June 17, 2009. DTS #2009-

2529. 

27 Haji Chalgi 14 C IA detainee charts provided to the 

28 Nazur Ali 1 

Committee on April 27, 2007. Document 

in Committee Rccords entitled, "Briefing 

Chans provided to committee members 

from CI A Director Michael Hayden at the 

closed Hearing on April 12,2007, 

29 Juma Gul ^•§^•200 2 4 

Committee on April 27, 2007. Document 

in Committee Rccords entitled, "Briefing 

Chans provided to committee members 

from CI A Director Michael Hayden at the 

30 Wafli bin Ali aka Abdullah 4 closed Hearing on April 12,2007, 

Committee on April 27, 2007. Document 

in Committee Rccords entitled, "Briefing 

Chans provided to committee members 

from CI A Director Michael Hayden at the 

closed Hearing on April 12,2007, 

31 Adel ^^•^•200 2 4 concerning EITs used with CIA detainees, 

and n list of techniques." DTS #2007-

32 Qari Mohib Ur Rehman ^••^•200 2 4 1594. 

33 Shah Wali Khan •^••200 2 1 C IA operational cables and other records 

produced for the Committee's Study of the 

34 Hayaiullah CIA's Detention and Interrogation Haqqani 4 

C IA operational cables and other records 

produced for the Committee's Study of the 

CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

35 Bisher al-Rawi 1 

Program. 

36 Jamil el-Banna, aka Abu Anas •^^•200 2 1 

TOP 

Page 458 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

458 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

# CIA Detainees Date <ij 

Cushats 

Days in CIA 

Custody 

37 Gliairut Bahir ^•^••200 2 

38 Pacha Wazir ••••200 2 33| 

39 Muhammad Amein ai-Bakri •••2OO 3 49| 

40 Abdullah Midhat Mursi H i 

41 Ramzi bin al-Shibh ••••>00 3 128| 

42 Ibn Shaykh al-Libi 114| KEY 

43 Muhammad Umar 'Abd al-Rahman, aka 

Asadallah •^••200 3 1 4 

Bold Text: Detainees in bold text were 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques. 

Italics Text: Detainees in italics have not 

been previously acknowledged by the CIA 

44 Abu Khalid ^^•200 3 - 1 

Bold Text: Detainees in bold text were 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques. 

Italics Text: Detainees in italics have not 

been previously acknowledged by the CIA 45 Khalid Shaykh Mohammad ^^•200 3 1 2 4 

Bold Text: Detainees in bold text were 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques. 

Italics Text: Detainees in italics have not 

been previously acknowledged by the CIA 

46 Mustafa Ahmad al-IIawsawi 126| to die SSCI. 

47 Ahu Yasir al-Jaza'iri 124| #: Detainee number on main detainee 

spreadsheet; based on date of CIA cusLody. 

Number is based on a designation made by 

the SSCI, not the CIA. 

48 Suleiman Abdullah •••200 3 43| 

#: Detainee number on main detainee 

spreadsheet; based on date of CIA cusLody. 

Number is based on a designation made by 

the SSCI, not the CIA. 

49 Hamid Aich •••200 3 

#: Detainee number on main detainee 

spreadsheet; based on date of CIA cusLody. 

Number is based on a designation made by 

the SSCI, not the CIA. 

50 Sayed Habib ^^•200 3 49| 

51 Abu Hazim, aka Abu Hazim al-Libi ^^•200 3 72| 

52 Al-Shara'iya, aka Abd al-Karim ^^•200 3 48| 

53 Muhammad Khan (son of Suhbat) •••200 3 38| 

54 Ibrahim Haqqani ^^•200 3 1 

55 Ammar al-Baluchi •^•200 3 118| 

56 Khallad bin Attash ^^•200 3 11-1 

57 Laid Ren Dohman Saidi, aka Abu Iludhaifa ^^•200 3 46| 

58 Majid Khan ^^•200 3 118| 

59 Mohammad Dinshah ^•200 3 26| 

SOURC E INFORMATION 

60 Muhammad Jafar Jamal al-Qahtani ^^•200 3 34| 

C IA Fax 10 SSC I Committee Staff, 

61 Abu entitled, "15 June Request for Excel Nasim al-Tunisi ••12Q0 3 32| 

C IA Fax 10 SSC I Committee Staff, 

entitled, "15 June Request for Excel 

62 Molid Farik bin Amin, aka Abu Zubair ^^•200 3 115| 

Spreadsheet," June 17,2009. DT S #2009-

2529. 

63 Zarmein 

C IA detainee charts provided to the 

Committee on April 27, 2007. Document 

in Committee Records entitled, "Briefing 

Charts provided lo committee members 

64 Hiwa Abdul Rahman Rashul ••[200 3 " 1 

C IA detainee charts provided to the 

Committee on April 27, 2007. Document 

in Committee Records entitled, "Briefing 

65 A dd Charts provided lo committee members Abu Redwan Ben Hamtili ••§200 3 30| 

C IA detainee charts provided to the 

Committee on April 27, 2007. Document 

in Committee Records entitled, "Briefing 

Charts provided lo committee members 

66 Shaistah Habibuilah Khan |^H200 3 21| 

from CIA Director Michael Hayden at the 

closed Hearing on April 12, 2007, 

67 Sainr Iiiliiii Abdul Lalifal-Barq •••200 3 1 concerning EITs used with CI A detainees, 

and a list of techniques." DTS #2007-

68 Al 1594. i Jan 2003 34| 

concerning EITs used with CI A detainees, 

and a list of techniques." DTS #2007-

1594. 

69 Muhammad Khan (son of Amir) ••H200 3 1 C IA operational cables and other records 

70 Modln Nit Muhammad ^•^•200 3 20| 

produced for the Committee's Study of the 

CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

71 Abdullah Ashaini m|200 3 27| Program. 

72 Basliir bin Lap, aka Lillic •••^00 3 |],| 

73 Riduan bin Isoinuddin, aka Itambali •••1200 3 128| 

TOP SECREiVV^^^MMB^^^M/^QgQR N 

Page 459 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

459 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

# CIA Detainees Dole of 

Custody 

Days in CIA 

Custody 

74 Sanad 'Ali Yislam al-Kazimi ^••200 3 2<fl 

75 Salah Nasir Salim Ali, aka Muhsin ^•••200 3 

76 Abd Qudra Allah Mala Azrat al-Hadi 4 

77 Bismullah 1 

78 Sa'id Allam ••^•§200 3 4 

79 Sa'ida Gul •^^•1200 3 4 KEY 

80 Shall Khan Wali •••••200 3 4 Bold Text: Detainees in bold text were 

81 Yahya, aka Rugollah 4 subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

82 Zakariya 'abd al-Rauf ••^••[200 3 4 

83 Zamarai Nur Muhammad Juma Khan 4 

Italics Text: Detainees in italics have not 

been previously acknowledged by the CIA 

84 Abdullali Salim al-Qcililaui 4 

to the SSCI. 

85 Awwacl Sabhan al-Shaiuniari ••••f t 003 4 #: Detainee number 011 main detainee 

86 Noor Jalal •^•^•200 3 23| Number is based on a designalion made by 

87 Majid Bin Muhammad Bin Sulaymnn 

Khayil, aka Arsala Khan 4 

the SSCI, not the CIA. 

88 Aso Ihiwlcrt 4 

89 Mohd al-Shomaila 5 4 

90 Ali Saeed Awadh ^•^••200 3 i 4 

91 Adnan al-Libi 24 

92 Muhammad Abdullah Saleh •^•200 4 4 4 

93 Riyadh the Facilitator 12| 

94 Abu Abdallah al-Zulaytini ^^••200 4 | 

95 Binyam Ahmed Mohamed ^^••200 4 1 4 

96 Firas al-Ycmeni 9 4 

98 Khalid Abd al-Razzaq al-Masri | SOURC E INFORMATION 

97 Hassan Ghul ^^^•200 4 94| C IA Fax to SSCI Committee Staff, 

entitled, "15 June Request for Excel 

99 Muhammad Qurban Sayyid Ibrahim ^•••200 4 2 4 Spreadsheet," June 17,2009. DTS #2009-

C IA Fax to SSCI Committee Staff, 

entitled, "15 June Request for Excel 

Spreadsheet," June 17,2009. DTS #2009-

100 Saud Memon ••^•200 4 74| 

2529. 

101 Gul Rahman (2) ^^•200 4 4 

C IA detainee charts provided to the 

Committee on April 27, 2007. Document 

in Committee Records entitled, "Briefing 

Charts provided to committee members 

from CIA Director Michael Hayden at the 

102 Hassan Ahmed Guleed •••2OO 4 94 

C IA detainee charts provided to the 

Committee on April 27, 2007. Document 

in Committee Records entitled, "Briefing 

Charts provided to committee members 

103 Abu 'Abdallah •^H200 4 S7| from CIA Director Michael Hayden at the 

C IA detainee charts provided to the 

Committee on April 27, 2007. Document 

in Committee Records entitled, "Briefing 

Charts provided to committee members 

from CIA Director Michael Hayden at the 

104 ABU BAHAR AL-TURKI [REDACTED] 

2004 

Approximately 

1 4 

closed Hearing on April 12, 2007, 

concerning EITs used with CIA detainees, 

and a list of techniques." DTS #2007-

105 ABU TALHA AL-MAGREBI [REDACTED] 

2004 

Approximately 

l | 

1594. 

C IA operational cables and other records 

produced for the Committee's Study of the 

CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program. 

106 Abd al-Bari al-Filistini •••200 4 77| 

1594. 

C IA operational cables and other records 

produced for the Committee's Study of the 

CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

107 Ayyub Program. al-Libi ••200 4 30| 

1594. 

C IA operational cables and other records 

produced for the Committee's Study of the 

CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program. 

108 Marwan al-Jabbur ^^•200 4 77| 

109 Qattal al-Uzbeki ^^•200 4 8 ( | 

TOP SECRE^^^^MMBBBBJ/ZNOgOR N 

Page 460 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

460 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

# CIA Detainees Date of 

Custody 

Days ill CIA 

Custody 

no Janat Gut •^•200 4 92| 

in Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani 73| KEY 

112 Sharif al-Masri 81| 

113 Abdi Rashid Samatar ^^••^00 4 65| subjected to ihe CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques. 

Italics Text: Detainees in italics have not 

been previously acknowledged by the CIA 

114 Abu Farnj al-Libi ••200 5 4 4 

subjected to ihe CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques. 

Italics Text: Detainees in italics have not 115 been previously acknowledged by the CIA Abu Munthir al-Mngrcbi ^^•200 5 4 4 

subjected to ihe CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques. 

Italics Text: Detainees in italics have not 

been previously acknowledged by the CIA 

116 Ibrahim Jan • I B 31| to the SSCI. 

117 Abu Ja'Far al-Iraqi 2 4 #: Detainee number on main detainee 

spreadsheet; based on date of CI A custody. 

Number is based on a designation made by 

the SSCI, not the CIA. 

IIS Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi ^•••200 6 17| 

#: Detainee number on main detainee 

spreadsheet; based on date of CI A custody. 

Number is based on a designation made by 

the SSCI, not the CIA. 

119 Muhammad Rahim ••200 7 24| 

#: Detainee number on main detainee 

spreadsheet; based on date of CI A custody. 

Number is based on a designation made by 

the SSCI, not the CIA. 

Sources: CIA Fax to SSCI Committee Staff, entitled, "15 June Request for Excel Spreadsheet," June 17, 2009 

(DTS #2009-2529); CIA detainee charts provided to the Committee on April 27, 2007; document in Committee 

records entitled, "Briefing Charts provided to committee Members from CIA Director Michael Hayden at the closed 

Hearing on April 12, 2007, concerning EITs used with CIA detainees, and a list of techniques" (DTS #2007-1594, 

hearing transcript at DTS# 2007-3158); and CIA operational cables and other records produced for the Committee's 

Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. 

** Gul Rahman, listed as detainee 24, was the subject of a notification to the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence following his death at DETENTION SITE COBALT; however, he has not appeared on lists of CIA 

detainees provided to Committee. 

TOP SECRET// 1//NOFORN 

Page 461 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

461 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ y/NOFORN 

X. Appendix 3: Example of Inaccurate CIA Testimony to the CommitteeApril 12,2007 

Testimony of Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency 

to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, April 12, 20072553 

CIA Testimony Sampling of Information 

in CIA Records 

The Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "Now 

in June, after about four months 

of interrogation, Abu Zubaydah 

reached a point where he refused 

to cooperate and he shut down. 

He would not talk at all to the 

FBI interrogators and although he 

was still talking to CIA 

interrogators no significant 

progress was being made in 

learning anything of intelligence 

value. He was, to our eye, 

employing classic resistance to 

interrogation techniques and 

employing them quite effectively. 

And it was clear to us that we 

were unlikely to be able to 

overcome those techniques 

without some significant 

intervention." 

Abu Zubaydah was rendered to CIA custody on March 

2002. The CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah stopped 

cooperating with debriefers who were using traditional 

interrogation techniques is not supported by CIA records. 

In early June 2002, Abu Zubaydah's interrogators 

recommended that Abu Zubaydah spend several weeks in 

isolation from interrogation while the interrogation team 

members traveled "as a means of keeping [Abu 

Zubaydah] off-balance and to allow the team needed time 

off for a break and to attend to personal matters H 

^^ft " as well as to discuss "the endgame" for Abu 

Zubaydah HI^ H with officers from CIA Headquarters. 

As a result, Abu Zubaydah spent much of June 2002 and 

all of July 2002, 47 days in total, in isolation. When CIA 

officers next interrogated Abu Zubaydah, they 

immediately used the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques, including the waterboard. 

Prior to the 47 day isolation period, Abu Zubaydah 

provided information on al-Qa'ida activities, plans, 

capabilities, and relationships, in addition to information 

2553

 Transcript at DTS #2007-3158. The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "We disagree with the Study's 

conclusion that the Agency actively impeded Congressional oversight of the CIA Detention and Interrogation 

Program. ...As discussed in our response to Conclusion 9, we also disagree with the assessment that the information 

CIA provided on the effectiveness of the program was largely inaccurate. Finally, we have reviewed DCIA 

Hayden's testimony before SSCI on 12 April, 2007 and do not find, as the Study claims, that he misrepresented 

virtually all aspects of the program, although a few aspects were in error....The testimony contained some 

inaccuracies, and the Agency should have done better in preparing the Director, particularly concerning events that 

occurred prior to his tenure. However, there is no evidence that there was any intent on the part of the Agency or 

Director Hayden to misrepresent material facts." The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the CIA has "identified 

a number of broad lessons learned" and includes eight recommendations. Tlie CIA's only recommendation related 

to Congress was: "Recommendation 8: Improve recordkeeping for interactions with Congress. Direct the Director of 

the Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA) and the Chief Information Officer to develop a concrete plan to improve 

recordkeeping on CIA's interactions with Congress. OCA's records going forward should reflect each interaction 

with Congress and the content of that interaction. OCA should work with the oversight committees to develop 

better access to transcripts of CIA testimony and briefings. This plan should be completed within 90 days of the 

arrival of a new Director of OCA." 

11ii i i i i i IIIIII 

Page 462 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

462 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

on its leadership structure, including personalities, 

decision-making processes, training, and tactics. Abu 

Zubaydah provided this type of information prior to, 

during, and after the utilization of the CIA's enhanced 

inteirogation techniques.2554 

Abu Zubaydah's inability to provide information on the 

next attack in the United States and operatives in the 

United States was the basis for CIA representations that 

Abu Zubaydah was "uncooperative," and for the CIA's 

determination that Abu Zubaydah required the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to become 

"compliant" and reveal the information the CIA believed 

he was withholding. At no point during or after the use of 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did Abu 

Zubaydah provide the information sought.2555 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "This 

really began in the spring of 2002 

with the capture of Abu 

Zubaydah. At that time we 

deployed a psychologist who had 

been under contract to CIA [Dr. 

SWIGERT], to provide real-time 

recommendations to help us 

overcome what seemed, to be Abu 

Zubaydah's very strong 

resistance to interrogation... We 

also made arrangements for [Dr. 

DUNBAR]. [Dr. DUNBAR] 

was the H[||psychologist for 

the Department of Defense's 

SERE program, DOD's Survival, 

Escape, Recovery and Evasion 

program, the program of training 

we put our troops, particularly 

our airmen, through so that they 

can withstand a hostile 

environment." 

The CIA testimony that SWIGERT was deployed to 

"overcome what seemed to be Abu Zubaydah's very 

strong resistance to interrogation" is not supported by 

internal CIA records. Rather, CIA records indicate that 

CIA CTC officers anticipated Abu Zubaydah would resist 

providing information and contracted with SWIGERT 

prior to any meaningful assessment of Abu Zubaydah and 

his level of cooperation. 

• On April 1, 2002, at a meeting on the interrogation of 

AbuZubaydah, ^^•CI C Legal 

recommended that SWIGERT—who was 

working under contract in the CIA's OTS—be brought 

in to "provide real-time recommendations to overcome 

Abu Zubaydah's resistance to interrogation." (Abu 

Zubaydah had been in CIA custody for H|. ) That 

evening, SWIGERT, and the CIA OTS officer who 

had recommended SWIGERT to HflH , 

prepared a cable with suggestions for the interrogation 

of Abu Zubaydah. SWIGERT had monitored the U.S. 

Air Force's Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape 

(SERE) training. SWIGERT, who had never 

conducted an actual interrogation, encouraged the CIA 

255,1 See intelligence reporting charts in Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, as well as a CIA paper 

entitled, "Abu Zubaydah," dated March 2005. Similar information was included in, "Abu Zubaydah Bio," a CIA 

document "Prepared on 9 August 2006." 

2555 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III. 

11 ii 1111 1 MH^BBB^^^^ B

 11111 1 

Page 463 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

463 
TOP SECRET//^ 

UNCLASSIFIED 

1//NOFORN 

to focus on developing "learned helplessness" in CIA 

detainees.2556 

• Following the suggestion of ^m^|CT C Legal, 

CTC contracted with SWIGERT to assist in the 

interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. 

• As described in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in 

Volume III, almost immediately after Abu Zubaydah's 

transfer to CIA custody on March 2002, Abu 

Zubaydah's medical condition deteriorated and Abu 

Zubaydahwastransferred to the intensive care unit of 

a hospital in Country During this 

time, FBI personnel continued to collect significant 

intelligence from Abu Zubaydah. According to an FBI 

report, during the period when Abu Zubaydah was still 

"connected to the intubator" at the hospital and unable 

to speak, he "indicated that he was willing to answer 

questions of the interviewers via writing in Arabic." 

While in the intensive care unit of the hospital, Abu 

Zubaydah first discussed "Mukhtar" (KSM) and 

identified a photograph of KSM. 

• When Abu Zubaydah was discharged from the 

hospital and returned to the CIA's 

DETENTION SITE GREEN on April 15, 2002, he 

was kept naked, sleep deprived, and in a cell with 

bright lights with white noise or loud music playing. 

The FBI personnel objected to the coercive aspects of 

Abu Zubaydah's interrogation at this time, as they 

believed they were making substantial progress 

building rapport with Abu Zubaydah and developing 

intelligence without these measures. (During their 

questioning of Abu Zubaydah, the FBI officers 

provided a towel for Abu Zubaydah to cover himself 

and continued to use rapport building techniques with 

the detainee.2557) 

2556 See Volume I, including 178955 (012236Z APR 02); April 1, 2002 email from [REDACTED] to 

[REDACTED], re: Please coord on cable attached; and email from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], cc: •H I 

April 1, 2002, re: POC for [SWIGERT]- consultant who drafted Al-Qa'ida resistance to interrogation 

backgrounder (noting that CTC/LGL would contact SWIGERT). 

2557 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III. 

i i ii 11 i i i BH^M^BMI^M B i>i i II 

Page 464 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

464 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECREiV/^^^^MBi^^^MAfrJQgQR N 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "We 

wanted [SWIGERT's and 

DUNBAR's] ideas about what 

approaches might be useful to get 

information from people like Abu 

Zubaydah and other 

uncooperative al-Qa'ida 

detainees that we judged were 

withholding time-sensitive, 

perishable intelligence. Keep in 

mind, as a backdrop for all of 

this, this wasn't interrogating a 

snuffy that's picked up on the 

battlefield. The requirement to 

be in the CIA detention program 

is knowledge of [an] attack 

against the United States or its 

interests or knowledge about the 

location of Usama bin Ladin or 

Ayman al-Zawahiri." 

The representation that the "requirement to be in the CIA 

detention program is knowledge of [an] attack against the 

United States or its interests or knowledge about the 

location of Usama bin Ladin or Ayman al-Zawahiri" is 

inconsistent with how the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program operated from its inception.2558 As 

detailed elsewhere, numerous individuals had been 

detained and subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, despite doubts and questions 

surrounding their knowledge of terrorist threats and the 

location of senior al-Qa'ida leadership. 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "We 

began in 2002, in the spring of 

2002. We had one very high 

value detainee, Abu Zubaydah. 

We knew he knew a lot. He 

would not talk. We were going 

nowhere with him. The decision 

was made, we've got to do 

something. We've got to have an 

intervention here. What is it we 

can do?" 

The representation that Abu Zubaydah "would not talk" is 

incongruent with CIA interrogation records. The CIA 

representation that the CIA "knew [Abu Zubaydah] knew 

a lot" reflected an inaccurate assessment of Abu Zubaydah 

from 2002, prior to his capture, and did not represent the 

CIA's assessment of Abu Zubaydah as of the April 2007 

testimony. 

• Prior to Abu Zubaydah's capture, the CIA had 

intelligence stating that Abu Zubaydah was the "third 

or fourth" highest ranking al-Qa'ida leader. This 

information was based on single-source reporting that 

was retracted in July 2002—prior to Abu Zubaydah 

being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques. Other intelligence in CIA databases 

indicated that Abu Zubaydah was not a senior member 

of al-Qa'ida, but assisted al-Qa'ida members in 

acquiring false passports and other travel documents. 

Still other reporting indicated that, while Abu 

Zubaydah served as an administrator at terrorist 

training camps, he was not the central figure at these 

camps. 

2558 See Volume 1 for additional details. 

TOP SECRET//! I//NOFORN 

Page 465 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

465 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRE^W^M^^^^M^^MtoOFQR N 

• After Abu Zubaydah was subjected to the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques in August 2002, the 

chief of Base at DETENTION SITE GREEN wrote: 

"I do not believe that AZ was as wired with al-Qa'ida 

as we believed him to be prior to his capture."2559 

• In August 2006, the CIA published an assessment that 

concluded that "misconceptions" about Afghanistan 

training camps with which Abu Zubaydah was 

associated had resulted in reporting that "miscast Abu 

Zubaydah as a 'senior al-Qa'ida lieutenant.'" The 

assessment concluded that "al-Qa'ida rejected Abu 

Zubaydah's request in 1993 to join the group."2560 

CIA representations that interrogators "were going 

nowhere with [Abu Zubaydah]" prior to the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques are also 

incongruent with CIA records. 

• Prior the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques, Abu Zubaydah provided information on alQa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, relationships, 

leadership structure, personalities, decision-making 

processes, training, and tactics. Abu Zubaydah 

provided this type of information prior to, during, and 

after the utilization of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques. 

• A quantitative review of Abu Zubaydah's 

disseminated intelligence reporting indicates that more 

intelligence reports were disseminated from Abu 

Zubaydah's first two months of interrogation—prior to 

the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques—than were derived during the two-month 

period during and after the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques.2561 

2559

 Email from: [REDACTED] (outgoing Chief of Base at DETENTION SITE GREEN): to: [REDACTED] 

subject: "Assessment to Date" of AZ; date: 10/06/2002, at 05:36:46 AM. 

2560

 CIA Intelligence Assessment, August 16, 2006, "Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in 

Afghanistan, 1990-2001." 

2501 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, including monthly intelligence reporting charts. 

Page 466 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

466 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET^ 1//NOFORN 

CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques and the SERE School 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "After 

lengthy discussion, [Dr. 

SWIGERT] suggested that we 

might use the interrogation 

approaches that had been, for 

years, safely used at the DOD 

survival school ~ in other words, 

the interrogation techniques that 

we were training our airmen to 

resist. Those techniques have 

been used for about 50 years, 

with no significant injuries." 

VICE CHAIRMAN BOND: 

"And the techniques you are 

using are boiled down, is it true, 

from the SERE school?" 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "AH of 

them are techniques that have 

been used in the SERE school, 

that's right, Senator." 

The CIA consistently represented that the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques were the same as the techniques 

used in the U.S. Department of Defense SERE school. 

However, CIA interrogation records indicate there were 

significant differences in how the techniques were used 

against CIA detainees. For example, a letter from the 

assistant attorney general to the CIA general counsel 

highlighted the statement in the Inspector General Special 

Review that the use of the waterboard in SERE training 

was "so different from subsequent Agency usage as to 

make it almost irrelevant."2562 Prior to the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu 

Zubaydah, the chief of Base at the detention site identified 

differences between how the SERE techniques were 

applied in training, and how they would be applied to Abu 

Zubaydah: 

"while the techniques described in Headquarters 

meetings and below are administered to student 

volunteers in the U.S. in a harmless way, with no 

measurable impact on the psyche of the volunteer, 

we do not believe we can assure the same here for a 

man forced through these processes and who will be 

made to believe this is the future course of the 

remainder of his life... personnel will make every 

effort possible to insure [sic] that subject is not 

permanently physically or mental harmed but we 

should not say at the outset of this process that there 

is no risk."2563 

Department of Justice Approval 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "This 

list of recommended techniques 

then went to the Department of 

Justice for their opinion 

regarding whether or not the 

As described in this summary, the August 1, 2002, 

Department of Justice OLC memorandum relied on 

inaccurate information provided by the CIA concerning 

Abu Zubaydah's position in al-Qa'ida and the 

interrogation team's assessment of whether Abu Zubaydah 

2562

 Letter from Assistant Attorney General Goldsmitli to CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, May 27, 2004. For 

more information on the SERE program, see the Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry into the Treatment of 

Detainees in U.S. Custody, December 2008. See also statement of Senator Carl Levin relating to the inquiry, 

December 11, 2008: "In SERE school, our troops who are at risk of capture are exposed in a controlled 

environment with great protections and caution - to techniques adapted from abusive tactics used against American 

soldiers by enemies such as the Communist Chinese during the Korean War. SERE training techniques include 

stress positions, forced nudity, use of fear, sleep deprivation and, until recently, the Navy SERE school used the 

waterboard. These techniques were designed to give our students a taste of what they might be subjected to if 

captured by a ruthless, lawless enemy so that they would be better prepared to resist. The techniques were never 

intended to be used against detainees in U.S. custody." 

2563

 [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02) 

LLLL I I III I I LLLL MILL I 

Page 467 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

467 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

techniques were lawful. DOJ 

returned a legal opinion that the 

13 techniques were lawful, didn't 

constitute torture, and hence 

could be employed for CIA 

interrogations."2564 

was withholding information about planned terrorist 

attacks. 

The OLC memorandum, which stated that it was based on 

CIA-provided facts and would not apply if facts were to 

change, was also specific to Abu Zubaydah. The CIA 

nonetheless used the OLC memorandum as the legal basis 

for applying its enhanced interrogation techniques against 

other CIA detainees.2565 

Resistance Training 

VICE CHAIRMAN BOND: 

"How far down the line [does alQa'ida] train [its] operatives for 

interrogation resistance?" 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "I'm 

getting a nod from the 

experts,2566 Senator, that it's 

rather broadly-based." 

VICE CHAIRMAN BOND: "So 

even if you capturcd the alQa'ida facilitator, probably the 

army field manual stuff are 

things that he's already been 

trained on and he knows that he 

doesn't have to talk." 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "We 

would expect that, yes, Senator." 

A review of CIA records on this topic identified no 

records to indicate that al-Qa'ida had conducted "broadlybased" interrogation resistance training. The CIA 

repeatedly represented that Abu Zubaydah "wrote al 

Qaeda's manual on resistance techniques."2567 This 

representation is also not supported by CIA records. 

When asked about interrogation resistance training, Abu 

Zubaydah stated: 

"... both Khaldan camp and Faruq [terrorist 

training] camp at least periodically included 

instruction in how to manage captivity. He 

explained that in one instance, Khaldan had an 

Egyptian who had collected and studied 

information from a variety of sources 

(including manuals and people who had been 

in 'different armies'). This Egyptian 'talked 

to the brothers about being strong' and 'not 

talking.' Abu Zubaydah's response to this 

2564 yil e August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum addressed 10 interrogation techniques. The May 10, 2005, OLC 

memorandum addressed 13 techniques. 

2565 "Qu r ativice is based upon the following facts, which you have provided to us. We also understand that you do 

not have any facts in your possession contrary to the facts outlined here, and this opinion is limited to these facts. If 

these facts were to change, this advice would not necessarily apply." (See Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting 

General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 

Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 1).) CIA records indicate that 

it was not until July 29, 2003, that the Attorney General stated that the legal principles of the August 1, 2002, 

memorandum could be applied to other CIA detainees. (See June 18, 2004, letter from Assistant Attorney General 

JacJ^^Joldsmith III to Director Tenet (DTS #2004-2710).) In a subsequent interview with the OIG, however, 

Legal, stated that "every detainee interrogated is different in that they are outside 

the opinion because the opinion was written for Zubaydah." The context for ^^^^^B' s statement was the 

legality of the waterboarding of KSM. See Interview of by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and 

[REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 20, 2003. 

2566

 Other CIA attendees at the hearing included John Rizzo, and ^ H 

former HHCT C Legal, attended for the ODNI. 

2567 Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant 

Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810, 

Tab 1). 

M i l I I III I UI^M^B^^^B N 

Page 468 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

468 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

was to take him aside—out of the view of the 

brothers—and explain to him that it was more 

important to have a 'super plan-not expect a 

superman.'"2568 

Abu Zubaydah explained that he informed trainees at the 

training camp that '"no brother' should be expected to 

hold out for an extended time," and that captured 

individuals will provide information in detention. For that 

reason, the captured individuals, he explained, should 

"expect that the organization will make adjustments to 

protect people and plans when someone with knowledge is 

captured."2569 

CIA Interrogators, U.S. Military Interrogators, and the Army Field Manual 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "All 

those involved in the questioning 

of detainees have been carefully 

chosen and carefully 

screened.2510 The average age of 

our officers interrogating 

detainees is 43. Once they are 

selected, they must complete 

more than 250 hours of 

specialized training for this 

program before they are allowed 

to come face-to-face with a 

This CIA testimony is incongruent with internal CIA 

records and the operational history of the program. 

• On November 2002, after the completionofthe 

first formal interrogation training class, 

CTCLegalJBH^^ B asked CTC attorney 

"|m]ake it known that from now 

on, CTC/LGL must vet all personnel who are enrolled 

in, observing or teaching - or otherwise associated 

with - the class."2572 The chief of CTC, Jose 

Rodriguez, objected to this approach, stating: "I do 

not think that CTC/LGL should or would want to get 

110496 (162014Z FEB 03). On July 25, 2002, a CIA Headquarters cable stated that Abu Zubaydah 

was the "author of a seminal al-Qa'ida manual on resistance to interrogation techniques." (See DIRECTOR 

(251609Z JUL 02)). As a result of an ACLU lawsuit, in April 2010, the CIA released a document stating that Abu 

Zubaydah was the "author of a seminal al-Qa'ida manual on resistance to interrogation techniques." (See ACLU 

release entitled, "CIA Interrogation of AZ Released 04-15-10.") No CIA records could be identified to support this 

CIA assessment. 

2569

 •• • 10496 (162014Z FEB 03) 

2570

 The CIA's June 20.13 Response states that "[w]e concede that prior to promulgation of DCI guidance on 

interrogation in January 2003 and the establishment of interrogator training courses in November of the same year, 

not every CIA employee who debriefed detainees had been thoroughly screened or had received formal training. 

After that time, however - the period with which DCIA Hayden, who came to the Agency in 2005, was most 

familiar - the statement is accurate." CIA records indicate that the first interrogator training course was established 

in November 2002. General Hayden became the CIA Director on May 30, 2006. After this time two CIA detainees 

entered CIA custody, one of whom was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. 

2572

 Email from: ••^•••^l/CTC/LGL ; to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], flHHHHTsubject: EYES ONLY; date: November 2002, at 03:13:01 PM. As 

described above, Gul Rahman likely froze to death at DETENTION SITE COBALT sometime in the morning of 

November^, 2002. email, however, appears to have been drafted before the guards had 

found Gul Rahman's body and before that death was reported to CIA Headquarters. See [REDACTED] 30211 

describing the guards observing Gul Rahman alive in the morning of November 2002. Gul 

Rahman's death appeared in cable traffic at least HUH !

 a ft e r

 email. No records could be identified 

to provide the impetus for Hold' s email. 

11 ii 1111 1 ^MBBBB I

 111(1 1 

Page 469 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

469 
T O P SECRET/ / 

UNCLASSIFIED 

wNOFOU N 

terrorist And we require 

additional field work under thc 

direct supervision of an 

experienced officer before a new 

interrogator can dircct an 

interrogation." 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: 'The 

Army field manual was also 

written to guide tlic conduct of a 

mucli larger, much younger force 

that trains primarily to detain 

large numbers of enemy 

prisoners of war. That's not what 

ihc CIA program is." 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "JThe 

Army Field Manual has| got to 

be done by hundreds and 

hundreds of teenagers in 

battlefield tactical situations." 

SENATOR JOHN WARNER: 

"Without ihc benefit of a tenth of 

thc training of your 

professionals." 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: 

"Exactly."2571 

into thc business of vetting participants, observers, 

instructors or others that are involved in this program. 

It is simply not your job j Your job is to tell all what 

arc thc acceptable legal standards for conducting 

interrogations per thc authorities obtained from Justicc 

and agreed upon by thc White House."2"

3

 Contrary to 

CIA Director Haydcn's comments and Statement for 

thc Record that "[a|ll those involved in thc questioning 

of detainees are carefully chosen and screened for 

demonstrated professional judgment and maturity," 

CIA records suggest that thc vetting sought by 

| did not take place. The Committee 

reviewed CIA records related to several CIA officers 

and contractors involved in thc CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program, most of whom conducted 

interrogations. Thc Committee identified a number of 

personnel whose backgrounds includc notable 

derogatory information calling into question their 

eligibility for employment, their access to classified 

information, and their participation in CIA 

interrogation activities. In nearly all cases, thc 

derogatory information was known to thc CIA prior to 

the assignment of thc CIA officers to thc Detention 

and Interrogation Program. This group of officers 

included individuals who, among other issues, had 

engaged in inappropriate detainee interrogations, had 

workplace anger management issues, and had 

reportedly admitted to sexual assault.2574 

Director Haydcn's testimony on thc required hours of 

training for CIA interrogators is inconsistent with thc 

early operational history of the program. Records 

indicate that CIA officers and contractors who 

conducted CIA interrogations in 2002 did not undergo 

any interrogation training. Thc first interrogator 

training course, held in November 2002. required 

approximately 65 hours of classroom and operational 

In addition, i^H^^^H * Former Chief, CTC, testified: "First off, we have 

thirteen interrogators and, of that thirteen, eleven arc contract employees of ours, and they've all been through the 

screening process, they've all been through our vetting process, and they are certainly more than qualified. They are 

probably some of the most mature and professional people V"ii will have in this business." 

JTM Email from; Jose Rodriguez:. ttn^^^^^HHH . HCTC/LGL; cc: [REDACTED|, [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED!, I REDACTED], •^^^^^•Tsubject : EYES ONLY; date: November 2002, at 04:27 

PM. 

1,74

 For additional detailed information, see Volume 111. 

I III I I III I 1 11 1 1 111 1 

Page 470 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

470 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECREIVy^M^^W^^^^MflNQEQft N 

instruction.2575 The initial training was designed and 

conducted by who had been sanctioned 

for using abusive interrogation techniques in the 

1980s, and who had never been 

trained in, or conducted interrogations. In April 2003, 

^^BHH I [CIA OFFICER 1] was certified as 

an interrogator after only a week of classroom 

training.2576 In 2003, interrogator certification 

required only two weeks of classroom training (a 

maximum of 80 hours) and 20 additional hours of 

operational training and/or actual interrogations.2577 

Other Members of the Interrogation Team 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "All 

interrogation sessions in which 

one of these lawful procedures is 

authorized for use has to be 

observed by nonparticipants to 

ensure the procedures are applied 

appropriately and safely. Any 

observer can call 'knock it off' at 

any time. They are authorized to 

terminate an interrogation 

immediately should they believe 

anything unauthorized is 

occurring." 

SENATOR SNOWE: "So you 

also mentioned that there are 

non-participants who are 

observing the interrogation 

process. Who are these nonparticipants?" 

This testimony is incongruent with CIA records, for 

example: 

• During the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, CIA 

personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN objected to 

the continued use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques against Abu Zubaydah, stating that it was 

"highly unlikely" Abu Zubaydah possessed the threat 

information CIA Headquarters was seeking.2578 When 

the interrogation team made this assessment, they 

stated that the pressures being applied to Abu 

Zubaydah approached "the legal limit."2579 CIA 

Headquarters directed the interrogation team to 

continue to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques and instructed the team to refrain from 

using "speculative language as to the legality of given 

activities" in CIA cables.2580 

2575

 December 4, 2002 Training Report, High Value Target Intenogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training 

Seminar 12-18 Nov 02, (pilot running). 

2576

 DIRECTOR •Ht^^ l APR 03) 

2577

 Interrogator Selection, Training, Qualification, and Certification Process; approximately January 29-February 4, 

2003. 

See 10604 (091624Z AUG 02) and 10607 (100335Z AUG 02). In an email, the former 

SERE psychologists on contract with the CIA, who largely devised the CIA enhanced interrogation techniques, 

wrote that Abu Zubaydah stated he was "ready to talk" the first day after they used the CIA's techniques. Speaking 

specifically of the waterboard technique, they wrote, "As for our buddy; he capitulated the first time. We chose to 

expose him over and over until we had a high degree of confidence he wouldn't hold back. He said he was ready to 

talk during die first exposure." See email from: [REDACTED]; subject: "Re: [SW1GERT and DUNBAR]"; date: 

August 21,2002, at 10:21 PM. 

1060 7 (100335Z AUG 02) 

2580

 Email from: Jose Rodriguez; to: [REDACTED]; subject: "[DETENTION SITE GREEN]," with attachment of 

an earlier email from: [REDACTED1; to: [REDACTED]; date: August 12, 2002. See also the section on Abu 

Zubaydah's intenogation in this summary and the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III. 

m i 11 iii i i mi inn i 

Page 471 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

471 
TOP SECRET//^ 

UNCLASSIFIED 

1//NOFORN 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "They 

could be other interrogators, 

medical personnel, chief of base, 

debriefers, analysts." 

SENATOR SNOWE: "Do they 

ever raise concerns during this 

process, during these 

interrogations?" 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: 

"Everybody watching has - every 

individual has an absolute right 

to stop the procedure just by 

saying 'stop.'" 

SENATOR SNOWE: "Did it 

happen? It's never happened?" 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "No, 

we're not aware. I'm sorry. 

John [Rizzo] and 

HHIH l point out it's just not 

the ability to stop it; it is an 

obligation to stop it if they 

believe something is happening 

that is unauthorized." 

During the KSM interrogation sessions, the CIA chief 

of Base directed that the medical officer at the 

detention site not directly contact CIA Headquarters 

via the CIA's classified internal email system, to avoid 

establishing "grounds for further legal action." 

Instead, the chief of Base stated that any information 

on KSM's interrogations would be first reviewed by 

the chief of Base before being released to CIA 

Headquarters.2381 Prior to KSM's third waterboard 

session of March 13, 2003, the on-site medical officer 

raised concerns that the session would exceed the 

limits of draft OMS guidelines for the waterboard.2582 

The waterboard session was conducted after an 

approval email from a CTC attorney at CIA 

Headquarters.2583 The medical officer would later 

write that "ft]hings are slowly evolving form [sic] 

[medical officers] being viewed as the institutional 

conscience and the limiting factor to the ones who are 

dedicated to maximizing the benefit in a safe manner 

and keeping everyone's butt out of trouble."2584 

As was the case with several other CIA detainees, 

'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was repeatedly subjected to 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at the 

direction of CIA Headquarters, despite opposition 

from CIA interrogators.2585 

The CIA Inspector General Special Review states that 

CIA "psychologists objected to the use of on-site 

2,81

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: | 

3/10; date: March 11, 2003, at 8:10:39 AM. 

I; subject: Re: MEDICAL S1TREP 

from: [REDACTED]; to: cc: Jose 

Rodriguez; subject: re: Eyes Only - Legal and Political Quand[]ry; date: March 13, 2003, at 11:28:06 AM. 

2583

 Email from: to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, H H 

|; subject: EYES ONLY - Use of Water Board; date: March 13, 

2003, at 08:28 AM. ^^^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^^^ ^ 

2584

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: cc: ^HHIHH R subject: Re: State cable; date: 

March 13, 2003, at 1:43:17 PM. The previous day, the medical officer had written that "I am going the extra mile to 

try to handle this in a non confrontational manner." See email from: [REDACTED]; to:

 cc : 

^•^••H ; subject: Re: MEDICAL SITREP 3/10; date: March 12, 2003, at 5:17:07 AM. 

2585 See, for example., the report of investigation of the Inspector General: "By mid-2002, Headquarters and 

[DETENTION SITE BLUE] were at odds regarding [DETENTION SITE BLUE]'s assessment on Al-Nashiri and 

how to proceed with his interrogation or debriefing. On several occasions throughout December 2002, 

[DETENTION SITE BLUE] reported via cables and secure telephone calls that Al-Nashiri was not actively resisting 

and was responding to questions directly. Headquarters disagreed with [DETENTION SITE BLUE]'s assessment 

because Headquarters analysts thought Al-Nashiri was withholding imminent threat information." See. Report of 

Investigation, Office of the Inspector General, Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at [DETENTION SITE 

BLUE] (2003-7123-IG), 29 October 2003, p. 18 (DTS #2003-4897). 

Page 472 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

472 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET// 1//NOFORN 

psychologists as interrogators and raised conflict of 

interest and ethical concerns." According to the 

Special Review, this was "based on a concern that the 

on-site psychologists who were administering the 

[CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques] participated 

in the evaluations, assessing the effectiveness and 

impact of the [CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques] on the detainees."2586 In January 2003, 

CIA Headquarters required that at least one other 

psychologist be present who was not physically 

participating in the administration of the CTA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques. According to | 

however, the problem still existed 

because "psychologist/interrogators continue to 

perform both functions."2587 

SENATOR SNOWE: "Did any 

CIA personnel express 

reservations about being engaged 

in the interrogation or these 

techniques that were used?" 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "I'm 

not aware of any. These guys are 

more experienced. No." 

This statement is incongruent with CIA records. For 

example, from August 4, 2002, through August 23, 2002, 

the CIA subjected Abu Zubaydah to its enhanced 

interrogation techniques on a near 24-hour-per-day basis. 

The non-stop use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques was disturbing to CIA personnel at 

DETENTION SITE GREEN. These CIA personnel 

objected to the continued use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, but were 

instructed by CIA Headquarters to continue using the 

techniques. The interrogation using the CIA's enhanced 

techniques continued more than two weeks after CIA 

personnel on site questioned the legality "of escalating or 

even maintaining the pressure" on Abu Zubaydah. CIA 

records include the following reactions of CIA personnel 

expressing "reservations about being engaged in the 

interrogations" and the use of the techniques: 

• August 5, 2002: "want to caution [medical 

officer] that this is almost certainly not a place 

he's ever been before in his medical career... It is 

visually and psychologically very 

uncomfortable."2588 

2586

 Special Review, Office of the Inspector General, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities 

(September 2001 - October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), 7 May 2004, p. 35 (DTS #2004-2710). 

2587

 Special Review, Office of the Inspector General, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities 

(September 2001 - October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), 7 May 2004, p. 40 (DTS #2004-2710). 

2588

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: | 

at 05:35AM. 

T O P SECRET//! 

|, [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Monday; date: August 5, 2002, 

y/NOFORN 

Page 473 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

473 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

• August 8, 2002: "Today's first session... had a 

profound effect on all staff members present... it 

seems the collective opinion that we should not go 

much further... everyone seems strong for now 

but if the group has to continue... we cannot 

guarantee how much longer."2589 

• August 8, 2002: "Several on the team profoundly 

affected... some to the point of tears and choking 

• August 9, 2002: "two, perhaps three [personnel] 

likely to elect transfer" away from the detention 

site if the decision is made to continue with the 

enhanced interrogation techniques.2591 

• August 11, 2002: Viewing the pressures on Abu 

Zubaydah on video "has produced strong feelings 

of futility (and legality) of escalating or even 

maintaining the pressure." With respect to 

viewing the interrogation tapes, "prepare for 

something not seen previously."2592 

The chief of CTC, Jose Rodriguez—via email—instructed 

the CIA interrogation team to not use "speculative 

language as to the legality of given activities" in CIA 

cable traffic.2593 Shortly thereafter, circa December 2002, 

the CIA general counsel had a "real concern" about the 

lack of details in cables of what was taking place at CIA 

detention sites, noting that "cable traffic reporting was 

becoming thinner," and that "the agency cannot monitor 

the situation if it is not documented in cable traffic."2594 

The CIA's chief of interrogations—who provided training 

to CIA interrogators—expressed his view that there was 

|, [REDACTED]; subject: Update; date: 

|, [REDACTED]; subject: Update; date: 

2589

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], | 

August 8, 2002, at 06:50 AM. 

251)0

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], | 

August 8,2002, at 06:50 AM. 

2591

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: 9 August Update; date: August 9, 

2002, at 10:44 PM. ^^^^^ ^ 

2592

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Greetings; date: August 11, 2002, at 

09:45AM. 

2593

 Email from: Jose Rodriguez; to: [REDACTED]; subject: [DETENTION SITE GREEN]; date: August 12, 2002. 

2594

 Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, Scott W. Muller, 

September 5, 2003. 

III! I I III I I I' 1'"H I I 

Page 474 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

474 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ 1//NOFORN 

"excess information" in the Abu Zubaydah interrogation 

cables.2595 

Reporting Abuses 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "Any 

deviations from approved 

procedures and practices that are 

seen are to be immediately 

reported and immediate 

corrective action taken, including 

referring to the CIA Office of 

Inspector General and to the 

Department of Justice, as 

appropriate." 

This testimony is not supported by CIA records, for 

example: 

• Multiple individuals involved in the interrogation of 

CIA detainee 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri failed to report 

inappropriate activity. With regard to the unauthorized 

use of a handgun and power drill to threaten alNashiri, one CIA interrogator stated he did not report 

the incidents because he believed they fell below the 

reporting threshold for the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, while noting he did not 

receive guidance on reporting requirements. The chief 

of Base stated he did not report the incidents because 

he assumed the interrogator had CIA Headquarters' 

approval and because two senior CIA officials had 

instructed him to scale back on reporting from the 

detention site to CIA Headquarters. The inappropriate 

activity was discovered during a chance exchange 

between recently arrived CIA Headquarters officials 

and security officers.2596 

• There were significant quantitative and qualitative 

differences between the waterboarding of KSM, as 

applied, and the description of the technique provided 

to the Department of Justice. Neither CIA 

interrogators nor CIA attorneys reported these 

deviations to the inspector general or the Department 

of Justice at the time. 

• Additionally, CIA records indicate that at least 17 

detainees were subjected to CIA enhanced 

interrogation techniques for which they were not 

approved.2597 

Detainee Statistics 

2595

 Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Inteirogations for Counterterrorism Puiposes, | 

7, 2003. 

2596

 Report of Investigation, Office of the Inspector General, Unauthorized Intenogation Techniques at 

[DETENTION SITE BLUE] (2003-7123-IG), 29 October 2003, p. 24 (DTS #2003-4897). 

2597 See Volume III for details. 

TOP SECRET//! 

April 

k/NOFORN 

Page 475 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

475 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/d 1 /7NOFORN 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "What 

you have there is a matrix. On 

the lefthand side of the matrix are 

the names of the 30 individuals in 

the CIA program who have had 

any EITs used against them. Mr. 

Chairman and Vice Chairman 

and Members, you've heard me 

say this before. In the history of 

the program, we've had 97 

detainees. Thirty of the detainees 

have had EITs used against 

them." 

This testimony is inaccurate. At the time of this 

testimony, there had been least 118 CIA detainees. CIA 

records indicate at least 38 of the detainees had been 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques.2598 

Legal Basis for CIA Detention and Interrogation 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "The 

Army field manual is designed 

for the folks at Guantanamo to 

interrogate a rifleman that was in 

the employ of Gulbuddin 

Hekmatyar. That guy never gets 

into our program. The ticket into 

This testimony is incongruent with CIA detention and 

interrogation records. For example, numerous individuals 

had been detained and subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, despite doubts and questions 

surrounding their knowledge of terrorist threats and the 

location of senior al-Qa'ida leadership. They include 

Asadullah,2599 Mustafa al-Hawsawi

 2600

 Abu Hudhaifa,2601 

25,8 See Volume III for details. As discussed in this summary and in greater detail in the full Committee 

Study, on January 5, 2009, a CIA officer informed Director Hayden that additional CIA detainees beyond the 

98 CIA detainees previously briefed to Congress had been identified. A CIA chart indicated there were "13 

New Finds," additional individuals who had been detained by the CIA, and that the new true number of CIA 

detainees was now at least 112. After the briefing with Director Hayden, the CIA officer sent a record of this 

interaction via email only to himself, which stated: "I briefed the additional CIA detainees that could be 

included in RDI numbers. DCIA instructed me to keep the detainee number at 98 — pick whatever date i 

needed to make that happen but the number is 98." (See email from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; 

subject: Meeting with DCIA; date: January 5, 2009, at 10:50 PM.) Shortly thereafter, the final draft of 

prepared remarks by Director Hayden to President-elect Obama's national security team state: "There have 

been 98 detainees in the history of the CIA program." 

2599

 Interrogators had asked CIA Headquarters for the assessments supporting the decision to subject Asadullah to 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, noting that "it would be of enormous help to the interrogator to know 

whaUf^oncret^acUindwhat is good analysis, " (See 33963 

34098 ••^^^•B^IHHH^H H

 3481 I " 

response, ALEC Station acknowledged that "[t]o be sure, our case that Asadullah should have a good sense of bin 

Ladin's location is circumstantial." (See ALEC I^^ H HIHI^I^H' ) The following day, interrogators 

commented that "it may be that he simply does not know the [locational information on AQ leaders]." See 

^••••••3431 0 ___ _ 

2600 p0 i i 0 W i n g al-Hawsawi's first interrogation session, Chief of Interrogations m m asked CIA 

Headquarters for information on what al-Hawsawi actually "knows," saying "he does not appear to the [sic] be a 

person that is a financial mastermind. However, we lack facts with which to confront [al-Hawsawi], What we need 

at this point is substantive information vice supposition." See ^B H 34757 (101742Z MAR 

03). 

2601

 Although CIA records include no requests or approval cables for the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques, Abu Hudhaifa was subjected to ice water baths and 66 hours of standing sleep deprivation. He was 

released because die CIA discovered he was likely not the person he was believed to be. See WASHINGTON DC 

513 

Page 476 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

476 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

this program is knowledge of Arsala Khan,2602 ABU TALHA AL-MAGREBI2603 and 

threat to the homeland or the ABU BAHAR AL-TURKI,2604 Janat Gul,2605Ahmed 

interests of the United States or Ghailani,2606 Sharif al-Masri,2607 and Sayyid Ibrahim

 2608 

knowledge of location of 1 or 2." 

The CIA represented to the OLC that the CIA would only 

use its enhanced interrogation techniques against detainees 

who had knowledge of imminent threats or direct 

involvement in planning and preparing of terrorist actions. 

Not until July 20, 2007, more than three months after this 

testimony, did the OLC approve the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques against detainees based 

2602

 CIA Headquarters initially resisted approving Arsal^Clmn^apture becaus^^Uacl^nnforniation 

confirming that he was a "continuing threat." 169986 email from: 

BH^^H ; to: and 

Approval to Capture Ai iliilliiii ilili I I'i |iili iliinlil, that Arsala Khan was the individual 

sought by the CIA, interrogators subjected him to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "to make a better 

assessment regarding [his] willingness to start talking, or assess if our subject is, in fact the man we are looking for." 

see ^HriH^HHH 137 3 I 

2603 Authorization to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against ABU TALHA AL-MAGREBI was 

sought in order to "identify inconsistencies in [ABU BAHAR AL-TURKl's] story." See ^^^^HmHU^I 

2186 ^••••1 . 

2604

 The true names of these detainees have been replaced with the capitalized pseudonyms AL-MAGREBI and ALTURKI. At the time the two detainees were rendered to CIA custody, the CIA was aware that they were tiien 

working for a foreign partner government. They were subjected to sleep deprivation and dietary manipulation until 

the CIA confirmed that the detainees had been trying to contact the CIA for weeks to inform the CIA of what they 

believed were pending al-Qa'ida terrorist attacks. After the CIA had determined that AL-MAGREBI and ALTURKI should not be in CIA custody, the two detainees were held for ^^HB H additional months before 

they were released. 

2605

 Janat Gill's CIA interrogators wrote: "Team does not believe [Gul] is withholding imminent threat information, 

however team will continue to press [Gul] for that during each session." (See 1574 (^^HUB I 

04).) The interrogation of Janat Gul is described in this summary and detailed in Volume 111. 

26M The CIA's assessment of Ghailani's knowledge of terrorist threats was speculative. As one CIA official noted, 

"[a]lthough Ghailani's role in operational planning is unclear, his respected role in al-Qa'ida and presence in Shkai 

as recently as October 2003 may have provided him some knowledge about ongoing attack planning against the 

United States homeland, and the operatives involved." See email from: CTC/UBLDIHIHHH I 

(formerly ALEC^^HHHfl) ; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: 

derog information for ODDO on Talha, Ghailani, Hamza Rabi'a and Abu Faraj; date: August 10, 2004. 

2607

 As noted above, the credibility of the source implicating Sharif al-Masri, Janat Gul, and Ghailani's connection to 

a pre-election plot was questioned by CIA officials prior to the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques against the detainees. The source was later determined to have fabricated die information. 

2608 pj v e (jayS a ft e r interrogators began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Sayyid Ibrahim, 

interrogators cabled CIA Headquarters requesting information that would "definitively link [Ibrahim] to nefarious 

activity or knowledge by [Ibrahim] of known nefarious activities of al-Qa'ida members, if this is possible." (See 

1324 HIHH^E B 04).) Without receiving a response, they continued using the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques against Ibrahim. CIA Headquarters, which rejected an assessment from two CIA debriefers 

that Ibrahim was, "at best... a low-level facilitator," would later indicate that it was "uncertain" he would meet the 

Buirements for U.S. military or foreign government detention. (See HEADQUARTERS 

; HEADQUARTERS H^l^riHHHHL ) Other detainees, Abd al-Karim and Abu Hazim, were 

subjected to die CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "in an attempt to more rapidly assess [their] knowledge of 

pending attacks, operational planning, and whereabouts of UBL." See 36843 | 

\ 36908 — 

11 ii 1111 1 B^HMMMW U I II I II 

Page 477 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

477 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

on their suspected knowledge of the locations of UBL or 

Ayman al-Zawahiri.2609 Prior to July 20, 2007, in the case 

of at least six CIA detainees, the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques was nonetheless 

predicated on the assessment that the detainees possessed 

"locational information" on senior HVTs, to include UBL 

or Ayman al-Zawahiri.2610 

Intelligence Reporting from Overall Detainee Population 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "Since 

we began this in the summer of 

2002, the 97 detainees have 

helped us by their testimony 

create 8,000 intelligence reports." 

SENATOR SNOWE: "Of the 

8,000 intelligence reports that 

were provided, as you said, by 30 

of the detainees - " 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "By all 

97, ma'am."2611 

CIA representations suggesting that every CIA detainee 

provided intelligence reporting are not supported by CIA 

records. A detailed reporting chart is provided in Volume 

II. CIA reporting records indicate that 34 percent of all 

CIA detainees produced no intelligence reports, and nearly 

70 percent produced fewer than 15 intelligence reports. 

Of the 39 detainees who were, according to CIA records, 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, 

nearly 20 percent produced no intelligence reports, while 

40 percent produced fewer than 15 intelligence reports. 

2609 yjl e OLC defined a High-Value Detainee as "a detainee who, until time of capture, we have reason to believe: 

(J) is a senior member of al-Qai'da or an al-Qai'da associated terrorist group (Jemaah Islamiyyah, Eqyptian [sic] 

Islamic Jihad, al-Zarqawi Group, etc.); (2) has knowledge of imminent terrorist threats against the USA, its military 

forces, its citizens and organizations, or its allies; or that has/had direct involvement in planning and preparing 

terrorist actions against the USA or its allies, or assisting the al-Qai'da leadership in planning and preparing such 

terrorist actions; and (3) if released, constitutes a clear and continuing threat to the USA or its allies" (Memorandum 

for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, 

Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. 

Sections 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda 

Detainee (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 9); Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central 

Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 

Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against 

Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS 

#2009-1810, Tab 11)). Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from 

Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: 

Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 

to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (DTS 

#2009-1810, Tab 14) ("The CIA informs us that it currently views possession of information regarding the location 

of Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri as warranting application of enhanced techniques, if other conditions are 

met.") 

26, 0

 RidhaAhmai^ifNaiiy H i 1ALE C Ghairat 

Bahir 31118 ^^^^^^^BTlJmar ' Abd al-Rahman aka Asadullah (CIA 

40471•^^^^^HDIRECTO R 

B

id Bin Muhammad Bin Sulayman Khayil aka Arsala Khan 13701 

Ibrahim 1294 

2611

 Similar representations had been made by Director Hayden on September 6, 2006. Senator Bayh: "I was 

impressed by your statement about how effective the [CIA's enhanced interrogation] techniques have been in 

eliciting important information to the country, at one point up to 50 percent of our information about al-Qa'ida. I 

think you said 9000 different intelligence reports?" Director Hayden: "Over 8000, sir." Senator Bayh: "And yet 

M i l I I III I I III! "Il l I 

Page 478 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

478 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

CIA Detainee Reporting and Captures of Terrorists 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: 

"Detainee reporting has played a 

role in nearly every capture of 

key al-Qa'ida members and 

associates since 2002." 

The CIA consistently represented that the interrogation of 

CIA detainees using the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques resulted in critical and otherwise unavailable 

intelligence that led to the capture of specific terrorists, to 

include, among others: KSM, Majid Khan, Ramzi bin alShibh, Iyman Faris, Saleh al-Marri, Ammar al-Baluchi, 

Khallad bin Attash, Sajid Badat, and Dhiren Barot.2612 

These representations were inaccurate. 

The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program Led to the Capture of Hambali and the 

Karachi "Cell" 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "March 

2003, KSM gives us information 

about an al-Qa'ida operative, 

Majid Khan... KSM was aware 

that Majid had been recently 

captured. KSM, possibly 

believing that Khan was talking, 

admitted to having tasked Majid 

with delivering $50,000 to some 

of Hambali's operatives in 

December 2002... So now we go 

to [Majid] Khan and we tell him, 

hey, your uncle just told us about 

the money. He acknowledged 

that he delivered the money to an 

operative named Zubair. He 

provided Zubair's physical 

description and phone number. 

Based on that H captured 

Zubair in June." 

The chronology provided in this testimony, which is 

consistent with other CIA representations, is inaccurate. 

Prior to KSM's capture, in early January 2003, coverage 

of a known al-Qa'ida email account uncovered 

communications between the account and a former 

Baltimore, Maryland, resident, Majid Khan. The 

communications indicated that Majid Khan traveled to 

Bangkok for terrorist support activities and was in contact 

there with a "Zubair."2613 By this time, the CIA had 

significant intelligence indicating that a "Zubair" played a 

central supporting role in Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), was 

affiliated with al-Qa'ida figures like KSM, had expertise 

in mi^^ m in Southeast Asia, and was 

suspected of playing a role in Hambali's October 12, 

2002, Bali bombings.2614 On March 6, 2003, the day after 

Majid Khan was captured (the capture was unrelated to 

CIA detainee reporting), and while being questioned by 

foreign government interrogators using rapport-building 

techniques, Majid Khan described how he traveled to 

Bangkok and provided $50,000 USD to Zubair at the 

behest of al-Qa'ida.2615 Majid Khan's physical description 

this has come from, I guess, only thirty individuals." Director Hayden: "No, sir, 96, all 96" (Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence, Briefing by the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, on the Central Intelligence 

Agency Detention, Interrogation and Rendition Program, September 6, 2006 (DTS #2007-1336)). 

2612 See, for example, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, 

Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003; Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, 

Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention 

and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum 

re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities; CIA briefing slides entitled, "CIA 

Interrogation Program." dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials; Hearing of the Senate 

Select Committee on Intelligence, February 14, 2007 (DTS #2007-1337). For additional details, see Volume II. 

2613

 ALEC •• • (170117Z JAN 03) 

2614 See intelligence chronology in Volume II. 

2615

 A cable describing the foreign government interrogation of Majid Khan stated, "|a foreign government officer] 

talked quietly to [Majid Khan] alone for about ten minutes before the interview began and was able to establish an 

llll I I III I I llll Ill I 

Page 479 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

479 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/d 1/7NOFORN 

of Zubair matched previous intelligence reporting already 

collected on Zubair.2616 

When confronted with this information, KSM confirmed 

the reporting, but denied knowing Zubair.2617 

By May 2003, the CIA learned that a source the CIA had 

been developing, Hl^^^m m 

received a call from a phone number associated 

with Zubair. When the source was contacted by the CIA, 

he described a Malaysian man 

^^Blater , the source alerted the CIA that Zubair would 

Acting on this information, 

Thai authoritiesT^^^^^^I^Hi, captured Zubair 

on June 8, 2003. 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "Zubair 

enters the program. During 

debriefing, Zubair reveals he 

worked directly for Hambali. He 

provides information on | 

Hambali and a 

This testimony is incongruent with CIA records. Prior to 

entering the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, 

while still in foreign government custody, Zubair was 

questioned about his efforts to obtain fraudulent^^B 

documents, as well as his phone contact with 

[Business Q] ••••^•••li^ h .

2hl'' 

Zubair admitted to seeking illegal^^^Bdocuments on 

behalf of Hambali, as well as using 

[Business Q] 

detention records do not state what immediate 

investigative steps the CIA or Thai authorities took with 

regard to [Business Q], although signals 

intelligence had indicated that Zubair had been in frequent 

contact with the company.2621 

After being rendered to CIA custody, Zubair was 

immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

excellent level of rapport." (See 13678 (070724Z MAR 03).) Records indicate that this information was 

also disseminated in FBI channels. See ALEC | 

2616 See intelligence chronology in Volume II. 

2617

 ••• • 13678 (070724Z MAR 03), disseminated as l^^HHH ; ^^^ M 10865 (171648Z MAR 

03), disseminated as ••• H 10866 (171832Z MAR 03). Prior to Majid Khan's reporting 

in foreign government custody, the CIA was aware from sources outside of the CIA detainee program that KSM had 

used couriers to transfer money to Hambali. Even while being questioned about such transfers, however, KSM 

made no mention of Majid Khan. See DIRECTOR MHii^jj^ZSE P 02); ALEC • • (072345Z MAR 03); 

84854

 8487 6

 876171 

TOP SECRET/ /NOFORN 

Page 480 of 499 

2620 

2621 

UNCLASSIFIED 

480 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

interrogation techniques.2622 After days of being 

questioned about other matters, Zubair was asked about 

his efforts to obtain ^^•documents for Hambali, at 

which point he again acknowledged 

^^^•^^^•^B^^IBusines s Q] HI^M^I ^ 

^^^IBI^^^IV^WhenTha i 

approached "a contacTat^B^H^ B [Business Q], they 

were provided 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: 

"Working with [an entity of a 

foreign government], we used 

that information to capture 

another Hambali lieutenant, a 

fellow named Lillie — who is also 

on your list [of CIA detainees] -

who provided the location of 

Hambali. And that location 

information led us to his 

capture." 

In an operation that included surveillance of IB^^B B 

[Business Q], Hambali associate Amer was arrested on 

August 11, 2003.2625 Amer was immediately cooperative 

and assisted in the arrest of Lillie hours later at 

approximately 6:00 PM.2626 During his arrest, Lillie was 

found to have a key fob in his possession imprinted with 

an address of an apartment building in Ayutthaya, 

Thailand. In response to questioning, "within minutes of 

capture," Lillie admitted that the address on the key fob 

was the address where Hambali was located. Less than 

four hours later, Hambali was captured at the address 

found on the key fob.2627 

According to the chief of the CTC's Southeast Asia 

Branch: 

"[The CIA] stumbled onto Hambali. We stumbled 

onto the [source]... picking up the phone and calling 

his case officer to say there's ...we 

really stumbled over it. It wasn't police work, it 

2622 

2623 |84908| 

1410171 

| In response to this 

information, ^^^^^^^^^•wrote , "Wow., this is just great... you guys are soooo closing in on Hmabali [sic]." 

See email fromT^^^^^^^^H ; others; subject: "wohoo—hilite for EA team 

pis....aliases for Hambali"; date: June M- 2003, at 9:51:30 AM. 

2624 ^Mj^ M 8644 9 | 

2625

 ^^^ ^ 87409 876171 

2626 87414 87617 

2627

 Lillie provide this information immediately and prior to entering CIA custody. See \ 

187617 •••••Hi ; IHH H 874141 

|, "Hambali Capture." 

IIII 1 1 III I '

 M

'

M

" 

Page 481 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

481 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/D 1//NOFORN 

wasn't good targeting, it was we stumbled over it 

and it yielded up Hambali."2628 

KSM, Hambali, am the Karachi "Cell" (the al-Ghuraba Group) 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: 

"Bringing this story full circle, 

'Abdul al-Hadi then identifies a 

cell of JI operatives whom 

Hambali had sent to Karachi for 

another al-Qa'ida operation. We 

take this information from Abdul 

Hadi to his brother, Hambali. 

Hambali then admits that he was 

grooming members of the cell for 

a U.S. operation, at the guidance 

of KSM — remember, this is 

where this started — and we're 

almost certain these were the 

guys trying to implement KSM's 

plot to fly hijacked planes into 

the tallest buildings on the west 

coast of the United States." 

CIA Director Hayden's reference to "the guys trying to 

implement KSM's plot to fly hijacked planes into the 

tallest buildings on the west coast of the United States," is 

a reference to the al-Ghuraba student group and KSM's 

"Second Wave" plotting detailed in this summary and in 

greater detail in Volume II.2629 

A review of CIA records found that contrary to CIA 

representations, Hambali's brother, 'Abdul al-Hadi, aka 

Gunawan, who was in foreign government custody, did 

not identify a "cell of JI operatives whom Hambali had 

sent to Karachi for another al-Qa'ida operation." He 

identified "a group of Malaysian and Indonesian students 

in Karachi" who were witting of his affiliation with 

Jemaah Islamiyah.2630 CIA officers on site recalled other 

intelligence reporting indicating that KSM planned to use 

Malaysians in the "next wave of attacks," connected it to 

Gunawan's statements about Malaysian students, and 

reported that Gunawan had just identified "a group of 16 

individuals, most all of whom are Malaysians."2631 

Records indicate that it was this initial analysis that led the 

CIA to consider the group a KSM "cell" for the "next 

wave of attacks." 

While Hambali was being subjected to the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques, he was confronted 

about KSM's efforts to find pilots, as well as information 

on the al-Ghuraba group—which the CIA assessed was a 

KSM "cell." Hambali told his CIA interrogators "that 

some of the members of [the al-Ghuraba group] were 

destined to work for al-Qa'ida if everything had gone 

2628

 CIA Oral History Program Documenting Hambali capture, interview of [REDACTED|, interviewed by 

[REDACTED], on November 28, 2005. 

2629

 [REDACTED] 45915 (141431Z SEP 03). See also February 27, 2004, Memorandum for CIA Inspector General 

from James L. Pavitt, CIA Deputy Director for Operations, entitled "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 

"Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program," which contains a February 24, 2004, attachment entitled, 

"Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities"; CIA Intelligence Product entitled, 

"Jemaah Islamiya: Counterterrorism Scrutiny Limiting Extremist Agenda in Pakistan," dated April 18, 2008; KSM 

and Hambali reporting from October 2003 in Volumes II and III. 

2630 153591 

2611

 153591 

iii i 11 III i i i" ' ""I i 

Page 482 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

482 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/D 1//NOFORN 

according to plan," and that "KSM told him to provide as 

many pilots as he could."2632 

Months later, on November 30, 2003, after three weeks of 

being questioned by a debriefer "almost entirely in Bahasa 

Indonesia," Hambali admitted to fabricating information 

during the period he was being subjected to the CIA's 

enhanced intenogation techniques. According to 

Hambali, he fabricated these claims "in an attempt to 

reduce the pressure on himself' and "to give an account 

that was consistent with what [Hambali] assessed thc 

questioners wanted to hear."2633 A November 30, 2003, 

cable noted that CIA personnel "assesse[d] [Hambali]'s 

admission of previous fabrication to be credible." 

Hambali then consistently described "the al-Ghuraba 

organization" as a "development camp for potential future 

JI operatives and leadership, vice a JI cell or an 

orchestrated attempt by JI to initiate JI operations outside 

of Southeast Asia." This description was consistent and 

corroborative of other intelligence reporting.2634 

A wide body of intelligence reporting indicates that, 

contrary to CIA representations, the al-Ghuraba group was 

not "tasked" with, or witting, of any aspect of the "Second 

Wave" plotting.2635 

While KSM's reporting varied, KSM stated "he did not 

yet view the group as an operational pool from which to 

draft operatives."2636 An Octobcr 27, 2006, CIA cable 

stated that "all of the members of the JI al-Ghuraba cell 

have been released,"2637 while an April 18, 2008, CIA 

intelligence report referencing the al-Ghuraba group 

2632 See the intelligence chronology in Volume II, including [REDACTED] 45953 (151241Z SEP 03) 

[REDACTED] 1323 (161749Z SEP 03). 

2533

 H i 142 (301055Z NOV 03) 

2634 See intelligence chronology in Volume II. Although NSA signals intelligence was not provided for this Study, 

an April 2008 CIA intelligence report on the Jemaah Islamiya noted that the al-Ghuraba group "consisted of the sons 

of JI leaders, many of whom completed basic militant training in Afghanistan and Pakistan while enrolled at Islamic 

universities in Karachi," and that this assessment was based on "signals intelligence and other reporting." See CIA 

Intelligence Product entitled, "Jemaah Islamiya: Counterterrorism Scrutiny Limiting Extremist Agenda in Pakistan," 

dated April 18,2008. 

2635 See intelligence chronology in Volume II. 

10223 (221317Z OCT 03); WUt^K^ M 

2637

 WASHINGTON DC (272113Z OCT 06) 

LLLL I I III I I LLLL Mill I 

Page 483 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

483 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/D 1//NOFORN 

makes no reference to the group serving as potential 

operatives for KSM's "Second Wave" plotting.2638 

J 

r

he Interrogation Process 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "As 

before, with these seven 

[enhanced interrogation 

techniques] we use the least 

coercive measures to create 

cooperation at a predictable, 

reliable, sustainable level. They 

are used to create a state of 

cooperation. Once the state of 

cooperation is created, we simply 

productively debrief the detainee. 

On average, we get to that state 

of cooperation in a period 

measured by about one to two 

weeks." 

"When we're asking him 

questions during that period of 

increased stress, when we're 

being more rather than less 

coercive, we are generally asking 

him questions for which we know 

the answers. Otherwise, how do 

we know we have moved him 

from a spirit of defiance into a 

spirit of cooperation? And only 

after we have moved him into 

this second stage do we then 

begin to ask him things we really 

think he knows but we don't." 

This testimony is incongruent with CIA records. As is 

detailed throughout the Committee Study, CIA detainees 

were frequently subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques immediately after being rendered 

to CIA custody.2639 CIA interrogators asked open-ended 

questions of CIA detainees, to which the CIA did not 

know the answers, while subjecting detainees to the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques. This approach began 

with Abu Zubaydah, whose interrogation focused on him 

being told to provide "the one thing you don't want me to 

know,"2640 and remained a central feature of the program. 

Numerous CIA detainees were determined never to have 

reached a "state of cooperation." Several detainees, when 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, 

transitioned to normal debriefing, and were then subjected 

to one or more additional periods of being subjected to the 

techniques.2641 

2638 CIA Intelligence Product entitled, "Jemaah lslamiya: Counterterrorism Scrutiny Limiting Extremist Agenda in 

Pakistan," dated April 18,2008. 

M39 Numer o us detainees were stripped and shackled, nude, in the standing stress position for sleep deprivation or 

subjected to other enhanced interrogation techniques prior to being questioned by an interrogator. See for example 

KSM •••^••^••3449 1 (051400Z MAR 03); Asadullah (DIRECTOR WK M (•^MFEB03)) ; 

Abu Yasir MAR 03)); Suleiman Abdullah (| 

I 35787 Abu Hudhaifa 

I II 11 11 11 I I 11 

| and Majid Khan

 1 (241242Z MAY 39077 

(271719Z MAY 03). 

