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i 

87–858 2014

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–95] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR 

AND LAND FORCES HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NAVY, MARINE CORPS, 

AND AIR FORCE COMBAT AVIATION 

PROGRAMS 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 26, 2014 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois 

PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

JULIE HERBERT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 26, 2014, Fiscal Year 2015 Navy, Marine Corps, and 

Air Force Combat Aviation Programs ................................................................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 26, 2014 ................................................................................... 29 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 26, 2014 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NAVY, MARINE CORPS, AND AIR FORCE COMBAT 

AVIATION PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ................................................ 3 

Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ...................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Bogdan, Lt Gen Christopher C., USAF, Program Executive Officer for the 

F–35 Joint Program Office .................................................................................. 4 

Grosklags, VADM Paul A., USN, Principal Military Deputy, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development and Acquisition; accompanied 

by LtGen Robert E. Schmidle, Jr., USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, and RADM Michael C. Manazir, USN, Director, Air Warfare, OPNAV 

N98 ........................................................................................................................ 17 

LaPlante, William A., Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; 

accompanied by Lt Gen Burton M. Field, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff 

for Operations, Plans and Requirements, U.S. Air Force ................................. 18 

Sullivan, Michael J., Director of Acquisition and Sourcing, U.S. Government 

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Bogdan, Lt Gen Christopher C. ....................................................................... 33 

Grosklags, VADM Paul A., joint with LtGen Robert E. Schmidle, Jr., 

and RADM Michael C. Manazir .................................................................. 76 

LaPlante, William A., joint with Lt Gen Burton M. Field ............................ 106 

Sullivan, Michael J. .......................................................................................... 64 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Response to Request for Information on Department of the Navy’s Aviation Procurement Programs ......................................................................... 135 
Page

IV 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Jones, Walter B. ............................................................................................... 167 

Smith, Adam ..................................................................................................... 167 

Turner, Michael ................................................................................................ 157 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NAVY, MARINE CORPS, AND AIR 

FORCE COMBAT AVIATION PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 26, 2014. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:37 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R. Turner 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. Call to order the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and 

Land Forces. 

I want to apologize for being late. I was doing the important people’s work of being on the House floor congratulating the University of Dayton, which is in my community, and which I am alumnus, on entering the Sweet 16, and wishing them well on their 

game tomorrow night. 

But, this committee meets here today to receive testimony on the 

Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force budget requests for combat aircraft programs for fiscal year 2015. 

Our hearing today will consist of two panels. In the first panel, 

we will hear testimony on the F–35 program, and the second panel 

will consist of Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force acquisition and 

requirements official, who will provide testimony on the services’ 

combat aviation programs. 

On the first panel, we welcome Lieutenant General Christopher 

Bogdan, F–35 Program Executive Officer, and Mr. Michael Sullivan, Director of Acquisition and Sourcing, Government Accountability Office [GAO]. 

The second panel, our witnesses are: Vice Admiral Paul 

Grosklags, Principal Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of 

the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition); Lieutenant 

General Robert Schmidle, Deputy Commandant of the Marine 

Corps for Aviation; Rear Admiral Michael Manazir, Director of the 

Air Warfare Division for the U.S. Navy; Dr. William LaPlante, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; and Lieutenant 

General Burton Field, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, 

Plans, and Requirements. 

I thank you all for your service and your testimonies today. 

We have a number of issues to cover today. But my opening remarks will focus on the F–35 and budget reductions in the Navy, 

Marine Corps, and Air Force budget requests. 
2 

The F–35, a fifth-generation fighter, is required to achieve the effects necessary to win in an integrated anti-access/area denial [A2/ 

AD] environment. Over the last year, slow but steady progress was 

achieved in development, production, and operations. The F–35 did 

well in testing last year, but with about one-half of flight testing 

completed. Much testing remains to demonstrate and verify its performance. 

This year, as was the case last year, F–35 software development 

is still of particular concern. The GAO’s primary concern is that 

software development may be taking longer than expected, resulting in a potential delay of initial operational capability for the 

three F–35 variants. 

The Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces also shares that concern. And for the fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization 

Act [NDAA], the subcommittee included a provision that would require an independent team to review the F–35 software development program and provide recommendations for improvement. This 

provision was adopted by the House-Senate Conference Committee 

and included in the fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act. We expect the Department of Defense to send us that report no later than June of this year. 

This is an area the subcommittee continues to watch to ensure 

that the final software block of the development phase is completed 

on schedule. While the capability of the F–35 is needed for the future, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps cannot ignore the 

modernization and life extension upgrades for their legacy fleets of 

AV–8Bs, FA–18s, F–15s, and F–16s, and the sustainment of those 

fleets. 

As most of you know, I didn’t support the Budget Control Act 

[BCA] of 2011. But now, unfortunately, the effects of this act and 

sequestration have become apparent in this budget request which 

will reduce both capacity and capability in our Strike Fighter 

forces, resulting in higher risk in achieving military objectives in 

the future. 

Last year, the fiscal year 2015 through 2019, the Navy anticipated procurement of 69 F–35Cs. This year, the Navy’s budget 

plans for only 36, a 52 percent reduction. These F–35C procurement reductions have resulted in an increase in the Navy’s Strike 

Fighter shortfall, from 18 last year to 35 this year, in the 2023 

timeframe. With fewer F–35Cs, the Navy Strike Fighter fleet will 

be less capable. 

For the Air Force, budget reductions have required the Air Force 

to lower its F–35 procurement in fiscal years 2015 from 30 to 26, 

a 13 percent reduction. Additionally, the Air Force proposes retirement of the entire A–10 fleet, and 51 F–15Cs in the Future Years 

Defense Program. While the Air Force did not report a Strike 

Fighter shortfall last year, this year the Air Force projects that it 

will have a shortfall of 175 Strike Fighter aircraft in fiscal year 

2019, 9 percent below its required inventory of 1900 Strike Fighter 

aircraft. 

The Air Force has also proposed the termination of the F–16’s 

Combat Avionics Program Extension Suite, or CAPES. CAPES 

would equip the block 40, 42, 50, and 52 fleets with new radars 

and defense systems that increase survivability against emerging 
3 

threats. Without CAPES, the Air Force F–16 fleet will be less capable. 

I look forward to the testimony today of our witnesses, and I 

hope that they will be able to expand on the risks associated with 

the capacity and capability reductions in our combat aviation 

forces. 

And, with that, I would like to recognize my good friend and colleague Loretta Sanchez. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, 

for being before us today. 

Today’s hearing will focus on fiscal year 2015 Navy, Marine 

Corps, and Air Force requests for tactical aircraft development, 

modifications, and procurement. And like almost all the parts of 

the DOD [Department of Defense] budget, there are significant reductions and changes being proposed in this area because of the decline in the overall funding picture. However, it is important to remember that today the United States remains the only country 

that can deploy and maintain thousands of combat aircraft almost 

anywhere in the world. 

The U.S. Navy and the Marine Corps total tactical aircraft fleet 

alone, is larger than almost any other nation’s entire air force. In 

addition, the United States also remains the world’s leader in tactical aircraft technology, including stealth, unmanned aircraft, engine performance, electronic warfare, precision-guided weapons, et 

cetera, et cetera. 

So it seems that the critical question for today’s hearing is how 

the 2015 budget proposal affects the United States current dominance in the area of air warfare. And I think that this—that is one 

of the subcommittee’s most important roles, is trying to maintain 

our advantage with respect to that. 

Also want to note that complex aircraft programs take a long 

time to come to fruition, and so whatever we do today is going to 

impact what we look like in the future. And making the right investments of course may not pay off for a decade or more. 

For example, it was investment decisions by the DOD and Congress in the 1970s that allows us to have a highly effective F–16 

and F–18 aircraft still in the Air Force and the Navy today. In the 

time, there were many critics of that aircraft. They were said to be 

too expensive, too complicated, unaffordable to maintain, and to be 

sure, in both cases, it took time to get the aircraft as capable as 

they are today. 

And I want to say that because eventually we fix the problems 

and, of course, these are some of our most important tactical fighters today. And I think it is important to see that as we look at this 

F–35 program, which is what this first panel is going to be about. 

Because the F–35 also has many critics, and this program is very 

complex. And we have earlier versions flying today that aren’t as 

reliable as we would like them to be, don’t meet all the capability 

goals that we need. 
4 

But we need to figure out whether they are on the right trajectory to ensure that we have the right product for our men and 

women in the military, especially keeping in mind the history, for 

example, of the F–16 and the F–18. 

So we have to make decisions today on the F–35 that will impact 

the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps in the 2020s and 

the 2030s and maybe beyond, and at the same time we have to ensure that taxpayer funds are used correctly. And so I am really 

looking forward to this presentation today and this give and take, 

because this is a highly complex program. 

And, of course, the second panel on today’s hearing will focus on 

all the other tactical and intelligence aircraft programs beyond the 

F–35, and there are a lot of pressing issues there also. One of them 

is the fate of the A–10 aircraft, for example. The Air Force is proposing to retire all 283 A–10s over the next 5 years. But in most 

cases, they propose to replace them with F–16s or F–35s or other 

aircraft. 

And, you know, production line of the F–18 is—which is scheduled to close in 2016, some in Congress are proposing that we procure more EA–18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft. But it 

comes at a very high price, and the Navy may not need more of 

these aircraft if it ends up eliminating an aircraft carrier and an 

associated wing, for example. 

And, finally, this subcommittee has to consider the whole arena 

of unmanned aircraft, the ones we fly today and the ones we have 

for the future. You know, we had the Global Hawk on the cutting 

block recently and it was kept in, and now the reversal is taking 

place. Now we want to retire the U–2 in 2016 and keep the Global 

Hawk. So both aircrafts have different advantages to them. I look 

forward to hearing from the Air Force, why they have gone in this 

direction, for example. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I think this is going to be a very interesting 

hearing. 

Thank you. 

Mr. RUNYAN [presiding]. Thank the ranking member. 

And with that, I now recognize General Bogdan for his oral testimony. 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN CHRISTOPHER C. BOGDAN, USAF, 

PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR THE F–35 JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE 

General BOGDAN. Thank you, Congressman. 

Congressman and Ranking Member Sanchez and distinguished 

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to address this committee and discuss the F–35 Lightning II program 

today. Over the past few years, we focused on creating and maintaining a realistic program baseline for DOD’s largest acquisition 

program. And despite a turbulent past, the program is making slow 

but steady progress on all fronts to include technical improvements 

and driving costs out of the program. I believe the F–35 program 

is headed in the right direction now, and I am confident in our ability to meet U.S. Marine Corps initial operating capability and Air 

Force initial operating capability in the summers of 2015 and 2016, 

respectively, with all the capabilities our warfighters need. 
5 

We are now seeing the benefits of a disciplined systems engineering process that we instituted a few years ago in response to many 

of our technical issues, including improvements in the helmet, the 

hook, our fuel dump capability, weapons capability, lightning protection, and night and all-weather flying. We are closely managing 

F–35 on-board and off-board software, and software still remains 

the number one risk on the program. 

We have also fundamentally changed the way we are developing 

the ALIS system, our [Automatic] Logistics Information System, 

and are starting to see some incremental improvements there. 

We are also fully committed to making the F–35 more affordable 

in both the cost of buying the airplanes and the cost of operating 

and sustaining the aircraft. 

Finally, I want to thank the Congress and the Department of Defense for their support during the past 2 years of budget instability. 

The program has weathered this storm relatively intact. We have 

made no changes to the development program, and our aircraft 

quantities were preserved in fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014, 

though the Department has reduced quantities in fiscal year 2015. 

I would like to close by saying that my team is focused and committed to doing the very best we can for the warfighters, the taxpayers, and our partners to ensure the F–35 meets all of our needs. 

To that end, my team is rising to the challenge of managing this 

very large and complex program with integrity, transparency, accountability, and discipline. 

I ask that you hold me and my team accountable in the coming 

years to ensure that we develop and deliver the warfighting capability that this country needs and expects. 

I look forward to taking your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Bogdan can be found in the 

Appendix on page 33.] 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Sullivan. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR OF ACQUISITION AND SOURCING, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Sanchez, members of the subcommittee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on the F–35 

Lightning II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter. With estimated costs near $400 billion today, the F–35 is the Department’s 

most costly acquisition program. And with its three variants, it will 

provide fifth-generation fighter capabilities for the United States 

Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, as well as eight international 

partners. 

As we have reported in the past, the program’s acquisition strategy originally called for high levels of concurrency between testing 

and production, and, as a result, it has encountered significant 

costs and schedule growth, and has been restructured three times. 

First in 2003 and then again in 2007 and then again in 2012, 

when the Department increased the program’s cost estimates, extended its testing and delivery schedules, and deferred the procure-
6 

ment of 410 aircraft into the future. Since that time, the program 

has remained stable; costs and schedule has also remained stable. 

My testimony today is based on our March 2014 report, which 

was just released Monday, and I believe the committee has a copy 

of. And I would like to just make some quick points on the risk the 

program still faces concerning software development and future 

funding as well as some of the progress they have made with regard to manufacturing. 

Software development challenges continued through 2013 due 

largely to delays in getting the software for Block 2B to flight test, 

then limited capability once it was delivered, and the need to fix 

and retest multiple software versions. So there is a lot of churn 

with the software development at this time. 

In addition to risking the delivery of less than required initial operating capabilities for the Marines by 2015, these delays could increase the already significant concurrency between testing and procurement and result in additional cost growth. So there is—I am 

talking about this in terms of risk potential, not necessarily things 

that are happening today. 

Finally, without a clear understanding of the initial capabilities 

that will be delivered, the services may not be able to make fully 

informed resource allocation decisions. To execute the program as 

planned, the Department plans to increase annual funding steeply 

over the next 5 years. It has a total of more than $50 billion in its 

current Future Years Defense Plan, and after that, it then plans 

to sustain an average of about $12.6 billion per year for this aircraft through 2037. 

