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73–798 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–126] 

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS 

MATERIEL RESET 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 28, 2012 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

BILL OWENS, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

RYAN CRUMPLER, Professional Staff Member 

VICKIE PLUNKETT, Professional Staff Member 

NICHOLAS RODMAN, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 28, 2012, Army and Marine Corps Materiel Reset .............. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 28, 2012 ................................................................................... 19 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 28, 2012 

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS MATERIEL RESET 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 2 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Mason, LTG Raymond V., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, G–4, U.S. 

Army ...................................................................................................................... 4 

Panter, LtGen Frank A., Jr., USMC, Deputy Commandant, Installations and 

Logistics Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps ...................................................... 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 23 

Mason, LTG Raymond V. ................................................................................. 25 

Panter, LtGen Frank A., Jr. ............................................................................ 36 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 47 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 54 

(1) 

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS MATERIEL RESET 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 28, 2012. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:00 p.m. in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON READINESS 

Mr. FORBES. First of all, I would like to welcome all of our members and our distinguished panel of experts to today’s hearing, focused on materiel reset. I want to, at the outset, apologize to both 

of you for the delay and thank you for being patient with us as we 

work through these votes that we had on the floor. 

And I want to thank our witnesses for being with us this afternoon. General Mason, I understand this is your first time testifying 

in your new capacity as the deputy chief of staff of the Army for 

logistics, and we want to welcome you and look forward to your 

service in that position. 

And we also understand, General Panter, that this is likely your 

last time to testify before this subcommittee before your retirement. And we just want to tell you what an honor it is to have you 

here, and thank you for the honorable service that you have given 

to this country and the service that you have rendered to our Nation. 

I believe it is important that you are all here with us today. Resetting our force is a strategic imperative and one that will require 

continued commitment from this subcommittee and this Congress 

beyond combat operations. In light of shrinking defense budgets, 

the Budget Control Act’s looming sequestration, and the Administration’s announcement of an accelerated drawdown in Afghanistan 

I believe this hearing is very timely. 

Last year, we spent a great deal of time exploring our current 

state of readiness and discussing how we remain prepared to meet 

the challenges we are likely to face in the future. Time and again, 

we heard of a force that General Breedlove described as being on 

the ragged edge. We learned that one of the major drivers behind 

this degraded force was a lack of materiel readiness. 

Today, we again explore readiness. This time in the context of 

reset and its importance to ensuring a capable future force. Complicating this effort is the reduction of $754 billion in the Department 

of Defense’s 10-year budget, leading the DOD [Department of De-
2 

fense] to cancel many of its most advanced systems, like the CG(X) 

next-generation cruiser program, the F–22, and the Army’s future 

combat system. 

DOD has also made tough decisions on force structure and civilian personnel, shrinking the Marine Corps by more than 25,000 

marines, the Active Army by 72,000 soldiers. In short, this means 

that resetting the force is now more important than ever. The Administration is arguing that we can afford a smaller force, one with 

less capacity, as long as we have a more capable force. 

Let us be clear that failure to reset the force undermines this position, and will leave us with a smaller and less capable force. If 

we do not get this right, the implications will be far-reaching and 

long-lasting. Many tough decisions still lie ahead, and I remain 

concerned that because the Department has not begun planning for 

a possible sequestration we only have a small sense of how truly 

catastrophic sequestration could be. 

We all have a responsibility to ensure our men and women in 

uniform are given the tools necessary for the job we have asked 

them to do. I look forward to learning more about reset and its importance to the warfighter. 

And I would now like to turn to my friend and ranking member, 

Madeleine Bordallo, the gentlewoman from Guam, for any remarks 

she may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 23.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE 

FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General 

Mason, General Panter, we all appreciate your service and we look 

forward to your testimonies this afternoon. I want to congratulate 

you, General Mason, on your promotion. And also to you, General 

Panter, good luck as you enter into retirement. 

Today, we explore the issues and the challenges surrounding the 

reset of Army and Marine Corps equipment after more than a decade of war. We have surged hundreds of thousands of pieces of 

equipment from units and depots in the United States to locations 

across the Middle East in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Now that the war in Iraq is over, we are still dealing with the 

challenges of moving equipment from locations in Kuwait back to 

units who need this equipment for training and to perform new 

missions. So it is important for our committee members to understand the challenges with returning this equipment from Iraq to 

units at home. 

