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ACCESS TO JUSTICE?: 

DOES DOJ’S OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION NEEDED TO 

CONDUCT PROPER OVERSIGHT? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 9, 2014 

Serial No. 113–96 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia, Chairman 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

RAU ́ L LABRADOR, Idaho 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

RON DeSANTIS, Florida 

JASON T. SMITH, Missouri 

[Vacant] 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

JUDY CHU, California 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

KAREN BASS, California 

CEDRIC RICHMOND, Louisiana 

SUZAN DelBENE, Washington 

JOE GARCIA, Florida 

HAKEEM JEFFRIES, New York 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

SHELLEY HUSBAND, Chief of Staff & General Counsel 

PERRY APELBAUM, Minority Staff Director & Chief Counsel 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

SEPTEMBER 9, 2014 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary ................................. 1 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary ......... 2 

The Honorable Jim Jordan, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Ohio, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary .......................................... 4 

WITNESS 

The Honorable Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector General, United States Department of Justice 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Supplemental Material submitted by the Honorable Michael E. Horowitz, 

Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice ................................................. 32 

Material submitted by the Honorable Spencer Bachus, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of Alabama .................................................................. 127 

(1) 

ACCESS TO JUSTICE?: DOES DOJ’S OFFICE OF 

INSPECTOR GENERAL HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION NEEDED TO CONDUCT PROPER 

OVERSIGHT? 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 2014 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:13 a.m., in room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Bob Goodlatte 

(Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Goodlatte, Sensenbrenner, Coble, 

Chabot, Issa, Franks, Gohmert, Jordan, Chaffetz, Gowdy, Farenthold, Holding, Collins, Conyers, Jackson Lee, Johnson, and Garcia. 

Staff Present: (Majority) Shelley Husband, Chief of Staff & General Counsel; Branden Ritchie, Deputy Chief of Staff & Chief Counsel; Allison Halataei, Parliamentarian & General Counsel; Stephanie Gadbois, Counsel; Kelsey Deterding, Clerk; (Minority) Perry 

Apelbaum, Minority Staff Director & Chief Counsel; Danielle 

Brown, Parliamentarian; and Aaron Hiller, Counsel. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Good morning. The Judiciary Committee will 

come to order. And, without objection, the Chair is authorized to 

declare a recess of the Committee at any time. 

We welcome everyone to this morning’s oversight hearing entitled, ‘‘Access to Justice? Does DOJ’s Office of Inspector General 

Have Access to Information Needed to Conduct Proper Oversight?’’ 

And I will begin by recognizing myself for an opening statement. 

On August 5, 2014, 47 of 72 statutory U.S. inspectors general 

signed a letter to Congress in protest of constraints that have recently been imposed on access to agency records—constraints that 

impeded efforts to perform oversight work in critical areas. The 

conduct of meaningful oversight by any Office of Inspector General 

depends on complete and timely access to all agency materials and 

data. As such, section 6(a)(1) of the Inspector General Act expressly 

provides for such access. 

Restricting or delaying an inspector general’s access to key materials in turn deprives Congress and the American people of timely 

information with which to evaluate an agency’s performance. Limiting access, except in very narrow instances, is at odds with the 
2 

necessary independence of inspectors general and is contrary to 

congressional intent. 

This hearing will examine whether agency components at the Department of Justice have undermined the OIG’s independence by 

withholding, filtering, or delaying the production of essential 

records based on a novel interpretation of the Inspector General 

Act as well as restrictive readings of other statutes. 

In each of the three instances of interference we will hear about 

today, a review of agency correspondence with the OIG evinces a 

mindset that views DOJ leadership of the arbiter of what information the Office of Inspector General receives. It reveals an agency 

that believes the OIG must ask for and receive permission to review Department of Justice data and material and that sanctions 

OIG investigations as necessary to advance its own supervisory responsibilities alone. 

The mission of DOJ’s Office of Inspector General is to detect and 

deter waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct in DOJ programs and 

personnel and to promote economy and efficiency in those programs. Efforts to reduce transparency, such as those described by 

the inspectors general in the August 5th letter, leave agencies vulnerable to mismanagement and misconduct and will not be condoned. 

Although not every inspector general who signed the letter has 

experienced barriers to access, each one signed in support of the 

principle that an inspector general must have complete, unfiltered, 

and timely access to all information and materials available to the 

agency that relate to that inspector general’s oversight activities 

without unreasonable administrative burdens. 

I welcome our witness today, the Honorable Michael Horowitz, 

Inspector General of the United States Department of Justice. I am 

pleased to have him here to describe the challenges he has faced 

and share his valuable insights so that we may evaluate for ourselves whether the executive branch is executing the Inspector 

General Act as Congress has intended and whether additional action is needed to restore congressional intent. 

And now it is my pleasure to recognize the Ranking Member of 

the Committee, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers, for his 

opening statement. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Chairman Goodlatte and Members of 

the Committee. I thank you for convening a hearing on this critical 

topic. We have an obligation to preserve the continued independence and effectiveness of the Office of the Inspector General at the 

Department of Justice. 

Inspector General Horowitz, we welcome you here before the 

House Judiciary Committee today. 

I suspect that the membership of this Committee is virtually 

unanimous in recognizing the need for vigorous oversight of the Department of Justice. No matter which party controls the executive 

branch, a strong and independent Office of Inspector General is key 

to protecting civil liberties, reining in executive overreach, safeguarding taxpayer dollars, and preserving the public trust. 

I have the privilege of having voted for the original Inspector 

General Act of 1978, both in the House Committee on Government 

Operations, then under the leadership of Jack Brooks of Texas, and 
3 

subsequently on the House floor. It is my suspicion that I may be 

the only one that has done those things on this Committee. 

I have reviewed the 1978 Committee report accompanying the 

passage of the Inspector General Act, House Report 95-584. It was 

our intention then and remains our intention today that ‘‘each inspector general is to have access to all records, documents, et 

cetera, available to his or her agency which relate to programs and 

operations with respect to which the office has responsibilities.’’ 

Simply put, the inspector general is to have complete and direct access—emphasized—to all of the information he or she deems necessary to conduct thorough and impartial investigations. 

Recent legal analysis by the FBI’s Office of General Counsel unfortunately suggests otherwise. They reason that the Inspector 

General Act actually prohibits the FBI from sharing certain sensitive or confidential materials, including but not limited to grand 

jury information, Title III wiretap information, and consumer credit information. 

Members of the Committee, I find this analysis wholly 

unpersuasive. Nothing in the Inspector General Act authorizes the 

Department or its component agencies to refuse even these materials to the inspector general. Again borrowing from the 1978 report, the act was designed to assign to each inspector general primary responsibility for auditing and investigative activities relating to programs and operations of his or her agency. That is a direct quotation. 

It is difficult to imagine how the Inspector General of the Department of Justice might conduct those auditing and investigative responsibilities without full access to relevant court documents, intelligence reports, or financial records. It is also difficult to imagine 

how the Inspector General might conduct effective oversight of the 

Department of Justice if the materials it requires can only be obtained with the permission of department attorneys. 