So annual funding of this magnitude clearly poses long-term affordability risks, especially given the nature of the current fiscal 

environment. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics has directed the program to find ways to 

reduce unit costs on these aircraft before full-rate production begins. But meeting those targets will be challenging, as significant 

cost reductions are still needed there. 

Sustainment cost estimates also strain affordability constraints. 

The Department’s most recent estimates for operating and supporting the F–35 fleet are somewhere between $850 billion and $1 

trillion, which Department officials have deemed unaffordable. The 

key driver separating those estimating assumptions is assumptions 

about future inflation rates. 

On the upside, the aircraft manufacturing continued to improve 

in 2013. As the number of aircraft in production has increased, 

manufacturing efficiency has increased significantly, and the contractor has steadily reduced the overall labor hours needed to manufacture the aircraft. 

In 2013, the contractor delivered 35 aircraft to the government, 

5 more than it delivered in 2012 and 26 more than it delivered in 

2011, and it is on track to deliver 39 more aircraft in 2014. It has 

now delivered just over 100 aircraft and has another 75 in process. 

To summarize, the Department has made a number of difficult 

decisions through the years to put the F–35 on more sound footing, 

but more risks lie ahead, and it will be important as to how these 

risks are managed. If software delays continue, if funding falls 

short of expectations, or if unit cost targets cannot be met, the De-
7 

partment may have to consider whether to proceed with production 

as planned or alter production rates in the future. 

At this point, we believe the most pressing issue is the effect 

software delays are likely to have on the initial capabilities that 

each military service will receive. To make informed decisions 

about weapons system investments and force structure, the services must have a clear understanding of the capabilities that the 

initial operational F–35 will possess. Thus in our annual report, we 

recommended that the Department assess the capabilities that can 

realistically be delivered to each of the services by their established 

ILC [initial launch capability] dates and share the results of the assessment with the Congress and the services as soon as possible. 

Mr. Chairman, that completes my prepared statement. I would 

be pleased to take questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan can be found in the Appendix on page 64.] 

Mr. TURNER [presiding]. Mr. Sullivan, since you are from WrightPatterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, it would be perfectly appropriate to say ‘‘Go Flyers’’ at the end of your testimony. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am also a brand new 

grandfather, if I could. Charlie Sullivan was born Monday. 

Mr. TURNER. Excellent. Congratulations. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mother and son are doing well. 

Mr. TURNER. Excellent. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Go Flyers. 

Mr. TURNER. There you go. 

You know, obviously, Mr. Sullivan, as I stated in my opening 

statement, we are very concerned about the software delays. And 

recognizing that the issue is one of both, you know, operational capability and inventiveness, it is not as if we are—this is off-theshelf software completion, this is where actual advances need to 

occur. 

What is your concerns about what these additional impacts could 

be on the program with these delays? This obviously is one that 

can cascade, the software being one of the leading aspects of development. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. That is a good question, Mr. Chairman. I 

think there are two parts to that. The first one is just the risk that 

you don’t get the software completed, that you don’t get full capability, and I think there still is risk in that area. Very, very, very 

complex software development has to go to get the sensor fusion 

and all of the communications across many different platforms that 

they are going to need on this aircraft. By the time they complete 

block 3F, which is the final software. 

So there is still an enormous amount of complexity. This program 

had started its software and has developed it in blocks, from block 

0 all the way up to Block 3F. And as they have delivered the 

blocks, there has been spillover from one block to the next block, 

and so that creates inefficiencies, more churn, and kind of a more 

chaotic environment. So there is all of that the program is working 

with now is trying to get the earlier blocks finished up while they 

are still trying deliver very complex software. A lot of costs and 

schedule strain on that. 
8 

And, the other thing that it means to the program, I think, I 

mentioned in my statement that concurrency was a huge issue on 

this aircraft program. And the longer it takes to complete that software development, of course, the longer you remain concurrent between testing and production, and that means that more changes 

could take place before you finally get the aircraft that you want. 

You might also have to keep software engineers around longer, you 

might have to stay in development longer. All of that stuff creates 

cost and inefficiency. 

Mr. TURNER. General, looking at the GAO’s report about the software delays, obviously the concern is the end goal of delivering 

warfighting capabilities, the concerns about the warfighting capabilities to the Marine Corps by July 2015. Could you please describe these impacts, especially since we are in a period of time 

where the Air Force is looking at divesting of other weapons systems, aircraft. Is the gap going to get bigger? 

General BOGDAN. Sir, right now, the three increments of software that I am watching very carefully and, oh, by the way, when 

Mr. Sullivan talks about concurrency, we are also a little bit concurrent when it comes to software development. Because we are 

currently finishing up our 2B capability, interim capability. At the 

same time, we are in the middle of our 3I capability, which is the 

exportable version of the F–35, and then finally that 3F capability. 

So when I make my comments, I will have to talk about each of 

those individually. Because, quite frankly, the risk is different for 

all three. 

For the 2B capability that the U.S. Marine Corps is going to use 

to declare IOC [initial operational capability] and limited warfighting capability, we are tracking 206 individual capabilities within 

the software, and those are what the U.S. Marine Corps needs to 

declare IOC. 

As of today, 80 percent of those have been verified as good to go. 

We have 20 percent left. And I have two more increments of software to go this summer before I finish flight testing for 2B at the 

end of the year. 

My assessment, and my look at the technical risk and the flight 

test program, is that I am within 30 days of completing 2B on time. 

So fundamentally very, very little risk in delivering software-wise 

the capability to the U.S. Marine Corps. 

What I will tell you is more troubling for Marine Corps IOC, and 

I will just mention it here, and we can get it later. Modifying all 

of the older airplanes to the production-representative configuration that the Marine Corps needs to go to war with, is even more 

of a problem than the software in 2015. So that is 2B. I am pretty 

confident on the software capability, a little less confident on the 

mods [modifications]. 

The 3I capability, for U.S. Air Force, also quite confident. They 

have an extra year for us to get it right before they declare IOC, 

and it has the same capability as 2B. So, fundamentally, there is 

some time margin built into that. 

And, finally, the last capability, the 3F capability, that is the one 

I am most concerned about in terms of schedule delay. I will tell 

you today, if we don’t do anything else and we just continue to perform the way we are performing right now and not getting any bet-
9 

ter, we are going to be somewhere between 4 and 6 months late 

on that software. It is as simple as that. And that has impact not 

only on the U.S. Navy’s ability to declare IOC, but some of our 

partners and their ability to field what they consider to be a minimum capable airplane. 

That is unmitigated. I haven’t done any—there are a lot of things 

I can do between now and 2018 to bring that back to a more reasonable timeframe. But if I had to tell you today, I would say 4 to 

6 months late. And it has mainly to do with the complexity of the 

software work we have to do in 2016 and 2017. It is really, really 

hard stuff. And I am just projecting that we are going to have some 

trouble getting it done. 

Mr. TURNER. General, my last question, the news articles that 

Italy may be delaying its acquisition of 90 F–35s, what is the status of the foreign acquisition programs with our partners? It obviously both significantly affects our cost structure but also the development path. 

General BOGDAN. Absolutely, sir. The biggest impact our partners have today when it comes to the quantity of airplanes they are 

buying and when they buy them is the unit cost of the airplane. 

In fact, the partners have a greater impact on either reducing the 

cost of the airplane or actually—I won’t say increasing the cost of 

the airplane, because it will always cost cheaper, later. We have 

made that commitment to the enterprise. But that cost reduction 

gets smaller. Even greater than any movement our services have 

made at this time. So they are very, very important to the cost 

curve as we call it. 

Relative to Italy, some of the press reports, at least in the conversations I have had with the senior leadership with the Italian 

Air Force and their Ministry of Defense, and I have had conversations with them recently, their Prime Minister has said that future 

investment in the F–35 is on hold. Okay, so they have committed 

to buying a certain number of airplanes in their FACO [Final Assembly and Check Out], or their fabrication facility in Cameri, 

Italy. 

And they will buy those airplanes. But their future buy beyond 

that, beyond the first 20-some-odd airplanes is on hold until such 

time as their Parliament decides what to do. So that is an instability for us that could affect future prices. 

Turkey, the same. They have delayed their buy 2 years. They 

were anticipating this year that they would come on board and 

fully commit to buying. They have not yet. So we are waiting there. 

And Canada would be the third country where we are waiting to 

see how their political process plays out. 

If those three partners choose to push airplanes out or choose to 

reduce their buy on airplanes, it will have an effect on the price 

of all the other partners and the services buying the airplanes to 

the tune of about 2–3 percent increase in price. 

Mr. TURNER. General, to the extent that our subcommittee may 

help in trying to communicate some of the issues of the advantages 

of the F–35 and foreign acquisition decisionmaking, please let us 

know. We know there is a lot of legislative discussion among their 

Parliaments and legislators that perhaps we can help effect. Please 
10 

do and include us if there are issues where we can make a difference. 

Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I will just note for those who are on committee who haven’t been 

following this, as we go out on the timeline, the per-unit cost of the 

F–35, supposedly, theoretically, will come down. And so when our 

foreign partners are looking, they want to catch the end part of 

that in order to have their per-unit costs come down, rather than 

catch the front end. So a lot of them are figuring—so it is not because they don’t want them, it is because they want to find the 

sweetest spot they possibly can when it comes to per-unit costs. Am 

I not correct, General? 

General BOGDAN. You said that very well, ma’am. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Yes. 

General BOGDAN. However, the other part of that is, as you 

know, the other side of that coin is, those people that need the airplane sooner—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Right. 

General BOGDAN [continuing]. Will now pay that price. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Right. Or those of us—with the U.S., if our foreign 

partners move out on that timeline, then the cost per unit for us, 

sitting on that timeline of keeping the production going and bringing down the cost, is higher to us. So it is a real interesting game 

we play. 

General BOGDAN. But there is one thing, and I don’t want to interrupt, our FMS [foreign military sales] customers, who are different from our partners, they are actually offsetting a lot of the 

movement that our partners have made in pushing airplanes out 

and the U.S. services. So our FMS customers are filling the gap, 

so to speak, over the next few years, and that is helpful. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. General, you have been quoted many, many 

times as saying that there is no more money and no more time, 

when it come to the F–35 program. Correct? 

General BOGDAN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Well, just this week, the committee was briefed by 

your office and was told that in 2015, our partner nations on this 

program have agreed to provide $400 million in additional funding. 

While that is good news, in theory, that our partners are willing 

to provide the extra money, does that mean that we have $400 million cost increase in development that these funds are covering up? 

What is happening—— 

General BOGDAN. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. SANCHEZ [continuing]. With these $400 million that you told 

me—— 

General BOGDAN. Well—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ [continuing]. That it is enough, remember you 

spent it, it is done. You are going to work within that time, that 

time and that money allotment. I have heard this over and over, 

and now I am getting, oh, by the way, somebody is throwing in another $400 million into the pot. 

General BOGDAN. Yes, ma’am. A couple of things. The money 

that the partners have generously offered for development work 

came from prior savings that they had on the program in terms of 
11 

what they had budgeted for and what they are paying for airplanes 

and paying for things right now. 

So this was not our partners going back and asking the governments for more money. They didn’t do that. What we did with 

this—what we are going to do with that money is we are going to 

use it in development to offset what the services would have to pay 

over the next 5 years. The price of—the end price of development 

has not changed. All we have done is moved that $400 million into 

the SDD [Strategic Deployment Document] line so that we could 

help offset the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force’s bill for 

the next 5 years for development. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So what—I am trying to understand what you just 

said to me. But it seems to me that what you said was our partners 

have—they had allocated more, they are going to spend less for 

what they thought they were going to get. They have some additional monies they are going to put into the development phase, 

and that phase would have been picked up by the Navy, the Army, 

and the Marines. And now our Army, and Navy, and Marines don’t 

have to put that money there. So are they going to come and give 

the committee the $400 million to put somewhere else? 

General BOGDAN. So, so I will make two points about that. I will 

make two points about that. 

The first point is, the reason why the partners chose to do this 

is because, as you recall, Mr. Sullivan said the program had been 

re-baselined three times. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Uh-huh. 

General BOGDAN. In re-baselining the program three times, the 

Department of Defense put in 13.5 billion more dollars than it expected to for development, and none of that money came from the 

partners. Because they had made the initial investment in SDD 

and never contributed anything further. So as a show of good faith for that $13 and a half billion that 

the Department of Defense picked up, that is why they agreed that 

this added money could be used. 

When we put our POM [program objective memorandum] in our 

President’s budget each year, I let the services know how much 

money I need each year for the development program. In 2015, 

where I am going to book that $400 million, I reduced the bill to 

the services by that amount. So when they put in their fiscal year 

2015 President’s budget, it included $400 million from our partners, which reduced their bill, and, therefore, they could use that 

money for other things. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So noted. We are going to take it back and take 

a look and make sure that that is what happened. 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Enyart. 

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Bogdan, I am glad to see that you grew up in KC–135s 

and that was the first operational aircraft you flew. And I am glad 

also to see that you worked on the KC–46 program. 

And I guess what concerns me is with all of the talk about the 

mushrooming costs in the F–35, as you well know, the design of the 

135s is over 60 years old. Most of the airframes the crews are flying are now older than the crews. And, of course, the KC–46 mod-
12 

ernization program is vital to the entire fleet. And do you foresee 

any problems with the funding of the KC–46 Alpha, in light of the 

increasing costs that we have seen in the F–35? 

General BOGDAN. I don’t want to get too far out of my lane. I 

haven’t been on the KC–46 program for a number of years. But as 

I do recall the development program for the KC–46 is a fixed-price 

development. So the U.S. government’s liability is capped on how 

much it is going to pay for that development. And that was a choice 

Boeing made during the competition, that the tough competition 

they had for that program. 

So relative to the KC–46 and the Air Force budgets, I will defer 

to General Field and Dr. LaPlante. 