How do the Army and the Marine Corps prioritize equipment 

reset among many competing interests and units—from home station units to foreign military sales—and what is the underlying 

strategy? I am concerned that National Guard units in the United 

States will end up with significant equipment shortfalls, and thus 

hinder their ability to respond to domestic, homeland defense requirements. 
3 

And how is this specific concern being addressed, especially by 

the Army? And I also hope that General Panter can elaborate on 

the Marine Corps process for reset, and how they are addressing 

readiness issues with the III MEF [III Marine Expeditionary 

Force]. As we pivot to the Asia-Pacific region, it is more important 

than ever that we make the III MEF whole again and ensure that 

they have the proper equipment to meet current and emerging requirements in this theater over the coming years. 

In terms of whether to repair, rebuild, or replace, how do you assess what equipment now being used in Afghanistan is appropriate 

for the challenges that exist in the Asia-Pacific region? Additionally, our hearing will explore some of the challenges involved with 

retrograde of equipment from Afghanistan and its return to the 

United States for reset. 

Given the inability to move equipment across Pakistan ground 

routes, how is the Department posturing itself to ensure equipment 

can flow by strategic airlift through the northern distribution network? The fiscal year 2013 president’s budget request outlines 

some significant changes to the Air Force’s strategic and tactical 

airlift capabilities. 

I am concerned what impact some these changes will have on our 

ability to move equipment out of Afghanistan in a timely fashion. 

And we must understand that retrograde and the reset of equipment from Afghanistan is going to be a vastly different endeavor 

than the reset of equipment from Iraq because of the transportation challenges and the lack of a holding area, such as we had 

for Iraq with Kuwait. 

It is important for members of our committee to understand this 

important distinction as we assess the adequacy of budgets and the 

strategic value of recent budgetary recommendations of Congress. 

And I also hope our hearing will make clear the further complication and the challenges posed by ever-increasing gas prices, especially given our reliance on airlift for reset in Afghanistan. 

I know that tomorrow we will explore the issue of alternate energy and its potential benefit to rising gas prices. However, I do remain concerned that if we don’t continue efforts to look at alternate 

energy for operational purposes we will be assuming even more significant risk in reset in Afghanistan. 

So I hope that our witnesses can touch on this matter in their 

testimony, as well. And I also hope our witnesses can comment on 

what is being done at our Army and Marine Corps depots to sustain workload over the coming years, as we continue to reset equipment coming out of Iraq and Afghanistan. 

And I again thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to our 

witnesses’ testimony and our question and answer period. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Madeleine, for those remarks. 

As we discussed prior to the hearing, I would like to dispense 

with the 5-minute rule for this hearing and depart from regular 

order so that members may ask questions during the course of the 

discussion. I think this will provide a roundtable type forum and 

will enhance the dialogue on these very important issues. 

We would like to proceed with standard order for members to address the witnesses. However, if any member has a question pertinent to the matter being discussed at that time, please seek ac-
4 

knowledgment and wait to be recognized by the chair. We are planning to keep questioning to standard 5 minutes, however I don’t 

want to curtail productive dialogue. 

I believe we can do this and still ensure each member has the 

opportunity to get his or her questions asked. If we get bogged 

down, the chair will ask members to hold further discussion until 

the first round of questioning is complete. I ask unanimous consent 

that for the purposes of this hearing we dispense with the 5-minute 

rule and proceed as described, and without objection we will do so. 

At this point in time, we would like to move to our opening statements. General Mason, normally move from left to right, but since 

this is a bipartisan subcommittee we can go from right to left. And 

I will leave it up to whichever one of you guys want to go first, and 

you can decide among yourselves. And then we look forward to 

hearing from you. 

General MASON. I will go. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

STATEMENT OF LTG RAYMOND V. MASON, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF 

OF STAFF, LOGISTICS, G–4, U.S. ARMY 

General MASON. Well, good afternoon, Chairman Forbes and 

Ranking Member Bordallo, other members of the committee. I will 

follow your guidance, sir, and rather than read my written statement I will ask it to be submitted and accepted into the record. 

I would like to highlight three key points. First and foremost, we 

have accomplished much in the past 8, 10 years on reset. We have 

met our Iraq drawdown goals and we have surged to meet the reset 

requirements, thanks to your unwavering support and the support 

of our citizens. And we have infused significant readiness into our 

fleets, particularly our track fleet and our wheeled vehicle fleet. 

Second point is, much to be done yet. Reset is certainly the true 

cost of war. It is not about when the last unit gets back, it is when 

the last piece of equipment gets back and we get it into the depot 

and get it repaired. And as Ms. Bordallo said, Afghanistan is a different challenge from Iraq and perhaps we will discuss that in 

more detail. 

It is a tough challenge, it is a landlocked country, the enemy is 

significant there. So we are working our way through the retrograde operations out of Afghanistan. And we will need funding for 

2 years once all the equipment gets back, and I would ask for your 

support of that certainly. 