To be clear, the current leadership of the Department of Justice 

has taken extraordinary steps to make sure that the Inspector 

General has eventually received access to the material he seeks in 

each of the cases before us today. Attorney General Eric Holder 

and Deputy Attorney General James Cole are not the problem. 

They have both intervened personally on multiple occasions to 

overcome the FBI’s objections and to compel production of the materials in question. 

I commend them for that leadership, but I do not know who will 

hold these posts in future Administrations. And we should not be 

willing to entrust this key oversight matter to men and women who 

may feel differently about the effectiveness of the Office of the Inspector General. 

In May of this year, Deputy Attorney General Cole asked the Office of Legal Counsel to issue a formal opinion resolving this dispute. I hope that Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Karl 

Thompson and his team will adhere to the plain text of the statute 

and to our obvious intent and grant the Inspector General unfettered access to every document in the Department’s possession. 

And if the Office of Legal Counsel finds enough ambiguity in the 

law to place any limit on the Inspector General’s access to informa-
4 

tion, then the House Judiciary should be the first to act to correct 

their mistaken impression. 

Inspector General Horowitz, we welcome and we look forward to 

your testimony today and to your assistance if a legislative response is indeed required. 

And I thank the Chairman and yield back. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

And the Chair understands that the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 

Jordan, would like to make a brief statement—— 

Mr. JORDAN. Yes. 

Mr. GOODLATTE [continuing]. Welcoming the Inspector General. 

Mr. JORDAN. I thank the Chairman. 

I am just looking, Mr. Horowitz, I am looking at the letter that 

you signed along with a whole bunch of other inspector generals 

from August 5 of this year. The first paragraph talks about serious 

limitations on access to records; second paragraph talks about the 

Department of Justice recently faced restrictions on their access to 

certain records. 

I was just going to say, welcome to the club. It is noticeable that 

four of the six Republican Members here are also from the Oversight Committee, and I know we have a hearing tomorrow on this 

very issue. But we have been frustrated from the kind of response 

we have gotten from the Internal Revenue Service and, frankly, 

from the Department of Justice. So we share in your frustration, 

and we want to commend you for the work you have done. I have 

always been impressed with your service to the public and the 

work that you have done. 

But this is critical, and so I just wanted to say, Mr. Chairman, 

thank you for this hearing. And I want to thank Mr. Horowitz for 

his work and for being here today. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

Without objection, all other Members’ opening statements will be 

made a part of the record. 

We thank our only witness, Inspector General Horowitz, for joining us today. 

And, Mr. Horowitz, if you would please rise, I will begin by 

swearing you in. 

[Witness sworn.] 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you very much. 

Let the record reflect that the Inspector General responded in 

the affirmative. 

On April 16, 2012, Mr. Michael Horowitz was sworn in as Inspector General for the United States Department of Justice. As Inspector General, Mr. Horowitz oversees a nationwide workforce of more 

than 400 special agents, auditors, inspectors, attorneys, and support staff. 

The Inspector General has enjoyed a long career in both the public and private sectors. Mr. Horowitz previously worked as an assistant United States attorney for the Southern District of New 

York from 1991 to 1999. After this, he served in the Criminal Division at Main Justice, first as Deputy Assistant Attorney General 

and next as Chief of Staff. Mr. Horowitz has also spent time working in the private sector, most recently as a partner at Cadwalader, 

Wickersham & Taft. 
5 

He earned his juris doctor magna cum laude from Harvard Law 

School and his bachelor of arts from Brandeis University. 

Mr. Horowitz, we appreciate your presence today and look forward to your testimony. Your written statement will be entered 

into the record in its entirety, and we ask that you summarize your 

testimony in 5 minutes or less. Thank you, and welcome. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL E. HOROWITZ, INSPECTOR GENERAL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Conyers, Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify today. 

Access by inspectors general to information and agency files goes 

to the heart of our mission to provide independent and nonpartisan 

oversight. That is why 47 inspectors general signed a letter last 

month to Congress expressing their concerns about this issue. I 

want to thank the Members of Congress for their bipartisan support in response to that letter. 

The IG Act adopted by Congress in 1978 is crystal-clear. Section 

6(a) expressly provides that inspectors general must be given complete, timely, and unfiltered access to all agency records. However, 

since 2010, the FBI and some other department components have 

not read section 6(a) of the IG Act in that manner and, therefore, 

refused requests during our reviews for relevant grand jury, wiretap, and credit information in their files. As a result, a number of 

our reviews were significantly impeded. 

In response to these legal objections, the Attorney General or the 

Deputy Attorney General granted us permission to access the 

records by making a finding that our reviews were of assistance to 

them. They also stated their intention to do so in all future audits 

and reviews. And we appreciate of course, their commitment to do 

that. 

However, there are several significant concerns with this process. 

First and foremost, the process is inconsistent with the clear mandate of section 6(a) of the IG Act. The Attorney General should not 

have to order department components to provide us with access to 

records that Congress has made clear we are entitled to review. 

Second, requiring the OIG to obtain permission from department 

leadership seriously compromises our independence. The OIG 

should be deciding which documents it needs access to, not the 

leadership of the agency that is being overseen. 

Third, while current department leadership has supported our 

ability to access records, agency leadership changes over time, and 

our access to records should not turn on the views of the Department’s leadership. 

Further, we understand that other department components that 

exercise oversight over department programs and personnel, such 

as the Office of Professional Responsibility, continue to be given access to these same materials without objection. This disparate 

treatment is unjustifiable and results in the Department being less 

willing to provide materials to the OIG, presumably because the 

OIG is statutorily independent while the OPR is not. 
6 

*See Appendix for supplemental material submitted with this statement. 

This disparate treatment once again highlights OPR’s lack of 

independence from the Department’s leadership, which can only be 

addressed by granting the statutorily independent OIG with jurisdiction to investigate all alleged misconduct at the Department. Indeed, the independent, nonpartisan Project on Government Oversight made the same recommendation in a report earlier this year, 

and bipartisan legislation has been introduced in the Senate to do 

just that. 

This past May, the Department’s leadership asked the Office of 

Legal Counsel to issue an opinion addressing the legal objections 

raised by the FBI. Attached to my written statement is a summary 

of the OIG’s legal views regarding these issues. 

It is imperative that the OLC issue its decision promptly, because the existing practice at the Department seriously impairs our 

independence. Moreover, in the absence of a resolution, our struggle to access information in a timely manner continues to seriously 

delay our work. 

It also has a substantial impact on the morale of the OIG’s auditors, analysts, agents, and lawyers, who work extraordinarily hard 

every day. Far too often, they face challenges getting timely access 

to information, including even with routine requests. For example, 

in two ongoing audits, we had trouble getting organizational charts 

in a timely manner. 

