J-S25036-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ROBERT LELLOCK 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 657 WDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 7, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0013778-2012

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ROBERT LELLOCK 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 659 WDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 7, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0003936-2013

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 14, 2022

Appellant, Robert Lellock, appeals from the order entered in the 

Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed in part his petition 

filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm. 

____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 
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Appellant worked as a school police officer in Pittsburgh. During the 

course of his employment, he sexually abused multiple boys. The PCRA court 

opinion set forth the remaining procedural history of this appeal as follows: 

On July 29, 2013, a jury found [Appellant] guilty [of 

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”) and multiple 

counts of endangering the welfare of a child (“EWOC”),

corruption of minors, and indecent assault at two different 

docket numbers]. The [court] sentenced Appellant to an 

aggregate term of incarceration of 32-64 years and found 

him to be a sexually violent predator. Judgment of sentence 

was affirmed on appeal, but the Superior Court of 

Pennsylvania remanded the case for resentencing, finding 

that the imposition of a mandatory sentence was illegal. 

[The trial court] resentenced [Appellant] to the same 

sentence, without the mandatory sentence, on July 21, 

2016. This sentence was affirmed on August 16, 2017. 

In 2017, appointed counsel filed an amended PCRA petition 

and in 2018 the Commonwealth conceded a sentencing 

issue on two counts of [EWOC]. On January 2[8], 2019, 

just before retiring, [the trial jurist] granted a resentencing 

hearing on the EWOC [convictions] and denied the rest of 

the PCRA. The case was reassigned to [the current jurist]. 

Next, counsel for Appellant filed a motion to reconsider, and 

Appellant filed a pro se motion for a Grazier[2] hearing. 

[The PCRA court] granted both motions and ordered 

Appellant to refile a PCRA [petition] and raise all issues 

therein. Appellant complied and the Commonwealth 

answered. [The PCRA court] reviewed the record, issued a 

notice of intent to dismiss the non-sentencing related 

issues, and scheduled a resentence[ing] hearing. Appellant 

filed motions to amend and to stay, which [the PCRA court]

granted. On [August 26], 2020, Appellant filed an amended 

PCRA [petition]. The Commonwealth responded that claims 

of ineffective assistance of counsel at claims 1-8 and 10-12 

were without merit, and claim 13 of cumulative prejudice 

was also meritless. Claim 9 is a time credit issue wherein 

____________________________________________

2 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 552 Pa. 9, 713 A.2d 81 (1998). 
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the Commonwealth believes [Appellant] is entitled to three 

additional days. Appellant had been given credit from 

9/12/12-12/18/12, but had not been released from custody 

until 12/21/12. 

[On May 4, 2021, the court resentenced Appellant on some 

of the counts pursuant to the original trial jurist’s 2019 

order.] On May 7, 2021, [the PCRA court] dismissed claims 

1-8 and 10-13 [and] granted the three-day time credit....

(PCRA Court Opinion, filed 7/28/21, at 2-3) (some capitalization omitted). 

On June 1, 2021, Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal from 

the order denying PCRA relief.

3

 Appellant voluntarily filed a pro se Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal on June 28, 

2021. 

Appellant now raises seven issues for our review: 

The PCRA court abused its discretion when it dismissed 

without a hearing on Appellant’s claim that trial counsel 

gave ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to fully 

develop and argue that the amendments that extended the 

criminal statute of limitations were illegal and the holding 

that allowed them [was] erroneously decided. 

The PCRA court abused its discretion when it dismissed 

without a hearing on Appellant’s claim that trial counsel and 

appellate [counsel] gave ineffective assistance of counsel 

when they failed to properly raise, argue, and brief that the 

prosecution on twelve of the counts that Appellant was 

facing at trial [was] time-barred by the criminal statute of 

____________________________________________

3 More specifically, Appellant filed separate pro se notices of appeal at each 

underlying docket number from the order denying PCRA relief. Appellant also 

filed separate pro se notices of appeal at each underlying docket number from 

the new judgment of sentence imposed following the resentencing hearing. 

This Court docketed the appeals related to the resentencing hearing at 658 

and 660 WDA 2021. This Court subsequently consolidated each set of appeals 

sua sponte. 
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limitations. 

The PCRA court abused its discretion when it dismissed 

without a hearing on Appellant’s claim that trial counsel 

gave ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to 

raise, argue, and brief this claim of pre-arrest delay. 

The PCRA court abused its discretion when it dismissed 

without a hearing on Appellant’s claim that trial counsel 

gave ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to 

properly object, raise, argue, and litigate that several jury 

instructions were legally deficient when charged to the jury. 

The PCRA court abused its discretion when it dismissed 

without a hearing on Appellant’s claim that trial counsel and 

appellate counsel #2 gave ineffective assistance of counsel 

when they failed to properly object, raise, argue, litigate, 

and brief that Appellant was illegally labeled as a sexually 

violent predator. 

The PCRA court abused its discretion when it dismissed 

without a hearing on Appellant’s claim that appellate 

counsel #3 gave ineffective assistance of counsel when she 

failed to raise that Appellant being sentenced under [the Sex 

Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”)] was 

illegal and that SORNA II cannot apply to Appellant’s case. 

The PCRA court abused its discretion when it dismissed 

without a hearing on Appellant’s claim that all [counsel]

gave ineffective assistance of counsel throughout all phases 

of Appellant’s case. 

(Appellant’s Brief at 4-5).

“Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to 

examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s determination 

and whether its decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Beatty, 

207 A.3d 957, 960-61 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 655 Pa. 482, 218 

A.3d 850 (2019). “[W]e review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” 
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Commonwealth v. Prater, 256 A.3d 1274, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal 

denied, ___ Pa. ___, 268 A.3d 386 (2021). 

Appellant’s first two issues are related, and we address them together. 

Appellant argues that a two-year statute of limitations applied for twelve of 

the offenses at issue, the statute of limitations had expired by the time that 

the Commonwealth brought the charges, and that the trial court should have 

dismissed the relevant counts. Appellant acknowledges that trial counsel 

raised the statute of limitations issue in a pretrial motion. Appellant insists, 

however, that the pretrial motion was inadequate. Additionally, Appellant 

notes that our legislature amended the relevant statutes of limitations after 

Appellant’s offenses but before the Commonwealth brought the charges. 

Appellant asserts that the amended version of the statutes should not have 

applied to his case. 

Appellant acknowledges Commonwealth v. Johnson, 520 Pa. 165, 

553 A.2d 897 (1989) and Commonwealth v. Harvey, 542 A.2d 1027

(Pa.Super. 1988), holding that when a new limitations period is enacted and 

the prior period has not yet expired, the longer statute will apply to an action. 

Nevertheless, Appellant maintains these cases were erroneously decided and

“his argument proves that his Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1, Section 

9 constitutional rights were violated by the government’s arbitrary actions 

against him and others like him.” (Appellant’s Brief at 19). Appellant 

concludes trial counsel was ineffective for filing an inadequate pretrial motion
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and failing to challenge the amendment of the statute of limitations. We 

disagree. 

“Counsel is presumed to have rendered effective assistance.” 

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal 

denied, ___ Pa. ___, 242 A.3d 908 (2020). 

[T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, 

ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances 

of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining 

process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence 

could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to 

prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying 

claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no 

reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; 

and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is 

a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 

proceedings would have been different. 

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2019), 

appeal denied, 654 Pa. 568, 216 A.3d 1029 (2019) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for 

ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612 

Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111 (2011). 

“The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the 

issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis 

for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit[.]” Commonwealth 

v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 788 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal denied, 645 Pa. 175, 

179 A.3d 6 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524, 

645 A.2d 189, 194 (1994)). “Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing 
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to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 

852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Geathers, 

847 A.2d 730, 733 (Pa.Super. 2004)). 

“Once this threshold is met we apply the ‘reasonable basis’ test to 

determine whether counsel’s chosen course was designed to effectuate his 

client’s interests.” Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1012 

(Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95). 

The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable

basis for his action or inaction is whether no competent 

counsel would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the 

alternative, not chosen, offered a significantly greater 

potential chance of success. Counsel’s decisions will be 

considered reasonable if they effectuated his client’s 

interests. We do not employ a hindsight analysis in 

comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he may 

have taken. 

Commonwealth v. King, 259 A.3d 511, 520 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting 

Sandusky, supra at 1043-44). 

“To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 

of the proceedings would have been different. [A] reasonable probability is a 

probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the 

proceeding.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 624 Pa. 4, 33-34, 84 A.3d 294, 312 

(2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[A] criminal 

defendant alleging prejudice must show that counsel’s errors were so serious 

as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” 
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Hopkins, supra at 876 (quoting Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3, 

22, 807 A.2d 872, 883 (2002)). 

Regarding the effect of amendments on statutes of limitations, 

Pennsylvania law states: 

§ 1975. Effect of repeal on limitations

Whenever a limitation or period of time, prescribed in any 

statute for acquiring a right or barring a remedy, or for any 

other purpose, has begun to run before a statute repealing 

such statute takes effect, and the same or any other 

limitation is prescribed in any other statute passed by the 

same General Assembly, the time which has already run 

shall be deemed part of the time prescribed as such 

limitation in such statute passed by the General Assembly. 

1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1975. 

In interpreting this statute, this Court noted that, “when a new period 

of limitations is enacted, and the prior period of limitations has not yet expired, 

in the absence of language in the statute to the contrary, the period of time 

accruing under the prior statute of limitations shall be applied to calculation 

of the new period of limitations.” Harvey, supra at 1029-30. Our Supreme 

Court has also explained that “[t]here is nothing retroactive about the 

application of an extension of a statute of limitations, so long as the original 

statutory period has not yet expired.” Johnson, supra at 170, 553 A.2d at

900 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Instantly, trial counsel raised the statute of limitations issue in omnibus 

pretrial motions. At docket No. 3936 of 2012, trial counsel argued that three 

of the criminal counts expired in 2008 and four counts expired in 2011. (See
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Omnibus Pretrial Motion, filed 5/1/13, at ¶¶15, 18, 23). At docket No. 13778 

of 2012, trial counsel argued that six of the criminal counts expired in 2008

and ten counts expired in 2011. (See Omnibus Pretrial Motion, filed 1/3/13,

at ¶¶15, 18, 23). The court evaluated the pretrial motions and denied relief. 

On direct appeal, this Court also considered Appellant’s statute of limitations 

claims and determined that the Commonwealth timely filed the charges. See 

Commonwealth v. Lellock, No. 2021 WDA 2013, unpublished memorandum 

at 4, n. 2 (Pa.Super. filed Apr. 23, 2015). 