2640

 10016 (120509Z APR 02); •• • 10594 (061558Z AUG 02) 

2641 See detainee reviews in Volume III for additional information. 

I III I I I I I JJ^JJ^GJJI^ J I II I II 

Page 484 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

484 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

Use of Detainee Reporting 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: 

"Nothing that we get from the 

program, however, is used in 

isolation. It's a data point that 

then has to be rubbed up against 

all the other data points we have 

available to us." 

The CIA regularly disseminated intelligence reports based 

on uncorroborated statements from CIA detainees. The 

reports, some of which included fabricated or otherwise 

inaccurate information, required extensive FBI 

investigations.2642 For example, the CIA disseminated 

information that KSM had sent Abu Issa al-Britani to 

Montana to recruit African-American Muslim converts.2643 

In June 2003, KSM stated he fabricated the information 

because he was "under 'enhanced measures' when he 

made these claims and simply told his interrogators what 

he thought they wanted to hear."2644 Other KSM 

fabrications led the CIA to capture and detain suspected 

terrorists who were later found to be innocent.2645 

The Relit 'ious Foundation for Cooperation 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "This 

proposed program you have in 

front of you has been informed 

by our experience and it has been 

informed by the comments of our 

The CIA made a similar representation to the Department 

of Justice in the context of Abu Zubaydah.2647 CIA 

records do not indicate that CIA detainees described a 

religious basis for cooperating in association with the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.2648 

2642

 For example, on May 15 and May 16, 2003, the FBI hosted a conference on KSM and investigations resulting 

from KSM's reporting. The agenda included al-Qa'ida recruitment efforts in the U.S., a topic on which KSM had 

provided significant fabricated infonnation. (See Memorandum from: [REDACTED]; for: 

[REDACTED],••••••JP^^HI . [REDACTED], [REDACTEDlB^ B 

[REDACTED], [REDACTEDT^^^^^BH![REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], • 

, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 11 I 11 I II ll| |l I II I II ll| [REDACTED]; 

date: 8 May 2003.) See also Email from: [REDACTED]; to: | 

.subject: Thanks from FBI; date: May 17, 2003, at 

7:25:15 PM^^^ H 12095 (222049Z JUN 03); 12558 (041938Z AUG 03); • • 31148 (171919Z 

DEC^5)jB3114 7 (171919Z DEC 05), disseminated as] 

110942 (221610Z MAR 03), disseminated as 10948 (222101Z MAR 

03), disseminated as 

26+t , 2095 (222049Z JUN 03) 

2645

 The CIA captured and detained two individuals whom KSM had identified as the protectors of his children. 

KSM later described his reporting as "all lies." See 34569 (061722Z MAR 03); H 

1281 (130801Z JUN 04). 

2647 Til e ci a has referred only to Abu Zubaydah in the context of this representation. See Memorandum for John A. 

Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations 

Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques diat May be Used in the Interrogation of 

High Value Al Qaeda Detainees. The OLC document states: "As Zubaydah himself explained with respect to 

enhanced techniques, 'brothers who are captured and interrogated are permitted by Allah to provide information 

when they believe they have 'reached the limit of their ability to withhold it' in the fact of psychological and 

physical hardships." 

2648 while there are no records of CIA detainees making these statements, the Deputy Chief of ALEC Station, 

told the Inspector General on July 17, 2003, that the "best information [the CIA1 received on 

how to handle the [CIA] detainees came from a walk-in [a source] 

| to volunteer information to the CIA] after the arrest of Abu Zubaydah. He told us we were 

11II 1111 1 ^BMBBBBM M MIN I 

Page 485 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

485 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ 1//NOFORN 

detainees. It's built on the 

particular psychological profile 

of the people we have and expect 

to get ~ al-Qa'ida operatives. 

Perceiving themselves true 

believers in a religious war, 

detainees believe they are 

morally bound to resist until 

Allah has sent them a burden too 

great for them to withstand. At 

that point — and that point varies 

by detainee ~ their cooperation 

in their own heart and soul 

becomes blameless and they 

enter into this cooperative 

relationship with our debriefers." 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: 

"Number one, we use the 

enhanced interrogation 

techniques at the beginning of 

this process, and it varies how 

long it takes, but I gave you a 

week or two as the normal 

window in which we actually 

helped this religious zealot to get 

over his own personality and put 

himself in a spirit of 

cooperation." 

VICE CHAIRMAN BOND: 

"Once you get past that time 

period, once you have convinced 

them that Allah gives them the 

green light, that's when you get 

the 8,000 intelligence reports." 

The CIA has referred only to Abu Zubaydah in the context 

of this representation. As detailed, Abu Zubaydah 

referenced religion in the context of his cooperation prior 

to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques. On May 14, 2002, more than two months 

before Abu Zubaydah began his August 2002 enhanced 

interrogation period, Abu Zubaydah told interrogators that 

"if he possessed any more information on future threats, 

then he would provide this information to us to help 

himself, claiming that 'the sharia' gives him permission to 

do so in his current situation."2649 Abu Zubaydah also 

made a similar statement to his interrogators 

approximately a week later—again, prior to the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—stating that he 

had "prayed his 'Istikharah' (seeking God's guidance) and 

was now willing to tell what he really knew," and "that he 

had received guidance from God" to cooperate to "prevent 

his captured brothers from having a difficult time."2650 

Further, Abu Zubaydah maintained that he always 

intended to provide information and never believed he 

could withhold information from interrogators.2651 In 

February 2003, he told a CIA psychologist that he 

believed every captured "brother" would talk in detention, 

and that these "brothers should be able to expect that the 

organization will make adjustments to protect people and 

plans when someone with knowledge is captured."2652 

Abu Zubaydah stated he conveyed this perspective to 

trainees at a terrorist training camp.2653 

underestimating Al-Qa'ida. The detainees were happy to be arrested by the U.S. because they got a big show trial. 

When they were turned over to [foreign governments], they were treated badly so diey talked. Allah apparently 

allows you to talk if you feel threatened. The [CIA] detainees never counted on being detained by us outside the 

U.S. and being subjected to methods they never dreamed of." See Memorandum for the Record; 

subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003. 

10262 (151138Z MAR 02) 

10262 (151138Z MAR 02) 

110496 (162014Z FEB 03) 

10496 (162014Z FEB 03) 

10496 (162014Z FEB 03) 

TOP SECRET//! I//NOFORN 

Page 486 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

486 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/D 1//NOFORN 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "That's 

correct, Senator, when we get the 

subject into this zone of 

cooperation. I think, as you 

know, in two-thirds of the 

instances we don't need to use 

any of the techniques to get the 

individual into the zone of 

cooperation." 

SENATOR NELSON: "How do 

you suspect that al-Qa'ida 

operatives are training in order to 

counter your techniques?" 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "You 

recall the policy on which this is 

based, that we're going to give 

him a burden that Allah says is 

too great for you to bear, so they 

can put the burden down."2646 

Threats Related to Sodomy, Arrest of Family 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "Many 

assertions [in the ICRC report] 

regarding physical or threatened 

abuse are egregious and are 

simply not true. On their face, 

they aren't even credible. 

Threats of acts of sodomy, the 

This testimony is incongruent with CIA interrogation 

records. 

• As documented in the May 2004 Inspector General 

Special Review and other CIA records, interrogators 

threatened 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, KSM, and Abu 

Zubaydah with harm to their families.2654 

2646 jn addition, CIA officertestifie d at the April 12, 2007, Committee hearing: "I spoke with 

Zubaydah. I was at one of these facilities for several months and I spent around 18 hours a day with Abu Zubaydah. 

At the conclusion of my time, as I was leaving the facility, he spoke with me, and he said there is something I need 

you to understand - to go back to the question that came earlier about walling and a collar. He looked at the 

plywood wall in the cell and said I want to thank you for that. I've had a lot of time to sit and reflect, and I 

understand why that's there. That's there so I don't get hurt. In terms of the totality of the experience, his advice 

was I may have been the first person, but you need to continue to do this because I need to be able to live with who I 

am and I will continue to be the religious believing person I am, but you had to get me to the point where I could 

have absolution from my god to cooperate and deal with your questions. So he thanked us for bringing him to that 

point, beyond which he knew his religious beliefs absolved him from cooperating with us." There are no CIA 

records to support this testimony. 

2654

 According to the Inspector General Special Review, a debriefer threatened al-Nashiri by saying "[w]e could get 

your mother in here," and, "[w]e can bring your family in here." In addition, one of KSM's interrogators told the 

inspector general that the psychologist/interrogators told KSM that, if anything happens in the United States, 

"[wje're going to kill your children." (See Special Review, pp. 42-43; interview of by 

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 30 April 2003; interview of j 

by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 22 October 2003; 10757 

(111505Z MAR 03).) According to a CIA cable, a case officer "used [Abu Zubaydah's] 'family card' to apply more 

psychological pressure on [Abu Zubaydah]." The cable stated that the case officer "advised [Abu Zubaydah] that 

even if [Abu Zubaydah] did not care about himself... [Abu Zubaydah] should at least care about his family and keep 

TOP SECRETZ/BM^^^^^^^M^Q^Q ^ 

Page 487 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

487 
TOP SECRET/D 1 

UNCLASSIFIED 

//NOFORN 

aixest and rape of family 

members, the intentional 

infection of HIV or any other 

diseases have never been and 

would never be authorized. 

There are no instances in which 

such threats or abuses took 

place." 

Rectal exams were standard operating procedure for 

security purposes. A June 2002 cable noted that Abu 

Zubaydah was mildly "tense," "likely an anticipatory 

reaction given his recent unexpected rectal exam" the 

previous day.2655 

At least five detainees were subjected to rectal 

rehydration or rectal feeding. There is at least one 

record of Abu Zubaydah receiving "rectal fluid 

resuscitation" for "partially refusing liquids."2656 

According to CIA records, Majid Khan was "very 

hostile" to rectal feeding and removed the rectal tube 

as soon as he was allowed to.2657 KSM was subjected 

to rectal rehydration without a determination of 

medical need, a procedure that KSM interrogator and 

chief of interrogations, would later 

characterize as illustrative of the interrogator's "total 

control over the detainee."2658 Marwan al-Jabbur was 

subjected to what was originally referred to in a cable 

as an "enema," but was later acknowledged to be rectal 

rehydration

 2559

 Both al-Nashiri2660 and Majid Khan 

were subjected to rectal feeding.2661 

in mind their welfare; the insinuation being [that] something might happen to them." See \ 10095 

(220713Z APR 02) ^^^^^^ ^ 

2655 10507 CIA leadership, including CIA General Counsel Scott Muller and DDO 

James Pavitt, were also alerted to allegations that rectal exams were conducted with "excessive force" on two 

detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT. See email from [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; cc: 

I, [REDACTED]; subject: ACTIONS from the GC Update this Morning, date: 

12:15 PM; Email fromHIH^^^ H

 to :

 [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: ACTIONS from the GC Update this Morning; date: 1:23:31 

PM; Email from •I^HHI ; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: 

ACTIONS from die GC Update this Morning REQUEST FOR STATUS UPDATE; date: at 10:47:32 

AM^H3223Hi^^HHEADQUARTER S 

2656 ^^^ ^ 

3657

 [REDACTED] 3868 (291534Z DEC 04); [REDACTED] 3868 (291534Z DEC 04). See also 

HEADQUARTERS ^^^(302114 Z NOV 04). 

134491 (051400Z MAR 03); Interview of^^^MB , by [REDACTED] and 

[REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 27 March 2003. ^Hf^^^HlHH^^Hth e Office of 

Medical Services (OMS), described the rectal rehydration of KSM as helping to "clear a person's head" and 

effective in getting KSM to talk. 

See ^•MHH^H^H i 2563 email from: to: | 

I, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: TASKING - Fw: 

|; date: March 30, 2007; DTS #2007-1502. 

2660

 As described in the context of the rectal feeding of al-Nashiri, Ensure was infused into al-Nashiri "in a forwardfacing position (Trendlenberg) with head lower than torso." See H^H H 1203 (231709Z MAY 04). 

2661

 According to CIA records, Majid Khan's "lunch tray," consisting of hummus, pasta with sauce, nuts, and raisins 

was "pureed" and rectally infused. See •^•^^M^^^H3240(231839 Z SEP 04). 

Page 488 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

488 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/D 1//NOFORN 

• Three detainees, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Khallad bin 

Attash and Adnan al-Libi, were threatened with rectal 

rehydration.2662 

Punches and Kicks 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: 

"Punches and kicks are not 

authorized and have never been 

employed."2663 

This testimony is incongruent with CIA records. 

Interviews conducted for two CIA internal reviews related 

to Gul Rahman's death provided details on CIA 

interrogations at the CIA's DETENTION SITE COBALT. 

In an interview report, CIA contractor DUNBAR 

described the "hard" or "rough" takedown used at 

DETENTION SITE COBALT. According to the 

interview report of DUNBAR, "there were approximately 

five CIA officers from the renditions team... they opened 

the door of Rahman's cell and rushed in screaming and 

yelling for him to 'get down.' They dragged him outside, 

cut off his clothes and secured him with Mylar tape. They 

covered his head with a hood and ran him up and down a 

long corridor adjacent to his cell. They slapped him and 

punched him several times. [DUNBAR] stated that 

although it was obvious they were not trying to hit him as 

hard as they could, a couple of times the punches were 

forceful. As they ran him along the corridor, a couple of 

times he fell and they dragged him through the dirt (the 

floor outside of the cells is dirt). Rahman did acquire a 

number of abrasions on his face, legs, and hands, but 

nothing that required medical attention. (This may 

account for the abrasions found on Rahman's body after 

his death. Rahman had a number of surface abrasions on 

his shoulders, pelvis, arms, legs, and face.)"2664 

The use of the "hard" or "rough" takedown, as used on 

Gul Rahman, was described by the CIA officer in charge 

of the CIA's DETENTION SITE COBALT as "employed 

often in interrogations at [DETENTION SITE COBALT] 

as 'part of the atmospherics."'2665 

26152 See Volume 111 for additional information. 

2M3 jjj e CIA's June 2013 Response states, "DCIA Hayden stated that 'punches' and 'kicks' were not authorized 

techniques and had never been employed and that CIA officers never threatened a detainee or his family." The 

CIA's June 2013 Response adds: "Part of that assertion was an error. The DCIA would have been better served if 

the Agency had framed a response for him that discussed CIA's policy prohibiting such conduct, and how the 

Agency moved to address unsanctioned behavior which had occurred (including punches and kicks) and implement 

clear guidelines." ^^^^^^^^^^^ ^ 

2664 Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from January 28, 2003, Subject: Death 

Investigation - Gul RAHMAN, pp. 21-22. ^^^^ ^ 

26(55

 CIA Inspector General report, "Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee H^^^H " (2003-7402-IG), 

April 27, 2005, at 38. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^ 

11 ii 1111 1 "i" i 

Page 489 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

489 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/d 1//NOFOKN 

Hygiene 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: 

"Detainees have never been 

denied the means ~ at a 

minimum, they've always had a 

bucket — to dispose of their 

human waste." 

This testimony is incongruent with CIA records. CIA 

detainees, particularly those subjected to standing sleep 

deprivation, were routinely placed in diapers. Waste 

buckets were not always available. In the interrogation of 

Abu Hazim, a waste bucket was removed from his cell for 

punishment. According to a CIA cable, Abu Hazim 

"requested a bucket in which he could relieve himself, but 

was told all rewards must be earned."2666 

Medical Personnel and Medical Care 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "The 

medical section of the ICRC 

report concludes that the 

association of CIA medical 

officers with the interrogation 

program is 'contrary to 

international standards of 

medical ethics.' That is just 

wrong. The role of CIA medical 

officers in the detainee program 

is and always has been and 

always will be to ensure the 

safety and the well-being of the 

detainee. The placement of 

medical officers during the 

interrogation techniques 

represents an extra measure of 

caution. Our medical officers do 

not recommend the employment 

or continuation of any procedures 

or techniques." 

CIA records detail how throughout the program, CIA 

medical personnel cleared detainees for the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and played a 

central role in deciding whether to continue, adjust, or 

alter the use of the techniques against detainees. For 

example: 

• Prior to the initiation of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, CIA 

Headquarters, with medical personnel participation, 

stated that the "interrogation process takes precedence 

over preventative medical procedures."2667 

• Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi was provided medication for 

swelling in his legs to allow for continued standing 

sleep deprivation.2668 

37493 2666 

2667

 ALEC (182321Z JUL 02). According to the CIA attorney who reviewed the videotapes of the 

interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, "the person he assumed was a medical officer was dressed completely in black from 

head to toe, and was indistinguishable from other [interrogation] team members." See June 18, 2003, Interview 

Report of [REDACTED], Office of General Counsel Assistant General Counsel. 

2668

 Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi was subjected to nudity, dietary manipulation, insult slaps, abdominal slaps, attention grasps, 

facial holds, walling, stress positions, and water dousing with 44 degree Fahrenheit water for 18 minutes. He was 

shackled in the standing position for 54 hours as part of sleep deprivation, and experienced swelling in his lower 

legs requiring blood thinner and spiral ace bandages. He was moved to a sitting position, and his sleep deprivation 

was extended to 78 hours. After the swelling subsided, he was provided with more blood thinner and was returned 

to the standing position. The sleep deprivation was extended to 102 hours. After four hours of sleep, Abu Ja'far alIraqi was subjected to an additional 52 hours of sleep deprivation, after which CIA Headquarters informed 

interrogators that eight hours of sleep was the minimum. In addition to the swelling, Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi also 

experiencedan edemaonhisheiid due to walling, abrasions on his neck, and blisters on his ankles from shackles. 

1 8 D E C 05)JHi | 1813(^H H DEC 05); •• • 1819 ABH^C05) ; 

•^•fl84 7 (•••DE C 05); ^•HT^ S (^^HDE C 05); HEADQUARTERS | 

DEC 05). See additional information on Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi in Volume III. 

Page 490 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

490 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET// 1//NOFORN 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "The 

allegation in the report that a CIA 

medical officer threatened a 

detainee, stating that medical 

care was conditional on 

cooperation is blatantly false. 

Health care has always been 

administered based upon detainee 

needs. It's neither policy nor 

practice to link medical care to 

any other aspect of the detainee 

program." 

SENATOR HATCH: "Has there 

been any use of any kind of drug 

or withholding of any kind of 

drug or medication?" 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "No, 

absolutely not." 

This testimony is incongruent with CIA records. For 

example, as CIA interrogators prepared for the August 

2002 "enhanced interrogation" phase of Abu Zubaydah's 

interrogation, the CIA's DETENTION SITE GREEN 

noted, and CIA Headquarters confirmed, that the 

interrogation process would take precedence over 

preventing Abu Zubaydah's wounds from becoming 

infected.2659 DETENTION SITE GREEN personnel also 

stated that delaying a medical session for 72 hours after 

the start of the new phase of interrogation would convey 

to Abu Zubaydah that his level of medical care was 

contingent upon his cooperation.2670 On August 10, 2002, 

the medical officer at DETENTION SITE GREEN stated 

that, under the model of medical intervention that the 

detention site was following during the most aggressive 

interrogation phase, Abu Zubaydah's medical status was 

likely to deteriorate to an "unacceptable level" over the 

next two weeks.2671 On August 25, 2002, the Base stated 

that the "combination of a lack of hygiene, sub-optimal 

nutrition, inadvertent trauma to the wound secondary to 

some of the stress techniques utilized at that stage, and the 

removal of formal obvious medical care to further isolate 

the subject had an overall additive effect on the 

deterioration of the wound."2672 

Abu Zubaydah lost his left eye while in CIA custody. In 

October 2002, DETENTION SITE GREEN recommended 

that the vision in his right eye be tested, noting that "[w]e 

have a lot riding upon his ability to see, read and write." 

DETENTION SITE GREEN stressed that "this request is 

driven by our intelligence needs vice humanitarian 

concern for AZ."2673 

CIA detainees Abu Hazim and Abd al-Karim each broke a 

foot while trying to escape capture and were placed in 

casts; Abd al-Karim's medical evaluation upon entry into 

CIA custody included a recommendation that he not be 

subjected to "extended standing for a couple of weeks," 

10536 (15J006Z JULY 02); ALEC | 

10536 (151006Z JULY 02) 

10607 (100335Z AUG 02) 

10647 (201331Z AUG 02); | 

11026 (070729Z OCT 02) 

TOP SECRET//! 

(182321Z JUL 02) 

10618 (121448Z AUG 02); | 10679 (250932Z 

y/NOFORN 

Page 491 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

491 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/D 1//NOFORN 

which was then extended to three months.2674 A cable 

describing the CIA enhanced interrogation techniques to 

be used on the two detainees stated that the interrogator 

would "forego cramped confinement, stress positions, 

walling, and vertical shackling (due to [the detainees'] 

injury)."2675 Abd al-Karim was nonetheless subjected to 

two 45-minute sessions of cramped confinement,2676 

repeated walling, and a stress position that involved 

placing his "head on [the] wall, bent at waist, shuffled 

backwards to a safe, yet uncomfortable position."2677 As 

part of sleep deprivation, he was also "walked for 15 

minutes every half-hour through the night and into the 

morning."2678 A few days later, a cable stated that, even 

given the best prognosis, Abd al-Karim would have 

arthritis and limitation of motion for the rest of his life.2679 

Meanwhile, Abu Hazim was subjected to repeated 

walling.2680 

Subsequently, and despite the aforementioned 

recommendation related to Abd al-Karim and a 

recommendation from a regional medical officer that Abu 

Hazim avoid any weight-bearing activities for five 

weeks,2681 interrogators sought and received approval to 

use standing sleep deprivation on al-Karim and Abu 

Hazim.2682 

Abu Hazim underwent 52 hours of standing sleep 

deprivation,2683 and Abd al-Karim underwent an 

unspecified period of standing sleep deprivation.2684 

136862 (181352Z APR 03); DIRECTOR 

I; DIRECTOR 

3690$ HHHHT^^H^ H 36862 (181352Z APR 

The interrogator requested approval to use sleep deprivation, the facial slap, attention grasp, abdominal slap and 

water dousing. To accommodate Abu Hazim's and Abd al-Karim's injuries, the cable stated that, rather than being 

shackled standing during sleep deprivation, the detainees would be "seated, secured to a cell wall, with intermittent 

disruptions of normal sleeping patterns." For water dousing, the detainees' injured legs would be "wrapped in 

|; DIRECTOR Hlr -

37152 (231424Z APR 03) 

" 37202 (250948Z APR 03) 

lastic." The request was approved. See DIRECTOR 

37121 (221703Z APR 03); 

37508 (021305Z MAY 03); 

37152 (231424Z APR 03) 

2683 

2684 

37410 (291828Z APR 03); 

03); 37754 

38161 (131326Z MAY 03); DIRECTOR 

39582 (041743Z JUN 03); | 

38365 (170652Z MAY 03) 

TOP SECRET//I 

Page 492 of 499 

37509 (021309Z MAY 03) 

^AY03); DIRECTOR 

39656 (060955Z JUN 03) 

7NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

492 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET// K/NQFORN 

Interrogators left Asadullah, a detainee with a sprained 

ankle, in the standing sleep deprivation position. When 

Asadullah was subsequently placed in a stress position on 

his knees, he complained of discomfort and asked to sit. 

He was told he could not sit unless he answered questions 

truthfully.2685 

Due to a lack of adequate medical care at CIA detention 

sites and the unwillingness of host governments to make 

hospital facilities available, CIA detainees had care 

delayed for serious medical issues. See, for example, the 

detainee reviews for Janat Gul, Hassan Guleed, Mustafa 

al-Hawsawi, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Firas al-Yemeni in 

Volume III. 

Dietary Manipulation 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "And, 

in the section [of the ICRC 

report] on medical care, the 

report omits key contextual facts. 

For example, Abu Zubaydah's 

statement that he was given only 

Ensure and water for two to three 

weeks fails to mention the fact 

that he was on a liquid diet [was] 

quite appropriate because he was 

recovering from abdominal 

surgery at the time." 

This testimony is inaccurate. CIA records detail how Abu 

Zubaydah was fed solid food shortly after being 

discharged from the hospital in April 2002.2686 In August 

2002, as part of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques, Abu Zubaydah was placed on a liquid diet of 

Ensure and water as both an interrogation technique, and 

as a means of limiting vomiting during waterboarding.2687 

In planning for the interrogation of subsequent detainees, 

the CIA determined that it would use a "liquid diet."2688 

At least 30 CIA detainees were fed only a liquid diet of 

Ensure and water for interrogation purposes.2689 

Waterboarding and Its Effectiveness 

SENATOR HATCH: "So this is 

not tipping the board and putting 

his head underneath the water." 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "No. 

It's slightly inclined, cloth, 

This testimony is incongruent with CIA interrogation 

records. As described in the Study, the waterboarding of 

KSM involved interrogators using their hands to maintain 

a one-inch deep "pool" of water over KSM's nose and 

mouth in an effort to make it impossible for KSM to ingest 

all the water being poured on him.2690 According to the 

2685 Asadullah was also placed in a "small isolation box" for 30 minutes, without authorization and without 

discussion of how the technique would affect his ankle. 340981 

10 j 

2586

 In May20027^^^H | stated that variety was introduced into Abu Zubaydah's diet; in addition to his daily 

intake of two cups of kidney beans, one cup of rice, Ensure, and juice, Abu Zubaydah was given a piece of fried 

10327 (240624Z MAY 02). 

and [REDACTED]; date: August 4, 2002, at 09:45:09AM. 

chicken, Coke, and several cups of hot tea. See 

2687

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: 

2688 ^^^ ^ 1096 1 (260650Z SEP 02) 

2689 See detainee reviews in Volume III. 

2690

 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: | 

3/15; date: March 15, 2003, at 3:52:54 AM; Interview of | 

TOP SECRET//I 

Page 493 of 499 

|; subject: Re: Sitrep as of AM 

|, by [REDACTED] and 

/NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

493 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/D 1//NOFORN 

pouring of water under the rules I 

just laid out, Senator." 

attending medical officer, the technique became a "series 

of near drownings."2691 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: 

"[W]aterboarding cannot take 

place any more than five days out 

of a total of 30 days. There 

cannot be more than two sessions 

per day. A session is described 

as being strapped to the board. 

No session can last longer than 

two hours. In any session, there 

can be no more than six pourings 

of the water greater than ten 

seconds in duration. Under no 

circumstances can any detainee 

be under the pouring of the water 

a total of more than twelve 

minutes in any 24-hour period, 

and one pouring cannot exceed, 

one application cannot exceed 40 

seconds." 

This testimony is incongruent with CIA interrogation 

records. For example, KSM was waterboarded on nine 

separate days over a two-week period. On March 13, 

2003, KSM was subjected to three waterboard sessions in 

one day. Over March 12-13, 2003, he was subjected to 

five waterboard sessions in 25 hours. During that same 

period, he was subjected to the pouring of water for more 

than twelve minutes during a 24-hour period.2692 

In regard to the description of "pouring," a CIA record 

related to Abu Zubaydah states that: 

"Each iteration of the watering cycle consisted 

of four broad steps: 1) demands for 

information interspersed with the application 

of the water just short of blocking his airway 

2) escalation of the amount of water applied 

until it blocked his airway and he started to 

have involuntary spasms 3) raising the waterboard to clear subject's airway 4) lowering of 

the water-board and return to demands for 

information."2693 

SENATOR NELSON: "On 

KSM, was it waterboarding that 

you were able to get the 

information from him?" 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "Yes, 

sir, it was." 

SENATOR NELSON: 

"Although it took you a long 

time to break him?" 

This testimony is incongruent with CIA interrogation 

records. CIA personnel—including members of KSM's 

interrogation team—believed that the waterboard 

interrogation technique was ineffective on KSM.2694 The 

on-site medical officer told the inspector general that, after 

three or four days, it became apparent that the waterboard 

was ineffective, and that KSM "hated it but knew he could 

manage."2693 KSM interrogator jjjj^^^^^m f told the 

subject: More; date: April 

10802 (131921Z MAR 

[REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003. See also interview of | 

[REDACTED] anc^REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15,2003. 

from: to: cc: 

10, 2003, at 5:59: 27 PM. ^^^ ^ 

2692 H^ H 10800 (131909Z MAR 03); •• • 10801 (131918Z MAR 03); | 

03);^H B 10803 (131929Z MAR 03) 

2693

 CIA record entitled, "Aggressive Interrogation Phase Synopsis," Abu Zubaydah, August 2002. 

2694

 Similarly, participants in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah wrote that Abu Zubaydah "probably reached the 

point of cooperation even prior to the August institution of 'enhanced' measures - a development missed because of 

the narrow focus of the questioning. In any event there was no evidence that the waterboard produced timeperishable information which otherwise would have been unobtainable." See CIA Summary and Reflections of 

H^^Bviedica l Services on OMS participation in the RDI program, at 41. 

2695

 Interview of

 bY [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 

15,2003. 

11ii 11 i i i BBBMBBIMW ! KM i n i 

Page 494 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

494 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ K/NOFORN 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "He had 

nine separate days in which 

waterboarding took place. He 

also was subjected] to sleep 

deprivation and I believe his 

deprivation was the longest of 

any detainee's, at one stretch, and 

I think that may be what Senator 

Hatch was referring to by that 

180 number. That's the number 

of hours at one stretch." 

inspector general that KSM had "beat the system,"2696 and 

assessed two months after the discontinuation of the 

waterboard that KSM responded to "creature comforts and 

sense of importance" and not to "confrontational" 

approaches.2697 KSM debriefer and Deputy Chief of 

ALEC Station told the inspector 

general that KSM "figured out a way to deal with [the 

waterboard]."2698 •^•^T C Legal, 

t o ld the inspector general that the 

waterboard "was of limited use on KSM."2699 CIA 

records indicate that KSM was subjected to the waterboard 

interrogation technique at least 183 times. 

Injuries and Deaths 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "The 

most serious injury that I'm 

aware of - and I'll ask the 

experts to add any color they 

want, Senator - is bruising as a 

result of shackling." 

This testimony is incongruent with CIA interrogation 

records. CIA records indicate that CIA detainees suffered 

physical injuries beyond bruising from shackling, as well 

as psychological problems: 

• During a waterboard session, Abu Zubaydah "became 

completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through 

his open, full mouth." He remained unresponsive after 

the waterboard was rotated upwards and only regained 

consciousness after receiving a "xyphoid thrust."2700 

• Multiple CIA detainees subjected to prolonged sleep 

deprivation experienced hallucinations, and CIA 

interrogation teams did not always discontinue sleep 

deprivation after the detainees had experienced 

hallucinations.2701 

| by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, October 2696

 Interview of | 

22,2003. ____ _ 

2697 11715 (201047Z MAY 03). In August 2006, wrote in a Saraetime communication that 

KSM and Abu Zubaydah "held back" despite the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, but added 

"I'm ostracized whenever I suggest those two did not tell us everything." See Sametime Communication, 

•HHand|^^HHj5/Aug/06 , 10:28:38 to 10:58:00. 

2698

 InterviewonM^HHf >

 b y [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 

2003. also wrote in a 2005 Sametime communication that "we broke KSM... using the Majid Khan 

stuff... and the emails." See Sametime Communication, ^^^^^^H H and [REDACTED], 02/May/05, 

14:51:48 to 15:17:39. 

2690

 Interview of by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector 

General, August 20, 2003. 

2700

 Email from: HH|HH <

 0MS ;t o :

 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], subject: Re: Acceptable lower 

ambient temperatures; date: March 7, 2003; email from: OMS; to: [REDACTED] and 

[REDACTED]; subject: Re: Talking Points for review and comment; date: August 13, 2004; email from 

H I ; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: 

Discussion with Dan Levin - AZ; date: October 26, 2004. 

IIII 1 1 1 1 I M I III 

Page 495 of 499 

2701 

UNCLASSIFIED 

495 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/D 1 //NOFORN 

• Some detainees exhibited significant bruising and 

swelling unrelated to shackling. For example, a 

medical officer noted that, in addition to the swelling 

of his ankles and wrists, Ramzi bin al-Shibh had a 

bruise on his brow.2702 

• During the application of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, KSM was described as 

"[tJired and sore," with abrasions on his ankles, shins, 

and wrists, as well as on the back of his head.2703 He 

also suffered from pedal edema2704 resulting from 

extended standing.2705 

• At the CIA's DETENTION SITE COBALT, CIA 

interrogators used "rough takedowns," described as 

taking a naked detainee outside of his cell, placing a 

hood over his head, and dragging him up and down a 

long corridor while slapping and punching him. Gul 

Rahman, after his death, was found to have surface 

abrasions on his shoulders, pelvis, arms, legs, and 

face.2706 

SENATOR LEVIN: "Did 

anybody die?" 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "No." 

SENATOR LEVIN: "Not one 

person?" 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "No 

one. The Committee is aware 

that there was an individual who 

died in CIA custody prior to the 

initiation of this program." 

SENATOR LEVIN: "Prior to 

the initiation of what?" 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "This 

program. In fact, the discipline 

of this program is a product of or 

This testimony is incongruent with CIA records. 

• Gul Rahman died in CIA custody at the CIA's 

DETENTION SITE COBALT after being rendered 

there on November 2002. At the time, 

DETENTION SITE COBALT was described as a 

place where the CIA could detain suspected terrorists 

for the purposes of "intense interrogations" by CIA 

officers

 2707

 DDO James Pavitt told the inspector 

general that "there were some who say that 

[DETENTION SITE COBALT] is not a CIA facility, 

but that is 'bullshit.'"2708 

• CIA records reveal that Gul Rahman was subjected to 

what the CIA chief of interrogations described as 

10429 (101215Z FEB 03) 

110916 (210845Z MAR 03) 

; of the feet. 

10909 (201918Z MAR 03) ^^^^^^^ ^ 

2706 Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from BHI^^^^^ H January 28, 2003, Subject: Death 

Investigation - Gul RAHMAN, pp. 21-22. See Volume III for additional injuries resulting from CIA interrogations. 

ALEC • • ^H H 

2708 August 21, 2003, Interview Report of James Pavitt, (pursuant to 2003-7123-IG), Deputy Director of Operations. 

nil 11 I I I ^^^JBMWB^ B I IIII Mill I 

Page 496 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

496 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/D 1//NOFORN 

result of the undisciplined 

activity that took place earlier." 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "[Gul 

Rahman] was not part of this 

program, but I understand it was 

in CIA custody." 

"coercive techniques without authorization."2709 At 

ALEC Station's request, CIA contractor Hammond 

DUNBAR conducted an assessment of Gul Rahman to 

determine which CIA enhanced interrogation 

techniques should be used on him.2710 While the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were never 

authorized, DUNBAR interrogated Rahman, once 

employing the "insult slap" enhanced intenogation 

technique without CIA Headquarters approval.2711 On 

November 2002, Gul Rahman was shackled to the 

wall of his cell in a short chain position,2712 which 

required him to sit on the bare concrete.2713 Rahman 

was wearing a sweatshirt, but was nude from the waist 

down. On November 2002, the guards at 

DETENTION SITE COBALT found Gul Rahman's 

dead body.2714 Although a CIA employee tried to 

perform CPR, Gul Rahman remained unresponsive 

and was declared dead.2715 An autopsy report by the 

CIA found that the cause of Gul Rahman's death was 

"undetermined," but that the clinical impression of the 

medical officer who conducted the autopsy was that 

the cause of death was hypothermia.2716 

Stress Positions 

SENATOR LEVIN: [Reading a 

SSCI staff document, "Summary 

Notes of the February 14, 2007 

ICRC Report"] "Prolonged 

stress standing position, naked, 

armed chained above the head [?] 

This testimony is inaccurate. 

There are multiple descriptions of CIA detainees being 

forced to stand with their arms shackled above their heads 

for extended periods of time at the CIA's DETENTION 

SITE COBALT.2717 In one example, a U.S. military legal 

; email dated November 2002, from CIA interrogator 

with the subject line, "Another example of field interrogation 

|; ALEC | 

| (2003-7402-IG), 27 April 2005, p. 23 (DTS #2005-

|29520 

| to CTC/LGL Officer 

using coercive techniques without authorization: 

2710 29909 

2711

 Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee 

1957). 

2712

 In the short chain position, a detainee's hands and feet are shackled together by a short chain. 

2713

 [REDACTED] 29520 ••••• H 

2714

 January 27, 2003, Memorandum from [REDACTED], Chief, Counterintelligence Evaluation Branch, 

Counterespionage Group Counterintelligence Center, to Deputy Director for Operations, Subject: Death 

Investigation - Gul Rahman. 

2715

 January 27, 2003, Memorandum from [REDACTED], Chief, Counterintelligence Evaluation Branch, 

Counterespionage Group Counterintelligence Center, to Deputy Director for Operations, Subject: Death 

Investigation - Gul Rahman. The circumstances surrounding Gul Rahman's death are described in detail in both 

reports prepared by the Counterintelligence Center and a 2005 report prepared by the Inspector General. See April 

27, 2005, CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee (DTS #2005-1957). 

2716

 FINAL AUTOPSY FINDINGS, by [REDACTED], MP, CASE #: OMS A-01-02. 

27,7

 I^^^BH^^^ H 28246 HHi^Intervie w Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of 

Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes,Apri l 5, 2003; Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, 

11ii 11 ii1 1 i II i in 

Page 497 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

497 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ y/NOFORN 

DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "Not 

above the head. Stress positions 

are part of the EITs, and 

nakedness were part of the EITs, 

Senator." 

advisor observed the technique known as "hanging," 

involving handcuffing one or both wrists to an overhead 

horizontal bar. The legal advisor noted that one detainee 

was apparently left hanging for 22 hours each day for two 

consecutive days to "break" his resistance.2718 

CIA records indicate that multiple detainees were shackled 

with their hands above their heads at other CTA detention 

sites. For example, see detainee reviews in Volume IE, to 

include 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri,2719 Hassan Ghul,2720 

and KSM.2721 According to CIA cables, Abu Zubaydah 

was handcuffed "high on the bars."2722 

Draft OMS guidelines on interrogations, noted that 

detainees could be shackled with their arms above their 

heads for "roughly two hours without great concern," and 

that the arms could be elevated for between two and four 

hours if the detainee was monitored for "excessive 

distress."2723 

Legal i leasonsfor Overseas Detention 

SENATOR WHITEHOUSE: 

"Has there been any 

consideration at any point within 

the Agency that the purpose in 

locating facilities overseas is 

either to avoid liability under 

American statutes or to avoid the 

ability of any court to claim 

jurisdiction because they would 

not know where these took 

place? Is there an element of 

Mr. Rizzo's testimony is incongruent with CIA records. 

After the capture of Abu Zubaydah, ^^B|CT C Legal, 

^m/^m , prepared a PowerPoint presentation 

laying out the "pros" and "cons" of six detention options. 

The pros for detention in Country where Abu 

Zubaydah would be rendered, included "[n]o issues of 

possible U.S. [court] jurisdiction." The cons for a CIA 

facility in the United States included "[c]an't foreclose 

ability of U.S. [courts] considering Habeas Corpus 

petition."2724 

Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purp""-" nil III I Hi I Memorandum for 

[REDACTED] from [REDACTED] ^^B^HHi^Hi[^^^h^BIHNovembeijB2002 , Subject: 

LeeaIAnalysisof[REDACTED] Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in 

(aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]"). 

27,8

 Memorandum for [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] ^HflH^^^HIII^^HIil^l^ H 

November®^002, Subject: Legal Analysis of [REDACTED| Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA 

Detention Facility in (aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]"). 

2719

 Email from: [DETENTION SITE BLUE] COB

 t0 :

 IHlti^^^ H subject: EYES 

ONLY - I^^B^BM l ONLY - MEMO FOR ADDO/DDO; date: January 22,2003. 

2720

 M^M l 285 

2721 ^^^^mama^^—iAM , 10654(030904ZMAR 03);1075 2 |34491 (051400Z MAR 03); 

(102320Z MAR 03) 

2722 ^^^ ^ 1048 7 (1 gl656 Z j U N 02); B^^ H 10393 (020543Z JUN 02) 

2723

 OMS GUIDELINES ON MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO DETAINEE 

INTERROGATIONS, "First Draft," March 7, 2003. 

2724

 PowerPoint presentation, Options of Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 27, 2002. 

TOP SECRET/^ y/NOFORN 

Page 498 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

498 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NOFORN 

providing legal defense to the 

participants in these 

applications?" 

MR. RIZZO: "Well, certainly 

not the first." 

In late 2003 and early 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court's 

decision to accept certiorari in the case of Rasul v. Bush 

prompted a decision by the CIA, in coordination with the 

Department of Justice, to transfer five CIA detainees held 

at Guantanamo to other CIA detention facilities.2725 

2725

 Email from: Scott W. Muller; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Detainees in 

Gitmo; date: January ^2004 ; email from Scott W. Muller; to: [REDACTEDl^ubject: DCI Meeting with Rice; 

date: JanuaryH|2004; email from: Scott Muller; to: James Pavitt, cc: George Tenet, Jobn 

McLaughlin, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ••••^•f[REDACTED] , subject: CIA 

Detainees at GITMO; date: February B2004. 

m i 11 III i i m i IHII i 

Page 499 of 499 

UNCLASSIFIED 

499 
UNCLASSIFIED 

Additional Views of Senator Rockefeller 

The Senate Intelligence Committee's entire Study on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program is the most in-depth and substantive oversight initiative that the Committee has ever 

undertaken, and it presents extremely valuable insights into crucial oversight questions and 

problems that need to be addressed at the CIA, 

Moreover, this Study exemplifies why this Committee was created in the first place - following 

the findings of the Church Committee nearly 40 years ago - and I commend Chairman Feinstein 

for shepherding this landmark initiative to this point. 

It is my hope and expectation that beyond the initial release of the Executive Summary and 

Findings and Conclusions, the entire 6,800 page Study will eventually be made public with the 

appropriate redactions. Those public findings will be critical to fully learning the necessary 

lessons from this dark episode in our nation's history, and to ensuring that this never happens 

again. 

It has been a long, hard fight to get to this point. Especially in the early years of the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program, it was a struggle for the Committee to get the most basic 

information - or any information at all - about the program. 

The Committee's Study of the Detention and Interrogation Program is not just the story of the, 

brutal and ill-coneeived program itself. This Study is also the story of the breakdown in our 

system of governance that allowed the country to deviate, in such a significant way, from our 

core principles. 

One of the profound ways that breakdown happened was through the active subversion of 

meaningful congressional oversight - a theme mirrored in the Bush Administration's warrantless 

wiretapping program during the same period. 

As a matter of my own history with this issue, I first learned about some aspects of the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003, when I became Vice Chair of the Committee. At 

that point, and for years after, the CIA refused to provide me with additional information I 

requested about the program or share information regarding the program with the full 

Committee. The briefings I received provided little or no insight into the CIA's program. 

Questions or follow up requests were rejected, and at times I was not allowed to consult with my 

counsel or other members from my staff. 

It was clear that the briefings were not meant to answer my questions, but were intended only to 

provide cover for the Administration and the CIA. It was infuriating to realize that I was part of a 

box checking exercise the Bush Administration planned to use - and later did use - so they eould 

disingenuously claim that they had "fully briefed Congress." 

In the years that followed, I fought - and lost - many battles to obtain credible information about 

the Detention and Interrogation Program. As Vice Chair I tried to launch a comprehensive 

1 

UNCLASSIFIED 

500 
UNCLASSIFIED 

investigation into the program, but that effort was blocked. Later, in 2005, when I fought for 

access to over 100 specific documents cited in the Inspector General report, the CIA refused to 

cooperate. 

The first time the full Senate Intelligence Committee was given any information about the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program was September 2006. This was years after the program's 

inception, and the same day President Bush informed the public of the program's existence. 

The following year, when I became Chairman, the new Vice Chairman, Kit Bond, agreed with 

me to push for significant additional access to the program - including Senators' access to our 

staffs counsel on these matters. We finally prevailed and got this access, which enabled us to 

have much needed hearings on the program, and we did. As Chairman, I made sure we 

scrutinized it from every angle. However, the challenge of getting accurate information from the 

CIA persisted. 

In the same time period, I also sent two Committee staffers to begin reviewing cables at the CIA 

regarding the agency's interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri. I firmly believed we had 

to review those cables, which are now the only source of important historical information on this 

topic because the CIA destroyed its videotapes of the interrogation sessions. The CIA did this 

against the explicit direction of the White House and the Director of National Intelligence. 

The investigation I began in 2007 grew under Chairman Feinstein's dedication and tremendous 

leadership into a full study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The more the 

Committee dug, the more it found, and the results we uncovered are both shocking and deeply 

troubling. 

First, the Detention and Interrogation Program was conceived by people who were ignorant of 

the topic and made it up on the fly based on the untested theories of contractors who had never 

met a terrorist or conducted a real-world interrogation of any type. 

Second, it was executed by personnel with insufficient linguistic and interrogation training, and 

little if any real-world experience. 

Third, it was managed incompetently by senior officials who paid little or no attention to crucial 

details, and it was rife with troubling personal and financial conflicts of interest among the small 

group of CIA officials and contractors who promoted and defended it. 

Fourth, it was physically severe, far more so than any of us outside the CIA ever knew. 

Finally, its results were unclear at best, but it was presented to the White House, the Department 

of Justice, the Congress, and the media as a silver bullet that was indispensable to "saving lives." 

In fact, it did not provide the intelligence it was supposed to provide, or that CIA officials argued 

it provided. To be perfectly clear, these harsh techniques were not approved by anyone - ever -

for the low-bar standard of learning "useful information" from detainees. These techniques were 

approved because Bush Administration lawyers and officials were told, and believed, that these 

2 

UNCLASSIFIED 

501 
UNCLASSIFIED 

coercive interrogations were absolutely necessary to elicit intelligence that was unavailable by 

any other collection method and would save American lives. That was simply not the case. 

Nevertheless, for all of the misinformation, incompetence^ and brutality in the CIA's program, 

the Committee's Study is not, and must not be, simply a backward looking condemnation of past 

mistakes. The Study presents a tremendous opportunity to develop forward looking lessons that 

must be central to all future intelligence activities. 

The CIA developed the Detention and Interrogation Program in a time of great fear, anxiety and 

unprecedented crisis; but it is at these times of crisis when we need sound judgment, excellence, 

and professionalism from the CIA the most. When mistakes are made, they call for selfreflection and scrutiny. For that process to begin, we first have to make sure there is an accurate 

public record of what happened. The public release of the Executive Summary and Findings and 

Conclusions is a tremendous and consequential step toward that goal. 

For some I expect there will be a natural temptation to reject, cast doubt on, or rationalize parts 

of the Study that are disturbing or embarrassing. Indeed the CIA program's dramatic divergence 

from the standards that we hold ourselves to is hard to reconcile. However, we must fight that 

shortsighted temptation to wish away the gravity of what this Study has found. 

How we deal with this opportunity to learn, and improve, will reflect on the maturity of our 

democracy. As a country, we are strong enough to bear the weight of our mistakes, and as an 

institution, so is the CIA. We must confront this dark period in our recent history with honesty 

and critical introspection. We must draw lessons, and we must apply those lessons as we move 

forward. Although it may be uncomfortable at times, ultimately we will grow stronger, and we 

will ensure that this never happens again. 

3 

UNCLASSIFIED 

502 
UNCLASSIFIED 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN 

Having served in Congress for nearly thirty-five years, and having served on the 

Intelligence Committee for over thirteen, I can easily say that this report is among the most 

detailed and comprehensive that I have ever seen. In addition, the investigation that produced it 

has been one of the most thorough and diligent that Congress has conducted during my tenure. I 

am proud to have been able to support it, and I would like to thank the extremely dedicated and 

talented staff who worked incredibly hard to produce it in the face of significant obstacles. Also, 

I commend Chairman Feinstein, and her predecessor Senator Rockefeller, for their leadership on 

the issue of interrogations. 

However, I would be remiss if I let this opportunity go by without adding some brief 

additional thoughts that go beyond the scope of this report and touch on broader issues of secrecy 

and transparency. In my view certain aspects of the disturbing history surrounding coercive 

interrogations highlight broader problems faced by those who lead intelligence agencies, and 

those who oversee them. 

In particular, I have long been concerned about the problems posed by government 

officials' reliance on what is effectively secret law. As I have said before, when laws are 

secretly interpreted behind closed doors by a small number of government officials, without 

public scrutiny or debate, it dramatically increases the likelihood of government agencies taking 

actions that the American public would not support. 

Most Americans expect their government to gather information about genuine threats to 

national security and public safety, and they recognize that this information can sometimes be 

gathered more effectively when some details about how it is collected remain secret. But 

Americans also expect government agencies to operate at all times within the boundaries of 

publicly understood law. Americans in the 21st century don't expect their military and 

intelligence agencies to publish every single detail of their operations any more than they 

expected George Washington to publish his strategy for the Battle of Yorktown. But Americans 

absolutely expect that the law itself will not be secret - and as voters they have a need and a right 

to understand what government officials think the law actually means, so that they can decide 

whether particular laws need to be changed and ratify or reject decisions that their elected 

officials make on their behalf. . 

It is clear that a central problem with the CIA's secret detention and interrogation 

program was that it relied on secret interpretations of the law that went well beyond both the 

law's plain meaning and the public's understanding of what the law permitted. And this problem 

was unfortunately not confined to the CIA. During the same time period, the NSA relied on 

secret legal interpretations from the Department of Justice (and, later, the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Court) as the basis for a massive expansion of its domestic surveillance activities. 

Both history and common sense made it clear that these secret interpretations of the law would 

not stay secret forever, and the predictable result was a robust public backlash and an erosion of 

confidence in US intelligence agencies and in government more generally. 

UNCLASSIFIED 

503 
UNCLASSIFIED 

Another serious problem that can be seen in both the CIA interrogation case and the NSA 

surveillance case is the way that reliance on a secret body of law helped spawn a culture of 

misinformation, in which senior government officials repeatedly made inaccurate and misleading 

statements to the public and the press regarding intelligence agencies' authorities and activities 

In addition to misleading the public about how the law was being interpreted, these statements 

often inaccurately characterized the effectiveness of these controversial programs - much of 

what CIA officials said about the effectiveness of coercive interrogations was simply untrue. 

Beyond the problem of secret law, it is also clear that excessive secrecy within the 

government contributed to a troubling lack of oversight. This lack of oversight meant that bad 

decisions were not corrected, and shocking mistakes were often allowed to proliferate and be 

repeated. While some individual members of Congress and the executive branch pushed hard for 

more oversight of CIA interrogation activities, the argument that information about these 

programs needed to be kept tightly guarded even within the government was allowed to prevail. 

This is an argument that has been frequently been made when oversight bodies in 

Congress and the executive branch have attempted to learn more about potentially controversial 

secret programs. Intelligence officials will naturally tend to argue that it is necessary to limit 

access to information about sensitive intelligence collection methods to keep those methods from 

being publicly disclosed. If this imperative is not balanced against the need for informed and 

vigilant oversight of intelligence activities, then effective oversight can be stymied by excessive 

secrecy, leaving these agencies much more likely to make serious errors and repeat them. 

In the case of the CIA interrogation program, of course, the fact that this impulse toward 

secrecy was allowed to outweigh the need for robust, well-informed oversight is particularly 

egregious because CIA officials were at times providing information to the press (including 

information that was often inaccurate and misleading) at the same time that congressional 

requests for information were being stonewalled. It is an unfortunate fact that intelligence 

agencies' legitimate mandate for secrecy has often been used to hide programs and activities 

from people who might criticize them. 

Fortunately, the solution to these problems is straightforward, even if it isn't easy. 

Members of Congress and the executive branch must continually push for the information that 

they need to do their jobs, and intelligence officials must avoid taking actions that obstruct this 

important oversight. And everyone involved must remember that there is ultimately no 

substitute for oversight from the public itself, which is why all government agencies - even 

intelligence agencies - should constantly be pressed to make as much information available to 

the public as possible. Finally, everyone who values the legitimacy of our democratic 

institutions must remember that the government's understanding of laws, treaties and the 

Constitution shouldn't just be public when government officials find it convenient. This 

information should be public all the time, and every American should be able to find out what 

their government thinks the law means. 

- 2 -

UNCLASSIFIED 

504 
UNCLASSIFIED 

The vast majority of the men and women who work at America's intelligence agencies 

are overwhelmingly dedicated professionals who make enormous sacrifices to help keep our 

country safe and free, and they should be able to do their jobs secure in the knowledge that they 

have the confidence of the American people. By remembering these principles and working hard 

to adhere to them, I believe that those of us who are lucky enough to serve in government can 

ensure the protection of both American security and American values, and give these men and 

women the confidence that they deserve. 

-3-

UNCLASSIFIED 

505 
UNCLASSIFIED 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SEN. UDALL OF COLORADO 

June 9,2014 

This summary of the Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program is over five years in the 

making and highlights the key facts and findings in the much more comprehensive, nearly 6700-page 

report that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence voted to initiate in 2009. This Study has been 

rightly called one of the most significant examples of oversight in the history of the U.S. Senate. It is 

based on a documentary review of more than 6 million pages of CIA and other records, and raises critical 

questions about intelligence operations and oversight, many of which remain highly relevant today. 

The Committee's Study details the numerous flaws in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program. Among them: It was allowed to be shaped and conducted by individuals who didn't understand 

what they were doing and who had a financial stake in representing the program as effective. It was run 

by personnel with insufficient training. It was managed incompetently by senior CIA personnel. The 

"enhanced interrogation techniques" were far more brutal than anyone understood. Perhaps most 

importantly, these techniques did not work. Nonetheless, the program was sold to the White House, the 

Department of Justice, the Congress, and the media as a necessary program that provided unique 

information that "saved lives." 

The significance of the Committee Study lies in the words written in its pages. But the history of the 

Study itself is also an important story that needs to be told. 

Chairman Feinstein, who has shouldered the greatest responsibility and deserves the greatest credit for 

seeing this project to completion, and former Chairman Rockefeller, who served as the Committee's 

ranking member and then Chairman during the time when the CIA was conducting its program, are best 

able to speak to the earliest days of the Study and the events that led the Committee to undertake this 

enormous task. And after five years of courageous leadership in pushing this Study forward, navigating 

partisan rancor and CIA obstacles. Chairman Feinstein can certainly speak most authoritatively to all the 

twist and turns on the road to the Study's release. 

But as a newer member of the Committee, I also have a perspective to share. And I believe that the 

history of the CIA's program isn't complete without a full telling of the events that came after the 

program ended, to include this Committee's efforts - and mine - to complete and declassify the Study of 

the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. 

As a new member on the Committee in 2011,1 was briefed on the origins and status of the Study and 

began reading early drafts and discussing the way forward with Committee colleagues. I had always 

believed that the CIA's program - with its "enhanced interrogation techniques," renditions, and black 

sites - was a stain on our country's recent past. But I was deeply disturbed to learn specifics about the 

flaws in the program, the misrepresentations, the brutality. During this time, I also learned about the 

dedicated Committee staff who were working every day and late into the nights at the CIA-leased off-site , 

facility, where they sifted through millions of CIA records, and in our Committee spaces in the Senate, 

where they continued to write the thousands of pages that would become the first comprehensive review 

of the CIA's program. 

UNCLASSIFIED 

506 
UNCLASSIFIED 

By late 2012, the Study was largely complete. In December 2012,1 supported the Chairman and other 

Committee colleagues in voting to approve the Study, which we then provided to the White House and 

Executive Branch agencies for "review and comment." The CIA took over six months to produce its 

comments on the Study, during which time I and other Committee members repeatedly requested that 

CIA personnel meet with Committee staff to discuss the report. The CIA declined all requests to meet 

with its oversight committee on this matter. 

In January 2013, President Obama nominated John Brennan to serve as the next CIA director. I hoped 

that as a career CIA officer, Brennan would understand the opportunity before him to lead the Agency in 

correcting the false record that the Committee's Study uncovered and instituting the necessary reforms to 

restore the CIA's reputation for integrity and analytical rigor. During his nomination hearing, I stressed to 

Mr. Brennan that this Study isn't just about the past. Acknowledging the flaws of this program is 

essential for the CIA's long-term institutional integrity - as well as for the legitimacy of ongoing sensitive 

programs. The findings of this Study directly relate to how other CIA programs are managed today. The 

CIA cannot be its best unless it faces the serious and grievous mistakes of this program - to include the 

false representations made to policymakers and others - to ensure these mistakes never happen again. 

I also expressed my belief to Mr. Brennan that the government has an obligation to the American people 

to face its mistakes transparently, help the public understand the nature of those mistakes, and correct 

them. I asked him whether he believes the CIA has a responsibility to correct any inaccurate information 

that was provided to the previous White House, the Department of Justice, Congress, and the public 

regarding the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Mr. Brennan said yes. 

Mr. Brennan has yet to make any corrections to the public record. Instead, the CIA engaged in efforts to 

obstruct and undermine the Committee's oversight efforts. In spring 2013, as the CIA prepared its 

comments on the Study, we heard through the public statements of unnamed current intelligence officials 

and named former officials - those who have a clear stake in preserving the myth of the program's value 

- that the CIA was highly critical of the Committee's report, believing it to be "political" and "biased." 

In May 2013, still awaiting the CIA's promised response to the Committee Study, I wrote to President 

Obama, underlining the importance of correcting the public record if it was determined that inaccurate 

information had been conveyed to the American people by the U.S. ,government and urging a swift 

response from the CIA to the Committee Study. I received no reply. 

On June 27, 2013, the CIA finally submitted its 122-page formal response to the Committee, though it 

was not the correction of the record that many of us hoped it would be. Instead, a CIA spokesman said 

that although the Agency "agrees with a number of the study's findings," the Study contained "significant 

errors." A White House spokeswoman noted "factual questions" about the Study. But the CIA only 

identified one factual error in its response - and it was one that had no impact on the report and was 

quickly corrected. More worrisome, the CIA continued to cling to false narratives about the effectiveness 

of the program in its written response - only admitting to the factual errors in its own response in 

meetings with Committee staff. The Committee requested that the CIA resubmit a written response 

reflecting corrections to the errors that the CIA acknowledged in meetings, but the CIA submitted no 

revised response, As such, the last document the CIA submitted to the Committee on this program 

continues to be riddled with factual errors and misstatements. 

) 

In July 2013, as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I attended the nomination hearing of 

Stephen Preston - then CIA General Counsel - to be General Counsel at the Department of Defense. His 

UNCLASSIFIED 

507 
UNCLASSIFIED 

answers to questions regarding his role in and support of the CIA's June 27, 2013, response concerned me 

enough that I asked him to answer additional questions for the hearing record. His answers to my 

additional questions contrasted with statements provided by the CIA in its response to the Committee 

Study, admitting that the CIA's efforts 'fell well short" of current standards for providing information to 

its oversight committees, as is required by law; that CIA briefings to the Committee included "inaccurate 

information"; that the CIA's efforts had again fallen "well short of our current practices when it comes to 

providing information relevant to [the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel's legal analysis"; 

and that by reviewing the CIA's records, it would be possible to determine whether information provided 

after the use of brutal interrogation techniques had already been obtained from other sources, something 

the CIA continued to officially claim was "unknowable." 

But Stephen Preston wasn't the only CIA official to disagree with the standard CIA narrative on its 

detention and interrogation program. As I discovered in late 2013, an internal CIA review of the program 

initiated under former Director Panetta corroborates some of the significant findings of the Study and 

acknowledges significant errors made during the course of the CIA's program - but this internal review 

conflicts with the CIA's own official response provided to the Committee, which denies or minimizes 

those same errors. 

As Chairman Feinstein so eloquently outlined in her floor speech on March 11,2014, drafts of the socalled Panetta review had been provided to Committee staff years before - apparently unknowingly or 

mistakenly by the CIA. When the disparity between its conclusions and the CIA's June 27, 2013, 

response to the Committee became clear, Committee staff grew concerned that the CIA was knowingly 

providing inaccurate information to the Committee in the present day - which would be a serious offense 

and a deeply troubling matter for this Committee, the Congress, the White House, and our country. To 

preserve evidence of this potential offense. Committee staff securely transported a printed portion of the 

draft Panetta review from the CIA-leased facility to the Committee's secure offices in the Senate. 

At the December 2013 nomination hearing of Caroline Krass - who was slated to replace Preston as the 

CIA's top lawyer - 1 asked Ms. Krass to ensure that a final copy of this review would be made available 

to the Committee, since it raised fundamental questions about why a review the CIA conducted internally 

years ago - and never provided to the Committee - is so different from the CIA's formal written response 

and from the many public statements of unnamed and former CIA officials. Chairman Feinstein had 

made the same request in an earlier letter. Although the Committee had a draft of the review already in its 

possession, I believed then - as I do now - that it was important to make public the existence of this 

internal document and its conclusions and to obtain a final version. 

In early January 2014,1 wrote a letter to President Obama reiterating my request that the final draft of the 

Panetta review be provided to the Committee. The CIA needed to reconcile the fact that it agreed with the 

Committee behind closed doors with its continued CIA criticisms of the Study in public. But instead of 

coming clean, the Agency chose to double down on its denials. 

In early March 2014,1 wrote another letter to President Obama, restating my interest in the final Panetta 

review. In that letter, I also alluded to "unprecedented action" that the CIA had recently taken against the 

Committee, calling it "incredibly troubling for the Committee's oversight responsibilities and for our 

democracy." As news reports made clear on March 4, 2014, and Chairman Feinstein explained further in 

her March 11, 2014, speech, that action was the CIA's unauthorized search of the Committee's computers 

at the off-site facility - a search conducted out of concern that Committee staff already had access to the 

Panetta review, a document they were fully cleared to see. More troubling, despite admitting to the 

UNCLASSIFIED 

508 
UNCLASSIFIED 

Committee that the CIA conducted the search, Director Brennan publicly referred to "spurious allegations 

about CIA actions that are wholly unsupported by the facts." 

The CIA never asked the Committee whether or how it had access to the review conducted under Director 

Panetta. Instead, without notifying the Committee, the CIA searched the Committee computers that the 

agency had agreed were off limits, and in the process, the CIA may have violated multiple provisions of 

the Constitution (including both the Speech and Debate Clause and the Fourth Amendment) as well as 

federal criminal statutes and Executive Order 12333. Director Brennan declined to respond to further 

questions about the CIA's actions to the Committee, and instead, the CIA's acting general counsel - who 

was involved in the 2005 decision to destroy the CIA's interrogation videotapes - filed a crimes report 

with the Department of Justice about the Committee staffs actions to preserve the Panetta review 

documents. The CIA's Inspector General also referred the CIA search to the Department of Justice, and 

the Senate Sergeant at Arms continues to conduct a forensic review of the Committee's computers. 

The matter of the Panetta Review remains unresolved, but serves to emphasize the fact that the CIA is 

unwilling or unable to submit itself to honest and transparent oversight by the Congress. The agency not 

only hasn't learned from its mistakes of the past, but continues to perpetuate them. 

Meanwhile, even as the threat of criminal prosecution and inquiry persisted, Committee staff continued to 

work at the direction of the Members in preparing the Committee Study for declassification and 

release. After months spent incorporating comments from the CIA's June 27,2013, response - to ensure 

that the CIA's views on the Study's findings were represented - Committee staff completed a revised 

Committee Study that grew from 6,300 pages to nearly 6,700 pages. On April 3, 2014, in a bipartisan 11 

- 3 vote, the Committee moved to submit for declassification the nearly 500-page Executive Summary 

and 20 findings and conclusions of the Committee Study on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program. 

This was a proud day for the Committee - for the Chairman who led this vital effort, for other members 

who worked alongside her, and for Committee staff, who put their lives on hold for years while 

completing this seminal work. This was also a proud day for the American people - who deserve to 

understand this dark chapter in our history and why it is still relevant today. 

The American people also deserve to read as much of this history as possible. That is why the Chairman 

and I and many of our colleagues called repeatedly for the fullest possible declassification of the 

Executive Summary and the Study's findings and conclusions, with only redactions as necessary for real 

national security concerns, not to avoid embarrassment. The American people deserve a proper and 

accurate accounting of the history, management, operation, and effectiveness of this program - and they 

have the right to know what the government has done on their behalf. It is my hope that we can soon 

release not just the Executive Summary, but the entire 6,700 pages of the Committee's Study, for the 

American people. 

UNCLASSIFIED 

509 
UNCLASSIFIED 

Additional Views of Senator Heinrich 

In January 2009, President Obama signed Executive Order 13491, limiting 

interrogations by any American personnel to the guidelines in the Army Field 

Manual, and reinforcing the commitment that prisoners in U.S. custody are entitled 

to rights under the Geneva Conventions. This officially ended a dark period in 

American history that, in reality, had already effectively collapsed under the 

weight of poor policy decisions, ineffectiveness, bad management, and public 

disclosures. 

I came to this Committee believing that the press accounts and books I read had 

adequately prepared me for what took place in this program. I was wrong. 

Compounding this is the fact that my ignorance was not unique: the CIA 

deliberately kept the vast majority of the Senate and House Intelligence 

Committees in the dark until the day the president revealed the detention and 

interrogation program to the world in 2006 - four years after it began. 

Even then, misrepresentations to the Committee about the effectiveness of the 

CIA's detention and interrogation program continued, in large part because the 

CIA had never performed any comprehensive review of the effectiveness of the 

program or the actions of its officers. Myths of the "effectiveness" of torture have 

been repeated in the press, perpetrating the fable that this was a necessary program 

that "saved lives." My hope is this meticulously detailed, near 7,000-page 

Committee study finally puts those lies to rest. 

Those who were responsible for the CIA's detention and interrogation program 

will continue to exploit public ignorance of what took place in the program to 

argue that the study is one-sided or biased, or that it lacks important details or 

context. In the course of their efforts, they will misrepresent what is or is not in the 

study, while selectively picking through the executive summary in an effort to 

support their arguments. 

However, the full study contains far more information and detail than could ever 

be captured in an executive summary. That is why I firmly believe the release of 

the executive summary should not be the last step in this process, but the first. It is 

my hope that someday soon there will be a public release of the full Committee 

study. If this deplorable chapter is to truly be closed and relegated to history, the 

full study should be declassified and released. The president has that authority, 

and I hope he will exercise it. 

UNCLASSIFIED 

510 
UNCLASSIFIED 

This study represents years of hard work by Members and staff who faced a 

number of obstacles in completing the work: the CIA taking years to dump 

millions of unsorted documents in a massive database while resisting requests for 

additional information; the executive branch withholding thousands of pages of 

documents from the Committee; and current and former officials anonymously 

misrepresenting the contents and the findings of the study in the press. The list 

could go on. The fact that this study was finished is a testament to the dedication 

of Chairmen Rockefeller and Feinstein in deciding that oversight is worth it, 

regardless of how long it takes. 

This is an objective and fact-based study. It is a fair study. And it is the only 

comprehensive study conducted of this program and the CIA's treatment of its 

detainees in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. 

The reality is that the president's signature on Executive Order 13491 is only valid 

until the next national crisis emerges and moves a well-meaning, but misguided 

president to rescind the order. It is worth remembering that years before this 

detention and interrogation program even began, the CIA had sworn off the harsh 

interrogations of its past; but in the wake of the terrorist attacks against the United 

States, it repeated those mistakes by once again engaging in brutal interrogations 

Uiat undermined our nation's credibility on the issue of human rights, produced 

information of uneven - and often questionable - value, and wasted millions of 

taxpayer dollars. 

This study should serve as a warning to those who would make similar choices in 

the future: torture doesn't work. It is therefore my hope that Members of Congress 

will read this study and join me in the conclusion that we must never let this 

happen again. We need to shut the door on abusive interrogations completely 

through legislative action that leaves no loopholes, and no room for interpretation. 

UNCLASSIFIED 

511 
UNCLASSIFIED 

SECRET 

Additional Views of Senator King 

(U) I joined the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in January 2013, approximately 

four years after President Obama issued an Executive Order to end the detention and 

interrogation program of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). As such, I was not involved in 

the inception and initial stages of the committee's review of the program. After carefully reading 

this study's lengthy executive summary, the CIA's response, and other relevant documents, it is 

clear to me that some detainees were subjected to techniques that constituted torture. Such 

brutality is unacceptable, and the misconduct on the part of some of the individuals involved in 

the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, which is documented in the study, is inexplicable. 

Based upon this review, it appears to me that the enhanced interrogation techniques were not 

effective in producing the type of unique and reliable information claimed by the agency's 

leadership, and should never again be employed by our government. 

(U) In the course of conducting vigorous oversight with respect to this program, it is also 

important to bear in mind several points. First, in the wake of the September 2001 attacks, our 

government was inundated with endless leads to track down. There was genuine fear and 

uncertainty about follow-on strikes, which may explain, but not excuse, the actions that are the 

subject of this study. Second, we live in a dangerous world with all-to-real enemies and I believe 

firmly that intelligence is our nation's first line of defense against terrorism. As such, the CIA 

and other intelligence agencies are vital to keeping us safe and the disturbing nature of the 

study's findings should not be used to undermine our overall intelligence enterprise. Lastly, it 

should be understood that those responsible for the mismanagement and misconduct associated 

with the detention and interrogation program are not representative of the many dedicated 

professionals serving our nation, often in anonymity, at the CIA. Having met with many CIA 

officers, I have great respect for their intellect, dedication, courage, and sacrifice. 

(U) Despite the unquestionable professionalism of the vast majority of CIA personnel, 

the study demonstrates that the detention and interrogation program was mismanaged, that some 

within the leadership of the CIA actively impeded congressional oversight, and that agency 

officials misrepresented the program's effectiveness. 

•^SjrThe study finds that CIA headquarters failed to keep accurate records on those it 

detained and placed individuals with limited experience in senior detention and interrogation 

roles. Even after a detainee died of hypothermia at a detention facility in November 2002, many 

of these practices continued without adequate oversight. In its response to the study, the CIA 

states that delegating management of this particular facility to a junior officer "was not a prudent 

managerial decision given the risks inherent in the program."' It is difficult to imagine a greater 

understatement of what occurred. More accurately, in the words of one of the CIA's senior 

interrogators, the program was "a train wreak [sic] waiting to happen."2 

1

 Central Intelligence Agency's Response to the SSCI's Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, 

June 27, 2013, Response to Conclusion 15, p. 42. 

2

 SSCI Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, April 3,2014, Executive Summary, p. 68. 

SECRET 

Page 1 of 3 

UNCLASSIFIED 

512 
UNCLASSIFIED 

SECRET 

(U) Of the many examples of impeding congressional oversight documented in the study, 

none is more striking than the decision by CIA leaders to destroy videotapes of CIA 

interrogations out of a concern that Congress might discover evidence of misconduct and 

brutality. There is no excuse for this decision and those involved should no longer be associated 

with the CIA or the United States government. 

^•Most significantly, the study finds that the CIA's justification for the use of enhanced 

interrogation techniques rested on inaccurate claims of their effectiveness. In its official 

response to die study, the CIA contradicts many of its previous claims of unqualified 

effectiveness by arguing that it is now "unknowable" whether the same information could have 

been acquired without the use of enhanced interrogation techniques and further contends that its 

past assertions were "sincerely believed but inherently speculative."3 Yet in the long and 

unfortunate history of this program, no one in the CIA's leadership expressed such an equivocal 

view of the techniques' effecdveness. What was once certain is now "unknowable;" this 

migration of rationales underlines forme the magnitude of the prior misrepresentations. 

I have to assume that in many cases the representations of effectiveness were believed 

by the individuals who made them. However, the CIA also admits in its response that it never 

attempted to develop a "more sustained, systematic, and independent means by which to evaluate 

the effectiveness of the approaches used with detainees."4 It states further that its reviews of the 

program's effectiveness were "heavily reliant on the views of the practitioners" - including the 

contract psychologists who designed and executed the techniques. 

(U) If such a sustained, systematic, and independent evaluation was impractical, as the 

CIA now claims, then it follows that the CIA's assertions about the effectiveness of such 

techniques were largely guesswork. In the end, policymakers based their decisions about a 

program so at variance with our past practices and values on anecdotal information, rather than 

on a verifiable process. This, in my opinion, is among the seminal failings of the program and 

the CIA's leadership during this period. 

(U) Finally, I am deeply disturbed by the implications of the study for the committee's 

ability to discharge its oversight responsibility. The core of the oversight function rests in large 

part upon the interaction of our committee with representatives of the various intelligence 

agencies, most particularly the CIA. Because it appears from the study that the committee was 

continuously misled as to virtually all aspects of this program, it naturally raises the extremely 

troubling question as to whether we can trust the representations of the agency in connection 

with difficult or sensitive issues in the future. If our principal oversight approach is based on 

frank and open communication with the CIA's leadership, and we cannot fully rely upon the 

answers we receive, then the entire oversight function is compromised. 

3

 Central Intelligence Agency's Response to the SSCI's Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, 

June 27, 2013, Response to Conclusion 9, p. 23. 

4

 Central Intelligence Agency's Response to the SSCI's Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, 

June 27, 2013, Response to Conclusion 10, p. 24. 