We remain hopeful that OLC will issue an opinion promptly that 

concludes the OIG is entitled to independent access to the records 

and information pursuant to the IG Act. However, should an OLC 

opinion interpret the IG Act in a manner that results in limits on 

our ability to access information pursuant to the IG Act, we will 

request a prompt legislative remedy. 

For the past 25 years, my office has demonstrated that effective 

and independent oversight saves taxpayers money and improves 

the Department’s operations. Actions that limit, condition, or delay 

access to information have substantial consequences for our work 

and lead to incomplete, inaccurate, or significantly delayed findings 

or recommendations. 

I cannot emphasize enough how critical it is to get these pending 

access issues resolved promptly. And, hopefully, OLC will shortly 

issue a legal opinion finding that section 6(a) of the IG Act means 

what it says. 

This concludes my prepared statement, and I would be pleased 

to answer any questions that the Committee may have. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Horowitz. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Horowitz follows:*] 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 

Mr. GOODLATTE. I will begin the questioning. 

The only explicit limitation on an inspector general’s authority to 

conduct audits and investigations within its jurisdiction resides in 

section 8(e) of the Inspector General Act. Section 8(e) is an extraordinary exemption that provides the Attorney General with the authority in carefully circumscribed circumstances to prohibit the Office of Inspector General from carrying out an audit or investigation. 

To invoke section 8(e), the Attorney General must explain the 

reason for his decision in writing and make a determination that 

a limitation on an IG’s exercise of authority is necessary to prevent 

the disclosure of certain specifically described categories of information or to prevent significant impairment to national interests. 

My question to you is, has Attorney General Holder at any time 

during your tenure used this formal procedure to limit your office’s 

access to material essential to a review? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. He has not. And that is one of the arguments we 

have put forward, which is that is the mechanism Congress set up 

to limit our access if there are sensitive matters. That is the provision that should be used, not simply a standing objection to our access. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. In your experience, prior to your troubling experiences with the three reviews that you cite in your testimony, had 

any Department of Justice component ever asserted the right to 

make unilateral determinations about what requested documents 

were relevant to an Office of Inspector General review? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. To my understanding from speaking to my predecessors and others in the agency, that had not happened before 

2010. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. How valuable is your authority to access grand 

jury or other sensitive material to your ability to execute rigorous 

oversight of national security matters? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. It is critical, Mr. Chairman. These are the tools 

of the trade for the FBI, other law enforcement agencies. If we 

can’t access every piece of information in their files when we are 

doing oversight of the FBI’s use of these tools in its handling of 

various national security tools, we won’t know the full answer to 

what is going on. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And according to your office, the FBI’s withholding of the grand jury information is unsupported in law and 

contrary to both the Inspector General Act and exceptions to the 

general rule of grand jury secrecy. 

Would you outline the three reasons why the Office of Inspector 

General is entitled to access grand jury material that the FBI 

claimed was privileged? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Certainly. 

First and foremost, section 6(a) of the act could not be clearer, 

as Congressman Conyers just outlined in his opening statement. It 

is crystal-clear. That is the primary reason. 

But, secondarily, under the grand jury rules, prior to 2010, we 

had regularly obtained grand jury material because we have attorneys for the government working for us. I am an attorney; we have 

a number of attorneys working on our staff. That would be the 

other exception. 
13 

And then, third, in the national security area, there is an additional exception in the grand jury rules that had before 2010 been 

used to get us grand jury material. 

So there are at least three reasons why we should be getting this 

material. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. You testified earlier that at no time has the Attorney General complied with section 8(e) and given you a statement in writing as to why material would not be provided. 

Have you had the opportunity to have any verbal discussion with 

either he or the Director of the FBI as to why they are choosing 

not to make this material available to you? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I have. I have raised my concerns with both of 

them. And the response from the Department has been most recently to send the matter to the Office of Legal Counsel to evaluate 

the two—the FBI’s competing legal argument. And that is where 

the matter currently lies and has for several months now. 

And it is very important that that opinion be issued. I think it 

should be clear that we are entitled to it, but if there is going to 

be a contrary ruling, we want to know it sooner rather than later 

so that we can fix the problem and work with Congress to fix the 

problem. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Have there been any previous opinions put forward by the Office of Legal Counsel with regard to this issue. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. There have. And that, again, is one of our points, 

which is, in 1984, prior to our existence, which we came into existence in 1988, OLC issued a legal opinion finding that the Office of 

Professional Responsibility was entitled to access grand jury information. 

We are at a loss to understand why that same opinion wouldn’t 

apply to us, given we have the same oversight responsibilities. And 

on top of that, unlike with OPR, Congress, again, as Congressman 

Conyers quite clearly laid out, found that we should be getting 

these materials and put a provision in law that says that. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you very much. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan for his questions. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Chairman Goodlatte. You have anticipated some of the questions I was going to ask, and I thank you 

for raising them yourself. 

Just so that we are clear, Mr. Horowitz, am I correct in characterizing our discussion about the correct reading of the Inspector 

General Act as nonpartisan in nature? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Correct. 

Mr. CONYERS. All right. 

We have in our possession several letters, written over the course 

of late 2011, from Attorney General Eric Holder and Deputy Attorney James Cole. In each of these letters, over the objection of the 

FBI’s general counsel, the Department grants you access to sensitive material. 

As recently as last Thursday, in his response to your office’s report on a material witness statute, Deputy Attorney General Cole 

again pledged, quote, to provide your office with access to all materials necessary to complete our reviews consistent with existing 

law. 
14 

Are these fair descriptions of the role of the Department leadership in this debate? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Yes. As I mentioned earlier, the Department’s 

leadership has made clear they will continue to issue orders giving 

us access. And so our issue isn’t with getting the documents; it is, 

frankly, the process that is laid out compromises our independence. 

Mr. CONYERS. Have the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney 

General been helpful to you? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Yes. In getting us these orders, they have been 

helpful—in issuing these orders, they have been helpful to us getting the access. 

Mr. CONYERS. Now, as the only Member of the Committee that 

voted for the 1978 act, I agree wholeheartedly with your testimony. 

Congress meant what it said in section 6(a) of the act. Inspectors 

General must be given complete, timely, and unfiltered access to 

agency records. 

In your opinion, why did the general counsel of the FBI feel compelled to arrive at a different interpretation of the same statute? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I would be speculating, frankly, as to what the 

motivation was. But I think it is clear, as you have indicated from 

looking at the opinion—and you have that; it is attached to my 

statement—that the IG Act, I think, trumps the arguments quite 

clearly. 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, I hope the Office of Legal Counsel issues a 

strong opinion giving your office unequivocal access to the material 

and information that you require. And this Committee is going to 

be watching that very carefully. 

I thank the Chairman and yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes 

the gentleman from California, Mr. Issa, the Chairman of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Horowitz, thank you for your courage. For inspectors 

general to write a letter appealing to us over the people who appointed them but will not let them do their job and to have more 

than half of all the IGs do so is clearly unprecedented. And I commend you for your courage. 