Considering this procedural history, the PCRA court found that Appellant 

could not satisfy the arguable merit prong of the test for ineffectiveness 

because trial counsel raised the issue in a pretrial motion, argued it at a 

hearing, and the trial court did not grant relief. (See PCRA Court Opinion at 

5). We discern no legal error in the PCRA court’s conclusion, and we reiterate 

that it would be improper to relitigate this issue in hindsight where the record 

supports the conclusion that trial counsel adequately raised a statute of 

limitations defense. See Beatty, supra; King, supra. Moreover, Appellant

offers no relevant authority to support his own self-serving conclusion that 

Harvey and Johnson were erroneously decided. In light of this relevant case 

law, the amendment of the statutes of limitations at issue did not prevent the 

Commonwealth from bringing the charges in this case. Based upon the 

foregoing, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his first two claims. 

In his third issue, Appellant argues that there was an impermissible 
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period of pre-arrest delay after the commission of the offenses. Appellant 

claims that the pre-arrest delay left him unable to obtain critical evidence that 

would have helped him to establish an alibi. Although the PCRA court 

determined that this claim lacked arguable merit, Appellant maintains that the

PCRA court improperly relied on a plurality decision of the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court. To the extent that the court also found that the pre-arrest 

delay was due to delayed reporting by the victims, Appellant contends that

the record does not support this finding. Appellant concludes that trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to challenge the pre-arrest delay. We disagree. 

“The constitutional right to due process ... protects defendants from 

having to defend stale charges, and criminal charges should be dismissed if 

improper pre-arrest delay causes prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair 

trial.” Commonwealth v. Snyder, 552 Pa. 44, 51-52, 713 A.2d 596, 599-

600 (1998). In Snyder, our Supreme Court determined that “our due process 

inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay and whether it resulted in 

actual prejudice to the accused.” Id. at 60, 713 A.2d at 604. The Court also 

noted: 

This Court recognizes that murder prosecutions often come 

to fruition after many years of investigation. We do not 

intend to limit the power of the Commonwealth to prosecute 

a murderer if and when an investigation yields new evidence 

after many years of inactivity. However, if no additional 

evidence appears, the delay results in actual prejudice to 

the defendant, and there are no proper reasons for 

postponing the defendant’s arrest, the due process clauses 

of the Constitutions of the United States and Pennsylvania 

require that the charges be dismissed. 
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Id. at 62, 713 A.2d at 605. 

The Court later attempted to elaborate on this standard in a plurality 

opinion.4 See Commonwealth v. Scher, 569 Pa. 284, 803 A.2d 1204 (2002) 

(plurality). In Scher, the lead opinion stated:

“[T]he defendant must first show that the delay caused him 

actual prejudice, that is, substantially impaired his or her 

ability to defend against the charges. The court must then 

examine all of the circumstances to determine the validity 

of the Commonwealth’s reasons for the delay. Only in 

situations where the evidence shows that the delay 

was the product of intentional, bad faith, or reckless 

conduct by the prosecution, however, will we find a 

violation of due process.” 

Id. at 313, 803 A.2d at 1221 (emphasis added) (internal footnote omitted). 

Nevertheless, the concurring opinions presented divergent views on the 

standard applicable to the Commonwealth’s actions. 

This Court subsequently evaluated the divergent views set forth in

Scher. See Commonwealth v. Wright, 865 A.2d 894, 900-01 (Pa.Super. 

2004). Consequently, we utilized the standard set forth in Snyder, supra,

which established that a pre-arrest delay constitutes a due process violation 

“where there has occurred ‘actual prejudice to the defendant’ and there 

____________________________________________

4 “In cases where a concurring opinion enumerates the portions of the 

plurality’s opinion in which the author joins or disagrees, those portions of the 

agreement gain precedential value.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 

544, 556 (Pa.Super. 2011). “Where, ... however, the concurrence does not 

explicitly state its agreement or disagreement with the plurality, we must look 

to the substance of the concurrence to determine the extent to which it 

provides precedential value to points of agreement.” Id. 
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existed ‘no proper reasons for postponing the defendant’s arrest.’” Wright, 

supra at 901 (quoting Snyder, supra at 62, 713 A.2d at 605). 

Instantly, Appellant’s PCRA petition included an exhibit to demonstrate

that the Commonwealth could have brought its charges against Appellant 

sooner. Specifically, Appellant submitted a supplemental police report from 

the City of Pittsburgh Bureau of Police, dated August 28, 2012. (See Amended 

PCRA Petition, filed 8/26/20, at Ex. C-11).5 The report stated that law 

enforcement received an email from a counselor at a youth development 

center, which indicated that one victim, S.L., made a disclosure about 

Appellant’s sexual abuse in 2005. The supplemental police report quoted a 

portion of the youth counselor’s intake report summarizing the victim’s 

disclosure. The report also stated that the counselor contacted the state police 

in 2005, and a trooper subsequently took a statement from the victim. 

Here, the supplemental report does not provide any information about 

the victim’s statement to the trooper, and it does not indicate whether the 

trooper ever contacted Pittsburgh police about the disclosure. The 

supplemental report also fails to mention the other victims at issue in this case 

and the respective dates of their disclosures. On this record, we cannot accept

Appellant’s conclusion that the Commonwealth lacked any proper reason for 

the pre-arrest delay. Instead, we note that the PCRA court properly evaluated

____________________________________________

5 Although the report stated that it is four pages long, Appellant included only 

one page with his petition. 
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the record and determined that the victims’ delay in pursuing their disclosures

excused the pre-arrest delay. See Snyder, supra; Wright, supra. This 

analysis is free of legal error, and it supports the court’s determination that 

Appellant’s claim lacked arguable merit. See Beatty, supra. Therefore, 

Appellant is not entitled to relief on his third claim. 