What I can say is, when I was the program director there, it was 

imperative that the Air Force funded each and every year of the 

development program because you do not want to underfund a 

fixed-development contract because the contractor will then have 

recourse to come back and say, You didn’t give me all the money 

I needed, and, therefore, you slowed me down, therefore, we will 

change the terms and conditions later on. 

So it is important to keep the funding for the KC–46 on the development program constant because of that contract type, sir. 

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, General. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your testimony, and we appreciate the information you provided to the committee. We are going to turn to our next panel now. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Question. 

General BOGDAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Before I let you go—— 

Mr. TURNER. Before I excuse you, my ranking member has a last 

question. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I’m sorry, I had one other question that I felt was 

very important for our committee to hear. 

So the F–35 program figure shows that all three versions remain 

far below the planned level of reliability. Specifically, as of this 

month, the F–35A was 4 hours between critical failures as opposed 

to 13 hours expected. The F–35B was 3 and a half hours, when it 

should have been 7 and a half hours. And the F–35C was only 2.7 

hours, however, we anticipated would be at 9 hours. 

If we weren’t in such a large-scale production, it might be one 

thing. But we are there now. So that means that within a couple 

years the service will have hundreds of F–35s on their hands that 

won’t be able to fly very often unless things get dramatically better. 

At this point, it looks like the program wouldn’t even meet a 50- 

percent reliability goal when the aircraft are fully operational. 

So, I know that these will improve over time, but what are the 

specific steps that you are taking to lift that critical reliability time 

up? 

General BOGDAN. I bet that is my question. 

You are right, ma’am. All three variants today are below what 

we call the reliability growth curve on the airplane. And ‘‘over 

time’’ is not the right answer. Things will get better over time, but 

that is not the right answer. 
13 

The right answer is, and we have started it now, was a fully 

funded, disciplined, reliability and maintainability [R&M] program 

that looks at all of the cost drivers, all of the pieces and parts that 

are coming off the airplane too often, the repair times for those 

parts, the supply chain and spares posturing. All of those things 

play into reliability and maintainability. 

And I can tell you, quite frankly, when we first started flying the 

airplane, one, we didn’t have enough data to know where we were 

bad, so to speak, we have got more of that data; and, two, we didn’t 

have a great focus on it because, quite frankly, the last few years 

the program was just trying to hang on. 

We are past that point now. We are at the point now where I 

have 58 operational airplanes out there. We have flown 12,000 

hours. We know what the cost drivers are, we know what parts are 

coming off too frequently, we know what maintenance procedures 

take too long. We have just got to go do something about it. So I 

started last year a fully funded, fully dedicated R&M program. I 

put a program manager in place. Lockheed Martin and Pratt & 

Whitney have done the same corporately on their side, putting 

folks in place. And we are systematically attacking that problem. 

The problem here is, you are not going to see results in the next 

2 or 3 months. It is going for take months and months and months 

of constant effort to start seeing this improve. Our goal is by 2015 

to have the aircraft availability at 60 percent. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, I think that is a very critical piece 

to this program, and that you and I need to sort of keep an eye, 

and ensure that this reliability figure continues to go up rather 

than stagnant as it is. 

Mr. TURNER. Excellent. Absolutely. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. If I could, we have looked at the reliability too, 

and it is a really big concern now. It is very risky. In terms of not 

only getting the unit costs down on the aircraft but also in terms 

of the operating and support costs that are—you know, the estimate right now is deemed unaffordable. That has all got as much 

to do with reliability of the aircraft as anything else. So this is a 

critical point. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Yeah, if you are paying for it but you are not flying it, that is bad news. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That’s right. 

I mean, we have many examples from the past. The F–22 program is an example where they are still working on reliability on 

that aircraft, and, in fact, have started additional acquisition programs to get that fixed today. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, gentlemen, as I was excusing you, before you 

almost made an escape, but we have two members who were able 

to return to the hearing, both of which who have questions. We will 

turn to—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Sorry, Mr. Chairman. But this is incredibly important. 

Mr. TURNER. I am glad that our ranking member held you for a 

time—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I might add that that $61 million program they 

are talking about, it is above the amount of money that we have 

going on. So—— 
14 

Mr. TURNER. Giving the floor for Ms. Walorski. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And sorry if you have already addressed this. But I just want to 

kind of follow up with Mr. Sullivan with what you were just talking about on this issue of the significant financial obligation on 

this—for the Air Force and the Navy being deemed unaffordable. 

And I apologize if you talked about this earlier. But are there specific steps or can you talk about how in the world this program 

can—we can drive the operating and sustainment costs down? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is a very good question, and it is—the last 

question was kind of dealing with that too. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Yes. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Since—and the program and the general here is 

dealing with O&S [operating and support] costs now, I know. They 

have many initiatives going on, trying to drive that down. 

So in order to get O&S costs down, you can do a lot of things. 

You can change the availability of the aircraft, you can have them 

fly less. You know, less flight hours mean less maintenance, and 

things like that. You can look at manning and try to reduce the 

number of people that it takes to keep an aircraft up and running. 

You can look at fuel costs, which is very good. That is a kind of 

uncontrollable. There is an awful lot about O&S that is uncontrollable. Fuel costs is one of those things. That is a big part of it. 

Inflation rates are, you know, who can predict inflation? That is 

a big part of it. So there are a lot of costs you can’t control. 

But reliability is one of the best ways, if you can have a reliable 

weapons system, and that means designing in reliability. And the 

general talked about a reliability growth curve. That is really the 

critical thing that you want to keep an eye on. In order to get more 

reliability they drive down the reliability growth curve established 

from flight test and ground testing and things like that. 

That is the single, key, real root way to get O&S costs down 

more, is to improve reliability of the aircraft. And this program, 

with a lot of initiatives under way, but still, as the Congresswoman 

said, they are still only halfway there, and they are not that far 

away from full-rate production. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Barber. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And before I begin my question, I just want to congratulate you 

on being a new grandparent. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BARBER. It is awesome. I have five. They are wonderful, 

beautiful. Have you ever heard a grandparent say his kids are not 

wonderful or beautiful? But I hope you enjoy, because it is a great 

experience. I really appreciate it myself. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Charlie is a gift. 

Mr. BARBER. I want to thank you both for coming today. 

And I want to start off by saying that I am a very strong supporter of the F–35, and as you probably know, I would love to see 

this program, or this fighter flying in southern Arizona. Hopefully, 

one day we will be bedded down in Tucson. 
15 

A recent survey that was conducted in my community, in fact it 

was just published about a week ago, showed overwhelming community support for Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, which is in my 

district, and the bedding down of the F–35. So I think that survey, 

which was done in an objective and scientific way, should put to 

rest any notion that our community is not interested in the F–35 

or the future of the air base. 

So we have invested a lot in this program, obviously. And getting 

your arms around trying to make it more affordable and prevent 

future cost overruns. And since we have invested so much money, 

we have got to finish the job. I don’t think it is any time to reconsider. But I am concerned, as my colleagues are, about the delays 

in the F–35 program, because it means, in my view, that during 

a time of fiscal uncertainty we will be spending more tax dollars 

while potentially negatively impacting on our air strategy. 

First, the development and procurement costs for this platform 

are already significant, as we’ve stated. And now delays in developmental flight testing will cost us more money as we fix recurring 

problems with emission systems. These delays could, I believe, prolong the delivery of the first batch of F–35s by an additional 13 

months before it attains initial operational capability. 

The President’s budget has called for divestment of an important 

air platform, many of them, including the A–10, so that the Air 

Force can modernize by acquiring the multi-role F–35. And I would 

like to ask you, General, if we won’t see the F–35 fielded until well 

after the Air Force begins to rid itself of important capabilities, 

such as the A–10, don’t we leave our military men and women 

without the important tools they need? 

And would you agree that it would be prudent to maintain the 

A–10 warfighting capability until we can be assured or reassured 

that the F–35s will be ready? 

I am very concerned about this gap I think the divestment plan 

would create for our men and women on the ground. 

General BOGDAN. Sir, I am going to defer most of that question 

to my Air Force brethren for the next panel. But what I will tell 

you is that we are intending on delivering an air-to-ground and 

close-air-support capability with the F–35 in all three increments, 

2B, 3I, and 3F, with 3F being the final capability. And I think the 

airplane from a technical standpoint and from a national standpoint will have the ability to conduct that mission safely and effectively for the Air Force. What they do with the A–10s, again, I will 

defer that to the next panel. 

Mr. BARBER. Nice punt there, General. I understand. We will 

talk about it next panel. 

I just want to ask a follow-up question, though. Due to the uncertainty surrounding the delivery of the F–35 software capabilities, 

the GAO, as you know, Mr. Sullivan, recommended that DOD execute an assessment of the specific software capabilities that could 

realistically be delivered, and those that would not likely be delivered. How will the DOD conduct this assessment? And what software capabilities are most critical? 

And, additionally, if DOD follows the GAO recommendations and 

decides to lessen software capabilities, would this have any impact, 
16 

in your view, on the proposed mission systems that would enable 

the F–35 to conduct adequate close air support, Mr. Sullivan? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Okay. So our recommendation is that they assess 

where they are with software today in relation to the 2B software 

block that they are to deliver to the Marines for the Marines’ IOC 

date, which is now scheduled for July 2015. 

So, what we are saying is, the Marines deserve to know exactly 

what they are going to get. So before that date, they should—there 

should be an assessment on, realistically, here is what we have for 

you. 

And I would go back—you mentioned a 13-month delay, and I 

know in our report we have a 13—we have something in there 

about 13 months’ delay in software. But want to clarify that that 

is a delay that would only extend the IOC date 6 months. That 13- 

month delay would be from May of 2015 to November of 2015. 

They right now are saying May. They have a 7-month kind of management reserve in there. The Cost Assessment and Programming 

Effectiveness, the CAPE from OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] has looked at that schedule and said that that they may be 

as late as 13 months beyond May. Which would put them to November of 2015. That is—so, all told, that is a 6-month delay that 

the CAPE is talking about. That is what we refer to in our report. 

So what our recommendation is, is really just to assess software 

and let people know what is going to be available to them on these 

key dates. July 2015 is one. If the Marines aren’t going to get the 

full 2B block capability, then they should know what they are getting. They should have, you know, the ability to delay if it is going 

to be a little bit longer to get full 2B. That is essentially what we 

are saying. 

Mr. BARBER. I guess I just close—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We are not by any means saying that they 

should—that the JSF [Joint Strike Fighter] should be delivered 

without full capability eventually. 

Mr. BARBER. I just would wonder, though, since we have had so 

many delays, so many promises made that have not been kept, 

General, how can we be assured that these timelines are real? 

General BOGDAN. I will give you a two-part answer, sir. The first 

answer is rooted in the technical underpinning of the re-baseline 

that we did starting in 2010. We added time and margin into that 

schedule from 2010 to 2018, and we made it much more realistic. 

We planned for discovery that we hadn’t foreseen, we planned for 

delays in flight testing. We planned for a lot of things that were 

more optimistically planned for before that. I guess that is the best 

way to say it. 

So from that perspective, the dates that I am giving you are on 

that baseline plan from 2010, and we are currently executing to 

that plan without changing. The other—so that is the technical answer, sir. 

The other answer is, I am not here to advocate for the F–35, necessarily. I am here to execute the program. And I want to give you 

the best information I can, good, bad, or otherwise. 

And so the other part of my answer is, you will—you somehow, 

somehow have to trust me, and if I am wrong then you guys can 
17 

take it out on me. Because I consider myself accountable for the 

outcomes on this program. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, Mr. Barber, we are going to ask that—— 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. I ask that the remainder of your questions be submitted for the record. We do need to get to the second panel. 

Thank you, gentlemen. We appreciate your testimony. 

General BOGDAN. Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Next, we will go to Vice Admiral Paul Grosklags; 

Lieutenant General Robert Schmidle; Michael Manazir, and—Rear 

Admiral; and Dr. William LaPlante, Military Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; and General Field, United 

States Air Force. 

I understand the two opening statements will be given by Admiral Grosklags and Dr. LaPlante. 

Turning to Admiral. 

STATEMENT OF VADM PAUL A. GROSKLAGS, USN, PRINCIPAL 

MILITARY DEPUTY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, 

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION; ACCOMPANIED BY LTGEN ROBERT E. SCHMIDLE, JR., USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR AVIATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS, AND 

RADM MICHAEL C. MANAZIR, USN, DIRECTOR, AIR WARFARE, OPNAV N98 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Turner, Representative Sanchez, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thanks for the opportunity to be here 

today to talk about our Naval and Marine Corps aviation programs. 

As I think you are aware, we had to make many difficult decisions as we built our 2015 budget submission. But we believe what 

we have submitted for your consideration is a plan that ensures we 

have the capacity and the capability to ensure that we can fight 

and win when called upon. 

But I also have to tell you that this is a plan that contains increased levels of risk as opposed to our PB 2014 [President’s budget 

for fiscal year 2014] submission. Now, on our 2015 submission, we 

are continuing development of fifth-generation aircraft. We are 

fully committed to both the F–35B and the F–35C, and believe the 

program is on a solid path to meeting our initial operational requirements for the Marine Corps in 2015 and the Navy in late 

2018 or early 2019. 

Our unmanned aircraft systems also maintain a full measure of 

our attention. These include already fielded systems at the unit 

level, like the Marine Corps’ RQ–21 Blackjack, all the way up to 

carrier strike group and carrier air wing platforms, like the Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Strike and Surveillance aircraft, otherwise known as UCLASS. It is a mouthful. 

We also continue investment in our critical development programs, such as the 53K Heavy Lift Helicopter, the MQ–4C Triton 

unmanned maritime surveillance aircraft, and the Presidential helicopter program. 

And we are recapitalizing in other areas. Maritime patrol, with 

the P–8 replacing the P–3, our carrier-based early warning aircraft 
18 

with the E–2D, and virtually all of our vertical-lift and tiltrotor aircraft with the V–22, our H–60s, and the H–1. 

And, finally, but not in the least, we have focused investments 

being made in our currently fielded aircraft and systems to ensure 

that they remain relevant, they remain safe, and that they are able 

to counter the threat well into the next decade. 