I have no doubt that this Administration will attempt retribution 

against all of you. That is their pattern. You won’t say it, but I will. 

This is an Administration that believes justice delayed is justice 

given. They have delayed at every step. 

So although the distinguished Ranking Member is absolutely 

willing to say all the right things, he made one error. The fact is, 

there should be no commending of a man who sat in your chair, 

the Attorney General of the United States, and told us he wore two 

hats, one being a political hat, because the FBI does not operate 

in a vacuum. That information can be made available to you over 

the objections of everybody who works for him, and the policies 

that are in place are his choice. 

Now, I am going to ask you just a few quick questions, because 

you and I will be together tomorrow next-door. One of them is: Is 

there any basis, not just with your shop but with any of the 74 inspectors general, any of the 12,000 men and women, is there any 
15 

basis to see that IGs have not been good stewards of confidential 

information over the many years since the act was enacted? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. We absolutely have been. We have handled in my 

office some of the most sensitive matters, including the Hanssen 

matter, including the Katrina Leung matter, including the 9/11 review that we did—we handled those documents entirely appropriately and consistently with the law. 

Mr. ISSA. And isn’t it a practice of the very organizations you see, 

both on the FISA side and, quite frankly, across the Department 

of Justice—FBI and all the other agencies, ATF—isn’t, in fact, one 

of the most important tools the clandestine nature of discovery? 

Isn’t, in fact, a good FBI investigation often done in a way in which 

the target of that investigation is not aware that they are a target 

until after a substantial amount of information has been gathered? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. That is correct. 

Mr. ISSA. So the very requirement for you to ask for access, 

doesn’t that essentially negate the ability for you to look through 

such information as you need, and perhaps extraneous information, 

so as to not have the target always know you are coming and potentially thwart your investigation? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. It is. And I would note that in those earlier reviews, for example, in the Hanssen matter, we had direct access to 

the information. We didn’t even have to go through the process 

that we are now going through that is creating all the problems 

that we are facing. 

Mr. ISSA. And I guess one of the—I always say ‘‘last question,’’ 

and I don’t really mean it, as you know. But an additional question 

is: If in fact the target knows and if your statutory limit is in fact 

only against current employees of the Department you are involved 

in, doesn’t any delay cause the likelihood that both political and 

nonpolitical appointees will move on, either through retirement or 

transfers? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. We face that problem frequently, I have learned 

in the last 2 years, that individuals under review or investigation 

retire, move on to another job before we are able to complete our 

work. There are an innumerable number of issues that result from 

the delays that we face that are problematic. 

Mr. ISSA. And just hypothetically, let’s say that Congress is interested and sends you a letter because we are concerned that the 

people doing the Lois Lerner/IRS targeting investigation are in fact 

tainted in some way, either because of their conduct or some other 

matter, and you agree to look into it, isn’t that a classic example 

where it has to be done timely or irreparable harm to the process 

occurs? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. There are so many reviews that we do that it is 

imperative that we be able to do them timely. And we are not able 

to do that right now in a number of our ongoing reviews. 

Mr. ISSA. Well, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, I want to 

take a moment just to say that one of the few areas of specific legislative jurisdiction of the Oversight Committee is, in fact, the inspector generals. And it is my intention to conclude tomorrow’s 

hearing and take draft legislation, which has been done on a bipartisan basis over the last several years, working with the inspector 

generals and with their oversight groups, and offer that legislation. 
16 

And I hope both of you and your staffs will look at it ahead of time, 

give us your input. 

Because I think today’s hearing here tells us that we must, as 

a body, restate some principles and make some reforms in the IG 

Act to make it clear for the next President and the next Administration that we really meant what that legislation said. 

And I would yield to the Ranking Member. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, can I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman 

be given 1 additional minute? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Without objection. And I yield to the gentleman. 

Mr. CONYERS. And I thank you very much, my friend. 

But I do not think that I am in error in commending either the 

Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General. Because since 

2010, when the FBI first advanced this argument, the leadership 

of the Department of Justice has bent over backwards to make certain that the Office of the Inspector General has access to every 

last shred of evidence it requires. Attorney General Holder, Deputy 

Attorney General Cole have intervened personally at least a halfdozen times. 

And I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

And I would just ask Mr. Horowitz to comment on whether those 

interventions, in fact, represent the kind of timely and unobstructed activity, particularly when the Ranking Member said six 

times. Isn’t once enough to show leadership and six times a pattern 

of obstruction that you are not able to overcome? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I would say while the problem with the process, 

as I laid out, is significant in terms of our independence, it also 

delays our reviews, because we have to keep going up the chain to 

get to the leadership. And that is the continuing problem we face, 

which is why the leadership has made the decision to send it to the 

Office of Legal Counsel. We need that decision promptly. That is 

what we need to hear right away. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson 

Lee, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank the witness for being here and 

helping us ferret through what are important issues. 

And I certainly hope that we are not on another chain of condemnation of the Obama administration, that we are actually trying to get to the facts that will help the oversight of this Congress 

and, as well, work with the IGs at various agencies. I understand 

the DOJ, EPA, and Peace Corps—certainly, Peace Corps shocks 

me, because they are humanitarians around the world, and we 

hope there is nothing that they are doing except sending great 

Americans forward to be of help. 

But let me start by saying, have you had an absolute bar to 

being able to address issues that have come to your attention? 

Meaning that there has been an absolute dropping of the iron gate, 

the steel gate, the concrete wall. What have you faced in trying to 

do the work of the IG, the Inspector General? 
17 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Yeah, the issue hasn’t been roadblocks to our undertaking reviews. The issue has been getting the information to 

timely complete them. That has been the big problem. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And, you know, that is a distinction, to be 

very honest with you. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Correct. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I want to help you find a system that works. 

But as you well know and as I as a practicing lawyer previously, 

I will use the term ‘‘discovery.’’ And many times, particularly if we 

are in litigation against one of the big guys, there are several ways 

we can interpret discovery: one, that they are, in essence, 

roadblocking, or that the documents, whether it is a governmental 

entity, which of course, you know, we have immunity issues, but 

it is down in the bowels somewhere. 

So my question to you is: Is this, you know, an issue of getting 

a system that works? Because they are in the bowels—remember, 

we have gone tech, but 5 years ago, 10 years ago, or as many of 

us started in the United States Congress, for example, we were all 

paper. And we packed up papers at the end of the session, we 

boxed them up, we thought we were labeling them, and they were 

somewhere in a distant—in distant mind. 

Can you discern that we are speaking of what every American 

understands, ‘‘I filed it away somewhere, but where is it?’’ Would 

you? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. It is a great point, Congresswoman. In fact, I 

would have to say, in many respects, we feel like civil litigants, 

where we are opposite the party that is going through documents 

and having lawyers look through documents. 