In his fourth issue, Appellant raises various challenges to the trial court’s 

jury instructions. Specifically, Appellant questions the accuracy of the 

instructions regarding: 1) reasonable doubt; 2) evaluation of a defendant’s 

character; 3) proof of date of the crimes; and 4) impeachment of witnesses 

with prior convictions. Appellant complains that the court provided legally 

deficient jury instructions that did not adequately present the law to the jury. 

With respect to the reasonable doubt instruction, Appellant asserts that 

the court incorrectly stated, “[t]o summarize, you find the defendant guilty on 

mere suspicion.” (Appellant’s Brief at 31). Appellant indicates that the court 

should have stated, “you may not find the defendant guilty on mere 

suspicion.” (Id.) For these reasons, Appellant maintains that the court 

provided the jury with the incorrect standard of proof. 

For the jury instruction regarding evaluation of a defendant’s character, 

Appellant asserts that the court failed to provide the correct standard of proof 

and omitted an unspecified portion of the jury instruction. Appellant also 

believes that the instruction should have stated that Appellant is a nonviolent 

individual. For the date of crime instruction, Appellant again asserts that the 
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court failed to provide the correct standard of proof. Regarding the instruction 

on the impeachment of a witness with a prior conviction, Appellant claims that 

the jury did not have information regarding which witnesses had prior 

convictions, when the convictions occurred, and the offenses at issue. 

Appellant maintains that trial counsel had no reasonable basis for failing 

to object to these instructions. Appellant also argues that counsel’s inaction 

caused him to suffer prejudice because he was “convicted on all counts and 

the record does not show that [the convictions were] beyond a reasonable 

doubt as required by the constitution.” (Id. at 34). Based upon the foregoing, 

Appellant concludes that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 

the jury instructions at issue. We disagree. 

This Court has set forth the relevant standard for jury instructions as 

follows:

A trial court has wide discretion in phrasing jury instructions. 

When reviewing an allegation of an incorrect jury 

instruction, the appellate court must view the entire charge 

to determine whether the trial court clearly and accurately 

presented the concepts of the legal issue to the jury and 

should not reverse, as a result of the instruction, unless the 

trial court committed an abuse of its discretion. We will not 

examine a phrase or sentence of an instruction in a vacuum. 

Rather, when we evaluate a challenge to a charge, we must 

consider how each part fits together to convey a complete 

legal principle. 

Geathers, supra at 733 (quoting Commonwealth v. Ragan, 560 Pa. 106, 

743 A.2d 390, 397-98 (1999)). See also Commonwealth v. Lesko, 609 

Pa. 128, 216, 15 A.3d 345, 397 (2008) (reiterating that charge, “as a whole,”
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must be considered; court has broad discretion in phrasing instructions, so 

long as directions given “clearly, adequately, and accurately” reflect law). 

Regarding reasonable doubt, Pennsylvania’s Suggested Standard 

Criminal Jury Instructions provide as follows:

A fundamental principle of our system of criminal law is that 

the defendant is presumed to be innocent. The mere fact 

that [he] [she] was arrested and is accused of a crime is not 

any evidence against [him] [her]. Furthermore, the 

defendant is presumed innocent throughout the trial and 

unless and until you conclude, based on careful and 

impartial consideration of the evidence, that the 

Commonwealth has proven [him] [her] guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

It is not the defendant’s burden to prove that [he] [she] is 

not guilty. Instead, it is the Commonwealth that always has 

the burden of proving each and every element of the crime 

charged and that the defendant is guilty of that crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The person accused of a crime 

is not required to present evidence or prove anything in his 

or her own defense [except with respect to the defense of 

[type of defense], which I will discuss later]. If the 

Commonwealth’s evidence fails to meet its burden, then 

your verdict must be not guilty. On the other hand, if the 

Commonwealth’s evidence does prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the defendant is guilty, then your verdict should 

be guilty. 

Although the Commonwealth has the burden of proving that 

the defendant is guilty, this does not mean that the 

Commonwealth must prove its case beyond all doubt and to 

a mathematical certainty, nor must it demonstrate the 

complete impossibility of innocence. A reasonable doubt is 

a doubt that would cause a reasonably careful and sensible 

person to hesitate before acting upon a matter of 

importance in his or her own affairs. A reasonable doubt 

must fairly arise out of the evidence that was presented or 

out of the lack of evidence presented with respect to some 

element of the crime. A reasonable doubt must be a real 

doubt; it may not be an imagined one, nor may it be a doubt 
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manufactured to avoid carrying out an unpleasant duty. 

So, to summarize, you may not find the defendant guilty 

based on a mere suspicion of guilt. The Commonwealth has 

the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. If it meets that burden, then the 

defendant is no longer presumed innocent and you should 

find [him] [her] guilty. On the other hand, if the 

Commonwealth does not meet its burden, then you must 

find [him] [her] not guilty. 

Pa.SSJI (Crim) 7.01 (internal numbering omitted). 

In Commonwealth v. Reid, ___ Pa. ___, 259 A.3d 395 (2021), our 

Supreme Court addressed a similar issue regarding a reasonable doubt

instruction. Specifically, the appellant complained that the trial court 

inaccurately informed the jury that “the Commonwealth is not bound to prove 

the case beyond a reasonable doubt, a shadow of a doubt or to a mathematical 

certainty.” Id. at ___, 259 A.3d at 430. The Court subsequently evaluated 

the reasonable doubt instruction in its entirety and concluded that the trial 

court provided an accurate description of the law prior to the complained-of 

statement. The remainder of the instruction “included multiple references to 

the Commonwealth’s duty to prove [the a]ppellant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Id. at 434. 