5

 Central Intelligence Agency's Response to the SSCI's Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, 

June 27, 2013, Response to Conclusion 10, p. 25. 

SECRET 

Page 2 of 3 

UNCLASSIFIED 

513 
UNCLASSIFIED 

SECRET 

(U) As a committee, we should discuss this matter to determine if additional steps may be 

necessary to ensure that we are getting accurate information. I.believe that our solemn 

responsibility to provide vigilant legislative oversight over the intelligence activities of the 

United States requires serious consideration of this problem. 

(U) I agree with my colleagues in the minority who note that the Department of Justice's 

decision to begin a criminal investigation in 2009 prevented the committee from conducting 

most interviews and required the study to rely mainly on documents provided by the CIA. I am 

also disappointed that the study could not utilize the expertise of the minority through a joint 

review, as has been the committee's practice. While I believe the study is accurate, this is a 

fundamental lesson that will inform my approach to the committee's work in the years ahead. 

(U) In conclusion, upon joining the committee in 2013 I endeavored to undertake a 

thorough review of the study, the CIA's response, and other relevant documentation. I also 

discussed this matter with Democrats and Republicans on the committee, the staff members 

involved in writing the study and the minority staff, the CIA personnel who drafted the agency's 

response, a former senior military interrogator, current CIA officers bravely serving our nation in 

harm's way, a former top FBI official, and numerous Maine people - including human rights 

experts and leaders of the religious community. 

(U) Based upon this review, I voted to approve declassification of the study because I 

believe our nation's reputation as a beacon of openness, democratic values, human rights, and 

adherence to the rule of law is at stake. Our credibility - and ultimately our influence - in the 

world is dependent upon this reputation, and it is our obligation to admit when we fail to meet 

America's high standards. I believe we can protect intelligence sources and methods and still 

declassify a significant portion of the study to accomplish this goal. 

(U) As then Secretary of State Colin Powell said in 2004, following the scandals at Abu 

Ghraib prison, 

"Watch America. Watch how we deal with this. Watch how America will do the 

right thing. Watch what a nation of values and character, a nation that believes in 

justice, does to right this kind of wrong. Watch how a nation such as ours will not 

tolerate such actions."6 

(U) In the last analysis, America's real power is based upon our values and how we put 

those values into practice. As with any individual - or great nation - we will occasionally 

stumble, but when we do, we acknowledge our failings - as we have in this case - and move on, 

true to ourselves and to the better angels of our nature. 

6

 Powell, Colin. "Commencement Address." Wake Forest University. 17 May 2004. 

•SECRET 

Page 3 of 3 

UNCLASSIFIED 

514 
UNCLASSIFIED 

QFORN 

Additional Views of Senator Collins 

(U) The use of torture is deplorable and is completely contrary to our values as 

Americans. For as long as I have served in the Senate, I have cast votes in opposition to torture 

and inhuman treatment of detainees. I cosponsored and voted in favor of Senator John McCain's 

Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which banned "cruel, inhuman, and degrading" treatment of 

any prisoner in the custody of any U.S. government agency, and I supported the Military 

Commissions Act of 2006, which bolstered the Detainee Treatment Act's prohibition on abusive 

interrogations. 

(U) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) Review of the Central 

Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) Detention and Interrogation Program devotes much of its report 

to supporting its judgment that enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs) were ineffective in 

acquiring intelligence. While I agree with the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) current 

position that it is "unknowable" whether or not its "enhanced interrogation techniques" elicited 

significant intelligence that would not otherwise have been obtained, the fact remains that torture 

is wrong. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment 

or Punishment, which the United States ratified in 1994, is clear: "No exceptional circumstances 

whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other 

public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture." 

(U) The method by which the SSCI report was produced was unfortunate, to say the 

least, and will cause many to question its findings. In my years of service on the traditionally 

bipartisan Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC), die Senate's 

chief oversight committee, the congressional reports I have coauthored have almost always been 

the result of collaborative, bipartisan investigations. Indeed, even a subject as controversial as 

the treatment of detainees can lead to the production of a strong bipartisan report, as 

demonstrated by the Senate Armed Services Committee's Inquiry into the Treatment of 

Detainees in U.S. Custody drafted by Chairman Carl Levin and Ranking Member John McCain 

and approved by voice vote in November 2008. When I joined the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence in January 2013,1 was disappointed to learn that the Committee's investigation into 

the CIA's Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation (RDI) program had not been conducted in a 

similarly bipartisan manner. 

(U) Since joining the Committee, I have sought to compensate for this missed 

opportunity and have encouraged greater dialogue among the CIA and the majority and minority 

Committee staff members, and extensive conversations have indeed occurred. Following the 

delivery of the CIA's feedback to the Committee's report in June 2013,1 asked that we hold a 

hearing prior to a vote to declassify this report that would have included CIA witnesses. Such a 

hearing would have permitted a robust and much-needed debate about the claims made in the 

report compared to the rebuttals in the Agency's formal response. Unfortunately, this hearing 

did not occur. 

(U) In the absence of a formal Committee hearing, I was briefed directly by veteran, 

career CIA analysts who provided feedback on the report's factual accuracy and analytic quality. 

Two Senators from both sides of the aisle joined me in this worthwhile briefing. 

TOPSECRET IOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

515 
UNCLASSIFIED 

m i 11 IIII i MHBHM 1'

1

""'"'i " 

Page 2 of 5 

(U) I also sought to improve the report by recommending revisions and greater precision 

in the Review's Findings & Conclusions, and I appreciate Chairman Feinstein incorporating 

some of my edits. 

(U) In addition to the partisan nature of the staff investigation, the report has significant 

intrinsic limitations because it did not involve direct interviews of CIA officials, contract 

personnel, or other Executive branch personnel. John Rizzo, one of the chief architects of the 

program, has stated publicly that he would have been happy to be interviewed, and he said a 

number of his colleagues would have as well. The absence of interviews significantly eroded the 

bipartisan cooperation that existed when the SSCI Review began and calls into question some of 

the report's analysis. 

(U) The lack of interviews violated the Committee's bipartisan Terms of Reference that 

were approved by an overwhelming 14-1 vote in March 2009. The Terms of Reference describe 

the purpose, scope, and methodology of the Review, and they include the following statement: 

"The Committee will use the tools of oversight necessary to complete a thorough review 

including, but not limited to, document reviews and requests, interviews, testimony at closed and 

open hearings, as appropriate, and preparation of findings and recommendations." Yet, there 

were no interviews, no hearings, and no recommendations. By comparison, the SASC's 2008 

Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody included 70 interviews, written 

responses from more than 200 individuals in response to written questions, two hearings, and at 

least two subpoenas. 

(U) Documents never tell the full story and lack context. As the former Chairman or 

Ranking Member of the Senate's chief investigative committee for ten years, I found that 

interviews were always key sources of information for every investigation our Homeland 

Security Committee conducted. In the 2012 HSGAC investigation into the attacks in Benghazi, 

for example, we discovered one of our most alarming findings in a discussion with the 

Commander of U.S. Africa Command, General Carter Ham. We learned that he was unaware of 

the presence of CIA officers in Benghazi, despite the fact that his Command had responsibility to 

prepare for the evacuation of U.S. government personnel. 

(U) The bipartisan Terms of Reference also called for the production of policy 

recommendations, but not one is included in the Review's Findings & Conclusions or its 

Executive Summary. Ironically, it was the CIA, rather than the Committee, that first developed 

recommendations to address the mismanagement, misconduct, and flawed performance that 

characterized too much of the CIA's Detention & Interrogation program. I have identified 

several recommendations that should be implemented as soon as possible. 

(U) Despite these significant flaws, the report's findings lead me to conclude that some 

detainees were subject to techniques that constituted torture. This inhumane and brutal treatment 

never should have occurred. 

-The Review also raises serious concerns about the CIA's 

management of this program. I particularly agree with its conclusions that the CIA was not 

prepared to conduct the RDI program, that the CIA failed to conduct a comprehensive evaluation 

^meeR&idm^mRN -

UNCLASSIFIED 

516 
UNCUSSIRED 

i ni ' 111111 I|M M 

Page 3 of 5 

of the effectiveness of the use of EITs, that the CIA rarely held officers accountable for 

misconduct and mismanagement related to the RDI program, and that the CIA allowed a conflict 

of interest to exist among contractors responsible for too much of the RDI program. Is there any 

function that could be more inherently governmental than the questioning of high-level al Qaeda 

detainees in CIA custody? Yet, the CIA relied heavily on contractors for its RDI program and 

even had contractors evaluate the program. 

(U) The Review's most significant finding deals with the ineffectiveness of EITs in 

collecting valuable intelligence. As a Senator who strongly opposes torture, I would have 

welcomed a well-documented finding that reached this judgment. Unfortunately, the evidence 

cited does not sustain the Review's categorical judgment that EITs were ineffective at acquiring 

valuable intelligence. 

(U) For example, the Review concedes that some detainees were subject to EITs so soon 

after their capture that it is impossible to determine whether the information they provided could 

have been obtained through non-coercive debriefing methods. Here the report gets it right: there 

is no way to know what information these particular detainees would have provided without the 

use of EITs because the detainees were not afforded that opportunity for very long. Yet, the 

report draws a different and much more definitive conclusion: EITs were categorically 

ineffective at acquiring valuable intelligence. 

It is also striking to me that two highly experienced public 

servants who are both widely respected for their integrity and impartiality, examined the program 

at two different times, independently of each other, and they both rendered the same verdict 

regarding the effajtivenesyi^IT^r^O^^ ^ Leon Panetta, and in 2005, a 

took we 

simply can never know for sure if the information obtained from detainees who were subjected 

to EITs would have been obtained through other non-coercive means. 

A letter from then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta to 

Senator John McCain sums up his conclusion on the effectiveness of EITs with respect to the 

Osama bin Laden raid: "Some of the detainees who provided useful information about the 

facilitator/courier's role had been subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques. Whether those 

techniques were the 'only timely and effective way' to obtain such information is a matter of 

debate an^mnoyj^stablished definitively." According to the Review's own Executive 

Summary^^^H^sai d the following about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques: "here enters the epistemological problem. We can never know whether 

or not this intelligence could have been extracted though alternative procedures." 

(U) It bears repeating that torture need not be ineffective to be wrong. The United States 

correctly answered the question of whether torture should be prohibited when our nation ratified 

the Convention against Torture in 1994. The prohibition against torture in both U.S. law and 

international law is not based on an evaluation of its efficacy at eliciting information. Rather, the 

prohibition was put in place because torture is immoral and contrary to our values. 

TOP SECRET^ HOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

517 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRIffi^JUJ^NefORN -

Page 4 of 5 

<U) There are three findings about the RDI program that warrant attention because they 

provide important perspective and context about the CIA program. 

(U) First, even as the mistreatment of detainees was occurring, senior CIA officials 

repeatedly sought legal approval from the Department of Justice (DOJ) in an effort to make sure 

each the EITs employed by CIA officers did not constitute torture. For example, the CIA 

suspended the program and/or sought legal approval prior to conducting EITs on Abu Zabaydah 

and several times afterwards: in 2004 after a new attorney in DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel 

(OLC), Jack Goldsmith, said the Department had never formally opined on whether EITs met 

constitutional standards, in 2005 when another attorney in OLC assessed OLC had not provided 

a substantive ruling on whether certain EITs violated portions of the Convention Against 

Torture, after passage of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, and after the Supreme Court's 

decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and the passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006. 

(U) Second, the problems of the detention program were frequently whole-ofgovernment failures, not just CIA's alone. Legal opinions issued by OLC are almost never 

withdrawn, especially by the same Administration that issued them. Yet, that is exactly what 

happened in this case. Why was the original legal analysis by the Department of Justice so 

inadequate regarding such an important issue? CIA should not have made definitive claims 

about the effectiveness of EITs, but independent of the material facts represented by CIA, the 

withdrawal of the original August 1, 2002, OLC classified legal analysis demonstrated that it was 

too flawed and lacked the legal rigor necessary to serve as the basis for a controversial and 

questionable program. 

fFS^H^^I^^Bftti B Third, the Review's Findings & Conclusions understate the 

degree to which the U.S. Government failed to focus on an end game for CIA detainees in the 

program by not moving them to military installations, even as the CIA repeatedly sought to move 

the detainees out of its custody in 2005 after many had ceased producing valuable intelligence. 

(U) Ih the absence of recommendations in the SSCI's report, I believe four actions 

should be taken to prevent the terrible mistakes in the CIA's RDI program from ever happening 

again. 

(1) Outlaw waterboarding of detainees once and for all. President Obama implemented 

this policy when he took office by signing Executive Order 13491, which requires all 

government agencies, not just the Department of Defense, to adhere to the techniques 

in the Army Field Manual 2-22.3. Codifying this prohibition would make this 

restriction even more explicit than the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. I voted in 

favor of the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization Act in February 2008, which 

would have restricted the interrogation techniques employed by CIA personnel to 

only those covered in the Army Field Manual. Unfortunately, tihis legislation was 

vetoed on March 8,2008. 

(2) Reduce the number of programs now shared exclusively with the Gang of Eight, 

which consists of the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the intelligence committees 

and the leadership of both chambers of Congress, so more member of the oversight 

TOP SECILETJ^^^JJ'NEEQFTN -

UNCLASSIFIED 

518 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET iQFQMN 

Page 5 of 5 

committees have access to significant information. Congress was informed about the 

RDI program to the bare minimum required by the National Security Act and no 

further. Most members of the intelligence committees, not to mention the rest of 

Congress, officially learned about the program on the same day President Bush 

announced it to the world in September 2006. In this case, adherence to the letter of 

the law rather than the spirit of the law resulted in insufficient oversight. As former 

CIA attorney John Rizzo has said: 

The decision in 2002 to limit congressional knowledge of the EITs to the 

Gang of 8 and to stick to that position for four long years—as the prevailing 

political winds were increasingly howling in the other direction—was foolish 

' feckless.. .For our part, we in the CIA leadership should have insisted at 

the outset that all members of the intelligence committees be apprised of all 

the gory details all along the way, on the record, in closed congressional 

proceedings. 

(3) Strengthen the review process at the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Legal 

Counsel (OLC) for legal opinions concerning sensitive intelligence activities. The 

Intelligence Community (IC) requires and deserves to have confidence that OLC can 

produce valid, durable legal analysis upon which it can rely. At the same time, the IC 

needs to inform OLC if material facts related to sensitive programs that have 

previously been reviewed have changed. 

(4) Improve CIA controls in the management of covert action. The unauthorized use of 

EITs beyond those approved by DOJ OLC, along with the many shortcomings in 

CIA's management of the RDI program, require CIA to implement greater and more 

detailed controls regarding sensitive programs. 

(U) My vote to declassify this report does not signal my endorsement of all of its 

conclusions or its methodology. I do believe, however, that the Executive Summary, and 

Additional and Minority Views, and the CIA's rebuttal should be made public with appropriate 

redactions so the American public can reach their own conclusions about the conduct of this 

program. In my judgment, the "enhanced interrogation techniques" led, in some instances, to 

inhumane and brutal treatment of certain individuals held by the United States government. 

fOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

519 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

MINORITY VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN CHAMBLISS, 

SENATORS BURR, RISCH, COATS, RUBIO, AND COBURN* 

June 20, 2014 

{(Revised for Redaction on Decembers, 2014]]* 

* When these minority views were initially written in response to the original Study approved by the United States 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on December 13, 2012, the following members of the Committee signed on 

to them: Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Blunt, and Rubio, 

' [(Please note that the double-bracketed text in this document is new explanatory text necessitated by substantive 

modifications to die Study's Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions that were made after our June 20, 

2014, Minority Views were submitted to the Central Intelligence Agency for the declassification review. We also 

note that these Minority Views are in response to, and at points predicated upon, the research and foundational work 

that underlie the Study's account of the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. These Views should not be 

treated as an independent report based upon a separate investigation, but rather our evaluation and critique of the 

Study's problematic analysis, factual findings, and conclusions.]] 

7NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

520 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I 

(U) INTRODUCTION 1 

(U) THE STUDY'S FLAWED PROCESS 2 

(U) Failure to Interview Witnesses 3 

(U) Insufficient Member Review of the Approved Study 5 

(U) Insufficient Initial Fact Checking 6 

(U) The CIA Response 7 

(U) The Summer Meetings 8 

(U) The Clash Over the Panetta Review 9 

(U) The Declassification Review Business Meeting 10 

(U) THE STUDY'S PROBLEMATIC ANALYSIS , 10 

(U) Inadequate Context 11 

(U) Inadequate Objectivity 12 

(U) Indications of Political Considerations 15 

(U) Lack of Timeliness.. 16 

(U) Inadequate Use of Available Sources of Intelligence 17 

(U) Exhibits Poor Standards of Analytic Tradecraft 17 

(U) Inadequately Describes the Quality and Reliability of Sources 17 

(U) Inadequate Caveats About Uncertainties or Confidence in Analytic 

Judgments 18 

(U) Inadequate Incorporation of Alternative Analysis Where Appropriate 19 

(U) Based on Flawed Logical Argumentation... 19 

(U) ERRONEOUS STUDY CONCLUSIONS...... 20 

i 

TOP SECRETfl^BHBBBB M 

UNCLASSIFIED 

521 
TOP SECRETO^^^M^M^BI I HI |I|H| mi ||| 

(U) Conclusion 1 (The CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques was 

not effective) 21 

(U) Conclusion 2 (CIA's Justification for EITs Rested on Inaccurate 

Effectiveness Claims) 24 

(U) The Study's Flawed Analytical Methodology 25 

(U) Our Analytical Methodology,,.... '. 26 

(U) Re-organization of the "Effectiveness" Case Studies.. 27 

(U) The Domino Effect 28 

(U) The Identification of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad as the Mastermind 

of the 9/11 Attacks and His "Mukhtar" Alias 29 

(U) The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the 

Capture of Jose Padilla 

(U) The Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh 37 

(U) The Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad 41 

(U) The Disruption of the Karachi Hotels Bombing Plot 45 

(U) The Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plots 47 

(U) The Capture of Hambali.,.. 50 

(U) The Thwarting of the Second Wave Plots and Discovery of the AlGhuraba Group 53 

(U) Critical Intelligence Alerting the CIA to Jaffar al-Tayyar 56 

(U) The Identification and Arrest of Saleh al-Marri 57 

(U) The Arrest and Prosecution of Iyman Faris 58 

(U) The Arrest and Prosecution of Uzhair Paracha and the Arrest of 

Saifullah Paracha , 

(U) Tactical Intelligence on Shkai, Pakistan 64 

(U) The Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting 67 ii 

TOP SECRE^BMBB^^^^^^p/NQyOR N 

UNCLASSIFIED 

522 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECREiWMBW^^HIWM^Q^OR N 

(U) CIA Detainees Subjected to EITs Validated CIA Sources .... 69 

(U) The Identification of Bin Ladin's Courier 73 

(U) Conclusion 6 (CIA Impeded Congressional Oversight) 77 

(U) Timing of the CIA's Briefings on Enhanced Interrogation 

Techniques ... 78 

(U) Access to Documents... 79 

(U) Breadth of Congressional Access 79 

(U) Conclusion 7 (CIA Impeded White House Oversight) 80 

(U) Executive Branch Oversight 81 

(U) Accuracy of Information Provided 83 

(U) Conclusion 8 (CIA Impeded National Security Missions of Executive 

Branch Agencies) 84 

(U) Access to the Covert Action Program 85 

(U) CIA Denied FBI Requests 85 

(U) The ODNI was Provided with Inaccurate and Incomplete Information 86 

(U) Conclusion 5 (CIA Provided Inaccurate Information to the Department 

of Justice) 86 

(U) "Novel" Use of the Necessity Defense 87 

(U) Accuracy of Claims about Abu Zubaydah 90 

(U) Breadth of Application of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 93 

(U) Detainees' Importance Overstated 94 

(U) Effectiveness of the Program 96 

(U) Use of Constant Light, White Noise, and Shaving of Detainees 98 

(U) Conclusion 9 (CIA Impeded Oversight by CIA Office of Inspector 

General) 98 

iii 

UNCLASSIFIED 

523 
UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Conclusion 10 (The CIA Released Classified Information on EITs to the 

Media) 103 

(U) CONCLUSION 106 

(U) APPENDIX I: CIA, Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in 

Afghanistan, 1990-2001, August 16,2006 : 1 

(U) APPENDIX II: CIA, Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting, 

August 2005 j 

(U) APPENDIXIILEmailfrom:^ ^ 

IHHHHHHI ' [ 

subject: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and [source name REDACTED!?; 

HHH^^^HHI^I^^^^HIH^IK REDACTED] , 

flHHfl^HHH subject: Re: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and 

[source name REDACTED]?; date: March U 2004, at 7:52:32 AM....... 1 

(U) APPENDIX IV: CIA, Office of General Counsel draft Legal Appendix: 

Paragraph 5-Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers, 

November 26, 2002 

i v 

UNCLASSIFIED 

524 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ 1//NOFORN 

MINORITY VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN CHAMBLISS, 

SENATORS BURR, RISCH, COATS, RUBIO, AND COBURN1 

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

(U) In March 2009, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ("SSCI" or 

"Committee") decided, by a vote of 14-1, to initiate a Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's 

Detention and Interrogation Program, (the Study).2 On August 24, 2009, Attorney General Eric 

Holder decided to re-open the criminal inquiry related to the interrogation of certain detainees in 

the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Detention and Interrogation Program ("the Program" or 

"the Detention and Interrogation Program").3 Shortly thereafter, the minority withdrew from 

active participation in the Study when it determined that the Attorney General's decision would 

preclude a comprehensive review of the Program, since many of the relevant witnesses would 

likely decline to be interviewed by the Committee. Three years later, on August 30, 2012, 

Attorney General Holder closed the criminal investigation into the interrogation of certain 

detainees in the Detention and Interrogation Program.4 At the end of the 112,h Congress, on 

December 13, 2012, the Committee approved the adoption of the Study's three-volume report, 

executive summary, and findings and conclusions by a vote of 9-6.5 On April 3, 2014, by a vote 

of 11-3. the Committee approved a motion to send updated versions of the Study's executive 

summary and findings and conclusions to the President for declassification review.6 

(U) The latest version of the updated Study is a [[6,682]]-page interpretation of 

documents that, according to the CIA, has cost the American taxpayer more than 40 million 

dollars and diverted countless CIA analytic and support resources.7 Contrary to the Terms of 

Reference, the Study does not offer any recommendations for improving intelligence 

interrogation practices, intelligence activities, or covert actions. Instead, it offers 20 conclusions, 

The'following members of the Committee signed on to the minority views drafted in response to the original Study 

approved by the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on December 13, 2012: Vice Chairman 

Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Blunt, and Rubio. [[Please note that the double-bracketed text in 

this document is new explanatory text necessitated by substantive modifications to the Study's Executive Summary 

and Findings and Conclusions that were made after our June 20,2014, Minority Views were submitted to the 

Central Intelligence Agency for die declassification review. We also note that these Minority Views are in response 

to, and at points predicated upon, the research and foundational work that underlie the Study's account of the CIA 

Detention and Interrogation Program. These Views should not be treated as an independent report based upon a 

separate investigation, but rather our evaluation and critique of the Study's problematic analysis, factual findings, 

and conclusions.]] 

2

 SSCI Transcript, Business Meeting to Discuss and Revote on the Terms of Reference for the Committee's Study of 

the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, March 5, 2009, p. 10 (DTS 2009-1916). 

DOJ, Attorney General Eric Holder Regarding a Preliminary Review into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees 

August 24, 2009, p; 1. ' 

4

 See DO J, Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder on Closure of investigation into the Interrogation of Certain 

Detainees. August 30. 2012. p. 1, 

5

 SSCI Transcript, Business Meeting to Consider the Report on the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program d 74 

(DTS 2013-0452). 

6

 SSCI Transcript. Hearing to Vote on Declassification of the SSCI Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program, April 3, 2014, pp. 8-9 (DTS 2014-1137). 

7

 CIA, Letter from V. Sue Bromley, Associate Deputy Director, November 6, 2012, p. 1 (DTS 2012-4143). 

VI 

TOP SECRETE 7NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

525 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ TN'OFQRN 

many of which attack the CIA's integrity and credibility in developing and implementing the 

Program. Absent the support of the documentary record, and on the basis of a flawed analytical 

methodology, these problematic claims and conclusions create the false impression that the CIA 

was actively misleading policy makers and impeding the counterterrorism efforts of other federal 

government agencies during the Program's operation. 

(U) We begin with an examination of the procedural irregularities that negatively 

impacted the Study's problematic claims and conclusions. First, the Committee's decision not to 

interview key witnesses led to significant analytical and factual errors in the original and 

subsequent updated versions of the Study. Second, over the objection of the minority, the 

Committee did not provide a copy of the draft Study to the Intelligence Community for initial 

fact-checking prior to the vote to adopt the Study at the end of the 112th Congress. Third, 

Committee members and staff were not given sufficient time to review the Study prior to the 

scheduled vote on December 13, 2012. Fourth, the Committee largely ignored the CIA's 

response to the Study on June 27, 2013, which identified a number of factual and analytical 

errors in the Study. Fifth, during the summer and early fall of 2013, SSCI majority staff failed to 

take advantage of the nearly 60 hours of meetings with some of the CIA personnel who had led 

and participated in the CIA's study response. Instead of attempting to understand the factual and 

analytical errors that had been identified by the CIA, the majority staff spent a significant portion 

of these meetings criticizing the CIA's study response and justifying the Study's flawed 

analytical methodology. Sixth, the production and release of the updated Study was marred by 

the alleged misconduct of majority staff and CIA employees in relation to a set of documents 

known as the "Panetta Internal Review." Finally, Committee members and staff were not given 

sufficient time to review the updated Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions prior to 

the scheduled vote on April 4, 2014. 

(U) With the exception of the decision not to interview relevant witnesses, most, if not 

all, of these procedural irregularities could have been avoided. As will be seen below, the 

updated Study still contains a significant number factual inaccuracies and invalid claims and 

conclusions. We believe that many of these problems could have been corrected if the 

Committee had simply adhered to our established procedural precedents for a report of this 

importance. 

(U) THE STUDY'S PROBLEMATIC ANALYSIS 

(U) We found a number of analytical deficiencies in the Study beginning with an 

inadequate discussion of the context that led to the implementation and operation of the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program. Also, as an oversight body, this Committee reviews the 

Intelligence Community's analytic products with an expectation that they will follow certain 

analytic integrity standards. While these standards do not technically apply to this Committee's 

oversight products, the values behind these standards are useful in assessing our own analytic 

tradecraft. When applied to the Study, these standards were helpful in identifying some of the 

Study's general analytic deficiencies concerning objectivity, independence from political 

(U) THE STUDY'S FLAWED PROCESS 

II 

TOP SECRET// f/NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

526 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRETFL^^M^^^ M 

considerations, timeliness, the use of all available intelligence sources, and consistency with 

proper standards of analytic tradecraft. 

(U) Inadequate Context 

(U) The Study does very little to provide the context in which the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program was initiated and operated. It is entirely silent on the surge in terrorist 

threat reporting that inundated the Intelligence Community following the September 11, 2001, 

terrorist attacks by al-Qa'ida. It also makes no mention of the pervasive, genuine apprehension 

about a possible second attack on the United States that gripped the CIA in 2002 and 2003. 

During our review of the documentary record, we could clearly discern a workforce traumatized 

by the thousands of lives lost as a result of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, but also 

galvanized by the challenge of working to ensure such an attack never occurred again. 

(U) Inadequate Objectivity 

(U) With respect to the standard of objectivity, we were disappointed to find that the 

updated Study still contains evidence of strongly held biases. John Brennan emphasized this 

point prior to his confirmation as the Director of the CIA, when he told Vice Chairman 

Chambliss that, based on his reading of the originally approved Executive Summary and the 

Findings and Conclusions, the Study was "not objective" and was a "prosecutor's brief," 

"written with an eye toward finding problems." We agree with Director Brennan's assessments. 

We also agree with the"criticism he relayed from Intelligence Community officials that it was 

written with a "bent on the part of the authors" with "political motivations," 

(U) We found that those biases led to faulty analysis, serious inaccuracies, and 

misrepresentations of fact in the Study. For example, the Study states, "At no time during or 

after the aggressive interrogation phase did Abu Zubaydah provide the information that the CIA 

enhanced interrogation were premised upon, specifically, 'actionable intelligence about alQa'ida operatives in the United States and planned al-Qa'ida lethal attacks against U.S. citizens 

and U.S. interests.'"8 Specifically, our review of the documentary record revealed that Abu 

Zubaydah provided actionable intelligence, after he was subjected to "aggressive" interrogation 

in April9 and August10 2002, that helped lead to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and other alQa'ida associates during the Karachi safe house raids conducted on September 10-11, 2002. 

These captures effectively disrupted the al-Qa'ida plot to bomb certain named hotels in Karachi, 

Pakistan, that had been selected because they were frequented by American and German guests. 

(U) The Study's lack of objectivity is also evidenced by the uneven treatment of key 

U.S. officials throughout the report, attacking the credibility and honesty of some, while making 

little mention of others. For example, former Director George Tenet led the CIA at the outset of 

the Program, during a period the Study contends was characterized by mismanagement. Tenet 

authorized the enhanced interrogation techniques, and if the Study is to be believed, headed an 

8

 SSCI Study, Volume I, March 31, 2014, p. 146. 

9

 See SSCI Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Riseh, Coats, Rubio and Coburn 

June 20, 2014, p. 33. 

10 See CIA, •( • 10586, August 4, 2002, pp. 2-5. 

III 

UNCLASSIFIED 

527 
UNCLASSIFIED 

' TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN 

organization that withheld information from and misled policymakers in the executive branch 

and Congress. He is mentioned 62 times in the updated version of the Study's Executive 

Summary. By comparison, former Director Michael Hayden—who joined the CIA in 2006, after 

all but two detainees entered the Program and the most severe EITs were no longer in use—is 

mentioned over 200 times in the Executive Summary and disparaged numerous times. Notably, 

he was also the only Director to brief the Program to all members of the congressional oversight 

committees. 

(U) Indications of Political Considerations 

(U) Ideally, oversight reports should not be distorted or altered with the intent of 

supporting or advocating a particular policy, political viewpoint, or specific audience."11 We 

found indications of political considerations within the Study. For example, the Study uses outof-context quotes from certain minority members to suggest incorrectly that they supported 

certain positions taken by the Study. The Study omits additional comments by these same 

members which contradict the out-of-context statements. 

(U) Lack of Timeliness 

(U) The analytic integrity standard of timeliness centers on the need to effectively inform 

key policy decisions. The same could be said for intelligence oversight reports. The updated 

version of the Study was released for declassification review on April 3, 2014—more than five 

years after the Terms of Reference were approved. No version of the Study, updated or 

otherwise, has ever contained any recommendations. Moreover, there are no lessons learned, nor 

are there any suggestions of possible alternative measures. This absence of Committee 

recommendations is likely due to the fact that the key policy decisions about the CIA's Detention 

and Interrogation Program were decided by President Obama in 2009. Since it does little to 

effectively inform current policymakers, we found that the Study is not timely. 

(U) Inadequate Use of Available Sources of Intelligence 

(U) Despite the millions of records available for the Study's research, we found that 

important documents were not reviewed and some were never requested. We were surprised to 

learn that the e-mails of only 64 individuals were initially requested to support the review of a 

program that spanned eight years and included hundreds of government employees. Committee 

reviews of this magnitude typically involve interviewing the relevant witnesses. Here, these 

relevant witnesses were largely unavailable due to the Attorney General's decision to re-open a 

preliminary criminal review in connection with the interrogation of specific detainees at overseas 

locations. When DOJ closed this investigation in August 2013, however, the Committee had a 

window of opportunity to invite these relevant witnesses in for interviews, but apparently 

decided against that course of action. The lack of witness interviews should have been a clear 

warning flag to all Committee members about the difficulty of completing a truly 

"comprehensive" review on this subject. 

1

' Intelligence Community Directive Number 203, Analytic Standards (effective June 21, 2007), p. 2. 

IV 

TOP SECRET/; VNOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

528 
UNCLASSIFIED 

7N0F0RN 

(U) Poor Standards of Analytic Tradecraft 

(U) We found numerous examples of poor analytic tradecraft in the Study. There were 

instances where the Study did not accurately describe the quality and reliability of the sources of 

information supporting its analysis. For example, the Study states that a review by the CIA 

Inspector General (IG) "uncovered that additional unauthorized techniques were used against" a 

detainee, but the Inspector General report actually said it "heard allegations" of the use of 

unauthorized techniques and said, "[F]or all of the instances, the allegations were disputed or too 

ambiguous to reach any authoritative determination about the facts."12 The Study rarely included 

caveats about uncertainties or confidence in its analytic judgments. Many of the Study's 

conclusions and underlying claims are offered as matters of unequivocal fact. As an example, 

the Study asserts "CIA officers conducted no research on successful interrogation strategies 

during the drafting of the [Memorandum of Notification], nor after it was issued."13 Proving a 

negative is often very difficult, and in this particular case it is difficult to understand how such an 

absolute assertion can be made without interviewing the affected witnesses or even citing to one 

documentary source that might support such a claim. 

(U) The Study also engaged in little alternative analysis of its claims and conclusions. In 

many respects, these minority views provide this necessary alternative analysis. For example, 

the Study is replete with uncited and absolute assertions like "there is no indication in CIA 

records that Abu Zubaydah provided information on bin al-Shibh's whereabouts."14 Our review 

of the documentary record revealed that Abu Zubaydah did provide locational information about 

bin al-Shibh. As discussed below, Zubaydah made four separate photographic identifications of 

bin al-Shibh and placed him in Kandahar, Afghanistan, during the November to December 2001 

timeframe and provided sufficient information for interrogators to conclude that bin al-Shibh was 

subsequently with Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) in Karachi, Pakistan.15 

(U) Finally, we found instances where claims were supported more by rhetorical devices 

than sound logical reasoning. For example, in support of the Study's conclusion that the CIA's 

use of enhanced interrogation techniques were not effective, the Study stated: 

At least seven detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques almost immediately after being rendered into CIA custody, making it 

impossible to determine whether the information they provided could have been 

obtained through non-coercive debriefing methods."16 

12 Compare SSCI Study. Volume I, March 31, 2014, p. 229 with CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review: 

Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003). May 7, 2004, p. 41 

(DTS 2004-2710). [[This tradecraft error was partially corrected in the November 26, 2014, version of the 

Executive Summary by editing the offending sentence to read, "The Office of Inspector General later described 

additional allegations of unauthorized techniques used against... ," (emphasis added). Compare SSCI Study, 

Executive Summary, April 3,2014, p. 67 with SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 7011 

1J

 SSCI Study, Volume I, March 31, 2014, p. 20. 

14

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary. December 3,2014, p. 318. 

15 See SSCI Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr. Risch, Coats, Rubio, and 

Cubum, June 20, 2014, pp. 37-38. 

16

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, April 3, 2014, p. 2 (emphasis added). [[This false reasoning was 

tempered in the December 3, 2014, version of the Executive Summary by editing the sentence to read, "CIA 

V 

TOP SECRET/ VNOFQRN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

529 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ 1//NOFORN 

This statement is a rhetorical attempt to persuade the reader that non-coercive techniques may 

have been equally or even more successful than the enhanced techniques. It is little more than an 

appeal to unknowable facts and is not based upon logical reasoning.17 

(U) Despite the fact that the CIA response and the summer staff meetings essentially 

validated our criticisms of the original Study, it appears that the updated version of the Study 

largely persists with many of its erroneous analytical and factual claims. We have used these 

past eleven weeks to update our own Minority Views and focus our attention on eight of the 

Study's most problematic conclusions. 

(U) Conclusion 1 (The CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques was not effective) 

(U) This updated conclusion asserts that the "CIA's use of enhanced interrogation 

techniques was not an effective means of acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from 

detainees."18 The Study attempts to validate this conclusion by relying upon four faulty 

premises. The first faulty premise is that "seven of the 39 CIA detainees known to have been 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced no intelligence while in CIA 

custody."19 If true, that means that 82 percent of detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation 

techniques produced some intelligence while in CIA custody, which is better than the 57.5 

percent effectiveness rate of detainees not subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques. 

Regardless, these statistics do not provide any real insight on the qualitative value of the 

intelligence information obtained. The true test of effectiveness is the value of what was 

obtained—not how much or how little was obtained. 

(U) We have already discussed the second faulty premise, which involves a rhetorical 

appeal to ignorance based on the fact that at least seven detainees were subjected to enhanced 

interrogation techniques almost immediately after coming into the CIA's custody. Such 

speculation is not helpful in assessing whether the enhanced interrogation techniques were 

effective. 

(U) The third faulty premise of this ineffective techniques conclusion focuses on the fact 

that "multiple" detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques "fabricated information, 

resulting in faulty intelligence."20 Our documentary review also found that "multiple" detainees 

detainees who were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were usually subjected to the 

techniques immediately after being rendered to CIA custody. Other detainees provided significant accurate 

intelligence prior to, or without having been subjected to these techniques." Compare SSCI Study, Findings and 

Conclusions, April 3, 2014. p. 2 with SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2.]] 

17

 For a more detailed analysis of this unsupported claim, see infra, SSCI Minority Views of Vice Chairman 

Chambliss joined by Senators Burr. Risch, Coats, Rubio, and Cobum, December 5, 2014, p. 22. 

" SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2. The first and second conclusions in the updated 

Findings and Conclusion had been combined in Conclusion 9 of the original Study. 

19

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2. The assertion of "produced no intelligence" as 

used by the Study reflects that the interrogations of these detainees resulted in no intelligence reports. 

20

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2. 

(U) ERRONEOUS STUDY CONCLUSIONS 

VI 

TOP SECRETE 7NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

530 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ 7NQFORN 

who were not subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques also provided fabricated 

information to their interrogators. The only real inference that can be drawn from these facts is 

that detainees fabricated information regardless of whether they were subjected to enhanced 

interrogation. 

(U) The final faulty premise used in support of this "effectiveness" conclusion was that 

"CIA officers regularly called into question whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques were effective, assessing that the use of the techniques failed to elicit detainee 

cooperation or produce accurate intelligence."21 While the opinions of these unidentified CIA 

officers may happen to coincide with the Study's first conclusion, there were at least three other 

CIA officials who held the opposite view—Directors Tenet, Goss, and Hayden. 

(U) Conclusion 2 (CIA's Justification for EITs Rested on Inaccurate Effectiveness Claims) 

(U) Conclusion 2 states, "[t]he CIA's justification for the use of its enhanced 

interrogation techniques rested on inaccurate claims of their effectiveness."22 While our review 

of the documentary record did reveal some instances of inaccurate effectiveness claims by the 

CIA, we found that many of the Study's claims related to this conclusion were themselves 

inaccurate. We reviewed 17 of the 20 cases studies that the Study relies upon to support this 

flawed conclusion. We examined these case studies in logical groupings (e.g., related to 

information provided by Abu Zubaydah) using chronological order rather than the Study's 

confusing "primary" and "secondary" effectiveness representations. This approach helped us 

better understand how the intelligence resulting from these detainee interrogations was used by 

the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots and identify, capture, and sometimes prosecute other terrorists. 

(U) The Study developed an analytical methodology to examine the effectiveness of the 

information obtained from the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program that we found to be 

both confusing and deeply flawed. Usually, effectiveness is measured by establishing 

performance metrics that require the collection of pertinent data and the subsequent analysis of 

such data. For example, in the context of counterterrorism such metrics might include: (1) 

increased understanding of terrorist networks; (2) identification of terrorists and those providing 

material support; (3) terrorist captures; (4) terrorist interrogations; (5) disruption of terrorist 

operations and financing; (6) disruption of terrorist recruitment; (7) reduction in terrorist safehavens; (8) development of counterterrorism assets; (9) intelligence gathering of documents, 

computer equipment, communications devices, etc.; (10) improved information sharing; and (11) 

improved foreign liaison cooperation against terrorism. Such metrics could then be compared 

against the information provided by CIA detainees to assess the relative effectiveness of the 

Program. 

(U) Instead of performance metrics, the Study's analytical methodology creates artificial 

categories that are used to exclude certain detainee information from being considered in an 

effectiveness assessment of the Program. For example, if the Study found that a detainee 

subjected to enhanced interrogation had provided similar information during an earlier non21

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2. 

22

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2. 

VII 

TOP SECRET// ^OFORM 

UNCLASSIFIED 

531 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 1//NQFORN 

enhanced interrogation, then such information could not he used for assessing the effectiveness 

of the program. This category appears to have been developed in an attempt to exclude much of 

the intelligence information provided by Abu Zubaydah after he was subjected to enhanced 

interrogation in August 2002, since some of the information Abu Zubaydah provided during 

those interrogations was similar to information he had provided prior to August. However, it 

aims out that this category is largely inapplicable to Abu Zubaydah's case, because he was 

subjected to enhanced interrogation by the CIA when he was released from the hospital on April 

15, 2002. 2 3 

(U) Another category of information that the Study's flawed analytical methodology 

excludes is corroborative information. If a detainee subjected to enhanced interrogation 

provided information that was already available to the CIA or other elements of the Intelligence 

Community from another source, then the methodology dictates that such information cannot be 

considered to support a CIA effectiveness representation. This result occurs even in situations in 

which the detainee's information clarified or explained the significance of the prior information. 

Another exclusion category applies if the Study determined that there was no causal relationship 

between the information obtained from a detainee after the use of enhanced interrogation and the 

operational success claimed by the CIA. In these case studies, we often found documentary 

evidence that supported direct causal links between such detainee information and the 

operational success represented by the CIA. The final category excludes detainee information 

about terrorist plots when there was a subsequent assessment by intelligence and law 

enforcement personnel that such plots were infeasible or never operationalized. 

(U) This flawed analytical methodology often forced the Study to use absolute language 

such as, "no connection," "no indication," "played no role," or "these representations were 

inaccurate." Our review of the documentary record often found valid counter-examples that 

disproved such absolute claims. We also found that when we invalidated the claims in the initial 

case studies, there was often a cascading effect that further undermined claims in the subsequent 

case studies. Here we summarize the claims for the case studies we examined and our alternate 

analysis of those claims. 

(U) The Identification of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad as the Mastermind of the 9/11 

Attacks and His "Mukhtar" Alias 

fFSfll^^l^l^l^E ) We combined our analysis of these two case studies 

because they share common facts and analytical issues. The Study claims that "[ojn at least two 

prominent occasions, the CIA represented, inaccurately, that Abu Zubaydah provided 

[information identifying KSM as the mastermind of 9/11] after the use of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques."24 We found that neither of the occasions cited with respect to the 

"Mastermind of 9/11" information were "prominent." The first occasion was not even a CIA 

representation, but rather a mistake made by the Department of Justice in one of its legal 

opinions.25 The second occasion involved a set of November 2007 documents and talking points 

23 See infra, SSCI Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Rubio, and 

Cobum, December 5, 2014. pp. 33-37. 

24

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 312. 

25 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 313, n.1748. 

v n i 

II"! I 

UNCLASSIFIED 

532 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//] 1//NOFORN 

for the CTA Director to use in a briefing with the President. Although these briefing materials 

did contain some erroneous information about KSM's interrogation, the Study fails to 

demonstrate whether this erroneous information was actually briefed to the President during that 

timeframe.26 

(TSl^^BI^^^KNF ) The Study also claims that "{ijn at least one instance in 

November 2007 .. . the CIA asserted that Abu Zubaydah identified KSM as 'Mukhtar' after the 

use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques."27 However, this instance is no more 

"prominent" than the above "mastermind" occasion, because it was contained in the same 

November 2007 briefing materials used by the CLA Director to brief the President.28 Again, the 

Study fails to demonstrate whether this erroneous information was actually briefed to the 

President during this timeframe. 

The Study's third claim in relation to this case study is that 

"[tjhere is no evidence to support the statement that Abu Zubaydah's information—obtained by 

FBI interrogators prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and while Abu 

Zubaydah was hospitalized—was uniquely important in the identification of KSM as the 

'mastermind' of the 9/11 attacks."29 We found considerable evidence that the information Abu 

Zubaydah provided identifying KSM as "Mukhtar" and the mastermind of 9/11 was significant 

to CIA analysts, operators, and FBI interrogators. Both the Congressional Joint Inquiry into the 

9/11 Attacks and the 9/11 Commission discussed the importance of this information to the 

Intelligence Community in understanding KSM's role in the attacks and in the al-Qa'ida 

organization. 

(U) The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose 

Padilla 

The Study falsely claims that "[a] review of CIA 

operational cables and other CIA records found that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques played no role in the identification of 'Jose Padilla' or the thwarting of the Dirty 

Bomb or Tall Buildings plotting. CIA records indicate that: .. . (3) Abu Zubaydah provided this 

information to FBI officers who were using rapport-building techniques, in April 2002, more 

than three months prior to the CIA's 'use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques,' . 

. . ."30 However, CIA records clearly indicate that during the time period when FBI agents and 

CIA officers were working together in rotating, round-the-clock shifts, some of the interrogation 

techniques used on Abu Zubaydah included nudity,31 liquid diet,32 sensory deprivation,

33 and 

26 See DCIA Talking.Points: Waterboard, 06 November 2007, pp. 1 -3. This document was sent to DCIA on 

November 6 in preparation for a meeting with the President. 

27

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 315. 

2B See DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard, 06 November 2007, pp. 1 -3. 

29

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary. December 3,2014, p. 313. 

30

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, pp. 229-31 (emphasis added). 

31

 SSCI Transcript, Staff Interview of FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan, April 28, 2008, p. 22. (DTS 2008-2411) 

32 See CIA, 10090, April 21, 2002, p. 5. 

33 See CIA, I 10116, April 25. 2002, pp. 3-4; CIA, 

TOP SECRET^ 

[10016, April 12, 2002, pp. 4-5. 

I//NOFORN 

IX 

UNCLASSIFIED 

533 
UNCLASSIFIED 

FQRN 

extended sleep deprivation,

34 Specifically, sleep deprivation played a significant role in Abu 

Zubaydah's identification of Jose Padilla as an al-Qa'ida operative tasked to carry out an attack 

against the United States. Abu Zubaydah provided this information to FBI agents during an 

interrogation session that began late at night on April 20, 2002, and ended on April 21, 2002. 

Between April 1.5, 2002 and April 21, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was deprived of sleep for a total of 

126.5 hours (5.27 days) over a 136 hour (5.6 day) period—while only being permitted several 

brief sleep breaks between April 19, 2002 and April 21, 2002, which totaled 9.5 hours. Thus, all 

information provided by Abu Zubaydah subsequent to his return from the hospital on April 15, 

2002, was obtained during or after the use of enhanced interrogation techniques and cannot be 

excluded from supporting the CIA's effectiveness representations under the Study's flawed 

analytical methodology. Over the course of his detention, Abu Zubaydah provided 766 solesource disseminated intelligence reports.35 

(U) The Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh 

fPSHHflflHHHN ^ The Study claims, "[a] review of CIA records found no 

connection between Abu Zubaydah's reporting on Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Ramzi bin al-Shibh* s 

capture While CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah provided information on Ramzi bin 

al-Shibh, there is no indication that Abu Zubaydah provided information on bin al-Shibh's 

whereabouts. Further, while Abu Zubaydah provided information on bin al-Shibh while being 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, he provided similar information to 

FBI interrogators prior to the initiation of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques."36 

CIA records demonstrate that Abu Zubaydah was subjected 

to enhanced interrogation techniques during two separate periods in April 2002 and August 

2002. During these timeframes, Abu Zubaydah made several photographic identifications of 

Ramzi bin al-Shibh and provided information that bin al-Shibh had been in Kandahar at the end 

of 2001, but was then working with KSM in Karachi, Pakistan. More important, Abu Zubaydah 

provided information about how he would go aboutlocating Hassan Ghul and other al-Qa'ida 

associates in Karachi. This information caused Pakistani authorities to intensify 

their efforts and helped lead them to capture Ramzi bin al-Shibh and other al-Qa'ida associates 

during the Karachi safe house raids conducted on September 10-11, 2002. 

(U) The Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad 

The Study claims "there are no CIA records to support the 

assertion that Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, or any other CIA detainee played any role in 

34 See CIA, • • 10094, April 21, 2002, p. 3; CIA, •• [ 10071, April 19, 2002, p. 2; CIA, 10091, 

April 21, 2002, p. 2. Dietary manipulation, nudity, and sleep deprivation (more than 48 hours) were also 

subsequently authorized as enhanced interrogation techniques by the Department of Justice. See Memorandum for 

John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury. Principal 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, May 30, 2005, Re: Application 

of United States Obligations under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be 

Used in the Interrogation of High value At Qaeda Detainees (DTS 2009-1810, Tab-11) 

35

 SSCI Study, Volume III, March 31, 2014, pp. 282-283. 

3C

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary. December 3,2014, p. 318 (emphasis added). 

X 

TOP SECRET/* 7NOFQRN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

534 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/FL K/NOFORN 

the 'the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.';'37 

However, information obtained from CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah was essential to furthering the 

CIA's understanding of KSM's role in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and helped lead 

to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. The HHHHH^HHi^Hjnterrogation s of bin 

al-Shibh and DETAINEE R provided key insights abom KSMHHHNHI Information 

produced through detainee interrogation was pivotal to the retention of a key CIA asset whose 

cooperation led directly to the capture of KSM. 

(U) The Disruption of the Karachi Hotels Bombing Plot 

The Study claims, "[T]he CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques—to include the waterboard—played no role in the disruption, of the Karachi 

Plot(s)."38 However, CIA documents show that key intelligence collected through the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program, including information obtained after the use of enhanced 

interrogation techniques, played a major role in disrupting the Karachi hotels bombing plot. 

Specifically, Abu Zubaydah provided crucial information that helped lead to the successful 

raids of the al-Qa'ida safe houses on September 11, 2002—the same raids that yielded the 

"perfume letter" and disrupted the Karachi hotels plot. Specifically, the raid s 

were the direct result of information provided by Abu Zubaydah on August 20, 2002, during his 

second period of enhanced interrogation. 

(U) The Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plots 

. The Study asserts that "contrary to CIA representations, 

information acquired during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 

played no role in 'alert [ing]' the CIA to the threat to—or the *disrupt[ing]' the plotting against— 

Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf."39 We found that the CIA interrogation program played a 

key role in disrupting the Heathrow and Canary Wharf plotting. Specifically, the Study itself 

twice concedes these plots were "fully disrupted" with the detentions of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, 

KSM, Ammar al-Baluchi, and Khallad bin Attash.40 The Study then incorrectly asserts, "There 

are no CIA records to indicate that any of the detainees were captured as a result of CIA detainee 

reporting."41 Information obtained from the CIA interrogation program played a key role in the 

capture of al-Shibh and KSM.42 Also, Ramzi bin al-Shibh provided information about Ammar 

al-Baluchi and Abu Zubaydah provided information about Khallad bin Attash prior to their 

arrests

 43

 The same detainee information that helped lead to the capture of these terrorists also 

played a key role in fully disrupting the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf plots. 

37

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 327. 

38

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 242. 

39

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 297-298. 

40 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3. 2014, pp. 295 and 299. 

41

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary December 3,2014, p. 299. 

42 See SSCI Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Rubio, and 

Cobum, December 5, 2014. pp. 37-41. 

43 See SSCI Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Rubio, and 

Coburn, December 5, 2014, pp. • and 47. 

• XI 

IIIII I II IIII II I^^MBBMBBBB I m i mil l 

UNCLASSIFIED 

535 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ 1//NOFQRN 

(U) The Capture of Hambali 

. The Study claims that "[al review of CIA operational 

cables and other records found that information obtained from KSM during or after the use of the 

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the capture of Hambali."44 However, 

CIA documents show that the interrogation of KSM and al-Qa'ida operative Zubair, during and 

after the use of enhanced interrogation techniques on both individuals, played a key role in the 

capture of Hambali. Specifically, CIA documents indicate it was the combination of reporting 

from KSM and Majid Khan that led to the efforts to find Hambali through Zubair. A CIA 

summary of Hambali's capture timeline states, while "numerous sources had placed Hambali in 

variou^outheas^sian countries, it was captured al-Qa'ida leader KSM who put H 

•HHHHHHI o n Hambali's trail"—contradicting the Study's claim that the KSM 

interrogation played "no role."43 

(U) The Thwarting of the Second Wave Plots and Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group 

cables and other documents found that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no 

role in the 'discovery' or thwarting of either 'Second Wave' plot. Likewise, records indicate that 

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the 'discovery' of a 17-member 

'cell tasked with executing the 'Second Wave.""46 However, we found that the CIA 

interrogation program played a key role in disrupting the "Second Wave" plot and led to the 

capture of the 17-member al-Ghuraba group. Specifically, the Study ignores that KSM, who had 

also been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, provided information 

months earlier on this same group of JI students and their location in Karachi—information that 

helped lead to the capture of Gunawan himself. According to CIA information, while the CIA 

was already aware of Gunawan, "KSM's identification of his role as Hambali's potential 

successor prioritized his capture. Information from multiple detainees, including KSM, 

narrowed down [Gunawan's] location and enabled his capture in September 2003."47 This 

information was excluded from th^tud^Pakistan^utl ^ arrested the members of the alGhuraba group during raids on H^I^^^^H^ H A cable describing the arrests said 

H I captured this cell based on the debriefings of captured senior al-Qa'ida operatives, who 

stated that some members of this cell were to be part of senior al-Qa[']ida leader Khalid Shaykh 

Muhammad (KSM)['s] ['jsecond wavef] operation to attack the United States using the same 

modus operandi as was used in the September 11, 2001 attacks."48 

44

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 305. 

45

 CIA, Hambali Capture/Detention Timeline, no date, p. 6. 

46

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 251. This claim has been modified from the version that 

appeared in the report that was approved by the Committee at the end of the 112th Congress. For example, it no 

longer claims that the CIA's interrogation program, excluding the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, did not 

play a role in the thwarting of the al-Ghuraba Group. It also substitutes the words "discovery or thwarting" in place 

of the original "identification and disruption." (emphasis added). 

47

 CIA, Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Aeainst Al-Qa'ida, June I, 2005, p 2 (DTS 2009-1387) 

48

 CIA, CIA CABLE 52981. | 

TOP SECRET//! 

XII 

K/NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

536 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

(U) Critical Intelligence Alerting the CIA to Jaffar al-Tayyar 

The Study asserts that, 

CIA representations [about detainee reporting on Jaffar al-Tayyar] also omitted 

key contextual facts, including that... (2) CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah provided 

a description and information on a KSM associate named Jaffar al-Tayyar to FBI 

Special Agents in May 2002, prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques. .. and (5) CIA records indicate that KSM did not know 

al-Tayyar's true name and that it was Jose Padilla—in military custody and being 

questioned by the FBI—who provided al-Tayyar's true name as Adnan elShukrijumah."49 

provided information on an associate of KSM by the name of Abu Jaffar al-Thayer. Abi/ 

Zubaydah provided a detailed description of Abu Jaffar ai-Thayer, including that he spoke 

English well and may have studied in the United States.50 The Study incorrectly claims that this 

May 20, 2002, interrogation took place prior to the initiation of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques.51 Abu Zubaydah had already been subjected to an extended period of sleep 

deprivation and other enhanced interrogation techniques during his interrogation between April 

15, 2002 and April 21, 2002, about one month prior to his May 20 interrogation.52 

The Study also cites as a key contextual fact omitted from. 

CIA representations that KSM did not know al-Tayyar's true name, and it was Jose Padilla, in 

military custody and being questioned by the FBI, who provided al-Tayyar's true name as Adnan 

el-Shukrijumah.53 However, this omission was rendered moot because, as the Study itself notes 

a few pages later,54 the "FBI began participating in the military debriefings [of Padilla] in March 

2003, after KSM reported Padilla might know the true name of a US-bound al-Qa 'ida operative 

known at the time only as Jaffar al-Tayyar. Padilla confirmed Jaffar's true name as Adnan El 

Shukrijumah."55 

(U) The Arrest and Prosecution of Saleh al-Marri 

The Study correctly asserts, "The CIA represented to the 

CIA Office of Inspector General that 'as a result of the lawful use of EITs,' KSM 'provided 

information that helped lead to the arrests of terrorists including .. . Saleh ALmari, a sleeper 

4

' SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 358-359. 

50 See FBI draft report of the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, May 20, 2002, 5:25 p.m. to 8:40 p.m., p 3. 

51 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 362. 

52 Se e

 "»/"»• SSCI Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Riseh, Coats, Rubio. and 

Coburn, December 5, 2014, pp. 33-36. 

53 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3. 2014. p. 359. 

^ See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 365 (emphasis added). 

"

 See CIA, Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting, April 15, 2005, p. 3 (emphasis added); See also CIA, 

ALEC ^^^^larc h 21, 2003, p. 6 ("Our service has developed new information, based on leads from detained alQa'ida operations chief Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), that al-Qa'ida operative Jafar al-Tayyar's true name is 

Adnan Shukri Jumah and he could be involved in an imminent suicide attack in the United States"). 

XHI 

11 HI ' ii i mi i IMBWIBB^^^ W inn Mum 

UNCLASSIFIED 

537 
UNCLASSIFIED 

operative in New York.'"56 As the Study makes clear, al-Marri was not arrested based on 

information from KSM, and could not have been, because al-Marri was arrested in December 

2001, before the detention of KSM in March 2003.57 

In its response to the Study, the CIA concedes that the 

agency erred in describing detainee reporting as contributing to al-Marri's arrest. However, the 

agency stresses that KSM did provide valuable intelligence on al-Marri—intelligence that played 

a significant role in al-Marri's prosecution.58 It was KSM who identified a photograph of alMarri and described him as an al-Qa'ida sleeper operative sent to the United States shortly 

before 9/11. KSM said he planned for al-Marri, who "had the perfect built-in cover for travel to 

the United States as a student pursuing his advanced degree in computer studies at a university 

near New York," to serve as al-Qa'ida's point of contact to settle other operatives in the United 

States for follow-on attacks after 9/11,59 KSM also said that al-Marri trained at the al-Faruq 

camp, had poisons training, and had offered himself as a martyr to bin Ladin.60 

Prior to the information from KSM, al-Marri was charged 

with credit card fraud and false statements. After the information from KSM, al-Marri was 

designated as an enemy combatant. In 2009, after being transferred to federal court, al-Marri 

pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to provide material support to al-Qa'ida. In his plea, he 

admitted that he attended terrorist training camps and met with KSM to offer his services alQa'ida, who told him to travel to the United States before 9/11 and await instructions—all 

information initially provided by KSM. 

(U) The Arrest and Prosecution of iyman Faris 

(U) The Study claims, "[o]ver a period of years, the CIA provided the 'identification,' 

'arrest,' 'capture,' 'investigation,' and 'prosecution' of Iyman Faris as evidence for the 

effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. These representations were 

inaccurate."61 The Study correctly points out that CIA statements implying that detainee 

information led to the "identification" or "investigation" of Iyman Faris were inaccurate. 

However, CIA, FBI, and Department of Justice documents show that information obtained from 

KSM after he was waterboarded led directly to Faris's arrest and was key in his prosecution. 

On March 17 and 18, 2003, the CIA questioned KSM about 

Majid Khan's family and KSM stated that another Khan relative, whom he identified from a 

picture of Faris, was a "track driver in Ohio."62 On March 18, 2003, KSM told interrogators he 

tasked the truck driver to procure specialized machine tools (hat would be useful to al-Qaida in 

loosening the nuts and bolts of suspension bridges in the United States. KSM said he was 

56

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 366. 

57

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,20!14, p. 366. 

58

 See CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27, 2013, p. 35. 

59

 CIA, WASHINGTON DCj 

00 See CIA, CIA WASHINGTON DC 

61

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 276-277. 

62

 CIA, CIA CABLE 10886. March 18, 2003, pp 5-6. 

XIV 

UNCLASSIFIED 

538 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ L/A'OFQRN 

informed by an intermediary that Faris could not find the tools.63 This revelation would turn out 

to be a key piece of incriminating evidence against Iyman Faris. The Study excluded 

information found in CIA documents which shows that, immediately after obtaining information 

from KSM and Majid Khan regarding Faris, the CIA queried the FBI for "additional details" on 

Faris, "including a readout on his current activities and plans for FBI continued investigation."64 

The cable specifically noted that "KSM seems to have accurately identified" Faris from a 

photograph as the "truck driver in Ohio."65 

On March 20, 2003, the FBI picked up Faris for 

questioning and conducted a consent search of his apartment, seizing his laptop. When our staff 

asked the FBI why Faris was picked up, they cited the cables from CIA.66 The FBI investigators 

went into this interview armed with the information revealed by KSM and Majid Khan, which 

enabled them to explore Faris's ties with KSM and al-Qa'ida plotting in the United States

 67

 On 

May 1, 2003, Faris pled guilty to "casing a New York City bridge for al Qaeda, and researching 

and providing information to al Qaeda regarding the tools necessary for possible attacks on U.S. 

targets," the exact terrorist activities described by KSM. Ultimately, the CIA's representation 

concerning the identification and initial investigation of Faris is much less important than the 

details that led to his arrest and prosecution. 

(U) The Arrest and Prosecution of Uzhair Paracha and the Arrest ofSaifullah 

Paracha 

. The Study asserts,"[t]he CIA represented that information 

obtained through the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced otherwise 

unavailable intelligence that led to the identification and/or arrest of Uzhair Paracha and his 

father Saifullah Paracha (aka, Sayf al-Rahman Paracha). These CIA representations included 

inaccurate information and omitted significant material information, specifically a body [of] 

intelligence reporting—acquired prior to CIA detainee reporting—that linked the Parachas to alQa'ida-related terrorist activities."68 

We found, however, that information obtained from KSM 

during his enhanced interrogation on March 25, 2003, about alleged explosives smuggling into 

the United States, attacks on U.S. gas stations, and related material support to al-Qa'ida, 

motivated the FBI to track down and arrest Uzhair Paracha in New York a few days later on 

Marc h

 continued its pursuit of Saifullah, who was later 

arrested ^^HHHHHHHHHI 0 , 1 Ju'y 6, 2003. Among other charges, Uzhair was 

successfully convicted on November 23, 2005, of providing material support to al-Qa'ida and 

sentenced to 30 years in prison. KSM's description of Uzhair's involvement in the gas station 

plots and his claim that Uzhair may have provided other logistical support for Majid's entry into 

63 CIA> CIA CABLE 10886, March 18,2003, 

64

 CIA, 

65

 CIA, 

5-6. 

Information front KSM on Majid Khan. 

—————Information from KSM on Majid Khan. 

' Phone call from the FBI responding to minority staff questions from a document review, January 25, 2013. 

67 See CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27. 2013, p. 13; FBI WASH 040537Z, April 4, 2003, p. 2. 

68

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p 352 

® CIA, DIRECTOR I 

TOP SECRET//] 

XV 

K/NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

539 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//j 

the United States was consistent with the press release's description of some of the evidence 

used during Uzhair's trial.70 

(U) Tactical Intelligence on Shkai, Pakistan 

(U) This case study is no longer as problematic as the version contained in the appendix 

to the original Findings and Conclusions section of the Study approved by the Committee during 

the 112th Congress. That appendix falsely accused the CIA of providing an inaccurate 

representation about the tactical intelligence acquired on Shkai, Pakistan, during the 

interrogations of Hassan Ghul after the use of enhanced interrogation techniques.71 Fortunately, 

that appendix has been dropped from the Study's updated Findings and Conclusions and there is 

no claim in the updated version of the Study that the representation concerning Shkai, Pakistan, 

was inaccurate. 

(U) Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting 

The Study claims, "[t]he CIA represented that intelligence 

derived from the use of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques thwarted plotting against the 

U.S. military base, Camp Lemonier, in Djibouti. These representations were inaccurate."72 We 

found, however that representations about the thwarting of an attack against Camp Lemonier in 

Djibouti, specifically President Bush's 2006 comments that "Terrorists held in CIA custody have 

also provided information that helped stop a planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier 

in Djibouti," were accurate and have been mischaracterized by the Study.73 Specifically, 

contrary to the Study's assertions, the President did not attribute the thwarting of this plot 

exclusively to the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, but information from "[tjerrorists 

held in CIA custody." Tn addition, the President never stated that the plot was disrupted 

exclusively because of information from detainees in CIA custody. The President was clear that 

information from detainees "helped" to stop the planned strike. This idea that detainee reporting 

builds on and contextualizes previous and subsequent reporting is repeated a few lines later in 

the speech, when the President makes clear, "[t]he information we get from these detainees is 

corroborated by intelligence . . . that we've received from other sources, and together this 

intelligence has helped us connect the dots and stop attacks before they occur."74 

(U) CIA Detainees Subjected to EITs Validated CIA Sources 

enhanced interrogation techniques were necessary to validate CIA sources. The claim was based 

70 See DOJ, United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, Pakistani Man Convicted of Providing Material 

Support to Al Qaeda Sentenced to 30 Years in Federal Prison, July 20, 2006, p.2. 

71

 SSCI Study, December 13, 2012, Findings and Conclusions, Appendix; Details on CIA's Effectiveness 

Representations-Conclusion #9, p. 92. 

72

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3.2014, p. 336. 

73

 President George W. Bush, Trying Detainees; Address on the Creation of Military Commissions, Washington, 

D C., September 6, 2006. 

74

 President George W. Bush, Tiying Detainees; Address on the Creation of Military Commissions, Washington, 

D.C., September 6, 2006. 

TOP SECRET/4 

XVI 

y/NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

540 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! WNQFORN 

on one CIA detainee—Janat Gul—contradicting the reporting of one CTA asset.."73 Contrary to 

the Study's claim, the representations cited by the Study do not assert that enhanced 

interrogation techniques helped to validate sources. Rather, the representations only make 

reference to "detainee information" or detainee "reporting." Also contrary to the Study's claim, 

we found evidence in the documentary record where the CIA representations about Janat Gul 

also contained additional examples of source validation. Moreover, the three items of 

information that the Study asserts should have been included in the Janat Gul asset validation 

representations were not "critical" and their inclusion does not alter the fact that Gul's persistent 

contradiction of the asset's claims did help the CIA "validate" that particular asset. 

(U) The Identification of Bin Ladin's Courier 

fFSHHHHHHB^ ) Tbe Study asserts, "the 'tipoff on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti 

in 2002 did not come from the interrogation of CIA detainees and was obtained prior to any CIA 

detainee reporting."76 However, CIA documents show that detainee information served as the 

"tip-off' and played a significant role in leading CIA analysts to the courier Abu Ahmad alKuwaiti. While there was other information in CIA databases about al-Kuwaiti, this information 

was not recognized as important by analysts until after detainees provided information on him. 

Specifically, a CIA paper in November 2007 noted that "over twenty mid to high-value detainees 

have discussed Abu Ahmad's ties to senior al-Qa'ida leaders, including his role in delivering 

messages from Bin Ladin and his close association with former al-Qa'ida third-in-command Abu 

Faraj al-Libi."77 The report highlighted specific reporting from two detainees, Hassan Ghul and 

Ammar al-Baluchi, who both identified Abu Faraj al-Libi's role in communicating to bin Ladin 

through Abu Ahmad. It was this and similar reporting from other detainees that helped analysts 

realize Abu Faraj's categorical denials that he even knew anyone named Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, 

"almost certainly were an attempt to protect Abu Ahmed," thus showing his importance.78 

fFS^^^^B^H^F } The Study also asserts, "the most accurate information on 

Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti obtained from a CIA detainee [Hassan Ghul] was provided by a CIA 

detainee who had not yet been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,"79 We 

found, however, that Detainees who provided useful and accurate information on Abu Ahmad alKuwaiti and bin Ladin had undergone enhanced interrogation prior to providing the information. 

Specifically, Ammar al-Baluchi, who appears to be the first detainee to mention Abu Ahmad alKuwaiti's role as a bin Ladin courier and a possible connection with Abu Faraj al-Libi, provided 

this information at a CIA black site during a period of enhanced interrogation.80 

75

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014. p. 342. 

76

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 389. 

77

 CIA Intelligence Assessment, Al-Qa'ida Watch, Probable Identification of Suspected Bin Ladin Facilitator Abu 

Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, November 23, 2007, p. 2. 

78

 CIA Intelligence Assessment. Al-Qa'ida Watch, Probable Identification of Suspected Bin Ladin Facilitator Abu 

Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, . November 23,2007, p. 2. 

79

 SSCI Study, Execudve Summary, December 3, 

80 See CIA, WASHINGTON DC] 

description of Abu Ahmad as a Bin Ladin courier. CIA 

379. _ 

Ammar al-Baluchi attemt 

DIRECTOR 

ited to recant his earlier 

XVII 

1//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

541 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! 1//XOFORN 

(T-S^^BH^^^^^gNP ) Additional CIA-fact checking explained that Ghul offered 

more details about Abu Ahmad's role after being transferred from COBALT and receiving 

enhanced interrogation. Specifically, the CIA stated: 

After undergoing enhanced techniques, Gul stated that Abu Ahmad specifically 

passed a letter from Bin Ladin to Abu Faraj in late 2003 and that Abu Ahmad had 

"disappeared" from Karachi, Pakistan in 2002. This information was not only 

more concrete and less speculati ve, it also corroborated information from Ammar 

that Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) was lying when he claimed Abu Ahmad 

left al-Qa'ida in 2002.81 

Ghul stated that while he had "no proof," he believed that Abu Faraj was in contact with Abu 

Ahmad and that Abu Ahmad might act as an intermediary contact between Abu Faraj and Bin 

Ladin. Ghul said that this belief "made sense" since Abu Ahmad had disappeared and Ghul had 

heard that Abu Ahmad was in contact with Abu Faraj.82 Months later, Ghul also told his 

interrogators that he knew Abu Ahmad was close to Bin Ladin, which was another reason he 

suggested that Abu Ahmad had direct contact with Bin Ladin as one of his couriers.83 

The role of other detainees who had undergone enhanced 

interrogation, but were believed to be untruthful about knowing Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, was 

described by CIA analysts as being very significant in their understanding of the courier as well. 

CIA documents make clear that when detainees like Abu Zubaydah, KSM, and Abu Faraj alLibi—who had undergone enhanced interrogation and were otherwise cooperative—denied 

knowing Abu Ahmad Kuwaiti or suggested that he had "retired," it was a clear sign to CIA 

analysts that these detainees had something to hide, and it further confirmed other detainee 

information that had tipped them off about the true importance of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.84 

(U) Conclusion 6 (CIA Impeded Congressional Oversight) 

Conclusion 6 states: "[t]he CIA has actively avoided or 

impeded congressional oversight of the program."85 In reality, the overall pattern of engagement 

with the Congress shows that the CIA attempted to keep the Congress informed of its activities. 

From 2002 to 2008, the CIA provided more than 35 briefings to SSCI members and staff, more 

than 30 similar briefings to HPSCI members and staff, and more than 20 congressional 

notifications.86 Because the Study did not interview the participants in these restricted briefings, 

it is impossible to document how much information the CIA provided to Committee leadership 

during those briefings. Often, the Study's own examples contradict the assertion that the CIA 

tried to avoid its overseers' scrutiny. For example, the Study notes that the CIA reacted to Vice 

CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27, 2013, p. 38 (citing CIA, | 

83

 CIA, DIRECTOR 

84

 CIA, DIRECTOR CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, Lessons from the Hunt 

for Usama Bin Ladin, dated September 2012, pp. 9-10 (DTS 2012-3826); CIA Intelligence Assessment, Al-Qa'ida 

Watch, Probable Identification of Suspected Bin Ladin Facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, November 23, 2007, p. 2. 

85

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 5. 

86

 CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B), June 27, 2013, p. 35. 

xvni 

u rn '.i i III i MBBWI^BM^ M 'in I> II A II in i • i 

UNCLASSIFIED 

542 
Chairman Rockefeller's suspicion about the agency's honesty by planning a detailed briefing on 

the Program for him.87 

The Study claims, "[t]he CIA did not brief the Senate 

Intelligence Committee leadership on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques until 

September 2002, after the techniques had been approved and used."88 We found that the CIA 

provided information to the Committee in hearings, briefings, and notifications beginning shortly 

after the signing of the Memorandum of Notification (MON) on September 17, 2001. The 

Study's own review of the CIA's representations to Congress cites CIA healing testimony from 

November 7, 2001, discussing the uncertainty in the boundaries on interrogation techniques.89 

The Study also cites additional discussions between staff and CIA lawyers in February 2002.90 

The Study seems to fault the CIA for not briefing the Committee leadership until after the 

enhanced interrogation techniques had been approved and used. However, the use of DOJapproved enhanced interrogation techniques began during the congressional recess period in 

August, an important fact that the Study conveniently omitted.91 The CIA briefed HPSCI 

leadership on September 4, 2002. SSCI leadership received the same briefing on September 27, 

2002.92 

efforts by then-Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller, IV, to investigate the program, including by 

refusing in 2006 to provide requested documents."93 However, we determined that the CIA 

provided access to the documents requested. On January 5, 2006, the Director of National 

Intelligence's Chief of Staff wrote a letter to Vice Chairman Rockefeller which denied an earlier 

request for full Committee access to over 100 documents related to the Inspector General's May 

2004 Special Review.94 However, this denial of "full Committee access," did not mean that the 

documents were not made available to the CIA's congressional overseers. In fact, the Chief of 

Staffs letter stated, "Consistent with the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, the 

White House has directed that specific information related to aspects of the detention and 

interrogation program be provided only to the SSCI leadership and staff directors."95 The letter 

concluded by advising Vice Chairman Rockefeller that the documents "remain available for 

review by SSCI leadership and staff directors at any time through arrangements with CIA's 

Office of Congressional Affairs."96 

87 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary. December 3, 2014. p. 441. 