For example, at the FBI now, the process in place because of 

their legal position, that they are not sure what we are entitled to 

legally, they send all of their documents—all of our requests now 

go through their Office of General Counsel. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And do you say they are sending them in good 

intent? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. They are sending it there because of their legal 

position. The result, though, is we have lawyers—like civil litigants, we are sitting waiting for their discovery reviews. We end 

up sometimes getting documents from them and then learning from 

witnesses documents weren’t produced. 

That is the problem with this situation that has been set up, and 

it has to be resolved. And it should be resolved in a way that gets 

us access immediately, frankly. There is really no reason for this 

process to even be undertaken. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But let me get you to—not put words in your 

mouth, but this is not seen by the IG—because I am going to get 

to the point of a solution—this is not seen in the IG as a malicious 

intent. Is this a malicious intent? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. No, I am not here to suggest a malicious intent. 

But the consequence of the legal argument put forward and the 

time it has taken is that our reviews go through these processes. 

And we asked for organizational charts—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And this has gone over a series of Administrations. I don’t know how long you have been here, but this has been 
18 

ongoing. Whether it has been President Bush’s administration or— 

there is a system in place. Is that my understanding? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, on the IG’s side, my understanding is this 

began in 2010. I started in 2012, but the FBI raised its objection 

in 2010. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And this is on the FBI end of it. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Correct. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. But you see no malicious intent. So the question is—we are holding a hearing here, and I want the hearing intent to be a resolution, not a condemnation. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Correct. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And so I think it is important for us to look— 

certainly, as you well know, we are not litigants, but litigants each 

have individual rights. I would have the right to protect my client, 

and, therefore, in discovery, I am going to make sure that I am giving precisely what is asked and not something that is just raiding, 

and you on the other side will be doing the same if you are representing a client. 

In this instance, we want transparent government. But, as well, 

the FBI or the EPA or those producing documents should, in fact, 

be adhering to the law. If the law is presently or a structure is 

presently in place that came in in 2010, let’s see how we can work 

it better. But FBI has a right to counsel, EPA has a right to counsel, and you have a right to transparency. 

Am I arguing or making the point that you are now saying, that 

you need some system that allows these documents to come forward? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Yeah, and what I am suggesting is the mindset 

has to change. In our earlier reviews, for example, the Robert 

Hanssen matter, very sensitive matter, we had direct access to FBI 

information. No one tried to interpose lawyers in that regard. 

We are part of the Department of Justice. We should have and 

Congress set up a system in the IG Act, as Congressman Conyers 

laid out, that says we are there to oversee them. If we are going 

to oversee the FBI, their lawyers should not be going through and 

deciding and filtering what documents we get and how fast we get 

them. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, you have just given us a framework to 

be able to address. And you are from the DOJ. We don’t have the 

inspectors from EPA. We don’t know what their issues are, or the 

Peace Corps. And, as I said, I think of them as twinkle toes, to a 

certain extent, in terms of the work they do. But what I would say 

to you is that this is a workable—you are presenting facts. 

And I want to be clear, as I end my query, that—and I know 

there is a series of sections that you come under and offered sections going forward. As I end, could you precisely just give, is that 

your suggestion, to move that lawyer structure? Or could you work 

with a lawyer structure that will then have a direction that their 

job is to be fair and cooperative with the IG? Because if you remove 

them totally, could you work with that? 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The time of the gentlewoman has expired. The 

Inspector General can answer the question. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Thank you. 
19 

Yes, I think the lawyers need to be removed from the process for 

routine requests. There may be issues that arise that require legal 

opinion. Right now, what is going on is every request goes that 

route. 

We should be able to get direct access to information. If a witness, the whistleblower, if a witness at the FBI wants to come to 

us with information, with documents, they ought to be able to do 

that directly. We shouldn’t have to go make a request to the legal 

counsel, have them go look through the documents, and get them 

eventually, hopefully, but then we often, as I said, learn from other 

witnesses that there are more materials out there that are relevant 

to our review. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to 

have this query. I think that we can solve a transparent approach—— 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The time of the gentlewoman has expired. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE [continuing]. Without the condemnation that I 

hope is not coming forward in this hearing. I thank the witness. 

I thank the Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 

Ohio—— 

Mr. JORDAN. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. GOODLATTE.—Mr. Jordan, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Horowitz, I just want to make sure I understood your last statement. Every single request that you are—information you are trying to get access to now goes through the Department of Justice’s legal counsel? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I am sorry, the FBI Office of General Counsel. 

Mr. JORDAN. Their general counsel—— 

Mr. HOROWITZ. The FBI set up that process. 

Mr. JORDAN. The FBI has. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Correct. 

Mr. JORDAN. And you are saying that is not political? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I am just—the Office of General Counsel is not 

a political appointee. They—— 

Mr. JORDAN. I understand that, but—— 

Mr. HOROWITZ [continuing]. Send it through their Office of General Counsel and—— 

Mr. JORDAN. And that just happened—how long ago did that 

practice start? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Within the last 2 years, 2 to 3 years. It may have 

been—— 

Mr. JORDAN. So since you came? 

Mr. HOROWITZ [continuing]. Just before I got—it may have been 

just before I came. 

Mr. JORDAN. Okay. 

I mean, I am concerned about all your work, but I am particularly concerned about one issue that has been a focus of the Oversight Committee and some other Committees, and that is the targeting by the Internal Revenue Service of people exercising their 

First Amendment rights and, frankly, have been very disappointed 

in the criminal investigation of the Justice Department for a number of reasons. 
20 

Fifteen months ago, then-FBI Director Mueller sat right in the 

chair you are sitting in, was asked three questions: Who is the lead 

agent, how many agents have been assigned to the case, and have 

you interviewed any of the victims? This is 1 month into the investigation, when it has been the major news story in the country, and 

his answers were: I don’t know, I don’t know, I don’t know. Didn’t 

exactly inspire confidence at that point. 

And then, since then, there has been early this year the leak by 

someone at Justice that no one is going to be prosecuted. There has 

been the President’s now-famous comment, ‘‘no corruption, not a 

smidgen.’’ And, of course, the lead agent, Ms. Bosserman, has 

maxed out contributions to the President’s campaign and yet she 

is the lead agent—or, excuse me, not agent, but lawyer on the case. 

So, in the second paragraph of this letter you signed, I think 

with 46 other inspector generals, it says this: ‘‘The Department of 

Justice faced restrictions on their access to certain records available to their agencies that were needed to perform their oversight 

work in critical areas.’’ 

So I want to know, what were those critical areas? Were you denied access to oversight work in critical areas? Was any of those 

critical areas related to the situation at the Internal Revenue Service and the criminal investigation that is going on there? Any inquiries in that subject matter that you were denied access to? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. No, that is not an area that I was referring to 

in my—— 

Mr. JORDAN. Anything related to that at all? I know we have 

asked you to look into certain things. We have asked you specifically, I think, to look into the fact that Ms. Bosserman was selected 

to sort of head up this investigation. So you were not denied—you 

didn’t face any restriction or denied access to any information regarding that? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. We have not faced any document restrictions 

with regard to that matter. 