“[O]ther than the [trial] court’s passing and obviously inadvertent, 

misstatement regarding the Commonwealth’s burden of proof, the court 

clearly, adequately, and accurately instructed the jury regarding the 

Commonwealth’s duty to prove Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Id. Thus, the Supreme Court held “that the trial court’s instruction did not 
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lessen the Commonwealth’s burden of proof below the standard of beyond a 

reasonable doubt,” and “the PCRA court did not err in finding a lack of arguable 

merit in [the a]ppellant’s claim that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to 

object to the trial court’s jury instruction[.]” Id. Compare Commonwealth 

v. Montalvo, ___ Pa. ___, 244 A.3d 359 (2021) (holding appellant 

established ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to erroneous

jury instruction; contrary to Commonwealth’s argument, court did more than 

make one inaccurate statement; shortly after court gave erroneous instruction 

to which counsel failed to object, court gave second erroneous instruction; 

trial judge’s purported correction of misstatement could only have served to 

prejudice appellant further). 

Pennsylvania’s Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instruction as to the 

defendant’s character in a criminal matter is as follows:

The defense offered evidence tending to prove that the 

defendant is a person of good character. I am speaking of 

the defense witnesses who testified [that the defendant has 

a good reputation for being a law-abiding, peaceable, 

nonviolent individual] [that [proof of good character]]. 

[The district attorney called witnesses who in effect denied 

that the defendant has a good reputation for [character 

trait]. You may use the Commonwealth’s testimony for one 

purpose only. That is to help you judge whether the 

defense’s character witnesses are really familiar with the 

defendant’s reputation and whether in their testimony they 

gave you an accurate description of [his] [her] reputation.] 

The law recognizes that a person of good character is not 

likely to commit a crime that is contrary to that person’s 

nature. Evidence of good character may by itself raise a 

reasonable doubt of guilt and require a verdict of not guilty. 
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You must weigh and consider the evidence of good character 

along with the other evidence in the case. If, on all the 

evidence, you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s 

guilt, you must find [him] [her] not guilty. However, if, on 

all the evidence, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the defendant is guilty, you should find [him] 

[her] guilty. 

Pa.SSJI (Crim) 3.06 (internal numbering omitted). 

Pennsylvania’s Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions for “date 

of crime: proof of date alleged not essential” is as follows:

[The indictment alleges that the crime was committed on 

[date].] 

You are not bound by the date alleged in the [indictment] 

[information]. It is not an essential element of the crime 

charged. You may find the defendant guilty if you are 

satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] [she] 

committed the crime charged [in and around] [on or about] 

the date charged in the [indictment] [information] even 

though you are not satisfied that [he] [she] committed it on 

the particular date alleged in the [indictment] [information]. 

Pa.SSJI (Crim) 3.19. 

The suggested jury instruction for impeachment with prior conviction of 

a witness is as follows:

You have heard evidence that one of the witnesses, [name 

of witness], has been convicted of the crime of [crime]. 

The only purpose for which you may consider this evidence 

of prior conviction is in deciding whether or not to believe 

all or part of [name of witness]’s testimony. In doing so, 

you may consider the type of crime committed, how long 

ago it was committed, and how it may affect the likelihood 

that [name of witness] has testified truthfully in this case. 

Pa.SSJI (Crim) 4.08D (internal numbering omitted). 
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Instantly, the court instructed the jury on the concept of reasonable 

doubt as follows:

The fundamental principle of our criminal justice system is 

that a person accused of a crime, the Defendant, is 

presumed to be innocent. The mere fact that he was 

arrested and accused of a crime is not any evidence against 

him. In addition, there is no inference of guilt created by 

the fact that there is an information or even a trial. 

Furthermore, the Defendant is presumed innocent 

throughout the trial unless and until you conclude, based on 

careful and impartial consideration of the evidence, that the 

Commonwealth has proved him guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt. 

It is not the Defendant’s burden of proof to prove that he is 

not guilty. Instead, it is the Commonwealth that always has 

the burden to prove each and every one of the crimes 

charged. A person accused of a crime is not required to 

present evidence or to prove anything in his own defense. 

If the Commonwealth fails to meet his burden, then your 

verdict must be “not guilty.” On the other hand, if the 

Commonwealth does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the Defendant is guilty, then your verdict—I’m sorry; if 

the Commonwealth does prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the Defendant is guilty, then your verdict should be 

“guilty.” 

Although the Commonwealth has the burden of proving the 

Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, this does not 

mean that the Commonwealth must prove its case beyond 

all doubt or to a mathematical certainty, nor must it 

demonstrate the complete impossibility of innocence. A 

reasonable doubt is a doubt that would cause a reasonably 

carefully and sensible person to pause or hesitate before 

acting in a matter of importance in his or her own affairs. A 

reasonable doubt must fairly arise out of the evidence that 

was presented or the lack of evidence presented with 

respect to some element of the crime charged. 

A reasonable doubt must be a real doubt. It may not be an 

imagined one, nor may it be a doubt merely manufactured 

to avoid carrying out an unpleasant duty. To summarize, 
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you may find the Defendant guilty based on the mere 

suspicion of guilt. The Commonwealth has the burden of 

proving the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If 

it meets that burden, the Defendant is no longer presumed 

to be innocent, and you should find him guilty. On the other 

hand, if the Commonwealth does not meet its burden, then 

you must find him not guilty. 