88

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3,2014, p. 5, 

89

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 437 n.2447. See also SSCI Transcript, Briefing on 

Covert Action, November 7, 2001, p. S6 (DTS 2002-0611). 

ee SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 437; Email from: Christopher Ford, SSCI Staff, to: 

Cleared SSCI staff; subject: Meeting yesterday with CIA lawyers on date: February 26, 2002 

(DTS 2002-0925). 

91 See CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB Bj. June 27, 2013, p. 36. 

92

 CIA Study Response. Conclusions (TAB B). June 27,2013, p. 36. 

93

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3,2014, pp. 5-6. 

94

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 442. 

95

 Letter from David Shedd to Andy Johnson, January 5, 2006 (DTS 2006-0373). 

96

 Letter from David Shedd to Andy Johnson, January 5. 2006 (DTS 2006-0373). 

XIX 

UNCLASSIFIED 

543 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

, In support of this erroneous conclusion that the CIA 

impeded congressional oversight, the Study notes that the "CIA restricted access to information 

about the program from members of the Committee beyond the Chairman and Vice Chairman 

until September 6, 2006."97 Although we agree that the full Committee should have been briefed 

much earlier, the CIA's limitation of access to sensitive covert action information is a longstanding practice codified in Section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. 

The Study notes that the CIA briefed a number of 

additional Senators who were not on the Select Committee on Intelligence.98 The National 

Security Act permits the President to provide senators with information about covert action 

programs at his discretion, without regard to Committee membership. Moreover, providing a 

briefing to inform key senators working on legislation relevant to the CIA's program is 

inconsistent with the narrative that the CIA sought to avoid congressional sera tiny. 

(U) Conclusion 7 (CIA Impeded White House Oversight) 

(U) Conclusion 7 states, "[t]he CIA impeded effective White House oversight and 

decision-making."99 It is important to place this serious allegation within its proper context—the 

CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was conducted as a covert action.100 Covert action is 

the sole responsibility of the White House, a principle enshrined in law since the National 

Security Act of 1947.101 The President, working with his National Security Staff, approves and 

oversees all covert action programs. The congressional intelligence committees also conduct 

ongoing oversight of all covert actions and receive quarterly covert action briefings. Given this 

extensive covert action oversight regime, this conclusion seems to imply falsely that the CIA was 

operating a rogue intelligence operation designed to "impede" the White House. We rejcct this 

unfounded implication. 

officer, up to and including CIA Directors George Tenet and Porter Goss, briefed the President 

on the specific CIA enhanced interrogation techniques before April 2006. By that time, 38 of the 

39 detainees identified as having been subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 

had already been subjected to the techniques."102 We found that the CIA records are 

97

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 6. 

9S See SSCI Study. Executive Summary, December 3, 2014. p. 443. 

99

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions. December 3. 2014, p. 6. 

100 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary. December 3. 2014. p. 11. "On September 17, 2001, six days after the 

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush signed a covert action MON to authorize the 

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to 'undertake operations designed to capture and detain persons who pose a 

continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities."' 

(emphasis added). 

101

 In 1974, the Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 created the requirement for 

presidential "Findings" for covert action. The Intelligence Oversight Acts of 1980 and 1988 amended the Finding 

process, and the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1991 replaced Hughes-Ryan with the current Finding process. See 

William Daugherty, Executive Secrets, Covert Action and the Presidency, The University Press of Kentucky 2004 

pp. 92-98. 

102

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3,2014, p. 6. 

UNCLASSIFIED 

544 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ K/NOFORN 

contradictory and incomplete regarding when the President was briefed, but President Bush 

himself says he was briefed in 2002, before any techniques were used.103 

:

 . The Study claims that, "[t]he information provided 

connecting the CIA's detention and interrogation program directly to [the "Dirty Bomb" 

Plot/Tall Buildings Plot, the Karachi Plots, Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plot, and the 

Identification/Capture of Iyman Faris] was, to a great extent, inaccurate."ltM We found, however, 

the information provided to the White House attributing the arrests of these terrorists and the 

thwarting of these plots to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was accurate.105 

(U) Conclusion 8 (CIA Impeded National Security Missions of Executive Branch Agencies) 

(U) Conclusion 8 states, "[t]he CIA's operation and management of the program 

complicated, and in some cases impeded, the national security missions of other Executive 

Branch agencies."106 As noted in the CIA response to the Study, "the National Security Council 

established the parameters for when and how CIA could engage on the program with other 

Executive Branch agencies."107 The CIA was not responsible nor did it have control over the 

sharing or dissemination of information to other executive branch agencies or members of the 

Principals Committee itself. That responsibly rested solely with the White House. 

The Study claims, "[tjhe CIA blocked State Department 

leadership from access to information crucial to foreign policy decision-making and diplomatic 

activities."108 However, the Study does not provide any evidence that the CIA deliberately 

impeded, obstructed or blocked the State Department from obtaining information about the 

Program inconsistent with directions from the White House or the National Security Council. 

CIA officers were in close and constant contact with their State Department counterparts where 

detention facilities were located and among senior leadership to include the Secretary of State 

and the OS. Deputy Secretary of State. For example, leading to the establishment of a facility in 

Country® the Study notes that the chief of station (COS) was coordinating activities with the 

ambassador. Because the Program was highly compartmented, the ambassador was directed by 

the National Security Council not to discuss with his immediate superior at headquarters due to 

the highly compartmented nature of the covert action. Instead, the COS, sent feedback from the 

ambassador through CIA channels, to the NSC, whereby the Deputy Secretary of State with the 

knowledge of the Secretary, would discuss any issues or concerns with the ambassador in 

country.109 While the process was less direct, the security precautions to protect sensitive 

information did not impede the national security mission of the State Department. 

103

 See George W. Bush, Decision Points, Broadway Paperbacks. New York, 2010, p. 169. 

104

 SSCI Study, April 1,2014, Volume II, p. 446. 

- See SSCI Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Rubio, and 

Cobum, June 20, 2014, The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Talt Buildings Plot cuid the Capture of Jose Padilla, pp. 

33-36; The Thwarting of the Karachi Plots, pp. 44-47; The Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plots, pp. 47-49; and The 

Arrest and Prosecution of lyman Faris. pp. 58-60. 

11)6

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 7. 

107

 CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B), June 27, 2013, p. 11. 

108

 SSCI Study, l^^^^^^^^^g^^tecembe r 3, 

TOP SECRET//! 

XXI 

BFNOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

545 
TOP SECRET/4 1//XOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

^^VHffi N The Study also claims, "Mhe CIA denied specific requests 

from FBI Director Robert Mueller, III, for FBI access to CIA detainees diat the FBI believed was 

necessary to understand CIA detainee reporting on threats to the U.S. Homeland.'"10 While the 

FBI's participation in the interrogation of detainees was self-proscribed, the Bureau was still able 

to submit requirements to the CIA and received reports on interrogations. Recognizing the need 

for FBI access to detainees, both agencies finalized a memorandum of understanding in the fall 

of 2003 that detailed how FBI | 

agents would be provided access to detainees 

inaccurate and incomplete information about the program, preventing the ODNI from effectively 

carrying out its statutory responsibility to serve as the principal advisor to the President on 

intelligence matters."112 We do not agree with this assertion. The updated Study treats this 

assertion differently than it did in the version that was adopted by the Committee during the 

112th Congress. In the original Study, the assertion sought to dispute claims regarding the use of 

enhanced interrogation techniques and disruption of several plots. However, the updated Study 

drops the direct reference to coercive measures and instead focuses on the Detention and 

Interrogation Program in general.113 The 2006 press release from the Office of Director of 

National Intelligence114 does not reference the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, but 

states unequivocally: "The detention of terrorists disrupts—at least temporarily—the plots they 

were involved in." To assert that the detention and interrogation of terrorists did not yield 

intelligence of value is simply not credible. 

(U) Conclusion 5 (CIA Provided Inaccurate Information to the Department of Justice) 

(U) Conclusion 5 states, "[t]he CIA repeatedly provided inaccurate information to the 

Department of Justice, impeding a proper legal analysis of the CIA's detention and Interrogation 

Program."115 Our analysis of the claims used in support of this conclusion revealed that many 

were themselves inaccurate or otherwise without merit. 

. The Study falsely claims that "CIA attorneys stated that 'a 

novel application of using the necessity defense' could be used 'to avoid prosecution of U.S. 

officials who tortured to obtain information that saved many lives."'116 We found that the draft 

CIA Office of General Counsel (OGC) legal appendix cited by the report contained a cursory 

discussion of the necessity defense that did not support the use of such defense in the context of 

the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.117 Specifically, the claim here altered the 

110

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 7. 

111

 SSCI Study, Volume I, March 31. 2014, p. 413. 

112

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 8. 

113

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 8. 

ODNI Press Release, September 6,2006, "Infonnation on the High Value Terrorist Detainee Proeram.' 

• SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 4. 

II6 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 5. 

17 See CIA Office of General Counsel draft Legal Appendix: Paragraph S-Hostile Interrogations: Legal 

Considerations for CIA Officers, November 26^2001," pp. 5-6 (CIA, Draft Appendix on Neces^y Defense). This 

^ XXII 

IIIII II I III II ^^MMMMMM M -

UNCLASSIFIED 

546 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ZI Y/NOFORN 

meaning of the quoted text in draft legal appendix by separating portions of the text and inserting 

its own factually misleading text, which was not supported by the legal analysis, to achieve the 

following result: "CM attorneys stated that a novel application of the necessity defense could be 

used to avoid prosecution of U.S. officials who tortured to obtain information that saved 

lives."118 Fortunately, this erroneously doctored quotation only appears once in the Studythis Conclusion. 

-in 

Also in support of this conclusion, the Study makes a 

number of claims related to the accuracy of the information provided by the CIA about Abu 

Zubaydah to OLC. First, the Study asserts that the OLC "relied on inaccurate CIA 

representations about Abu Zubaydah's status in al-Qa'ida and the interrogation team's 

'certain[ty]' that Abu Zubaydah was withholding information about planned terrorist attacks."119 

We found that the information relied upon by the Study to criticize the CIA's representations 

about Abu Zubaydah withholding information about planned terrorists attacks neglected to 

include important statements from within that same intelligence cable, which supported those 

representations by the CIA. Specifically, the Study cites an email from the CIA's interrogation 

team that included the sentence: "[ojur assumption is the objective of this operation [the 

interrogation of Abu Zubaydah] is to achieve a high degree of confidence that [Abu Zubaydah] is 

not holding back actionable information concerning threats to the United States beyond that 

which [Abu Zubaydah] has already provided,"120 However, this carefully chosen text omits 

critical statements from later in the same cable: "[t]here is information and analysis to indicate 

that subject has information on terrorist threats to the United States" and "[h]e is an incredibly 

strong willed individual which is why he has resisted this long."121 

fFS^I^^HI^HHNF ) Second, the Study asserts the CIA assessment that Abu 

Zubaydah was the "third or fourth man" in al-Qa'ida was "based on single-source reporting that 

was recanted prior to the August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum."122 The CIA was in possession of 

multiple threads of intelligence supporting Abu Zubaydah's prominent role in al-Qa'ida.123 WM 

^ However, the level of 

detail that H^B^ B LI.NL |II M Is pirn ULU L I AI IIKI J IL,ili undermined his later 

attempts to retract his earlier admissions about his involvement in future terrorist attacks | 

document is attached as Appendix IV to the SSCI Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators 

Burr, Risch, Coats, Rubio, and Coburn, June 20, 2014. p. IV-1. 

118

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 5 (Erroneous text indicated by italics). 

SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 5. 

120

 CIA, [REDACTED^3208, July 23, 2003, p. 3; Email from: CIA staff officer; to: [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED], H^HHI ; subject: Addendum from GREEN, [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02); date: 

July 23, 2004, at 07:56:49 PM. See also email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Grayson 

SWIGERT and Hammond DUNBAR date: Auuust 8, 21, 2002, at 10:21 PM. 

121

 CIA, [REDACTED1^3208Jjiily 23, 2003, p. 3: email from: CIA staff officer; to: [REDACTED], 

[REDACTED), •••• • subject: Addendum from GREEN, [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02); date: 

July 23, 2004, at 07:56 PM. See also Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Grayson 

SWIGERT and Hammond DUNBAR: date: August 8, 21, 2002, at 10:21 PM. 

122

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 410 (emphasis added). 

123 See CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B), June 27, 2013, p. 32. 

TOP SECREiV/WBMM^^^^^M^OFOR M ^ ^ 

UNCLASSIFIED 

547 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ I//NOFORN 

I and his denials about meeting with Abu Zubaydah.124 Moreover, Abu Zubaydah himself 

admitted to at least one meeting with H H which undermines KtoMMiflflM denials 

about such meetings.125 

. Third, the Study incredibly claims that "[t]he CIA later 

concluded that Abu Zubaydah was not a member of al-Qa 'irfa."126 We found that the one 

document cited by the Study did not support this unbelievable and factually incorrect assertion. 

Specifically, a text box in this cited intelligence product makes the following assertions: 

A common misperception in outside articles is that Khaldan camp was run by alQa'ida. Pre-911 September 2001 reporting miscast Abu Zubaydah as a "senior 

al-Qa'ida lieutenant," which led to the inference that the Khaldan camp he was 

administering was tied to Usama Bin Ladin 

Al-Qa'ida rejected Abu Zubaydah's request in 1993 to join the group and that 

Khaldan was not overseen by Bin Ladin's organization.127 

The Study fails to state that the interrogation of this supposed "non-member" resulted in 766 

sole-source disseminated intelligence reports by the Study's own count.128 Ironically, this 

intelligence product was written based on "information from detainees and captured 

documents"—including from Abu Zubaydah.129 

In further support of this conclusion, the Study correctly 

asserts that "the CIA applied its enhanced interrogation techniques to numerous other CIA 

detainees without seeking additional formal legal advice from the OLC."'30 However, the CIA 

appropriately applied the legal principles of the August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum to other CIA 

detainees. Specifically, the fact that the CIA felt comfortable enough with OLC's August 1, 

2002, legal opinion to apply the same legal principles to other detainees does not constitute an 

impediment to DOJ's legal analysis of the Program. In fact, the Attorney General later 

expressed the view that "the legal principles reflected in DOJ's specific original advice could 

appropriately be extended to allow use of the same approved techniques (under the same 

conditions and subject to the same safeguards) to other individuals besides the subject of DOJ's 

specific original advice."131 

124 See SSCI Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Rubio. and 

Cobum, June 20, 2014, p. 91. 

*"CIA^LEC CIA. ALEC •••••••••• • Abu 

accounts differ as to the location of this meeting(s). 

I2

« SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 410 (emphasis added). 

117

 CIA, Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in Afghanistan, 1990-2001, August 16, 2006, p. 2 

(emphasis added). ). Tliis document is attached as Appendix I to the SSCI Minority Views of Vice Chairman 

Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Rubio, and Coburn. June 20. 2014, p. 1-1 

128 See SSCI Study. Volume III, March 31, 2014, pp. 282-283. 1 

123

 CIA, Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in Afghanistan, 1990-2001, August 16 2006, D i (DTS 

2006-3254). ' ' 

,J0

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 411. 

131 See Memorandum from Jack Goldsmith III, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of 

Justice, to John Helgerson, Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency, June 18, 2004, Addendum o 2 (DTS 

2004-2730). 

XXIV 

I//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

548 
UNCLASSIFIED 

" " '' 1 in' i MMMM M n mi i mi 11 

The Study asserts that the CIA made inaccurate 

representations to DOJ that Janat Gul and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani were high-value al Qaeda 

operatives with knowledge of a pre-election plot against the United States when seeking legal 

guidance on whether the use of four additional interrogation techniques might violate U.S. law or 

treaty obligations.132 Contrary to the Study's claim, the CIA believed the representations to be 

true at the time it made them to the OLC. The CIA did not learn that some of these 

representations had been fabricated by a sensitive CIA source until months after OLC had 

approved the use of enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul and Ahmed Khalfan 

Ghailani. Also, the Study claims that "the threat of a terrorist attack to precede the November 

2004 U.S. election was found to be based on a CIA source whose information was questioned by 

scniO|^^TCofficialsat the time. The same CIA source admitted to fabricating the information 

after

 i n

 H i

 0ctobe r

 2004."133 However, the email relied upon by the Study does 

not support the proposition that senior CTC officials questioned the veracity of the sensitive CIA 

source. While the source did admit to fabricating information about a meeting that never 

occurred, the Study does not acknowledge that the Chief of Base believed (hat the source was 

generaU^njthW^bouU^ on the pre-election threat, despite the source's 

Ion that issue. 

The Study also repeats its other claims that the CIA's 

"representations of 'effectiveness' were almost entirely inaccurate and mirrored other inaccurate 

information provided to the White House, Congress, and the CIA inspector general."134 Based 

upon our examination of the "effectiveness" case studies, we assess that the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program, to include the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, was effective and 

yielded valuable intelligence. The Study's exaggerated and absolute claims about inaccurate 

"effectiveness" representations by the CIA have been largely discredited by these minority views 

and the CIA's June 27, 2013, response to the Study. For the most part, we found that the CIA 

acknowledged those representations that were made in error or could have benefited from the 

inclusion of additional clarification. 

(U) Conclusion 9 (CIA Impeded Oversight by CIA Office of Inspector General) 

(U) Conclusion 9 states, "[t]he CIA impeded oversight by the CIA's Office of Inspector 

General."135 However, we found that the Study itself is replete with examples that lead to the 

opposite conclusion—that the CIA did not significantly impede oversight by the CIA Office of 

the Inspector General (OIG), The law requires the CIA Inspector General to certify that "the 

Inspector General has had full and direct access to all information relevant to the performance of 

his function."136 Yet, during the timeframe of the Program, the Inspector General certified in 

every one of its semiannual reports that it had "full and direct access to all CIA information 

132 See SSCI Study. Executive Summary. December 3, 2014. pp. 416-418. 

SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 417. 

134

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 426. 

135

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p, 8. 

136

 50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(1)(D). 

XXV 

URN II III I II MMI^^^MIM B II HI I MI I 

UNCLASSIFIED 

549 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ VNOFQRN 

relevant to the performance of its oversight duties."137 The law also requires the Inspector 

General to immediately report to the congressional intelligence committees if the Inspector 

General is "unable to obtain significant documentary information in the course of an 

investigation, inspection or audit "138 Again, we are not aware of any such report being 

made to the SSCI during the relevant time period. We do know, however, that John Helgerson, 

the CIA Inspector General, testified before SSCI prior to the commencement of the SSCl's 

review of the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program in February 2007 and did not complain 

of access to Agency information.139 Instead, he said that, during 2006, the IG took a 

comprehensive look at the operations of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center and conducted a 

separate comprehensive audit of detention facilities. General Helgerson also testified, 

[W]e look carefully at all cases of alleged abuse of detainees. The first paper of 

this kind that came to the Committee was in October 2003, not long after these 

programs had begun, when we looked at allegations of unauthorized interrogation 

techniques used at one of our facilities. It proved that indeed unauthorized 

techniques had been used. I'm happy to say that the processes worked properly. 

An Accountability Board was held. The individuals were in fact disciplined. The 

system worked as it should. 

On this subject, Mr. Chairman, I cannot but underscore that we also look at a fair 

number of cases where, at the end of the day, we find that we cannot find that 

there was substance to the allegation that came to our attention. We, of course, 

make careful record of these investigations because we think it important that you 

and others know that we investigate all allegations, some of which are borne out, 

some of which are not.140 

(U) Another possible indicator of impeded oversight would be evidence that the CIA 

OIG was blocked from conducting or completing its desired reviews of the Program. The Study 

itself acknowledges the existence of at least 29 OIG investigations on detainee-related issues, 

including 23 that were open or had been completed in 2005.141 We would also expect to see 

137 See CIA OIG, Semi-Ann toil Report to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency. July-December 2006. p. 5 (DTS 

2007-0669); CIA OIG, Semi-Annual Report to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency. January-June 2006, p. 5 

(DTS 2006-3195); CIA OIG, Semi-Annual Report to the Director. Central Intelligence Agency. July-December 

2005, p. 5 (DTS 2006-0678); CIA OIG, Semi-Annual Report to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency. JanuaryJune 2005, p. 5 (DTS 2005-3140); CIA OIG, Semi-Annual Report to the Director of Central Intelligence. JanuaryJune 2004, p. 5 (DTS 2004-3307); and CIA OIG. Semi-Annual Report to the Director of Central Intelligence. 

January-June 2003, p. 5 (DTS 2003-3327); CIA Study Response, Comments (TAB A), June 27, 2013, pp. 4-6; and 

10; and CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B), June 27, 2013, pp 7-9 

138

 50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(3)(E). 

139 See SSCI Transcript, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Rendition Program. February 14 2007 p 24 

(DTS 2007-1337). 

140

 SSCI Transcript, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Rendition Program, February 14, 2007, p. 25 (DTS 

2007-1337). 

141

 SSCI Study, Volume 1, April 1, 2014, p. 899 n.6257. The CIA asserts that the "OIG conducted nearly 60 

investigations" related lo the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and that the OIG found the initial 

allegations in 50 of these investigations to be unsubstantiated or did not make findings warranting an accountability 

review. Of the remaining 10 investigations, one resulted in a felony conviction, one resulted in the termination of a 

XXVI 

TOP SECRET/ 7N.OFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

550 
UNCLASSIFIED 

1—^AOFOR N 

indications in completed OIG reports that the investigation was hampered by limited access to 

documents, personnel, or site locations necessary for completing such investigations. Again, 

according to the OIG's own reports, we found evidence that the OIG had extensive access to 

documents, personnel, and locations. For example, in ks May 2004 Special Review of the RDI 

program, the CIA OIG reported that it was provided more than 38,000 pages of documents and 

conducted more than 100 interviews, including with the DCI, the Deputy Director of the CIA, 

the Executive Director, the General Counsel, ancUh^eput^irectorofOperations. The OIG 

made site visits to two interrogation facilities IHHII^HMBH I and reviewed 92 

videotapes of the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. The CIA IG's 2006 Audit is another good 

example of extensive access to documents, personnel, and locations. During this audit, the OIG 

not only conducted interviews of current and former officials responsible for CIA-controlled 

detention facilities, but it also reviewed operational cable traffic in extremely restricted access 

databases, reports, other Agency documents, policies, standard operating procedures, and 

guidelines pertaining to the detention program. The OIG also had access to the facilities and 

officials responsible for managing and operating three detention sites. The OIG was able to 

review documentation on site, observe detainees through closed-circuit television or one-way 

mirrors, and the IG even observed the transfer of a detainee aboard a transport aircraft. They 

even reviewed the medical and operational files maintained on each detainee in those 

locations.142 

(U) Conclusion 10 (The CIA Released Classified Information on EITs to the Media) 

(U) Conclusion 10 asserts, "ftjhe CIA coordinated the release of classified information to 

the media, including inaccurate information concerning the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques."143 This conclusion insinuates that there was something improper 

about the manner in which the CIA managed the process by which information about the 

Detention and Interrogation Program was disclosed to the media. We found the National 

Security Council Policy Coordinating Committee determined that the CIA would have "the lead" 

on the "Public Diplomacy issue regarding detainees."144 

(U) The Study also repeats one of its main faulty claims—that the CIA released 

inaccurate information about the Program's effectiveness. Our examination of the record 

revealed that the CIA's disclosures were authorized and that the CIA's representations about the 

Program were largely accurate. Specifically, we found that the Study's flawed analytical 

methodology cannot negate the reality that the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program set up 

an effective cycle of events whereby al-Qa'ida terrorists were removed from the battlefield, 

which had a disruptive effect on their current terrorist activities and often permitted the 

Intelligence Community to collect additional intelligence, which, in turn, often led back to the 

contractor and the revocation of his security clearances, and six led to Agency accountability reviews. CIA Study 

Response, Conclusions (TAB B), June 27, 2013, p. 7. 

M2

 "CIA-controlled Detention Facilities Operated Under the 17 September 2001 Memorandum of Notification." July 

14, 2006, APPENDIX A, page 1-2, DTS 2006-2793. 

wi.SSCI Study, FimUng^ndConclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 8. 

I4'1 Emai l frGm :

 ••^•^o : CIA attorney; subject: Brokaw interview: Take one; date: April 15, 2005, at 1:00 

PM. 

XXVII 

7NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//] 

551 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRETFL^B^^^^ M 

capture of more terrorists. We also found, with a few limited exceptions, that the CTA generally 

did a good job in explaining the Program's accomplishments to policymakers. 

(U) CONCLUSION 

The CIA called the detention program a "crucial pillar of US counterterrorism efforts, 

aiding intelligence and law enforcement operations to capture additional terrorists, helping to 

thwart terrorist plots, and advancing our analysis of the al-Qa'ida target."'45 We agree. We have 

no doubt that the CIA's detention program saved lives and played a vital role in weakening alQa' ida while the Program was in operation. When asked about the value of detainee 

information and whether he missed the intelligence from it, one senior CIA operator | 

1 H H told members, "I miss it every day."146 We understand why. 

^ Igug e Reporting PirotaHb^he War Against al-Qa'ida, June I, 2005, p. i. 

['conversation between SSCI members and CIA officers. 

XXVIII 

y/NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

552 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ F/NOFQRN 

MINORITY VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN CHAMBLISS, 

SENATORS BURR, RISCH, COATS, RUBIO, AND COBURN1 

(U) INTRODUCTION 

(U) In January 2009, as one of his first official acts, President Obama issued three 

Executive orders relating to the detention and interrogation of terror suspects, one of which 

ended the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Detention and Interrogation Program ("the 

Program" or "the Detention and Interrogation Program"). At the same time, there were ongoing 

calls from critics of the Program for the appointment of a special committee or independent 

commission to review the Program and "hold accountable" those involved. Against this 

backdrop, in March 2009, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ("SSCI" or "Committee") 

decided, by a vote of 14-1, to initiate a Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and 

Interrogation Program, hereinafter "the Study," and adopt Terms of Reference.2 While most 

minority members supported the Study in the hope that a fair, objective, and apolitical look at the 

Program could put calls for an "aggressive"3 and burdensome Commission to rest and might 

result in thoughtful and helpful recommendations for detention and interrogation policy going 

forward, Senator Chambliss was the sole Committee member to vote against the Committee 

conducting this review.4 He believed then, as today, that vital Committee and Intelligence 

Community resources would be squandered and the Committee's ability to conduct effective 

intelligence oversight would be jeopardized by looking in the rear-view mirror and debating 

matters that were, in practice, already settled by Congress, the executive branch, and the 

Supreme Court. 

(U) Indeed, by the time the Study began, Congress had passed two separate acts directly 

related to detention and interrogation issues, specifically the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 

(DTA) and the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). The executive branch had terminated 

the CIA's program, ordered the closure of the Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, detention facility within 

one year, directed a review of detention and interrogation policies, and required that—except for 

the use of authorized, non-coercive interrogation techniques by federal law enforcement 

1

 When these minority views were initially written in response to the original Study approved by the United States 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on December 13, 2012, the following members of the Committee signed on 

to them: Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Blunt, and Rubio. [[Please note that the 

double-bracketed text in this document is new explanatory text necessitated by substantive modifications to the 

Study's Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions that were made after our June 20, 2014, Minority Views 

were submitted to the Central Intelligence Agency for the declassification review. We also note that these Minority 

Views are in response to, and at points predicated upon, the research and foundational work that underlie the Study's 

account of the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. These Views should not be treated as an independent 

report based upon a separate investigation, but rather our evaluation and critique of the Study's problematic analysis, 

factual findings, and conclusions.]] 

2

 SSCI Transcript, Business Meeting to Discuss andRevote on the Terms of Reference for the Committee's Study of 

the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, March 5, 2009, pp. 10-11 (DTS 2009-1916). 

3

 See e.g.. SSCI Transcript. Business Meeting to Discuss the Committee's Investigation of the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program, February 11, 2009, p. 69 (DTS 2009-1420) (description by Majority member of potential 

commission on this matter). 

* SSCI Transcript, Business Meeting to Discuss and Revote on the Terms of Reference for the Committee's Study of 

the CIA ' J Detention and Interrogation Program, March 5, 2009, p. 10 (DTS 2009-1916). 

1 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

553 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ 

agencies—future interrogations be conducted in accordance with the U.S. Army Field Manual on 

Interrogation. The Supreme Court had decided Rasul i>. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), Hamdi v. 

Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), and Boumediene v. 

Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), which established that detainees were entitled to habeas corpus 

review and identified certain deficiencies in both the DTA and MCA. 

(U) Nonetheless, a majority of Committee members agreed to review the Program, and 

after its inception, the Study proceeded in a bipartisan manner until August 24, 2009, when 

Attorney General Eric Holder announced that the Department of Justice (DOJ) had re-opened a 

preliminary review into whether federal criminal laws were violated in connection with the 

interrogation of specific detainees at overseas locations.5 Once the Attorney General made this 

announcement, the minority correctly predicted that the criminal investigation would frustrate 

the Committee's efforts to conduct a thorough and effective review of the Program. Absent a 

grant of immunity, key CIA witnesses would likely follow the inevitable and understandable 

advice of counsel and decline to participate in any Committee interviews or hearings. This 

situation would make it very difficult for the Committee to comply with one of the key 

requirements in the Terms of Reference adopted for the Study, which specifically called for 

interviews of witnesses and testimony at hearings. 

(U) Without interviews, the Study was essentially limited to a cold document review 

with more questions likely raised than answered. Although in a prior, related review of the 

destruction of CIA's interrogation video tapes, the Committee had wisely suspended its own 

review rather than forego interviews or potentially jeopardize a criminal investigation, 

inexplicably, this precedent was not followed in the case of the Study. When Chairman 

Feinstein decided to continue the Study despite these impediments to a full and accurate review, 

then-Vice Chairman Bond informed her that he had directed the minority staff to withdraw from 

further active participation. 

(U) On August 30, 2012, Attorney General Holder announced the closure of the criminal 

investigation into the interrogation of certain detainees in the Detention and Interrogation 

Program.6 This provided the Committee a window of opportunity to invite relevant witnesses in 

for interviews, but that course of action was not pursued. 

(S) Now, five years later, the minority's prediction has come to pass. With the decision 

not to conduct interviews, the latest version of the Study is a [[6,682]]-page interpretation of 

documents that, according to the CIA, has cost the American taxpayer more than 40 million 

dollars and diverted countless CIA analytic and support resources.7 After expending tens of 

thousands of Committee and CIA staff working hours, this Study does not even offer a single 

5

 DOJ, Attorney General Eric Holder Regarding a Preliminary Review into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees 

August 24, 2009, p. 1. 

6

 See DOJ, Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder on Closure of investigation into the Interrogation of Certain 

Detainees, August 30, 2012, p. 1. 

1

 CIA, Letter from V. Sue Bromley, Associate Deputy Director, November 6, 2012, p. I (DTS 2012-4143). 

(U) THE STUDY'S FLAWED PROCESS 

2 

7XOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

554 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ 

recommendation for improving our intelligence interrogation practices—even though the Terms 

of Reference expressly contemplated both findings and recommendations.8 Rather, the Study 

purports to serve intelligence oversight interests by proffering 20 questionable and inflammatory 

conclusions attacking the CIA's integrity and credibility in developing and implementing the 

Program. To us, this Study appears to be more of an exercise of partisan politics than effective 

congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community. 

(U) It is important to understand that the Executive Summary and the Findings and 

Conclusions which the Committee recently sent to the executive branch for a declassification 

review are not the same documents that were approved by the Committee during the 112th 

Congress or even at the April 3,2014, declassification review business meeting. The original 

Executive Summary had 282 pages; the updated business meeting version had 479 pages; and the 

updated version transmitted to President Obama had 488 pages. Conversely, the original' 

Findings and Conclusions shrank down from 95 pages to 31-page updated business meeting 

version, only to shrink further to the 20-page updated version that was transmitted to the 

President. The 20 conclusions originally approved by the Committee during the 112th Congress 

are not the same as the 20 conclusions sent for declassification review. For example, two of the 

original conclusions—Conclusions 2 and 11—were dropped and two other conclusionsConclusions 9 and 19—were split in a manner that kept the total number of conclusions at 20. 

Although some remnants of Conclusions 2 and 11 can still be found in the Study, we believe that 

these conclusions were properly dropped as headline conclusions. While there have been 

numerous and repeated calls for the declassification of the Study since it was adopted on 

December 13, 2012,9 these individuals and groups did not understand that they were calling for 

the release of a report that was still being re-written more than 15 months after it was first 

approved by the Committee. 

(U) Failure to Interview Witnesses 

(U) Although the Study asserts that it "is the most comprehensive review ever conducted 

of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program,"10 it began to experience serious problems 

when the Attorney General decided to re-open the criminal inquiry into the Program in 2009. 

The Attorney General's decision resulted in the Committee's inability to interview key witnesses 

during the pendency of that inquiry and led to significant analytical and factual errors in the 

8

 See SSCI Review of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (SSCI Study) 

December 13. 2013 (SSCI Study), Volume 1, pp. 1214-1215. 

9

 On December 12, 2012, 26 retired generals and admirals urged the Committee to adopt the Study and make it 

public with as few redactions as possible. In early January 2013, Senators Feinstein, Levin, and McCain criticized 

the movie Zero Dark Thirty for its portrayal of the decade-long hunt for Usama Bin Ladin, because they believed it 

suggested that information obtained by torturing al-Qa'ida detainees aided in locating him. On November 26, 2013, 

the American Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit under (he Freedom of Information Act to compel the CIA to 

release the SSCI Study and the CIA's June 27,2013. response. On December 13, 2013, the Center for Victims of 

Torture released a statement supporting the release of the Study signed by 58 retired generals and admirals, national 

security experts, foreign policy experts, and religious leaders. 

10

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 9. It would'be more precise-to assert that the SSCI Study 

is the most comprehensive documentary review ever conducted of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. 

3 

TOP SECRET// 7NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

555 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/D TOJOFORN 

original and subsequently updated versions of the Study, a point we made in our original 

minority views and one that was strongly echoed in the CIA response. 

(U) In a Washington Post opinion piece published on April 10, 2014, the current and 

former Chairmen of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence admitted that: 

Although the committee was not able to conduct new interviews, it had access to 

and used transcripts from more than 100 interviews conducted by the CIA 

inspector general and other agency offices while the program was ongoing and 

shortly after it ended. Many of these transcripts were from interviews of the same 

people the committee would have talked to, with answers to the same questions 

that would have been asked. This included top managers, lawyers, 

counterterrorism personnel, analysts, interrogators and others at the CIA.11 

While these statements are true and might lead someone to infer that these interview transcripts 

may have been adequate substitutes for conducting new interviews of these key personnel, the 

Study itself appears to reach the opposite conclusion: 

There are no indications in CIA records that any of the past reviews attempted to 

independently validate the intelligence claims related to the CIA's use of its 

enhanced interrogation techniques that were presented by CIA personnel in 

interviews and documents. As such, no previous review confirmed whether the 

specific intelligence cited by the CIA was acquired from a CIA detainee during or 

after being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques or if the 

intelligence acquired was otherwise unknown to the United States government 

("otherwise unavailable"), and therefore uniquely valuable.12 

We suppose that this critique is leveled against the CIA IG Special Report, at least in part, 

because the special report concluded that: 

The detention of terrorists has prevented them from engaging in further terrorist 

activity, and their interrogation has provided intelligence that has enabled the 

identification and apprehension of terrorists, warned of terrorist plots planned for 

the United States and around the world, and supported articles frequently used in 

the finished intelligence publications for senior policymakers and war fighters. In 

this regard, there is no doubt that the Program has been effective. Measuring the 

effectiveness of EITs, however, is more subjective process and not without some 

concern.13 

The CIA OIG Special Report also noted that George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence 

(DCI), said he believed, "the use of EITs has proven to be extremely valuable in obtaining 

http://www.washingtonpoijl.com/opinions/thc-senate-report-on-the -cias-intetToeation-program-should-be-niade 

publie/20l4/04/10/eeeb237a-c0c3-l Ie3-bcec-b7 leeI'0e9bc3_story.html. 

12

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 179. 

13

 CIA, Office of Inspector General, Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities. 

(September 2001 - October 2003), May 7, 2004, p. 85 (DTS 2004-2710) (emphasis added). 

29 

TOP SECRET/FL //NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

556 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

enormous amounts of critical threat information from detainees who had otherwise believed they 

were safe from any harm in the hands of Americans."14 

(U) The Study cannot have it both ways. Either the CIA IG Special Review interview 

transcripts were adequate substitutes for new interviews or they were not. Conclusion 9 of the 

Study states that the "CIA impeded oversight by the CIA's Office of Inspector General."15 

Specifically, the Study alleges that "[djuring the OIG reviews, CIA personnel provided OIG with 

inaccurate information on the operation and management of the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program, as well as on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques."16 This conclusion seems to establish that the prior interview transcripts were 

inadequate substitutes for new interviews. While we do not agree with Conclusion 9, or any of 

the other conclusions examined in these views, it seems pretty clear that the lack of new 

interviews has prevented the Committee from conducting the comprehensive review that was 

envisioned in the original Terms of Reference. Unlike the Study, we are willing to acknowledge 

that our own analysis in these views was similarly hampered by the inability to interview key 

personnel who might be able to shed light on any documentary inconsistencies or inaccurate 

interpretations. Regardless, we remain convinced that the minority's non-partisan decision to 

withdraw from further active participation in the Study was the correct decision. 

(U) Insufficient Member Review of the Approved Study 

(U) Our concerns about the quality of the Study's analysis drove our efforts, before and 

during the Committee's business meeting on December 13, 2012, to implore the majority to give 

members sufficient opportunity to review the Study and submit it for review and comment by the 

Intelligence Community prior to a vote. Unfortunately, members were only given a little over 

three weeks to review the 2,148 pages released in the last tranche of the draft Study prior to the 

vote for adoption at the scheduled business meeting. This material provided the first look at the 

majority's analysis of the effectiveness of the interrogation program and became the core of the 

report adopted by the Committee, This last tranche contained nearly all of the most 

consequential analysis and—with the 282-page Executive Summary and the 95 -pages of 

Findings and Conclusions provided to members for the first time just three days prior to the 

business meeting—comprised 40 percent of the adopted Study. The day before the December 

13, 2012, business meeting, the Committee members received another "final version" of the 

report that made extensive changes to Study text, including the conclusions.17 This unreasonably 

short time-period to review thousands of pages of text essentially precluded the possibility of 

formulating and offering amendments to the Study—had such an opportunity even been afforded 

to our Committee members. 

w

 CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities 

(September 2001 - October 2003), May 7.2004, p. 88-89 (DTS 2004-2710). 

SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 8. 

" SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 8. 

17 See SSCI Transcript, Business Meeting to Consider the Report on the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program, 

December 13, 2012. p. 25 (DTS 2013-0452). 

5 

TOP SECRET// 7NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

557 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ 

(U) Aside from the sheer volume of the material, underlying the request for more time 

was the fact that almost all of the source material used to write the Study was located 40 minutes 

from Capitol Hill and thus not readily accessible to members and staff during the busiest month 

of the 112th Congress, when the Committee was simultaneously working on the Study, the 

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 

reauthorization, and its review of the Benghazi attacks. Nevertheless, the Chairman denied the 

Vice Chairman's request both prior to, and during, the Committee's business meeting for more 

time to review the draft Study. 

(U) Insufficient Initial Fact Checking 

(U) The 2,148-page tranche release, which specifically addressed the intelligence 

acquired from the Program and the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the 

Program, also made serious allegations attacking the honesty and integrity of the CIA as an 

institution and of many of its senior and junior officers. In preparing this part of the Study, the 

majority selected 20 cases in which they claim the CIA inaccurately described information' 

acquired from the interrogation program. This is ironic, since we found the Study itself 

consistently mischaracterized CIA's analysis. In each of these 20 cases, the Study absolutely and 

categorically dismissed any correlation previously drawn by the CIA between the Detention and 

Interrogation Program and the capture of terrorists, thwarting of terrorist plots, or the collection 

of significant intelligence. There is no ambiguity in the Study's indictment: in every one of 

these cases, the CIA and its officers lied—to Congress, to the White House, to the Department of 

Justice, and ultimately to the American people. 

(U) We believe that the serious nature of these original conclusions required, as the 

Committee has done in the past with reports of such magnitude, submitting the Study to the 

Intelligence Community for review and comment before the vote. This deviation not only 

hampered the Committee's efforts to approve a factually accurate report, but it deprived the 

Intelligence Community of its traditional opportunity to provide important feedback to the 

Committee prior to the approval of the Study. Moreover, the near absence of any timely 

interviews of relevant Intelligence Community witnesses during the course of this Study was a 

warning flag that should have signaled the increased need for initial fact-checking prior to the 

Study's adoption. 

(U) The Committee has a long-standing practice of sending reports to the executive 

branch for review dating back to the Church Committee reports in 1975.18 More recently, in 

2004, the Committee provided the draft report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar 

Intelligence Assessments on Iraq to the Intelligence Community for fact-checking. The 

Committee wanted to ensure that a report of that magnitude, which purported to tell the 

Intelligence Community why years of analysis on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs 

was wrong, needed to be unquestionably accurate and not subject to challenge by the Intelligence 

Community. Only after the Intelligence Community provided its feedback and after the 

Committee held a hearing with the Director of Central Intelligence to give him the chance to 

18 See Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation. University Press of Kentucky 

Lexington, 1985, p. 108. 

6 

7NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

558 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/D TOJOFORN 

comment on the record, did the Committee vote on the report. Thus, both the Committee and the 

Intelligence Community had a full and fair opportunity to review and check the report before a 

vote and before members provided additional or minority views. Also, unlike this Study, the 

Committee had conducted over 200 interviews with Intelligence Community witnesses who, 

over the course of a year, provided the investigative staff with information, insight, and 

clarification that could not be found in the documents alone. 

(U) Unfortunately, in spite of a specific request at the December 2012 business meeting 

to follow these precedents, the majority refused to do so. Adhering to our established precedent 

for a report of this importance would have sent a clear signal to the entire Intelligence 

Community that the Committee's primary goal was to provide an accurate accounting of the 

Detention and Interrogation Program. Had the CIA been allowed to do so, the Study could have 

been modified, if necessary, or if not, members would at least have had the benefit of 

understanding the CIA's perspective prior to casting their votes. Yet, because the Committee 

approved the Study as final, before the Study had been sent to the Intelligence Community for 

review, the CIA was placed in the unenviable position—not of fact-checking—but of critiquing 

the Study of its own oversight Committee. In doing so, the Committee significantly undermined 

and diminished its own credibility. 

(U) The CIA Response 

(U) On June 27, 2013, the CIA provided a 130-page response to the original Study 

approved during the 112th Congress. The CIA also provided a two-page response to our initial 

minority views.19 The purpose of the CIA response was to focus "on the Agency's conduct of 

the RDI program, in the interest of promoting historical accuracy and identifying lessons learned 

for the future, with the ultimate goal of improving the Agency's execution of other covert action 

programs."20 The CIA noted, however, that a comprehensive review of the Study's almost 6,000 

pages was an impossible task given the time allotted. They chose to concentrate their efforts on 

the Study's 20 conclusions and that part of the Study that assessed the value of the information 

derived from the CIA's RDI activities. When the CIA was able to review certain portions of the 

Study in detail, it found that the Study's accuracy "was encumbered as much by the authors' 

interpretation, selection, and contextualization of the facts as it was by errors in their recitation of 

the facts, making it difficult to address its flaws with specific technical correction."21 

(U) Consistent with our own observations, the CIA response found that, while the Study 

has all the appearances of an authoritative history of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program and contains an impressive amount of detail, it fails in significant and consequential 

ways to correctly portray and analyze that detail. The CIA attributed these failures to two basic 

limitations on the authors: (1) a methodology that relied exclusively on a review of documents 

with no opportunity to interview participants; and (2) an apparent lack of familiarity with some 

of the ways the CIA analyzes and uses intelligence.22 

19

 We modified these minority views based upon the CIA's input. 

50

 CIA Study Response. Comments (TAB A), June 27, 2013, p. 1. 

21

 CIA Study Response, Comments (TAB A), June 27, 2013, pp. 1-2. 

22

 CIA Study Response, Comments (TAB A), June 27, 2013, p. 2. 

29 

TOP SECRET/FL //NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

559 
UNCLASSI 

TOP SECRET/^ I//XOFORN 

(U) Unlike the Study, the CIA response actually offered eight specific recommendations 

for improving future covert actions: (1) improve management's ability to manage risk by 

submitting more covert action programs to the special review process currently used H^ H 

••H I (2) better plan covert actions by explicitly addressing at the outset the implications of 

leaks, an exit strategy, lines of authority, and resources; (3) revamp the way in which CIA 

assesses the effectiveness of covert actions; (4) ensure that all necessary information is factored 

into the selection process for officers being considered for the most sensitive assignments; (5) 

create a mechanism for periodically revalidating Office of Legal Counsel guidance on which the 

Agency continues to rely; (6) broaden the scope of accountability reviews; (7) improve 

recordkeeping for interactions with the media; and (8) improve recordkeeping for interactions 

with Congress.23 We believe the CIA should implement these recommendations. 

(U) The Summer Meetings 

(U) During the summer and early fall of 2013, SSCI staff spent about sixty hours with 

CIA personnel who had led and participated in the preparation of the CIA's response to the 

Study. The purpose of these meetings was to discuss factual discrepancies and areas of 

disagreement between the SSCI Study and the CIA Study Response. These exchanges would 

have been much more productive if they had occurred before the Study was approved by the 

Committee in December 2012. 

(U) The majority staff did not start these sessions with discussions about the substance of 

the Study or the CIA's response. Rather, they began by spending an inordinate amount of time 

questioning the CIA personnel about the process by which the CIA had prepared its response to 

the Study. Eventually, the discussions turned to more substantive issues. Prior to each session, 

the majority staff typically determined the order in which the Study conclusions would be 

discussed. Although the CIA and minority staff expressed repeated interest in discussing some 

of the more problematic conclusions and underlying "effectiveness" case studies, the majority 

staff proceeded with discussions of the least controversial portions of the Study. 

(U) Our staff reported to us that the general tenor of these sessions was "unpleasant." 

Instead of giving the CIA an opportunity to help improve the Study by explaining the errors and 

factual inaccuracies identified in their response, the majority staff spent the vast majority of these 

sessions in "transmit" rather than "receive" mode. When the discussions finally turned to the 

"effectiveness" case studies, the majority staff spent a significant portion of the remaining time 

explaining its "methodology" and reading large portions of the report into the record. The CIA 

initially made arrangements to have certain key analysts participate in these discussions to help 

the Committee understand the meaning of certain parts of the historical documentary record. 

Unfortunately, these analysts were often kept waiting outside of the meeting room while the 

majority staff plowed through its set agenda with the senior CIA personnel. Some of those 

waiting analysts never received an opportunity to participate. Seeing the writing on the wall, the 

lead CIA personnel eventually stopped bringing the pertinent analysts along, which did not seem 

23

 CIA Study Response, Comments (TAB A), June 27, 2013, pp. 17-18. 

8 

TOP SECRETfl^MBMBBilll^W^QgORN . 

UNCLASSIFIED 

560 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

to concern the majority staff. The most problematic case studies were summarily discussed in 

just a few hours during the very last session. 

(U) Given the unproductive manner in which these meetings were conducted, the 

Committee missed a significant opportunity to improve its Study through a better understanding 

of the CIA's analytical and operational practices that produced the documentary record upon 

which the Study was based. We commend the CIA personnel who patiently and professionally 

participated in these unproductive sessions and thank them for their dedicated service to our 

Nation. 

(U) The Clash Over the Panetta Review 

(U) On January 15, 2014, Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Chambliss met with 

the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), John Brennan, at his urgent request. At 

this meeting, Director Brennan disclosed that the CIA conducted a "search"24 of a CIA computer 

network used by the Committee. The CIA established this network at a CIA facility in 2009 

pursuant to written agreements between the Committee and then-Director Leon Panetta. It is the 

understanding of thc Committee that the CIA conducted the "Panetta Internal Review" for thc 

purpose of summarizing for CIA leadership the contents of documents likely to be reviewed by 

the Committee during its review. 

(U) As evidenced by repeated unauthorized disclosures in the news media, the 

production and release of the Study has been marred by the alleged misconduct of CIA 

employees and majority staff as it pertains to the so-called "Panetta Internal Review." 

Regardless of differences of opinion and policy, the relationship between the CIA and this 

Committee should not have escalated to this level of embarrassment and provocation. It is one 

of the most delicate oversight relationships in the Federal government and must be treated as 

such at all times. It would be a shame if this incident tarnished the reputation of the Committee 

or the CIA to such a degree that the normally constructive cooperation between the CIA and the 

Committee is scarred beyond repair. 

(U) Typically, matters such as these are handled discreetly through the accommodation 

process and would1 involve internal investigations or joint inquiries. These options were not 

available in this situation. Presently, the Department of Justice, the CIA Inspector General, and 

the U.S. Senate Sergeant at Arms are conducting ongoing investigation into these matters. 

Nonetheless, for the purpose of these Views, it is worth noting the following observations: 

(U) First, Committee majority staff knowingly removed the Panetta Internal Review, a 

highly classified, privileged CIA document, from a CIA facility without authorization 

and in clear violation of the existing agreed-upon procedures by the Committee and the 

CIA. 

M The 2009 written agreement permitted CIA access to the network for technical support, but at the time of this 

writing, the forensic details of the CIA "search" are unknown. 

9 

TOP SECRET/; moFom 

UNCLASSIFIED 

561 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECREIW^^^MHHI^^MP^QGQR M 

(U) Second, although the Committee certainly needs to understand the facts and 

circumstances of whether the CIA acted inappropriately when it allegedly "searched" a 

Committee shared drive on certain CIA computers, this issue is separate and distinct from 

the earlier incident involving the unauthorized removal of the Panetta Internal Review 

document from the CIA facility. The subsequent "search" does not excuse or justify the 

earlier staff behavior or vice versa. 

(U) Third, the Panetta Internal Review document that was brought back to Committee 

spaces was not handled in accordance with Committee protocols. Committee Rule 9.4 

states, "Each member of the Committee shall at all times have access to all papers and 

other material received from any source." It appears that the existence, handling, and the 

majority's possession of this privileged document were not disclosed to the minority for 

months, and might never have been revealed but for the public disclosures about the 

document which led to the January, meeting with Director Brennan. 

(U) Finally, given the CIA's repeated assertions of privilege concerning the document 

since the January meeting with Director Brennan, at no time has a minority member or 

staff handled the document or reviewed its contents. 

(U) The Declassification Review Business Meeting 

(U) The majority's practice of providing insufficient time for member review of the 

report's contents was repeated just prior to the Committee's April 3, 2014, business meeting to 

consider whether to send the report to the executive branch for a declassification review. On 

April 1, 2014, updated versions of the Study's three volume report, totaling 6,178 pages, were 

made available on a Committee shared drive. The majority staff did not release its third updated 

versions of the Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions until the day before the 

business meeting. Finally, four days after the business meeting, the Chairman transmitted to 

President Obama one last revised version of the updated Executive Summary and Findings and 

Conclusions.25 

(U) THE STUDY'S PROBLEMATIC ANALYSIS 

(U) As previously discussed, the flawed process used for the approval of the original 

Study and this updated version resulted in numerous factual errors. These factual errors were 

further compounded by the Study's numerous analytical' shortfalls, which ultimately led to an 

unacceptable number of incorrect claims and1 invalid conclusions. This section will generally 

highlight many of the analytical shortcomings we found in the Study. The next section will then 

specifically examine some of the Study's most problematic conclusions, including our analysis 

of the factual premises, claims, and flawed analytical methodology upon which many of these 

faulty conclusions were based. 

25

 The citations to the updated Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions in these minority views have been 

revised to match up with the versions that were transmitted to the President. The citations to the updated threevolume report are keyed to the versions that were placed on the Committee's shared drive. 

_ _ _ 10 

iniin ii I IIII ii MMBMI^^BI^^B 1 <MM I 

UNCLASSIFIED 

562 
UNCLASSIFIED 

7NOFORN 

(U) When this Committee reviews the Intelligence Community's analytic products, it 

does so with die expectation of adherence to certain analytic integrity standards.26 These 

standards "act as guidelines and goals for analysts and managers throughout the Intelligence 

Community who strive for excellence in their analytic work practices and products."27 Although 

these specific analytic standards do not technically apply to this Committee's oversight 

reporting, the aspirational analytical values they represent are applicable to the Committee's 

analytical expectations for its own oversight work product. The examples offered in this section 

illustrate some of the Study's general analytic deficiencies concerning objectivity, independence 

from political considerations, timeliness, the use of all available intelligence sources, and 

consistency with proper standards of analytic tradecraft. These examples also serve as a useful 

backdrop for our specific analysis and critique of some of the Study's erroneous conclusions and 

claims.28 

(U) Inadequate Context 

begin, however, with a review of the context in which 

the CIA Program was initiated and operated. Although there is no specific, Intelligence 

Community analytic standard addressing context, it is important in any analysis or report to 

provide appropriate context so that the reader is able to understand why events transpired as they 

did. The Study does very little to provide such context—it is entirely silent on the surge in 

terrorist threat reporting that inundated the intelligence Community following the September 11, 

2001, terrorist attacks by al-Qa'ida, and it makes no mention of the pervasive, genuine 

apprehension about a possible second attack on the United States that gripped the CIA in 2002 

and 2003. Rather, the Study begins by coldly describing the September 17, 2001, covert action 

Memorandum of Notification (MON) signed by the President authorizing the CIA to detain 

"persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests 

or who are planning terrorist activities," as if the attacks that had killed nearly 3,000 Americans 

just six days prior, were incidental to the extraordinary authorities granted under the MON, and 

all other events described in the Study.29 They were not. In our collective view, to depict 

judgments and decisions arising from the administration of this program as having been made in 

a vacuum, or somehow in isolation of these events, is both unrealistic and unfair. 

(U) During our review of the materials provided by the CIA for the Study, we could 

clearly discern a workforce traumatized by an intelligence failure that had left thousands of 

Americans dead, but also galvanized by the challenge of working on the frontline to ensure such 

an attack never occurred again. In the early years of this effort, there were constant threats of 

new attacks, and endless leads to track down. CIA and other Intelligence Community personnel 

worked relentlessly, day in and day out, to follow up on every one. 

2b

 In 2004, the SSCI was instrumental in including in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. P.L. 

108-458, a provision mandating that the Director of National Intelligence "ensure the most accurate analysis" by 

implementing policies and procedure "to encourage sound analytic tradecraft." 

27

 Intelligence Community Directive Number 203, Analytic Standards (effective June 21, 2007), p. 1. 

28 See Intelligence Community Directive Number 203, Analytic Standards (effective June 21, 2007), p. 2. 

See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3. 2014, p. II. 

11 

TOP SECRET/; VXOFORX 

UNCLASSIFIED 

563 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

(U) There is no doubt that the CIA Program—executed hastily in the aftermath of the 

worst terrorist attack in our Nation's history—had flaws. The CIA has admitted as much in its 

June 27, 2013 , response to the Study. However, the Study's conclusion that the use o f enhanced 

interrogation techniques was ineffective doe s not comport with a massive documentary record 

that clearly demonstrates a series of significant counter-terrorism operational successes. That 

same documentary record also undercuts the Study's flawed conclusions that the CIA "impeded" 

congressional and executive branch oversight of the Program, as well as the counterterrorism and 

diplomatic missions of other federal entities. Our review of the record revealed this 

conclusion—one the Study twists itself in knots to avoid—that the CIA Program was a vital 

source of critical intelligence that led to the detention of multiple terrorists and helped keep 

America safe. 

(U) Whether the CIA should operate a clandestine detention program and whether it is in 

America's interests to interrogate suspected terrorists using methods beyond those in the U.S. 

Army Field Manual are valid questions worthy o f serious debate. Unfortunately, the utility of 

Study's considerable work product in such a debate is seriously undermined by its disregard of 

the Program's historical context and its reliance upon an unrealistic analytical methodology, 

which appears to have been designed to exclude from consideration any inconvenient facts not 

fitting within the Study's preconceived view that such enhanced methods produced nothing of 

intelligence value. Although there are a number of findings in the Study with which we agree, 

our ow n review of the documentary record compelled us to focus our discussion in these 

minority views on these inconvenient facts that invalidate much of the revisionist histoiy that is 

being advocated by many of the Study's findings and conclusions. 

(U) Inadequate Objectivity 

The standard o f objectivity requires that analysts perform 

their analytic functions from an unbiased perspective—analysis "should be free o f emotional 

content, give due regard to alternative perspectives, and acknowledge developments that 

necessitate adjustments to analytic judgments."3 0 

. We wer e disappointed to find the updated version of the 

Study still contains evidence of strongly held biases by the authors—a point emphasized by John 

Brennan prior to his confirmation as the Director of the CIA, when he told Vic e Chairman 

Chambliss that, based on his reading of the originally approved Executive Summary and the 

Findings and Conclusions, the Study was "not objective" and was a "prosecutor's brief," 

"written with an ey e toward finding problems." We still agree with Director Brennan's 

assessments. We also agree with the criticism he relayed from Intelligence Community officials 

that it wa s written with a "bent on the part o f the authors" with "political motivations." We 

similarly found these problems, but more importantly, w e found that those biases were not only 

present, but they resulted in faulty analysis, serious inaccuracies, and misrepresentations of fact 

in the Study. 

30

 Intelligence Community Directive Number 203, Analytic Standards (effective June 21, 2007), p. 2. 

12 

i i mi ii < iii i BMBH^ B II II I III I 

UNCLASSIFIED 

564 
TOP SECRET/zi^^M^MB^BBtp^pQft ^ 

mHHVF ) For example, there were instances when detainees told their 

interrogators that they had provided everything they knew or denied that they were terrorists, and 

the Study seems to take them at their word. In June 2002, Abu Zubaydah told his interrogators, 

"What 1 have, I give it all... I have no more."31 The Study seems to have bought into this lie 

when it subsequently concluded, "At no time during or after the aggressive interrogation phase 

did Abu Zubaydah provide the information that the CIA enhanced [interrogations] were 

premised upon, specifically, 'actionable intelligence about al-Qa'ida operatives in the United 

States and planned al-Qa'ida lethal attacks against U.S. citizens and U.S. interests.'"32 

(TS^HIHH^^HNF) In fact, Abu Zubaydah did provide actionable intelligence 

that helped disrupt planned al-Qa'ida lethal attacks against U.S. citizens and interests following 

his June 2002 denials of having more information. Although our review of the documentary 

record revealed that Abu Zubaydah's first period of "aggressive" interrogation actually began on 

April 15, 2002,33 he certainly provided valuable intelligence after his second period of 

aggressive interrogation began on August 4, 2002.34 For example, on August 20, 2002,35 Abu 

Zubaydah provided information about how he would go about locating Hassan Ghul and other 

al-Qa'ida associates in Karachi. This information caused HHHtfPakistan i authorities to 

intensify their efforts and helped lead them to capture Ramzi bin al-Shibh and other al-Qa'ida 

associates during the Karachi safe house raids conducted on September 10-11, 2002."36 These 

arrests effectively disrupted a then ongoing plot to bomb certain named hotels in Karachi, 

Pakistan.37 In April 2002, Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) confirmed the hotels plot had been 

directed against U.S. citizens and interests when he told his interrogators that the hotels had been 

selected because they were frequented by American and German guests.38 

acceptance as factual those CIA documents that support its findings and conclusions, and the 

dismissal of documents contradictory to its findings and conclusions as being "inaccurate" or 

"misrepresentations." For example, the Study cites to a finished intelligence product published 

in 2006 as support for its stunning claim that the "CIA later concluded that Abu Zubaydah was 

not a member of al-Qa'ida."39 In fact, the product states: "Al-Qa'ida rejected Abu Zubaydah's 

request in 1993 to join the group and that Khaldan was not overseen by Bin Ladin's 

organization."40 The Study fails to state that the interrogation of this supposed "non-member" 

resulted in 766 sole-source disseminated intelligence reports by the Study's own count.41 

31

 SSCI Study, Volume I, March 31, 2014, p. 113: CIA, •• • 10487, June 18, 2002, p 4 

32

 SSCI Study, Volume I. March 31, 2014. p. 146. 

33 See infra, p. 34. 

34 See CIA, • • 10586, August 4, 2002, pp. 2-5. 

35 See CIA, Captures Resulting From Detainee information: Four Cttse Studies, November 26, 2003, p. 2; CIA, 

ALE C

 IHH^ugus t 29, 2002, pp. 2-7. 

36 See infra, pp. 38-41. 

37 See infra, pp. 45-47. 

38 See [REDACTED] 34513, March 5,2003, p. 2. 

39

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 410 n.2301. 

40

 CIA, Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in Afghanistan, 1990-2001, August 16. 2006, p. 2 (DTS 

2006-3254) (emphasis added). ). This document is attached as Appendix I, see infra, p. 1-1. 

See SSCI Study, Volume III, March 31.2014, pp. 282-283. 

. 13 

TOP SECRETfl^J I 

UNCLASSIFIED 

565 
UNCLASSIFIED 

IUJ1 ^LLILL 

Ironically, this intelligence product was written based on "information from detainees and 

captured documents"—including from Abu Zubaydah.42 

Another indication of the Study's lack of objectivity is its 

tendency to state its conclusions in such a manner as to be technically accurate, but factually 

misleading. For example, in the Executive Summary, the Study authors state, 

a review of CIA records found no connection between Abu Zubaydah's reporting 

on Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Ramzi bin al-Shibh's capture. CIA records indicate 

that Ramzi bin al-Shibh wa^aptoedunexpectedly—on September 11, 2002, 

. when Pakistani authorities, I^^HIH B were conducting raids targeting 

Hassan Ghul in Pakistan."43 

The implication is that none of the information Zubaydah provided pursuant after enhanced 

interrogation led to al-Shibh's capture. What is ignored here is the exact expression of 

Zubaydah's role in al-Shibh's apprehension, captured in a CIA internal communication, where it 

is made clear, "[Zubaydah's] knowledge of al-Qa'ida lower-level facilitators, modus operandi 

and safehouses, which he shared with us as a result of EITs .. . played a key role in the ultimate 

capture of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh."44 Zubaydah's reporting on how to locate terrorists in Pakistan, 

by trying to find another terrorist, is what led to bin al-Shibh's arrest45 

The Study's uneven treatment of key U.S. officials 

throughout the report, attacking the credibility and honesty of some, while making little mention 

of others, also lacked objectivity. For example, former Director George Tenet led the CIA at the 

outset of the Program, during a period the Study contends was characterized by mismanagement. 

Tenet authorized the enhanced interrogation techniques, and if the Study is to be believed, 

headed an organization that withheld information from and misled policymakers in the executive 

branch and Congress. He is mentioned 62 times in the updated version of the Study's Executive 

Summary. By comparison, former Director Michael Hayden joined the CIA in 2006, after all but 

two detainees entered the Program and the most severe EITs were no longer in use. He was also 

the only Director to brief the Program to all members of the congressional oversight committees. 

Yet, Director Hayden is mentioned 172 times in the Executive Summary, where he is disparaged 

numerous times. For example, in Conclusion 18, which alleges the CIA marginalized criticisms 

and objections concerning the Detention and Interrogation Program, the Executive Summary 

states: "CIA Director Hayden testified to the Committee that 'numerous false allegations of 

physical and threatened abuse and faulty legal assumptions and analysis in the [ICRCJ report 

undermine its overall credibility.'"46 The Study also states: 

42

 CIA, Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in Afghanistan, 1990-2001, August 16, 2006, p i (DTS 

2006-3254). 

41

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 318. 

44

 CIA Memo from Pavitt to CIA IG on Draft Special Review, February 27, 2004, pp. 13-14. For a more detailed 

examination of this issue, see infra, pp. 38-42. 

45 See CIA, ALEC •••Augus t 29, 2002, pp. 2-3; CIA, ALEC September 11, 2002, p. 2. 

46

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 15. 

14 

K/NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

566 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET^ 

After multiple Senators had been critical of the program and written letters 

expressing concerns to CIA Director Michael Hayden, Director Hayden 

nonetheless told a meeting of foreign ambassadors to the United States that every 

Committee member was 'fully briefed,' and that '[tjhis is not CIA's program. 

This is not the President's program. This is America's program.'47 

Beyond the imbalance with which some officials are treated in the Study, we are particularly 

concerned that such treatment will send the perverse message to future CIA Directors and the 

CIA that they will face less criticism if they keep information limited to only a few members. 

(U) Indications of Political Considerations 

(U) The analysis and products of the Intelligence Community are supposed to remain 

independent of political consideration, leaving policy and political determinations to the 

policymakers and politicians. It follows that, Intelligence Community analysts "should provide 

objective assessments informed by available information that are not distorted or altered with the 

intent of supporting or advocating a particular policy, political viewpoint, or audience."48 

Although some might think that this analytic standard would have little applicability to Congress, 

which is an inherently political body, in the context of congressional oversight of the Intelligence 

Community, our Committee was designed to function in a bipartisan manner. Thus, this 

analytical standard is useful in assessing whether a particular Committee oversight report was 

crafted in a bipartisan manner or suffers from indications of political considerations. 

uses quotes from minority members out,of context to suggest they supported positions in the 

Study, that they in fact did not, and entirely omits contradictory comments. For example, the 

Study selectively quotes from a February 11, 2009, meeting organized around the discussion of a 

report prepared by majority staff, evaluating the detention and interrogation of two detainees. 

The Study indicates that "a Committee staff' presented the report, and quotes Chairman 

Feinstein saying the review represented, "the most comprehensive statement on the treatment of 

these two detainees."49 What the Study fails to note, however, is that Vice Chairman Bond 

clarified the draft was "the work of two majority staff members," and that neither he, "nor any 

minority staff was informed of the work going into the memo over the course of the last year." 

He also noted that the minority had offered some input, but had not been able to review the 

document thoroughly, or fact check it, and therefore did not view the report as a bipartisan 

document. Moreover, he noted that the minority staff had just received the remarks the majority 

staff had prepared, several points of which were subsequently disputed by minority staff during 

the meeting.50 

fFSiHHHB ^ The Study also claims that a minority member's comments 

during the meeting, "expressed support for expanding the Committee investigation to learn more 

47

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 448. 

48

 Intelligence Community Directive Number 203, Analytic Standards (effective June 21, 2007), p. 2. 

49

 SSCI Study, Volume I, March 31, 2014, p. 1211. 

30 See SSCI Transcript, Business Meeting to Discuss the Committee's Investigation of the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program, February 11, 2009, pp. 6-7 and 33-34 (DTS 2009-1420), 

15 

I//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

567 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//| 

about the program."51 In fact, the member was explaining to two majority members, who were 

already talking about declassifying a report they had just seen, why he would like to know a lot 

more "before I pass judgment" on the CIA officers described in the document. Suggesting doubt 

about the allegations in the document, he commented, "It's hard to believe, and 1 can't help but 

think that there isn't more here."52 

(U) Lack of Timeliness 

(U) The analytic integrity standard of timeliness is predicated on maximizing the impact 

and utility of intelligence, and it encourages the Intelligence Community to produce relevant 

analysis that effectively informs key policy decisions.53 The "effectively informs" aspect of this 

notion means that intelligence products which are published too near to a decision point, let 

alone after it, are of diminishing or negligible value. This same susceptibility holds true for 

intelligence oversight reports. 

On January 22, 2009, President Obama issued Executive 

Order 13491, which required the CIA to "close as expeditiously as possible any detention 

facilities that it currently operates and .. . not operate any such detention facility in the future." 

The Executive Order prohibited any U.S. government employee from using intenogation 

techniques other than those in the Army Field Manual 2-22.3 on Human Intelligence Collector 

Operations.54 The Terms of Reference for the Study were approved by the Committee on March 

5, 2009.53 However, the original Study was adopted by the Committee on December 13, 2012— 

approximately three years and nine months after the approval of the Terms of Reference.56 On 

April 3, 2014—more than five years after the Terms of Reference were approved—the 

Committee sent updated versions of the previously approved Executive Summary and Findings 

and Conclusions to the executive branch for a declassification review. 

This Study purports to represent "the most comprehensive 

review ever conducted of the CIA's Detention and Intenogation Program."57 Certainly, there is 

some utility in the exercise of studying an intelligence program so expansive and intricate, that 

the document production phase alone lasted more than three years, and produced more than six 

million pages of material.58 Normally, a review of this magnitude might be expected to yield 

valuable lessons learned and best practices, which might then be applied to future intelligence 

3!

 SSCI Study, Volume I, March 31. 2014, p. 1213. 

52

 SSCI Transcript, Business Meeting to Discuss the Committee's Investigation of the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program, February 11, 2009, pp. 48-51 (DTS 2009-1420). 

53 See Intelligence Community Directive Number 203, Analytic Standards (effective June 21, 2007), p. 2. 

54

 Executive Order 13491, "Ensuring Lawful Interrogation," January 22, 2009, Section 3(b), p. 2. 

55 See SSCI Transcript, Business Meeting to Discuss and Revote on the Terms of Reference for the Committee's 

Study of the CIA 's Detention and Interrogation Program, March 5, 2009, p. 11 (DTS 2009-1916). 

56 See SSCI Transcript, Business Meeting to Consider the Report on the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program, 

December 13, 2012, p. 74 (DTS 2013-0452). 

57

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2004, p. 9. A more accurate statement would have been, "the 

most comprehensive documentaiy review ever conducted of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program." 

58

 SSCI Study. Executive Summary, December 3, 2004, p. 9. 

16 

1//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

568 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOPSECRElfl—— • 

programs. However, no version of the Study has ever contained any recommendations.59 

Moreover, there are no lessons learned, nor are there any suggestions of possible alternative 

measures. This absence of Committee recommendations is likely due to the fact that the key 

policy decisions about the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program were decided years ago 

by President Obama in 2009. Despite its massive size, the Study does little to effectively inform 

current policymakers, but rather makes a number of inaccurate historical judgments about the 

CIA's Program. For these reasons, we conclude that the Study is not timely. 

(U) Inadequate Use of Available Sources of Intelligence 

(U) Despite the millions of records available for the Study's research, we found that 

important documents were not reviewed and some were never requested. We were surprised to 

learn that the e-mails of only 64 individuals were requested to support the review of a program 

that spanned eight years and included hundreds of government employees. Committee reviews 

of this magnitude typically involve interviewing the relevant witnesses. Here, these relevant 

witnesses were largely unavailable due to the Attorney General's decision to re-open a 

preliminary criminal review in connection with the interrogation of specific detainees at overseas 

locations. When DOJ closed this investigation in August 2013, however, the Committee had a 

window of opportunity to invite these relevant witnesses in for interviews, but apparently 

decided against that course of action. The lack of witness interviews should have been a clear 

warning flag to all Committee members about the difficulty of completing a truly 

"comprehensive" review on this subject. 

<U) Exhibits Poor Standards of Analytic Tradecraft 

(U) Compounding its disconcerting analytic integrity challenges, the Study's content is 

littered with examples of poor analytic tradecraft, across several critical measures of proficiency 

for authoring intelligence products. Here we provide some examples of the Study's poor 

analytic tradecraft. 

(U) Inadequately Describes the Quality and Reliability of Sources 

Analysis that adheres to Intelligence Community tradecraft 

standards properly describes the quality and reliability of sources. Analysis that misrepresents or 

misinterprets the quality of source material compromises the integrity of the resulting analysis. 

At points, the Study relies upon "draft talking points" documents as being authoritative.60 Doing 

so raises questions about the credibility of the assessment being drawn based on such a source, 

because draft talking points are prepared by staff for a senior leader and it is often difficult to 

ascertain, absent interviews, whether all, some, or none of the information contained in talking 

points was even used by the senior leader. 

39

 At least the CIA's June 27, 2013, response to the Study identified eight recommendations derived from the 

lessons it had learned related to the Detention and Interrogation Program. See CIA Study Response, Comments (Tab 

A), June 27, 2013, pp. 16-17. 

m

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, pp. 143 and 196. 