Mr. JORDAN. So, changing gears a little bit then, one of the other 

issues that we were very nervous about, brought to our attention 

a few months ago, was the fact that the Internal Revenue Service 

gave 21 disks of information to the FBI regarding the targeting 

issue. That information was given to the FBI in 2010, 1.1 million 

pages. Some of that information contained 6103 confidential taxpayer information, donor information. 

Are you aware of that issue, Mr. Horowitz? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I am, from the news stories and various letters. 

Mr. JORDAN. Has your office looked into that at all just in any 

type of elementary way or examined any of that information at all? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. We try not to talk about matters that are nonpublic in our office and what we might look at or we might not be 

looking at. 

Mr. JORDAN. Well, let me ask you this way. Are you concerned 

about the fact that the Justice Department, specifically the FBI, 

had confidential taxpayer information and they had it for 4 years? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Yes, I have noted that information and taken 

note of it. 

Mr. JORDAN. Okay. 
21 

Last question, then. Just to be clear, though, none of the access 

you were denied, information you were denied in your oversight 

work dealt with the Internal Revenue Service? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. That is correct. 

Mr. JORDAN. Okay. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes 

the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Chaffetz, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I thank the Chairman and thank the Inspector 

General. I appreciate his work and his efforts. 

And I had the pleasure to interact with you on several different 

occasions. And you play a vital role in our system of checks and 

balances, and we wish you nothing but success and want to make 

sure that your efforts are unimpeded. 

And so I want to ask you some questions, though, about Operation Fast and Furious. Part of the indication from the Attorney 

General was that he could not answer questions, would not provide 

more information to the public, in part because the Inspector General was doing a review. 

How do you summarize your ability to access information regarding Fast and Furious? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. We had difficulty—and this occurred just before 

I arrived, and, of course, then I picked up the investigation—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Right. 

Mr. HOROWITZ [continuing]. But we had difficulty just before I 

arrived in gaining access to the grand jury information, because, as 

you know, Fast and Furious raised a number of prosecutive issues, 

as well as Title III information. As our report made public, there 

were numbers of wiretaps. We had difficulty obtaining both of 

those in a timely fashion because of the objections raised by components to providing it to us, because they did not read section 6(a) 

of the act as giving us authority to look at that information. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So what percentage of the information could you 

actually see? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I am not sure I could put a number on it, frankly, 

because I wasn’t here at the time, I wasn’t the IG at the time that 

these requests were going on. But I do know there was a fair 

amount of information that was potentially grand jury information. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And your interpretation is you should be able to— 

talk specifically about grand jury information and then also 

about—— 

Mr. HOROWITZ. So I think it is quite clear, in the first instance, 

that section 6(a) in the IG Act means we should have unfiltered, 

timely access to all records. The agency doesn’t get to pick and 

choose. So that would be the first basis. 

The second is we have always gotten grand jury information up 

till 2010 from the FBI and other department components either 

through the IG Act or through one of the exceptions in the grand 

jury law, which has an exception for attorneys for the government. 

I am an attorney, we are attorneys for the government, I work for 

the Department of Justice. That should be, I think, self-evident, 

but that apparently has not been how it has been interpreted by 

the FBI. 
22 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And how many people report to you in your 

group? How many IGs are you overseeing? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. My office has over 400 employees. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And so the process now, they are having to go 

and ask permission? From who is it that they are—specific to the 

FBI, who are they having to ask permission from? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. So what happens now is we send our requests— 

because we don’t have unfiltered access, we now have this review 

going on between our requests and us getting the documents. We 

make a request. The FBI, the Office of General Counsel, looks at 

it. And if it has an objection, it raises an objection, and then we 

start this process going. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And what are the so-called objections? What are 

their excuses as objections? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, we have had the grand jury objection. We 

have had objection to wiretap information, to Fair Credit Reporting 

Act Information. We also had during the course of our review an 

objection raised to personally identifiable information, for which 

there was no basis for an objection, but it took months before it got 

sufficiently elevated and the FBI withdrew its objection and we got 

the materials. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Now, at one point, there was an objection about 

an organizational chart? Can you tell—— 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Correct. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ [continuing]. Me about that? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. In two of our reviews, that has come up. 

One of the audits, an FBI-related matter relating to cyber, our 

review on cyber, the witness we were speaking with was prepared 

to hand us the organizational chart that we asked for, but we were 

told he couldn’t do that because it had to go through this process 

at the Office of General Counsel to review it, and so we were delayed for weeks. I actually had to send an email to the General 

Counsel saying, I don’t understand how this can be the case. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. A simple organizational chart. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. A simple organizational chart. 

In addition, recently, with the DEA, we requested an organizational chart. We got an organizational chart with names whited 

out. We then went back and said, well, we need the names, because 

one of the purposes is to see who we need to interview. And we 

then got a makeshift, unofficial organizational chart with names. 

I had to elevate that to the Administrator in order to get the organizational chart we were looking for. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Chairman, I am so glad we are holding this 

hearing, glad we are doing so in the Oversight and Government Reform Committee tomorrow, as well. This is outrageous. The Inspector General should have unfettered access to all the information 

they want. And when it has gotten to the point where they can’t 

even see an organizational chart, it has reached the level of absurdity that must be addressed immediately. 

I appreciate the bipartisan notion on this, and I yield back. 

Thank you. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Would the gentleman yield. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I would be happy to yield. 
23 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The gentleman’s point is well taken, because not 

only does the organizational chart give an indication of who they 

need to talk to, it also gives an indication of who should be held 

accountable. And accountability is, I think, a very serious issue in 

any government, but it is certainly an issue with this government. 

At this time, it is my pleasure to recognize the gentleman from 

North Carolina, Mr. Holding, for his questions for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HOLDING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In a limitation that is unique to DOJ, the Department’s OIG does 

not have authority to investigate all allegations of misconduct within the agency. So, while the OIG may review alleged misconduct 

by nonlawyers at DOJ, under section 8(e) of the IG Act, it does not 

have the same jurisdiction over alleged misconduct by DOJ attorneys when they are acting, you know, as lawyers in the Department. 

If you could explain for us, you know, how this distinction came 

about and kind of how the process works. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. This is really a historical anomaly. It is because 

of the fact that OPR existed before we did in 1988, and when our 

office was created in 1988 by Congress, they decided at that time 

to keep OPR in existence and have this jurisdictional limitation so 

that all matters went to OPR, the argument being that for many 

years OPR had experience doing these matters and so they should 

have authority. 

We are 25 years later now. We have been given authority over 

misconduct by all the other parts of the Justice Department. We 

have exercised that appropriately, effectively, and, most importantly, independently. It is time for us to have authority over all 

misconduct. There is no reason that agents’ alleged misconduct 

should be reviewed by the OIG but attorneys get to go to a nonstatutorily independent body for their conduct to be reviewed. 