Now, as I mentioned earlier, the efforts that we are undertaking 

I have just described are not without risk. Even with the spending 

levels supported by the Bipartisan Budget Agreement, we have 

been forced to extend some development timelines, we have reduced our procurement rates, and we have reduced the rates at 

which we have planned to modernize both capability and capacity. 

And, frankly, a transition back to the Budget Control Act levels 

of spending will have a significant negative impact on our readiness, our modernization, and eventually the relevancy of Naval 

Aviation. Ultimately, this result is increased risk to our operating 

forces forward deployed. 

So, Mr. Chairman, we appreciate the opportunity and look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Grosklags, General 

Schmidle, and Admiral Manazir can be found in the Appendix on 

page 76.] 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. LaPlante. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM A. LAPLANTE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION; ACCOMPANIED BY LT GEN BURTON M. FIELD, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF 

OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS, 

U.S. AIR FORCE 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Thank you, Chairman Turner. 

Thank you, Ranking Member Sanchez, other members of the— 

distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thanks for having the 

hearing. And already we have already had good discussions and 

good questions; so, thank you for having the hearing and for what 

you do. 

I am joined here by Lieutenant General Burt Field, who is the 

Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Operations, Requirements 

and Plans. So we are here to talk about the fiscal year 2015 budget 

that we have submitted and the tough choices that we have already talked about here. 

Just like my Navy counterpart, the Air Force, all the services 

had to make these tough choices. The choices were between the 

things we know, readiness today, if we have to go to war today, 

versus building the force that we know we need for the next 10, 

15 years. 

We also know as we watch around the world, regardless of whatever threat assessment you think, that the technologies are proliferating. Particularly, places where we are used to just being able 

to operate at will—space, cyber, air—we can’t assume that in the 

future. 

The technologies to contest that are proliferating, and we have 

to plan for that. We also have to plan for being able to react quickly and globally. 
19 

So in this tough environment there was tough choices being 

made, and we have talked about some of those hard choices already. 

I would say, if the last time that some of us appeared before you 

was back in October, it was a hearing about the effects of the sequester. And I just want to contrast and thank you from where we 

are then from where we are now and, also, talk about still issues 

we have problems with. 

First of all, back then, what we were telling you was, to meet the 

sequester numbers, we were having to make this very difficult 

choice between readiness today—flying hours, weapons systems 

sustainment, going into depots—and investment in RDT&E [research, development, test and evaluation] really were the only two 

places we could take the money, and it was a very difficult situation. We asked you also to help us with just understanding stability so we could do planning. 

But with the BBA [Bipartisan Budget Act], you have given us— 

and I want to thank you for that—some stability. We now know 

what the budget is. We know what to plan for in 2014. We know 

what to plan for 2015, in particular. And we have a down payment 

to begin to turn back and upturn and working on readiness. Readiness is not going to be fixed with turning a switch, as you know, 

but thank you for the BBA because it is going to allow us to start 

working on that again. 

The other thing the BBA did a bit—and I want to just temper 

what it was able to do for us—we did use a little bit of it in the 

Air Force to protect some of our high-priority programs. 

Specifically, we were able to protect the F–35 buy. I think back 

in October we said that, had the sequester occurred, we had four 

to five airplanes at risk in F–35. That was able to be mitigated 

with the BBA in 2014. And the same would have had to happen 

in 2015. So that helped us there. And we were able to do some to 

help us stay above minimal sustainable rates in munitions. 

But, largely, what the BBA does for us is it gives us stability and 

it helps us turn the corner back again, begin to, in readiness. 

But here is what the BBA does not do. If we return to the sequester numbers in 2016 and beyond, we still have the reality of 

a smaller Air Force. We are going to have a smaller Air Force regardless. 

But, as has been said, platforms like the KC–10, the Global 

Hawk Block 40, technologies—exciting technologies like the new 

engine technology that we are looking at for adaptable engines— 

all of those frankly do not survive mathematically if you look at it 

in a sequester budget beyond 2016. 

And so that longer-term situation remains unchanged, and we 

are having to plan for that, but the near-term situation is significantly different than when at least I appeared before you back in 

October. 

So that is a summary of what I wanted to say, and I look forward 

to answering your questions. And I also, again, enjoyed the discussion on F–35 and would be happy to talk more about that. Thanks. 

[The joint prepared statement of Dr. LaPlante and General Field 

can be found in the Appendix on page 106.] 
20 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. LaPlante, your statement is an excellent transition to my questions for General Field and Admiral Manazir and 

General Schmidle. 

I opposed sequestration because I thought it would be irresponsible and devastating to our military. Sometimes pessimists are 

right. I am not optimistic about what we are facing for 2016 and 

on. 

I believe that part of the reason why sequestration was put into 

effect is because the picture of what would occur if sequestration 

was implemented was not told, in part, because DOD was constrained from planning for sequestration until it was upon us and 

then, when they were implementing it, they didn’t have the time 

to be able to look up from their desks and explain what was to happen. 

So my question to each of you is: If you are forced to accept sequestration-level budgets between 2016 and 2023, how will that affect capability, capacity of each of your branches, Air Force, Marines, and Navy? And how does that affect your ability to meet the 

requirements of the National Defense Strategy? 

General Schmidle, we will begin with you. 

General SCHMIDLE. Okay. Thank you, Chairman, and Ranking 

Member Sanchez. 

So, to begin with, the sequestration, as you know, Chairman— 

there is two things that affect us, two big bins. One of them is 

readiness and the other one is in our investment portfolios. And 

we—the example that we used—oh. Sorry. Better now? Okay. 

The example that we talked about last year was the number of 

F–18s that we had that were in reporting status as opposed to the 

number that were out of reporting status. 

Just a couple of snapshots of where we are today. About 50 percent of the airplanes that—the Marine Corps F–18s that we own 

are not on our flight lines. 

They are going through depot maintenance, and they are in various places where they are getting modified so that we can continue 

to fly them until we get enough F–35s to be able to move into the 

fleet to make up for those to replace those airplanes. 

So that is an effect that we have noticed right away from sequestration because of the workforce that was being paid, if you will, 

to work in the depots to do that. 

The other place that we would notice it is in all the aircraft procurement programs. As you know, sequestration comes in and it 

just takes a bite out of a—a percentage, if you will, out of each of 

the program element lines. 

And we don’t have a lot of choice in that. We have to pay the 

bills somehow. So you are going to have—our ability to buy more 

to modernize our airplanes is going to be affected as well. 

And the third piece of this—or the second big piece, if you will, 

is readiness. Sequestration would have an effect on readiness, 

which would equate to about 10 percent, if you will, of the flying 

hours that we fly every year. 

And if you just do the problem mathematically, right now, today, 

as of right now, we have a little over 70 percent, 73 percent of all 

the airplanes in Marine aviation, all of them, are at—the readiness 
21 

level for all of our squadrons, rather, is at what we would refer to 

as C2, which is ready to go to war. That was in 2013. 

In 2014, as where we are today, we are at 65 percent, and that 

is—and it would be lower except for the money that we got back 

in the BBA. 

If we continue on that rate, by the time we get to 2017, if we 

are fully sequestered, we will be down to—around 50 percent of our 

forces will actually be at the level of readiness that we would want 

them to be at in order to push them out the door, and by 2021 we 

estimate that we could be as low as 27 to 30 percent. 

So that is over time what happens to us when we take the flight 

hours out, we don’t have the hours to fly, we don’t have the airplanes to use to train the pilots, and the readiness continues to go 

down. 

So that is probably the best example that I can give you between 

the investment accounts and the readiness of how that is going to 

affect us. 

Mr. TURNER. Admiral. 

Admiral MANAZIR. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question. 

I share the concerns that General Schmidle laid out because, as 

you know, Naval Aviation is Navy and Marine Corps aircraft. I will 

start far term, then midterm, then near term. 

Far term is procurement of aircraft. As we continue to buy our 

P–8 out to the end of the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], 

as we continue to buy the unmanned systems with N–26 sponsorship and N–98 sponsorship to the end of the FYDP year, as we continue to look to buy JSF and we continue to look at the numbers 

of the EA–18G Growlers that are coming this way in the execution 

year and then potentially in fiscal year 2016, you will see those 

numbers go down because that is where the flexibility comes from. 

In the midterm, our modernization is to keep our forces relevant. 

So in Naval Aviation, as we increment the P–8 to greater capability, as we increment the air plan or flight plan for the F–18E 

and F Super Hornet and make those more relevant, those capabilities will be pushed out 1 year and 2 years to the right. The initial 

operational capabilities of those advanced Super Hornets, advanced 

aircraft, advanced P–8s, will be pushed to the right. 

And then near term is readiness. As the general laid out, we normally like to push our forces out with C2 readiness to be able to 

accomplish any mission across the spectrum of warfighting. We 

would have to lower that down to a lower level, but what we would 

do is we would push those deployed forces out with a C2. It is the 

search forces behind them that would take the greatest impact. 

I will give you an example, sir. Last year, a year ago, I was the 

strike group commander for the Eisenhower Strike Group. Because 

of sequestration, we were told to come home, do flight deck maintenance, and in 2 months took the entire strike group back out again 

to the Gulf. 

So we turned around in two deployments, 101⁄2 months deployed 

in 12 months, and we took the surface forces with us to do that. 

That was a direct impact of the sequestration levels of readiness 

that we had to take our previously trained strike group and turn 

around twice. So that surge force was not available to back up 

what we have out on the line. 
22 

You will see very, very capable forces on the line, Navy and Marine Corps. What you will find is the surge forces behind them are 

going to start to hollow out. As the sequestration levels go down 

to what they were during the BCA, you will see no surge forces behind them. With the current BBA, you will see a surge force of one 

to two behind what you have currently got deployed. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. General. 

General FIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This will sound remarkably similar to my colleagues. You will 

have a smaller, less capable, less ready, less viable Air Force that 

will not be able to execute the Defense Strategic Guidance. That is 

the bottom line. 

And similar to what the Marines and the Navy just said, what 

happens is we are in an—at risk will be some of our highest priority programs, the F–35, the long-range strike bomber, and the 

KC–46, although those are the three that we are going to try to 

protect the most. 

What will also be on the table will be the KC–10, the RQ–4 Global Hawk, other ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] 

assets. Virtually every modernization program that has not already 

been cut will be on the floor, and that is what will lead to that 

smaller and less capable and less viable force. 

Like the Marines and the Navy, our readiness suffered. As we 

told you last year, our readiness levels were remarkably low prior 

to sequester, and we were looking at a 3- to 6-month effort just to 

recover to that already too low level. 

In some of our squadrons of the 31 we stood down, we have recovered that readiness. In other squadrons, we are still working to 

recover back to those levels that were already too low. 

We will have to probably attack that readiness problem again, 

and we will probably have more squadrons stood down for periods 

of time that will inhibit any recovery of the readiness for the future. 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to put down for the record—because I heard General—our Marine General here say a comment. He said we have to 

pay the bills somehow. 

So we got into sequestration because we had to pay our bills 

somehow, and that was the fight that was going on at the time. So 

it seems like nobody would want to vote in a sequester. 

But the problem was there were some that were holding up our 

ability to pay the bills that we, as a Congress, had already agreed 

to pay. So that is how we ended up where we are. 

To the Admiral, the Navy has stated that the production of the 

F–18 will end in 2016 or 2017 unless additional foreign military serials occur and that, as a result, the U.S. will be left with only one 

production line for manned tactical fighter aircraft. Some have proposed providing the Navy with additional EA–18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft in order to keep the production line going. 

So my questions are: Does the Navy have a validated requirement for more of these aircraft? If we, the Congress, would provide 

the additional aircraft, what would the Navy do with them if Con-
23 

gress doesn’t provide additional people and operations, funding facilities, et cetera? Would you still use the extra aircraft? And if the 

production line is shut down, does that necessarily mean we 

wouldn’t be able to start one up, for example, for a sixth-generation 

aircraft intended to replace something like the F–18, that the F– 

35 would not be in that space? 

Admiral MANAZIR. Thank you, Member Sanchez. Thank you for 

the multifaceted question. I will address the last part first. 

I will tell you, in the Naval Aviation, we don’t know what ‘‘sixth 

generation’’ means because we don’t know what capability that 

brings us later on. 

To be fair, we are required to look—when any type model series 

goes out of service, at the end of its service life, like in the F–18E 

and F series, which is going to go out in 2035, we will look at the 

range of gaps in capability that that Super Hornet delivers right 

now to the Nation and we will determine what the solution could 

be. It could be more F–35s. It could be an unmanned system. It 

could be a family of systems. We will look at capabilities across the 

board, not necessarily a one-for-one replacement out into the future. 

To the F–18E/F and the G, we have 563 Super Hornets, Es and 

Fs, that are currently being delivered, and the last bunch is going 

to be delivered to us in 2015, and that will complete the buy. And 

that is our requirement, 563 Es and Fs that provisions 31 strike 

fighter squadrons on our carrier decks, including the attrition and 

reserve airplanes. 

The EA–18G Growler, we currently have 138 in our program of 

record. That 138 airplanes is 10 squadrons that are in our carrier 

air wings, the 10 carrier air wings that support our 11 carriers that 

are currently in the budget, and then there are 5 expeditionary 

squadrons. The last 2 squadrons of the EA–18G Growlers are being 

built to take the place of the Marine EA–6B Prowlers that are 

going to go out of service in 2019. 

If we were to get additional Growlers, what they would service 

is the joint mission. The 18G Growler, with the ALQ–99 pod now 

and the next-generation pod in the future, services a large part of 

the electromagnetic spectrum. And as the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] has testified multiple times, it is the domination of the 

electromagnetic spectrum that is going to ensure that we can get 

into anti-access environments. 