17 

TOP SECRET/^ 1//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

569 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/D Y/NOFORN 

We found frequent examples of citations that pointed to 

documents that did not discuss the material in question, were taken out of context, or did not 

accurately reflect the contents of the cited source documents—in some cases changing the 

meaning entirely. For example, the Study states that a review by the CIA Inspector General (IG) 

"uncovered that additional unauthorized techniques were used against" a detainee, but the 

Inspector General report actually said it "heard allegations" of the use of unauthorized 

techniques and said, "For all of the instances, the allegations were disputed or too ambiguous to 

reach any authoritative determination about the facts."61 In another case, the Study states: "By 

early October 2002, the CIA completed a search of the names identified in the 'perfume letter* in 

its databases and found most of the individuals who 'had assigned roles in support of the 

operation' were arrested by Pakistani authorities during the raids."62 This inaccurate paraphrase 

is different from the actual language of the quote, which states, "it appears that most of the 

detainees arrested on [September 11, 2002], had assigned roles in support of the operation 

outlined in the 'perfume" letter."63 After explaining that a detainee had already admitted that 

"purchasing perfumes" likely referred to purchasing or making poisons, the cable states that, 

"[0]ur concern over this letter is heightened because of the identities of the individuals involved 

in the operation it outlines."64 The Study's inaccurate paraphrase appears to minimize the 

remaining threat, while the cable itself indicates heightened concern. In hindsight, it appears that 

while the September 11, 2002, safe house raids helped to derail the Karachi hotels plot, the threat 

evolved into a planned attack on the U.S. consulate in Karachi by Ammar al-Baluchi and 

Khallad bin Attash, who were not captured during the September 2002 safe house raids.65 

(U) Inadequate Caveats About Uncertainties or Confidence in Analytic Judgments 

fFS^I^^^^^^^^NF ) Proper tradecraft requires that the strength of an analytic 

judgment should be expressed when appropriate, through confidence level statements and the 

identification of uncertainty. This is an important check on analytical judgments that provides a 

key safeguard for policy makers. Many of the Study's conclusions and underlying claims are 

offered as matters of unequivocal fact. As an example, the Study asserts "CIA officers 

conducted no research on successful interrogation strategies during the drafting of the MON, nor 

after it was issued."66 Proving a negative is often very difficult, and in this particular case it is 

difficult to understand how such an absolute assertion can be made without interviewing the 

affected witnesses or even citing to one documentary source that might support such a claim. 

61

 Compare'SSCI Study, Volume I, March 31, 2014, p. 229, with CIA Office of Inspector General. Special Review: 

Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003), May 7.2004, p. 41 

(DTS 2004-2710). [[This tradecraft error was partially corrected in the November 26. 2014. version of the 

Executive Summary by editing the offending sentence to read, "The Office of Inspector General later described 

additional allegations of unauthorized techniques used against .. . ." (emphasis added). Compare SSCI Study, 

Executive Summary, April 3. 2014, p. 67 with SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 70.]] 

62

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 242. The Study cites to CIA, ALEC 188560, October 3, 

2002, but the quoted language actually appears in CIA, ALEC 188565, October 3, 2002, p. 2. 

63

 CIA, ALEC^^MOctobe r 3, 2002, p. 2. 

64

 CIA, ALEC ^^MOetobe r 3,2002, pp. 2-3. 

65

 CIA, CIA CABLE 45028. ••••••iCIA , [CIA CABLE] 38405, May 17. 2003, p. 4-7. See infra, pp. 

45-47. 

SSCI Study, Volume I, March 31, 2014, p. 20. 

IB inn i 11 i BBi^^^^MIMH I nun 

UNCLASSIFIED 

570 
UNCLASSIFIED 

K/NOFORN 

(U) Inadequate Incorporation of Alternative Analysis Where Appropriate 

Analysts are generally encouraged to incorporate 

alternative analysis into their production where they can. Sometimes this exercise helps identity 

weaknesses in the analysis or highlights intelligence collection gaps. The Study is replete with 

uncited and potentially unknowable assertions like "there is no indication in CIA records that 

Abu Zubaydah provided information on bin al-Shibh's whereabouts"67 or' 

^ ^ H

 neve r

 visited the site."68 Alternate analysis would certainly have been helpful in 

disproving the first claim and may have been helpful in the determination of whether the second 

assertion could really be established by records alone. With respect to the first claim, Abu 

Zubaydah did provide locational information about bin al-Shibh. As discussed below, Zubaydah 

made four separate photographic identifications of bin al-Shibh and placed him in Kandahar, 

Afghanistan, during the November to December 2001 timeframe and provided sufficient 

information for interrogators to conclude that bin al-Shibh was subsequently with KSM in 

Karachi, Pakistan.69 With respect to the absolute claim that BHBHHBHHUI^^I^^IIIB never 

visited a particular site, alternative analysis may have demonstrated a need for additional 

information beyond that contained in the documentary record. That alternative analysis may 

have counseled in favor of modifying the assertion to something like, "it appears that no | 

| visited the site during that timeframe" or dropping the assertion in its entirety. 

(UJ Based on Flawed Logical Argumentation 

Proper tradecraft entails understanding of the information 

and reasoning underlying analytic judgments. Key points should be made effectively and 

supported by information and coherent reasoning. Substandard analysis presents unsupported 

assertions that appear contrary to the evidence cited or in violation of common sense. We found 

instances where claims were supported more by rhetorical devices than sound logical reasoning. 

For example, in support of the Study's conclusion that the CIA's use of enhanced interrogation 

techniques was not effective, the Study stated: 

At least seven detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques almost immediately after being rendered into CIA custody, making it 

impossible to determine whether the information they provided could have been 

obtained through non-coercive debriefing methods,"70 

67

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 317. 

68

 SSCI Study, Volume I. March 31, 2014, p. 227. 

69 See infra, p. 38. 

70

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, April 3,2014, p. 2 (emphasis added). {'[This false reasoning was 

tempered in the December 3,2014, version of the Executive Summary by editing the sentence to read, "CIA 

detainees who were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were usually subjected to the 

techniques immediately after being rendered to CIA custody. Other detainees provided significant accurate 

intelligence prior to, or without having been subjected to these techniques." Compare SSCI Study, Findings and 

Conclusions, April 3, 2014, p. 2 with SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions. December 3. 2014. p. 2.|] 

19 

TOP SECRET/*! Y/NOFQRN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

571 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! Y/NOFORN 

This statement is a rhetorical attempt to persuade the reader that non-coercive techniques may 

have been equally or even more successful than the enhanced techniques. It is little more than an 

appeal to unknowable facts and is not based upon logical reasoning.71 

We also found instances where the Study undermined its 

own claims by citing to documents that contradicted those claims. For example, while 

discussing testimony given by then CIA Director Hayden on the Program, the Study states, 

"Hayden's testimony includedthe representation that Abu Zubaydah had a religious basis for 

cooperating after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques .. .Research Note: CIA 

records do not support this representation related to Abu Zubaydah .. . .''72 The Study also 

asserted, "Abu Zubaydah explained that he informed trainees at the training camp that '"no 

brother' should be expected to hold out for an extended time," and that captured individuals will 

provide information in detention. For that reason, the captured individuals, he explained, should 

"expect that the organization will make adjustments to protect people and plans when someone 

with knowledge is captured."73 However, in the same intelligence report cited for the above 

proposition, Abu Zubaydah revealed, that as his conditions in CIA detention worsened. 

[H]e became increasingly concerned for his long-term wellbeing. He said that 

this process eventually became an 'unbearable weight' that Allah would no 

longer require him to cany. Under these conditions, Allah would have mercy and 

forgive him ('As Jesus forgave Peter for denying him three times')/or revealing 

to the Americans what he knew about al Qa 'ida and the brothers.74 

This one admission by Abu Zubaydah, unexplainably omitted from the Study, completely 

contradicts the flawed logic of the Study's claim that religion played no role in his cooperation 

with the Americans. The criticism of Director Hayden here is unwarranted. 

(U) ERRONEOUS STUDY CONCLUSIONS 

(U) We were only given 60 days to prepare our initial minority views in response to the 

more than 6,000-page Study, which was approved by the Committee at the end of the 112th 

Congress. In those initial views, we successfully endeavored to describe the major fallacies and 

problematic findings that we had time to identify in the Study. Despite the fact that the CIA 

response and the summer staff meetings essentially validated our criticisms of the original Study, 

it appears that the updated version of the Study largely persists with many of its erroneous 

analytical and factual claims. We have used these past eleven weeks to update our own minority 

views and focus our attention on eight of the Study's most problematic conclusions.75 

71

 For a more detailed analysis of this unsupported claim, see infra, p. 22. 

73

 SSCI Study, Volume 1. iMarch 31,2014, p. 1130 (emphasis added). 

7J

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 469 (citing CIA,| ® 10496, February 1'6, 2003, p. 2). 

74

 CIA, 10496, February 16,2003, p. 3 (emphasis added). 

75

 We will address these eight conclusions in the following order: (1) Conclusion 1; (2) Conclusion 2; (3) 

Conclusion 6; (4) Conclusion 7; (5) Conclusion 8; (6) Conclusion 5; (7) Conclusion 9; and (8) Conclusion 10. 

20 

'/N'OFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 

572 
UNCLASSIFIED 

m i

 1 i i III I i WW—MHW1— I mi inn i 

(U) Conclusion 1 (The CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques was not effective) 

(U) The First of these updated conclusions asserts that the "CIA's use of enhanced 

interrogation techniques was not an effective means of acquiring intelligence or gaining 

cooperation from detainees."76 The Study attempts to validate this apparently absolute 

conclusion by relying upon a number of faulty premises. 

(U) The first faulty premise is that "seven of the 39 CIA detainees known to have been 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced no intelligence while in CIA 

custody."77 This 18 percent "failure rate" statistic may encourage some readers to jump to the 

hasty judgment that enhanced interrogation techniques were not an effective means of acquiring 

intelligence, because they failed to produce intelligence from every detainee against whom they 

were used. Such a judgment seems unreasonable, given that, in most human endeavors, 100 

percent success rates are pretty rare, especially in complex processes like the ones involved here. 

If the Study's statistic is true, then it is just as true that 32 of the 39 detainees subjected to 

enhanced interrogation techniques did produce some intelligence while in CIA custody. That is 

an "effectiveness" rate of 82 percent for obtaining intelligence from detainees who were 

subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques. While an 82 percent effectiveness rate in 

obtaining some information sounds pretty good, this claim suffers from the same analytical 

defect as the Study's 18 percent failure rate, in that it does not provide any real insight about the 

qualitative value of the intelligence information obtained. The true test of effectiveness is the 

value of what was obtained—not how much or how little was obtained. 

(U) As long as we are considering quantitative assessments of whether detainee 

interrogations led to the creation of intelligence reports, it might be useful to look at the "failure" 

and "effectiveness" rates for those detainees who were not subjected to enhanced interrogation. 

Using some of the Study's own numbers, a total of 119 detainees were in the CIA's Detention 

and Interrogation Program. Of these detainees, the interrogations of 41 of them resulted in no 

disseminated intelligence reports.78 If true, we can deduce that 80 detainees were not subjected 

to enhanced interrogation and that the interrogations of 34 of these same detainees resulted in no 

disseminated intelligence reports.79 Turning to the failure rate first, 34 of 80 CIA detainees who 

were not subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques produced no intelligence while in CIA 

custody. That is a 42.5 percent failure rate, more than double the 18 percent failure rate for the 

detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques. Conversely, 46 of 80 detainees who 

were not subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques produced some intelligence while in 

CIA custody. That is a 57,5 percent effectiveness rate, which is also considerably lower than the 

82 percent effectiveness rate for the detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation. 

76

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2. The first and second conclusions in the updated 

Findings and Conclusion had been combined in Conclusion 9 of the original Study. 

77

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2. The assertion of "produced no intelligence" as 

used by the Study reflects that the interrogations of these detainees resulted in no intelligence reports. 

78 See SSCI Study, Volume II. April 1,2014, pp. 420-421. 

79

 Subtracting the 39 detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation from 119 total detainees equals 80 detainees not 

subjected to enhanced interrogation. We know that seven of the detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation 

resulted in no intelligence reports. Subtracting these seven from the 41 total detainees whose interrogation did not 

result in disseminated intelligence reports leaves 34 detainees whose information did not result in disseminated 

intelligence products, even though they were not subjected to enhanced interrogation. 

21 

M I I I I N II I N 

UNCLASSIFIED 

573 
UNCLASSIFIED 

7NOFORN 

(U) Unlike the above measures, there are some quantitative statistics in the Study that are 

useful in comparing the relative "productivity" of certain detainees. The Study estimates that a 

total of 5,874 sole source disseminated intelligence reports were produced from the interrogation 

of 78 of the 119 detainees. Of these, 4266 reports (72.6 percent) were produced from the 

interrogation of 32 of the 39 detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation.80 Thus, 1608 reports 

(27.4 percent) were produced from the interrogation of 46 of the 90 detainees not subjected to 

enhanced interrogation.81 The Study also credits Abu Zubaydah and KSM with 1597 (27.1 

percent) of the total number of disseminated reports.82 While these statistics cannot be used to 

assess the qualitative value of the specific intelligence in these disseminated reports, they do 

seem to provide insight into the CIA's perceived value of the information being produced by the 

detainees who were subjected to enhanced interrogation, especially Abu Zubaydah and KSM. 

Given that the vast majority of these intelligence reports came from detainees selected for 

enhanced interrogations, these statistics seem to indicate that the CIA was proficient at 

identifying those detainees who might possess information worthy of dissemination. 

(U) The second faulty premise states: 

At least seven detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques almost immediately after being rendered to CIA custody, making it 

impossible to determine whether the information they provided could have been 

obtained through non-coercive debriefing methods. By contrast, other detainees 

provided significant accurate intelligence prior to, or without having been, 

subjected to these techniques.83 

(U) This premise is problematic for at least two reasons. First, the premise itself admits 

that it is based upon ignorance—we will never know whether less coercive techniques would 

have provided the same amount of intelligence from these seven detainees as was obtained by 

using enhanced interrogation. It is troubling that the very first conclusion in this Study is based, 

at least in part, upon an appeal to unknowable facts. Second, this appeal to ignorance is linked to 

an observation that other detainees provided "significant accurate intelligence" without having 

been subjected to enhanced interrogation, in an apparent effort to persuade us that the use of less 

coercive techniques might have also resulted in "significant accurate intelligence." While this 

second observation is factually correct, it is misleading. We know from our earlier examination 

of the "productivity" statistics that the group of detainees who were not subjected to enhanced 

interrogation only provided 27.4 percent of the disseminated intelligence reporting, which 

undercuts the very inference raised by this empty premise. 

80 See SSCI Study, Volume II, April 1, 2014, p. 421. 

81

 Subtracting the 4,266 reports produced from the interrogation of detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation 

from the 5,874 total number of reports equals 1,608 reports (27.4 percent) produced from the interrogation of 

detainees not subjected to enhanced' interrogation. 

82 See SSCI Study, Volume II. April 1, 2014, p. 421. 

83

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, April 3,2014, p. 2 (emphasis added). ([This false reasoning was 

tempered in the December 3. 2014, version of the Executive Summary by editing the sentence to read, "CIA 

detainees who were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were usually subjected to the 

techniques immediately after being rendered to CIA custody. Other detainees provided significant accurate 

intelligence prior to, or without having been subjected to these techniques." Compare SSCI Study, Findings and 

Conclusions, April 3, 2014, p. 2 with SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2.|| 

22 

TOP SECRET/ VNOFQRN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

574 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ FR/NQFORN 

(U) The third faulty premise of this ineffective means conclusion focuses on the fact that 

"multiple" detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques "fabricated information, 

resulting in faulty intelligence."84 Like the first faulty premise, this premise only tells one side of 

the story. It implies that only detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation provided fabricated 

information. Not surprisingly, our review of the documentary record revealed that "multiple" 

detainees whose non-enhanced interrogations resulted in at least one sole source intelligence 

report also provided fabricated information to their interrogators.85 Fabrication is simply not a 

good measure of "effectiveness," because detainees are often strongly motivated to protect the 

identities of their terrorist colleagues and the details of their terrorist operations. We train our 

own military personnel to resist against providing sensitive information to their captors during 

the inevitable interrogation process. We understand that such resistance may occasionally lead 

our personnel to provide fabricated information to their interrogators, This is an ancient and 

well-recognized occupational hazard of war. 

(U) Another problematic aspect of this third faulty premise is that it ignores the fact that 

fabricated information can sometimes turn out to be highly significant. One of the best examples 

of this concept can be found in our discussion about how the courier who led us to Bin Ladin's 

hideout was finally located.86 Specifically, many of the senior al-Qa'ida detainees lied to protect 

the identity and importance of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. Abu Zubaydah and Abu Faraj al-Libi 

both lied when they claimed that they did not know anyone named Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. 

KSM fabricated a story that Ahmad had retired from al-Qa'ida. When compared against other 

detainee information, these fabrications were clear signals to CIA analysts that these three 

detainees were trying very hard to keep Ahmad hidden.87 

w

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2. 

85

 Our review examined the first 15 of the 46 detainees whose non-coercive interrogations had resulted in at least 

one sole-source intelligence report. See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 462. We found 

documentary evidence supporting the proposition that 11 of these 15 detainees provided deceptive or fabricated 

information to their interrogators. The 11 deceptive detainees were: Zakariya (CIA, [CIA CABLE] 22576, 

••• ; CIA, CIA CABLE ••••^^^^•CIAjCI A CABLE •• • Janial 

Eldin Boudraa, (CIA, [CIA CABLE] CIA [CIA CABLE] 21520, 

Bashir Nasir Ali al-Marwalah (CIA, [CIA CABLE] CIA CABLE 13756, 

HIHIHHHUIHHa'i l Aziz Alimad al-Mithali (CIA. CIA CABLE 13756^^^^M^^^^BMusa b 

Umar Ail al-Mudwani (CI'A, CIA CABLE l3756|^H||^^^^Hshawq i Awad (CIA, CIA CABLE 

15643HIHHIH||HHuma r Faruq. aka Abu al-Faruq al-Kuwaiti (CIA, CIA CABLE | 

:iA, CIA CABLE 12313| 

CABLE] [DETAINEE R] (CIA, CIA CABLE | 

Abd al-Rahim Ghulam Rabbani (CIA, CIA CABLE and Haji Ghalgi (CIA, CIA 

CABLE >91458,••^••• i We, were unable to find docunientaiy evidence supporting any 

deception or fabrication by the following four detainees: Abbar al-Hawari. aka Abu Sufiyan: Hassan bin Attash; 

Said Saleh Said, aka SaidSalih Said; and Hayatullah Haqqani. 

86 See infra, pp. 73-76. 

87

 See CIA. DIRECTOR •••••••• • CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence. Lessons from the 

Hunt for Usama Bin Ladin, dated September 2012, pp. 9-10 (DTS 2012-3826); CIA Intelligence Assessment, AlQa'ida Watch, Probable Identification of Suspected Bin Ladin Facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, November 23, 

2007, p. 2. 

87 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3. 2014. p. 378-379. 

23 

11III 11 in i ^^^^MMI M inn mill i 

UNCLASSIFIED 

575 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/D TOJOFORN 

(U) The final faulty premise used in support of this "effectiveness" conclusion was that 

"CIA officer s regularly called into question whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques were effective , assessing that the use o f the techniques failed to elicit detainee 

cooperation or produce accurate intelligence."8 8 Whil e the opinions of these unidentified CIA 

officer s may happen to coincide with the Study's first conclusion, there were at least three other 

CIA officials wh o held the opposite view—Director s Tenet, Goss, and Hayden. DCI Tenet 

stated that he "firmly believes that the intenogation program, and specifically the use of EITs, 

has saved many lives." Tenet added that the use o f the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 

was "extremely valuable" in obtaining "enormous amounts of critical threat information," and he 

did not believe that the information could have been gained any other way. 8 9 Director Goss told 

our Committe e members that 

This program has brought us incredible information. It's a program that could 

continue to bring us incredible information. It's a program that could continue to 

operate in a very professional way. It's a program that I think if you saw how it's 

operated you would agree that you would be proud that it's done right and well, 

with proper safeguards."9 0 

CIA Director Hayden also told our Committee that the CIA's intenogation Program existed "for 

one purpose-intelligence," and that the Program "is about preventing future attacks In that 

purpose, preventing attacks, disabling al-Qa'ida, this is the most successful program being 

conducted by American intelligence today."91 

(U) In our opinion, the reasons cited by the Study to support this conclusion that the 

CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of acquiring 

intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees are largely invalid. The faulty premises upon 

which the conclusion is based are more rhetorical than analytical. Our review of the facts 

contained in the documentary record has led us to Che opposite conclusion—that the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program, including the use of enhanced interrogation, was an 

effective means of gathering significant intelligence information and cooperation from a majority 

of these CIA detainees. Our conclusion, however, should not be read as an endorsement of any 

of these particular enhanced interrogation techniques. 

(U) Conclusion 2 (CIA's Justification for EITs Rested on Inaccurate Effectiveness Claims) 

( U) Conclusion 2 states, "[t]he CIA's justification for the use o f its enhanced 

intenogation techniques rested on inaccurate claims of their effectiveness."9 2 The Study 

continues to rely upon 2 0 separate case studies to support this erroneous conclusion. In our 

88

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2. 

89

 Interview of George Tenet, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 8 September, 

2003. \ 

90

 SSCI Transcript, Briefing by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Regarding CIA's Counterterrorism 

Operations and Detention, Interrogation, and Rendition Program, March 15, 2006, p. 8 (DTS 2006-1308). 

91

 SSCI Transcript, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program, April 1'2, 

2007, pp. 16-17 (DTS 2007-3158). 

92

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2. 

29 

TOP SECRET/FL //NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

576 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

original minority views, we only had time to identify the significant flaws in seven of these case 

studies. Prior to our receipt of the June 27, 2013, CIA response, we identified significant 

problems with four more of the case studies. Ultimately, the CIA response validated our critique 

of the original seven case studies and identified additional issues with the remaining case studies. 

We have decided to address 17 of these ease studies in our examination of this conclusion.93 

Although one may have individual views on the relative effectiveness of the enhanced 

interrogation techniques; it is important for the public to understand that these flawed case 

studies are insufficient to establish that the CIA's justification for the use of enhanced 

interrogation techniques rested upon inaccurate claims of their effectiveness. 

(U) The Study's Flawed Analytical Methodology 

(U) In general, the Study essentially refuses to admit that CIA detainees, especially CIA 

detainees subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques, provided intelligence information 

which helped the United States government and its allies neutralize numerous terrorist threats. 

On its face, this position does not make much sense, given the vast amount of information gained 

from these interrogations, the thousands of intelligence reports that were generated as a result of 

them, the capture of additional terrorists, and the disruption of the plots those captured terrorists 

were planning. 

(U) We reviewed 17 of the 20 cases studies that the Study relies upon to support this 

flawed conclusion. We examined these case studies in logical groupings (e.g., related to 

information provided by Abu Zubaydah) using chronological order rather than the Study's 

confusing "primary" and "secondary" effectiveness representations. This approach helped us 

better understand how the intelligence resulting from these detainee interrogations was used by 

the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots and identify, capture, and sometimes prosecute other terrorists. 

(U) The Study developed an analytical methodology to examine the effectiveness of the 

information obtained from the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program that we found to be 

both confusing and deeply flawed. Usually, effectiveness is measured by establishing 

performance metrics that require the collection of pertinent data and the subsequent analysis of 

such data. For example, in the context of counterterrorism such metrics might include: (1) 

increased understanding of terrorist networks; (2) identification of terrorists and those providing 

material support; (3) terrorist captures; (4) terrorist interrogations; (5) disruption of terrorist 

operations and financing; (6) disruption of terrorist recruitment; (7) reduction in terrorist safehavens; (8) development of counterterrorism assets; (9) intelligence gathering of documents, 

computer equipment, communications devices, etc.: (10) improved information sharing; and (11) 

improved foreign liaison cooperation against terrorism. Such metrics could then be compared 

against the information provided by CIA detainees to assess the relative effectiveness of the 

Program. 

93

 We have combined the KSM as the "mastermind" of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks case study with the 

KSM "Mukhtar" alias case study. We did not have time to adequately address the Majid Khan, Sajid Badat, and 

Dhiren Barot case studies. 

25 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

577 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ '/NOFQRN 

(U) Instead of performance metrics, the Study's analytical methodology creates artificial 

categories that are used to exclude certain detainee information from being considered in an 

effectiveness assessment of the Program. For example, if the Study found that a detainee 

subjected to enhanced interrogation had provided similar information during an earlier nonenhanced interrogation, then such information could not be used for assessing the effectiveness 

of the program. This category appears to have been developed in an attempt to exclude much of 

the intelligence information provided by Abu Zubaydah after he was subjected to enhanced 

interrogation in August 2002, since some of the information Abu Zubaydah provided during 

those interrogations was similar to information he had provided prior to August. However, it 

turns out that this category is largely inapplicable to Abu Zubaydah's case, because he was 

subjected to enhanced interrogation by the CIA when he was released from the hospital on April 

(U) Another category of information that the Study's flawed analytical methodology 

excludes is corroborative information. If a detainee subjected to enhanced interrogation 

provided information that was already available to the CIA or other elements of the Intelligence 

Community from another source, then the methodology dictates that such information cannot be 

considered to support a CIA effectiveness representation. This result occurs even in situations in 

which the detainee's information clarified or explained the significance of the prior information. 

Another exclusion category applies if the Study determined that there was no causal relationship 

between the information obtained from a detainee after the use of enhanced interrogation and the 

operational success claimed by the CIA. In these case studies, we often found documentary 

evidence that supported direct causal links between such detainee information and the 

operational success represented by the CIA. The final category excludes detainee information 

about terrorist plots when there was a subsequent assessment by intelligence and law 

enforcement personnel that such plots were infeasible or never operationalized. 

(U) This flawed analytical methodology often forced the Study to use absolute language 

such as, "no connection," "no indication," "played no role," or "these representations were 

inaccurate." Our review of the documentary record often found valid counter-examples that 

disproved such absolute claims. We also found that when we invalidated the claims in the initial 

case studies, there was often a cascading effect that further undermined claims in the subsequent 

case studies. Here we summarize the claims for the case studies we examined and our alternate 

analysis of those claims. 

(U) Our Analytical Methodology 

(U) Our analytical methodology simply focuses on the significant inherent weaknesses 

contained in the analytical categories of the Study's methodology. For example, in case studies 

where the Study claims there was no relationship between the use of enhanced interrogation 

techniques and the operational success, it often uses absolute language such as, "no connection," 

"no indication," "played no role," or "these representations were inaccurate." This greatly 

simplified our analytical task, because the main problem with absolute claims is that it usually 

only takes one valid counter-example to disprove the claim. We did not have too much difficulty 

94 See infra, pp. 33-36. 

15, 2002.94 

26 

TOP SECRET/ VNOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

578 
UNCLASSIFIED 

using the documentary record to: establish connections; find indications; identify the roles; and 

demonstrate the accuracy of certain representations. We suspect that this task would have been 

even easier if there had been an opportunity to speak to the relevant witnesses. 

(U) The same can be said with respect to the Study's treatment of the "otherwise 

available categories." In these case study claims, the Study would point to documents that 

"provided similar information" or contained "corroborative" information. The usual problem 

with these claims is that they failed to analyze the weight and significance of the information 

provided by the particular detainee. We found documentary evidence indicating that the CIA 

often had not understood or properly exploited previously acquired intelligence information until 

after its significance was clarified by a particular detainee or detainees. 

(U) Also, we were less inclined to dismiss the significance of certain plots and threats 

just because there was documentary evidence indicating that some intelligence professionals 

found them infeasible or had not yet become operational. Often, the most difficult part of a 

terrorist plot is getting the terrorists into a position where they can attack. If the terrorists are not 

neutralized, they have additional time to refine their plans, adjust to new targets, or gain access 

to better weapons and equipment. The evolving nature of the Karachi terrorist plots 

demonstrates this point quite well.95 

( U ) Re-organization of the "Effectiveness" Case Studies 

(U) In general, we have tried to organize our analysis of these case studies sequentially 

into six logical and chronological groupings. For example, since Abu Zubaydah was the first 

CIA detainee subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques, we begin with the case studies 

which examine the significant intelligence information that he disclosed to his interrogators. 

Despite claims made by the Study, we found that, over time, information obtained from Abu 

Zubaydah was very useful in the subsequent interrogation of other detainees and sometimes even 

helped lead to the capture of other terrorists, which in turn, often disrupted developing terrorist 

plots. 

<U) The next logical grouping of case studies centers geographically in Pakistan during 

the March 2002 through April 2003 time-frame and concerns the Intelligence Community's 

efforts to locate and capture the al-Qa'ida terrorists in that country. For example, we trace how 

Abu Zubaydah's information helped 'fl^^ H Pakistani authorities conduct important raids 

on several key safe houses in Karachi on September 10-11, 2002, which resulted in a treasure 

trove of collected physical evidence and intelligence information, as well as the capture of Ramzi 

bin al-Shibh, Abu Badr, Abdul Rahim Gulam Rabbani, Hassan Muhammad, Ali bin Attash, and 

other al-Qa'ida members. We turn next to the capture of KSM in Rawalpindi in March 2003 and 

then examine the various Karachi terrorist plots, which were largely neutralized by the 

September 2002 safe house raids, but were not finally disrupted until the capture of Ali Abdul 

Aziz Ali and Khallad bin Attash on April 29, 2003, in Karachi. This grouping ends with our 

discussion of the Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plots, which were fully disrupted with the 

captures of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, KSM, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, and Khallad bin Attash. 

95 See infra, pp. 45-47. 

_ 2 7 

inn 11 mi i WHMBBBBBM I

 11111 

UNCLASSIFIED 

579 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

(U) The third grouping takes us briefly to Southeast Asia and our analysis of how 

detainee information helped lead to the capture of Riduan Isamuddin, also known as "Hambali" 

in Thailand during August 2003, the disruption of the Second Wave plots, and the capture of his 

Al-Ghuraba Group in Karachi, Pakistan. 

(U) Our fourth grouping consists of the case studies that primarily involved information 

provided by KSM. We begin with an analysis of four case studies where KSM provided helpful 

information during 2003: the critical intelligence on Jaffar al-Tayyar (also known as Adnan elShukrijumah); the arrest of Saleh al-Marri; the capture of Iyman Faris; and the identification and 

arrests of Uzhair and Saifuilah Paracha. 

(U) The fifth grouping examines three case studies that are factually unrelated but 

depend upon detainee information that was provided in 2004. The first involves the tactical 

intelligence provided on Shkai, Pakistan, by Hassan Ghul. The second involves the thwarting of 

the Camp Lemonier plotting in Djibouti and the third examines how CIA detainees subjected to 

enhanced interrogation provided information useful in the validation of CIA sources. 

(U) Our final chronological group covers the identification of Usama Bin Ladin's 

courier. Here, we demonstrate that detainee information played a significant role in leading CIA 

analysts to the courier Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, who in turn, led the Intelligence Community to 

Usama Bin Ladin. 

(U) The Domino Effect 

(U) Our reorganization of these case studies away from the Study's confusing primary 

and secondary "effectiveness representations" frame of reference into a more traditional 

chronological analytical framework clearly exposes the fatal flaw in the structure of the Study's 

current analysis. In essence, the Study's analysis resembles a very large and carefully lined-up 

set of dominoes. The claims made in those first few dominoes are absolutely crucial in 

maintaining the structure and validity of many of the claims made and repeated in the dominoes 

that follow. Our analysis demonstrates that the claims in these initial case studies are simply not 

supported by the factual documentary record. This led to an analytical chain reaction in which 

many of the Study's subsequent claims became invalid, in part, because of their dependence on 

the first few factually inaccurate claims. 

incorrect claim made by the Study that the use of enhanced interrogation techniques played "no 

role" in the identification of Jose Padilla, because Abu Zubaydah provided the information about 

Padilla during an interrogation by FBI agents who were "exclusively" using "rapport-building" 

techniques against him more than three months prior to the CIA's "use of DOJ-approved 

enhanced interrogation techniques."96 The facts demonstrate, however, that Abu Zubaydah had 

been subjected to "around the clock" interrogation that included more than four days of dietary 

manipulation, nudity, as well as a total of 126.5 hours (5.27 days) of sleep deprivation during the 

136-hour (5.67 day) period by the time the FBI finished up the 8.5-hour interrogation shift which 

96

 SSCI Study. Executive Summary, December 3,2014, pp. 230-231 and 230 n. 1315; see infra, pp.33-36. 

- 28 

II< 1 1 11 III I i ^^BiMBBMB i mini m 

UNCLASSIFIED 

580 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/D TOJOFORN 

yielded the identification of Jose Padilla.97 Since these three enhanced interrogation techniques 

were used in combination with the FBI's "rapport building" technique during this particular 

interrogation, it is simply absurd to claim that they played "no role" in obtaining the information 

about Padilla from Abu Zubaydah. Consistent with the "Domino Effect" analogy, when this 

factually incorrect claim falls, it can no longer be cited as support for other claims. This specific 

factually incorrect claim, sometimes used in slightly different variations, is repeated at least 19 

times throughout the Study.98 

(U) Ultimately, our analysis of these case studies leads us to conclude that there are 

simply not enough "dominoes" left standing to support the Study's explosive conclusion—that 

the "CIA's justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques rested on inaccurate 

claims of their effectiveness." It is very disappointing that the Study has leveled such serious 

accusations against the personnel involved in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, 

when so many of the Study's own claims are demonstrably false. 

(U) The Identification of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad as the Mastermind of the 9/11 

Attacks and His "Mukhtar" Alias 

Study Claim: f^Sfl^HH^Hj^B^ ) "On at least two prominent occasions, the CIA 

represented, inaccurately, that Abu Zubaydah provided [information 

identifying KSM as the mastermind of 9/11] after the use of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques."99 

"In at least one instance in November 2007 .. . 

the CIA asserted that Abu Zubaydah identified KSM as 'Mukhtar' after the 

use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques."100 

'There is no evidence to support the statement 

that Abu Zubaydah's information—obtained by FBI interrogators prior to 

the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and while Abu 

Zubaydah was hospitalized—was uniquely important in the identification of 

KSM as the 'mastermind' of the 9/11 attacks."101 

Fact: (U) Neither of the occasions cited with respect to the "Mastermind of 9/11" 

information were "prominent." The first occasion was not even a CIA 

representation, but rather a mistake made by the Department of Justice in 

one of its legal opinions.102 The second occasion was a set of November 2007 

documents and talking points for the CIA Director to use in a briefing with 

97 See infra, pp. 33-36. 

"

8

 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, pp. 209-210. 230, 230 n.1314,234; SSCI Study, 

Volume I, March 31.2014, pp. 624 and 636; and SSCI Study, Volume II, April 1. 2014, pp. 57, 75. 75 n.274. 79, 

343, 349. 358, 409. 445 n.2245, 530,532. 535, and 1089. 

*

w

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,20'14, p. 312. 

"

I0

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 315. 

I1H

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 313. 

102 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary. December 3, 2014, p. 313, n.1748. 

29 

TOP SECRET/FL //NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

581 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

the President. Although these briefing materials did contain some erroneous 

information about KSM's interrogation, the Study fails to demonstrate 

whether this erroneous information was "represented" to the President 

during that timeframe.103 

(U) The one instance where the CIA asserted that Abu Zubaydah identified 

KSM as "Mukhtar" after the use of enhanced interrogation techniques was 

contained in the same November 2007 briefing materials used by the CIA 

Director to brief the President.104 Again, the Study fails to demonstrate 

whether this erroneous information was "represented" to the President 

during this timeframe. 

(U) There is considerable evidence that the information Abu Zubaydah 

provided identifying KSM as "Mukhtar" and the mastermind of 9/11 was 

significant to CIA analysts, operators, and FBI interrogators. Both the 

Congressional Joint Inquiry into the 9/11 Attacks and the 9/11 Commission 

discussed the importance of this information to the Intelligence Community 

in understanding KSM's role in the attacks and in the al-Qa'ida 

organization. 

(U) We have combined our analysis of these two case studies because they share 

common facts and analytical issues. The Study's claims with respect to the CIA's alleged 

misrepresentations about KSM's "Mukhtar" alias and being the mastermind of 9/11 are 

themselves inaccurate. Also, the Study's absolute claim that "there is no evidence" that Abu 

Zubaydah's information was uniquely important in the identification of KSM as the mastermind 

of 9/11 is contradicted by the documentary record and publicly available information. 

(U) Our analysis of the Study's erroneous claims about the supposed CIA 

"representations" is dispositive. For the first "prominent" occasion, the Study mistakenly alleges 

that the CIA made an inaccurate representation about Abu Zubaydah providing information 

identifying KSM as the mastermind of 9/11 after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques.105 It turns out that this particular inaccurate representation was not made by the CIA, 

but rather was expressed in a written legal opinion by the Office of Legal Counsel at the 

Department Justice (DOJ).106 The Study confirms its own mistake by pointing out that the CIA 

briefing notes provided to DOJ in support of their request for the OLC opinion correctly stated, 

"Within months of his arrest, Abu Zubaydah provided details about al-Qa'ida's organization 

structure, key operatives, and modus operandi. It was also Abu Zubaydah, early in his detention, 

,0J See DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard, 06 November 2007, pp. 1 -3. This document was sent to DCIA on 

November 6 in preparation for a meeting with POTUS. 

""•See DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard, November 6. 2007, pp. 1-3. 

,os See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 312-313. 

IM See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo from Steven Bradbury, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under 

Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High 

Value al Qaeda Detainees, May 30, 2005, p. 10. 

30 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFQRN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

582 
UNCLASSIFIED 

who identified KSM as the mastermind of 9/1!. "mi DOJ is accountable for this negligible 

mistake, not the CIA. 

(S//QC/NF) With respect to the second "prominent" occasion, the CIA does admit that 

"in one instance—a supporting document for a set of DCIA talking points for a meeting with the 

President—we mischaracterized the information as having been obtained after the application of 

enhanced interrogation techniques."108 However, while this information in Director Hayden's 

briefing materials about KSM was inaccurate, the Study fails to explain how the CIA supposedly 

"represented" these inaccuracies to the President or other executive branch officials during this 

November 2007 timeframe. Without talking to witnesses, we have no proof that any such 

inaccurate representation ever occurred. What we do know is that President Bush got this issue 

right in a speech that he delivered nearly a year before this particular error was inserted into 

Director Hayden's briefing materials. Specifically, President Bush said, 

After he recovered, Zubaydah was defiant and evasive. He declared his hatred of 

America. During questioning, he at first disclosed what he thought was nominal 

information—and then stopped all cooperation. Well, in fact the 'nominal' 

information he gave us turned out to be quite important. For example, Zubaydah 

disclosed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed—or KSM—was the mastermind behind the 

9/11 attacks, and used the alias 'Muktar.'103 

The President's speech is the "representation" that mattered most, regardless of whether the 

erroneous information in Director Hayden's briefing materials was discussed during a classified 

Presidential briefing one year later. We conclude that if there was any error here, it was 

harmless. 

(S//OC/NF) The Study's claim in the second case study is essentially identical to the 

first, except that Director Hayden's briefing materials for the November 2007 meeting with the 

President contained an erroneous assertion that Abu Zubaydah identified KSM as "Mukhtar" 

after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.110 Analytically, this is a distinction 

without a difference and we reach the same conclusion—if there was any error here, it was 

harmless. 

Turning now to the Study's "no evidence" claim, numerous Intelligence 

Community documents show that Intelligence Community analysts believed that Zubaydah's 

information identifying KSM as the mastermind of 9/11 was important. Soon after the 

interrogation that revealed KSM as the mastermind of 9/11 and identification as "Mukhtar," the 

CIA disseminated an intelligence report, H within the Intelligence Community m^H I 

107

 Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting, Aprii 8,2005, p. 5. (emphasis added) 

108

 CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27, 2013, p. 20. 

109

 President George W. Bush, Trying Detainees; Address on the Creation of Military Commissions, Washington, 

D.C., September 6, 2006. 

110 See SSCI Study. Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 315. 

TOP SECRET/4 

31 

I//NQFQRN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

583 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ //NQFORN 

detailing the information.1" Respoi 

followed up and requested more information 

indicated they 

(S//NF) Zubaydah's FBI inten-ogator Ali Soufan also described the information from 

Zubaydah on KSM as significant. In 2008, Soufan told Committee staff that when Zubaydah 

provided that information, "we had no idea at the time that Mukhtar was the KSM from 9/11 

Because we had been working so diligently on trying to figure out the puzzles of 9/11 and who is 

Mukhtar, and when Abu Zubaydah said that, I think the picture was complete."113 On May 13, 

2009, Soufan also told the Senate Judiciary Committee that prior to Zubaydah providing 

information on KSM's role as the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, "we had no idea of KSM's 

role in 9/11 or of his importance in the al Qaeda leadership structure."114 

(U) Moreover, a summary of the Program released publicly by the Director of National 

Intelligence in 2006 explained both the significance of this information and how other previously 

collected intelligence had not stood out to analysts until the information from Zubaydah. 

According to the summary, "during initial interrogation, Abu Zubaydah gave some information 

that he probably viewed as nominal. Some was important, however, including that KSM was the 

9/11 mastermind and used the moniker "Mukhtar." This identification allowed us to comb 

previously collected intelligence for both names, opening up new leads to this terrorist plotterleads that eventually resulted in his capture."115 

f^HI^^^^BVF ) The Senate and House Intelligence Joint Inquiry Into the 

Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 

2001, adopted with the support of four members who also voted in favor of the Study, said that 

"although the Intelligence Community knew of KSM's support for terrorism since 1995 and later 

learned of his links to al-Qa'ida, he was not recognized as a senior al-Qa'ida lieutenant. In April 

2002, the Intelligence Community learned that KSM and his group conceived the September 11 

plot."116 If there is any doubt that the report was referring to the information from Zubaydah, 

CIA operational cable traffic from April 2002 confirms: "[Abu Zubaydah] stated the idea of 

September 11 was conceived by [KSM] and his group."117 

(U) The 9/11 Commission Report also made clear that the Intelligence Community did 

not recognize KSM's importance prior to 9/11. "KSM, who had been indicted in January 1996 

for his role in the Manila air plot, was seen primarily as another freelance terrorist, associated 

with Ramzi Yousef."118 The Commission noted that because KSM was being targeted for arrest, 

responsibility for tracking him was in CIA's Renditions Branch, which did not focus on analytic 

connections. "When subsequent information came, more critical for analysis than for tracking, 

CIA, 

See CIA, 

113

 SSCI Transcript, Staff Interview of FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan, April 28. 2008 (DTS 2008-2411). 

Ali Soufan, Statement for the Record, before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 13, 

2009. 

I,5

 Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, p. 1. 

1

 The Joint Inquiry Into the Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 

II, 2001, December 2002, p. 310. 

117

 CIA, H 10065, April 18,2002, p. 3. 

118

 9/11 Commission Report, p. 276. 

32 

TOP SECRET// 7NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

584 
UNCLASSIFIED 

no unit had the job of following up on what the information might mean."119 As one of ten 

'•Operational Opportunities" that were missed prior to 9/11, the Commission wrote, "August 

2001, the CIA does not foeus on information that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is a key al Qaeda 

lieutenant or connect information identifying KSM as the 'Mukhtar' mentioned in other reports 

to the analysis that could have linked 'Mukhtar' with Ramzi Binalshibh and Moussaoui."120 The 

9/11 Commission adds: 

The final piece of the puzzle arrived at the CIA's Bin Ladin unit on August 28 [2001] in a 

cable reporting that KSM's nickname was Mukhtar. No one made the connection to the 

reports about Mukhtar that had been circulated in the spring. This connection might have 

also underscored concern about the June reporting that KSM was recruiting terrorists to 

travel, including to the United States. Only after 9/11 would it be discovered that 

Mukhtar/KSM had communicated with a phone that was used by Binalshibh, and that 

Binalshibh used the same phone to communicate with Moussaoui.121 

(U) Finally, the 9/11 Commission notes that the information connecting KSM to the 

Binalshibh phone came from detainee interviews with Binalshibh in late 2002 and 2003 and with 

KSM in 2003, well after Abu Zubaydah identified KSM as Mukhtar and the 9/11 mastermind.122 

It is also worth noting that, like this information, all of the information for chapters 5 and 7 of the 

9/11 Commission report, which explain what the Commission knew about al-Qa'ida's planning 

for the 9/11 attacks, "reifies] heavily on information obtained from captured al Qaeda members," 

mostly in CIA's interrogation program.123 

(U) The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose 

Padilla 

Study Claim: {TSHHHHHHN^} "A review of CIA operational cables and other 

CIA records found that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques played no role in the identification of 'Jose Padilla' or the 

thwarting of the Dirty Bomb or Tall Buildings plotting. CIA records indicate 

that:... (3) Abu Zubaydah provided this information to FBI officers who 

were using rapport-building techniques, in April 2002, more than three 

months prior to the CIA's 'use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation 

techniques,'.,. ."124 

Fact: (TS^^^HH^^^H^F ) CIA records clearly indicate that sleep 

deprivation played a significant role in Abu Zubaydah's identification of 

Jose Padilla as an al-Qa'ida operative tasked to carry out an attack against 

1,9

 9/11 Commission Report, p. 276. 

120

 9/1 1 Commission Report, p. 356, 

12 

124 

121

 9/11 Commission Report, p. 277. The CIA acknowledged that this intelligence report identified KSM as 

"Mukhtar" prior to Aba Zubaydah's information. After reviewing its records, the CIA concluded that "our officers 

simply missed the earlier cable." CIA Study Response, Cose Studies (TAB C), June 27, 2013, p. 22. 

9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 7, n.163. 

123

 9/11 Commission Report, p. 146. 

SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, pp. 229-231. 

33 

T OP SECRETA^#NQFOR N 

UNCLASSIFIED 

585 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/D TOJOFORN 

the United States. Abu Zubaydah provided this information to FBI agents 

during an interrogation session that began late at night on April 20, 2002, 

and ended on April 21,2002. Between April 15,2002 and April 21,2002, 

Abu Zubaydah was deprived of sleep for a total of 126.5 hours (5.27 days) 

over a 136 hour (5.6 day) period—while only being permitted several brief 

sleep breaks between April 19,2002 and April 21,2002, which totaled 9.5 

hours. 

This particular Study claim gives the false impression that 

enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in obtaining important threat information about 

Jose Padilla during the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah on April 20-21, 2002, and implies that 

such information was really just the result of the "rapport-building" techniques used by the FBI 

agents that evening. 

The CIA documentary record is clear that Abu Zubaydah 

was subjected to an extended period of sleep deprivation and other enhanced interrogation 

techniques during his interrogation between April 15, 2002 and April 21, 2002.125 Specifically, 

during this time period when FBI agents and CIA officers were working together in rotating, 

round-the-clock shifts, some of the interrogation techniques used on Abu Zubaydah included 

nudity,126 liquid diet,127 sensory deprivation,128 and extended sleep deprivation.129 

, The sleep deprivation of Abu Zubaydah began on April 15, 

2002.130 By April 19, 2002, Abu Zubaydah had been subjected to 76 straight hours of sleep 

deprivation in the form of intensive interrogation sessions and his ability to focus on questions 

and provide coherent answers appeared to be compromised to a point where sleep was 

required.131 Abu Zubaydah was allowed three hours of sleep at that time.132 On April 20, 2002, 

the FBI began its late-night interrogation shift at approximately 10:30 p.m. with Abu Zubaydah 

and continued until about 7:00 a.m. the next morning. During that shift, Abu Zubaydah was 

given a two-hour sleep break; time for prayer, food, and water; and a medical check-up.133 By 

April 21, 2002, the day he identified Jose Padilla as a terrorist inside the United States, CIA 

10091, 

125 See CIA, • H 10043, April 15. 2002. p. 2; 10047, April 16, 2002, p. 2. 

126

 SSCI Transcript, Staff Interview of FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan, April 28. 2008. p. 22. (DTS 2008-2411) 

127 See CIA.HHjj l 10090, April 21, 2002, p. 5. _ _ 

12BSee 10116, April 25, 2002,pp. 3-4; Cl/VHp | 10016, April 12, 2002, pp. 4-5. 

See CIA, 10094, April 21,2002, p. 3; CIA, H^Hl^l , April 19. 2002, p. 2; CIA, 

April 21, 2002, p. 2. Dietary manipulation, nudity, and sleep deprivation (more than 48 hours) were also 

subsequently authorized as enhanced interrogation techniques by the Department of Justice. See Memorandum for 

John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, May 30, 2005, Re: Application 

of United States Obligations under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be 

Used in the Interrogation of High value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS 2009-1810, Tab-11). 

130 See FBI Letter to Pasquale J. (Pat) D' Amuro, Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, April 16. 2002, p. 2 

("The interview with ABU ZUBAYDA is continuing around the clock and we will advise you of any further 

information ASAP"). 

131 See CIA, M M | 0 0 7 1 , April 19, 2002, p. 2. 

132 See CIA, 10071, April 19, 2002, p. 2. 

133 See FBI Draft Report on Abu Zubaida interview session from approximately 10:30 p.m., April 20, 2002, to about 

7:00 a.m., on April 21, 2002, p. 1. 

29 

TOP SECRET/FL //NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

586 
UNCLASSIFIED 

11 in

 1 ii i ii ii ii M^BMWIUHIHi l nuiinm i 

records indicate that Abu Zubaydah had only been permitted several brief sleep breaks between 

April 19, 2002 and April 21, 2002, which only totaled 9.5 hours of sleep over a 136-hour 

period.134 That means Abu Zubaydah had been sleep deprived for a total of 126.5 hours (5.27 

days) over a 136-hour (5.6 day) period by the time his FBI interrogators were finished with him 

at the end of that shift. 

{TSfl^^^l^^^^BNF ) A CIA chart, not included in the Study, which describes 

both the standard and enhanced techniques used on Abu Zubaydah, notes for April 21, 2002, 

"two sessions; sleep deprivation (136 hours)" under the heading "enhanced techniques."135 

Moreover, the FBI interrogator, identified in the press as who was questioning 

Zubaydah at the time he provided the Padilla information, told the OIG that "during the CIA 

interrogations Zubaydah 'gave up' Jose Padilla and identified several targets for future al-Qaeda 

attacks."136 In other words, while Special Agent the information on Padilla, it 

was during a period that the FBI and CIA officers were using the CIA's techniques. 

ffSjHHHHHH^ ^ When the CIA and FBI interrogators entered the room late 

on the night of April 20, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was totally naked.137 He had been subjected to at 

least four days of dietary manipulation and had been deprived of 126,5 hours of sleep during the 

past 136 hours.138 According to FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan, they gave him a towel. They 

took some Coke and tea into the room and "started talking about different things." Sometime 

during the next morning, Abu Zubaydah "came back to his senses and he started cooperating 

again. And this is when he gave us Padilla."139 Rather than concede that Abu Zubaydah was 

being subjected to a combination of at least three enhanced interrogation techniques while the 

FBI agents were using an additional rapport-building technique, the Study includes this 

perplexing footnote text: "While Abu Zubaydah was subjected to nudity and limited sleep 

deprivation prior to this date by the CIA, he had been allowed to sleep prior to being questioned 

by the FBI officers, who were exclusively using rapport-building interrogation techniques when 

the information was acquired."140 Like the claim in this case study, this footnote is simply at 

odds with what really happened. 

134 See CIA, HB H 10094. April 21. 2002, p. 2; CIA Assessment of the accuracy of facts stated in the SSCI 

Minority's response to the Studv of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program. June 

27, 2013, p. 1. 

135

 CIA, Interrogations Using Standard and Enhanced Techniques, Abu Zubaydah, undated, p. 1. 

136

 Department of Justice Inspector General, A Review of the FBI's Involvement in and Obsen>ations of Detainee 

Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay. Afghanistan, and Iraq, May 2008, p. 69 (DTS 2008-2188). 

137 See SSCI Transcript. Staff Interview of FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan, April 28,2008, p. 22. (DTS 2008-2411). 

138 See CIA. jH H 10094, April 21. 2002. p. 2; 10090, April 21,2002, p. 5. 

139

 SSCI Transcript, Staff Interview of FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan, April 28, 2008, p. 19. (DTS 2008-2411). 

140

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, April 3, 2014, p. 226 n. 1292 (emphasis added). But see FBI Draft Report on 

Abu Zubuida interview session from approximately 10:30 p.m.. April 20, 2002, to about 7:00 a.m., on April 21, 

2002, p. 1. It appears from this draft report that Abu Zubaydah was permitted a two-hour sleep break sometime 

during the FBI shift, which seems to clearly demonstrate that the FBI interrogators were aware that Abu Zubaydah 

was being subjected to sleep deprivation. [[The December 3,2014, revision of footnote 1292 in the April 3.2014 

version of the Executive Summary continues to misrepresent the events surrounding Abu Zubaydah's interrogation 

by editing the footnote to read, "While Abu Zubaydah was subjected to sleep deprivation and nudity prior to this 

date by the CIA, he had been allowed to sleep shortly prior to being questioned on this matter by the FBI special 

agents, who were exclusively using rapport-building interrogation techniques when this information was acquired 

35 

T OP SECRET^BBBII^^BIMBB^^Qft N 

UNCLASSIFIED 

587 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! 

There is no reasonable way to reconcile these facts with the 

claim that enhanced interrogation techniques played "no role" in Abu Zubaydah's identification 

of lose Padilla. Sleep deprivation for 126.5 hours over a 136-hour period—which was hardly 

"limited"—was an enhanced interrogation technique regardless of whether the Department of 

Justice formally labeled it as such a couple of months later. The Study cannot dismiss the use of 

these enhanced interrogation techniques simply because they were used before the Department of 

Justice eventually approved them. The Study's assertion that the FBI was "exclusively" using 

rapport-building techniques fails to recognize the reality that this interrogation technique was 

used in combination with at least three other enhanced interrogation techniques. In judging what 

caused Abu Zubaydah to give up valuable intelligence, including information on Jose Padilla, it 

is impossible to separate or disaggregate enhanced interrogation techniques from rapportbuilding techniques after enhanced techniques are applied. Enhanced interrogation techniques 

are designed to compel detainees to cooperate with questioning and are used in conjunction with 

traditional questioning methods or interrogation techniques. The simple fact is that Abu 

Zubaydah gave up Padilla during that interrogation, after being subjected to enhanced 

interrogation techniques. It is simply not factually accurate for the Study to claim that Abu 

Zubaydah gave up the information on Padilla before he was subjected to enhanced interrogation 

techniques. Nor is it factually accurate to claim that enhanced interrogation techniques played 

no role in identifying Padilla as a terrorist threat. 

The direct refutation of this Study claim illustrates the 

Study's flawed analytical methodology. As we detail in many of the case studies below, 

Zubaydah provided much of the key initial information that caused the Intelligence Community 

to recognize the significance of certain events, future threats, terrorist networks, and even 

potential assets. The Study repeatedly and incorrectly alleges that the FBI obtained this 

information prior to the application of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.141 As a result, 

this mistaken allegation is taken as a settled premise in the Study's analysts of other case studies 

and related issues, which has the practical effect of undermining the Study's analyses of those 

matters. 

flPS^^Ifl^^^^^^l^tP ) Under its flawed methodology, the Study was able to 

disregard the significance of the large amount of information provided by Abu Zubaydah 

between April 15, 2002 and August 4, 2002, by incorrectly categorizing it as not being obtained 

from the use enhanced interrogation techniques. We now know that all of the information 

obtained from Abu Zubaydah on and after April 15, 2002, was provided after he had been 

subjected to enhanced interrogation. The practical result of this fact is that infonnation obtained 

from Abu Zubaydah after April 15, 2002, can no longer be disregarded by the Study and must be 

factored into the assessment of the executive branch's effectiveness claims concerning the 

enhanced interrogation techniques along with the significant amount of important information 

obtained from Zubaydah following his second period of enhanced interrogation, which began on 

from Abu Zubaydah (who was covered with a towel)." (emphasis added). Compare SSCI Study, Executive 

Summary, April 3, 2014, p. 226 n.1292 with SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 230. n.1315.]] 

141 See SSCI Study. Executive Summary. December 3, 2014, pp. 209-210, 230,230 n.1314,234; SSCI Study, 

Volume I, March 31, 2014, pp. 624 and 636; and SSCI Studv, Volume II, April 1, 2014, pp. 57, 75, 75 n.274, 79, 

343, 349, 358,409, 445 n.2245, 530, 532,535, and 1089. 

36 

TOP 

UNCLASSIFIED 

588 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/D TOJOFORN 

August 4, 2002 , Given the breadth of the information provided by Abu Zubaydah after April 15, 

2002, and its attendant impact on subsequent intelligence efforts by the United States 

government and its allies, w e conclude that this information supports the CIA's specific 

representations about the effectiveness of its Detention and Interrogation Program, including the 

use of enhanced interrogation techniques, in relation to the thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall 

Buildings plot and the capture of Jose Padilla. 

(U) The Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh 

Study Claim: "A review of CIA records found no connection 

between Abu Zubaydah's reporting on Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Ramzi bin alShibh's capture... While CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah 

provided information on Ramzi bin al-Shibh, there is no indication that Abu 

Zubaydah provided information on bin al-Shibh's whereabouts. Further, 

while Abu Zubaydah provided information on bin al-Shibh while being 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, he provided 

similar information to FBI interrogators prior to the initiation of the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques."142 

Fact: fFSHHj^^^^Hfr 1^ CIA records demonstrate that Abu Zubaydah 

was subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques during two separate 

periods in April 2002 and August 2002. During these timeframes, Abu 

Zubaydah made several photographic identifications of Ramzi bin al-Shibh 

and provided information that bin al-Shibh had been in Kandahar at the end 

of 2001, but was then working with KSM in Karachi, Pakistan. More 

important, Abu Zubaydah provided information about how he would go 

about locating Hassan Ghul and other al-Qa'ida associates in Karachi. This 

information caused Pakistani authorities to intensify their 

efforts and helped lead them to capture Ramzi bin al-Shibh and other alQa'ida associates during the Karachi safe house raids conducted on 

September 10-11,2002. 

The claim made in this case study relies, in part, upon the 

factually incorrect premise that Abu Zubaydah was not subjected to enhanced interrogation 

techniques until August 4, 2002. 1 4 3 As previously demonstrated, Abu Zubaydah was first 

subjected to the enhanced interrogation techniques of sleep deprivation, nudity, and dietary 

1

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 318. 

1

 Compare SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 323 with supra, pp. 33-36. 29 

TOP SECRET/FL //NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

589 
UNCLASSIFIED 

manipulation on April 15, 2002.144 Abu Zubaydah's second period of enhanced interrogation, 

which included the use of the waterboard, began on August 4, 2002.145 

The Study also incorrectly claims that "there is no 

indication in CIA records that Abu Zubaydah provided information on bin al-Shibh's 

whereabouts."146 While the CIA Study Response appears to concede this point unnecessarily,147 

CIA and FBI records establish that Abu Zubaydah did provide locational information about 

Ramzi bin al-Shibh. Specifically, he noted that he had seen bin al-Shibh in Kandahar, 

Afghanistan, at the end of 2001, and that he was aware that bin al-Shibh was presently working 

with KSM in Karachi, Pakistan. 

enhanced interrogation, an FBI interrogator showed him a photograph of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. 

According to the FBI, Abu Zubaydah said that he knew the man in the photograph as "Ramzi bin 

al-Shiba" and that he had seen him with a group of Arabs shortly after a missile strike in 

Kandahar, Afghanistan, on the house of Taib Agha, Mullah Omar's secretary.148 This 

information appears to place bin al-Shibh in Kandahar in the November 2001 timeframe, roughly 

five months prior to this interview with Abu Zubaydah. On June 2, 2002, the FBI again showed 

Abu Zubaydah a photograph of bin al-Shibh. This time Abu Zubaydah provided some additional 

information, stating that he knew this man as "Al-Sheeba," whom he saw with KSM in Kandahar 

around December 2001, near the end of Ramadan. He also noted that al-Shibh speaks Arabic 

like a Yemeni and that he had seen al-Shibh in the media after the September 11, 2001, terrorist 

attacks.149 On August 21, 2002, during his second period of enhanced interrogation, Abu 

Zubaydah "immediately recognized the photograph of Ramzi bin al Shibh."150 Abu Zubaydah 

mentioned that he had heard "that al-Shibh had stayed at the secret guest house in Qandahar that 

Mukhtar had established for the pilots and others destined to be involved in the 9/11 attacks."151 

identified a picture of bin al-Shibh as "al-Shiba" and "noted that he is always with (KSM)"m If 

144 See supra, pp. 33-36. The CIA began subjecting Abu Zubaydah to monitored sleep deprivation on April 15, 

2002, the day he was discharged from the hospital. He was continued on a liquid diet and subjected to nudity. All 

three of these interrogation techniques were subsequently and formally categorized by the Department of Justice as 

"enhanced interrogation techniques." See CIA, HB f 10043, April 15, 2002, p. 2; CIA, 10047, April 16, 

2002, p. 2; Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from 

Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, 

May 30. 2005., Re; Application of United States Obligations under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to 

Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS 2009-1810, Tab11). ^ ^ 

145 See CIA, 10586, August 04, 2002, p. 4. 

146

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 318. 

147 See CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C). June 27, 2013, p. 23 ("It is true that Abu [Zubaydah] provided 

no information specifically on Bin al-Shibh's whereabouts . . ..") (emphasis added). 

148 See FBI draft report of the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. April 18, 2002, 6:1© a.m. to 10:40 a.m., p 1. 

149 See FBI draft report of the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. June 3, 2002, 4:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m., p 3; CIA, 

••|l0428Jun e 7, 2002, p. 5. 

150

 CIA, •• • 10656, August 21, 2002, p. 2. See also CIA,^H | 10654, August 21, 2002, p. 1-2. 

151

 CIA, M M 10656, August 21, 2002, p. 3. 

112

 CIA, DIRECTOR ••••••• • May 27, 2002. p. 4. 

• 38 

UNCLASSIFIED 

590 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/4 WNOFQRN 

that assertion was true, then Abu Zubaydah was essentially suggesting that bin al-Shibh was with 

KSM in or around Karachi, Pakistan, because he had also informed his interrogators that KSM 

was located in or around Karachi.153 Abu Zubaydah confirmed this association while being 

subjected to enhanced interrogation on August 21, 2002, when he stated that bin al-Shibh was 

"one of the operatives working for Mukhtar aka Khalid Shaykh Mohammad,"154 again 

suggesting that bin al-Shibh was likely in Karachi. 

The Study's claim that it found "no connection" between 

Abu Zubaydah's reporting and Ramzi bin al-Shibh's capture is the result of poor analysis. On 

August 20, 2002, during his second period of enhanced interrogation, when asked how he would 

find his former al-Qa'ida associates if he were set free, Abu Zubaydah told CIA interrogators 

that he would contact the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul, who could put him in touch with 

Hassan Ghul and other senior al-Qa'ida members.135 The Study frames this interchange much 

more narrowly. It asserts that "Abu Zubaydah was asked specifically how he would find Hassan 

Ghul. In response, Abu Zubaydah provided corroborative reporting: that Hassan Ghul could 

possibly be located through a well-known associate."156 This narrow framing of the question and 

response enables the Study to conclude incorrectly that the capture of bin al-Shibh was an 

"unexpected" result of the raids that failed to capture Hassan Ghul.157 The Study's approach 

fails to understand the causal link between Abu Zubaydah's information and the successful 

Karachi safe house raids of September 11, 2002, which resulted in the collection of important 

intelligence information and the capture of 11 al-Qa'ida associates, including Ramzi bin alShibh. 

About six weeks before Abu Zubaydah identified the 

significance of the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul, Pakistani authorities^HHIHHfl 

raided the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul's home

 12arty July 

2002. The well-known associate of Hassan Ghul was interviewed on the spot and cooperated 

authorities|||BHHH| H The 

known associate of III in I illi lln I1 il i I Ill i in nli mil a home 

where Hassan Ghul formerly resided.158 The CLA officers observed that the location was 

"extremely close to (if not an exact match)" to a location where KSM once resided, according to 

a June 18, 2002, report from the FBI.159 

153

 The draft report of this interview states: (1) "Abu Jafar told [Abu ZubaydahJ that he and his friend had to get to 

Karachi because they had business with Muhktar"; (2) "This [group of 11 Filipinos or Malaysians] was on their way 

to Karachi to meet up with Muhktar"; (3) "the American and Kenyan [Zubaydah] sent to Muhktar in mid-March 

2002 .. . [Zubaydah] actually sent them to Hassan Ghul and Aiiumullah (in Karachi) who would have then arranged 

for them to be taken to Muhktar"; and (4) "Subject advised that, prior to his arrest he was trying to coordinate a trip 

to Karachi to meet with Muhktar." FBI draft report of the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, May 20, 5:25 p.m. to 

8:40 p.m., pp. 3 and 5. 

154

 CIA, DIRECTOR ••Augus t 26, 2002, p. 4. 

135 See Captures Resulting From Detainee Information; Four Case Studies. November 26, 2003, p. 2; CIA, 

10644. August 20; 2002. pp. 2-3; and CIA. ALEC •••Augus t 29.2002. p. 2. 

156

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 323. 

157 See SSCI Study, Executive Summitry, December 3. 2014. pp, 75,318, and 320. 

158 See CIA, CIA CABLE 117551 

159 See CIA, CIA CABLE 117551 

39 

TOP SECRET^ I//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

591 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! I//NQFORN 

The Study dismisses Abu Zubaydah's identification of the 

well-known associate of Hassan Ghul as mere ''corroborative reporting," and does not attach the 

appropriate significance to this information because of its rigid adherence to its flawed analytical 

methodology, which presumes that anything corroborative cannot be considered as "otherwise 

unavailable actionable intelligence."160 The facts tell a different story. Abu Zubaydah was a 

recognized senior member of al-Qa'ida who had direct ties to multiple high-ranking terrorists, 

including Usama Bin Ladin. The CIA was focused on Hassan Ghul, another well-connected 

senior member of al-Qa'ida, and "other" al-Qa'ida associates of Abu Zubaydah. Therefore, Abu 

Zubaydah's disclosures were deemed by the CIA as significant and actionable intelligence. 

When Abu Zubaydah identified the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul as the first person he 

would contact to reconnect with Hassan Ghul and other al-Qa'ida associates, it is very likely that 

collecting additional intelligence from the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul became a top 

operational priority for U.S. and Pakistani officials. 

It is not surprising that CIA Headquarters | 

o n

 August 29, 2002, to request that Pakistani officials "reinterview the well-known 

associateofllassaii Ghul for additional intelligence on Hassan Ghul."161 On September 3, 2002, 

^ H H reported that Pakistani officials had re-interviewed the well-known associate of 

Hassan Ghul an unknown number of times and that these officials noted that at times the wellknown associate of Hassan Ghul contradicted himself.162

 On September 9, 2002, Pakistani 

officials returned to the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul's home and interviewed another 

well-known associate of Hassan Ghul who had recently returned to^^^MB^^^ K The other 

well-known associate of Hassan Ghul cooperated and disclosed thelocationof^^^^^| | 

Hassan Ghul's apartment, which was promptly raided but found to be empty.163 Pakistani 

authorities interviewed HHMHMHHHHt n i 1 learned that while 

Hassan Ghul had vacated the apartment, he was scheduled to return to the complex 

The Pakistani authorities subsequently placed the 

complex under surveillance in an effort to capture Hassan Ghul.164 

On September 10, 2002, Pakistani authorities arrested two 

individuals believed to be Hassan Ghul and his driver outside of the apartment complex.163 

These individuals turned out to be Muhammad Ahmad Ghulam Rabbani, a.k.a. Abu Badr and 

Muhammad Madni, Abu Badr's driver.166 Information obtained from Madni led to a series of 

raids on September 11, 2002, by Pakistani authorities of the identified safe houses, resulting in 

the arrest of 11 individuals, including Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Abdul Rahim Gulam Rabbani, Hassan 

160 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 323. 

161

 CIA, ALEC •••Augus t 29, 2002, p. 3. 

162 See CIA, CIA CABLE 12207, September 5, 2002, p. 2. 

163 See CIA, CIA CABLE 12249, September 9, 2002, p. 2. 

164 See CIA, CIA CABLE 12249, September 9, 2002, pp. 2-3. 

165 See CIA. CIA CABLE 12251, September 12002 , p. 2; CIA, CIA] 

2002. p. 2. 

I September | 

See CIA, CIA CABLE 33363, September 11, 2002, p. 2. Abu Badr is the brother of Abdul Rahim Gulam 

Rabbani, aka Abu Rahama, who ran the KSM safe house used by the 9/11 al-Qa'ida terrorists. Abu Zubaydah made 

photographic identification of Abu Badr and called htm KSM's man in Karachi. See CIA, ALEC | 

| CIA, CIA CABLE 12267, September 11, 2002, p. 2. 

40 

TOP SECRET/4 I//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

592 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/4 1//XOFORN 

Muhamma d Ali bin Attash, and other al-Qa'ida members. 1 6 7 Thes e raids also resulted in the 

collection of important al-Qa'ida operational documents, including financial records and the 

coded "perfume letter."1 6 8 

The Study's claims with respect to the capture o f Ramz i bin 

al-Shibh d o not hold up under a clos e examination of the CIA documentary record. Ther e wa s a 

direct causal connection between the information provided by Abu Zubaydah during his second 

period o f enhanced interrogation and bin al-Shibh's capture. Abu Zubaydah had informed his 

interrogators that bin al-Shibh was one of KSM's operatives in Karachi. Zubaydah confirmed 

the importance the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul to locate Hassan Ghul and other alQa'ida associate s operating in Karachi, including bin al-Shibh. 

( U) Sinc e the Study's claims on this topic d o not hold up to factual scrutiny, its 

criticisms of the CIA representations with respect to Ramz i bin al-Shibh and President Bush's 

reference s t o bin al-Shibh in his Septembe r 6, 2006 , speech on the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program are not valid. The CIA said Abu Zubaydah's "knowledg e of al-Qa'ida 

lower-leve l facilitators, modus operandi and safehouse s .. . played a key role in the ultimate 

capture o f Ramz i bin al-Shibh."1 6 9 Far from a "misrepresentation," that statement wa s 

completel y accurate and consistent with the circumstance s that led to bin al-Shibh's ultimate 

capture. Similarly, the text in President Bush's Septembe r 6, 2006 , speech on the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program noting that "the information Zubaydah provided helped 

lead to the capture of Binalshibh" wa s also accurate. 1 7 0 

( U) The capture of Ramz i bin al-Shibh and the other al-Qa'ida terrorists during 

| raids o f Septembe r 10-11, 2002 , wer e stunning operational successes, made 

possible , in part, by the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. 

(U) The Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad 

Study Claim: ^d^^^H^^^F ) "£T]here are no CIA records to support the 

assertion that Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, or any other CIA detainee 

played any role in the 'the planning and execution of the operation that 

captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.'"171 

Fact: fFSHHlHHI^HP ^ Information obtained from CIA detainee Abu 

Zubaydah was essential to furthering the CIA's understanding of KSM's 

role in the September 11,2001, terrorist attacks and helped lead to the 

'"7 See CIA, ALEC H$eptembe r 11, 2002, pp. 2-3. Madni informed the arresting officers that Abu Badr was 

a "major al-Qa'ida [facilitator!." See also CIA, CIA CABLE 12267, September 11, 2002, pp. 2-4. He also gave p i 

ja'ida-affiliated residences and safe houses in Karachi. CIA, 

| September 2002, pp. 3-4. 

I information about the locations of alCIA CABLE 12251, September 12002 , p. 2; CIA, B | 

m

 See CIA, ALEC October 3, 2002, p. 2. 

169

 CIA, Memorandum to the Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA Deputy Director for Operations, Comments 

to Draft IG Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities, February 27, 2004, 

170

 President George W, Bush, Trying Detainees; Address on the Creation ofMUitarv Commissions, Washington, 

D.C., September 6, 2006. 

171

 SSCI Study. Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 327. 

' 41 

inn 11 III I MI IMI'I 

UNCLASSIFIED 

593 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! 1//NOFORN 

capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. The | 

interrogations of bin al-Shibh and DETAINEE R provided key insights 

about K.SmSS^HHSBHE Information produced through detainee 

interrogation was pivotal to the retention of a key CIA asset whose 

cooperation led directly to the capture of KSM. 

The Study almost exclusively attributes the capture of KSM 

to a "unilateral CIA asset."172 We agree with the Study that this asset provided information that 

was crucial to KSM's capture in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, on March 1, 2003.173 We also 

acknowledge that the CIA had met with the asset as early as fall 2001 and that the asset had 

provided good intelligence information related to KSM. However, the Study fails to 

acknowledge the cascading sequence of revelations that began with Abu Zubaydah's 

identification of the importance of the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul and culminated in 

the information provided by the asset which led directly to the capture of KSM. Moreover, the 

Study does not recognize that, but for the fortuitous intervention of a CIA officer—who was 

aware of recently obtained detainee information which corroborated the asset's claims 

concerning KSM—the asset would have been terminated as a CIA source prior to providing the 

crucial pre-capture information about KSM.174 

As stated previously, information obtained from Abu 

Zubaydah about KSM prior to the use of enhanced interrogation techniques was key to the CIA's 

realization of KSM's operational significance. The CIA disseminated an intelligence report, 

H I within the Intelligence Community HHHIHIiH I detailing KSM's identification as 

"Mukhtar" and his role as the mastermind of 9/11.175 Rc.sponscsJHflBHBHHH H 

indicated they followed up and requested more information on him.176 Zubaydah's 

FBT interrogator Ali Soufan also described the information from Zubaydah on KSM as 

significant. In 2008, Soufan told Committee staff that when Zubaydah provided that 

information, "we had no idea at the time that Mukhtar was the KSM from 9/11. . . . Because we 

had been working so diligently on trying to figure out the puzzles of 9/11 and who is Mukhtar, 

and when Abu Zubaydah said that, I think the picture was complete,"177 Also, on May 13, 2009, 

Soufan told the Senate Judiciary Committee that prior to Zubaydah providing information on 

KSM's role as the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, "we had no idea of KSM's role in 9/11 or of 

his importance in the al Qaeda leadership structure."178 

!