Mr. HOLDING. So are you advocating, I guess, for—if you are advocating for that, would OPR continue to have any role at DOJ, or 

are you saying it is past its usefulness? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I think that would obviously be a decision Congress would need to make, but in the past when Congress has created these situations, they have kept in place, for example, the 

FBI’s OPR. And what has happened now is we have right of first 

refusal. So we take the most sensitive cases, the cases where there 

needs to be independent review, where there is criminal conduct alleged, where there are high-level officials involved, and OPR for 

DEA, FBI, the Marshals Service, et cetera, handled the other matters. 

That could stay as the process, or Congress could decide that we 

should have all attorney misconduct, no matter who or what it is 

alleged to have done. 

Mr. HOLDING. Right. 

In addition to OPR, there is the DOJ’s National Security Division 

Oversight Section, as well. And as you have put forward in your 

testimony, they are provided access to the information that the 

OIG has had trouble accessing, you know, despite the language of 

the statute. 
24 

So what is your understanding as to why DOJ leadership is more 

forthcoming with these documents and materials to these other entities as opposed to OIG? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Our presumption is because we are independent 

and they are not. And so there appears to have been a conclusion 

that there indeed does need to be a finding that our reviews are 

of assistance to the leadership. It is self-evident for the other entities—OPR, NSD—because they are working for the leadership. We 

are statutorily independent; Congress set it up that way. And, 

therefore, it would appear the decision has been made that somehow we need to go through this process so that it is clear our reviews are being overseen or are being of help to the leadership. 

And, of course, that is entirely inconsistent with what Congress has 

set up in the IG Act. 

Mr. HOLDING. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes 

the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Gohmert, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Inspector General. Appreciate your being here, 

and we appreciate your candor and your efforts at trying to get 

records. 

We had the Attorney General testifying here early during his 

tenure as Attorney General, and there was a reference about how 

close he was to—that he made—about how close he was to the Inspector General at the time. That caused me concern, because I 

had hoped that there was more independence from an inspector 

general. Nobody is supposed to be an inspector general and be big 

buddies with the Attorney General, although he has called me his 

buddy. I take that as a term of endearment, even though he said 

it, ‘‘You don’t want to go there, buddy.’’ 

But we never intended for you to have trouble, have any impediment to getting documents. 

And just so you are aware, Mr. Horowitz, for almost all of this 

Administration, I have been seeking the documents that the Justice Department gave to the defendants in the Holy Land Foundation who were convicted of supporting terrorism. This Attorney 

General has used such lines as, you know, classification issues, 

things like that when, actually, it is very clear, if you give documents from the Justice Department to terrorists, who are convicted, then it is probably okay to give them to Congress, and yet 

still, the most that I have been able to get after all these years is 

a notice that I can go online and check out some Web sites that 

have some of the documents that were admitted. 

So I share your pain in trying to get information from this Administration that should have been a slam dunk. Very easy. Just 

give me disks, give me the papers, whatever. I have been through 

boxes, I have been through, you know, masses of CDs as a judge 

and a lawyer. 

So what do you think we can do? Just the top thing that this 

Congress could do—well, put it this way, the House could do to 

make your job easier and make your position more effective? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I think, frankly, the—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. The number one. 
25 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Given where this is at OLC right now, I think 

having comments by the Ranking Member about the intent of Congress and pressing for an answer to the question by Congress on 

does section 6(a) of the IG Act that Congress passed mean what it 

says. That is the number one issue we are waiting to get an answer 

to right now. 

Mr. GOHMERT. All right. Well—— 

Mr. CONYERS. Gentleman yield? 

Mr. GOHMERT. Yes. 

Mr. CONYERS. I just wanted to invite you to join with me in this 

endeavor, because I think you are interested in and have learned 

a lot about it. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, and would certainly be willing if—I would 

think that a sense of the House might be what we should try to 

pass as quickly as possible to make clear about our bipartisan belief in the importance of inspector general, and I very much appreciate the Ranking Member, the former Chairman, understanding 

that this should be a bipartisan issue because we change majorities, the White House changes, but we have got to make sure inspectors general can get the information they need. So I very much 

appreciate the Ranking Member—— 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. I look forward to working with you. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Mr. Horowitz, you don’t have to come back here 

for a hearing to seek individual assistance in your job. Any of us 

that can help—I know all of us, I know the Chairman, any of us 

would be willing to assist in any way. You let us know what we 

can do. It is critical for any democratic republic, as this is supposed 

to be, to function efficiently if an inspector general cannot get direct access to the information he needs. So thank you for being 

here today. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Thank you, Congressman. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes the 

gentleman from Texas, Mr. Farenthold, for his questions for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Horowitz, thank you for being here. 

As a Member of this Committee and the Oversight and Government Reform Committee, I am acutely aware of the benefits that 

the inspector general community throughout government provide to 

the citizens of this country. You are the first line of watch dogs 

right there with the whistle blowers that combat waste, fraud, and 

abuse in the government. 

The idea behind inspector generals were they worked within the 

agency, but they were independent. So they understood how the 

agency worked. They felt like there would be less reluctance of the 

agencies to share information with the IG for internal investigations and the like. 

But the stuff we have been talking about and hearing about 

today has taken this into politics, and that is where I think the 

trouble is. Again, one of the advantages of the IG is they are within 

the organization so ostensibly nonpartisan. I mean, that is the intent, and, you know, rather than having Congress subpoena a 

bunch of documents and do an investigation ourselves where poli-
26 

tics get infused in it, a lot of stuff can be taken care of by the IGs 

within the agencies. 

But this situation seems politicized. Would it be—is that the 

sense that you get? Thereis a political element to this? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. You know, from our standpoint, what we have 

seen is simply, in lots of different reviews, objections being raised. 

No one has said to us that it is being done maliciously or for other 

reasons. I will let others decide, you know, how this all came about 

and why. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Well, it has certainly been my experience in 

trying to pry information out of this Administration that delay, 

stonewall, and, quite frankly, when dealing with the IRS, outright 

lie seems to be the rule of the day, and eventually, you know, some 

of these—you all got some of the documents that you all were after, 

but this was only after the leadership in the DOJ determined that 

they were positive, and, again, this points to politicism of it. And 

I guess I don’t have another question. I just want to express publicly and on the record my dismay at the dismantling of what I 

think has been one of the most effective oversight and reform tools 

within the government, the inspector general, as being coopted, 

and, in my opinion, politicized and misused. It is a horrible indictment of an Administration that early on said they wanted to be the 

most transparent Administration in history, and, clearly, that has 

not been the case, and this is just another example of it, and I 

struggle not to be numbed by it. It is like we have another scandal 

that comes out every 2 weeks, any one of which would have had 

folks’ head exploding not that many years ago, and it is disheartening, and I am going to yield back the remainder of my time. 

Thank you. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

Recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Collins, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As coming back in, we get a lot of things going on, but I am glad 

you are here, and, I mean, it is really good. 

Serving on Oversight and as well as Judiciary, the importance of 

what you do is really amazing to the government. I wish we actually had more work in this way. 