Having that high-end airplane with those high-end capabilities to 

address the electromagnetic threat allows us to be able to bring a 

family of systems. For instance, the F–35 is very, very capable in 

an electronic attack, but it has a narrow part of the spectrum. So 

the EA–18G supports in a complementary capability the F–35Bs 

and Cs when you put them forward. Families of systems called 

stand-in jammers that would get inside of those threat envelopes 

need to get standoff jamming support first before you get in there 

to allow us to have assured access. 

So what we are looking at now, ma’am, is a series of studies that 

look at the validated requirements above 138 EA–18Gs to determine whether the joint fight, the interoperable fight, with the Marine Corps, the Navy, the Air Force, and our coalition partners requires additional EA–18Gs. 
24 

I will tell you that the CNO has testified that there are 22 

Growlers on an unfunded requirements list. Of those 22 Growlers— 

and thanks for the omnibus that gave us $75 million in AP [advanced procurement]; so, we have a little bit of a discount there 

from Congress—congressional action earlier—we would take those 

22 Growlers and increase the PMAA [Primary Mission Aircraft Authorization] of the squadrons on the flight decks from 5 to 7. 

We have determined in our campaign analysis that, when you increase from 5 towards 8 aircraft, that actually gives us a knee in 

the curve to reduce the time of the campaign and increase the effectiveness of electromagnetic maneuver warfare. 

Ma’am, I hope that answered all of your questions. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Well, we will have to digest everything you just 

told us and then probably come back with some more questions, 

Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the time. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Wenstrup. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here. 

Doctor, I have a question for you. And I do appreciate the Air 

Force having a continued effort with engine propulsion technology 

and developing that further. I think it is important not only for our 

capabilities and efficiency, but it—like anything else, it is important to our industrial base here. 

And I saw that the Secretary in the budget—2015 budget allocated $1 billion for next-generation jet technology development. 

And so my question is: Can you give me some detail on how this 

funding will be used and when it would be used? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yeah. We are still working through the details of 

it; so, I can tell you just broadly what we are thinking. 

So the program and the research area that has been ongoing— 

and it has been some excellent work sponsored, in part—began 

with DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency], but 

then moved over to AFRL [Air Force Research Laboratory], is what 

we call adaptive engine technology. 

What the $1 billion allows us to do is—without that, we were 

going to basically end with some technology development—piece 

part technology development about 2017, and we just did not have 

the money to take it further, which, of course, for all the reasons 

you said, you know, it is just—you know, we didn’t want to stop 

it, but we had no choice with the budget. 

With the billion dollars in there, we are going to be able to continue that and at least take it, I believe, potentially to an engineering development model. I am hoping—and there—depending on 

how mature the technology is, that we could further that even 

through the end of 2019 or so. Again, we are working through the 

details of it, of exactly how far it is going to take us. 

I think, also, it is going to depend upon our assessment how mature the technology is as to how quickly we can go into an EDM 

[electric discharge machining]-type situation, but it is going to 

allow us basically—it doesn’t completely get us to transition. You 

know, we all talk about the transition and the ‘‘valley of death.’’ 

But it is a bridge that starts to bridge the ‘‘valley of death.’’ 
25 

So it was a good thing that we are doing that and we are continuing it. And I hope we can. As a technologist, I think it is great 

work. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Well, I appreciate that. Thank you very much. 

I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Admiral, you mentioned in your testimony that meeting the Marine Corps F–35B IOC will require modification of aircraft to bring 

them up to the required hardware configuration and that the 

schedule to do so is tight. 

What steps is the Navy taking to mitigate the risk that all required modifications will be done on time? We are aware that, previously, General Bogdan has indicated that it is not necessarily— 

some of these delays are not necessarily software development, 

they are actually completion of modifications. Do you have a comment? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I will address that for 

you. 

This is not a technical issue for us. This is purely a management 

issue. We understand the technical changes that need to be made 

to the aircraft. The simple fact is we have competing priorities. 

We have aircraft required for test. We have aircraft required for 

training our pilots to make sure that the pilots are trained and 

ready for initial operational capability. And we need to use those 

same—or take those same aircraft and turn them around and modify them to the appropriate IOC configuration. So it is a management issue. It is not a technical issue. So I just want to be clear 

on that. 

What we are doing, quite honestly, is prioritizing. We are trying 

to ensure that, with the depot stand—the recent depot standup at 

Cherry Point last year, that gives us the facility to do the deep 

modernization work that needs to be done. 

We have also established a small footprint at Yuma at the operational site so we can do limited modifications there. 

Part of our approach is to try and bundle, if you will, the modifications that need to be done. So we are taking a close look at the 

scope of the modernization so we don’t have to reach in to various 

parts of the aircraft more than one time. 

So, in a nutshell, that is it. General Schmidle may have more insight to specific things the Marine Corps is doing, but it is really 

a management issue for us. 

General SCHMIDLE. Again, if you like, just to pile on very briefly, 

in terms of the schedule for the modifications, we are, in fact, taking a very, very close look. 

As General Bogdan said, this is actually—he mentioned it was 

his concern going to IOC. It is, we believe, the long pole in the tent 

right now, and we have got all kinds of focus on this, to include 

down to the squadron, to the individual airplane level, how many 

airplanes they need on the line to be able to fly, the sorties the pilots need to be able to get ready to IOC the jets so that we can declare IOC in the summer of 2015. 

It clearly is a challenge, but we are absolutely laser-focused on 

it right now. 
26 

Mr. TURNER. My last question, Dr. LaPlante. You mentioned in 

your testimony that the Air Force has concern about the aerospace 

industrial base that supports engineering, design, and development 

of tactical fighter aircraft. You note that, when production of the 

F/A–18 and F–15 ends, there will be only one prime contractor producing tactical aircraft. 

What steps is the Air Force taking in the FY 2015 and the future 

years to address this concern? And when you say we are accepting 

risk that some elements of the current aerospace industry capacity 

may atrophy, what specific skills are likely to atrophy and what 

would be the impact on the Nation’s aerospace programs? And how 

do the Air Force long-range strike aircraft program and the Navy’s 

Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike 

programs affect the industrial base necessary to develop and 

produce tactical fighter aircraft? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes. I appreciate the question. 

There are key skill sets that, of course, are needed to build advanced tactical aircraft, some of which are common to the bomber. 

It is not completely a one-to-one correlation, but we can’t talk much 

publicly about the bomber because of security classification. 

But I think it has been—as we have been saying, it is identified 

to be going after mature technologies such to lower risk, something 

that is at high TRL [technology readiness levels], as they call it. 

What the Air Force is doing consciously in that program is beginning to set up a feeder line, if you will, so when the first versions 

of the bomber start getting delivered, they have in there, for lack 

of a better word, the hooks and the blocks to put in future upgrades, that there is, frankly, a technology line and a technology 

demonstration line that can feed those future blocks. 

I will tell you—I mean, I can’t go into the details here because 

of the classification. I would say it is in the following type of areas: 

It is in materials. It is how we integrate and keep low observable 

technology with electronic attack. It is with advanced controls. 

Those are the kind of areas that we are very conscious of keeping 

the industrial base alive, and those are—could be common between 

advanced tactical and the bomber. 

Do I think that that is by itself enough? I don’t, actually. And 

I don’t pretend to have all the answers here. But I will tell you 

what some of us are thinking is that exactly at this time is probably when—if you look back in history when, in the past, we have 

done, for lack of a better word, experimentation, whether it was in 

the 1990s or in the 1970s, where we kept prototyping, we kept 

ideas, we kept innovation going, we kept design teams going even 

for things that we didn’t know if we were just going to put on the 

shelf, but that we were trying. And we were trying them between 

the technology community and the warfighter. We believe—there is 

many of us that believe we are in the era now where we need to 

be doing that. 

Now, that is not a panacea for all of the industrial base. That 

will not deal with, for example, a production line being shut down. 

We have to think differently about that. 

But I believe that we need to do some type of comprehensive experimentation program to feed not just the future bomber, which 

we already have some of that going on, which I can’t go into be-
27 

cause it is classified, but to feed whatever we end up with beyond 

F–35 and even F–35 itself. 

In my experience, we often set up the mainstream program to 

have the hooks and the blocks, and then we kind of just assume 

industry will innovate and provide us the technology. Well, we also 

have to fund it. IRAD [independent research and development] can 

only go so far. So I believe we need to, as a Department—this isn’t 

just in Air Force—set up such an experimentation program. 

Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Veasey. 

Mr. VEASEY. Yes. I wanted to ask specifically about the retiring 

of the 283 A–10s. Now, when those A–10s are retired, all those 

planes are going to be replaced with F–16s and F–35 at many of 

those bases. Isn’t that correct? 

General FIELD. Yes, sir, it is. 

Mr. VEASEY. Okay. 

General FIELD. Except for one. One of the units is a Guard unit 

from Idaho, and they are going to become an active associate—or 

a classic associate, which means they are going to work with the 

Mountain Home F–15Es and fly those airplanes. 

Mr. VEASEY. And the A–10—the role of the A–10 is basically— 

it is pretty much a single mission. It is just basically to provide 

ground support. Is that—— 

General FIELD. Sir, its primary mission is to provide close air 

support for troops on the ground that are fighting. It does some 

other things in terms of personnel recovery and some other air-toground missions as well, but that is its primary role, is in close air 

support. That is correct. 

Mr. VEASEY. Okay. So when you land those things—because I 

know that the Air Force has also looked at retiring some B–1 

bombers and even looked at retiring F–16s and F–15s. 

And so I just wanted to know if you could expand just a little 

bit more on retiring some of those planes versus the A–10s. 

General FIELD. Yeah. Sir, I think that was a misinterpretation 

of some previous discussions with folks. 

When we talked about the A–10 decision, we went through a series of analysis to look at the effect that would have, and we compared that with what the Air Force brings to the table to the joint 

community. 

Because, at the end of the day, we fight as a joint force and we 

need to be able to provide the capabilities to our brothers and sisters in the other services and our coalition partners. 

So we looked through mobility. We looked through ISR. We 

looked through air superiority. We looked at command and control. 

And we looked at, you know, precision attack. And there are all 

kinds of facets to every one of those. 

We also did a study with our—in the Air Force and we did some 

analysis and lessons learned with the Army on how we would perform the CAS mission, the close air support mission, if the A–10 

did go away. 

And when we looked across the spectrum of conflict that we 

might be having, when we looked into some of the higher-end 

issues that we might be facing in the future, it looked like the A– 

10 was the best of all bad options to take off the table. 
28 

There isn’t a single airman in the Air Force that thinks this is 

a good idea. This is basically a budget-driven decision. So we came 

to the conclusion that we had to remove the A–10 because, if we 

took the whole fleet out, we could take a lot of the support structure and gain billions of dollars in savings, not millions of dollars 

in savings. 

And so some of the examples that you referenced here are some 

of the things we looked at just to explain the comparison. So if we 

take the A–10 fleet out, we will save about $4.3 billion over the 

FYDP. 

To get that kind of savings, if we took out F–16s, we would have 

to take—retire 350 F–16s, which affects about 14 squadrons. We 

would have to take out the entire B–1 fleet, 62 aircraft. 

So why don’t we want to take out the B–1 fleet? The B–1 provides most of our—you know, 38 percent of our long-range strike 

and is the only aircraft in the Air Force inventory that is going to 

use—be able to employ the JASSM [Joint Air to Surface Standoff 

Missile], which is a long-range cruise missile, between now and fiscal year 2019 and 2020. It is enormously capable and can do missions from CAS to deep strike and beyond. 

The 350 F–16s—the amount of capability was just more so than 

the A–10 in terms of not just the CAS environment, but in other 

missions beyond that. We looked at ways that we could reduce 

readiness, and we have already—we are already down at what I 

would term a critical level in the readiness status of our combat 

air forces. And we would go even lower to the fact that we would 

take off—two to three squadrons would just not fly ever at a time 

for the near future. 

So when we looked through that, we looked at the studies, we 

discussed it with our service partners, we decided that the A–10 

was the best decision to make, even though nobody likes the result 

of that decision. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Gentlemen, thank you. We are going to conclude. 

They have called votes on the House floor. We appreciate all of 

your comments. And thank you for your service. We will be adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:03 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 26, 2014 

(157) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. GAO’s most recent report points out that software delays may impact software deliveries and could hinder the delivery of expected warfighting capabilities—first to the Marine Corps and then possibly to the Air Force and Navy as 

well. Please describe the mission system software difficulties that the program has 

experienced, and explain what the program is planning to do/or is in the process 

of doing to mitigate the impacts of those difficulties. What are the impacts, if the 

program is not able to deliver all of the expected warfighting capabilities to the Marine Corps by July 2015? 

General BOGDAN. The F–35 Joint Program Office (JPO) does not fully agree with 

all of the conclusions made by the GAO in their recent report, ‘‘Problems Completing Software Testing May Hinder Delivery of Expected Warfighting Capabilities.’’ The program is making steady progress and is fundamentally on the 2011 

baseline plan, with moderate confidence in the Block 2B/3i software delivery schedules. There is additional risk with 3F as it is dependent upon the successful and 

timely completion of blocks 2B/3i. 

Software continues to be the program’s number one technical risk; however, the 

program has a track record of overcoming difficulties related to software development. These difficulties include technical challenges implementing multi-level security in Block 1B, delays in maturing and integrating Block 2A software, and burning 

down outstanding technical debt from earlier software blocks. Over the past two 

years, the program has implemented significant changes in how system software is 

developed, lab tested, flight tested, measured, and controlled. The program is starting to see the positive effects of these changes. As part of these process changes, 

the program has: 

• Created a Capability Block Plan that provides an integrated roadmap to define 

when individual capabilities are integrated into each software block. 

• Instituted a Block Review Board, led by the government, to track all configuration, capability, and schedule changes to software development. 

• Directed a more robust Systems Engineering/Technical Review process for all 

development work to provide greater knowledge and defined decision gates to 

determine when configurations are mature enough to proceed to the next phase. 

This includes assessing the impact and corrective actions for issues identified 

against the defined Block Capabilities and missions. 