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 20'14, p. 327. 

174 See CIA Oral History Program. Interview of/REDACTED] by (REDACTED], October 14, 2004, pp. 5-7. 

175 See CIA, 

176 See CIA, 

177

 SSCI Transcript, Staff Interview of FBI Special Agent, Ali Soufan, April 28, 2008 (DTS 2008-2411). 

178

 Ali Soufan, Statement for the Record, before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Mav 13, 

2009. 

42 

TOP SECRET//! 1//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

594 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/D 

As 

The chain of events leading to KSM's capture begins in 

earnest with Zubaydah's interrogation on August 20, 2002, when, during his second period of 

being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques, he was asked how he would go about 

locating Hassan Ghul and other al-Qa'ida associates if he were to be released."9 Zubaydah 

responded to this question by stating that he would reach out to [the well-known associate of 

Hassan Ghul] H^HH^HHH^HHII^H t o reconnect with Ghul and others.180 

explained in greater detail in our discussion about the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, this 

information from Zubaydah caused HHH I Pakistani authorities to intensify their 

investigative efforts [ the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul] who 

ha^beeryareviously located, interviewed, and survcillcd.181 These investigative efforts resulted 

in •••Pakistan i raids of safe houses in Karachi on September 10-11, 2002.182 Ramzi 

bin al-Shibh was among those captured during these raids. 

Ramzi bin al-Shibh becomes one of the next links in the 

effort to track down and capture KSM. Shortly after his capture in Karachi, bin al-Shibh was 

transferred HIHIH^^^H I In late 2002| 

| Ramzi indicated that the best 

way to find KSM is to findgj^^^^^H^^^fAmma f who is also in Karachi."183 A few 

days later, in a photographic identification, bin al-Shibh confirmed that 9/11 financier, Ali Abdul 

Aziz Ali, was Ammar al-Baluchi, 

••••••••••••MB 1 8 4 The Study that "Ammar 

Baluchi played no role in the operation that captured KSM, which centered aroundB I 

|

185

 While Ammar might not have played a direct role in the "operation" 

that captured KSM, bin al-Shibh's key insights about Ammar clarified his importance such that 

Alec Station highlighted bin al-Shibh's photo-identification of Ammar al-Baluchi as a 

breakthrough.186 

Moreover, according to the CIA, bin al-Shibh's information 

about Ammar al Baluchi was used to interrogate DETAINEE R.1S7This claim is supported by a 

CIA requirements cable which contained numerous questions concerning KSM HH I 

DETAINEE R provided background and physical details on KSM 

DETAINEE 

179

 See CIA, ALEC 

180

 See CIA. ALEC 

18t 

August 29,2002, pp. 2-3 

|August 29,2002, p. 2-4. 

See supra, pp. 37-41. 

182 See CIA, CIA CABLE 12251, September | , 2002, p. 2; CIA, CIA 468392 | 

2002, pp. 3-4. 

September | 

184 

185 

186 See CIA, CIA CABLE 

187

 See CIA, CIA CABLE 10118] 

188

 See CIA, CIA CABLE 530341 

See CIA. CIA CABLE 101031 

43 

1//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

595 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 

1190 T he next day | the CTA interrogators 

continuing their questioning of DETAINEE R on the topic of KS? 

ETAINEE R providec 

191

 In late 200 2 •••••••iDETAINEERwa s 

rendered into O^ustod^n d subjected tt^irfuincedinte^gatio n techniques. HHHSB H 

•9R9 9 CIAHHH H reported that ^I^HI^ H "said in no uncertain terms that 

none o f the information provided by DETAINEE R has been of any use and | 

E wasted time here chasing peopl e and place s that are probably bogus." CIA j 

urged interrogators to readdres^h^ssueswidiDETAINE E R and acquire more—an d more 

accurate—information. 1 9 2 ••^^^^^^^DETAINE E R wa s asked to provide as much 

Ideational information as possibl e on I 

This brings us to ASSE T X, wh o wa s initially undervalued 

by the CIA, despit e his repeated claims that he could help locate KS M in Pakistan. In | 

200 1 the asset declined to worl^vith the CIA becaus e his proposed financial compensation 

packag e had been rejected. In HH2002 , the Counterterrorism Center directed recruiters to 

reconnec t with ASSE T X. 1 9 4 o f tha t sam e year, he wa s assigned to a ne w cas e 

officer . Th e cas e office r wa s unfamiliar with ASSE T X's potential to provide information that 

might lead to the location of KSM, and the cable s he sent to CIA Headquarters in pursuit of 

guidanc e in handling the asset went unread and unanswered when they wer e re-routed to a 

compartmented team which had been disbanded. 1 9 5 

Having heard nothing back from CIA Headquarters, the 

cas e office r wa s on the verge of terminating the CIA's relationship with the asset in HI^ H 

2002 . Whe n the cas e office r met with his Chie f of Bas e to discuss the termination, by chance , 

another CIA office r with prior operational contact with the asset 1 9 6 overheard their conversation 

a^^wa s waiting to meet with the Chief of Base . This other CIA office r 

BBBjiavin^orriejTo ^ that reported information from DETAINE E R 

included trying to track down KSM. He recognized ASSE T X's information 

He 

advised ASSE T X's current cas e office r and the Chie f o f Bas e against proceeding with the 

termination, and joine d in a meeting between the current cas e office r and ASSE T XJ. ASSE T X 

w a s subsequently able to provide information that resulted in KSM's capture on March 1, 2003 . 

190 See CIA, CIA CABLE 1012 

See CIA, CIA CABLE 10140] 

192 See CIA. CIA CABLE 1025' 

See CI IA CABLE] 30266, 

194 See CIA Oral History Program, Intemew of [REDACTED} by [REDACTED], October 14, 2004, 

See CIA Oral Histor 

l'»6 

p. 3. 

' Program, Interview of [REDACTED] by [REDACTEDj, October 14, 2004, p. 4, 

44 

TOPSECRET/D I//NOFQRN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

596 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ wNOFORN 

Although ASSE T X's contributions wer e clearly important tn 

KSM's capture, the true linchpin in the operation wa s the visiting officer's familiarity with the 

crucial information that the detainees had provided about KSM. Information from DETAINE E 

R background and|^HHHIIIH I infonnation on KSMHH0 |

 lie s a t th e cn d o f a 

causal chain that traces back through Ramz i bin al-Shibh and Ab u Zubaydah. Absent this 

collectiveb^j^nnformation , the requisite understanding o f KSM's activities, organizational 

stature, HHHHHHH i would have eluded analysts, to mak e nothing o f the fact ASSE T 

X 's relationship with the CIA would have been terminated in HHHI2002 ; months in 

advanc e o f KSM's March 200 3 capture. 

(U) The Disruption of the Karachi Hotels Bombing Plot 

Study Claim: "[T]he CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques—to include the waterboard—played no role in the disruption of 

the Karachi Plot(s)."198 

Fact: 

refers to: 

(U) CIA documents show that key intelligence collected through the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program, including information obtained after 

the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, played a major role in 

disrupting the Karachi hotels bombing plot. 

As the Study notes, the reference to the "Karachi Plot(s)" 

terrorist plotting that targeted a variety o f U.S. and western interests in the 

Karachi area, to include the U.S. Consulate, named hotels near the airport and 

beach, U.S. vehicle s traveling between the Consulat e and the airport, U.S. 

diplomati c housing, potential sniper attacks against U.S. personnel, as well as 

Pakistan's Faisal Army Base. 1 9 9 

(S//NF) The CIA has acknowledged that on several occasions, including in prominent 

representations such as President's Bush's 200 6 speech, it mischaracterized the impact of the 

reporting acquired from detainees on the Karachi plots. Instead o f claiming that the information 

"helped stop a planned attack on the U.S. Consulat e in Karachi," the CIA should have stated that 

it "revealed ongoin g attack plotting against the U.S. official presenc e in Karachi that prompted 

the Consulat e to take further steps to protect its officers."2 0 0 

{TSflHI^^^^H^t ^ Our analysis will demonstrate that the intelligenc e collected 

through the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, including information obtained after the 

u s e o f enhanced interrogation techniques, played a ke y role in the disruption o f the Karachi 

hotels bombin g plot. The Study notes that the CIA had information regarding the Karachi 

19,1

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 242. 

SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 239; see also CIA, 

4. 

200

 CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27, 2013, p. 6. 

TOP SECRET^ 

UNCLASSIFIED 

[11454, April 30,2003, pp. 1-

45 

1//NOFORN 

597 
UNCLASSIFIED 

ii < ii i h i mi i IHMHIHW I 'in »i II Mini 

terrorist plotting ascarly as September 11, 2002, in the form of the "perfume letter," which was 

obtained during a M B raid SSfl^^UffiSSSffi i

 o f a saf e

 house in Karachi, 

Pakistan.201 What the Study fails to point out, however, is that Abu Zubaydah provided crucial 

information which played a big role in leading to the H | raids of the al-Qa'ida safe houses on 

September 11, 2002—the samcraids that yielded the "perfume letter" and disrupted the Karachi 

hotels plot. Specifically, raids were the direct result of information provided 

by Abu Zubaydah on August 20, 2002, during his second period of enhanced interrogation. 2 0 2 

When asked how he would go about finding his former alQa'ida associates if he were set free, Abu Zubaydah told CIA interrogators that he would contact 

a well-known associate of Hassan Ghul who could put him in touch with Ghul and other senior 

al-Qa'ida members.203 CIA officers then asked Pakistani officials to question the well-known 

associate of Hassan Ghul, who on September 7, 2002, provided vague information the Pakistanis 

assessed was untruthful.204 The Pakistanis continued to watch the residence and, when another 

well-known associate of Hassan Ghul returned to the residence, questioned the other well-known 

associate of Hassan Ghul as well. The other well-known associate of Hassan Ghul cooperated 

and provided the location of Ghul's last apartment.205 This information led to the arrest, on 

September 9, 2002, of an individual thought to be Ghul206, but who turned out to be another alQa'ida terrorist.207

 Abu Zubaydah then positively identified this terrorist as Abu Badr, "KSM's 

driver and KSM's man in Karachi," facilitating the movement of al-Qa'ida operatives.208 Badr's 

driver, who was also arrested, identified information about several al-Qa'ida safehouses and 

residences in Karachi.209 

Based on this information, on September 11, 2002, 

conducted raids, which resulted in the arrests of several terrorists and 

key documents, including one dubbed the "perfume letter" because the word "perfumes" was 

used as a codeword.210 In this May 2002 letter, KSM told Hamza Zubayr, a terrorist killed in the 

same raids, he would provide him with $30,000, with another $20,000 available upon request, 

and that "we have acquired the green light that is strong for the [hotels]" clearly indicating a plot 

of some kind.2'

1

 More troubling, the ietter suggested "[increasing] the number to make it three 

instead of one."212 Were it not for Abu Zubaydah's original information about the significance 

|October 03, 2002, p. 2; 

201 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 242; CIA, ALEC | 

and CIA, ALEC •HP^ctobe r 3, 2002, pp. 2-4. 

302 See CIA, Captures Resulting From Detainee Information: Four Case Studies, November 26, 2003, p.2. 

^SeeCIA , Captures Resulting From Detainee Information: Four Case Studies, November 26, 2003. p.2; CIA, 

• H i 10644. Augus^^M2^^2^ClA^LECBHHAugus t 29.2002.:pp. 2-3. 

204 See CIA, ALEC••••••H^HHCl^^ A CABLE 12207. September 05.2002, pp. 2-3. 

205

 See CIA, CIA CABLE 12249, September 09; 2002, p. 2. 

206

 See CIA, CIA CABLE 12251, September^, 2002, p. 2. 

207

 See CIA, CIA CABLE 12254, September 10, 2002. p. 4; CIA, ALEC | 

208

 CIA, ALEC | 

209

 See CIA. CIA CABLE 12251, September! 2002, p. 2. 

210

 See CIA. CIA CABLE 12267, September 11,2002, p. 2; CIA, CIA CABLE •^•Octobe r 03, 2002. p. 2. 

2M CIA, CIA CABLE 33804, September 19, 2002, p. 4; After bis capture on April 1, 2003, KSM would confirm that 

the Karachi plot referenced in the "perfume letter" was the plot directed at three named hotels, chosen because they 

were frequented by American and German guests. See SSCI Study, Volume II, April 1, 2014, pp. 592-593 

212

 CIA, CIA CABLE 33804, September 1<9, 2002, p. 4. 

' 46 

Hill1 'il MlM 1 '^^BBlBBj^BM^BIi 01 MM 

UNCLASSIFIED 

598 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/D 

o f the well-known associat e o f Hassan Ghul, which led to the Karachi safe hous e raids, it is 

unclear i f the "perfume letter" would ever have been found. 

providing the true significanc e of the well-known associate of Hassan Ghul. Zubaydah 

subsequently translated the "perfume letter" for the CIA, identified the ke y word in the letter— 

"hotels"—that had not been previously translated, and told the CIA that the reference to 

"Khallad" in the letter ma y be the "one legged Yemeni." A CIA analyst noted that the onelegge d Yemen i wa s terrorist Khallad bin Attash, wh o wa s later arrested and admitted to his 

involvement in the plot. 2 1 3 

By early Octobe r 2002 , the CIA had completed a search of 

the individuals identified in the "perfume letter" and concluded that most o f those wh o had been 

assigned roles in support of the hotels operation had been arrested or killed by the Pakistani 

authorities during the Septembe r 11, 200 2 raids. 2 1 4 Although the Karachi hotels plot had been 

thwarted by thes e raids, at least one of the individuals identified by Ab u Zubaydah in the letter, 

KhallacH3ii^ttasMHmowiK ^ remained at large. 2 1 5 Eventually, on April 28, 

2003 , wa s able to capture several al-Qa'ida operatives, 

including Amma r al-Baluchi and bin Attash, H H also successfully confiscated explosives, 

detonators, and ammunition as part of the capture operation. 2 1 6 

On Ma y 17, 2003 , Khallad bin Attash confirmed that 

Amma r al-Baluchi had intended to use the explosive s stashed for that operation to target the U.S. 

Consulate. 2 1 7 The next day,B[| m indicated its clear understanding of ho w these 

interrelated Karachi plot events had improved the U.S. security posture in the area whe n it noted 

that although its options to enhanc e security: 

m a y appear limited . . , HHHHHHHHHHI^H H

 an d

 what w e have 

seen ove r past months as an increased aggressiveness of local authorities have 

provided som e protection from these threats. W e point specifically to the 11 

Septembe r 200 2 raids in Karachi, the 1 March 200 3 take-down of KSM, and to 

the recent arrests of al-Baluchi and ba Attash as example s of. how have 

thwarted attacks. 2 1 8 

(U) The Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plots 

Study Claim: fF^^H^^^^^^^^F ) "[C]ontrary to CIA representations, information 

acquired during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques played no role in 'alert[ing]' the CIA to the threat to—or the 

213

 See E-mail from: CIA analyst; to: 

2002, at 9:50 AM, 

ctober 3, 2002, pp. 2-12. 

2-12. 

214 See CIA, ALEC 

• p c 

; subject: Re: AZon the perfume letter; date; October 10, 

215 See CIA, ALEC ^BOetnhe r 3. 2002, 

216 See CIA, CIA CABLE 45028, 

217 See CIA, [CIA CABLE] 38405, May 

218

 CIA, CIA CABLE 1451 

47 

TOP SECRET/^ 1//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

599 
UNCLASSIFIED 

""ii ii i ii ii i MMMfflHllWBIM I ii »»i inn 11 

'disrupting]' the plotting against—Heathrow Airport and Canary 

Wharf."219 

Fact: f^^VBHHI^^HH^ ) The CIA interrogation program played a key 

role in disrupting the Heathrow and Canary Wharf plotting. 

Despite its claim that information acquired during or after 

the use of enhanced interrogation techniques played "no role" in the disruption of the Heathrow 

Airport and Canary Wharf plots, the Study twice concedes these plots were "fully disrupted" 

with the detentions of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, KSM, Ammar al-Baluchi, and Khallad bin Attash.220 

The Study then incorrectly asserts that "ftjhere are no CIA records to indicate that any of the 

detainees was captured as a result of CIA detainee reporting."221 As we have previously 

demonstrated, information obtained from the CIA interrogation program played a key role in the 

capture of al-Shibh and KSM.222 Also, Ramzi bin al-Shibh provided information about Ammar 

al-Baluchi and Abu Zubaydah provided information about Khallad bin Attash prior to their 

arrests.223 The same detainee information that helped lead to the capture of these terrorists also 

played a key role in fully disrupting the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf plots. 

Thus far, the following analytical dominoes have fallen in 

relation to the Heathrow and Canary Wharf plots: (1) "There is considerable evidence that the 

information Abu Zubaydah provided identifying KSM as "Mukhtar" and the mastermind of 9/11 

was significant to CIA analysts, operators, and FBI interrogators";224 (2) "Abu Zubaydah 

provided information about how he would go about locating Hassan Ghul and other al-Qa'ida 

associates in Karachi. This information caused HHHH I Pakistani authorities to intensify 

their efforts and helped lead them to capture Ramzi bin al-Shibh and other al-Qa'ida associates 

during the Karachi safe house raids conducted on September 10-11, 2002";225 (3) "Information 

produced through detainee interrogation was pivotal to the retention of a key CIA asset whose 

cooperation led directly to the capture of KSM";226 (4) Zubaydah told the CIA that the reference 

to "Khallad" in the letter may be the "one legged Yemeni";227 and (5) Pakistan's arrest of alQa'ida terrorists Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad Bin Attash disrupted the al-Qa'ida plot to attack 

the U.S. Consulate in Karachi.228 Taken together, these significant operational accomplishments, 

most of them resulting from information obtained from CIA detainees, also had the added bonus 

of disrupting the Heathrow and Canary Wharf plots. 

interrogation program played no role in the disruption of the Heathrow and Canary Wharf 

219

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 297-298. 

220 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 295 and 299. 

-m 

221

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 299. 

22 See supra, pp. 37-45. 

223 See supra, pp. 43 and 47. 

224 See supra, pp. 29-33. 

225 See supra, pp. 37-41. 

226 See supra, pp. 41-45. 

227

 E-mail from: CIA analyst; to: 

9:50 AM, p. 6. 

228 See CIA Study Response, Case Studies (Tab C), p:

 6. 

|: subject: Re: AZ on the perfume letter; date: October 10, 2002, at 

48 

1//NQFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

600 
UNCLASSIFIED 

I^NOFORN 

plotting almost immediately after its narrative on the plots begins. The Study says "records 

indicate the Heathrow Airport plotting had not progressed beyond the initial planning stages 

when the operation was fully disrupted with the detention of Ramzi bin al-Shibh (detained on 

September 11, 2002), KSM (detained on March 1, 2003), Ammar al-Baluchi (detained on April 

29, 2003), and Khallad bin Attash (detained on April 29, 2003)."229 As we explained previously, 

Ramzi bin al-Shibh was detained as a result of information provided by Abu Zubaydah during a 

period of enhanced interrogation.230 By asserting that the detention of Ramzi bin al-Shibh 

played a role in the disruption of the plot, certainly the detainee information that led to his 

detention also played a role in the plbt's disruption. 

Additionally, while the Study claims that the CIA already 

had information in its possession prior to the detention and interrogation of those detainees the 

CIA credits with providing information on the plot (KSM, Ammar al-Baluchi, and Khallad bin 

Attash), much of that reporting, including identification of Heathrow airport as the target, came 

fronwnterTogations of Ramzi bin al-Shibh occurring prior to CIA custody. Again, H " 

were only able to detain and question Ramzi bin al-Shibh because information 

provided by Abu Zubaydah in CIA detention led to bin al-Shibh's arrest. 

While the Study cites a CIA document to support its claim 

that the plot "was fully disrupted" with the arrests of the four previously mentioned terrorists, the 

CIA document says that the plot was "disrupted," not "fully disrupted."231 Perhaps for that 

reason, the CIA continued to interrogate detainees about the plot, long after the arrests of both 

Ramzi bin al-Shibh and KSM, to uncover more details about the plot and any operatives. For 

example, the CIA confronted Ramzi bin al-Shibh and KSM about e-mail addresses found in 

KSM's computer that belonged to the two Saudi-based operatives who could have been used in 

the plot, Ayyub and Azmari.232 Although the Study notes that these two operatives were 

"unwitting" of the Heathrow plot, they appear to have been willing terrorist operatives, as the 

CIA learned that Ayyub participated in a suicide attack in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on May 12, 

2003, that killed 36 individuals and injured more than 160 others. Azmari was arrested on July 

I, 2003 for his connections to the attack.233 

Additionally, as noted in several papers and briefings by the 

CIA, in mid-March 2003, the CIA questioned KSM about a hand-drawn illustration in his 

notebook of what appeared to be an I-beam with the term "Wharf" written in English, and 

"Cannery Wharf' in Arabic.234 KSM told interrogators it was part of the "Heathrow program" to 

target Canary Wharf in London as well, a target that had not been previously discussed by other 

detainees,235 

229

 SSCI Study, Volume II, April 1, 2014, pp. 1000-1062. 

230 See supra pp. 37-41. 

2,1

 SSCI Study, Volume 11, April 1, 2014, pp. 976-78. 

232 See SSCI Study, Volume II, April 1, 2014, p. 983. 

233

 SSCI Study, Volume II, p. 983 n.4387. 

J3J

 CIA. WASHINGTON DC | 

235 See CIA. 10787. March 13, 2003, p. 3. 

TOP SECRET^ 

CIA. 110787, March 13,2003, p. 3. 

1//NOFORN 

49 

UNCLASSIFIED 

601 
UNCLASSIFIED 

fF^IH^OHiB ^

 Atte r

 the detention in April 29, 2003, of Khallad bin Attash 

and Ammar al-Baluchi, debriefers used the reporting from KSM and bin al-Shibh to confront 

them. In a document explaining the value of detainee reporting provided to the Department of 

Justice, CIA explained: 

Khallad admitted to having been involved in the plot and revealed that he directed group 

leader Hazim al-Sha'ir to begin locating pilots who could hijack planes and crash them 

into the airport. Khallad said he and operative Abu Talha al-Pakistani considered |H H 

countries as possiblejaunch sites for the hijacking attempts and that they narrowed the 

options to the H^^^HIIiHHiHHIiH^H H Khallad's statements provided 

leverage in debriefings of KSM. KSM fleshed out the status of the operation, including 

identifying an additional target in the United Kingdom, Canary Wharf.236 

(U) In the years that followed the initial arrest of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, CIA officers 

continued to unravel the details of this plotting and provided information that helped lead to the 

detention and questioning of several other individuals involved in the plot.237 In light of the 

information cited above, the Study's assertion that the CIA interrogation program played "no 

role" in the disruption of this plotting makes little sense, especially when the Study's own 62-

page chart identifying the intelligence on the Heathrow plot devotes most of the pages to 

information from detainees in CIA's program or to Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who was captured 

because of CIA detainee information.238 

(U) The Capture of Hambali 

Study Claim: "A review of CIA operational cables and other 

records found that information obtained from KSM during or after the use 

of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the capture 

of Hambali."239 

Fact: CIA documents show that the interrogation of 

KSM and al-Qa'ida operative Zubair, during and after the use of enhanced 

interrogation techniques on both individuals, played a key role in the capture 

of Hambali. 

(TS^^^^I^^BNF ) S^y's; claim that the enhanced interrogation of KSM 

played "no role" in the capture of Hambali is not accurate, because two detainees subjected to 

enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM and Mohd Farik bin Amin, a senior member of Jemaah 

Islamiya (JI) and more commonly known as "Zubair,240 provided significant information that 

helped lead to the capture of Hambali. 

2M CIA, Briefing Notes on the. Value of Detainee Reporting, April 8, 2005, 10:47am, p. 4. 

237 See SSCI Study, Volume II, April 1, 2014, pp. 1000-1062. 

238 See SSCI Study. Volume II, April 1,2014, pp. 1000-1062. 

239

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 305. 

M0

 The Study acknowledges that Zubair was immediately subjected to CIA enhanced interrogation techniques upon 

being transferred into CIA custody on June^B2Q03. See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 

309. It attempts to downplay this fact by noting that: (I) "CIA records indicate that Thai authorities were 

unilaterally following investigative leads related to Hambali and Zubair" and that "[i|t is unknown what specific 

investigative steps were taken by Thai authorities (or the CIA) between early June 2003 and July 16, 2003, to 

50 

TOP SECRET//I K/NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

602 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET^M^^B—//NOFOR N 

(-TSgH^^HggggNF ) The claim that the enhanced interrogation of KSM played 

"no role"' in the capture of Hambali ignores the fact that KSM provided the crucial piece of 

information permitting the CIA to recognize the significance of, and act upon, previously known 

connections that would ultimately lead to Hambali's capture. The Study correctly points out that 

on March 6, 2003, Majid Khan told foreign government HflH H interrogators about his 

travel to Bangkok in December 2002 and provision of $50,000 to an individual named "Zubair" 

at the behest of al-Qa'ida.241 While the Study would like the reader to infer that Majid Khan 

provided a sufficient connection to Hambali, the Study ignores the fact that Khan never 

mentioned that the money was destined for Hambali. Moreover, the Study excludes the CIA's 

answer to the following question for the record: "Was there enough other information linking 

Zubair and Hambali?" The CIA's answer states: 

No. We assess, and believe the documentary record indicates that otherwise 

available intelligence was not sufficient to enable officers at the time to conclude 

Zubair was a targeting inroad to Hambali. A targeting study on Hambali in the 

late December timeframe, for example, lists a number of potential inroads but not 

Zubair. A look at the contemporaneous records as well as a plot summary from 

years later provide no evidence that Zubair played a role in the Bali Bombings.242 

While Majid Khan's information was still an important piece of the puzzle, it is clear that 

something more was needed to help locate. Hambali. That "something more" would come from 

KSM several days later. 

fKflMH^H ^ KSM had been rendered into CIA custody on March | 

2003, and immediately subjected to enhanced interrogation.243 On March 11, 2003, KSM 

admitted to providing Hambali with $50,000 to conduct a terrorist attack in "approximately 

November 2002." KSM reported, however, that the money was "necessary materials" for a 

Hambali operation that was approaching "zero hour," information that created a sense of urgency 

for the CIA to uncover more about Hambali's location.244 During this interrogation, KSM made 

no reference to Majid Khan or Zubair.245 On March 13, 2003, se m 

investigate [BUSINESS Q] i^B^^^^HHH H

 an d tll e CI A

 has never represented "to policymakers 

that the information obtained from Zubair after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques led to 

Hambali's capture." See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, pp. 309, n. 1737. Although we might 

not know what specific "unilateral" steps were taken by the Thai authorities related to 

records provide a good description of the information provided bw^ubait^ifteaheu^ 

techniques and the subsequent steps taken by the CIA, including HliHI^HIi^Hlililll^^H. 1 0 track down 

and capture Hambali. The absence of a CIA representation about Zubair does not invalidate the assertion that the 

information he provided after being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques may have helped lead to the 

capture of Hambali, especially since this assertion is supported by the CIA documentary record. 

341

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 307-308. 

242

 CIA Response to SSCI Request for Information. October 25, 2013, p. 4 (DTS 2013-3152). This answer 

contradicts the assertion by the Study that "[bly this time, the CIA had significant information—prior to KSM's 

capture—indicating that a 'Zubai^)lavedacentrul supporting role in the JI, was affiliated with al-Qa'ida figures 

like KSM. had expertise in HHflBHH i n Southeast Asia, and was suspected of playing a role in Hambali's 

October 12, 2002, Bali bombings." SSCI Study, Executive Summary. December 3,2014, p. 306-307. 

243

 See CIA. [CIA CABLE] 34491, March 5, 2003, pp. 1-3. 

244

 CIA, ^•l£755 , March 11, 2003. 

245

 See CIAJH I 10755. March 11, 2003. pp. 1-3. 

51 

LTNOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

603 
UNCLASSIFIED 

1//NQFQRN 

cable saying that in light of KSM's information that he arranged to send $50,000 to Hambali in 

November 2002 to procure materials for an operation that was approaching "zero hour," "we 

view [the information] from Majid Khan on his trip to Bangkok for an alleged money transfer 

between 26-29 December with ever greater concern."246 Moreover, the same cable makes clear 

that at the time of KSM's reporting, the CIA did not know whether the information from KSM 

and Majid Khan were about the same transaction. The cable says, "KSM's information and 

Majid's 'story' may be urn-elated, but it appears too premature to judge at this juncture, and we 

must assume they possibly are until additional facts are learned."247 

On March 17, 2003, KSM was questioned about the Majid 

Khan network. KSM positively identified a picture of Majid Khan as "Majid aka Yusif, the alQa'ida courier" KSM used to deliver the $50,000 for the next big Hambali operation, through 

"Hambali representatives in Thailand."248 Significantly, KSM said that Khan had not been 

informed that the money was ultimately for Hambali and that KSM did not know who Hambali's 

intermediary was.249 Days later, CIA officers still seemed to be trying to understand the 

connection between the KSM and the Majid Khan reporting. According to a March 20,2003, 

cable, KSM's reporting that he used Majid Khan as a courier to transport al-Qa'ida funds to 

Hambali, "appears to confirm station [sic] earlier concerns that the $50,000 transfer involving 

KSM and Hambali may be one in the same with the $50,000 al-Qa'ida transfer facilitated by 

Khan.250 Questioned again on March 22, 2003, Khan acknowledged that his trip to Thailand to 

deliver the $50,000 was at KSM's request.251 

(U) While it would be difficult to know conclusively without talking to the analysts 

involved, CIA documents indicate it was the combination of reporting from KSM and Majid 

Khan that led to the efforts to find Hambali through Zubair. A CIA summary of Hambali's 

capture timeline states, while "numerous sources had placed Hambali in various Southeast Asian 

countries, it was captured al-Qa'ida leader KSM who put on 

Hambali's trail"—contradicting the Study's claim that the KSM interrogation played "no 

role."252 

^^^^^^^^^^^ ^ On June 8, 2003, Zubair was detained by the Government 

ofThailand. HHHBHH ' Zubair on mmH^lHIHii H 

corroborated reporting on Business Q,2" OiTkinelj^pOO^Zubair was transferred 

into CIA custody and was immediately subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques.254 

Zubair told his interrogators about I 

I.255 Zubair 

246

 CIA, CIA CABLE, 81697 

247 See CIA, CIA CABLE, 81697 

248

 CIA, BB110865 , March 17, 2003, p. 3. 

249 See CIAjB H 10865, March 17, 2003, p. 3, 

250

 CIA, CIA CABLE 81990, March 20. 2Q03, p. 2. 

251 See CIA. CIA CABLE 13890, 

252

 CIA, Hambali Capture/Detention Timeline, no date. p. 6 

2

" See CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27, 2013, p. 19. 

254 See CIA [CIA CABLE] 40568, 

255 See CIA, Hambali Capture/Detention Timeline, no date, p. 7; CIA, [CIA CABLE] 40915 | 

CIA, [CIA CABLE] 41017, | 

52 

TOP SECRET/^ I//MOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

604 
(the CIA planned an operation to find Hambali by watching^^^^^^^^Man d 

waiting for Hambali's It appears that Zubair provided 

key information about these Hambali facilitators after being subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques. Specifically, CIA documents show that analysts assessed that it would 

be "Zubair cohoit and former roommateLilie^JHH "per 

thc Zubair now anc( 

"findin^ilie, therefore, may be tantamount to finding Hambali."258 

flHfli Hambali associate Amer, who actually Hl^^H^I^Hwa s tracked and Zubair 

identified a picture of him and speculated that "Lilie likely tasked [Amer] to handle H^^ H 

thus following Amer would likely lead to finding Lilie."259 Amer was arrested on August 11, 

2003, and cooperated in locating Lilie hours later.260 Lilie was found to have a key fob in his 

possession imprinted with an address, which Lilie said was the address of two apartments he 

used for Hambali's activities, one of which was Hambali's residence.261 Hambali was captured 

at the address found on the key fob several hours later.262 It appears that Zubair's cooperation 

after being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques played a significant role in the capture 

of Hambali through Amer and Lilie. 

(U) The Thwarting of the Second Wave Plots and Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group 

Study Claim: "A review of CIA operational cables and other 

documents found that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played 

no role in the 'discovery' or thwarting of either 'Second Wave' plot. 

Likewise, records indicate that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 

played no role in the 'discovery' of a 17-member 'cell tasked with executing 

the 'Second Wave.""263 

256

 See CIA. Hambali Capture/Detention Timeline, no date. p. 7: CIA, [CIA CABLE}40915| 

357 See CIA, Hambali Capture/Detention Timeline, no date, p. 7-8; CIA, ALEC | 

258

 CIA, Hambali Capture/Detention Timeline, no date, p. 2. 

259

 CIA, Hambali, Capture/Detention Timeline, no date, p. 5. 

260

 CIA, Hambali Capture/Detention Timeline, no date, p. 5. 

261

 CIA, Hambali Capture/Detention Timeline, no date, p. 6. 

202

 CIA, Hambali Capture/Detention Timeline, no date, p. 5. 

261

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 251. This claim has been modified from the version that 

appeared in Ihe report that was approved by the Committee at the end of the 112th Congress. For example, it no 

longer claims that the CIA's interrogation program, excluding the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, did not 

play a role in the thwarting of die al-Ghuraba Group. It also substitutes the words "discovery or thwarting" in place 

of the original "identification and disruption." (emphasis added). 

53 

TOP 

UNCLASSIFIED 

605 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/4 k/NOFOR N 

Fact: (TSWWlHWIiWIWIIHMII i The CIA interrogation program played a key 

role in disrupting the "Second Wa ve" plot and led to the capture of the 17-

membe r al-Ghuraba group. 

The Study asserts that because Hambali's brother, Gun Gun 

Ruswan Gunawan, first identified a group of 17 Malaysian and Indonesian Jemaah Islamiya (JI) 

affiliated students in Karachi, "the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against 

Hambali did not result in the 'discovery' of 'the Ghuraba Cell' that was 'tasked with executing 

the 'Second Wave' plotting."'264 While Gunawan did identify the group of JI students in 

Karachi, the Study ignores that KSM, who had also been subjected to the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques, provided information months earlier on this same group of JI students 

and their lbcation in Karachi—information that had helped lead to the capture of Gunawan 

himself. The Study also ignores information provided by other detainees in CIA's interrogation 

program. 

Gunawan's role in Karachi as a communications conduit between Hambali and al-Qa'ida and 

reported that he was living in the dormitory where he was enrolled at Abu Bakr-Sadeeq 

University.265 KSM also drew a map with the location of a house he called "Colony Gate" where 

he met Gunawan, where he said a group of JI students would meet.266 According to CIA 

information, while the CIA was already aware of Gunawan, "KSM's identification of his role as 

Hambali's potential successor prioritized his capture. Information from multiple detainees, 

including KSM, narrowed down [Gunawan's] location and enabled his capture in September 

2003."267 This information was excluded from the Study. Hambali provided very similar 

information after his capture in August 20031 268 

On August 20, 2003, CIA headquarters provided 

information on Gunawan "which solidly ties Rusman 

Gunawan to al-Qa'ida and al-Qa'ida's terrorist attacks' 

H H 2 6 9 The information provided was largely from interrogations of KSM, including 

information about Gunawan working as a communications conduit for Hambali and al-Qa'ida, 

his location in Karachi, a description of Gunawan, but also provided information from another 

detainee in CIA custody, Ammar al-Baluchi.270 Gunawan was arrested on BHHHH >

 a t 

the Abu Bakr Madrassa, locational information first provided by KSM, along with most of JI 

student group.271 

After Gunawan's arrest he was caught trying to send a 

coded message which he admitted was intended to warn the group of Jl-affiliated students about 

-

M SSCI Stud' 

265 See CIA 

•166 

Ay, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 255-256. 

11192. April 8, 2003, p. 3. 

See CIA, 11212, April 11,2003, p.. 2. 

367

 CIA, Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa'ida, June 1, 2005, p. 2 (DTS 2009-1387). 

See CIA, CIA CABLE 87551, August 15, 2003, pp. 4-5. 

269

 CIA, ALEC [ 

270

 CIA, ALEC | 

271 See CIA, CIA CABLE 15252, 

268 

55 

TOP SECRET/4 WNOFOKN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

606 
UNCLASSIFIED 

1 //NOFQR N 

his arrest. 

272 larticipating in the interrogation recognized Gunawan's information 

about this group of mostly Malaysian students as similar to intelligence reporting provided 

previously by KSM that he was planning to recruit Malaysians in a "next wave of attacks."273 

The officers asked that Hambali be questioned about the reporting.274 

During a CIA interrogation of Hambali days later. Hambali, 

now in CIA custody and undergoing enhanced interrogation, provided more information about 

the group, identifying them as the "al-Ghuraba" group and describing how they were set up by 

Hambali and sent to Karachi because of its "proximity to Afghanistan and the availability of 

military-style training facilities there."275 He said the Program was designed to "give a select 

few the opportunity for military-style training to prepare them for jihad" and identified two who 

were ready for operations.276 Hambali provided information about the identities and 

backgrounds of several of the al-Ghuraba group members and described conversations he had 

with KSM about possible future attacks on the United States.277 In a subsequent interrogation, 

Hambali said the group was not yet ready for operations, but may be in 2003-2004 (it was 

already late 2003 when he provided this information) and he named individuals who were being 

groomed as suicide and other operatives.278 

[ arrested the members of the alGhuraba group during raids on HIHHHHIHI -

 A cable describing the arrests said, 

"[W]e captured this cell based on the debriefings of captured senior al-Qa'ida operatives, who 

stated that some members of this cell were to be part of senior al-Qa[']ida leader Khalid Shaykh 

Muhammad (KSMM's] [']second wave['] operation to attack the United States using the same 

modus operandi as was used in the September 11, 2001 attacks."279 

z) In a seeming effort to suggest CIA's assessment of the threat 

posed by the al-Ghuraba group had diminished over time, the Study identified an October 27, 

2006, CIA cable that stated, "[Ajll of the members of the former al-Ghuraba cell have now been 

released."280 It also cited an April 18, 2008, CIA intelligence report focusing on the Jemaah 

Islamiya and referencing the al-Ghuraba group that makes no reference to the group serving as 

potential operatives for KSM's 'Second Wave' plotting."281 

These statements are misleading in several ways. The April 18, 

2008 intelligence report was about Jemaah Islamiya in Pakistan, not the al-Ghuraba group, and 

provided only a minor description of the "al-Ghuraba cell in Karachi," but did mention that its 

leader was in direct contact with Hambali and "al-Qa'ida external operations chief Khalid 

272 See CIA, CIA CABLE 15359, 

273

 CIA, CIA CABLE 15359, 

274 See CIA, CIA CABLE 15359, 

275

 CIA, [CIA CABLE] 45915, September 14, 2003, p. 2. 

276

 CIA, [CIA CABLEI 45915, September 14, 2003, p. 2. 

277

 See CIA, [CIA CABLE] 45915, September 14.2003. p. 2. 

278

 CIA, [CIA CABLE] 45953, September 15, 2003, p. 3. 

279

 CIA, CIA CABLE 52981, ••••HHHH I 

280

 CIA, CIA CABLE 131396, October 27, 2006, p. 2. 

281 See CIA, Jemaah Islamiya: Counterterrorism Scrutiny Limiting Extremist Agenda in Pakistan, April 18, 2008. 

TOP SECRET/4 

55 

TOOFQRN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

607 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/4 /NOFORN 

Shaykh Muhammad."282 The Study omitted a report focused on Jemaah Islamiya's al-Ghuraba 

group published five months later that said "members of the cell had also been identified by 

Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, the mastermind of the attacks of 11 September 2001, and senior alQa' ida and JI operative Hambali as candidates for post-11 September attacks against the U.S. 

Homeland," including for "second wave suicide hijacking operations in the Unites States and 

Europe."283 Far from suggesting the CIA was unconcerned about the al-Ghuraba group, this 

report devoted 20 pages to describing the threat from its members including their "jihad 

activities" and the caution that "as this group of radicalized militants reconnects and mingles 

with other young Southeast Asian Muslims, it poses a revived threat to US and Western 

interests."284 

(U) Critical Intelligence Alerting the CIA to Jaffar al-Tayyar 

Study Claim: 'CIA representations [about detainee reporting 

on Jaffar al-Tayyar] also omitted key contextual facts, including that... (2) 

CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah provided a description and information on a 

KSM associate named Jaffar al-Tayyar to FBI Special Agents in May 2002, 

prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques... 

and (5) CIA records indicate that KSM did not know al-Tayyar's true name 

and that it was Jose Padilla—in military custody and being questioned by the 

FBI—who provided al-Tayyar's true name as Adnan el-Shukrijumah."286 

Fact: fFSflHHHHHvtE ) Abu Zubaydah provided a description of and 

information about Jaffar al-Tayyar to FBI special agents in May 2002 after 

being subjected to enhanced interrogation between April 15,2002 and April 

21, 2002. Although KSM did not know al-Tayyar's true name, he did report 

that Padilla might know al-Tayyar's true name. Padilla subsequently 

confirmed Jaffar's true name as Adnan E! Shukrijumah. 

provided information on an associate of KSM by the name of Abu Jaffar al-Thayer. Abu^ 

Zubaydah provided a detailed description of Abu Jaffar al-Thayer, including that he spoke 

English well and may have studied in the United States.287 The Study incorrectly claims that this 

May 20, 2002, interrogation took place prior to the initiation of the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques.288 Abu Zubaydah had already been subjected to an extended period of sleep 

deprivation and other enhanced interrogation techniques during his interrogation between April 

15, 2002 and April 21, 2002, about one month prior to his May 20 interrogation.289 

382

 OA , Jemaah Islamiya: Counterterrorism Scrutiny Limiting Extremist Agenda in Pakistan, April 18, 2008, p. 1. 

283

 CIA, Southeast Asia: Jemaah Islamiya's Al-Ghuraba Cell Coalescing, September 17, 2008, pp. I and 2. 

284

 CIA, Southeast Asia: Jemaah Islamiya's Al-Ghuraba Cell Coalescing, September 17, 2008, pp. 1-2. 

285

 CIA, Southeast Asia: Jemaah Islamiya's Al-Ghuraba Cell Coalescing, September 17, 2008, p. 2. 

286

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 358-359. 

267 See FBI draft report of the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, May 20, 2002, 5:25 p.m. to 8:40 p.m.. p 3. 

288 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 362. 

289 See supra, pp. 33-36. 

//NOFORN 

56 

UNCLASSIFIED 

608 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

f^SfiSHI^GGHH^ ^ The Study also cites as a key contextual fact omitted from 

CIA representations that KSM did not know al-Tayyar's true name, and it was Jose Padilla, in 

military custody and being questioned by the FBI, who provided al-Tayyar's true name as Adnan 

el-Shukrijumah.290 However, this omission was rendered moot because, as the Study itself notes 

a few pages later,291 the "FBI began participating in the military debriefings [of Padilla] in March 

2003, after KSM reported Padilla might know the true name of a US-bound al-Qa'ida operative 

known at the time only as Jaffar al-Tayyar. Padilla subsequently confirmed Jaffar's true name as 

Adnan El Shukrijumah,"292 

(U) The Identification and Arrest ofSaleh al-Marri 

Study Claim: The Study correctly asserts, "[t]he CIA 

represented to the CIA Office of Inspector General that 'as a result of the 

lawful use of EITs,' KSM 'provided information that helped lead t the 

arrests of terrorists including... Saleh Almari, a sleeper operative in New 

York."*291 

Fact: 

. KSM provided valuable intelligence that helped 

to clarify Saleh al-Marri's role in al-Qa'ida operations and played a 

significant role in al-Marri's prosecution. 

The Study cites an interview between the OIG and the 

Deputy Chief of the Counterterrorist Center, in which the deputy chief claims that information 

from KSM helped lead to the arrest of al-Marri.294 As the Study makes clear, al-Marri was not 

arrested based on information from KSM, and could not have been, because al-Marri was 

arrested in December 2001, before the detention of KSM in March 2003. Two days after the 

interview with the IG, the deputy chief wrote in an email that al-Marri "had been detained on a 

material witness warrant based on information linking him to the 9/11 financier Hasawi."295 The 

Study correctly notes that this inaccuracy appears in the final version of the OIG's May 2004 

Special Review296, as referenced in an Office of Legal Counsel memorandum analyzing the 

legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.297 In its response to the Study, the CIA 

290 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 359. 

291 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 365. 

292 See CIA, Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting. April 15, 2005, p. 3 (emphasis added); See also 

CIA. ALEC ^^^•Marc h 21, 2003, p. 6 ("Our service has developed new information, based on leads from 

detained al-Qa'ida operations chief Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), that al-Qa'ida operative Jafar al-Tayyar's 

true name is Adnan Shukri Jumah and he could be involved in an imminent suicide attack in the United States"). 

293

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 366. 

m

 SSCI Study, Exerati^jummary, December 3, 2014, p. 366 n.2064. 

-

,,s

 Email from: to: i et al.; subject: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 

2:30 PM. 

296 See CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities 

(September 2001 - October 2003), May 7, 2004, p. 87 (DTS 2004-2710). 

297 See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven 

G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application 

of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be 

Used in the interrogation of high Value Al Qaeda Detainees, p.9 (DTS 2009-1810, Tab 11). 

57 

TOP SECRET//^ K/NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

609 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! 

concedes that the agency erred in describing detainee reporting as contributing to al-Marri's 

arrest. However, the agency stresses that KSM did provide valuable intelligence on al-Marri— 

intelligence that played a significant role in al-Marri's prosecution.298 

The Study's focus on this factual error is out of proportion 

with its significance. The IG's Special Review section on effectiveness contains approximately 

six pages of discussion, including numerous success stories attributed to intelligence collected 

from detainees.299 Incorrectly characterizing the manner in which detainee intelligence was 

valuable—arrest versus prosecution—for one item in a list of terrorists identified, captured, and 

prosecuted does not diminish the overall value that detainee intelligence provided in helping to 

identify, capture, and prosecute terrorists. 

The Study also notes that the CIA and the FBI had 

information about al-Marri prior to KSM's interrogation, in an apparent attempt to downplay the 

importance of the information obtained from KSM.300 It was KSM who identified a photograph 

of al-Marri and described him as an al-Qa'ida sleeper operative sent to the United States shortly 

before 9/11. KSM said his plan was for al-Marri, who "had the perfect built-in cover for travel 

to the United States as a student pursuing his advanced degree in computer studies at a university 

near New York," was to serve as al-Qa'ida's point of contact to settle other operatives in the 

United States for follow-on attacks after 9/11.301 KSM also said that al-Marri trained at the alFaruq camp and had poisons training and said al-Marri offered himself as a martyr to Bin 

Ladin.302 Prior to the information from KSM, al-Marri was charged with credit card fraud and 

false statements. After the information from KSM, al-Marri was designated as an enemy 

combatant. In 2009, after being transferred to federal court, al-Marri pled guilty to one count of 

conspiracy to provide material support to al-Qa'ida. In his plea, he admitted that he attended 

terrorist training camps and met with KSM to offer his services to al-Qa'ida, who told him to 

travel to the United States before 9/11 and await instructs—all information initially provided by 

KSM. 

(U) The Arrest and Prosecution of Iyman Faris 

Study Claim: (U) "Over a period of years, the CIA provided the 'identification,' 'arrest,' 

'capture,' 'investigation,' and 'prosecution' of Iyman Faris as evidence for 

the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. These 

representations were inaccurate."303 

Fact: (U) CIA, FBI, and Department of Justice documents show that information 

obtained from KSM after he was waterboarded led directly to Faris's arrest 

and was key in his prosecution. 

298

 See CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27, 2013, p. 35. 

299 See CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities 

(September 2001 - October 2003), May 7, 2004, pp. 85-91 (DTS 2004-2710). 

300

 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 367-368. 

301

 CIA, WASHINGTON DC| 

302 See CIA, CIA WASHINGTON DC | 

3i>: SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 276. 

TOP SECRET//! 

58 

UNCLASSIFIED 

610 
UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) The Study correctly points out that CIA statements implying that detainee 

information had led to the "identification" or "investigation" of Iyman Faris were inaccurate. 

However, contrary to the Study's claims, the CIA representations that information obtained from 

KSM after he was subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques directly led to the arrest and 

prosecution of Iyman Faris were accurate. 

(S//OC/NF) The CIA has admitted that, in a few cases, it incorrectly stated or implied 

that KSM's information led to the investigation of Iyman Faris when it should have stated that 

KSM's reporting informed and focused the investigation.304 The CIA's mistake is somewhat 

understandable, given that the CIA only began to focus on Iyman Faris in March 2003 and was 

not aware that the FBI had opened and closed a preliminary investigation on Faris back in 2001. 

In essence, Faris was a new investigative target to the CIA in March 2003.305 Regardless, the 

CIA's representation concerning the identification and initial investigation of Faris is much less 

important than the details that led to his arrest and prosecution. 

(TS|HHH^H^ISA/NF ) On March 5, 2003, Majid Khan, an al-Qa'ida 

operative directly subordinate to KSM, was taken into custody by Pakistani authorities.306 That 

same day, the FBI's authorized electronic surveillance of Majid Khan's residence in Maryland 

indicated HHHHHH , Majid Kahn's • • made a suspicious call to an individual, later 

confirmed to be Iyman Faris. They spoke about the possible arrest of Majid Khan and H| | 

••' s suspicions that he was under FBI surveillance. asked Faris whether he had 

been approached or questioned and warned Faris not to contact anyone using his phone.307 The 

FBI reopened its international terrorism investigation on Iyman Faris soon thereafter.308 

On March 10, 2003, in response to a requirements cable 

from CIA Headquarters reporting that al-Qa'ida was targeting U.S. suspension bridges,309 KSM 

stated that any such plans were "theoretical" and only "on paper." He also stated that no one was 

currently pursuing such a plot.310 

On March 11, 2003, Majid Khan identified a photograph of 

Iyman Faris before he was in CIA custody. Among other details, Khan said that Faris was a 35-

H

)ld truck dri ver of Pakistani origin who was a "business partner of his H 

.

3 n

 The next day, Majid Khan described Faris as "an Islamic extremist."312 On March 14, 

2003, Majid Khan provided the following additional details on Faris: (I) Faris was a 

mujahedeen "during the Afghan/Soviet period"; (2) Faris was a close associate of Maqsood 

394

 CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C); June 27, 2013, p. 13. 

305 See CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C)\ June 27, 2013, p. 14, 

306 See CIA, CIA CABLE 13658, March 5, 2003, pp. 1 -2. 

307

 CIA, CIA CABLE BBH ,

 Marc h

 6, 2003, p. 4. 

308

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 280; FBI information confirmed by the FBI on 

November 30, 2010, SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 280, n. 1581. 

309

 CIA, ALEC •••Marc h 7,2003. p. 1. 

3i0_C|AJBB 10752, March 10,2003, p. 2; CIA, DIRECTOR arch 12, 2003, p. 5. See also \ 

311

 CIA, CIA CABLE 13758,1 

312

 CIA, CIA CABLE 13765,1 

59 

TOP SECRET/^ y/N'OFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

611 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/D k/NOFORN 

Khan, a known al-Qa'ida associate in contact with senior al-Qa'ida members and Majid's uncle; 

and (3) Faris had contacted Majid Khan's family after the capture of KSM became public and 

requested that the family pass a message to Maqsood Khan regarding the status of KSM,313 

On March 16, 2003, when asked again about the targeting 

of U.S. suspension bridges, KSM repeated his earlier assertions, noting that, while Usama Bin 

Ladin officially endorsed attacks against suspension bridges in the United States, he "had no 

planned targets in the [United States] which were pending attack and that after 9/11 the [United 

States!| had become too hard a target."314 KSM never referenced Iyman Faris during his March 

10 and March 16 interrogations. Thus far, none of the information collected by the U.S. 

Intelligence Community would have been sufficient to prosecute Iyman Faris on charges of 

material support to terrorism. 

On March 17 and 18, 2003, the CIA questioned KSM about 

Majid Khan's family and KSM stated that another Khan relative, whom he identified from a 

picture of Faris, was a "truck driver in Ohio."315 On March 18, 2003, KSM told interrogators he 

tasked the truck driver to procure specialized machine tools that would be useful to al-Qaida in 

loosening the nuts and bolts of suspension bridges in the United States. KSM said he was 

informed by an intermediary that Faris could not find the tools.316 This revelation would turn out 

to be a key piece of incriminating evidence against Iyman Faris. 

The Study excluded information found in CIA documents 

which shows that, immediately after obtaining information from KSM and Majid Khan regarding 

Faris, the CIA queried the FBI for "additional details" on Faris, "including a readout on his 

current activities and plans for FBI continued investigation."317 The cable specifically noted that 

"KSM seems to have accurately identified" Faris from a photograph as the "truck driver in 

Ohio;" On March 20, 2003, the FBI picked Faris up for questioning and conducted a consent 

search of his apartment, seizing his laptop. When our staff asked the FBI why Faris was picked 

up, they cited the cables from CIA.318 The FBI investigators went into this interview armed with 

the information revealed by KSM and Majid Khan, which enabled them to explore Faris's ties 

with KSM and al-Qa'ida plotting in the United States.319 The Study notes that when approached 

by law enforcement, Iyman Faris voluntarily provided information and self-incriminating 

statements.320 This gives a false impression that the information provided by KSM was 

unnecessary to securing the arrest and prosecution of Faris by omitting the important context that 

the FBI questioned Faris armed with incriminating information obtained from KSM on March 17 

and 18, 2003.321 

313

 CIA, CI A CABLE 13785, 

314

 CIA, 10858. March 9, 2003, p. 2. 

110886, March 18,2003, pp 5-6. 

, March 18.2003, pp 5-6. 

I. Information from KSM on Majid Khan, 

"

8

 Phone call from the FBI responding to Staff questions from a document review, January 25, 2013. 

319 See CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27. 2013, p. 13; FBI WASH 040537Z, April 4, 2003, p. 2. 

320

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 283-284. 

321

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, Decembers, 2014, pp. 281-282. 

60 

I I III II III I MMMMMM M || III I llll I 

UNCLASSIFIED 

612 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! 1//NOFORN 

(II) There is further proof that the incriminating revelations obtained from KSM after he 

was subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques led directly to the successful arrest and 

prosecution of Iyman Faris—On May 1, 2003, Faris pled guilty to "casing a New York City 

bridge for al Qaeda, and researching and providing information to al Qaeda regarding the tools 

necessary for possible attacks on U.S. targets," the exact terrorist activities described by KSM. 

(U) The Arrest and Prosecution of Uzhair Paracha and the Arrest of Saifullah 

Paracha 

Study Claim: flPS^^^^Hl^^B^F ) "The CIA represented that information 

obtained through the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 

produced otherwise unavailable intelligence that led to the identification 

and/or arrest of Uzhair Paracha and his father Saifullah Paracha (aka, Sayf 

al-Rahman Paracha). These CIA representations included inaccurate 

information and omitted significant material information, specifically a 

body [of] intelligence reporting—acquired prior to CIA detainee 

reporting—that linked the Parachas to al-Qa'ida-related terrorist 

activities."322 

Fact: (TS^HHHV ^ Information obtained from KSM during his 

enhanced interrogation on March 25,2003, about alleged explosives 

smuggling into the United States, attacks on U.S. gas stations, and related 

material support to al-Qa'ida, motivated the FBI to track down and arrest 

Uzhair Paracha in New York a few days later on March 31,2003. The 

Intelligenc^omm^ who was later 

arrested on July 2003. Among 

other charges, Uzhair was successfully convicted on November 23,2005, of 

providing material support to al-Qa'ida and sentenced to 30 years in prison. 

KSM's description of Uzhair's involvement in the gas station plots and his 

claim that Uzhair may have provided other logistical support for Majid's 

entry into the United States was consistent with the press release's 

description of some of the evidence used during Uzhair's trial. 

On March 25, 2003, while being subjected to enhanced 

interrogation techniques, KSM provided U.S. domestic threat information concerning Saifullah 

Paracha and his son, Uzhair Paracha. KSM stated that Saifullah Paracha was a Pakistani 

businessman in Karachi, who owned a textile business with a branch in New York City. KSM 

alleged that his nephew,. Ammar al-Baluchi, and Majid Khan had discussed a plan with Saifullah 

to use his textile business to smuggle explosives into the United States. According to this plan, 

the explosives would be shipped in containers that Saifullah used to ship the clothes that he sold 

in the United States. KSM stated that Saifullah agreed to the plan, but he was unclear how much 

Uzhair Paracha knew about it.323 KSM added that Majid Khan planned to rent a storage space in 

whatever area of United States he chose, not necessarily close to New York City, and that the 

322

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 352. 

323

 CIA, DIRECTOR | 

61 

TOP SECRET/D 1//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

613 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/4 K/NQFORN 

explosives would be used in al-Qa'ida's campaign against economic targets in the United 

States.324 

KSM was also aware that Ammar al-Baluchi and Majid 

Khan had approached Saifullah and Uzhair to help resettle Majid Khan in the United States, 

where Majid had plans to blow up several gas stations. KSM stated that Ammar was hoping that 

Paracha could sponsor Majid's entry into the United States, if necessary. KSM also told his 

interrogators that"Uzhair may have provided other logistical support for Majid's entry into the 

United States."125 Finally, KSM noted that Saifullah owned a media company in Pakistan and 

had traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 1999 to meet with Usarna Bin Ladin for the purpose of 

offering al-Qa'ida the services of his media company.326 

Threat information related to the allegation of explosives 

smuggling motivated the FBI to begin searching in earnest for Saifullah and Uzhair Paracha. 

The next day, on March 26, 2003, the FBI's field division in Washington, DC requested the CIA 

to approve the following tearline based upon KSM's reporting: 

Subject: Sayf Al-Rahman Paracha's Possible Involvement in Plot to Smuggle 

Explosives to the United States. It has come to our attention that one Sayf alRahman Paracha, a Pakistani businessman and owner of an import-export textile 

business in Karachi, Pakistan, may be involved in a plan to smuggle explosives to 

the United States for al-Qa'ida terrorist related activities. There is a possibility 

that Mr. Paracha's son Uzhair may be involved as well. Our information 

indicates that Uzhair traveled from Pakistan to the U.S. circa 17 February 2003. 

We seek your assistance in providing any information you may have regarding 

these individuals, their activities, and personalities. Your cooperation and 

assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated.327 

In the same caW^quesMh^B^iotecht o records checks and that 

Parachas

 328 

The FBI arrested Uzhair in New York on March 31, 2003. 

The CIA was able tojgvglop an operation that lured Saifullah Paracha out of Pakistan, which 

resulted in his arrest ^HIHI^^^HIiil^^^^^H I on July 6, 2003.324 On 

November 23, 2005—after a two-week jury trial—Uzhair was convicted on all charges in the 

334

 CIA, DIRECTOR I 

325

 CIA, DIRECTOR] 

12,5

 CIA, DIRECTOR During a subsequent interrogation, KSM provided additional 

incriminating information about Saifullah Paracha. The cable reports that "[i]n light of Paracha's past history of 

handling money for al-Qa'ida, (KSM1 approached Paracha with approximately U.S. $260,000-275,000 in cash and 

asked him to hold it for al-Qa'ida. [KSM| told Paracha not to invest the money in any business ventures and 

instructed him to keep the money in a safe at his office." KSM had received these funds from Usama Bin Ladin 

CIA, m 11123, April 3,2003, p. 3. 

327

 FBI, WASH 261909Z, March 26, 2003, pp. 2-3. 

328

 FBI, WASH 261909Z, March 26, 2003, p. 2. 

329

 CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27, 2013, p. 31. 

62 

I//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

614 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/D K/NOFQRN 

five-count indictment of providing material support to al-Qa'ida and sentenced to 30 years in 

prison.330 The press release announcing the trial results stated, 

The evidence at trial proved that PARACHA, 26, agreed with his father, Saifullah 

Paracha, and two al Qaeda members, Majid Khan and Ammar Al-Baluchi, to 

provide support to al Qaeda by, among other things, trying to help Khan obtain a 

travel document that would have allowed Khan to re-enter the United States to 

commit a terrorist act. Statements from Khan admitted at trial revealed that, orice 

inside the United States, Khan intended to carry out an attack on gasoline 

stations. 331 

The decision to conduct the "late night" interrogation session with KSM on March 25, 2003, was 

made after reviewing recent intelligence obtained from Majid Khan and Iyman Faris.332 The 

March 22, 2003, interview of Majid Khan was conducted b) 

• The resulting cable from that interview explained the relationship between the Parachas 

and al-Qa'ida, specifically Majid Khan and Ammar al-Baluchi.334 It also provided details 

explaining how Uzhair impersonated Majid Khan by using Majid's debit card and a phone 

conversation between Uzhair and Majid Khan related to Majid's bank account and "calls to the 

INS."335 This information from the March 22, 2003, interrogation of Majid Khan was consistent 

with the charges described in Uzhair Paracha's indictment, although it did not include any 

reference to the gas station attacks mentioned by KSM.336 

Based on these facts, we conclude that KSM's allegations 

of Saifullah Paracha's involvement in a plan to smuggle explosives into the United States 

motivated the FBI to track down and arrest Uzhair Paracha in New York just a few days later, on 

March 31, 2003. The CIA was able to develop an operation that lured Saifullah Paracha out of 

Pakistan, which resulted in his arrest in

 o n

 I u'y 6, 2003. There appears to be 

a direct causal link between the information provided by KSM and the subsequent actions by the 

Intelligence Community that led to the arrests of Saifullah and Uzhair Paracha. Moreover, 

KSM's description of Uzhair's involvement in the gas station plots and his claim that Uzhair 

330

 DOJ, United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, Pakistani Man Convicted of Providing Material 

Support to At Qaeda Sentenced to 30 Years in Federal Prison. July 20, 2006, p.l. 

331

 DOJ, United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, Pakistani Man Convicted of Providing Material 

Support to r to Al Al Qaeda Qa Sentenced to 30 Years in Federal Prison, July 20, 2006, p. 2. I 

-Hf : 

332

 CIA, 10984, March 24, 2003, p. 2 ("Base decided to hold a late night session with KSM upon reviewing 

latest Karachi readout on [Majid Khan] debriefs [CIA CABLE 13890] and FBI intel report... from debriefings of. 

.. [Iyman Farisl"), 

333

 CIA, CIA CABLE 13890, 

334

 CIA, CIA CABLE 13890, 

335

 CIA, CIA CABLE 13890, 

336 Compare CIA, CIA CABLE 13890. wit! l

 Indictment, United States v. Uzair Paracha, United 

States District Court, Southern District of New York. Our review of the initial cables related to the plan to attack 

gas stations in the United States revealed that on March 18, 2003, Majid Khan was the first to disclose KSM's 

interest in "operational procedures of U.S. gas stations and the tanker trucks that service them," but provided'no real 

details about specific plans other than being later tasked by KSM to investigate the procedures for purchasing gas 

stations in Pakistan. CIA CIA CABLE 13816, March IS, 2003, p. 3. On March 18, 2003, KSM provided 

incriminating details about his conspiracy with Majid Khan to attack gas stations in the United States. See CIA, 

• • 10886, March 18, 2003, pp. 2-4. 

' 63 

TOP 

UNCLASSIFIED 

615 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ I//NOFORN 

may have provided other logistical support for Majid's entry- into the United States was 

consistent with the description of evidence used during Uzhair's trial that was included in the 

press release announcing the trial results.3" 

The Study asserts that KSM's allegations of explosives 

smuggling were inaccurate because Saifullah Paracha and others denied being involved in such a 

plot and at least one senior CIA counterterrorism official questioned the validity of the 

smuggling plot.338 The fact that Saifullah Paracha and his alleged co-conspirators denied their 

involvement in an explosives smuggling plot is not persuasive. Also, we have no intention of 

countering the CIA official's speculative judgment about the alleged plot with further 

speculation of our own. Regardless of whether the allegations of explosives smuggling were 

true, the allegations alone were sufficient to trigger the immediate responsive actions by the FBI 

and CIA that helped lead to the capture of these two terrorists. 

The Study also attempts to lessen the significance of the 

information provided by KSM by suggesting that the Intelligence Community had sufficient 

information prior to KSM's reporting to identify and arrest Saifullah and Uzhair Paracha. In 

support of this assertion, the Study identifies what it considers to be "significant material 

information" acquired by the Intelligence Community prior to any reporting from CIA 

detainees.339 Quibbling about the omission of "significant material information,"—including 

previously obtained information about an individual named Paracha other than Uzhair and 

Saifullah or contained in un-disseminated FBI case files340—seems largely tangential to the fact 

that detainee information, including some information obtained after using enhanced 

interrogation techniques, helped lead to the successful arrests of both men and was consistent 

with evidence used in the successful prosecution of Uzhair Paracha. 

i 

(U) Tactical Intelligence on Shkai, Pakistan 

The Study asserts that the "CIA representation that the use 

of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced otherwise unavailable tactical 

intelligence related to Shkai, Pakistan, was provided to senior policymakers and the Department 

of Justice between 2004 and 2009."341 Here is the actual text of the CIA representation at issue: 

Shkai, Pakistan: Thc interrogation of Hassan Ghul provided detailed tactical 

intelligence showing that Shkai^Pakktanwasan^or Al-Qa'ida hub in the tribal 

areas. Through [the] use of flHHHHHHH during

 th c

 Ghul 

interrogation, we mapped out and pinpointed the residences of key AQ leaders in 

337 Compare DO J, United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, Pakistani Man Convicted of Providing 

Material Support to Al Qaeda Sentenced to 30 Years in Federal Prison, July 20, 2006, p.l with CIA, DIRECTOR 

338

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 352. 

339

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 352-355. 

340 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary. December 3. 2014, pp. 354-355; see also, CIA Study Response, Case 

Studies, June 27, 2013, pp. 31-32. 

341

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 370 (emphasis added). 

64 

TOP SECRET/4 1/ZNOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

616 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//^ 

This intelligence was 

This representation does not assert that the intelligence was "otherwise unavailable'' tactical 

intelligence, but rather, "detailed" tactical intelligence. More important, while the Study's 

paraphrase of the representation is not accurate, the CIA's representation itself was factually 

accurate. 

(TSHH^B^H^)C/NF ) The CIA Response to the Study makes it clear that 

Ghul provided detailed tactical intelligence on Shkai, Pakistan, after he was subjected to 

enhanced interrogation techniques. Specifically, he sat down with experts and pointed 

to specific locations where he had met some of the senior al-Qa'ida members who the CIA was 

trying to find.343 Ghul also revealed his understanding about how Hamza Rabia, a then littleknown al-Qa'ida operative, had taken over as the group's lead attack coordinator after the 

capture of KSM in 2003.344 He used H to give more details about the "Bachelor House," 

the "Ida Khan Complex" and a separate compound used by a group of al-Qa'ida-aligned Uzbeks. 

He even described the group's evacuation plans in the event of an attack on Shkai.345 During an 

interrogation on January 28, 2004, Hassan Ghul drew a detailed map of the locations of a 

training camp/safehouse near Shkai, provided route information to the site, provided a detailed 

sketch of the compound and specified the rooms where explosives were stored. Ghul was shown 

the area and located the route IHBHHB 3 4 6 He also identified nine al-Qa'ida 

members—including Hamza Rabia, Abu Faraj al-Libia, and Spin Ghul—who were located at the 

safehouse as of June 2003.347 

Senior U.S. officials presented the CIA's analysis of Ghul's 

debriefin 

342

 CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2,2005, 

from CIA attorney, H I Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness of the CIA 

Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques" (emphasis added). 

343

 CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27, 2013, p. 36; ALEC | 

11. 

344

 CIA, CIA CABLE 20397. February® 2004, p. 5. 

(February |2004 , pp. 5 and 

|, February I 

February! 

February] 

1

2004, pp. 10 and 12; CIA, CIA CABLE 1299, January 

2004, pp. 10 and 12; CIA, CIA CABLE 1299, January 

2004, pp. 10 and 12; CIA, CIA CABLE 1299. January t t

2004, pp. 2-

2004, pp. 2-

345

 CIA, CIA CABLE 

346

 CIA, CIA CABLE 

347

 CIA, CIA CABLE _ 

348

 CIA, ALEC HHFfebruaryH20O4 , pp. 1-2; CIA, CIA CABLE 67575, May 6, 2004, p. 1-2; CIA, CIA 

CABLE 66803, April 26, 2004, pp. I-11. 

341)

 SSCI Study Response, Executive Summary, December 3, 2004, p. 378; CIA, DIRECTOR 

| CIA, Al-Qaida's Waziristan Sanctuary Disrupted but Still Viable. July 21, 2004, p 

2004, pp. 2-3. 

1, (DTS 2004-3240'}. 

65 

TOP SECRET/4 WNOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

617 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ 1//NOFQRN 

This particular case study has been a bit of a "moving 

target" since it first appeared in the original Study approved by the Committee during the 112th 

Congress.351 Its revised claims seek to undermine the significance of the information provided 

by Ghul after the use of the enhanced interrogation techniques. These revised claims basically 

assert that: (1) the "vast majority" of Ghul's information was provided prior to his being 

subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques; (2) the ClA's^HM^H^Hassesse d that 

this prior information was sufficient to press the Pakistani HUHHH^^^^ H and (3) 

Ghul's information confirmed earlier reporting that the Shkai Valley of Pakistan served as alQa'ida's command and control center after its exodus from Afghanistan in 2001.352

 These 

claims are little more than an effort to distract the reader from the previously referenced, 

significant tactical intelligence provided by Ghul after the use of enhanced interrogation 

techniques. Again, one of the problems with the Study's flawed analytical methodology is that it 

often turns a blind eye to information obtained after the use of enhanced interrogation techniques 

if it cannot readily undermine its significance, because such "inconvenient" facts disprove the 

Study's main conclusion that the CIA's use of enhanced interrogation techniques was not an 

effective means of acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees. 

In a similar vein, the Study asserts that "CIA records do not 

indicate that information provided by Ghul during this period, or after, resulted in the 

identification or capturc of any al-Qa'ida leaders."353 In fact, prior to the use of enhanced 

interrogation techniques, Hassan Ghul speculated that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti: (1) could be one 

of three people with Usama Bin Ladin; and (2>may have handled Bin Ladiri's needs, including 

sending messages to his gatekeeper, Abu Faraj al-Libi. After the use of enhanced interrogation 

techniques, Hassan Ghul cooperated by telling his interrogators that Abu Ahmad specifically 

passed a letter from Bin Ladin to Abu Faraj in late 2003 and that Abu Ahmad had "disappeared" 

from Karachi, Pakistan, in 2002. This information was not only more concrete than Ghul's 

earlier speculations, but it corroborated information from another detainee, Ammar al Baluchi, 

that Abu Ahmad served as a courier for Bin Ladin.354 While this information technically didn't 

result in the "identification" or "capture" of Bin Ladin, it most certainly played a crucial role in 

the U.S. Government's successful efforts to locate and neutralize Bin Ladin in his Abbottabad 

compound in Pakistan on May 2, 2011. 

350

 CIA, Al-Qaida 's Waziristan Sanctuary Disrupted but Still Viable, July 21, 2004, p. 1, (DTS 2004-3240). 

351 Compare CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27, 2013, p. 36 (citing the original Study claims 

concerning the CIA's representation about Ghul's tactical intelligence on Shkai in the appendix to the Study's 

original findings and conclusions) with SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 368. 

352

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 369. 

353

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 376. 

354

 CIA, DIRECTOR ! 

66 

TOP SECRET//! I'/NOFFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

618 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/4 Y/NOFQRN 

(II) The Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting 

In a.September 6, 2006 speech, President Bush highlighted 

the thwarting of a planned strike against Camp Lemonier in Djibouti as an example of the value 

of information obtained as a part of CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The core claim 

in this section of the Study is not only inaccurate; it was never made. 

Study Claim: fPS^HI^^^^^t^ ) "The CIA represented that intelligence derived 

from the use of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques thwarted plotting 

against the U.S. military base, Camp Lemonier, in Djibouti. These 

representations are inaccurate."355 

Fact: fi^fKHHSHH^ 1) Representations about the thwarting of an attack 

against Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, specifically President Bush's 2006 

comments that "Terrorists held in CIA custody have also provided 

information that helped stop a planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp 

Lemonier in Djibouti," were accurate and have been mischaracterized bv the 

Study.356 

In this section of the Executive Summary, the Study 

fundamentally mischaracterizes two representations attributed to President Bush and the CIA. 