And I think, you know, from my folks in the district of Georgia, 

we were just basically stunned to learn that you don’t have access 

to information that, frankly, I as an attorney, but others as well, 

believe you are entitled to. 

Leading up to the letter, leading up to the issues, based on your 

experience is, it particular people? Is it some body? Is it just an 

agency culture under this, you know, environment and this agency 

leader? What do you think led up to the necessity for them to write 

this letter and say, you know, we don’t think you are getting the 

access that you need? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Yeah. This all began a couple years before I became IG, but there had been a series of reports that we issued and 

reviews that we issued that were critical of some of the handling 

of some matters. This followed shortly thereafter. And what happens once this begins, is we start to see this among other components and in more regular reviews, and the road blocks become 
27 

more regular, and that is the problem with not resolving it and 

dealing with it promptly. 

Mr. COLLINS. Well, and I think, just one, it gives the impression 

if you are—you know, especially the government-to-government 

kind of—if you are roadblocking yourself, it is like there is something—and, frankly, it just leaves the opinion you are hiding something, and that is just the way it looks. 

Your view of the department’s use of material witness statute, 

which was published this past Thursday, reports that the FBI conducted a page-by-page preproduction review of all documents requested by the OIG and said it redacted anything it considered to 

be grand jury material. As a result, the review states, Documents 

were not useful, and the review came to standstill. While the Deputy Attorney General ultimately granted you access to certain documents under the foreign intelligence exception of the Federal 

Rules Criminal Procedure, this avenue was not without its delays. 

How long did the OIG have to wait for the grand jury material 

in all? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. It took us almost a year, from start to finish, to 

get the material we asked for in terms of completeness of the process. 

Mr. COLLINS. And there was really, at this point, no reason for 

that year’s delay? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. There was no reason. 

Mr. COLLINS. Okay. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. From our standpoint, certainly. 

Mr. COLLINS. Okay. So, basically, again, we are stopping, hiding, 

whatever you want to call it something—because—because, frankly, if you are going to stick with a story, it is like I have told my 

kids: If you are going to lie once, you—or start telling stories once, 

then you are going to have to tell the story the whole way through. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Right. 

Mr. COLLINS. And now, they are coming back and now giving you 

the information when they first said they couldn’t. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Right. And—and I will add, on top of the delay 

to our review, you have a whole bunch of lawyers at—in the FBI, 

who have a lot of things on their plates, spending time going 

through page by page documents we should be getting. You have 

my auditors and teams, lawyers, et cetera, being put on hold, not 

being able to complete the work. So thereis waste along with it. It 

is not only the delay. There’s this wasted resources that are going 

on. 

Mr. COLLINS. I understand, and I think that is another whole 

issue is we got to deal with is wasted resources when we are in an 

environment where we are trying to find every, you know, penny 

we can to properly use taxpayer dollars. 

Also, according to that report, while they are waiting for a DOJ 

attorney to produce the grand jury material, the FBI was busy redacting several other categories of information from documents it 

was providing to you. 

What information was that, and what was their rational? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Well, the FBI would come to us with a list of 

areas that it had concerns about producing, and so we ended up 

having to negotiate and discuss with them a whole variety of cat-
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egories beyond that before we could get what we thought was complete, but, again, since they are controlling the process and we are 

not getting direct access, we are relying on their interpretation of 

these statutes and whatis relevant and not relevant. 

Mr. COLLINS. And, again, not you know, to disparage in a large 

sense, but in the sense, we are looking at an investigation here 

that is coming internally as something that should be worked together on and not pitting, you know, us against them or—this is 

just an honest, truthful mentality. What are we doing? We just got 

back off a working period in which we were—I was in three town 

halls that is the biggest thing that I hear from most of our folks 

is they just—they don’t trust the government anymore, and I made 

many discussions about this. They would come up and they would 

say, you know, what can we do? We have got to restore trust, and 

part of this trust factor is going to our own inspector general process, going to our own internal checklist and making sure that we 

are not, for just the sake of what I call busy work, doing that. 

You know, and the letter was courageous. I mean, I think there 

is a lot of things that could be happening. In my short amount of 

time here real quickly, other than the hearings and bringing this— 

and I appreciate the Chairman for doing this, what action do you 

hope Congress will take in response to what has been brought forth 

today and what we have talked about? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I think the kind of the statements and message 

that has been put forward by the Ranking Member today, who 

talked about what happened back in 1978, but other statements, 

for example, in 1988 and in the 1993 reform, as to the—our office, 

what was meant by ‘‘accessed information’’? Did Congress intend 

us, when it gave us authority in the early ’90’s, to oversee the FBI 

and the DEA, that we should actually be able to look at all the 

records in their files like grand jury and Title III information. The 

answer has to be yes; otherwise, giving us that authority would be 

largely meaningless. 

Mr. COLLINS. Well, I think you summed it up very well, and I 

thank the Chairman for bringing this and the Ranking Member to 

be a part of this, because if you don’t have access, then basically 

we are telling the American people we are doing something we are 

not doing, and has got to step to this trust issue. Americans demand more. We have got to be accountable and transparent to that. 

I thank you for what you do. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Chair thanks the gentleman. 

The Chair has one additional follow-up question, and then I will 

check with the Ranking Member, see if he has any additional questions hewould like to ask. 

The FBIhas argued that based on its interpretation of section 

6(b)(2) of the Inspector General Act, it has the authority to refuse 

your requests—Office of Inspector General requests for documents 

so long as it deems its refusal to be, quote, ‘‘reasonable.’’ 

Will you explain the basis for this conclusion by the FBI and 

your opinion as to whether thereis any merit to that position? 

Mr. HOROWITZ. Yeah. Frankly, I don’t think it has any merit. I 

think Congress quite clearly put in place in section 8(e) of the act 

the process that is to be followed if there are sensitive documents 
29 

that shouldn’t be disclosed to the IG or the IG shouldn’t be able 

to disclose publicly. That leaves that power with the Attorney General, not with anybody else in the organization, and so we disagree 

entirely with that. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And where does that phrase ‘‘reasonable’’ emanate from? Do you know. 

Mr. HOROWITZ. I think that is their interpretation of the IG act. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you. 

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I have no additional questions. 

I want to thank again the Inspector General for his very thorough and complete testimony today. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And I want to join you in thanking Mr. Horowitz for his testimony, and we will work together in a bipartisan 

way to make sure that anything the Congress can do to bolster 

your ability to conduct neutral investigations into how our government, under any leadership, operates. I think it is important to set 

the precedent correctly, as we did in 1978, and if we need to reinforce that today, we will do so. 

So I thank the gentleman, and this concludes today’s hearing. 

And we thank the Inspector General for joining us. 

Without objecting, all Members will have 5 legislative days to 

submit additional written questions for the witness or additional 

materials for the record. 

And this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:21 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(31) 

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD
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Supplemental Material submitted by the Honorable Michael E. Horowitz, 

Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice 

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Material submitted by the Honorable Spencer Bachus, 

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