• Developed tools to define the relationship of each planned software capability 

to the overall mission sets, providing insight into the impact to mission effectiveness resulting from any potential shortfalls in capability maturity. 

In addition to implementing process changes, the program has made considerable 

strides in maturing the on-board software as a whole and retiring risks from earlier 

software blocks to establish a healthy foundation going forward. Specifically, the 

technical debt from previous software blocks will essentially be negated as we enter 

into Block 3 development and integration. The program has also recovered from 

software delays in fielding Block 2A LRIP 5 software and has executed the Block 

2B plan largely to the baseline. Lastly, the program has successfully demonstrated 

the rehosting of Block 2A and early Block 2B capability on the TR–2 hardware required for Block 3i LRIP 6 aircraft. 

It is the JPO’s plan to deliver all Block capabilities at the required maturity levels 

to meet the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy Initial Operational Capability (IOC) 

dates. Anomalies that may have an impact to planned IOC mission sets are either 

being corrected or assessed with the stakeholders for acceptability. It is my assessment that delivery of Block 2B-capable aircraft for USMC IOC is tracking to a July 

2015 date and software is not expected to be the limiting factor. 

Mr. TURNER. GAO and others have identified affordability as a significant challenge for the F–35. The total financial commitment needed for the program’s operation and support costs are still estimated at around $1 trillion, and GAO notes that 

acquisition costs over the coming decades will average $12.6 billion a year. What 

is the program doing to ensure that this program is affordable in the long-term? 

General BOGDAN. Affordability continues to be one of my top priorities. Over the 

years, my team and I have been successful at shifting the cost risk from being fully 
158 

absorbed by the government to a more equitable split between the government and 

the contractors. This has incentivized the contractors to become participants in driving down costs, without compromising capability or quality. We have been successful 

in ensuring that lot over lot, the cost of the aircraft continues to come down, and 

I expect this trend to continue. Although the cost is coming down, it has not come 

down as quickly as I would like, and I am taking strategic steps with my team to 

deliver an F–35A in Fiscal Year 2019 between $80–85 million in FY19 dollars. Operation and Sustainment (O&S) is one of the main cost drivers over the lifecycle of 

the program and it is imperative that we get it right. Some of the initiatives to address O&S affordability include: 

• Established an F–35 Cost War Room, which includes representatives from 

prime contractors, with the objective of identifying program-wide initiatives to 

drive down overall program costs. They are currently examining 48 opportunities to drive down or remove costs from the program. 

• Executing a Level of Repair Analysis study to define the most cost effective repair enterprise for the U.S. and International Partners. The outcome of this 

study will help us determine the optimum repair structure. We expect the study 

to be available for review by the U.S. Services in the third quarter of this year. 

• Completed a second Business Case Analysis in April 2014 to help inform the 

most cost effective Regional sustainment construct. This analysis will determine 

the best-value sustainment solution across a range of alternatives using a consistent set of baseline requirements and ground rules. We expect to have the 

analysis confirmed and finalized within the third quarter of this year. 

• Established an actively-managed and funded Reliability and Maintainability 

(R&M) Improvement Program with the objective of redesigning components to 

improve R&M from both a hardware and software perspective. The intended 

outcome will be increased component reliability and decreased maintenance 

burdens. 

We continue to press forward with continuous improvement/producibility efforts 

in order to reduce the labor hours associated with aircraft production. We are examining methods of addressing Diminishing Manufacturing Sources to introduce competition in the supply chain. We are taking a systematic approach to reduce aircraft 

prices below the normal production learning curves and are addressing supply chain 

arrangements to reduce material costs. The procurement quantity from year to year 

is a significant factor in achieving lower procurement costs. In the last two years, 

our International Partners and the U.S. Services have delayed purchases to future 

years, delaying the timeline for realizing unit cost targets. Over the next few years, 

I expect Foreign Military Sales customers to increase their quantities, which will 

make up for some of the delayed purchases by the U.S. Services and our International Partners, but if we continue to see the current trend then it will further 

delay how quickly we are able to reduce the procurement cost of the aircraft. 

Mr. TURNER. GAO notes that the F–35 program office estimate for operation and 

support costs is around $200 billon lower than the $1 trillion estimated by OSD. 

They also note that the major driver in the difference between the two estimates 

is the use of different inflation assumptions. Please explain how the program came 

to its most recent estimate. To what extent do you believe that the program’s estimate is more reliable than the OSD estimate? 

General BOGDAN. In the 2012 System Acquisition Report (SAR), the OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) and F–35 Joint Program Office (JPO) estimate for Operational and Support (O&S) costs differed in excess of $200 billion. 

There were two significant factors that led to this difference. First, the CAPE did 

not update the O&S cost estimate for SAR–12 but instead used the estimate from 

SAR–11, whereas, the F–35 JPO did update the O&S cost estimate for SAR–12 utilizing the latest data available. Secondly, the F–35 JPO and the CAPE used different inflationary assumptions which accounts for the large difference in SAR–12 

Then Year Dollar (TY$) estimates. For SAR–13, the CAPE did update their O&S 

estimates and reductions were seen in both the Base Year Dollar (BY$) and TY$ 

estimates. 

O&S Estimates SAR 12 

BY12$ 

SAR 12 

TY$B 

SAR 13 

BY12$ 

SAR 13 

TY$B 

CAPE O&S $617.0 $1113.3 $597.8 $1016.5 

JPO O&S $549.2 $856.7 $541.1 $916.8 

Difference $129.5 $256.6 $56.7 $99.7 
159 

In SAR–13, the TY$ difference between the CAPE and JPO’s O&S estimates was 

reduced from $256.6 billion to $99.7 billion. The F–35 JPO O&S estimate differs 

from the CAPE O&S cost estimate primarily in 4 areas—reliability, depot overall, 

government/contractor manpower and F–35A fuel consumption: 

1. Reliability: The CAPE used the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation’s 

(DOT&E) estimate for Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) based on 8,500 fleet 

hours. The F–35 JPO used the most current R&M forecasts of steady state reliability, informed by approximately 12,000 fleet hours, for their estimate. The CAPE 

position for this element is 4% higher than the JPO position. 

2. Depot Overhaul: the CAPE used historical data from AV–8B and F/A–18C aircraft and assumed each depot event was a discreet action and summed these actions 

for a total cost estimate. The F–35 JPO used historical data from F–15, F–16, and 

F–22 aircraft and bundled certain depot events, modeled after the strategy within 

the F–18 aircraft community. The CAPE position for this element is 71% higher 

than the JPO position. 

3. Government/Contractor Manpower: The CAPE used the 2011 manpower estimate which was based on high level manpower requirements allocated at a 20/80 

government/contractor split for most elements. The F–35 JPO used the Fiscal Year 

2013 latest manpower estimates as represented in the current sustainment strategy 

based on a discrete assessment of government and contractor requirements for future sustainment work. The CAPE position for this element is 17% higher than the 

JPO estimate. 

4. Fuel Consumption: The CAPE used a revalidated Air Force fuel burn rate that 

did not change from SAR–12. The F–35 JPO used a lower burn rate that was initially validated in the Air Force Weapon System Planning Document. Future SARs 

will ensure that the CAPE and F–35 JPO will use the same fuel burn rates. The 

CAPE estimate for this element is 5% higher than the JPO. 

I am confident in the F–35 JPO estimate for O&S costs. Incorporating the same 

technical baseline for these 4 areas would have resulted in less than 2% difference 

between the CAPE and F–35 JPO O&S cost estimates. 

Mr. TURNER. GAO notes that the program will be challenged to meet its unit cost 

affordability targets by 2019, as required by OSD. How does the program plan to 

meet its unit cost targets, if at all, and what steps are being taken to achieve those 

targets? If the targets are not met not, what is the impact and what action(s) does 

the program plan to take? 

General BOGDAN. Based on the program’s current production and procurement 

profile, I am moderately confident that we will meet the Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) unit price target of $83.4M in Fiscal Year (FY) 2019. Under the current procurement profile, we will deliver an F–35A in FY19 between $80–85 million in FY19 

dollars. For the F–35B and F–35C, I am moderately confident that we will meet the 

unit cost targets or be within a few percentage points of the target. 

Affordability continues to be one of my top priorities and my team and I continue 

to strive to not only meet the DOD unit price targets but to realize unit costs below 

the target. Over the years, my team and I have been successful at shifting the cost 

risk from being fully absorbed by the government to a more equitable split between 

the government and the contractors. This has incentivized the contractors to become 

participants in driving down costs, without compromising capability or quality. We 

have been successful in ensuring that lot over lot, the cost of the aircraft continues 

to come down, and I expect this trend to continue. Although the cost is coming 

down, it has not come down as quickly as I would like and I am currently pursuing 

several initiatives to make the F–35 weapon system more affordable and bring down 

the unit cost of the aircraft. 

Operation and Sustainment (O&S) is one of the main cost drivers over the 

lifecycle of the program and it is imperative that we get it right. Some of the initiatives to address O&S affordability include: 

• Established an F–35 Cost War Room, which includes representatives from 

prime contractors, with the objective of identifying program-wide initiatives to 

drive down overall program costs. They are currently examining 48 opportunities to drive down or remove costs from the program. 

• Executing a Level of Repair Analysis study to define the most cost effective repair enterprise for the U.S. and International Partners. The outcome of this 

study will help us determine the optimum repair structure. We expect the study 

to be available for review by the U.S. Services in the third quarter of this year. 

• Completed a second Business Case Analysis in April 2014 to help inform the 

most cost effective Regional sustainment construct. This analysis will determine 

the best-value sustainment solution across a range of alternatives using a consistent set of baseline requirements and ground rules. We expect to have the 

analysis confirmed and finalized within the third quarter of this year. 
160 

• Established an actively-managed and funded Reliability and Maintainability 

(R&M) Improvement Program with the objective of redesigning components to 

improve R&M from both a hardware and software perspective. The intended 

outcome will be increased component reliability and decreased maintenance 

burdens. 

We continue to press forward with continuous improvement/producibility efforts 

in order to reduce the labor hours associated with aircraft production. We are examining methods of addressing Diminishing Manufacturing Sources to introduce competition in the supply chain. We are taking a systematic approach to reduce aircraft 

prices below the normal production learning curves and are addressing supply chain 

arrangements to reduce material costs. 

The procurement quantity from year to year is a significant factor in achieving 

lower procurement costs. In the last two years, our International Partners and the 

U.S. Services have delayed purchases to future years, delaying the timeline for realizing unit cost targets. Over the next few years, I expect Foreign Military Sales customers to increase their quantities, which will make up for some of the delayed purchases by the U.S. Services and our International Partners, but if we continue to 

see the current trend then it will further delay how quickly we are able to reduce 

the procurement cost of the aircraft. 

Mr. TURNER. Your recent report emphasizes the risks posed by continuing delays 

in mission systems software testing, and notes that those delays could limit the capabilities the Marine Corps receives at the time it plans to declare its initial operational capability. If the program continues to experience software related delays, 

what additional impacts do you believe this could have on the program? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. In addition to software, GAO’s most recent report identifies a number of other ‘‘technical’’ risks that the program has faced during development. What 

progress have you seen the program making in these technical risk areas; and 

which areas, if any, do you believe still pose risks? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. F–35 operation and support costs—which are still estimated at around $1 trillion over the life of the fleet—represent a potentially significant financial obligation for the Air Force and Navy, and have been deemed ‘‘unaffordable’’ 

by the Department. What steps do you think the program can take to drive operating and sustainment costs down? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. You mentioned in your written testimony that F–35 sustainment 

costs remain a concern. What actions are the F–35 Joint Program Office and the 

Department of the Navy taking to reduce F–35 life-cycle costs? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. The Department of the Navy and the F–35 Program Executive Office (PEO) are continuing to reduce the Operations and Support (O&S) costs. 

As a result of our efforts to date and as reported in the 2013 Selected Acquisition 

Report (SAR), the CAPE O&S estimate from SAR 2012 to SAR 2013 reduced by approximately three percent (in BY2012 dollars). The Department and PEO have several initiatives underway that have substantial O&S cost savings potential: 

1. The Services are reviewing basing assumptions, squadron size, and training requirements. As an example, the training mission profile has been refined resulting in reduced estimates for F–35C fuel usage. 

2. The Services and PEO are conducting a level of repair analysis that fully explores all three levels of maintenance to improve readiness and reduce repair 

and turnaround costs. The study is expected to conclude in May. 

3. The PEO has established a sustainment cost war room with active participation from Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney. The team is focused on lifecycle affordability. Some of the initiatives include aligning periodic maintenance and planned modification, aligning engine data to maintenance planning, pursuing Red Air alternatives in training squadrons, reusing support 

equipment from legacy programs, optimizing the number of pilot fit facilities 

and warehousing, and optimizing low-observable maintenance practices. 

4. The PEO has a focused effort on reliability and maintainability improvements. 

The top reliability degraders have been identified and the PEO is conducting 

business case analysis for each to determine the best investment opportunities 

for improved reliability and/or reduced cost. 

5. The PEO is conducting a business case analysis to evaluate alternative lifecycle 

sustainment strategies comparing the baseline full contractor logistics support 

construct to a spectrum of fully organic or a hybrid mix of contractor and organic support. Initial results have identified several cost drivers in both labor 

(organic rates are lower than contractor rates) and material (original equipment manufacturer mark-up). The study will also consider investment costs 
161 

such as data rights, additional manning resources, training, and spares inventory. 

Mr. TURNER. The budget request postpones the MQ–4C Triton low-rate initial production from fiscal year 2015 to fiscal year 2016. What steps is the Navy taking to 

mitigate the effects of this delay on the Navy’s requirement for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Postponement of MQ–4C Triton low-rate initial production 

from Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 to FY 2016 resulted in a one-year fielding delay for MQ– 

4C Triton Multi-INT (signals intelligence capability) to FY 2020. In accordance with 

the National Defense Authorization Act of 2011 and the Navy’s Maritime Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting (MISR&T) Transition Plan, a 

delay in fielding MQ–4C Triton Multi-INT required a corresponding sustainment of 

legacy MISR&T platforms. The Navy’s Special Projects Aircraft (SPA) squadron will 

operate through FY 2019 and the Navy’s Fleet Air Reconnaissance (VQ) squadron 

will operate through FY 2020. These one-year extensions to planned retirement 

dates will ensure adequate MISR&T assets exist to meet Global Force Management 

requirements until MQ–4C Triton Multi-INT is fielded in sufficient numbers. 