(N.T. Trial, 7/29/13—Volume 5, at 425-27) (emphasis added). 

The record confirms Appellant’s assertion that the court stated, “you 

may find the Defendant guilty based on the mere suspicion of guilt.” (Id. at

427). Although the court deviated from the suggested instruction by omitting 

the word “not,” the instruction as given must be considered as a whole to 

determine whether it fairly conveyed the legal principles at issue. See Reid, 

supra. Despite the omission of “not,” the court accurately described the 

concept of reasonable doubt prior to the complained-of statement. (See N.T. 

Trial at 425-27). The court described reasonable doubt as something that

“would cause a ... sensible person to pause or hesitate before acting in a matter 

of importance in his or her own affairs.” (Id. at 427). The court elaborated 

by explaining that a reasonable doubt is a “real doubt,” and that it cannot be 

“imagined” or “manufactured.” (Id.) 

The court ended the reasonable doubt instruction by succinctly stating, 

“[o]n the other hand, if the Commonwealth does not meet its burden, then 

you must find him not guilty.” (Id.) Considering the court’s accurate 

descriptions of the law both before and after the omission of the word “not,” 

the court “accurately instructed the jury regarding the Commonwealth’s duty 
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to prove Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” despite the “obviously 

inadvertent, misstatement.” See Reid, supra at 434. 

Regarding the jury instruction as to a defendant’s character, the court 

instructed the jury as follows:

The defense offered evidence tending to prove that the 

Defendant is a person of good character. I am speaking of 

the Defense witnesses who testified that the Defendant has 

a good reputation for being law-abiding. The law recognizes 

that a person of good character is not likely to commit a 

crime which is contrary to that person’s nature. Evidence 

of good character may by itself raise a reasonable doubt of 

guilt and require a verdict of not guilty. You must weigh 

and consider the evidence of good character along with all 

of the other evidence in the case. 

(N.T. Trial, 7/29/13—Volume 5, at 430-31). 

Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the court provided the correct 

standard of proof when it said that evidence of good character may raise a 

reasonable doubt as to guilt. See Pa.SSJI (Crim) 3.06. Additionally, the 

transcript does not reveal that the instruction deviated from the suggested 

standard instruction. Finally, the court echoed the suggested instruction when 

it stated, “I am speaking of the Defense witnesses who testified that the 

Defendant has a good reputation for being law-abiding.” (Id. at 430). Thus, 

this instruction clearly, adequately, and accurately reflected the law. See 

Lesko, supra. See also Smith, supra. 

Regarding the instruction for the date of the crime, the court stated, in 

relevant part, “[y]ou may find that the Defendant is guilty if you are satisfied 

that he committed the crimes charged in the indictment even though you are 
J-S25036-22

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not satisfied that he committed them on the particular date alleged in the 

indictment.” (N.T. Trial, 7/29/13—Volume 5, at 431-32). Although the court 

used its own wording, the instruction accurately conveyed that a defendant 

may be found guilty of the crimes charged even if the jury is uncertain about 

whether the crimes were committed on the date alleged in the charging 

instrument. See Pa.SSJI (Crim) 3.19. 

Contrary to Appellant’s final assertion regarding a lack of information 

about the witnesses’ prior convictions, one of the victims, S.L., testified that 

he had a four-year-old prior conviction for felony burglary. (See N.T. Trial, 

7/23/13—Volume 2, at 79). Another victim, D.J., testified that he had multiple 

prior convictions, including criminal trespass in 2004, theft in 2006, and bad 

checks in 2011. (See N.T. Trial, 7/24/13—Volume 3, at 186). Additionally, 

the subsequent instruction for impeachment with prior convictions was nearly 

verbatim to the suggested standard instruction. See Pa.SSJI (Crim) 4.08D. 

Based upon the foregoing, we agree with the PCRA court’s conclusion 

that the entire charge clearly and accurately represented the relevant legal 

concepts to the jury. See Geathers, supra. Consequently, there is no 

arguable merit to Appellant’s challenge to the jury instructions, and he is not 

entitled to relief on his fourth claim. See Smith, supra. 

In the fifth claim, Appellant argues that he was illegally designated as a 

sexually violent predator (“SVP”). Appellant asserts that the record lacks clear 

and convincing evidence that Appellant is likely to reoffend. Appellant insists 
J-S25036-22

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that he has not had any accusations of sexual abuse or criminal activity lodged 

against him since the original sentencing hearing in this case, which indicates

that he is not likely to reoffend. Appellant concludes that prior counsel were

ineffective for failing to litigate or object to Appellant’s SVP designation. We 

disagree. 

Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a trial court’s 

SVP designation are governed by the following principles:

In order to affirm an SVP designation, we, as a reviewing 

court, must be able to conclude that the fact-finder found 

clear and convincing evidence that the individual is a[n 

SVP]. As with any sufficiency of the evidence claim, we view 

all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth. We will reverse a 

trial court’s determination of SVP status only if the 

Commonwealth has not presented clear and convincing 

evidence that each element of the statute has been 

satisfied. 

Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d 186, 189 (Pa.Super. 2015), 

appeal denied, 633 Pa. 763, 125 A.3d 1199 (2015) (quoting Commonwealth 

v. Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1033 (Pa.Super. 2011)). “SVP” is defined as: 

A person who has been convicted of a sexually violent 

offense ... and who is determined to be a sexually violent 

predator ... due to a mental abnormality or personality 

disorder that makes the person likely to engage in predatory 

sexually violent offenses. In order to show that the offender 

suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder, 

the evidence must show that the defendant suffers from 

congenital or acquired condition ... that affects the emotional 

or volitional capacity of the person in a manner that 

predisposes that person to the commission of criminal 

sexual acts to a degree that makes the person a menace to 

the health and safety of other persons. Moreover, there 

must be a showing that the defendant’s conduct was 
J-S25036-22

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predatory. Predatory conduct is defined as an act directed 

at a stranger or at a person with whom a relationship has 

been instituted, established, maintained, or promoted, in 

whole or in part, in order to facilitate or support 

victimization. Furthermore, in reaching a determination, we 

must examine the driving force behind the commission of 

these acts, as well as looking at the offender’s propensity to 

re-offend, an opinion about which the Commonwealth’s 

expert is required to opine. However, the risk of reoffending is but one factor to be considered when making 

an assessment; it is not an “independent element.”

Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 84-85 (Pa.Super. 2015) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Stephens, 74 A.3d 1034, 1038-39 (Pa.Super.

2013)). 

Pennsylvania’s Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (“SOAB”) evaluators 

must consider the following factors when performing SVP assessments:

(1) Facts of the current offense, including: 

(i) Whether the offense involved multiple 

victims. 

(ii) Whether the individual exceeded the means 

necessary to achieve the offense. 

(iii) The nature of the sexual contact with the 

victim. 

(iv) Relationship of the individual to the victim. 

(v) Age of the victim. 

(vi) Whether the offense included a display of 

unusual cruelty by the individual during the commission 

of the crime. 

(vii) The mental capacity of the victim. 

(2) Prior offense history, including: 
J-S25036-22

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(i) The individual’s prior criminal record. 

(ii) Whether the individual completed any prior 

sentences. 

(iii) Whether the individual participated in 

available programs for sexual offenders. 

(3) Characteristics of the individual, including: 

(i) Age of the individual. 

(ii) Use of illegal drugs by the individual. 

(iii) A mental illness, mental disability or mental 

abnormality. 

(iv) Behavioral characteristics that contribute to 

the individual’s conduct. 

(4) Factors that are supported in sexual offender 

assessment field as criteria reasonably related to the risk of 

reoffense. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.58(b). 

Instantly, Appellant was found guilty of IDSI, which is a sexually violent 

offense. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.12, 9799.14. In his testimony during the 

SVP hearing, Dr. Allan Pass, a SOAB examiner, addressed the factors set forth 

in Section 9799.58(b). (See N.T. SVP Hearing, 10/22/13, at 5-12). 

Regarding Appellant’s mental abnormality, Dr. Pass testified that Appellant’s 

“behavior in the commission of these offenses, the presence of mental 

abnormality or personality disorder as defined by the statute specifically 

identified as paraphilia not otherwise specified.” (Id. at 9). Dr. Pass noted 

that this diagnosis means that an individual engaged in “sexual misconduct 
J-S25036-22

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behavior over a period of time of at least six months which has created 

concerns and conflict, social conflict, personal conflict, for himself.” (Id. at 

10). Specific to Appellant, Dr. Pass stated that “we have an adult who is 

engaged in sexual misconduct with juvenile males over the course of 

approximately one year and six months.” (Id.) 

Dr. Pass observed that paraphilia is “chronic in nature, so, as a result, 

the likelihood of re-offending would be high.” (Id.) Dr. Pass elaborated on 

Appellant’s case as follows: “[Appellant] utilized his position of authority as a 

police officer over children at school to intimidate, control and sexually exploit 

them for his own personal sexually deviant gratification.” (Id. at 11). 

Appellant “did engage in acts with the victims with whom a relationship has 

been initiated ... in order to support or facilitate the victimization.” (Id.) Dr. 

Pass opined that “[Appellant] met the classification criteria as outlined within

the statute for predatory conduct,” and he reached this opinion to a reasonable 

degree of certainty within the accepted values in his field. (Id. at 11-12). 

Relying on Dr. Pass’s opinion, the trial court found that Appellant met the 

statutory definition of sexually violent predator. (Id. at 23). 

Here, Dr. Pass’s testimony confirmed that Appellant suffers from a 

mental abnormality that makes him likely to re-offend. See Leatherby, 

supra. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the record reveals that there was clear and convincing 

evidence to support Appellant’s classification as an SVP. See Hollingshead, 
J-S25036-22

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supra. Therefore, the PCRA court correctly concluded that this issue was 

without arguable merit, and Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

See Smith, supra. 

In Appellant’s sixth claim, Appellant argues he was illegally sentenced 

under SORNA II. Appellant asserts that his sentencing resulted in a violation 

of his due process rights and an ex post facto violation. Appellant insists that

SORNA II was applied retroactively and that it increased the authorized 

punitive measures, thereby creating an ex post facto violation. For these 

reasons, Appellant concludes all prior counsel were ineffective for failing to 

challenge the legality of the sentence under SORNA II.

6

 We disagree. 

In Commonwealth v. Muniz, 640 Pa. 699, 164 A.3d 1189 (2017) 

(plurality), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 925, 200 L.Ed.2d 313 (2018), 

our Supreme Court held that the registration provisions of SORNA I were 

punitive, such that application of those provisions to offenders who committed 

their crimes prior to SORNA I’s effective date violated ex post facto principles. 

Following Muniz and Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa.Super. 

____________________________________________

6 Appellant baldly asserts a separate claim when he states, “Section 9799.63 

violates his constitutional right to reputation protected under Article I, Section 

11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” (Appellant’s Brief at 40). This single 

sentence, however, does not adequately develop an argument advancing 

Appellant’s “right to reputation” claim. 
J-S25036-22

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2017) (“Butler I”), rev’d, ___ Pa. ___, 226 A.3d 972 (2020) (“Butler II”),7

the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted legislation to amend SORNA I. 