The first representation, which comes from the President's September 6, 2006, speech, is 

attributed to the CIA by the Study because of the CIA's vetting of the speech. In his speech, the 

President stated, "ftterrorists held in CIA custody have also provided information that helped 

stop a planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti . .. ."357 Contrary to the 

Study's assertions, the President did not attribute the thwarting of this plot exclusively to the use 

of enhanced interrogation techniques, but information from "| terrorists held in CIA custody." 

In addition, the President never stated that the plot was disrupted exclusively because of 

information from detainees in CIA custody. The President was clear that information from 

detainees "helped" to stop the planned strike. This idea that detainee reporting builds on and 

contextualizes previous and subsequent reporting is repeated a few lines later in the speech, 

when the President makes clear, "[t]he information we get from these detainees is corroborated 

by intelligence .. . that we've received from other sources, and together this intelligence has 

helped us connect the dots and stop attacks before they occur."358 This is another example of 

where the President and the CIA are pilloried by the Study for representations they actually 

never made. 

The second example cited in the Study is pulled from a set 

of talking points drafted for use in an October 30, 2007, briefing to then-Chairman of the House 

355

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 336. 

356

 President George W, Bush, Trying Detainees; Address on the Creation of Military Commissions, Washington, 

D.C., September 6, 2006. 

3,7

 President George W, Bush, Trying Detainees; Address oil the Creation of Military Commissions, Washington, 

D.C., September 6, 2006 (emphasis added).-

358

 President George W. Bush, Trying Detainees; Address on the Creation of Militaiy Commissions, Washington, 

D.C., September 6, 2006. 

67 

[//NQFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

619 
UNCLASSIFIED 

1//NQF0RN 

Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, former Congressman John Murtha. In the written 

talking points, the CIA states, "f A CIA detainee] informed us of an operation underway to attack 

the U.S, military at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. We believe our understanding of this plot 

helped us prevent the attack."359 Setting aside the question of whether these talking points were 

ever actually employed (which is virtually unanswerable, given the passing of Congressman 

Murtha in 1010 and the Study's failure to interview the relevant intelligence officers), this 

representation, like the President's 2006 speech, does not include a reference to enhanced 

interrogation techniques. Moreover, as was previously the case, the CIA does not claim that the 

attacks were thwarted solely because of detainee information. They clearly point to their 

"understanding of this plot," which was a mosaic based on many different sources of 

intelligence, 

fFSH^^H^B ^ The President's claim that "[terrorists held in CIA custody 

have also provided information that helped stop a planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp 

Lemonier in Djibouti" was accurate.360 The detention of two terrorists by the CIA, KSM and 

Guleed Hassan Ahmed, affected al-Qa'ida's ongoing plotting against Camp Lemonier. The 

March 3, 2003, arrest of KSM came days after a late-February meeting with Abu Yasir, alQa'ida's link to affiliated terrorist cells in Somalia and Kenya, and prevented KSM from 

attending a follow-on meeting, at which he was to discuss the provision of operational funds with 

al-Qa'ida leaders in East Africa, some of whom were plotting an attack against Camp 

Lemonier.361 Guleed Hassan Ahmed, who conducted reconnaissance of Camp Lemonier for alQa'ida, provided information about the Camp Lemonier plot and al-Qa'ida's Somali support 

network.362 The information Guleed provided, both prior to and after being transferred into CIA 

custody, combined with intelligence derived from other sources and methods, was central in 

driving CIA's targeting of al-Qa'ida proxies based in East Africa.363 Although these events are 

not independently responsible for thwarting the plot against Camp Lemonier, they undoubtedly 

"helped" or contributed to the disruption of the plot. 

Finally, the Study claims that plotting against Camp 

Lemonier "did not 'stop' because of information acquired from CIA detainee Guleed in 2004, 

but rather, continued well into 2007," implying that continued terrorist targeting of Camp 

Lemonier excludes the possibility a planned strike was thwarted.364 This assertion undervalues 

Camp Lemonier's appeal as a terrorist target, and is willfully blind to the victory even a single 

obstructed terrorist plot represents. Camp Lemonier is the only major U.S. military base in subSaharan Africa, hosting approximately 1,600 military personnel.365

 It is also located within 

striking distance of, and an active threat to, al-Qa'ida operatives throughout the Horn of Africa. 

It stands to reason that Camp Lemonier exists as a target of sustained terrorist focus. 

3S" SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 338; DCIA Meeting with Chairman Murtha re Rendition 

and Detention Programs, October 30, 2007, p. 1. 

MO President George W. Bush. Trying Detainees; Address on the Creation of Military Commissions, Washington, 

D.C., September 6, 2006. 

361

 CIA, DIRECTORI 

362

 CIA, CIA | 

303

 CIA, HEADQUARTERS | 

364

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 338. 

36?

 CIA, CIA CABLE 207044, May 22, 2003, p. 9. 

1; CIA, HEADQUARTERS | 

TOP SECRET//! 

68 

1//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

620 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/4 

(U) CIA Detainees Subjected to EITs Validated CIA Sources 

Study Claim: flSHiHIHHHN ^ "fflhe CIA also represented that its enhanced 

interrogation techniques were necessary to validate CIA sources. The claim 

was based on one CIA detainee—Janat Gul—contradicting the reporting of 

one CIA asset."366 ; 

Fact: fFSHHHIi^^HN ^ Contrary to the Study's claim, the CIA 

representations cited by the Study do not assert that enhanced interrogation 

techniques helped to validate sources. Rather, the representations only make 

reference to "detainee information" or detainee "reporting." Also contrary 

to the Study's claim, we found evidence in the documentary record where the 

CIA representations about Janat Gul also contained additional examples of 

source validation. Moreover, the three items of information thait the Study 

asserts should have been included in the Janat Gul asset validation 

representations were not "critical" and their inclusion does not alter the fact 

that Gul's persistent contradiction of the asset's claims did help the CIA 

"validate" that particular asset. 

The Study complains that the CIA justified the use of 

enhanced interrogation techniques by repeatedly using the same Janat Gul example of detainee 

reporting to determine that one of its assets had fabricated information. The Study first provides 

the following representation made by CIA Director Hayden during one of our Committee 

hearings: 

Detainee information is a key tool for validating clandestine sources. In fact, in 

one case, the detainee's information proved to be the accurate story, and the 

clandestine source was confronted and subsequently admitted to embellishing or 

fabricating some or all of the details in his report.367 

The Study also provides one other example of an asset validation justification: 

Pakistan-based facilitator Janat Gul's most significant reporting helped us 

validate a CIA asset who was providing information about the 2004 pre-election 

threat. The asset claimed that Gul had arranged a meeting between himself and alQa'ida's chief of finance, Shaykh Sa'id, a claim that Gul vehemently denied. 

Gul's reporting was later matched with information obtained from Sharif al-Masri 

and Abu Talha al-Pakistani, captured after Gul. With this reporting in hand, CIA 

"'<' See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 342. 

307

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 342 (citing General Michal Hayden, Director, Central 

Intelligence Agency, Classified Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, April 12, 2007, 

p. 8 (DTS 2007-1563)). 

69 

M I II III I BBBHBB^BMP/NOFQR N 

UNCLASSIFIED 

621 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ I//NOFORN 

I the asset, who 

about the meeting.368 

subsequently admitted to fabricating his reporting 

Contrary to the Study's claim here, the first observation that should be made about these 

representations is that they do not contain any reference to the use of "enhanced interrogation 

techniques." In the first representation, Director Hayden uses the words "detainee information." 

In the second, the briefing notes simply use the term "reporting." 

Another part of the Study's claim is also factually 

inaccurate. The Study asserts that the CIA's representation "was based on one CIA detainee— 

Janat Gul.. . ,"369 During our review of the documentary record we found numerous copies of 

the "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting," that contained the exact representation 

cited by the Study above, although the version we selected did not place special emphasis on 

"Janat Gul's most significant reporting"370 More important, the representations in the August 

2005 version contain the following additional examples under the same heading of "Helping to 

Validate Other Sources": 

In other instances, detainee information has been useful in identifying clandestine 

assets who are providing good reporting. For example, Hassan Ghul's reporting 

on Shkai helped us validate several assets in the field who also told us that alQa'ida members had found safehaven at this location.... 

Sometimes one detainee validates reporting from others. corroborated 

information from key who were involved in facilitating the movement of 

al-Qa'ida personnel, money, and messages into and out of For example, 

I indicated that | 

yas the link between al-Qa'ida and ] 

and corroborated that fact when he noted that | 

was the "go-between" for al-Qa'ida andjjj. 3 7 1 

Ironically, the Study's omission of these additional examples of source validation from its own 

analysis deprives the reader of "significant context." 

The Study seems to imply that the omission of certain 

"critical" contextual information from the CIA's representations about source validation 

somehow nullifies the Janat Gul example.372 Our examination of the three items of contextual 

information cited by the Study leads us to conclude that the Janat Gul case remains illustrative of 

368

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 343 (citing CIA. Briefing for Obama National Security 

Team - "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI 

Program 09 Jan. 2009." (emphasis in original). 

369

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 4,2014, p. 342 (emphasis added). 

370

 CIA, Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting, August 2005, p. 8, This document is attached as 

Appendix II, see infra, p. II-1. 

371

 CIA, Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting, August 2005, pp. 8-9 (emphasis added). 

372

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 4, 2014, p. 343. 64 

TOP SECRET/4 1 /ZNOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

622 
detainee information helping to determine that a CIA source had fabricated certain aspects of his 

reporting. 

First, the Study faults the CIA for failing to include 

in its representations that the asset's reporting about the 2004 pre-election threat was 

doubted by CIA officers prior to the use of enhanced interrogation techniques against 

Janat Gul.373 This concern is easily dismissed because a review of the e-mail reveals that 

the concerns raised by the CIA officers were not about the credibility of the sources, but 

more about the possibility that al-Qa'ida might be using this threat information to test the 

sources who had provided the pre-election threat information. The email raising the 

concern specifically states, "this is not to say that either ASSET Y or [source name 

REDACTED] are wrong or that the AQ statement below374 is anything more than 

disinformation."375 The reply email stated that it was possible the sources were just 

hearing the same rumors, but recollected that when al-Qa'ida put out similar rumors in 

the summer of 2001, those turned out to be true.376 These emails do not support any 

inference about early suspicions of the source's credibility nor do they dismiss the 

legitimacy of the threat information provided by the sources. 

The Study criticizes the asset validation 

representations by the CIA because they did not acknowledge that the source's fabricated 

reporting was the reason that Janat Gul was subjected to the enhanced interrogation 

techniques.377 There are two problems with this criticism. First, the CIA believed that 

the source's allegations about Janat Gul meeting with Shayk Sa'id, al-Qa'ida's chief of 

finance, were true when they began to use enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul 

between August 3, 2004, and August 10,2004, and then again from August 21, 2004, to 

August 25, 2004.378 The CIA source did not recant some of the underlying threat 

information pertaining to Gul until Octobei^andB, 2004, more than two months after 

Gul's enhanced interrogation began and 15 days after his enhanced interrogation ended. 

It is also important to understand that the source's information was not the only 

373 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 4, 2014, pp. 343. 

374

 The referenced statement was issued by ai-Qa'ida on March 17, 2004, and asserted that al-Qa'ida would not 

operate any large-scale operation prior to the election. 

375

 Email from: to: , [REDACTED] 

; subject: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and|[source name REDACTED]?; date: March | 

2004^06:5 5 AM; Email fromB^H^BBI ; toflHtt^H c c : HHHflHf t H I 

• M , [REDACTED], •H^H^HTsubject : Re: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and {source name 

REDACTED]?: date: March®, 2004, at 7:52:32 AM. p. 1 (footnote added). This document is attached as 

Appendix III, see infra, p. III-l. 

from: •••HI; t o : IHI^HHI . HHHHHI > [REDACTED], 

|; subject: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and [source name REDACTED]?; date: March 

2004^iH)6:55 AM; Email TO HBHHHI ' CC: HHHHH>fl H 

• H [REDACTED], HpflHHHT^je ^ could AQ be testing [ASSET Y1 and [source name 

REDACTED]?: date: March®, 2004, at 7:52:32 AM. p. I (footnote added). This email confirms that the sensitive 

source who subsequently admitted to fabricating information was not the only source providing information related 

to a possible pre-election terrorist threat. 

377

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 4, 2014, p. 343. 

1512. •®®|2004j3 . 2; CIAJBB| : 1545, 

2004, p. 3; and CIA. H| p 632, •^^^004 . p. 2. 

, 2004, p. 1; CIA, | 1603, 

71 

TOP SECRET//! I//NQFQRN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

623 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ I//NOFORN 

information that caused the CIA to believe that Gul was an al-Qa"ida facilitator with 

connections to multiple high value targets. The source's 'information was also not solely 

responsible for the request and authorization to subject Gul to enhanced interrogation 

techniques.379 The CIA cable requesting interrogation authorities makes clear those 

authorities were being pursued to "collect critical threat, locational, and other high 

priority information."380 This same communication cited a previous cable detailing CIA 

approval to detain Gul, in which Gul's apprehension was justified on grounds that he was 

"one of the highest level extremist facilitators remaining in Pakistan, and multiple source 

reporting indicates that he has connections to various HVTS,"381 

Second, the Study does not fully support its claim 

that the CIA source's representations about the pre-election threat were inaccurate.382 

Specifically, the cable reporting the fabrication by one of these sources in October 2004 

clearly indicates that some of the source's pre-election threat information was considered 

to be "generally truthful." The Study states that the source "was deceptive in response to 

questions regarding .. . the pre-election threat."3S3 This assertion is not entirely accurate. 

In fact, the cited cabl^ndicateeh^ issue of the 

pre-election threat Moreover, 

the assessment paragraph in the cited cable states: "Based on [the source's] seemingly 

genuine concern and constant return to the issue, COB believes that [the source] is being 

generally truthful about his discussions .. . on the pre-election threat."385 

The Study's final piece of "critical" contextual 

information that was missing from the CIA representations on this issue was the failure of 

the CIA to disclose that it eventually concluded that Janat Gul was not a high-level alQa'ida figure and never had threat information.386

 This seems to miscast Janat Gul as a 

hapless victim of circumstance, when in fact he was a known terrorist facilitator. Beyond 

that, the question of whether every accusation made against Gul was proven or not, is 

fundamentally immaterial to the matter of his detainee reporting being used to validate— 

or, in this instance, invalidate—an intelligence source. 

ftsH^^^^H^^^fi 1) Our analysis has demonstrated that this claim suffers from 

multiple fatal defects: (1) the representations do not reference enhanced interrogation 

techniques; (2) representations in the documentary record were found to have additional 

examples of asset validation beyond the Janat Gul example; and (3) including any of the three 

problematic contextual items raised by the Study would not alter the fact that Janat Gul's 

persistent contradiction of the asset's claims did help the CIA "validate" that particular asset. 

m

 CIA. ALEC 

380

 CIA, HH k 1484, 

381

 CIA, ALEC | 

382 See SSCI Study. Executive Summary, December 3, 2014. p. 417. 

383

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 348. 

384

 CIA, CIA CABLE 1411, 2004. p. 4. 

383

 CIA, CIA CABLE 1411, 2004, p. 5. 

386

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary. December 3, p. 343. 64 

TOP SECRET/4 1/Z NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

624 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/4 

(U) The Identification of Bin Ladin's Courier 

Shortly after the May 2011 raid on the Usama Bin Ladin 

compound, current and former CIA employees highlighted the role of reporting from the CIA 

Detention and Interrogation Program in the operation. These officials represented that CIA 

detainees provided the "tip-off' information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti (variant Abu Ahmed alKuwaiti), the Bin Ladin courier who ultimately led to finding Bin Ladin.387

 As we show below, 

these representations were accurate. 

'[T]he 'tipofF on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002 

did not come from the interrogation of CIA detainees and was obtained prior 

to any CIA detainee reporting."388 

Study Claim: 

Fact: (K^^^Hfr ^ CIA documents show that detainee information 

served as the "tip-off" and played a significant role in leading CIA analysts 

to tlie courier Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. While there was other information in 

CIA databases about al-Kuwaiti, this information was not recognized as 

important by analysts until after detainees provided information on him. 

analysts and operators testified before the Committee about how they tracked down Bin Ladin. 

The CIA described the lead information as being provided by detainees in U.S. custody at CIA 

secret sites and the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and from detainees in the 

custody of foreign governments that helped the CIA recognize the importance of Bin Ladin's 

courier, Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.389 CIA officers were clear that the information was from 

detainees, but never portrayed the information as originating solely from detainees held by the 

CIA, 

. CIA documents show that even before the raid took place, 

CIA analysts prepared briefings and papers on their analysis of what led them to the courier. 

These briefings and papers clearly described the key role that detainee reporting played in this 

analytical and operational process. A CIA paper in November 2007 noted that "over twenty mid 

to high-value detainees have discussed Abu Ahmad"s ties to senior al-Qa'ida leaders, including 

his role in delivering messages from Bin Ladin and his close association with former al-Qa'ida 

third-in-command Abu Faraj al-Libi."390 The report highlighted specific reporting from two 

detainees, Hassan Ghul and Ammar al-Baluchi, who both identified Abu Faraj al-Libi's role in 

7

 SSCI and SASC Transcript. Briefing on Operation Neptune's Spear, May 4, 2011, pp. 53-54 (DTS 2011-2049) 

(CIA Director Panetta stated, "I want to be able to get back to you with specifics .. . But clearly the tipoff on the 

couriers came from those pdetainee] interviews."); Scott Hennen radio interview of former CIA Director Michael 

Hayden, May 3, 2011 (Former Director Hayden stated, "What we got, the original lead information—and frankly it 

was incomplete identity information on the couriers—began with information from CIA detainees at the black 

sites"). 

388

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 389. 

m

 SSCI Transcript, Briefing on the Operation That Killed Usama Bin Ladin, May 2, 2011, pp. 7 and 39 (DTS 2011-

1941). 

M0

 CIA Intelligence Assessment, Al-Qa 'ida Watch, Probable Identification of Suspected Bin Ladin Facilitator Abu 

Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, November 23, 2007, p. 2, 

73 

TOP 

UNCLASSIFIED 

625 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOPSECRET^ 1//NOFQRN 

communicating to Bin Ladin through Abu Ahmad. It was this and similar reporting from other 

detainees that helped analysts realize Abu Faraj's categorical denials that he even knew anyone 

named Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, "almost certainly were an attempt to protect Abu Ahmed," thus 

showing his importance.391 

Additionally, a retrospective prepared by the CIA's Study 

for the Center of Intelligence after the raid also made clear in its report that detainee information 

was significant in the identification of the courier. The report noted that High-Value Terrorist 

analysts, targeters, and their managers told the Center that: 

debriefing al-Qa'ida detainees provided them with unparalleled expertise and 

knowledge of the organization. The ability to cross-check detainee statements 

against one another—specifically Abu Faraj's with that of numerous other 

detainees—ultimately led to the assessment that Abu Ahmad was directly serving 

as Bin Ladin's facilitator and possibly harboring him. In sum, 25 detainees 

provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, his al-Qa'ida membership, and 

his historic role as a courier for Bin Ladin. Nine of the 25 were held in non-CIA 

custody. Of the 16 held in CIA custody, all but three had given information after 

being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs), although of the 13 

only two (KSM and Abu Zubaydah) had been waterboarded. Even so, KSM gave 

false information about Abu Ahmad, as did Abu Faraj, who received lesser EITs. 

Ironically, the falsity of the information was itself important in establishing Abu 

Ahmad's significance.392 

The Study asserts that information acquired in 2002 H H 

I was the "tip-off' to Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, but this information sat 

unnoticed in a CIA database for five years.393 It was multiple detainee reports about a Bin Ladin 

courier with the alias Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti that triggered a search that uncovered the old 

information.194 This is another example of the Study's use of hindsight to criticize the CIA for 

not recognizing the significance of previouslycollecteOuUio^lly-understood, intelligence 

information. It is also an attempt to use this information to categorize the 

subsequently collected detainee information as being "otherwise obtainable." Under the Study's 

flawed analytical methodology, information in that category cannot be used as evidence of the 

effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. We are not similarly 

constrained. 

The Study—benefiting from the ability to search a database 

compiled of only information relevant to its specific task (something intelligence analysts are not 

391

 CIA Intelligence Assessment. Al-Qa'ida Watch, Probable Identification of Suspected Bin Ladin Facilitator Abu 

Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, November 23, 2007, p. 2. 

292 CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, Lessons from the Hunt for Usama Bin Ladin. September 2012 D 14 

(DTS 2012-3826). 

393

 CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, Lessons from the Hunt for Usama Bin Ladin, September 2012 p 9 

(DTS 2012-3826).

 1 ' 

394

 SSCI Transcript, Briefing on Operation Neptune's Spear Targeting Usama Bin Ladin, May 4,2011, pp 13-14 

47-49, and 53-54 (DTS 2011-2049). 

TOP SECRET//! 

74 

UNCLASSIFIED 

626 
UT|^IFIE D 

able to do) with the advantage of hindsight to understand which names are now important— 

asserts that prior to receiving information from CIA detainees, the CIA had other critical 

reporting on the courier. The Study cites Abu Ahmad's phone number and e-mail address, a 

body of intelligence reporting linking him to KSM's operational planning, and reporting on Abu 

Ahmad's age, physical appearance, and family—including information the CIA would later cite 

as pivotal in identifying his true name.395 

f^HHHHIH^^^ ^ While it is true that the CIA was conducting technical 

intelligence collection linked to Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002, CIA fact-checking confirmed 

that this information was meaningless because: (1) it did not link Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin; (2) 

Abu Ahmad had stopped using the phone number and e-mail address in 2002; and (3) Abu 

Ahmad was not linked to that email address in any of his subsequent correspondence.396 

According to the CIA, 

[t] hat intelligence was insufficient to distinguish Abu Ahmad from many other 

Bin Ladin associates until additional information from detainees put it into 

context and allowed us to better understand his true role and potential in the hunt 

for Bin Ladin,397 

Further review of CIA records confirmed that the phone number at issue was an Inmarsat 

number associated with "Mukhtar" and "Ahmad 'al-Kuwahadi."398 According to Adam 

Robinson, the author of Bin Laden Behind the Mask of the Terrorist, "[ajfter a long period of use 

of the Inmarsat system, Osama learned that this system is open to interception, both for covert 

observation and possibly for homing in on the signal . . . After he became aware of this, he used 

the system only periodically for calling his mother."399 If this claim about Bin Ladin's belief is 

accurate and al-Qa'ida leadership believed that phones were vulnerable, it may explain why this 

particular phone number was abandoned by KSM and Abu Ahmad. 

and family details was critical to ultimately identifying al-Kuwaiti's true name, but not until 

years later—2007 to be exact—after detainee reporting provided enough information about the 

courier that a search of old records illuminated key information in that reporting. The CIA 

Center for the Study of Intelligence said such information was "an unnoticed needle in the 

haystack on an unending plain of haystacks" until that time.400 One of the lead CIA analysts 

called similar information that later turned out to be important "meaningless" until years later 

when detainee reporting illuminated its importance.401 Thus, this information really only became 

395

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 385. 

396

 CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB Cj, June 27,2013, p. 40. 

397

 CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB CJ, June 27, 2013, p. 38; CIA Study Response, Comments (TAB A), 

June 27, 2013, p. 14. 

ALEC 

399

 Adam Robinson, Bin Laden Behind the Mask of the Terrorist, Arcade Publishing. Inc., New York, 2002. p. 247. 

400

 CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, Lessons from the Hunt for Usama BinLadin, September 2012, n. 9 

(DTS 2012-3826). 

401

 CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, Lessons from the Hunt for Usama Bin Ladin, September 2012 p 9 

(DTS 2012-3826). 

' 75 

UNCLASSIFIED 

627 
UNCLASSIFIED 

1//XOFORN 

critical to the CIA after detainee reporting provided enough information about the courier that a 

search of old records illuminated key information in that reporting. 

Study Claim: f^SflHHHIHB^F ) "[Tjhe most accurate information on Abu 

Ahmad al-Kuwaiti obtained from a CIA detainee [Hassan Ghul] was 

provided by a CIA detainee who had not yet been subjected to the CIA's 

enhanced interrogation techniques."402 

Fact: Detainees who provided useful and accurate 

information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and Bin Ladin had undergone 

enhanced interrogation prior to providing the information. For example, 

Hassan Ghul provided more specificity about Abu Ahmad after being 

transferred from COBALT and receiving enhanced interrogation techniques. 

(U) The Study disputes statements from current and former CIA officials that 

information from detainees in CIA's enhanced interrogation program provided valuable 

information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. For example, then-CIA Director Leon Panetta told ABC 

News in May 2011, soon after the Bin Ladin raid, that enhanced interrogation techniques were 

used to extract information that led to the mission's success.403 Former Director Hayden said in 

an interview that "the original lead information—and frankly it was incomplete identity 

information on the couriers—began with information from CIA detainees at the black sites."404 

Both of these statements are accurate. 

While numerous detainees at CIA black sites provided 

information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, as noted above, two detainees, Hassan Ghul and Ammar 

al-Baluchi, in particular were cited by the lead CIA analyst as leading her to search old 

intelligence files

 405

 Ammar al-Baluchi, who appears to.be the first detainee to mention Abu 

Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's role as a Bin Ladin courier and a possible connection with Abu Faraj alLibi, provided this information at a CIA black site during a period of enhanced interrogation.406 

The second detainee, Hassan Ghul, is described in the 

Study as providing the "best" and "most accurate" information on the courier. While we are not 

sure it was the "best" or "most accurate" information, a CIA report on the Bin Ladin raid 

described Ghul's information as a "milestone in the long analytic targeting trek that led to Bin 

Ladin."407 Clearly it was important. According the CIA, 

Gul, while in CIA custody-before undergoing enhanced techniques-speculated 

that Abu Ahmad could be one of three people with Bin Ladin and speculated that 

402

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 379. 

403

 Interview with CIA Director Leon Panetta, Brian Williams. ABC News, May 3, 2011. 

404

 Interview with former CIA Director Michael Hayden, Scott Hennen Show, May 3, 2011. 

405

 CIA Intelligence Assessment, Al-Qa 'ida Watch. Probable Identification of Suspected Bin Ladin Facilitator Abu 

Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, November 23.2007. p. 2. 

40,i

 CIA, WASHINGTON DC^HIHI^IHHH I Ammar al-Baluchi attempted to recant his earlier 

description of Abu Ahmad as a Bin Ladin courier. CIA. DIRECTOR 

407

 CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, Lessons from the Hunt for Usama Bin Ladin, dated September 2012 p 

9 (DTS 2012-3826). 

TOP SECRETE 

76 

I//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

628 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ 1//N0FQRN 

Abu Ahmad may have handled Bin Ladin's needs, including sending messages to 

his gatekeeper, Abu Faraj al-Libi.408 

Additional CIA fact-checking explained that Ghul offered more details about Abu Ahmad's role 

after being transferred from COBALT and receiving enhanced interrogation. Specifically, the 

CIA stated: 

After undergoing enhanced techniques, Gul stated that Abu Ahmad specifically 

passed a letter from Bin Ladin to Abu Faraj in late 2003 and that Abu Ahmad had 

"disappeared" from Karachi, Pakistan, in 2002. This information was not only 

more concrete and less speculative, it also corroborated information from Ammar 

that Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) was lying when he claimed Abu Ahmad 

left al-Qa'ida in 2002.409 

Ghul stated that while he had "no proof," he believed that Abu Faraj was in contact with Abu 

Ahmad and that Abu Ahmad might act as an intermediary contact between Abu Faraj and Bin 

Ladin. Ghul said that this belief "made sense" since Abu Ahmad had disappeared and Ghul had 

heard that Abu Ahmad was in contact with Abu Faraj.410 Months later, Ghul also told his 

interrogators that he knew Abu Ahmad was close to Bin Ladin, which was another reason he 

suggested that Abu Ahmad had direct contact with Bin Ladin as one of his couriers

 411 

fTSfl^^^^^^Bf^^F ) CIA documents make clear that when detainees like Abu 

Zubaydah, KSM, and Abu Faraj al-Libi—who had undergone enhanced interrogation and were 

otherwise cooperative—denied knowing Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti or suggested that he had 

"retired," it was a clear sign to CIA analysts that these detainees had something to hide, and it 

further confirmed other detainee information that had ripped them off about the true importance 

of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti

 412 

(U) Conclusion 6 (CIA Impeded Congressional Oversight) 

Conclusion 6 states: "[t]he CIA has actively avoided or 

impeded congressional oversight of the program."413 In reality, the overall pattern of 

engagement with the Congress on this issue shows that the CIA attempted to keep the Congress 

informed of its activities. From 2002 to 2008, the CIA claims to have provided more than 35 

briefings to SSCI members and staff, more than 30 similar briefings to HPSCI members and 

staff, and more than 20 congressional notifications,414 For some of these briefings, there are no 

j^^^^d y Response, Case Studies (TAB CJ. June 27, 2013, p. 38 (citing CIA, DIRECTOR| 

409

 CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27, 2013, p. 38 (citing CIA, | 

4,1

 CIA, DIRECTOR 

412

 CIA, DIRECTOR CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, Lessons from the Hunt 

for Usama Bin Ladin, dated September 2012, pp. 9-HO (DTS 2012-3826); ClA Intelligence Assessment, Al-Qa'ida 

Watch, Probable Identification of Suspected Bin Ladin Facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, November 23, 2007, p. 2. 

413

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 5. 

414

 CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B), June 27, 2013, p. 35. 

__7 7 

linn 11 III i M^HBI H MI inn i 

UNCLASSIFIED 

629 
. UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRESfl^B^BM^^^MS^'^QgQR N 

transcripts415, likely because they were limited to the Chairman and Vice Chairman/Ranking 

Member of the congressional intelligence committees. Because the Study did not interview the 

participants in these restricted briefings, it is impossible to document how much information the 

CIA provided to Committee leadership during those briefings. Often, the Study's own examples 

contradict the assertion that the CIA tried to avoid its overseers' scrutiny. For example, the 

Study notes that the CIA reacted to Vice Chairman Rockefeller's suspicion about the agency's 

honesty by planning a detailed briefing on the Program for.him

 416 

(U) Timing of the CIA's Briefings on Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 

Study Claim: (TSflH^HI^^B ^ " T h e CI A di d no t brie f th e Senate Intelligence 

Committee leadership on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques until 

September 2002, after the techniques had been approved and used.'"417 

Fact: fFSHHH^H^F ) The CIA provided information to the Committee 

in hearings, briefings, and notifications beginning shortly after the signing of 

the Memorandum of Notification (MON) on September 17,2001. 

Conclusion 6 opens with the statement that the CIA did not 

brief the Senate Intelligence Committee leadership on the CIA's enhanced interrogation 

techniques until after the techniques had been approved and used, setting the tone for a narrative 

that the CIA actively and systematically concealed information from the Congress. In reality, the 

CIA began discussing concerns about interrogation with the Committee even prior to the creation 

of the Program. The Study's review of the CIA's representations to Congress cites CIA hearing 

testimony from November 7, 2001, discussing the uncertainty in the boundaries on interrogation 

techniques

 418

 The Study also cites additional discussions between staff and CIA lawyers in 

February 2002.419 

The Study seems to fault the CIA for not briefing the 

Committee leadership until after the enhanced interrogation techniques had been approved and 

used. The CIA briefed HPSCI leadership on September 4, 2002. SSCI leadership received the 

same briefing on September 27, 2002.420 The Study does not include information on when the 

CIA offered briefings to Congress or how long it took to schedule them. Briefing Committee 

leadership in the month after beginning a new activity does not constitute actively avoiding or 

impeding congressional oversight. 

415

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 441. 

4,6

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p, 441. 

417

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusionsj December 3,2014, p. 5. 

418

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 437 n.2447. See also SSCI Transcript, Briefing on 

Covert Action. November 7, 2001, p. 56 (DTS 2002-0611). 

419

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 437. See also Email from: Christopher Ford, SSCI Staff, 

to: mCleare d SSCI staff; subject: Meeting yesterday with CIA lawyers on date: February 26, 

2002 (DTS 2002-0925). 

420

 CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B). June 27, 2013, p. 36. 

78 

TOP SECRE^V^MBMMBBBMIM^OFQR N 

UNCLASSIFIED 

630 
UNCLASSIFIED 

I//XOFORN 

(U) Acce. ss to Documents 

Study Claim: 

Fact: 

"The CIA subsequently resisted efforts by thenVice Chairman John D. Rockefeller, IV, tc investigate the program, 

including by refusing in 2006 to provide requested documents."421 

requested. 

> The CIA provided access to the documents 

The Study asserts that the CIA refused to provide requested 

documents. However, this misrepresents both the Vice Chairman's document request and the 

Intelligence Community's response. As noted in the Study, on January 5, 2006, the Director of 

National Intelligence's Chief of Staff wrote a letter to Vice Chairman Rockefeller which denied 

an earlier request for full Committee access to over 100 documents related to the Inspector 

General's May 2004 Special Review.422 However, this denial of "full Committee access," did 

not mean that the documents were not made available to the CIA's congressional overseers. In 

fact, the Chief of Staffs letter stated, "Consistent with the provisions of the National Security 

Act of 1947, the White House has directed that specific information related to aspects of the 

detention and interrogation program be provided only to the SSCI leadership and staff 

directors."423 The letter concluded by advising Vice Chairman Rockefeller that the documents 

"remain available for review by SSCI leadership and staff directors at any time through 

arrangements with CIA's Office of Congressional Affairs."424 

(U) Breadth of Congressional Access 

Study Claim: The CIA impeded congressional oversight by 

restricting access to information about the Program from members of the 

Committee beyond the Chairman and Vice Chairman.425 

Fact: fFSH^^^^H^BNF ) The CIA's limitation of access to sensitive covert 

action information is a long-standing practice codified in Section 503 of the 

National Security Act of 1947, as amended. 

The Study notes numerous times that the CIA refused to 

provide information on its Detention and Interrogation Program to Committee members and 

staff

 426

 The underlying assertion is that the CIA's restriction of access to the Chairman and 

Vice Chairman somehow constituted an attempt to avoid or impede congressional oversight of 

the Program. This is simply untrue. According to section 503(c)(2) of the National Security Act 

of 1947, as amended: 

SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, pp. 5-6. 

422

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 442. 

4 B

 Letter from David Shedd to Andy Johnson, January 5, 2006 (DTS 2006-0373). 

41i

 Letter from David Shedd to Andy Johnson, January 5, 2006 (DTS 2006-0373). 

SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, 

426 

,P- 6. 

SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, pp. 439-441. 

TOP SECRET//! 

79 

UNCLASSIFIED 

631 
UNCLASSIFIED 

1//XOFORN 

If the president determines that it is essential to limit access to the finding to meet 

extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States, the 

finding ma y be reported to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the 

congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the 

Hous e of Representatives, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, and 

such other membe r or members of the congressional leadership as may be 

included by the President. 

T he CIA's decision to limit the briefing of this particularly sensitive covert action program to the 

Chairman and Vic e Chairman was in keeping with customary practice and complied with the 

law. The Committe e has conducted oversight of other sensitive covert action programs under 

similar access limitations and continues to do s o at this time. 

fFS^^^^^I^^HNF ) The Study notes that the CIA briefed a number of 

additional senators wh o were not on the Select Committee on Intelligence. 4 2 7 As cited above, the 

law allows the President discretion to provide senators with information about covert action 

programs at his discretion, without regard to Committee membership. Moreover, providing a 

briefing to inform key senators working on legislation relevant to the CIA's program is 

inconsistent with the narrative that the CIA sought to avoid congressional scrutiny. 

(U) Conclusion 7 (CIA Impeded While House Oversight) 

(U) Conclusion 7 states, "[t]he CIA impeded effective White House oversight and 

decision-making."4 2 8 It is important to place this serious allegation within its proper context— 

the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was conducted as a covert action

 42 9

 Covert 

action is the sole responsibility of the White House, a principle enshrined in law since the 

National Security Act of 1947. 4 3 u The President, working with his National Security Staff, 

approves and oversee s all covert action programs. The congressional intelligence committees 

also conduct ongoing oversight of all covert actions and receive quarterly covert action briefings. 

Given this extensive covert action oversight regime, this conclusion seems to imply falsely that 

the CIA was operating a rogue intelligence operation designed to "impede" the White House. 

We reject this unfounded implication and it appears the CIA has rejected it as well: 

427

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary. December 3, 2014. p. 443. 

428

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 6. 

429 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 11. "On September 17, 2001, six days after the 

teirorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush signed a covert action MON to authorize the 

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to 'undertake operations designed to capture and detain persons who pose a 

continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities.'" 

(emphasis added). 

430

 In 1974. the Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 created the requirement for 

presidential "Findings" for covert action. The Intelligence Oversight Acts of 1980 and 1988 amended the Finding 

process, and the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1991 replaced Hughes-Ryan with the current Finding process. See 

William Daugherty, Executive Secrets, Covert Action and the Presidency, The University Press of Kentucky, 2004 

pp. 92-98. 

80 

7NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

632 
TOP T ECITET/.WBMMMHM^A'CROR ^ 

While we were able to find points in the preceding themes with which to both 

agree and disagree, the Study seems to most seriously diverge from the facts and, 

indeed, from simple plausibility in its characterizations of the manner in which 

CIA dealt with others with regard to the RDI program. The Study would have the 

reader believe that CIA 'actively' avoided and interfered with oversight by the 

Executive Branch and Congress .. . [and] withheld information from the 

President.... 

We would observe that, to accomplish this, there would have had to have been a 

years-long conspiracy among CIA leaders at all levels, supported by a large 

number of analysts and other line officers. This conspiracy would have had to 

include three former CIA Directors ... . 

We cannot vouch for every individual statement that was made over the years of 

the program, and we acknowledge that some of those statements were wrong. But 

the image portrayed in the Study of an organization that-on an institutional scaleintentionally misled and routinely resisted oversight from the White House, the 

Congress, the Department of Justice, and its own OIG simply does not comport 

with the record. . .. 

[The] CIA did not, as the Study alleges, intentionally misrepresent to anyone the 

overall value of the intelligence acquired, the number of detainees, the propensity 

of detainees to withhold and fabricate, or other aspects of the program.431 

Our analysis of the documentary record demonstrates that most of the CIA's representations 

about the Detention and Interrogation Program were accurate. 

(U) Executive Branch Oversight 

Study Claim: fFSHf^^^lfl^^^^tli) "According to CIA records, no CIA officer, up 

to and including CIA Directors George Tenet and Porter Goss, briefed the 

President on the specific CIA enhanced interrogation techniques before 

April 2006. By that time, 38 of the 39 detainees identified as having been 

subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques had already been 

subjected to the techniques."432 

Fact: (U) CIA records are contradictory and incomplete regarding when the 

President was briefed, but President Bush himself says he was briefed in 

2002, before any techniques were used.433 

The Study finds that the CIA "impeded" executive branch 

oversight, not just by withholding information about the Program, but by providing inaccurate 

431

 CIA Study Response, Comments (TAB A), June 27, 2013, pp: 15-16 (emphasis in original). 

432

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 6. 

433

 George W. Bush. Decision Points. Broadway Paperbacks, New York, 2010, p. 169. 

81 

TOP SECRET//! LVNOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

633 
UNCLASSIFIED 

urn 111 in i BiWIHIiMWiBftH l minim i 

information about its operation and effectiveness. Beginning with the premise that the Cf A did 

not obtain approval from the President or the National Security Council prior to using enhanced 

interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah, the Study identifies records that cast some doubt on 

whether the President was briefed before April 2006.434 However, CIA records are inconsistent 

on this point. 

program, dated April 2008, lists a meeting held on August 1, 2002, between the President and the 

Deputy Director of the CIA concerning the "Next Phase of the Abu Zubaydah Interrogation," 

which strongly suggests that the President had been briefed on the interrogation. Another 

undated chronology, however, notes that, according to a July 31, 2002, memorandum, the 

National Security Council communicated to the CIA that the President would not be briefed.435 

An Inspector General interview with former DCI Tenet also suggests that he did not brief the 

President on enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs). Tenet said "he had never spoken to the 

President regarding EITs, nor was he aware of whether the President had been briefed by his 

staff."436 An interview of the former Director or his staff, or a review of Director Tenet's e-mail 

communications and those of his staff, might also have helped clarify this point. 

(U) Since no interviews were conducted and since—as we learned during the course of 

our review of the Study material—the majority never requested e-mail communications from 

Director Tenet or other senior CIA leaders, such a clarification was impossible. In fact, as noted 

earlier, we learned that the majority did not request the e-mail communications of any senior 

CIA leaders who likely would have discussed the Program with the President—not Director 

Tenet, Director Goss, Deputy Director McLaughlin, Director of Operations Pavitt, Director of 

Operations Kappes, Director of the Counterterrorism Center Bob Grenier, and many others. 

Because of this gap in emails from critical participants, the majority's document review is 

incomplete. In the absence of interviews and with the gap in documents, the Study's reliance oh 

the CIA records it did review, therefore, is simply not definitive on whether the President was 

briefed on the use of interrogation techniques on Zubaydah. Yet the Study interprets the absence 

of clarity on this point as confirmation that the CIA must have withheld information from the 

President. 

(U) There is at least one person, however, who disputes this mutative and says that the 

President was briefed and approved the use of enhanced techniques on Zubaydah—President 

George W. Bush. In his book, Decision Points, the President has a different recollection than 

Director Tenet. The President recalls being told that Abu Zubaydah was withholding 

information; that "CIA experts drew up a list of interrogation techniques that differed from those 

Zubaydah had successfully resisted ;" and that "Department of Justice and CIA lawyers 

conducted a careful legal review."437 He describes looking at the list of techniques, including 

434 See, e.g., SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 18 n.17. SSCI StudyExecutive 

Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 38-40. 

435

 Chronology of Renditions, Detainees and Interrogations Program and Interrogation Approvals: 2001-2008. 

undated; see also April 3, 2014, SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 40 n. 179. 

436

 Office of the General Counsel. Comments on the Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention 

and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003), May 7, 2004 (DTS 2004-2710). 

437

 Bush, p. 169, 

82 

TOP SECRET//! I//NOFOMNUNCLASSIFIED 

634 
TOP SECRET/.FGBBMIIIBBBLL 1

. JULULTM 

waterboarding, and approving their use, while directing the CTA not to use two of thern that he 

"felt went too far, even if they were legal/'438 President Bush also confirms that he approved the 

use of enhanced interrogation techniques, including the waterboard, on KSM

 439

 So while the 

Study assumes the President did not give his approval prior to the use of enhanced techniques on 

Abu Zubaydah because the majority cannot find CIA records that unequivocally say when and 

how it happened, the President's own words set the record su-aight.440 

Regardless, even if it were true that the President had not 

been briefed by the CIA, we find it odd that the Study would assign blame for "withholding 

information" to the CIA, when the Study itself acknowledges the role of officials outside the CIA 

in making determinations about what should be briefed to policymakers. For example, the Study 

correctly notes that the description of the waterboard was removed from the 2002 Deputy DCI 

(DDCI) talking points for the meeting with the President, but its account of why this change was 

made is misleading.441 In describing an e-mail regarding the planned briefing, the Study states 

that "per an agreement between DCI Tenet and White House Counsel Gonzales, the briefing 

would include no 'further details about the interrogation techniques than those in the (revised) 

talking points."'442 In reality, the e-mail says that the "WH asks that DDCI brief POTUS 

tomorrow at 0800 meeting without any further details about the interrogation techniques than 

those in the talking points."443 Thus, it was at the request of the White House—not the CIA, that 

only a broad description of the nature of the techniques would be provided; specifically, that the 

"techniques incorporate mild physical pressure, while others may place Abu Zubaydah in fear for 

his life" and they "include an intense physical and psychological stressor used by the U.S. Navy 

in its interrogation resistance training for the Navy SEALS."444 

(U) Accuracy of Information Provided 

Study Claim: fFSfll^^^^^lB^F } "The information provided connecting the 

CIA's detention and interrogation program directly to [the "Dirty Bomb" 

Plot/Tall Buildings Plot, the Karachi Plots, Heathrow and Canary Wharf 

438

 Bush, p. 169. 

439

 Bush, p. 170, ("George Tenet asked if he had permission to use enhanced interrogation techniques, including 

waterboarding, on Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. 1 thought about my meeting with Danny Pearl's widow, who was 

pregnant with his son when he was murdered- I thought about the 2,973 people stolen from their families by al 

Qaeda on 9/11. And I thought about mv duty to protect the country from another act of tenor. 'Damn right,' I 

said"). 

440

 The CIA Study response also made reference to President Bush's autobiography, noting that "he discussed the 

program, including the use of enhanced techniques, with then (DCI [Tenet in 2002, prior to the application of the 

techniques on Abu Zubaydah, and personally approved the techniques." CIA Study Response, Conclusions, p. 6. 

The Study chooses to rebut President Bush's recollections of these events by stating, "A memoir by former Acting 

CIA General Counsel John Rizzo disputes the President's autobiographical account." SSCI Study, Findings and 

Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 18 nl7. Again, further clarification of these events was hampered by the lack of 

witness interviews. 

441

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 38. 

442

 SSCI Study, Volume I, March 31, 2014, p. 135. 

443

 CIA, E-maii to DDCI, dated July 31, 2002, Briefing of POTUS tomorrow (1 Aug) re AZ interrogation. 

444

 DDCI Talking Points for Meeting with the President, 31 July 2001 (sic). 

83 

TOP SECRE^BBBBB ^ 

UNCLASSIFIED 

635 
Plot, and the Identification/Capture of Iyman Faris] was, to a great extent, 

inaccurate."445 

Fact: (U) The information provided to the White House attributing the arrests of 

these terrorists and the thwarting of these plots to the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program was accurate. 

(S//NF) The Study accuses the CIA of providing inaccurate information to the White 

House and the National Security Council Principals about the Program and its effectiveness. 

Pivotal to this allegation is a July 29, 2003, briefing that the CIA Director and General Counsel 

had with executive branch officials, including the Vice President, the National Security Advisor, 

the White House Counsel, and the Attorney General. According to the six-page memorandum 

for the record prepared by the CIA General Counsel on August 5, 2003, the purpose of the 

meeting was to "discuss current, past and future CIA policies and practices concerning the 

interrogation of certain detainees held by CIA,"446 

The Study notes that the memorandum provided four of the 

eight "most frequently cited examples from 2002-2009" as evidence of the effectiveness of 

CIA's interrogation program, including: "the 'dirty bomb' plot/tall buildings plot (also 

referenced as the Capture of Jose Padilla), the Karachi Plots, the Heathrow and Canary Wharf 

Plot, and the Identification/Capture of Iyman Faris."447 While the Study asserts, "the information 

provided connecting the CIA's detention and interrogation program directly to the above 

disruptions and captures was, to a great extent, inaccurate," we found that the examples provided 

were, in fact, accurate.448 

(U) Conclusion 8 (CIA Impeded National Security Missions of Executive Branch Agencies) 

(U) Conclusion 8 states, "|t |he CIA's operation and management of the program 

complicated, and in some cases impeded, the national security missions of other Executive 

Branch agencies."449 

fTS^^^^^^^^^^^NF ) The standard by which the Study claims the CIA 

"impeded" national security missions of other executive branch agencies is based entirely on 

subjective standards (hat are never defined in the text. Equally problematic are statements that 

the CIA blocked or denied requests for information from other executive branch agencies. By 

inference this implies the President and the National Security Council did not control access to 

the covert action program. However, the September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification 

authorizing the detainee program, states: "Approval of the Principals shall be sought in advance 

445

 SSCI Study, April 1, 2014, Volume II, p. 446. 

446

 CIA General Counsel Memorandum for the Record, August 5, 2003, Review of Interrogation Program on 29 

July 2003. 

447

 SSCI Study, Volume II, April 1, 2014, p. 446. 

448 See supra, The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla, pp. 33-36; The 

Thwarting of the Karachi Plots, pp. 45-47; The Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plots, pp. 47-50; and The Arrest and 

Prosecution of Iyman Faris, pp. 58-61. 

449

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 7. 105 

TOP SECRET/4 1//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

636 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! WXOFORN 

whenever feasible with respect to such operations "4S0 As noted in the CIA response to the 

Study, "the National Security Council established the parameters for when and how CIA could 

engage on the program with other executive branch agencies."451 The CIA was not responsible 

nor did it have control over the sharing or dissemination of information to other executive branch 

agencies or members of the Principals Committee itself. That responsibility rested solely with 

the White House. 

(U) Access to the Covert Action Program 

Study Claim: fFS^^HH^H^F ) "The CIA blocked State Department leadership 

from access to information crucial to foreign policy decision-making and 

diplomatic activities."452 

Fact: The National Security Staff controlled access to 

the covert action program and there is no evidence that the CIA refused to 

brief State Department leadership when directed. 

The Study does not provide any evidence that the CIA 

deliberately impeded, obstructed or blocked the State Department from obtaining information 

about the Program inconsistent with directions from the White House or the National Security 

Council. In fact, the Study acknowledges that CIA officers were in close and constant contact 

with their State Department counterparts where detention facilities were located and among 

senior leadership to include the Secretary of State and the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State. For 

example, leading to the establishment of a facility in Country®, the Study notes that the chief of 

station (COS) was coordinating activities with the ambassador. Because the Program was highly 

compartmented, the ambassador was directed by the National Security Council not to discuss 

with his immediate superior at headquarters due to the highly compartmented nature of the 

covert action. Instead, the COS, sent feedback from the ambassador through CIA channels, to 

the NSC, whereby the Deputy Secretary of State with the knowledge of the Secretary, would 

discuss any issues or concerns with the ambassador in country.453 While the process was less 

direct, the security precautions to protect sensitive information did not impede the national 

security mission of the State Department. 

(U) CIA Denied FBI Requests 

Study Claim: "The CIA denied specific requests from FBI 

Director Robert Mueller, HI, for FBI access to CIA detainees that the FBI 

believed was necessary to understand CIA detainee reporting on threats to 

the U.S. Homeland."454 

450

 DTS 2002-0371, p. 3. 

451

 CIA Study Response, Comments (TAB A). June 27, 2013, p. 11. 

4:,rSSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014. p. 7. 

"" •KiacableMHMH|HHHHB cI A CABLI 

CABLTHHHHHHH 

454

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 7. 

TOP SECRET//^ 

ICIA 

85 

IVXOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

637 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/4 I//NOFORN 

Fact: While the FBI's participation in the 

interrogation of detainees was self-proscribed, the Bureau was still able to 

submit requirements to the CIA and received reports on interrogations. 

C-S^flHHHHHBHHi^^1) This Study claim appears to focus on FBI access to KSM in 

2003 after FBI Director Mueller read an intenogation report that vaguely referenced possible 

threats to New York, Washington, DC, Chicago, Dallas, and San Francisco.455 However, the 

Study acknowledges the FBI's fear that the use of enhanced techniques activity would place FBI 

agents at future legal risk if they participated in interrogations.456 Recognizing the need for FBI 

access to detainees, bothaggngigs finalized a memorandum of understanding in the fall of 2003 

FBI agents would 

be provided access to detainees ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^ 

(U) The ODNI was Provided with Inaccurate and Incomplete Information 

Study Claim: 

Fact: 

'The ODNI was provided with inaccurate and 

incomplete information about the program, preventing the ODNI from 

effectively carrying out its statutory responsibility to serve as the principal 

advisor to the President on intelligence matters."458 

> The Study incorrectly claims that inaccurate 

information was provided to the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence. 

(U) The updated Study treats this claim differently than it did in the version that was 

adopted by the Committee during the 112th Congress. The original Study sought to dispute 

claims regarding the use of enhanced interrogation techniques and disruption of several plots. 

However, the updated Study drops the direct reference to coercive measures and instead focuses 

on the Detention and Interrogation Program in general

 459

 The 2006 press release from the 

Office of Director of National Intelligence460 does not reference the use of enhanced 

interrogation techniques, but states unequivocally: "The detention of terrorists disrupts—at least 

temporarily—the plots they were involved in." To claim that the detention and interrogation of 

terrorists did not yield intelligence of value is simply not credible. 

(U) Conclusion 5 (CIA Provided Inaccurate Information to the Department of Justice) 

(U) Conclusion 5 states, "[t]he CIA repeatedly provided inaccurate information to the 

Department of Justice, impeding a proper legal analysis of the CIA's detention and Interrogation 

455

 SSCI Study, Volume I, March31^014^414. 

456

 Email from: James Pavitt; to: sub j ect : Re . Mueller's Interest in FBI Access to KSM; DateApril 24, 2003, 2:35 PM. 

457

 SSCI Study, Volume 1, March 31. 2014, p. 413. 

458

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3,2014, p. 8. 

459

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 8. 

4150

 ODNI Press Release, September 6, 2006, "Information on the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program." 

86 

TOP SECRET/^M^^^^^^JPYOPOIT N 

UNCLASSIFIED 

638 
TOP sECRET/.fBBMMMWMlllM I 

Program." Our analysis of the claims used in support of this conclusion revealed that many 

the Study's claims wer e themselves inaccurate or otherwise without merit. 

or 

(U) "Novel" Use of the Necessity Defense 

Study Claim: "CIA attorneys stated that 'a novel application 

of using the necessity defense' could be used 'to avoid prosecution of U.S. 

officials who tortured to obtain information that saved many lives."'462 

Fact: (TS^^^HHi^f^ ) The draft CIA Office of General Counsel (OGC) 

legal appendix cited by the report contained a cursory discussion of the 

necessity defense that did not support the use of such defense in the context of 

the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.463 

(U) This particular claim appears to be a remnant from what had been "Conclusion 2" in 

the original version of the Study approved by the SSCI during the 1I2l h Congress. Our original 

minority views were very critical of the claims made in support of the "necessity defense" 

conclusion. We were pleased to see that the original "Conclusion 2" was dropped from the 

conclusions in the updated version of the Study; however, w e are disappointed to see this 

factually and legally incorrect claim repeated here in support of a conclusion alleging that the 

CIA provided inaccurate information to the Department of Justice. 

(U) This claim advances the faulty proposition that a "novel application" of the necessity 

defens e could be used by participants in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to avoid 

criminal liability. On its face, this claim leaves the reader with the false impression that CIA 

attorneys endorsed the possible use of the "necessity" defens e in the context of the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program, when, in fact, the draft legal appendix cited by the Study4 6 4 

actually reached the opposite conclusion

 46 5 

Contrary to the Study's claim, the legal analysis provided in 

the cited draft legal appendix did not support the use o f the necessity defens e in the context of 

the CIA's program. The Study achieved this erroneous result by modifying the following 

original quote that it cherry picked from the legal analysis: "It would, therefore, be a novel 

application of the necessity defense to avoid prosecution of U.S. officials who tortured to obtain 

information that saved many lives "4 6 6 Specifically, the Study modified this quote by 

separating portions of the text and inserting its own factually misleading text, which was not 

supported by the legal analysis, to achieve the following result: "CIA attorneys stated that a 

461

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 4. 

462

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014. p. 5. 

463 See CIA Office of General Counsel draft Legal Appendix: Paragraph 5-Hostile Interrogations: Legal 

Considerations for CIA Officers, November 26, 2001, pp. 5-6 (CIA. Draft Appendix on Necessity Defense). This 

document is attached as Appendix IV, see infra, p. IV-1. 

464

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3,2014, p. 5 n.13. 

465 See CIA, CIA Draft Appendix on Necessity Defense. 

466

 CIA, CIA Draft Appendix on Necessity Defense, p. 6. See also SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 

2014, p. 179 (the Study provides an accurate quotation of this text). 

87 

TOP SECRK^BBWMH^^^^H^ ^ 

UNCLASSIFIED 

639 
UNCLASSIFIED 

novel application of the necessity defense could he used to avoid prosecution of U.S. officials 

who tortured to obtain information that saved lives."467 Fortunately, this erroneously doctored 

quotation only appears once in the Study—in this Conclusion. 

fFS^H^HHH^tF ) The Study does, however, cite the original "novel 

application" quotation in at least 12 different places in its updated report to support its incorrect 

assertion that CIA attorneys viewed necessity "as a defense" or as a "potential legal defense."468 

While this quotation is technically accurate, it is consistently removed from its context within the 

legal analysis to create the false impression that the defense of necessity might have been 

available to CIA employees engaged in interrogation activities. The legal appendix clearly 

conceded that since "U.S. courts have not yet considered the necessity defense in the context of 

torture/murder/assault cases. . . [i]t would, therefore, be a novel application of the necessity 

defense to avoid prosecution "469 When the "novel application" quote is placed back into its 

proper original context, it becomes clear that the legal analysis did not conclude that the 

necessity defense could be used to avoid prosecution. The use of the word "novel" in this 

context clearly suggests the drafting attorney viewed the approach as problematic.470 

entitled, "The Origins of CIA Representations Regarding the Effectiveness of the CIA's 

Enhanced Interrogation Techniques As Having "Saved Lives," "Thwarted Plots" and "Captured 

Terrorists."471 In that section, the Study cites to the "novel application" of the necessity defense 

contained in the draft legal appendix. This "Origins" section, when combined with the erroneous 

necessity defense claim made here, appears to have been designed to guide the reader into falsely 

inferring that the CIA represented that the enhanced interrogation techniques were necessary to 

acquire "otherwise unavailable" intelligence that "saved lives" because of the draft legal 

appendix's discussion of the necessity defense. 

(U) There are a number of problems with this false inference. If this inference is based 

simply on the fact that the CIA's representations were made after the circulation of the draft 

legal appendix's discussion of the necessity defense, then the claim is little more than a classic 

example of "post hoc " erroneous reasoning. Simply put, just because the CIA represented that 

the Program saved lives does not mean that such representations were caused by the draft legal 

appendix. 

It seems unlikely that the single appearance of the phrase 

"saved many lives" in the context of the draft legal appendix's discussion of the necessity 

defense was the reason behind the use of similar terminology in subsequent accounts of the 

467

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 5 (Erroneous text indicated by italics). 

468 See SSCI Study. Executive Summary, December 3, 2014. pp. 19 and 179: SSCI Study, Volume I, March 31, 

2014, pp. 55, 220, 255, 262 n.1700, and 283 n.1854; SSCI Study, Volume II, April 1,2014, pp. 28, 316, and 1753 

and SSCI Study, Volume III, March 31, 2014,, pp. 1179 and 1723 n.10679. 

469

 CIA, Draft Appendix on Necessity Defense, p. 6. 

470

 The CIA confirmed that the use of "novel" in the context of this document meant tenuous' 

because U.S. courts had not accepted such an argument. See CIA Study Response, Comments, 

Response, Conclusions, pp. 4-5. 

471

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary. December 3, 2014, p. 179. 

or "untested," 

p. 7 and CIA Study 

TOP SECRET/^ 

88 

1//NQFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

640 
UNCLASSIFIED 

Program. Aside from the false inference made in the "Origins" section, there is no evidence to 

support this leap of logic. 

necessity defense did not apply in the context of the CIA's Detention and'Interrogation Program, 

Therefore, this false inference—that the CIA's representations regarding the "otherwise 

unavailable intelligence" that "saved lives" were the result of efforts to preserve the necessity 

defense—does not make sense because the draft legal appendix had already concluded that the 

necessity defense raised in the context of a torture prosecution was unlikely to succeed in a U.S. 

court. 

(U) In this conclusion, the Study appears to buttress its argument about the applicability 

of the necessity defense in the context of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program by 

noting that OLC included a discussion of the "necessity defense" in its August 1, 2002, 

memorandum to the White House.472 That memorandum opinion stated: "under the current 

circumstances, necessity or self-defense may justify interrogation methods that might violate" the 

criminal prohibition against torture.473 Not surprisingly, this August 1, 2002, memorandum 

opinion was withdrawn in June 2004 and formally superseded in its entirety on December 30, 

2004. Specifically, the superseding memorandum stated, "Because the discussion in that 

memorandum concerning the President's Commander-in-Chief power and the potential defenses 

to liability was—and remains—unnecessary, it has been eliminated from the analysis that 

follows."474 Although the Study acknowledges this subsequent withdrawal of the necessity 

defense analysis in a footnote

 475

 it suggests that OLC included its discussion of the necessity 

defense at the request of the CI A 476 

(U) The August 1, 2002, memorandum opinion, however, did finally conclude with the 

somewhat more definitive statement: "even if an interrogation method might violate [the 

criminal prohibition against torture], necessity or self-defense could provide justifications that 

would eliminate any criminal liability."477 Regardless, the Study's apparent reliance upon this 

withdrawn OLC opinion is misplaced, because it actually seems to undermine its conclusion that 

the CIA provided inaccurate information to the Department of Justice. Assuming for the sake of 

argument that the CIA provided OLC with a copy of its legal analysis on the necessity defense— 

which seems highly unlikely—the CIA legal opinion was correct about necessity being a "novel" 

472

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 5 (citing DOJ, Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, 

Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, DOJ. to Alberto R. Gonzales. Counsel to the President, re: 

Standards of Conduct for Interrogation. August 1,2002). 

473

 DOJ, Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, DOJ, to Alberto R. 

Gonzales, Counsel to the President, re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation, August 1, 2002, p. 46 (emphasis 

added). 

474

 DOJ, Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General. Office of Legal Counsel, to James B. 

Comey, Deputy Attorney General, Re: Legal Standards Applicable under 18 U.S.C, §§ 2340-2340A, December 30, 

2004, p. 2. 

475

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 181 n.1069. 

476 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 181. 

477

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 180 n.1065 (citing DOJ, Memorandum from Jay S. 

Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, DOJ, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, 

re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation, August 1, 2002, p. 46). 

89 

TOP SECRETW^^^^^^^^BBB^^OR N 

UNCLASSIFIED 

641 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET^ 

application, while the OLC opinion reached a different result by concluding incorrectly that the 

defense of necessity would eliminate criminal liability. 

(U) Accuracy of Claims about Abu Zubaydah 

Study Claim: The OLC "relied on inaccurate CIA 

representations about Abu Zubaydah's status in al-Qa'ida and the 

interrogation team's 'certain[ty]' that Abu Zubaydah was withholding 

information about planned terrorist attacks."478 

The CIA assessment that Abu Zubaydah was the 

"third or fourth man" in al-Qa'ida was "based on single-source reporting 

that was recanted prior to the August 1,2002, OLC memorandum."479 

"The CIA later concluded that Abu Zubaydah 

was not a member of al-Qa'ida."480 

Fact: The information relied upon by the Study to 

criticize the CIA's representations about Abu Zubaydah withholding of 

information about planned terrorists attacks neglected to include important 

statements from within that same intelligence cable, which supported those 

representations by the CIA. 

The CIA was in possession of multiple threads of 

; Abu Zubaydah's prominent role in al-Qa'ida. The 

The level of detail that the detainee had previously provided 

about Abu Zubaydah undermined his later attempts to retract his earlier 

admissions about his involvement in future terrorist attacks j^^^H I and 

his denials about meeting with Abu Zubaydah. 

The Study's incredible assertion that the "CIA 

later concluded that Abu Zubaydah was not a member of al-Qa'ida" is 

factually incorrect. 

On August 1, 2002, the OLC provided the CIA with a 

memorandum on its legal analysis of the application of enhanced interrogation techniques to Abu 

Zubaydah. The Study asserts that "[m]uch of the information provided by the CIA to the OLC, 

however, was unsupported by CIA records."481 While the CIA acknowledges that it should have 

478

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 5. 

479

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 410. 

480

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 410. 

481

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 410. 

TOP SECRET^ 

90 

1//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

642 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/4 

kept OLC better informed and up-to-date, the Agency found no evidence that any information 

was known to be false when it was provided to OLC.*82 

The Study claims that the CIA's unsupported 

representations to OLC included the characterization of Abu Zubaydah as withholding critical 

threat information.483 The Study cites an email from the CIA's interrogation team that included 

the sentence; "[o]ur assumption is the objective of this operation [the interrogation of Abu 

Zubaydah] is to achieve a high degree of confidence that [Abu Zubaydah] is not holding back 

actionable information concerning threats to the United States beyond that which [Abu 

Zubaydah] has already provided."484 However, this carefully chosen text omits critical 

statements from later in the same cable: "[t]here is information and analysis to indicate that 

subject has information on terrorist threats to the United States" and "[h]e is an incredibly strong 

willed individual which is why he has resisted this long."485 

The Study argues that the CIA provided inaccurate 

information to OLC which was subsequently included in the OLC legal guidance contained in its 

August 1, 2002, memorandum

 486

 Specifically, the Study argues that the CIA information about 

Abu Zubaydah's status in al-Qa'ida was inaccurate because the representation that Abu 

Zubaydah was the "third or fourth man" in al-Qa'ida was based on single source reporting of a 

| who had recanted prior to the issuance of the memorandum, and 

unbelievably, "ftjhe CIA later concluded that Abu Zubaydah was not a member of alQa'ida.,"487 Our review of the underlying documents revealed that both of these Study assertions 

were wrong. 

Zubaydah was the "third or fourth man" in al-Qa'ida was based on a single source who had 

recanted prior to the drafting of the August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum

 488

 The CIA counters 

this criticism by stating that the Agency had: 

multiple threads of reporting indicating that Zubaydah was a dangerous terrorist, 

close associate of senior al Qa'ida leaders, and was aware of critical logistical and 

operational details of the organization, whether or not he held formal rank in alQa'ida. Analysts did not alter their fundamental assessment of Zubaydah's 

482

 CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B), June 27, 2013, p. 32. 

483

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 411. 

484

 CIA, [REDACTED] 73208, July 23, 2003, p. 3: Email from: CIA staff officer; to: [REDACTED1, 

(REDACTED1, ^IHHHi ; subject: Addendum from HH , [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02); date: 

July 23, 2004, at 07:56:49 PM. See also email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Grayson 

SWIGERT and Hammond DUNBAR: date: August 8, 21, 2002, at 10:21 PM. * 

485

 CIA, [REDACTED] 73208, July 23, 2003, p. 3; email from: CIA staff officer; to: [REDACTED"], , 

[REDACTED], ••••• ; subject: Addendum from [REDACTED] 73208 (23I043Z JUL 02); date; 

July 23, 2004, at 07:56 PM. See also Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]: subject: Re: Grayson 

SWIGERT and Hammond DUNBAR; date: August 8, 21, 2002, at 10:21 PM. 

486

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 410. 

487

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 410 (emphasis added). 

488

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 410. 

____ _ 91 

TOP SECRET/^BB^^^^MM^BTFNOYOR N 

UNCLASSIFIED 

643 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! 

intelligence value as a result of anything said or later recanted by the single 

489 " source. 

[who had admitted that he was sent by Abu Zubaydah to 

conduct terrorist operations HHH > including an attack on a U.S. embassy.490 

had also reported to interrogators that Abu Zubaydah was considered the "third or fourth ranking 

individual after Bin Ladin."491 He provided the following additional information that Abu 

Zubaydah: (!) was considered the financial officer; (2) handled the "fraudulent" operations; (3) 

was considered to be responsible for the Gulf networks; and (4) was considered to be 

experienced in military affairs.492 HHH | also admitted to meeting with Abu Zubaydah at 

least twice

 493

 An intelligence cable indicates that "as of 2 October 2001, [|HHHIl had 

retracte^ii^revious admissions .. . to cany out a terrorist attack against the U.S. embassy .. . 

."494 ••• M

 wer e

 certain, however, that despite retraction of his 

admissions concerning a plot against a U.S. embassy, he was involved in terrorist planning 

activity against unknown targets. They also assessed that |^Bha d not been previously 

aware of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by al-Qa'ida when he made his earlier 

admissions related to Abu Zubaydah

 495 

I further "denied that he ever met [Abu 

Zubaydah]" and "also denied any affiliation" with al-Qa'ida.496 Given the level of detail 

provided about Abu Zubaydah, including Abu Zubaydah's rank within al-Qa'ida, his 

denials of meeting with Abu Zubaydahdonotrino true. Moreover, Abu Zubaydah himself 

admitted to at least one meeting with HIBB * which undermines the Hfl^ H denials 

abmUsuchmeetings.497 Based on this information, we are not so quick to dismiss the validity of 

original assessments of Abu Zubaydah's stature within al-Qa'ida, especially since 

the timing of his recantation 

The Study cites to a finished intelligence product entitled, 

Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in Afghanistan, 1990-2001, as support for its 

stunning claim that Abu Zubaydah was not a member of al-Qa'ida. In a text box, this 

intelligence product makes the following assertions: 

A common misperception in outside articles is that Khaldan camp was run by alQa'ida. Pre-911 September 2001 reporting miscast Abu Zubaydah as a "senior 

al-Qa'ida lieutenant," which led to the inference that the Khaldan camp he was 

administering was tied to Usama Bin Ladin ... . 

See also CIA, ALEC 

489 See CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB8), June 27, 2013, p. 32. 

C J A, A L EC | 

491

 CIA, CIA I 

492

 CIA, CIA 

493

 CIA, CIA 

494

 CIA, CIA I 

495 See CIA, CIA I 

See CIA, CIA] 

497

 CIA, ALEC CIA, ALEC | 

[ accounts differ as to the location of this meeting(s). 

TOP SECRET//! 

Abu Zubaydah and 

92 

I//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

644 
TOP SECRETJMB^^MMI/\'OFOr, N 

Al-Qa'ida rejected Abu Zubaydah's request in 1993 to join the group and that 

Khaldan was not overseen by Bin Ladin's organization.498 

At best, this text supports the rather useless assertion that in August 2006, a CIA intelligence 

product stated that Abu Zubaydah was not a member of al-Qa'ida in 1993—not the Study's 

erroneous claim that the CIA later concluded in 2006 that "Abu Zubaydah was not a member of 

al-Qa'ida." This misrepresentation of the actual text is another example of poor analytical 

tradecraft by the Study. As previously noted, there were multiple threads of intelligence 

demonstrating Abu Zubaydah's leadership role in al-Qa'ida prior to September 11, 2001.499 

Moreover, by the Study's own count, the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah resulted in 766 solesource disseminated intelligence reports.500

 There should be absolutely no doubt in the Study 

that Abu Zubaydah was a senior and very-well informed member of al-Qa'ida. 

(U) Breadth of Application of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques 

Study Claim: "[T]lie CIA applied its enhanced interrogation 

techniques to numerous other CIA detainees without seeking additional 

formal legal advice from the OLC."501 

Fact: (TS|H^^^^^^^B N F ) The CIA appropriately applied the legal 

principles of the August 1,2002, OLC memorandum to other CIA detainees. 

fFS^B^^^^^B^F ) The Study authors appear to misunderstand the role of the 

OLC. The OLC does not exercise line management responsibility for CIA organizations, nor is 

it responsible for day-to-day legal advice to the agency. The OLC does provide legal analysis on 

specific questions of law applicable to a defined set of facts. The CIA then applies the OLC's 

guidance to similar scenarios under the guidance of its own legal counsel. The fact that the CIA 

felt comfortable enough with OLC's August 1, 2002, legal opinion to apply the same legal 

principles to other detainees does not constitute an impediment to DOJ's legal analysis of the 

Program. In fact, the Attorney General later expressed the view that "the legal principles 

reflected in DOJ's specific original advice could appropriately be extended to allow use of the 

same approved techniques (under the same conditions and subject to the same safeguards) to 

other individuals besides the subject of DOJ's specific original advice."502 

J98

 CIA, Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in Afghanistan, 1990-2001, August 16, 2006, p. 2 

(emphasis added). 

m

 See CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B), June 27, 2013, p. 32. 

500

 SSCI Study, Volume III, March 31,2014, pp. 282-283. 

501

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 411. 

502 See Memorandum from Jack Goldsmith I'll, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of 

Justice, to John Helgerson, Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agencv, June 18, 2004, Addendum, p. 2 (DTS 

2004-2730). 

93 

TOP SECRET//! I//NQFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

645 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/4 *ORN 

(U) Detainees' Importance Overstated 

Study Claim: (^jHHSHN ^

 Tt

»e CIA made inaccurate representations to 

DOJ that Janat Gul and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani were high-value al Qaeda 

operatives with knowledge of a pre-election plot against the United States 

when seeking legal guidance on whether the use of four additional 

interrogation techniques might violate U.S. law or treaty obligations.303 

'[T]he threat of a terrorist attack to precede the 

November 2004 U.S. election was found to be based on a CIA source whose 

information was questioned by senior CTC officials at the time and who 

admitted to fabricating the information after a HHH I >n H|Octobe r 

2004."504 

Fact: Contrary to the Study's claim, the CIA believed 

the representations to be true at the time it made them to the OLC. The CIA 

did not learn that some of these representations had been fabricated by a 

sensitive CIA source until months after OLC had approved the use of 

enhanced interrogation techniques against Janat Gul and Ahmed Khalfan 

Ghailani. 

The email relied upon by the Study does not 

support the proposition that senior CTC officials questioned the veracity of 

the sensitive CIA source. Also, while the source did admit to fabricating 

information about a meeting that never occurred, the Study does not 

acknowledge that the Chief of Base believed that the source was "generally 

truthful" about his discussions on the pre-election threat, despite f 

I result on that issue. 