Mr. TURNER. You mention in your testimony that meeting the Marine Corps F– 

35B IOC will require modification of aircraft to bring them up to the required hardware configuration and that the schedule to do so is tight. What steps is the Navy 

taking to mitigate the risk that all required modifications to the F–35B fleet will 

be done on time? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. The Marine Corps and the F–35 Program Executive Officer 

(PEO) are working together to meet aircraft modification requirements in support 

of F–35B Initial Operational Capability (IOC). The technical issues are understood; 

it is a management issue that is receiving the appropriate attention. The Marine 

Corps and PEO are building and constantly refining an integrated modification 

schedule to incorporate several air vehicle and propulsion modifications that will be 

performed at various locations. Most significant is the planned increase in aircraft 

throughput capacity at the Fleet Replacement Center-East in Cherry Point, NC. We 

may also look to increase throughput capacity and/or work at Yuma, AZ, as well 

as other locations to ensure requirements for F–35B IOC are met. The current 

planned timelines for throughput capacity increase and modification completion are 

executable, but leave a small margin before impacting F–35B IOC. 

Mr. TURNER. Your written testimony notes that the Marine Corps strike fighter 

shortfall is 20 aircraft in 2023. Do you believe that the Marine Corps may experience an elevated operational risk in the 2020’s if the predicted strike fighter shortfall comes to fruition? Please describe why you believe the Marine Corps faces this 

elevated operational risk and what the Department of the Navy is doing to mitigate 

those risks. 

General SCHMIDLE. The Marine Corps does not believe it will experience an elevated operational risk in the 2020’s. 

With the pending certification of the Naval Synchronization Tool Set and ongoing 

use of the Continuous Process Improvement Program (CPI Blackbelt projects), Marine Aviation is able to proactively plan aircraft utilization, and efficiently manage 

the service life of its remaining AV–8B and F/A–18A–D aircraft. In addition, Marine 

Corps Aviation is implementing force management and scheduling strategies targeted at greatly reducing risk throughout the transition to the F–35. 

The Department of the Navy (DoN) continues to manage aircraft service life of 

each aircraft at the operational level in order to achieve the maximum allowable 

service life limits prior to its sundown. The continued engineering and Service Life 

Extension Program (SLEP) kit development over the FYDP will ensure there is sufficient TACAIR inventory to meet DoN requirements through the transition to the 

F–35. 

Mr. TURNER. We understand that Marine aviation is on a path toward a distributed Airborne Electronic Attack system of systems including both unmanned and 

manned assets. Please describe the number and types of unmanned and manned assets that will be part of this system. 

General SCHMIDLE. The Marine Corps anticipates a future operating environment 

comprised of advanced Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) Warfare and digital 

threats. The Marine Corps will address these threats with the Marine Air Ground 

Task Force Electronic Warfare (MAGTF EW) concept. This approach will leverage 

all available transmitters and sensors across the MAGTF on both manned and unmanned platforms. A coordination cell comprised of EMS, Cyber, Operations, Intelligence, and Communications subject matter experts (SME) will collectively integrate collections and effects-delivery efforts in real-time. The Marine Corps will no 

longer depend on a large single-purpose platform, since the low-density, platformcentric approach has proven insufficient for meeting capacity requirements. MAGTF 
162 

EW systems will be capable of networking with Marine and Joint assets spanning 

the air, ground, space, and cyber domains. 

Any current or future airframe employed in support of MAGTF operations will 

maintain the ability to host advanced EMS payloads in support of integrated Spectrum and Cyber Operations. The Intrepid Tiger II Electronic Warfare pod, currently 

deployed aboard Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), is one such payload example. 

The types and numbers of these platforms and systems will be based on Service capacity and future mission requirements. These platforms specifically include future 

Group 4/5 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), RQ–21A, F–35B, AV–8B, F/A–18A++/ 

C/D, AH–1W/Z, though any aircraft in the inventory will be capable of serving as 

a host platform in the distributed capability network. As the future linchpin of Marine Corps Tactical Aviation, the F–35B will contribute by reducing counter-integrated air defense systems (C–IADS) requirements due to its inherent Spectrum 

survivability, and adding decisive networked attack and exploitation capabilities in 

EMS regions of significance. 

While the Marine Corps is currently achieving combat success with EMS payloads 

on manned platforms in theater and adding such capability to deployed Marine Expeditionary Units, the application of airborne Spectrum Warfare will increasingly 

gravitate towards UAS platforms. Marine Corps Aviation is actively exploring options to expand its UAS fleet with more capable platforms to provide the requisite 

size, weight, and power to perform a combination of standoff and penetrating Spectrum Attack operations. Coupling new UAS employment concepts with emerging 

EW payloads offers the Marine Corps a unique opportunity to counter a complex 

IADS. This approach will enable deliberate growth in the Spectrum Warfare portfolio and will include communications-based targets, RADAR-based targets, directed-energy (DE) and LASER targets. Additionally, the Marine Corps is exploring 

the viability and readiness of advanced (medium-high Technology Readiness Level) 

Spectrum Attack technologies to augment baseline Intrepid Tiger 2 capability for future incorporation. 

Mr. TURNER. If the Department of Defense is forced to accept sequestration-level 

budgets between fiscal year 2016 and 2023, what affect will that have on the capability and capacity of Navy and Marine Corps’ strike fighter fleets to achieve the 

requirements of the National Defense Strategy? 

General SCHMIDLE. The DoN is focused on maintaining a strike fighter fleet which 

possesses the capability and capacity to win decisively. Sequestration-level budgets 

will force the DoN to balance future capabilities and capacity within the limits of 

the Budget Control Act, challenging the ability of our strike fighter fleets to maintain an advantage against possible future threats and increasing risk in meeting 

National Defense Strategy requirements. 

Sequestration will reduce current modernization funding levels and severely limit 

further F/A–18A–F capability upgrades. Sequestration will also increase the risk to 

achieving initial operating capability goals, and ultimately, full fielding of the Joint 

Strike Fighter program of record. Initial operational capability of the F–35B in 

FY15 will not be affected but may increase risk to follow-on software development. 

Additionally, any reduction to Service Life Management funding levels will negatively impact Marine Corps F/A–18A–D capacity throughout the F–35 transition. 

Lastly, sequestration will adversely impact strike fighter readiness across all of 

Naval aviation. 

Mr. TURNER. Like the Air Force, Naval air forces require inventories of precision 

air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions. Please describe which inventories and short 

of requirements and provide the committee a list of those munitions and amounts 

above the budget request that could be executed in fiscal year 2015. 

General SCHMIDLE. Navy supports the Fiscal Year 2015 President’s Budget (PB15) 

as submitted. 

If additional funds were made available, the following precision air-to-air and airto-ground Naval munitions, listed in alphabetical order, are short of their inventory 

requirement. The amount of funding above the PB15 budget request that could be 

executed in fiscal year 2015 and the respective quantities to be procured with that 

funding is as follows: 

AARGM: $24.3M of WPN for an additional 46 missiles. 

AMRAAM 120–D: $62M of WPN for an additional 83 missiles. 

GP Bombs: $93.7M of PANMC for the additional components below: 

—JDAM tail kits 500 lbs ($15.3M, QTY 625) 

—JDAM tail kits 2,000 lbs ($38.0, QTY 27,576) 

—GBU–10 ($3.6M, QTY 201) 

—BLU–109 Bomb Body ($21.7M, QTY 678) 

—FMU–143 fuze ($27.5M, QTY 7624) 

Rockets: $100M of PANMC for the additional components below: 
163 

—LAU–61 G/A Digital Rocket Launcher ($0.256M, QTY 4) 

—MK 66 MOD 4 Rocket Motor ($24.3M, QTY 57,460) 

—WGU–59/B APKWS II Guidance and Control Section ($74.3M, QTY 2,552) 

—WTU–1/B Inert Warhead ($1.14M, QTY 15,985) 

Mr. TURNER. If the Department of Defense is forced to accept sequestration-level 

budgets between fiscal year 2016 and 2023, what affect will that have on the capability and capacity of Navy and Marine Corps’ strike fighter fleets to achieve the 

requirements of the National Defense Strategy? 

Admiral MANAZIR. The DoN is focused on maintaining a strike fighter fleet which 

possesses the capability and capacity to win decisively. Sequestration-level budgets 

will force the DoN to balance future capabilities and capacity within the limits of 

the Budget Control Act, challenging the ability of our strike fighter fleets to maintain an advantage against possible future threats and increasing risk in meeting 

National Defense Strategy requirements. 

Sequestration will reduce current modernization funding levels and severely limit 

further F/A–18A–F capability upgrades. Sequestration will also increase the risk to 

achieving initial operating capability goals, and ultimately, full fielding of the Joint 

Strike Fighter program of record. Additionally, any reduction to Service Life Management funding levels will negatively impact Marine Corps F/A–18A–D capacity 

throughout the F–35 transition. Lastly, sequestration will adversely impact strike 

fighter readiness across all of Naval aviation. 

Mr. TURNER. Like the Air Force, Naval air forces require inventories of precision 

air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions. Please describe which inventories and short 

of requirements and provide the committee a list of those munitions and amounts 

above the budget request that could be executed in fiscal year 2015. 

Admiral MANAZIR. Navy supports the Fiscal Year 2015 President’s Budget (PB15) 

as submitted. 

If additional funds were made available the following precision air-to-air and airto-ground Naval munitions, listed in alphabetical order, would be augmented in 

numbers. The amount of funding above the PB15 budget request that could be executed in fiscal year 2015 and the respective quantities to be procured with that 

funding is as follows: 

NAVY 2015 Unfunded Priority List: 

AMRAAM 120–D: $96.3M of WPN for an additional 83 missiles. 

Munitions above budget request that could be executed in fiscal year 2015: 

AARGM: $24.3M of WPN for an additional 46 missiles. 

GP Bombs: $102.7M of PANMC for the additional components below: 

—JDAM tailkits 500 lbs ($15.3M, QTY 625) 

—JDAM tailkits 2,000 lbs ($38.0M, QTY 1,378) 

—Laser Guided Bomb tailkits ($3.6M, QTY 201) 

—BLU–109 Bomb Body ($21.7M, QTY 678) 

—FMU–139 Fuze ($24.1M, QTY 7624) 

Rockets: $100M of PANMC for the additional components below: 

—LAU–61 G/A Digital Rocket Launcher ($0.256M, QTY 4) 

—MK 66 MOD 4 Rocket Motor ($24.3M, QTY 57,460) 

—WGU–59/B APKWS II Guidance and Control Section ($74.3M, QTY 2,552) 

—WTU–1/B Inert Warhead ($1.14M, QTY 15,985) 

Mr. TURNER. You mention in your testimony that the Navy does not have a requirement for additional F/A–18E/F aircraft. Does the Navy have a requirement for 

additional EA–18G aircraft? 

Admiral MANAZIR. On-going study indicates the likelihood of increasing threat capability, and additional Growlers on the flight deck will provide a significant advantage in a high end conflict. The Growler will soon be the only DOD tactical AEA 

aircraft in the joint force inventory and is required to support both 4th and 5th generation strike fighter aircraft. With legacy jamming pods or Next Generation 

Jammers the EA–18G provides precise control of a broad range of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to create sanctuaries for the Joint force, denying enemy 

access to portions of the EMS. 

The current total procurement of 138 aircraft can source the Navy mission. The 

addition of 22 EA–18Gs listed on the Navy’s Unfunded Requirements List will be 

used to augment existing Navy squadrons in the execution of the joint AEA missions allowing carrier squadrons to deploy with seven aircraft vice their current 

complement of five aircraft per squadron. The additional aircraft will reduce risk in 

meeting operational demand for multi-ship tactics and the potential increased need 

for AEA. As nations expand their use of the EMS, the ability to perform the AEA 

mission will become more critical and buying additional EA–18Gs in FY15 reduces 

risk in our ability to meet future AEA demand. 
164 

Mr. TURNER. You mention in your testimony an Air Force concern about the aerospace industrial base that supports the engineering design and development of tactical fighter aircraft. You note that when production of the F/A–18 and F–15 ends, 

there will be only one prime contractor producing tactical aircraft. What steps is the 

Air Force taking in the FY 2015 and in the future years defense program to address 

this concern? When you say, ‘‘we are accepting risk that some elements of the current aerospace industrial capacity may atrophy,’’ what specific skills are likely to 

atrophy and what would be the impact on the Nation’s aerospace programs? How 

do the Air Force long range strike aircraft program and the Navy’s unmanned carrier-launched airborne surveillance and strike (UCLASS) programs affect the industrial base necessary to develop and produce tactical fighter aircraft? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The current fiscal environment has forced the Air Force to make 

some very tough choices. In broad terms, the Air Force has chosen capability over 

capacity. The ripples from these decisions extend from the immediate force structure 

through our base infrastructure to the aerospace industrial base. Just as the Air 

Force lacks both the budget availability and flexibility to maintain the size and 

structure of current forces while we modernize, we lack the immediate mission requirements and resources to sustain the defense sector of the aerospace industrial 

base as configured. Elements of the aerospace industrial base have already taken 

some steps in terms of reorganizations and workforce adjustments to better position 

themselves in this new fiscal arena. The lack of demand from the Air Force will contribute to a reduced capacity, affecting all skills, from engineering through production. 