See Act of Feb. 21, 2018, P.L. 27, No. 10 (“Act 10”). Act 10 amended several 

provisions of SORNA I and added several new sections found at 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9799.42, 9799.51-9799.75. In addition, the Governor of Pennsylvania 

signed new legislation striking the Act 10 amendments and reenacting several 

SORNA I provisions, effective June 12, 2018. See Act of June 12, 2018, P.L. 

1952, No. 29 (“Act 29”). Through Act 10, as amended in Act 29 (collectively, 

“SORNA II”), the General Assembly split SORNA I’s former Subchapter H into 

a Revised Subchapter H and Subchapter I. 

Subchapter I addresses sexual offenders who committed an offense on 

____________________________________________

7

In Butler I, this Court held that the provision of SORNA I requiring a court 

to designate a defendant a SVP by clear and convincing evidence violates the 

federal and state constitutions because it increases a defendant’s criminal 

penalty without the factfinder making necessary factual findings beyond a 

reasonable doubt. See Butler I, supra. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court reversed Butler I. See Butler II, supra (holding SVPs are different 

from non-SVP SORNA registrants at issue in Muniz due to heightened public 

safety concerns based on determination that SVPs have mental abnormality 

or personality disorder that makes individual likely to engage in predatory 

sexual violent offenses; procedure for designating individuals as SVPs is not 

subject to requirements of Apprendi and Alleyne and remains 

constitutionally permissible). See also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 

466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (holding any facts, other than 

fact of prior conviction, that subject defendant to additional penalty beyond 

statutory maximum must be submitted to jury and proven beyond reasonable 

doubt) and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 

L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) (holding any fact that increases mandatory minimum 

sentence for crime is fact that must be submitted to jury and found beyond 

reasonable doubt). 
J-S25036-22

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or after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012; or those who were 

required to register under a former sexual offender registration law of this 

Commonwealth on or after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012, 

whose period of registration has not expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.52. 

Subchapter I contains less stringent reporting requirements than Revised 

Subchapter H, which applies to offenders who committed an offense on or 

after December 20, 2012. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.42. 

In Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 660 Pa. 568, 234 A.3d 602 (2020), 

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Subchapter I of SORNA II is 

nonpunitive and does not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post 

facto laws. See id. at 609, 234 A.3d at 626-27. See also Commonwealth 

v. Elliott, 249 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, ___ Pa. 

___, 263 A.3d 241 (2021) (rejecting ex post facto challenge to lifetime 

registration for rape conviction where appellant was subject to Subchapter I 

reporting requirements). 

Instantly, Appellant committed his sex offenses between 1998 and 

1999, and he is subject to registration and reporting requirements under 

Subchapter I. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.52. Subchapter I requires Appellant 

to report for life based on his IDSI conviction. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9799.55(b)(2)(i)(A). Under Lacombe and its progeny, Appellant’s ex post 

facto challenge fails. See Lacombe, supra; Elliott, supra. Based upon the 

foregoing, this claim is without arguable merit, and the PCRA court properly 
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denied relief. See Smith, supra. 

In his final issue, Appellant references his previous arguments and 

insists that the PCRA court should have granted relief under a theory of

“cumulative ineffective assistance.” Appellant also raises several “subclaims,” ostensibly to support his argument that all prior counsel were

ineffective on multiple bases, thereby permitting this Court to assess the 

cumulative impact. Based upon this cumulative impact, Appellant concludes 

that this Court must vacate all of his sentences and order a new trial. We 

disagree. 

Preliminarily, matters that are not raised in the Rule 1925(b) concise 

statement of errors complained of are waived on appeal. Commonwealth v. 

Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686 (Pa.Super. 2001). Moreover, “[t]he failure to 

develop an adequate argument in an appellate brief may result in waiver of 

the claim under Pa.R.A.P. 2119.” Commonwealth v. Freeman, 128 A.3d 

1231, 1249 (Pa.Super. 2015). Finally, “no number of failed ineffectiveness 

claims may collectively warrant relief if they fail to do so individually. When 

the failure of individual claims is based upon a lack of prejudice, however, 

then the cumulative prejudice from those claims may properly be assessed.” 

Commonwealth v. Elliott, 622 Pa. 236, 294, 80 A.3d 415, 450 (2013), cert. 

denied, 574 U.S. 828, 135 S.Ct. 50, 190 L.Ed.2d 54 (2014) (internal citations 

omitted). 

Here, Appellant failed to raise his “sub-claims” in his Rule 1925(b) 
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statement, and those arguments can be waived on this basis alone. See 

Dowling, supra. Further, with respect to these “sub-claims,” the argument

section of Appellant’s brief focuses on the arguable merit prong of the test for 

ineffective assistance while providing mere cursory analysis of the rational 

basis and prejudice prongs. Thus, the failure of the “sub-claims” to develop 

a meaningful argument for all three parts of the test for ineffectiveness 

provides an additional basis for waiver. See Freeman, supra. To the extent 

Appellant also seeks to assert a claim of cumulative prejudice, here, we have 

not rejected the aforementioned claims of ineffectiveness based upon the 

prejudice prong of the test for ineffectiveness. Thus, there can be no 

aggregation of prejudice from multiple ineffectiveness claims, and Appellant’s 

claim fails. See Elliott, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s 

decision. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/14/2022