The Study notes that the August 26, 2004, OLC letter 

advising that the use of four particular interrogation techniques on Janat Gul outside of the 

United States would not violate U.S. law or treaty obligations was based on the understanding 

that Janat Gul is a "high-value al Qaeda operative who is believed to possess information 

concerning an imminent terrorist threat to the United States."505 The Study also notes that the 

September 6, 2004, OLC letter advising that the use of twelve particular interrogation techniques 

outside of the United States on Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani would not violate U.S. law or treaty 

obligations was based on the understanding that "Ghailani is an al-Qa'ida operative who 'is 

believed to be involved in the operational planning of an al-Qa'ida attack or attacks to take place 

503 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 417-418. 

504

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 417. 

505

 DOJ, Letter from Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, 

August 26,2004, p. 1; SSCI Study. Executive Summary. December 3, 2014, p. 417. 

94 

TOP SECRET//! 1//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

646 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ 

in the United states prior to the November elections."'506 With the benefit of faulty hindsight, 

the Study claims that these representations were inaccurate.507 

This claim gives the false impression that the CIA 

intentionally withheld information from OLC about known fabrications from a questionable 

source. The truth is that the sensitive CIA source did not recant some of the underlying threat 

information that was contained in the CIA representations until OctoberHanc® 2004,40 days 

after the issuance of the OLC letter for Gul and 29 days after the issuance of OLC letter for 

Ghailani. Thus, the CIA made its August and September representations to OLC in good faith, 

believing them to be accurate. 

Moreover, the authorities cited by the Study do not fully 

support its claim that the CIA source's representations about the pre-election threat were 

inaccurate.508 Specifically, the cited email does not question the credibility of the sources who 

provided the threat information in March 2004; and the cable reporting the fabrication by one of 

these sources in October 2004 clearly indicates that some of the source's pre-election threat 

information was considered to be "generally truthful." 

As the subject of the email implies—"Re: could AQ be 

testing ASSET Y and [source name REDACTED]?"—the concerns raised were not about the 

credibility of the sources, but more about the possibility that al-Qa'ida might be using this threat 

information to test the sources who had provided the pre-election threat information. The email 

raising the concern specifically states, "this is not to say that either ASSET Y or [source name 

REDACTED] are wrong or that the AQ statement below509 is anything more than 

disinformation."510 The reply email stated that it was possible the sources were just hearing the 

same rumors, but recollected that when al-Qa'ida put out similar rumors in the summer of 2001, 

those turned out to be true.511 These emails do not support any inference about early suspicions 

of the source's credibility nor do they dismiss the legitimacy of the threat information provided 

by the sources. 

506

 DOJ, Letter from Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel. 

September 6, 2004, p. 1: SSCI Study. Executive Summary, December 3. 2014, p. 417-418. 

SD7

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 417. 

508 See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 417, 

5tw

 The referenced statement was issued" by al-Qa'ida on March 17, 2004, and asserted that al-Qa'ida would not 

operate any large-scale operation prior to the election 

Email from to: HHHHfei < ••••••I ' [REDACTED 

, subject: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y| and [source name REDACTED!?: date: Marc 

2004^3t06:55 AM; Email fromJHBBMB| ; to••••• : cc: 

•I^H , [REDACTED], could AQ be testing [the source] und^m^? ; date: 

MiirchjJ 2004^i^52J2AMji . 1 (footnote added). 

| subject: could AQ be testing [ASSET Y] and[source name REDACTED]?; Bate: March 

20^3106:5 5 AM; Email iron 

^HI^^ P [REDACTED], : Re: could AQ be testing [the source] aml^^^^ ^ date: 

Marcti^H2004, at 7:52:32 AM, p. 1 (footnote added). This email confirms that the sensitive source who 

subsequently admitted to fabricating information was not the only source providing information related to a possible 

terrorist threat. BI^I^^I^I^^^II^HI^^^^^H^^Hii^l ' 

95 

UNCLASSIFIED 

647 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ I//NOFORN 

that ASSET Y was "deceptive in response to questions regarding . . . the pre-election threat,"512 

This assertion is not entirely accurate. In fact, the cited cable indicated that the source | 

I on the issue of the pre-election threat | _ 

|."513 Moreover, the assessment 

paragraph in the cited cable states: "Based on ASSET Y's seemingly genuine concern and 

constant return to the issue, COB believes that ASSET Y is being generally truthful about his 

discussions .. . on the pre-election threat."514 

(U) Effectiveness of the Program 

Study Claim: The CIA's "representations of 'effectiveness' 

were almost entirely inaccurate and mirrored other inaccurate information 

provided to the White House, Congress, and the CIA inspector general."515 

Fact: f£$flHHlHflHNF ) The CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program, to include the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, was 

effective and yielded valuable intelligence. The Study's exaggerated and 

absolute claims about inaccurate "effectiveness" representations by the CIA 

have been largely discredited by these minority views and the CIA's June 27, 

2013, response to the Study. 

In our view, the CIA's June 27, 2013, response to the Study 

identified significant problems with the original Study approved by the SSCI during the 112lh 

Congress. Their response also fairly addressed the Study's many allegations of inaccurate 

representations in the context of the effectiveness of the Detention and Interrogation Program. 

For the most part, we found that the CIA acknowledged those representations that were made in 

error or could have benefited from the inclusion of additional clarification. 

As previously discussed, our own review of the 

documentary record in response to these serious allegations against the CIA found that many of 

the Study's claims of alleged misrepresentations were themselves inaccurate. As a reminder of 

these inaccurate Study claims, we provide the following sampling of our findings related to the 

CIA's effectiveness representations: (1) "There is considerable evidence that the information 

Abu Zubaydah provided identifying KSM as 'Mukhtar' and the mastermind of 9/11 was 

significant to CIA analysts, operators, and FBI interrogators";516 (2) "CIA records clearly 

indicate that sleep deprivation played a significant role in Abu Zubaydah's identification of Jose 

Padilla as an al-Qa'ida operative tasked to carry out an attack against the United States";517 (3) 

"Abu Zubaydah provided information about how he would go about locating, Hassan Ghul and 

512

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary. December 3,2014, p. 348. 

513

 CIA, CIA CABLE 1411. HI M 2004. p. 4. 

51,4

 CIA, CIA CABLE 141 l.^^H I 2004, p. 5. 

515

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 426. 

516 See supra, pp. 29-31. 

317 See supra, pp. 33-36. 

TOP SECRET/4 1 

64 

/ZNOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

648 
UNCLASSIFIED 

other al-Qa'ida associates in Karachi. This information caused Pakistani authorities 

to intensify their efforts and helped lead them to capture Ramzi bin al-Shibh and other al-Qa'ida 

associates during the Karachi safe house raids conducted on September 10-11, 2002" ;518 (4) 

"Information produced through detainee interrogation was pivotal to the retention of a key CIA 

asset whose cooperation led directly to the capture of KSM";519 (5) "CIA documents show that 

key intelligence collected through the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, including 

information obtained after the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, played a major role in 

disrupting the Karachi hotels bombing plot";520 (6) "The CIA interrogation program played a key 

role in disrupting the Heathrow and Canary Wharf plotting";521 (7) "CIA documents show that 

the interrogation of KSM and al-Qa'ida operative Zubair, during and after the use of enhanced 

interrogation techniques on both individuals, played a key role in the capture of Hambali";522 (8) 

"The CIA interrogation program played a key role in disrupting the "Second Wave" plot and led 

to the capture of the 17-member al-Ghuraba group";523 (9) "CIA, FBI, and Department of Justice 

documents show that information obtained from detainees in CIA custody was important to 

identifying Ja'far al-Tayyar";524 (10) "KSM provided valuable intelligence that helped to clarify 

Saleh al-Marri's role in al Qa'ida operations";525 (1 1) "CIA, FBI, and Department of Justice 

documents show that information obtained from KSM after he was waterboarded led directly to 

Faris's arrest and was key in his prosecution"526 (12) "Information obtained from detainee 

reporting, particularly KSM, provided otherwise unavailable intelligence that led to the 

identification of Saifullah Paracha as an al-Qa'ida operative involved in a potential plot, which 

spurred FBI action against him and his son, Uzhair";527 (13) "Representations about the 

thwarting of an attack against Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, specifically President Bush's 2006 

comments that 'Terrorists held in CIA custody have also provided information that helped stop a 

planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti,' were accurate and have been 

mischaracterized by the Study";528 and (14) "CIA documents show that detainee information 

served as the "tip-off and played a significant role in leading CTA analysts to the courier Abu 

Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. While there was other information in CIA databases about al-Kuwaiti, this 

information was not recognized as important by analysts until after detainees provided 

information on him."529 

518 See supra. pp. 37-41. 

519 See supra. pp. 41-45. 

520 See supra, pp. 45-47. 

521 See supra. pp. 47-50. 

522 See supra. PP- 50-53. 

523 See supra. PP- 53-56. 

524 See supra. pp. 56-57. 

525 See supra. pp. 57-58. 

52ti See supra, pp. 58-61. 

527 See-supra. pp. 61.64. 

528 See supra. pp. 67-68. 

529 See supra. pp. 73-75. 

97 

TOP 

UNCLASSIFIED 

649 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET^I^MMW^MM^OgQR N 

(U) Use of Constant Light, White Noise, and Shaving of Detainees 

Study Claim: fFSflHHHHHN ^

 CI A

 assertions to the OLC that loud music and 

white noise, constant light, and 24-hour shackling were all for security 

purposes were inaccurate.®30 

Fact :

 The CIA disclosed to OLC that these 

confinement conditions were both for security and for other purposes. 

purpose for confining detainees in conditions including loud music, white noise, constant light, 

24-hour shackling, and shaving of the head and face. 5 3 1 The CIA's response asserts that this 

characterization takes the CIA's representations out of context. The Agency claimed that such 

conditions wer e necessary for security, not that the mechanisms served no other purpose. The 

Agenc y noted that in responding to a draft OLC opinion, the CIA tried to correct the 

misunderstanding, noting that "these conditions are also used for other valid reasons, such as to 

create an environment conducive to transitioning captured and resistant terrorist to detainees 

participating in debriefings."5 3 2 

(U) Conclusion 9 (CIA Impeded Oversight by CIA Office of Inspector General) 

(U) Conclusion 9 states, "[t]he CIA impeded oversight by the CIA's Offic e of Inspector 

General."5 3 3 This,allegation is among the most serious charges the Study levels against the CIA. 

A s such, the Study should back up this charge with clear and convincing evidence. In our 

opinion it not only fails in that effort, but the Study itself is replete with example s that lead to the 

opposite conclusion—that the CIA did not significantly impede oversight by the CIA Offic e of 

the Inspector General (OIG). 

(U) The law requires the CIA Inspector General to certify that "the Inspector General has 

had full and direct access to all information relevant to the performance of his function."5 3 4 If 

the CIA OIG had been impeded in its oversight related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program, it would have had to report that it was unable to make the required certification with 

respect to its oversight of this program. Yet, during the timeframe of the Program, the Inspector 

General certified in every one of its semiannual reports that it had "full and direct access to all 

CIA information relevant to the performance of its oversight duties."535 The law also requires 

530

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 428-429. 

,31

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 428-429. 

532

 CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B), June 27, 2013, p. 34. 

533

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 8. 

534

 50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(1)(D). 

535 See CIA OIG, Semi-Annual Report to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, July-December 2006, p. 5 (DTS 

2007-0669); CIA OIG, Semi-Annual Report to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, January-June 2006, p. 5 

(DTS 2006-3195); CIA OIG, Semi-Annual Report to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, July-December 

2005, p. 5 (DTS 2006-0678); CIA OIG, Semi-Annual Report to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, JanuaryJune 2005, p. 5 (DTS 2005-3140); CIA OIG, Semi-Annual Report to the Director of Central Intelligence, JanuaryJune 2004, p. 5 (DTS 2004-3307); and CIA OIG, Semi-Annual Report to the Director of Central Intelligence. 

_ _ 98 

TOP 

UNCLASSIFIED 

650 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ 7NOFORN 

the Inspector General to immediately report to the congressional intelligence committees if the 

Inspector General is "unable to obtain significant documentary information in the course of an 

investigation, inspection or audit "33S Again, we are not aware of any such report being 

made to the SSCI during the relevant time period. We do know, however, that John Helgerson, 

the CIA Inspector General, testified before SSCI prior to the commencement of the SSCI's 

review of the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program in February 2007 and did not complain 

of access to Agency information.537 Instead, he said that, during 2006, the IG took a 

comprehensive look at the operations of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center and conducted a 

separate, comprehensive audit of detention facilities. General Helgerson also testified, 

I W|c look carefully at all cases of alleged abuse of detainees. The first paper of 

this kind that came to the Committee was in October 2003, not long after these 

programs had begun, when we looked at allegations of unauthorized interrogation 

techniques used at one of our facilities. It proved that indeed unauthorized 

techniques had been used. I'm happy to say that the processes worked properly. 

An Accountability Board was held. The individuals were in fact disciplined. The 

system worked as it should. 

On this subject, Mr. Chairman, 1 cannot but underscore that we also look at a fair 

number of cases where, at the end of the day, we find that we cannot find that 

there was substance to the allegation that came to our attention. We, of course, 

make careful record of these investigations because we think it important that you 

and others know that we investigate all allegations, some of which are borne out, 

some of which are not.538 

Thus, the allegation made by this conclusion is attacking the credibility and integrity of both the 

CIA OIG and the CIA. Issues of credibility and integrity can rarely be resolved by resorting to a 

documentary record alone. They are best resolved by personally interviewing and assessing the 

performance of relevant witnesses, which, with some limited exceptions, was not done during the 

course of this Study. The absence of evidence relating to these statutory reporting requirements 

is a strong indicator the CIA OIG was not impeded in its oversight of the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program, 

(U) Another possible indicator of impeded oversight would be evidence that the CIA 

OIG was blocked from conducting or completing its desired reviews of the program. If such 

oversight had been impeded, we would expect to see few, if any, completed investigations, 

reviews, or audits of the Program. Instead, it appears that the opposite took place. The Study 

itself acknowledges the existence of at least 29 OIG investigations on detainee-related issues, 

January-June 2003, p. 5 (DTS 2003-3327); CIA Study Response, Comments (TAB A), June 27, 2013, pp. 4-6; and 

10; and CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B). June 27, 2013, pp. 7-9. 

336

 50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(3)(E). 

3,7 See SSCI Transcript, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Rendition Program, February 14, 2007, p. 24 

(DTS 2007-1337). 

SSCI Transcript, Hearing on the Control Intelligence Agency Rendition Program, February 14, 2007, p. 25 (DTS 

2007-1337) (emphasis added). 

99 

TOP SECRET/ VN.OFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

651 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ I//NOFORN 

including 23 that were open or had been completed in 2005.339 We would also expect to see 

indications in completed OIG reports that the investigation was hampered by limited access to 

documents, personnel, or site locations necessary for completing such investigations. Again, 

according to the OIG's own reports, we found evidence that the OIG had extensive access to 

documents, personnel, and locations. For example, in its May 2004 Special Review of the RDI 

program, the CIA OIG reported that it was provided more than 38,000 pages of documents and 

conducted more than 100 interviews, including with the DCI, the Deputy Director of the CIA, 

the Executive Director, the General Counsel, and the Deputy Director of Operations. The OIG 

made site visits to two interrogation facilities ^^^Hfl^^^l H

 an d

 reviewed 92 

videotapes of the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. The CIA IG's 2006 Audit is another good 

example of extensive access to documents, personnel, and locations. During this audit, the OIG 

not only conducted interviews of current and former officials responsible for CIA-controlled 

detention facilities, but it also reviewed operational cable traffic in extremely restricted access 

databases, reports, other Agency documents, policies, standard operating procedures, and 

guidelines pertaining to the detention program. The OIG also had access to the facilities and 

officials responsible for managing and operating three detention sites. The OIG was able to 

review documentation on site, observe detainees through closed-circuit television or one-way 

mirrors, and the IG even observed the transfer of a detainee aboard a transport aircraft. They 

even reviewed the medical and operational files maintained on each detainee in those 

locations.540 

(U) The Study's case in support of this conclusion seems to rest mainly upon the 

following four observations: (I) the CIA did not inform the CIA OIG of the existence of the 

Program until November 2002; (2) some CIA employees provided the OIG with some inaccurate 

information about the Program; (3) CIA Director Goss directed the Inspector General in 2005 not 

to initiate planned review of the Program until the reviews already underway were completed; 

and (4) Director Hayden ordered a review of the OIG itself in 2007,541 Our examination of these 

observations supports our conclusion that the CIA OIG was not impeded in its oversight of the 

CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. 

(U) The Study seems to fault the CIA for not briefing the CIA Inspector General on the 

existence of the Detention and Interrogation Program until November 2002, but does not really 

pursue why this fact alone was a problem or how it actually "impeded" the CIA OIG. Acting 

53M SSCI Study, Volume I, March 31, 2014, p. 899 n.6257. The CIA asserts that the "OIG conducted nearly 60 

investigations" related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and that the OIG found the initial 

allegations in 50 of these investigations to be unsubstantiated or did not make findings warranting an accountability 

review. Of the remaining 10 investigations, one resulted in a felony conviction, one resulted in the termination of a 

contractor and the revocation of his security clearances, and six led to Agency accountability reviews. CIA Study 

Response, Conclusions (TAB B), June 27, 2013, p. 7. 

540

 CIA OIG, CIA-controlled Detention Facilities Operated Under the 17 September 2001 Memorandum of 

Notification, July 14, 2006, APPENDIX A, pp. 1-2 (DTS 2006-2793). 

541

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, April 3.2014. p. 8. ffThis factual error and misrepresentation of events 

was corrected in the December 3,2014, version of the Findings and Conclusions by editing the text to read. "In 

2005, CIA Director Goss requested in writing that the inspector general not initiate further reviews of the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program until review already underway were completed." (emphasis added). Compare 

SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, April 3, 2014, p. 8 with SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 

3, 2014, p. 8. ]J 

64 

TOP SECRET/4 1/Z NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

652 
UNCLASSIFIED 

11 hi 11 ii ii ii II ii i HI 11 

under the authority of the President's September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification, the 

CIA initiated the Program in late-March, 2002, when the first detainee was taken into its 

custody.542 The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was part of a highly classified and 

compartmented covert action program. As the Program was being implemented, the CIA sought 

legal guidance from the Department of Justice and began briefing the White House.543 

Congressional access to details about the Program was restricted to leadership of the 

congressional intelligence committees during that same timeframe.544 The CIA Inspector 

General was notified in November about the Program's existence in November 2002, because of 

the need for an OIG investigation into the death of a detainee who had been in the custody of the 

CIA.545 At that point, the OIG had a clear "need to know" about the Program. We see nothing 

sinister in these events. 

(U) The second "impeding" observation concerned the fact that CIA personnel provided 

the OIG with inaccurate information on the operation and management of the Detention and 

Interrogation Program, which was subsequently not corrected by the CIA and was included in 

the OIG's final report. The CIA has acknowledged in two cases that it made "mistakes that 

caused the IG to incorrectly describe in its 2004 Special Review the precise role that information 

acquired from KSM played in the detention of two terrorists involved in plots against targets in 

the [United States]."546 The inclusion of erroneous information in an oversight report is 

disappointing, but absolute precision in matters such as these is rarely obtainable. Overall, these 

errors did not fundamentally alter the overall representations the CIA made about the RDI 

program to the OIG and policy makers. 

(U) The Study's third observation about CIA Director Goss contains an error. It states 

that in 2005, "CIA Director Goss directed the Inspector General not to initiate planned reviews 

of the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program until reviews already underway were 

completed."547 In fact, Director Goss did not "direct," but rather asked that a newly proposed 

review by the OIG be rescheduled until a mutually agreed-upon date. We find that the actual 

text from Director Goss's request provides sufficient justification against any allegation of 

"impeding" OIG oversight with the respect to the timing of the proposed OIG review. The 

memorandum states; 

ALEC 

543 See CIA OIG, Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities, (September 2001 -

October 2003J, May 7, 2004., p. 4 (DTS 2004-27»). 

544

 The CIA briefed HPSC1 leadership on September 4, 2002, shortly after the August recess. SSCI leadership was 

briefed on the Program on September 27, 2002. See CIA Study Response, Conclusions, June 27, 2013, p. 36. 

545

 CIA OIG, Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities, (September 2001 - October 

2003), May 7, 2004, p. 52 (DTS 2004-2710). 

546

 CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B), June 27, 2013, p. 22 (emphasis in original). 

547

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, April 3. 2014, p. 8 (emphasis added). [[This factual error and 

misrepresentation of events was corrected in the December 3, 2014, version of the Findings and'Conclusions by 

editing the text to read, "In 2005, CIA Director Goss requested in writing that the inspector general not initiate 

further reviews of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program until review already underway were completed." 

(emphasis added). Compare SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, April 3, 2014, p. 8 with SSCI Study, Findings 

and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 8.]] 

'101 

TOP SECRET/Z^^^^MB^^^W^OFQ ^ 

UNCLASSIFIED 

653 
UNCLASSIFIED 

Given its mission, CTC unquestionably must be subjected to rigorous independent 

oversight. This, in fact, has been the case, as evidenced by the 20 or so ongoing, 

incomplete OIG reviews directed at the Center. I am increasingly concerned 

about the cumulative impact of the OIG's work on CTC's performance. As I 

have said in previous correspondence to you, I believe it makes sense to complete 

existing reviews, particularly resource-intensive investigations such as those now 

impacting CTC, before opening new ones. As CIA continues to wage battle in the 

Global War on Terrorism, I ask that you reschedule these aspects of the new CTC 

review until a mutually agreeable time in the future.548 

(U) The final observation in support of this "impeding" conclusion was that CIA 

Director Michael Hayden ordered a review of the OIG itself in 2007. The law governing the 

CIA OIG states, "The Inspector General shall report directly to and be under the general 

supervision of the Director."549 Director Hayden's request for this review stemmed from a 

disagreement between the Office of the General Counsel (OGC) and the OIG over a legal 

interpretation related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Director Hayden tasked 

Special Counselor Robert Dietz to assess how OGC and OIG interacted on legal issues. He also 

subsequently tasked Dietz with reviewing complaints of alleged OIG bias and unfair treatment of 

CIA officers as part of this review. On October 24, 2007, Deitz and his review team made an 

oral presentation to the Inspector General and his senior staff. They presented a number of 

recommendations regarding modifications to the OIG's procedures and practices, a number of 

which were adopted by the Inspector General. Director Hayden subsequently sent a message to 

the CIA workforce, stating that the Inspector General had "chosen to take a number of steps to 

heighten the efficiency, assure the quality, and increase the transparency of the investigative 

process." Director Hayden's message listed the agreed-upon recommendations.550 Rather than 

impeding the CIA OIG's oversight, it appears that Director Hayden's order resulted in agreedupon improvements to that office. 

(U) We find that these observations, whether considered individually or in combination, 

do not support the conclusion that the CIA improperly impeded oversight of the CIA's Detention 

and Interrogation Program by the CIA OIG. 

548

 CIA, Memorandum from Porter J, Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency to CIA Inspector General, re: New 

IG Work Impacting the CounterTerrorism Center. July 21,2005 (emphasis added). In this same memorandum, 

Director Goss did exercise his statutory authority to direct the Inspector General to stand down from talking directly 

with high-value detainees until he received a compelling explanation. Ibid., p. 1. See 50 U.S.C. 403q. A few days 

later, a compromise was reached that permitted the audit of the CIA black sites with the agreement that no high 

value detainees would be interviewed by the OIG during the audit. See July 28, 2005,08:54 AM, email from 

[REDACTED], DCI/OlG/Audit Staff/Operations Division to: [REDACTED] cc: 

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED!], [REDACTED], Robert Grenier, ^^^^^HjREDACTED] , 

John P. Mudd, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], CIA attorney, CIA attorney, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]Re: 

Request for TDY Support; CIA OIG, CIA-controlled Detention Facilities Operated Under the 17 September 2001 

Memorandum of Notification, July 14, 2006, Appendix A, p. 3 (DTS 2006-2793). Director Goss's lawful exercise 

of his statutory authority cannot be labeled as "impeding" oversight, especially here, where a reasonable 

accommodation was reached within a matter of days. 

-

w

 50 U.S.C. 403q. 

550 See Letter from DCIA Michael Hayden to Senator John D. Rockefeller, January 29. 2008 (DTS 2012-0606). 

___________ _ 102 

Mill I I III I mamm^^mmmmmmmm m , , (|||||l | 

UNCLASSIFIED 

654 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/ 7XOFORN 

(U) Conclusion 10 (The CIA Released Classified Information on EITs to the Media) 

(U) Conclusion 10 asserts, "|t]he CIA coordinated the release of classified information to 

the media, including inaccurate information concerning the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced 

interrogation techniques."551 This conclusion insinuates that there was something improper 

about the manner in which the CIA managed the process by which information about the 

Detention and Interrogation Program was disclosed to the media. It also repeats one of its main 

faulty claims—that the CIA released inaccurate information about the Program's effectiveness. 

Our examination of the record revealed that the CIA's disclosures were authorized and that the 

CIA's representations about the Program were largely accurate. 

Study Claim: "The CIA's Office of Public Affairs and senior 

CIA officials coordinated to share classified information on the CIA's 

Detention and Interrogation Program to select members of the media to 

counter public criticism, shape public opinion, and avoid potential 

congressional action to restrict the CIA's detention and interrogation 

authorities and budget. These disclosures occurred when the program was 

a classified covert action program and before the CIA had briefed the full 

Committee membership on the program."352 

(U) The Study seems to confuse the difference between an authorized disclosure of 

classified information and the unauthorized "leak" of that same information. Despite 

acknowledging that the "National Security Council Principals Committee discussed a public 

campaign for the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program,553 the Study tries to cast the 

authorized disclosures as a "media campaign" that must be "done cleverly,"554 and dwells on 

CIA officers providing information on the Program to journalists.555 Specifically, on April 15, 

2005, the National Security Council (NSC) Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) determined 

that the CIA would have "the lead" on the "Public Diplomacy issue regarding detainees."556 

Once the PCC designated CIA as "the lead" on this matter, the CIA was authorized to make 

determinations on what information related to this highly classified covert action could be 

disclosed to the public on a case-by-case basis, without having to return to the White House for 

subsequent approvals. 

(U) The White House did, however, retain its authority with respect to protecting sources 

and methods in the context of keeping the congressional intelligence fully and currently 

s

" SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 8. 

552

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions. December 3, 2014, p. 8. 

SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3,2014, p. 403. 

554

 SSCI Study, Volume II, April 1, 2014, pp. 1521-1522. 

555

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 403-404. 

556

 Email from: HHHH B

 to :

 CIA attorney; subject: Brokaw interview: Take one; date: April 15, 2005, at 1:00 

Fact: (U) The National Security Council Policy Coordinating Committee 

designated the CIA as "the lead" on the "Public Diplomacy issue regarding 

detainees." 

PM. 

103 

TOP SECRET/ 

UNCLASSIFIED 

655 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET/^ I//NOFORN 

informed of this particular covert action. Tt is within the President's discretion to determine 

which members of Congress beyond the "gang of eight," are briefed on sensitive covert action 

programs. There is no requirement for the White House to brief the full Committee as a 

prerequisite to the declassification or disclosure of information to the media. 

(U) The Study acknowledges the White House's guiding influence on opening aspects of 

the Program to public scrutiny557 in a section entitled, "NSC Principals Agree to Public 

Campaign Defending the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program."558 In a subsequent section, 

referring to another "media plan," the Study states, "In the fall of 2005, the CIA expanded on its 

draft public briefing document. One draft, dated November 8, 2005, was specifically intended 

for National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, who had requested it."559 Later, "[tjhroughout 

the summer of 2006, the CIA assisted the White House in preparing the public roll-out of the 

program, culminating in President Bush's September 6, 2006 speech describing specific 

intelligence obtained from CIA detainees."560 The Study cites no examples of the White House 

objecting to CIA activities that followed from these discussions. 

(U) The Study is correct that, "The CIA's Office of Public Affairs and senior CIA 

officials coordinated to share classified information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program to select members of the media."561 That is the function of the Office of Public Affairs 

(OPA), which is the CIA office primarily responsible for dealing with the routine daily inquiries 

from the media. The CIA response to the Study indicates that the "vast majority of CIA's 

engagement with the media on the program was the result of queries from reporters seeking 

Agency comment on information they had obtained elsewhere.561 The Study made no effort to 

review established procedures at OPA. The OPA's guidelines and practices include coordinating 

any information with "senior CIA officials," in order to mitigate or limit the disclosure of 

classified information. The OPA responds to media requests in a variety of ways that range from 

"no comment," to, in some cases, working with the media to provide context and improve the 

accuracy of stories that do not damage the CIA's equities. 

(U) The Study cites a few select examples of media inquiries that resulted in stories 

about the Detention and Interrogation Program. The Study does not make clear, in most cases, 

who initiated these requests, nor does the Study make clear in what way their selected examples 

represent the body of media exchanges that OPA had with the media during the period of the 

Program. Interviews with OPA personnel would have rendered some clarity on these questions. 

557

 DECISION PAPER: Background for 10 March Principals Committee Meeting on Long-Term Disposition ofSelected High Value Detainees, March 4, 2Q05. See also email from: L. Grenier; cc: 

John P. Mudd, [RKDACTED|!1HI^^H^ B subject: DCI Briefing 

Material/Talking points for upcoming PC; date: 3/01/05 11:33 AM. SSCI Study, Volume II, April 1, 2004, pp. 

1508-54. 

558

 SSCI Study, Volume II, April 1, 2014, p. 1521. 

559

 SSCI Study, Volume II, April 1, 2014, p. 1528. 

56u

 SSCI Study, Volume II, April 1, 2014, p. 1535-

561

 SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 8. 

562

 CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B). June 27, 2013, p. 39 (emphasis in original). 

64 

TOP SECRET/4 1/ZNOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

656 
UNCLASSIFIED 

m i 11111 'HBMBWMWMMI"'i" 111111 1 

(U) The Study quotes, inconclusively, emails with various CIA counsels on how to 

handle the protection of covert action equities against public revelations563 and chat sessions 

between officers in CTC who were tasked to prepare and review talking points for an appearance 

by senior CIA officials on NBC Dateline with Tom Brokaw. Their exchanges include comments 

on the rhetorical context of the possible media discussion, ("we either get out and sell, or we get 

hammered .. . we either put out our story or get eaten, there is no middle ground").564 As noted 

in the CIA response to the Study, "the informal comments of any one CIA officer do not 

constitute Agency policy with regard to media interactions."565 One officer's speculation in a 

chat session about the risks of the Congress' reaction to unfavorable media coverage does not 

support the conclusion that the CIA shaped its public affairs strategy as a means to avoid 

congressional action. Moreover, the CIA refuted the suggestion that this chat session exchange 

related to the disclosure of classified information by stating that the NBC Dateline broadcast for 

which the officers were preparing, "contained no public disclosures of classified CIA, 

information; indeed, the RDI program was not discussed. "566 

Study Claim: "Much of the information the CIA provided to 

the media on the operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program and the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques was 

inaccurate and was similar to the inaccurate information provided by the 

CIA to the Congress, the Department of Justice, and the White House."567 

Fact: fFSj^^^^H^^^iF ) The CIA's Detention and Interrogation 

Program, to include the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, was 

effective and yielded valuable intelligence. The Study's exaggerated and 

absolute claims about inaccurate "effectiveness" representations by the CIA 

have been largely discredited by these minority views and the CIA's June 27, 

2013, response to the Study. 

As previously discussed, our own review of the 

documentary record in response to the Study's serious allegations against the CIA found that 

many of these claims of alleged misrepresentations were themselves inaccurate. The Study's 

flawed analytical methodology cannot suppress the reality that the CIA's Detention and 

Interrogation Program set up an effective cycle of events whereby al-Qa'ida terrorists were 

removed from the battlefield, which had a disruptive effect on their current terrorist activities and 

often permitted the Intelligence Community to collect additional intelligence, which, in turn, 

often led back to the capture of more terrorists. We found, with a few limited exceptions, that 

the CIA generally did a good job in explaining the Program's accomplishments to policymakers. 

We will not repeat the listing of our specific effectiveness findings here.568 

563

 SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014. p. 403-405 

s64

 CIA, Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and dated April 13.2005, from 

19:23:50 to 19:56:05. 

565

 CIA Study Response. Conclusions (TAB B), June 27, 2013, p. 40. 

M6

 CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB R), June 27, 2013, p. 40 (emphasis in original). 

M?

 CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B), June 27, 2013, p. 9. 

568

 That list may be found in the discussion of Conclusion 5 under the Effectiveness of the Program heading, supra, 

pp. 96-97. 

105 

TOP SECRET/4 1//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

657 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET//! k/NOFORN 

(U) CONCLUSION 

(U) The Study concludes that the CIA was unprepared to initiate a program of indefinite, 

clandestine detention using coercive interrogation techniques, something we found obvious, as 

no element of our government was immediately prepared to deal with the aftermath of what had 

happened on September 11, 2001. In reviewing the information the CIA provided for the Study, 

however, we were in awe of what the men and women of the CIA accomplished in their efforts 

to prevent another attack. The rendition, detention, and interrogation program they created, of 

which enhanced interrogation was only a small part, enabled a stream of collection and 

intelligence validation that was unprecedented. The most important capability this program 

provided had nothing to do with enhanced interrogation—it was the ability to hold and question 

terrorists, who, if released, would certainly return to the fight, but whose guilt would be difficult 

to establish in a criminal proceeding without compromising sensitive sources and methods. The 

CIA called the detention program a "crucial pillar of US counterterrorism efforts, aiding 

intelligence and law enforcement operations to capture additional terrorists, helping to thwart 

terrorist plots, and advancing our analysis of the al-Qa'ida target."569 We agree. We have no 

doubt that the CIA's detention program saved lives and played a vital role in weakening alQa'ida while the Program was in operation. When asked about the value of detainee information 

and whether he missed the intelligence from it, one senior CIA operator ^HH^^ I told 

members, "I miss it every day."570 We understand why, 

569

 Detainee Reporting Pivot£forthe War Against al-Qa'ida, June I, 2005, p. i. 

570 Jj^^Chambliss, conversation between SSCI members and CIA officers, I 

106 

k/NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

658 
UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) APPENDIX I: CIA, Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in Afghanistan, 

1990-2001, August 16,2006 

' TOP 0ECHE1 

UNCLASSIFIED 

659 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRgTd 

fS August 2006 

Countering Misconceptions 

About Training Camps in 

Afghanistan, 1990-2001 

•TOP-SECftETJ 

UNCLASSIFIED 

660 
UNCLASSIFIED 

i UP stLK b ijjHjijHH H 

• Arab mujahidin took courses in explosives, 

electronics, and document falsification in private 

residences in Kabul where instructors charged fees 

of between $50 and S I 00 per month. 

• A Moroccan guesthouse in Kabul provided target 

reconnaissance training primarily to Moroccans. 

» One trainee received informal training on the 

placement, extraction, and camouflage of antitank 

and antipersonnel mines while on the frontlines in 

Bagraml 

The degree of al-Qa'ida involvement in the 

Afghanistan training scene during the 1990s is often 

overstated. Al-Qa'ida had only a peripheral role in 

training during the middle part of the decade when 

Bin Ladin and most of his group were located in 

Sudan.From 1993 to 1997, al-Faniq was used to train 

Tajiks with only a few al-Qa'ida members assisting. 

Al-Qa'ida reportedly was "in control of al-Faruq" 

again in J 997. 

• Some of the camps have been nusidentified as 

being run by al-Qa'ida, including Khaldan and Abu 

Khabab al-Masri's poisons-related facilities at 

Derunta and Kargha. 

• Recent reporting suggests that the degree to which 

al-Qa'ida financed nott-al-Qa'ida camps may have 

been exaggerated. For example, a senior al-Qa'ida 

leader reportedly said that he did not know of 

al-Qa'ida providing any money, material, or trainers 

to non-al-Qa'ida camps! 

By the late 1990s, al-Qa'ida—with the assistance of 

the Taliban—sought to gain hegemony over training 

in Afghanistan, but the group never controlled al! the 

camps. 

inference that the Khaldan camp be was 

administering was tied to Usama Bin Ladin. 

• The group's flagship camp, al-Faruq, reportedly 

was created in the late 1980s so that Bin Ladin's 

new organization could have a training 

infrastructure independent of 'Abdullah Azzam's 

Maktab al-Khidamat, the nongovernmental 

organization that supported Khaldan. 

• Al-Qa'ida rejected Abu Zubaydah's request in 1993 

to join the group and that Khaldan was not overseen 

by Bin Ladin's organization. 

•» There were relations between the al-Qa'ida camps 

and Khaldan. Trainees, particularly Saudis, who 

had finished basic training at Khaldan were referred 

to al-Qa' ida camps for advanced courses, and 

Khaldan staff observed al-Qa'ida training The two 

roups Jiowever. did not exchange trainers. 

• An al-Qa'ida facilitator reportedly said that in 1998 

Bin Ladin began to pressure other Arabs to close 

their facilities because he wanted all the recmits 

sent to al-Qa'ida. 

• lbn al-Shaykh al-Libi initially foiled attempts to 

shut down Khaldan, but by April 2000 the camp 

had closed. 

• The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and Abu 

Mus'ab al-Suri were able to bribe or convince 

Taliban officials to allow them to continue 

operating their camps despitelal-Oa'ida's pressure 

on the Taliban to close them.^^^^ ^ 

Khaldan Not Affiliated With Al-Qa'ida 

.A common misperception in outside articles is that 

Khaldan camp was run by al-Qa'ida. Pre-11 

September 2001 reporting miscast Abu Zubaydah as a 

"senior al-Qa'ida lieutenant," which led to the 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 3ECKE1 jQFORN 

<U) APPENDIX II: CIA, Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting. August 2005 

/ 

TOP SECRElJ^J^^yNQEQBM 

UNCLASSIFIED 

662 

1 
UNCLASSIFIED 

ii011 iii«11mi i jjjjjp^ ^

 1 

Briefing Notes cm ihe Value of Detainee Reporting 

August 2005 

I'm glad to speak to you today about the results we have seen from high and mid 

value detainee reporting, which since 9/11 has become a crucial pillar of US 

counterterrorism efforts. To get a sense for the importance of this reporting to 

CIA's overall collection effort, let me share some statistics with you: 

• Since we began the program in March 2002, detainees have produced 

over 6,000 disseminated intelligence reports. 

• Approximately half of CTC's disseminated intelligence reporting in 2004 

on al-Qa'ida came from CIA-held detainees. 

For both warning and operational purposes, detainee reportincn^isseminated 

JS intelligence and law enforcement entrties|HHHHHH | 

(3//NF) ^^^^^^ ^ 

For today's briefing, I'm going to highlight five key areas in which detainee 

reporting has played a critical role: aiding intelligence and law enforcement 

operations to capture additional terrorists, helping to thwart terrorist plots, 

advancing our analysis of the al-Qa'ida target, illuminating other collection, 

and validating sources. (S//NT) 

Capturing Other Terrorists 

Detainees have given us a wealth of useful targeting information on al-Qa'ida 

members and associates. Detainees have played some role—from 

identification of photos to providing initial lead and in depth targeting 

information—in members and associates 

since 2002, includingppH||^^^H|||^det«itions we assess as 

"key" because the indiviaual^e^necnepresented a significant threat to 

the United States or were playing leading roles in assisting al-Qa'ida. 

I have handed you graphics that tell the story of two such cases: 

Unraveling Hambali's network. In March 2003, al-Qa'ida operations chief 

Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) provided information about an al-Qa'ida 

operative, Majid Khan, whom he was aware had recently been captured. KSM— 

possibly believing the detained operative was "talking"—admitted to having 

tasked Majid with delivering a large sum of money to individuals working for 

another senior al-Qa'ida associate. 

«In an example of how information from one detainee can be used in debriefing 

another detainee in a "building block" process, Khan—confronted with KSM's 

UNCLASSIFIED 

663 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRE?ii^^^M^Bfl*tOFOBN//MR 

information about the money—acknowledged that he delivered the money to an 

operative named "Zubair" and provided Zubair's physical description and 

contact number. Based on that information, Zubair was captured in June 2003. 

• During debriefings, Zubair revealed that he worked directly for Jemaah 

Islamlyah (Jl) leader and al-Qa'ida's South Asia representative Hambali. Zubair 

provided information! 

• Next, KSM—when explicitly queried on the issue—identified Hambali's brother, 

'Abd al-Hadi, as a prospective successor to Hambali. Information from multiple 

detainees, including KSM. narrowed down 'Abd al-Hadi's location and enabled 

his capture! 

• Bringing the story full circle, 'Abd al-Hadi identified a cell of Jl operativessome of them pilots—whom Hambali had sent to Karachi for possible al-Qa'ida 

operations. When confronted with his brother's revelations, Hambali admitted 

that he was grooming members of the cell for US operations—at the behest of 

KSM—probably as part of KSM's ptoyofhHjjiacked planes into the tallest 

building on the US West Coast. 

The Arrest of Dhiren Barot (aka Issa al-Hindi). KSM also provided the first 

lead to an operative known as "Issa al-Hindi," whife other detainees gave 

additional identifying information. KSM also provided the first lead to an 

operative known as "Issa al-Hindi," while other detainees gave additional 

identifying information. Issa was well known in jihadi circles because he penned 

a book about his time fighting in Kashmir under his "al-Hindi" nom de guerre; 

however, no one seemed to know his true name. In March 2004, our hunt for 

Issa intensified when we receive reporting about a possible attack against the US 

Homeland. 

_ , i positively identities the photo as issa al-Hindi, and we 

are able to identified through a new search mechanism a separate individual 

who had traveled to the United States with Issa prior to 9/11. 

• Issa and his former traveling companion —who were arrested in 2004—appear 

to have been involved in plots in the UK. Moreover, in early 2004, Issa had 

briefed US targeting packages to al-Qa'ida senior leadership in Pakistan. Issa 

was well known in jihadi circles because he penned a book about his time 

fighting in Kashmir under his "al-Hindi" nom de guerre; it was only 

:>!ice work coupled with detainee confirmation on his identity, that] 

i/ere able to find him. 

2 

W-SEERETJ MH^H UOIWMM R 

IMCRSSIRED 

664 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

In addition to these two prominent cases, a number of other significant captures 

have resulted thanks to detainee reporting, ft is important to highlight that a 

number of these cases involve law enforcement's use of our detainee reporting: 

In debriefings, KSM 

it 

• Arrest of key al-Qa ida facilitator] 

in March 2003 noted that he 

t^ommunicate with seniorjj 

fHI^^ B CIA then determined that KS^ja d been using this account actively in 

ongoing operationaSDlanning for an^^|threat , which KSM confirmed. 

Analysis of after KSM's detention led to his being located 

and arresteoon^J^2003 . 

• identifying the "other" shoe bomber. Leads provided by KSM in November 

2003 led directly to the arrest of shoe bomber Richard Reid's one-time partner 

Sajid Badat in the UK. KSM had volunteered the existence of Badat—whom he 

knew as "Issa al-Pakistani"—as the operative who was slated to launch a 

simultaneous shoe bomb attack with Richard Reid in December 2001. 

• Jose Padilla. After his capture in March 2002, Abu Zubaydah provided 

information leading to the identification of alleged al-Qa'ida operative Jose 

Padilla. Arrested by the FBI in 2002 as he arrived at O'Hare Airport in Chicago, 

he was transferred to military custody in Charleston, South Carolina, where he 

is currently being held. The FBI began participating in the military debriefings in 

March 2003, after KSM reported Padilla might know the true name of a USbound al-Qa'ida operative known at the time only as Jafar al-Tayyar. Padilla 

confirmed Jafar's true name as Adnan El Shukrijumah. 

• Iyman Faris. Soon after his arrest, KSM described an Ohio-based truck driver 

whom the FBI identified as Iyman Faris, already under suspicion for his 

contacts with al-Qa'ida operative Majid Khan. FBI and CIA shared intelligence 

from interviews of KSM, Khan, and Faris on a near real-time basis and quickly 

ascertained that Faris had met and accepted operational taskings from KSM on 

several occasions. Faris is currently serving a 20-yeaygnignn^Qr conspiracy 

and material support to a terrorist organization. 

Bringing new targets to light A variety of detainee reporting has provided our 

nitial information about individuals having links to al-Qa'ida and has given us 

nsight into individuals about whom we had reporting but whose al-Qa'ida 

nvolvementwa^ncleai^or example, detainees in mid-2003 helped us build 

a Dist °f individuals—many of whom we had never heard 

of before—that al-Qa'ida deemed suitable for Western operations. We have 

shared this list broadly within the US intelligence and law enforcement 

communities,! 

MI MIL' 11A. II ini I^M^^MII I II NHI 11MI i 

665 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP OECFTE 

• Jafar al-Tayyar first came to FBI's attention when Abu Zubaydah named 

him as one of the most Eikeiy Individuals to be used by al-Qa'ida for 

operations in the United States or Europe. Jafar was further described by 

detainees, whose description of Jafar's family in the United States was key to 

uncovering Jafar's true name. An FBI investigation identified Gulshair El 

Shukrijumah, leader of a mosque in Hollywood, Florida, as having a son named 

Adnan who matched the biographical and physical descriptions given by the 

detainees. A "Be On The Lookout" notice has been issued for Adnan El 

Shukrijumah. 

• Most recently, for example, Abu Faraj al-Libi has revealed that an 

Revealing Plots, Potential Targets (9//NF) 

One of the fail-outs of detaining these additional! terrorists has been the 

unearthing and at least temporary thwarting of a number of al-Qa'ida 

operations in the United States and overseas. 

Possible Nuclear Threat to the United States. In some of the most 

groundbreaking information on al-Qa'ida collected in 2004, detainee Sharif alMasri provided at least 11 intelligence reports on nuclear and biological issues 

related to al-Qa'ida and may have revealed a new nuclear threat to the US 

Homeland associated with al-Qa'ida's key explosives expert Abu 'Abd alRahman al-Muhajir. 

• Sharif's debriefings indicated that he was aware of recent and possibly ongoing 

efforts to mow an unspecified nuclear "bomb" into the United States, possibly 

via Mexico, through his discussion in February 2004 with Muhajir. This 

reporting confirmed and fleshed outreportin g from 2004 about 

a plan to move people into the US through Mexico. The nuclear aspects to the 

threat, howevet^er^iew and confirmed al-Qa'ida's continuing interest in 

WMD. 

Heathrow Airport plot Shortly after his capture in March 2003, KSM divulged 

limited information about his plot to use commercial airliners to attack Heathrow 

Airport and other targets in the United Kingdom; he discussed this plot probably 

because he believed that key Heathrow plotter Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who had 

been detained six months previously, had already revealed the information. 

4 

TOP ocencT NororiNffMn 

666 
UNCLASSIFIED 

mil 11 mi II'III linn i 

• Debriefers used KSM's and Bin al-Shibh's reporting to confront Khallad and 

Ammar al-Baluchi, who were caught two months after KSM. Khallad admitted 

to having been involved in the plot and revealed that he directed group leader 

Hazim al-Sha'ir to begin locating pilots who could hijack planes and crash them 

into the airporM<halfad said he and operative Abu Talha al-Pakistani 

considered I^Hcountrie s as possible launc|^ite^oyh^iijad<inc^^^ 

attemot^jncHhatUiey narrowed the options tojHHMM l 

• Khallad's statements provided leverage tn debriefings of KSM. KSM fleshed 

out the status of the operation, including identifying an additional target in the 

United Kingdbm, Canary Wharf. (S//NO 

Revealing the Karachi plots. When confronted with information provided by alQa'ida senior facilitator Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad admitted during debriefings 

that al-Qa'ida was planning to attack the US Consulate in Karachi, Westerners at 

the Karachi Airport, and Western housing areas. (S//MF) 

Aiding Our Understanding Of Al-Qaida (S//NF) 

The capture and debriefing of detainees has transformed our 

understanding of al-Qa'ida and affiliated terrorist groups, providing 

Increased avenues for sophisticated analysis. Prior to the capture of Abu 

Zubaydah in March 2002, we had large gaps in knowledge of al-Qa'ida's 

organizational structure, key members and associates, intentions and 

capabilities, possible targets for the next attack, and its presence around the 

globe. 

• Within months of his arrest, Abu Zubaydah provided details about alQa'ida's organizational structure, key operatives, and modus operandi. Ot 

also was Abu Zubayda hearty in his detention, who identified KSM as She 

mastermind of 9/11. 

ln the years since 9/11, successive detainees have helped us gauge our 

progress in the fight against aO-Qa'ida by providing updated information on 

the changing structure and health of the organization. 

Hassan Ghul. After his early 2004 capture, Hassan Ghul provided considerable 

intelligence on al-Qa'ida's senior operatives in Waziristan and elsewhemjuhe 

tribal regions of Pakistan. We had fragmentary information|^Pf^|^ | 

Shkafvalle^s^ i 

satehave»Ho^Ri!pHf^mcn!s^ before Ghul's capture; 

however, Ghul's reporting brought instant credibility to all this disparate 

reporting and added minute details to what had previously been a murky, 

nascent picture. Ghul helped us assess that this valley, as of December 2003, 

TOP SECRET/B^I^ H NOFORN//MR 

UNCLASSIFIED 

667 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRETI^^^B^^BrcUFOHW/MH 

was not just one haven for al-Qa'ida in Waziristan, but the home base for alQa'ida in the area and one that al-Qa'ida was reluctant to abandon. 

Ghul—a key al-Qa ida facilitator—(pointed out the location 

:ai valley, Was 

lough we had a body of reporting from clandestine and other 

sources indicating that senior al-Qa'ida targets were congregating in the Shkai 

valley in 2004, Ghul's confirmation and critical narrative helped 

counterterrorism officer 

inedl 

Ghul 

then supplied detailed insight into the nature of their training, the al-Qa'ida 

operatives involved In their grooming, and the location ofiwacilities in Shkai 

where the operatives trained. Hglearned later through debriefings of Abu 

Talha al-Pal^^^^^^^pecnecrui t the Pakistanis—that one of the 

ooeratives. ^^^^^^Hwa s attempting to apply for a US student vis* 

Sharif al-MasrL Sharif al-Masri also provided Invaluable insights in over 150 

disseminated reports that have aided our analysis of al-Qa'ida's current 

organization, the personalities oy^te^nember^in d al-Qa'ida's 

decisionmaking process. 

Various operatives discuss capabilities, including CBRN. Detained al-Qa'ida 

technical experts—some of whom had very focused roles in the organization— 

have provided unique insight into the origins of the group's efforts to develop 

weapons and the technical limitations of key al-Qa'ida personnel—in particular, 

detainees have helped to clarify al-Qa'ida's CBRN program. 

senior al-Qa'ida military trainer Ibn al-Shaykh identified 

-who had been associated with poison training—as the 

individual who conducted experiments with mustard on rabbits and dogs. 

• KSM's reporting advanced our understanding of al-Qa'ida's interest in 

developing a nuclear weapons program, and also revealed important 

information about al-Qa'ida's program to produce anthrax. Me apparently 

calculated incorrectly that we had this information already, given that one of the 

three—Yazid Sufaat—had been in foreign custody 

TOP ^rtnrnJJB^M^ornnnrrrui n 

UNCLASSIFIED 

668 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP QeCRErJ[[[jjjNGronw/Mn -

1 After being confronted with KSM's reporting, Yazid eventually admitted his 

Illuminating Other Collection (S//NF) 

Detainee reporting has allowed us to confirm reporting from clandestine 

ajw^thej^ources^richTial ^ 

»As noted earlier, Abu Faraj—^lQQ^jttmyjfly^ainpes—has begun to flesh 

out threat reporting received •••••^|Hdurin g 2004, including 

tasking to send operatives to tnc^iHne^Jlexic^tna hopes to mount an attack 

prior to the 2004 US Presidential elections. While we are still in the early 

stages of exploiting the full extent of Abu Faraj's knowledge on Homeland 

threats, information he and others have provided has confirmed that efforts 

were underway to mount an attack in the US Homeland beginning in late 2003. 

•Hassan Ghul's disc containing a message from Zarqawi for Bin Ladin about 

Zarqawi's plan in Iraq coupled with Ghul's own reporting brought the 

burgeoning relationship between Zaroawyand al-Qa'ida into clear focus for the 

first time since the US entry into Iraq. 

TOP SECRET<^^MP«IOFORN//MR 

UNCLASSIFIED 

669 
UNCLASSIFIED 

Horonw/Mn 

Detainees Have been particularly useful in sorting out the large volumes of 

documents and computer data seized in raids. Such infommtior^otentiafly 

^ai^^msg^^fifla^raceedina^a^physica l evidence, 

H^HIHII^^^^^^I^ H

 a,s o ca n

 b e use^nrontrontin^ ^ detainees to get them to talk about topics they would otherwise not reveal. 

• For example, lists of names found on Mustafa al-Hawsawi's computer seized 

in March 2003 represented al-Qa'ida members who were to receive money. 

Debriefers questioned detainees extensively on these names to determine 

who they were and how important they were to the organization. This 

information helped us to better understand al-Qa'ida's revenues and 

expenditures, particularly in Pakistan, and money that was available to 

families, 

• The same computer had a list of e-mail addresses for individuals KSM helped 

deploy abroad that he hoped would execute operations; most of these names 

were unknown to us, and we used this informatioryrylebriefings of KSM and 

other detainees to unravel KSM's plots. 

iformatiory^lebrU 

Helping To Validate Other Sources (C//NF) 

Detainee information is a key tool for validating clandestine sources who 

may have reported false information. In one case, the detainee's information 

proved to be the accurate story, and the clandestine source was confronted and 

subsequently admitted to embellishing or fabricating some or all the details in his 

report. 

• Pakistan-based facilitator Janat Gul's most significant reporting helped us 

validate a CIA asset who was providing information about the 2004 pre-election 

threat. The asset claimed that Gul had arranged a meeting between himself 

and al-Qa'ida's chief of finance, Shaykh Sa'id, a claim that Gul vehemently 

denied. 

• Gul's reporting was later matched with information obtained from Sharif al-Masri 

and Abu Talha, captured after Gul. With this reporting in hand, CIA 

|the asset, wh^ubsequently admitted to fabricating his reporting 

about the meeting. 

In other Instances, detainee information has been useful in identifying 

clandestine assets who are providing good reporting. For example^Iassan 

Ghul's reporting on Shkai helped us validate several assets^HBBtfh o also 

told us that al-Qa'ida members had found safehaven at this location. 

8 

TOP 

UNCLASSIFIED 

670 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP SECRET NOFORN//MR 

• Sometimes one detainee validates reporting from others. Sharif corroborated 

Challenges of Detainee Reporting (S//NF) 

I don't want to leave you with the Impression that we do not assess 

detainee reporting with the same critical eye that we would other sources 

of intelligence. Detainees' information must be corroborated using multiple 

sources of Intelligence; uncorroborated information from detainees must 

be regarded) with some degree of suspicion. A detainee is more likely to 

budge if the debriefer, using information from another source, can demonstrate 

that the detainee possesses knowledge of the particular subject. 

• This tendency to reveal information when cornered with facts is one of the 

9 

TOP 8ECRE NOrORIWMn 

UNCLASSIFIED 

671 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP 

<U) APPENDIX III: Email front 

[[REDACTED" 

testing fthesource! and^^^^^Mdate : March! 

^^Uo^^^^^^m i cc: 

[REDACTEPI^BBMBBpubleit : Re: could AQ be testing f the source! and 

date: MarchH200Cat 7:52:32 AM 

subject: could AQ be 

2004. at 06:55 AM: Email from: 

TOP 

UNCLASSIFIED 

672 
UNCLASSIFIED 

Re: eould AQ be tesiin 

ee 

Subject: 

Oat®; 3 

could AO be testing 

/®20O4 7:52:32 AM 

Yes, that occured to me too. I agree w/ your concerns re aa well. It's 

aiwaya_gos5lble that they are just hearing the same "rumint" as well, however, 

>»h®n H^HH^^H^HH^HHBHMHHHMIH I so i 

don't know. But again, I've been a bit conceriredabout^^Koc^ . . 

cc: 

Subject: could AQ be testing! 

1 wa s SIIUC K D Y X N 

jjgnu^j^iMlugne e 

i was struck by thi3 weekend's reporting re an attack or^^ 

te the reported 

J worthless In terms of actionable intelligence, I^HHIH^^ ^ 

contrast, the 17 march 04 AQ statement below makes itexpllc!uTy 

clear that AO has no/no intention of attacking conus before the election; they 

want president bush to stay right where he is. Now, AC knows al l threat 

reporting causes panic in Washington an^tha^^^leak^soon afte r it is 

received -- as will the reports fthi s weekend — and 

this would be an easy way to test| 

this to say HHHHHHHrilHIIII^HHI^^^IIIIil wron 9'

 o c 

statement below is anything more than disinformation, the 

|rsports and the AQ statement, however, caught my eye. 

A word to the idiot Bush[0] 

He know you live the worst days of your lif e in fear of the brigades of 

death that ruined 

your life . We tel l you we axe ai l keen that you do not lose the forthcoming 

elections. 

Ha are aware that any large-scale operation will destroy your government but we 

do not 

want this to happen. Se will not find a person dumber[0) than you. You 

adopt force 

rather than wisdom and shrewdness. Yds, your stupidity and religious 

fanaticism is what 

we want because our nation will not wake up from its sleep unless an enemy 

emerges 

that lie s in wait for the nation. Actually, there is no difference between 

1 of 2 5/28/201* 10:00 PM 

UNCLASSIFIED 

673 
UNCLASSIFIED 

Re: could AQ be testir 

you and 

I Democratic presidential candidate John] Kerry. Kerry will take our nation 

unawares arxl 

Kill it- Kerry and the Democrats possess enough deception to give a face-lift 

to atheism 

and convince the Arab and Islamic nation to support i t in the name of 

modern!zation. 

Therefore, we are very keen that you, criminal Bush(01, will win the upcoming 

elections. ' 

2 of 2 5/28/2014 10:00 PM 
UNCLASSIFIE D 

T o r SECRET! I//NOFORN 

(U) APPENDIX IV: CIA, Office of General Counsel draft Legal Appendix; Paragraph 5 -

HostUe Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers, November 26,2002 

- K M 

UNCLASSIFIE D 

675 
UNCLASSIFIED 

D-R-A-F-T -

26 November 2001 @ 1600 

I. U.S. federal law makes it a crime for a U.S. citizen to torture someone both al home and 

abroad, even when directed to do so by superiors. 

A. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340 - 2340B implements the United Nations Coil veution Against Torture 

and Other Ciruel, Inhumane, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and incorporates 

vert>atUn the definition of "torture" from that treaty; namely, the Convention defines 

torture as "an act committed by a person acting under color of law specifically intended 

to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering," where "severe mental suffering" is 

further defined as "the prolonged mental harm resulting from" either causing or 

threatening infliction of severe physical pain; the administration or threat of 

administration of mind-altering drugs; the threat of imminent death; or threatening to do 

the above to someone else. 

B. Use of necessity as a defense toprosecution in a U.S. court 

1. Israel's Supreme Court has recognized that government officials who are prosecuted 

for torture may use the affirmative defense of necessity—i.e., "for the purpose of. 

saving the life, liberty, body or property, of either himself or his fellow person, from 

substantial clanger of serious barm, imminent from the particular state of things 

, (circumstances), at the requisite timing, and absent alternative means for avoiding the 

harm."3 That is, a government officer can avoid criminal prosecution if the torture 

was necessary (o prevent a danger "certain to materialize" and when no other means 

of preventing the harm are available. 

2. The niling, however, specifically notes that although necessity can be used as &post 

factum defense, it cannot serve as a source of positive, ab initio authority for (be 

systemic (even if rare) use of torture as a valid interrogation tool. 

3. The U.S. Code does not contain a statutory necessity defense provision, but U.S. 

common law has recognized an analogous doctrine: 

• State v. Marlev. 509 P.Td 1095,1097< 1973): Defendants were charged with 

criminal trespass on the property of Honeywell Corporation in Honolulu. They 

argued that they were seeking to stop the Vietnam War and raised as one of their 

defenses the "necessity defense." The court stated: 

The "necessity defense" exonerates persons who commit a crime 

under the pressure of circumstances if the harm that would have 

3

 H.C. 5100/94, 4054/95,6536/95,5188/96,7563/97,7628/97,1043/99. 

5 

D-R-A-F- T 

26 November 2001 # 1600 

in HI 111 mi iM^^^^^ M 

UNCLASSIFIED 

676 
UNCLASSIFIED 

TOP accaE'ft^^^^^^^^^MB- -

D-R-A-P- T 

26 November 20M ® 1600 

resulted front compliance with the law would have significantly 

exceeded die harm actually resulting fiom the defendant's breach of 

the law. Successful use of the "necessity defense" requires (a) that 

there is no third and legal alternative available, (b) that the harm to 

be prevented be imminent, and (c) that * direct, causal relationship 

be reasonable anticipated to exist between defendant's action and the 

avoidance of harm. 

Although the Marley court decided the necessity defense was not 

available to these particular defendants, the standard they set out is the 

norm. 

• In United States v Seward 68? F.2d 1270,1275 {10* Cir. 1982) (en 

banc), cert, denied. 459 U.S. 1147 (1983), the court held that a defendant 

may successfully use a defense of necessity to excuse otherwise illegal 

acts if (1) there is no legal alternative to violating the law, <2) the harm to 

be prevented is imminent, and (3) a direct, causal relationship is 

reasonable anticipated to exist between defendant's action and the 

• avoidance of harm. Under the defense of necessity, "one principle 

remains constant: if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to violating 

the law, 'a chance both to refuse Do do the criminal act and also to avoid 

the threatened harm,' the defense [] will fail," Id. at 1276, quoting United 

Slates v. Bai(ev. 444 U.S. 394 ((980). fo proving that there were no 

legal alternatives available to assist him, a defendant must show he was 

"confronted with ... a crisis which did not permit a selection from among 

several solutions, some of which did not involve criminal acts." Id. 

• See also United-States v. Contento-Pachon. 723 F.2d69l. 695 n.2 iff" 

Cir. 1984) (defense of necessity available when person faced with a 

choice of two evils and must decide whether to commit a crime or an 

alternative act that constitutes a greater evil); United States v. Nolan. 700 

F.2d 479,484 (9* Cir.) (the necessity defense requires a showing that the 

defendant acted to prevent an imminent harm which no available options 

coutd similarly prevent). 

• In suns: U.S. courts have not yet considered the necessity defense in the contcxt 

of torture/murdcfr/assault cases, primarily because in cases whtere one or two 

individuals were hurt out of necessity, this was treated as a self-defense analysis. 

See Tab 2, supra. It would, therefore, be a novel application of the necessity 

defense to avoid prosecution of U.S. officials who tortured to obtain information 

that saved many lives; however, if we follow the Israeli example, CIA could 

argue (hat the torture was necessary to prevent imminent, significant, physical 

harm to persons, where there is no other available means to pre vent the harm. 

6 

O-R-A-F- T 

26 November MM @ 1600 

inn1 LIHI in 

UNCLASSIFIED 

677 
UNCLASSIFIED 

SECRET//NOFORN 

Minority Views by Senator Coburn, 

Vice Chairman Saxby Chambliss, Senators Burr, Risch, Coats and Rubio 

(U) As parts of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) "Committee 

Study of the Interrogation and Detention Program" (hereafter, the "Study") become 

declassified, it is our hope that, in addition to these and the other Minority views, 

the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) response of June, 2013 also be declassified. 

Interested and objective readers will be able to balance these various views as they 

make their own assessments of the flaws, errors, initiatives and value of the CIA's 

detention and interrogation program conducted and terminated in the previous 

decade. 

(S//NF) For those who hold already set views, they may or may not be surprised 

that the CIA agreed with a number of the Study's findings, at least in part, although 

the CIA disagreed, in substance, with the core assertions of the Study: that the 

interrogation program provided little valuable intelligence and that the CIA 

misrepresented the program to the White House, other executive agencies, the 

Congress and the public (through the media). 

(U) As stated in the Minority views and the CIA response, so only briefly 

reiterated here, the methodology for the Study was inherently flawed. A SSCI 

investigation of this depth and importance requires that, in addition to a document 

review, interviews with participants and managers be conducted. This standard 

approach was included in the terms of reference that established the Study in 

March, 2009. For a recent and relevant example, the SSCI's investigation into the 

intelligence failures regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, "U.S. 

Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq," (July, 2004), 

was based on Committee interviews with more than 200 intelligence community 

(IC) officers, including analysts and senior officials, in addition to a review of tens 

of thousands of documents. Some of those individuals were interviewed up to 4 

times, as Committee staff worked to reconcile the complex documentary record 

with the perspectives of those involved in the analytic production. (That report, 

when published, was supported unanimously by the Committee, 15-0. This is 

significant in that properly performed reviews tend to gain bipartisan approval.) 

(COMMITTEE SENSITIVE) In addition, no Committee hearings were 

conducted with members of the IC once the Study was initiated in 2009 until it was 

first voted out of Committee in 2012. In sum, a massive (but still incomplete) 

outlay of documents was reviewed in isolation (outside of Committee spaces), 

SEGRET//NOFOISN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

678 
UNCLASSIFIED 

-SE.CRET//NOFOSNwithout the benefit of interpretation or perspective provided by the actual 

participants in the program. 

(COMMITTEE SENSITIVE) Perhaps if such interviews had occurred, the 

authors of the Study would have had better exposure to the analytic processes that 

underpin a global collection program that sought, in response to the attacks of 9/11, 

to assemble an analytic picture of a poorly understood global terrorism network, alQa'ida. Thousands of analysts worked with the reports that were derived from the 

interrogations (most of which were conducted without the use of enhanced 

interrogation procedures) and thousands of analytic products were generated to 

build an understanding of the terror organization that attacked us on September 11, 

2001, To read the Committee Study, the reader could conclude that majority of 

those analysts did not properly understand their profession and their products were 

flawed. That conclusion would be false. 

(U) A fundamental fact is missing from the point of departure for the Study: For 

any nation to respond to an attack by an insurgency, terrorist organization or armed 

group, the primary source of human intelligence will be detainee reporting. The 

CIA's program, improvised in its early stages because the CIA had no established 

protocols to draw on, sought to build the capacity to gather this intelligence by 

creating a global information network where the intelligence gained from 

interrogations around the world could be assessed, corroborated and challenged by 

analysts working in real-time to better develop an intelligence picture of a very real 

threat whose dimensions and direction were unknown to us. 

(U) How detainee reporting is collected - through what protocols of interrogation 

~ is the challenge that every nation, and, in particular, nations bound by the rule of 

law, must answer. This fundamental question is not addressed in the Study. 

(U) Instead, the most adamant supporters of the Study have declared that the effect 

of this Study will be that the abuses they assess occurred will never happen again. 

This is an odd conclusion, in that the CIA's interrogation program was ended in the 

last decade, and President Obama's Executive Orders put in place measures and 

procedures that clearly indicate the program would not be reconstituted. If the 

point of the Study was to end something the supporters of the Study wanted to 

terminate, the objective was achieved before the Study began. 

(U) But if the point of the Study is to ensure that abuses assessed by the supporters 

of the Study never occur again, the Study made no contribution to ensuring this 

because it failed to offer recommendations for lawful interrogation protocols for 

SECRET/mOrORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

679 
UNCLASSIFIED 

SECRET//NOFORN 

the collection of detainee intelligence in the future. Even more striking than the 

fact that the Study was completed without conducting interviews is the complete 

absence of any recommendations, recommendations that could provide meaningful 

guideposts for the future. 

(U) There is a cycle that can be observed in democracies fighting armed groups 

and relying upon detainee intelligence gained from interrogation. It is a cycle that 

has occurred in democracies throughout the last century and, in fact, throughout 

American history.1 An episode of national security crisis is responded to with 

urgency and frenzy, and the detention cycle begins. The early stage of the cycle is 

usually when the instances of brutality may occur. Over time, interrogation 

protocols are reconciled with the rule of law (and practicality, as brutality does not 

guarantee good intelligence). A consideration of American, British and Israeli 

history - to cite three examples of democratic societies - provides examples of this 

cycle in each country. 

(S//NF) That this cycle can repeat reflects an apparent weakness in democracies, 

including our own, in their inability to process and retain "lessons learned." We 

have certainly seen this elsewhere in the national security sphere - how our various 

national security institutions have "forgotten," for example, counterinsurgency 

theory, public diplomacy, and covert influence practices. 

(U) This Study has many flaws, articulated in the other Minority views and the 

CIA response. To that we would add is the failure to extract "lessons learned," in 

the form of recommendations that provide insights into which interrogation 

techniques work in gathering foreign intelligence and are consistent with rule-oflaw principles. This knowledge, were it to be captured and held in doctrine, would 

provide the tools for this nation as it continues to face threats from terrorist 

organization or other armed group overseas. Only in this way could the intent of 

"never again" be in fact ensured. 

(U) The Study provided no such recommendations for the future. Instead it is a 

partisan prosecutor's brief against history. It is a 6,000 page exercise in the 

rhetorical trope of synecdoche, where a part - in this case, the most egregious 

abuses, such as waterboarding - is substituted for the whole - in this case, the 

entire CIA detention and interrogation program, most of which did not rely on 

. Dr Coburn is grateful to have had access to United States Detention Policy in Counterterrorism and 

Counterinsurgency Operations: 200J to 201 /.particularly chapter 1, "Detention in US History from 1775 to 2000," 

Dr. Ahmed Qureshi, unpublished thesis submitted for the Degree of Philosophy (PhD), Kings College, University of 

London, 2013, 

SECRET//NOFORN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

680 
UNCLASSIFIED 

SECRET//NOFORN 

enhanced interrogation techniques and most of which provided the intelligence 

picture of al-Qai'da in the first decade of the 2181 century. We caution any reader 

of the Study against ever concluding that the threats of today and tomorrow can be 

addressed without the value of detainee intelligence that provided this picture of alQa'ida that allows us to prevail against it in the second decade of the 21st

 century. 

SECRE17/1MUI1 URN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

681 
UNCLASSIFIED 

MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATORS RISCH, COATS, AND RUBIO 

(U) As the only two members of both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), and as a former U.S. Ambassador to Germany, 

we maintain a unique perspective on declassification of the Study as it pertains to U.S. foreign 

policy and the security of U.S. embassies and consulates overseas. That perspective was further 

informed by the Department of State's intelligence chief, who warned the SSCI in 2013 that 

declassification could endanger U.S. personnel and jeopardize U.S. relations with other 

countries. This warning was particularly significant following the Benghazi terrorist attacks, 

which serve as a fresh reminder of the enormous risk facing U.S. embassies and consulates 

overseas. As a result, we voted against declassification of the Study. 

U.S. Foreign Policy Considerations 

letter frOTT^^^^^^H^^^SpMipGoldber g regarding the potential declassification 

of the Study. The letter raised two "significant State Department equities" pertaining to foreign 

policy concerns and the security of diplomatic facilities. With respect to foreign policy concerns, 

the letter states: 

If the report is declassified or disclosed without appropriate preparation or precautions, it 

could negatively impact foreign relations with multiple U.S. allies and partners who have 

participated in or have had nationals involved in the detention and interrogation program. 

Even with some country names redacted, context and publicly available information 

make it possible to identify some specific countries and facilities. Many of these 

countries cooperated with the United States on this program based on the understanding 

that their involvement would not be publicly disclosed. Publicly acknowledging their 

roles at this stage would have significant implications for our bilateral relationships and 

future cooperation on a variety of national security priorities, and could impact our 

relationships with countries even beyond those involved in the program. Should the 

report be declassified or released in any form, the Department would request notice well 

These concerns were not limited to the U.S. Department of State. Multiple diplomatic envoys 

posted in Washington raised similar concerns with us individually. 

Diplomatic Security 

With respect to the security of diplomatic facilities, 

the letter states: "With heightened threats and ongoing instability in the Middle East, North 

Africa, and elsewhere, the release of this report has the potential to provoke additional 

demonstrations against U.S. interests and to increase targeting of U.S. missions and U.S. citizens 

around the globe." In the days leading up to the SSCI vote to declassify the Study, the Minority 

UNCLASSIFIED 

682 
UNCLASSIFIED 

also contacted the White House to obtain their views on this issue. The Minority learned that at 

the time of the vote to declassify the Study, the Executive Branch was already developing 

security upgrades at various diplomatic facilities to coincide with the expected release of the 

Study. This fact was confirmed in a letter the SSCI received on April 18,2014, from White 

House Counsel Kathryn Ruemmler. This letter stated: "Prior to the release of any information 

related to the former RDI program, the Administration will also need to take a series of security 

steps to prepare our personnel and facilities overseas." 

Conclusion 

(U) While we generally support efforts to provide the American public with as much 

information as possible, our experiences and the stark warnings provided by the Department of 

State, the White House, and foreign diplomats serving in Washington made a compelling case to 

keep this material classified. We hope and pray the declassification process does not jeopardize 

the safety and security of the men and women who serve our country overseas or U.S. foreign 

policy. Ultimately, we could not take the risk to vote to declassify the Study, especially given 

our shared concerns for the utility of the underlying process and report. 

UNCLASSIFIED 

683