The fact that there will be only one tactical aircraft, the F–35, in production for 

the foreseeable future is a reality the Air Force has neither the operational requirements nor the financial resources to alter. However, the Air Force is able to use 

other elements of the budget to sustain and develop some industrial base capabilities at a reduced capacity. For example, Air Force research and development investments in advancing the state of the art in turbine engine technology contribute to 

the support of engineering and design teams of two contractors. Other aircraft programs, whether manned or not, also serve to sustain engineering design, integration, and production capabilities. Moreover, the Air Force has continuing needs for 

our current aircraft. As we maintain and modernize these legacy aircraft, we place 

demands on the industrial base for engineering design and production to sustain our 

operational capabilities. 

The defense sector of tomorrow’s aerospace industrial base will be similar to tomorrow’s Air Force—it will be capable but no longer have today’s capacity. 

Mr. TURNER. Last year the Air Force mentioned that depot delays would require 

the grounding of some of the affected aircraft, and that sequestration cuts to Air 

Force modernization will impact every one of the Air Force’s investment programs, 

creating inefficiencies, raising unit costs, and delaying delivery of valued capabilities 

to warfighters in the field. The Air Force also noted that the Fiscal Year 2014 budget request would not enable full recovery of warfighting capability, capacity and 

readiness and that additional resources would be required. 

As we are into execution of the FY 2014 budget this year, what steps has the Air 

Force taken to mitigate these affects? Did you get the additional resources required 

in fiscal year 2014 to make the fighter fleets whole again? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The Air Force did not develop its Fiscal Year 2013 weapon system 

sustainment (WSS) program factoring in sequestration, so when ‘‘sequestered’’ impacts were added to the WSS Fiscal Year 2013 President’s Budget funding position, 

unfunded requirements (a bow wave) resulted for aircraft and engine programmed 

depot maintenance. Initially, the impact was assessed to be approximately 24 aircraft and 84 engines. The impacts were mitigated by: Military Augmentation, House 

Resolution 933, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 

2013, buybacks, reduction in the number planned furlough days, and relief from 

overtime limitation. Fiscal Year 2013 ended with an unfunded bow wave of 13 aircraft and 19 engines. 

The Fiscal Year 2014 Bi-Partisan Budget Act impact, including a $500 million 

buyback, eliminated the sequestration bow wave with depot production back on 

track with minor impacts to due dates and flow days for aircraft and engine. Exchangeable production was diminished during the furlough period but is recovering. 

Impacts were offset by shelf shock with full recovery expected in Fiscal Year 2014. 

All Fiscal Year 2013 deferred aircraft and engines including the fighters were mitigated in Fiscal Year 2014, eliminating the sequestration bow wave. 

Mr. TURNER. You mentioned in your written testimony that all three mission 

areas in the air-to-surface munitions inventory are short of inventory objectives. 

Those missions are stand-off, direct attack, and penetrator munitions. 
165 

Please provide the subcommittee a list of those muntions and amounts that could 

be increased to the budget request and, if authorized and appropriated, could be executed in fiscal year 2015. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. If additional funds were made available, the following Air Force 

air-to-surface munition procurements could be executed in FY15 up to the quantities 

indicated. Quantities above the planned FY15 procurement will allow the Air Force 

to meet inventory objectives sooner. 

Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) 

To bring production to the contracted maximum capacity of 15,000 tail kits per year, an additional 5,000 JDAM units could be purchased for $147.5M. 

Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) 

The FY15 production contract is currently being negotiated with Lockheed Martin. If additional FY15 funds were made available, quantities of Baseline and Extended Range (ER) missiles would be adjusted to maximize ER production while 

maintaining the most economical unit price within the bounds set by the Request 

for Proposal (RFP). An additional 16 missiles could be purchased for an additional 

$19.5M resulting in 100 JASSM-Baseline missiles and 140 JASSM–ER missiles. The 

planned FY16 procurement brings production to the maximum capacity of 360 missiles per year. 

Hellfire 

Up to an additional 3,953 Hellfire missiles could be purchased for $411M to bring 

production to its maximum steady-state capacity of 6,000 missiles per year. 

WRM—Ammunition 

This mission area includes hundreds of items in several categories. Up to an additional 9,500 bombs (includes 2,000 pound penetrators and 2,000 pound general purpose bombs) could be purchased for $275M; up to 7,500 additional fuzes could be 

purchased for $15M; and up to 300,000 additional cartridges could be purchased for 

$15M. 

Training Munitions Items 

This mission area includes dozens of items in several categories. Approximately 8,000 additional practice bombs could be purchased for $25M in FY15. 

Mr. TURNER. We noted that the Combat Rescue Helicopter (CRH) program is currently scheduled for initial operational capability in FY 2021. Will the Air Force be 

taking risk in its combat rescue mission until the CRH becomes operational? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Given current aircraft attrition projections, a fully funded Ops 

Loss Replacement (OLR) program will recap the current HH–60G fleet to a program 

of record of 112 aircraft by Fiscal Year 2018. This will mitigate further risk to the 

combat rescue mission until the CRH program reaches initial operational capability 

in Fiscal Year 2021. 

Mr. TURNER. If the Department of Defense is forced to accept sequestration-level 

budgets between fiscal year 2016 and 2023, what affect will that have on the capability and capacity of Air Force strike fighter fleet to achieve the requirements of 

the National Defense Strategy? 

General FIELD. The fiscal constraints imposed by sequestration have forced the 

Air Force to make difficult choices. All budget decisions, not only in the strike fighter fleet, but also across all Air Force capabilities, are evaluated against planning 

scenarios directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense that support the President’s Defense Strategic Guidance. Ultimately any decisions the Air Force makes regarding potential aircraft divestment will be based on aligning the Air Force’s contribution to fulfilling the Defense Strategic Guidance, while complying with the fiscal constraints imposed by sequestration. 

The Air Force is very concerned with recent budget reductions and continues to 

monitor how these cuts will affect risk. The Air Forces’ fighter fleet is approaching 

30 years old—the oldest in our history. The Air Force is pursuing modernization 

programs to extend the service life of our strike fighter inventory. Without service 

life extensions and capability upgrades, it will be increasingly difficult to meet the 

defense strategy. Therefore, it is absolutely critical selected fourth generation 

sustainment and modernization efforts continue as outlined in the FY15 budget request. Additionally, we must procure the F–35 at a rate that ensures we have the 

capabilities and capacity to ensure success against emerging threats. 

Further, Air Force mission success is dependent on our fighter force manning. The 

Air Force is currently 200 fighter pilots short of the total manning requirement. Our 

projections indicate this deficit growing to approximately 500 by 2022, excluding any 

additional sequestration driven impacts on flying training. The shortfall resulted 

from a series of force reductions and it will take the Air Force many years to reverse 

this trend and recover. A return to sequestration level funding only exacerbates this 

problem and extends the number of years required to recover from the fighter pilot 

shortage. 
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At the levels requested in the President’s budget, the Air Force protects the capabilities required to prevail in the more demanding operational environment in years 

to come. At sequestration funding levels, it is not possible to budget for an Air Force 

capable of simultaneously performing all of the missions our Nation expects. We 

would end up with a force that is less ready, less capable, less viable, and unable 

to fully execute the defense strategy. 

Mr. TURNER. You noted in your written testimony that fiscal constraints have 

driven force structure divestments of 334 fighters that require the Air Force to ‘‘accept near-term risk today to be ready and viable tomorrow.’’ What scenarios are at 

greatest risk with the reduction of 334 fighters? 

General FIELD. To support the National Defense Strategy and meet future 

threats, the Air Force must continue investments in new capability programs and 

upgrades to gain and maintain full-spectrum readiness. Budget constraints have 

forced difficult decisions that reduced fighter force capacity in an effort to rebuild 

a more ready force and bridge the gap to future force requirements. Reduced fighter 

force capacity elevates risk in all scenarios. However, these deliberate capacity cuts 

that focused on single mission part of the fourth generation fleet leave the Air Force 

with the ability to manage near-term risk in supporting the National Defense Strategy, although significant challenges still exist. Ultimately, the strategy underlying 

the Presdient’s Budget allows the Air Force to balance capability and capacity to 

win today’s fight while acquiring critical capabilities to address future threats. 

Mr. TURNER. You mention in your written testimony that the Air Force fighter 

fleet is approaching 30 years old—the oldest in Air Force history—and that ‘‘without 

service life extensions and capability upgrades, it will not be possible to manage 

risk.’’ The FY 2015 budget request includes the termination of the F–16 combat avionics programmed extension suite, or ‘‘CAPES.’’ How does the termination of 

CAPES affect risk, and what scenarios are most affected by an F–16 fleet that 

would not have the CAPES upgrade? 

General FIELD. The termination of CAPES increases risk and decreases operational effectiveness in several scenarios, but to remain within fiscal guidance constraints, we had to make difficult trades between force structure investment, readiness, and modernization. We chose to terminate F–16 CAPES because the impact 

on operational risk was judged to be less than the impact of other higher priority 

capability upgrades. This budget driven decision likely increases operational risk in 

the Homeland Defense and highly contested environment scenarios as the F–16 may 

not be as effective due to the loss of the Airborne Electronically Scanned Array 

(AESA) radar and an upgraded electronic warfare suite. We recognize this elevated 

operational risk; however, these decisions remain consistent with our approach to 

take near-term risk in modernization of legacy systems to ensure future force structure recapitalization. 

Mr. TURNER. In your statement you note that when the U–2 is retired, you will 

not meet the overall demand for high altitude intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). What percentage of high altitude ISR demands are met now, and 

how much less of that requirement will be met with retirement of the U–2? 

General FIELD. The requirement for high altitude ISR capability is defined by the 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council; per the classified definition of conventional 

wartime high altitude ISR needs, either the U–2 or RQ–4 can meet 100 percent of 

the force structure requirement for Combat Air Patrols, with a narrow classified exception for the RQ–4. 

However, retirement of the U–2 results in the loss of approximately 50 percent 

of overall high-altitude ISR collection capacity. Combatant Commanders do not 

specify platforms when submitting annual ISR needs; however, the U–2 historically 

provides at least half of all high-altitude imagery and signals intelligence products. 

Mr. TURNER. What is the status of the Air Force’s air-to-air weapons inventory? 

Are there shortages in the AIM–120 or AIM–9 inventories? If so, please provide additional amounts that could be executed in fiscal year 2015 to address those shortages. 

General FIELD. Currently, both the AIM 120 and AIM 9 inventories lag Air Force 

requirements. Actual inventory requirements are classified and available under separate cover. At this time, the Air Force is not requesting any additional amounts 

for AIM–120D or AIM–9X procurement above what is presented in the FY15PB. The 

FY15PB addresses the inventory shortages with an overall increase to Air Force 

AIM 120D procurement by 103 missiles and AIM 9X Block II procurement by 333 

missiles across the FYDP over FY14PB levels. The FY15PB also includes Air Force 

procurement of an additional 388 AIM 120D and 201 AIM 9X missiles in FY19 and 

the production lines for both missiles are expected to remain open well into the 

2020s. 
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In the FY15 Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative, OSD included a request for $62M in WPN to procure approximately 62 AIM–120D missiles for the 

Navy in addition to the Air Force’s FY15PB request for 200 missiles. The FY15PB 

already outlines an aggressive Air Force and Navy AIM–120D production profile 

across the FYDP that balances the inventory shortage with the program’s aggressive Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS) efforts. 

Any increase in FY15 quantities beyond 262 missiles is limited by a depleting stock 

of missile components impacted by DMSMS issues. Production line introduction of 

components redesigned to address DMSMS are planned in FY16 and FY18 that will 

allow production quantities to increase as shown in the FY15PB. 

For AIM 9X, the total Air Force and Navy procurement quantities could be increased by a maximum of 168 missiles with an approximate total cost of $67M in 

FY15. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Mr. SMITH. When do you propose to standardize your fleet? 

General SCHMIDLE. Many different funding sources have been pursued over the 

past three years to retrofit the first 36 AH–1Z aircraft that are still equipped with 

the legacy T700–401 engines. Due to competing priorities in this fiscally constrained 

environment, the engine upgrade has thus far remained unfunded. Marine Aviation 

continues to explore all avenues of funding for this initiative. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JONES 

Mr. JONES. It is my understanding that when the Marines started the AH1Z and 

UH1Y program, that the first 36 AH1Zs were built utilizing old engines which were 

really built for the AH1W and that using those engines have resulted in aircraft 

that cannot carry a full payload on a hot day and that it also complicates logistical 

support and results in pilots having to learn two different sets of aircraft limitations. Is this true? 

General SCHMIDLE. The first 36 AH–1Zs built were ‘‘remanufactured’’ AH–1Ws 

that still have the old T700–401 engines installed. These 36 aircraft will have dissimilar engines from the other 313 AH–1Z and UH–1Y aircraft in the Marine Corps’ 

inventory unless retrofitted with new the T700–401C engines. The first 36 AH–1Zs 

with the 401 engines have 110 less shaft horsepower in each of their two engines. 

In same environmental conditions (6000 feet and 95 degrees F), the newer 401C configured AH–1Z can carry four additional Hellfire missiles and 100 extra rounds of 

20mm while increasing speed by 10%. Single engine performance is even more disparate. In hot temperature, high altitude conditions with heavy payloads, the decreased power of the old 401 engine increases risk during a single engine failure 

situation. 

These 36 aircraft also complicate logistical support across the fleet by requiring 

separate spare parts, maintenance training and technical publications. Marine pilots 

do not need to learn two different sets of engine limitations. The temperature limits 

are the same for the old 401 engines and the new 401C engines. However, the power 

reduction does pose a pilot awareness issue during standard flight operations at 

high altitudes, in hot temperatures, and at full payloads, as pilots will need to be 

aware of the performance reductions of the 36 specific AH–1Z aircraft with 401 engines mixed within the entire AH–1Z fleet including 401C engines. 

Mr. JONES. If this is true how much would it cost to upgrade these 36 aircraft 

and standardize your fleet? 

General SCHMIDLE. It will cost $62.7 million to upgrade all 36 AH–1Z aircraft 

with 72 T700–401C engines in order to standardize the AH–1Z and UH–1Y fleet. 

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