Thirdly, the organic industrial base. We are committed to having 

a viable organic industrial base. We are proud of the work that our 

depots and arsenals have completed in the last 8, 10 years. They 

have been very, very busy. The workload will certainly decline as 

our operations now have drawdown in Iraq and will draw down in 

Afghanistan in 2014 and beyond. 

But we are committed to keeping that core capability that provides us that warfighting capability to expand to future contingencies. And then finally, I would thank you for your awesome support of our soldiers, our 1.2 million Army soldiers and their families—Active, Reserve, and National Guard. And I what to thank 

you for your continued support of our reset operations, which is so 

critical to the readiness of America’s Army. 
5 

And I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of General Mason can be found in the 

Appendix on page 25.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 

General Panter. 

STATEMENT OF LTGEN FRANK A. PANTER, JR., USMC, DEPUTY 

COMMANDANT, INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS 

General PANTER. Thank you, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member 

Bordallo and other committee members. Thank you for allowing me 

to appear today. And for the sake of time, I will keep my remarks 

very short because the questions are probably more important than 

my opening statement. 

As you may know, today we have over 27,000 marines deployed 

throughout the world, with 20,000 in Afghanistan. It is with your 

continued support to our marines and their families that our Corps 

has maintained our role as the Nation’s expeditionary force in 

readiness. On behalf of our commandant, our marines and our family members, thank you sincerely. 

We were redeployed out of Iraq in the winter of 2009. We completed the last depot reset action at our depots in December of this 

last year. So that is an example of the time that is needed from 

redeployment to getting the equipment through the depots. We are 

now focused on the retrograde, as decisions are made of equipment 

coming out of Afghanistan. 

Our current OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] ground equipment reset strategy, that was signed 1 January, 2012, is grounded 

on lessons learned from Iraq and the experiences we had there related to retrograde and reset. It is written from an enterprise approach to ensure that we send the equipment to the right place the 

first time as best as we can. 

Lastly, much like General Mason mentioned, as long as we have 

marines and soldiers in harm’s way we need continued OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] support. Related to the equipment 

piece, it is when the last piece leaves Afghanistan. And we will 

need 2 or 3 years to reset and fix our Marine Corps for the next 

contingency that might arise in defense of our Nation. 

Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Panter can be found in the 

Appendix on page 36.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you both. And as I mentioned at the outset, 

we appreciate the service you have both given to our country. And 

we want thank not only both of you for what you have done, but 

also as representatives of the men and women who serve under you 

for the great job that they do in defending this country and keeping 

us free. 

I am going to defer my questions until the end because I know 

our members have very busy schedules. I want to make sure they 

can get their questions in. 

So I am going to ask the ranking member now to ask any questions that she has, and I yield her as much time as she needs. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, thank you 

to our witnesses. 
6 

General Mason, can you further discuss for the committee how 

the Army is working to ensure that National Guard units back in 

the United States and the Territories will receive equipment that 

is coming back from Iraq and Afghanistan? And further, can you 

elaborate on how the dual line and specific homeland defense mission equipment requirements will be met for National Guard units? 

I am concerned that simply replacing equipment to fill the units’ 

modified table of equipment may miss a broader strategic imperative in where we place returning equipment, and that it assumes 

significant risk for our National Guard. General. 

General MASON. Yes, ma’am. First off, I would say that the modernization and the fill of the equipment to the National Guard and 

the Reserve component has significantly improved in the past 8, 10 

years. And because of the force deployments through army force 

generation, those forces where, in the past, may not have been cascaded equipment because they have deployed at ever-increasing 

rates, we have filled them with equipment. 

So that is key right off the bat. So they are in pretty good shape. 

Secondly, how do we make sure that they get that equipment. First 

off, we follow the Department of the Army master priority list that 

the G–3 [Army Plans and Operations] of the Army runs, gets the 

priorities from the secretary and the chief. 

And then we have a series of processes we run through, and one 

them is called retrograde, redistribution and reset, and it is R3. It 

is managed by the Army staff. I am a member of that team. And 

what we do is, we get all the requirements in from the different 

MACOMs [Major Army Commands]—Army, National Guard, 

USAR [United States Army Reserve]—rack and stack those, based 

on the requirements. 

And then we cascade equipment to those units. It is based on 

ARFORGEN [Army Force Generation]. The next deploying unit is 

certainly going to get the latest equipment and get its entire fill. 

And we have aim points inside of the ARFORGEN that says you 

will get this readiness rate at return plus 90 days, return plus 180 

days. And that is regardless of whether you are an Active unit, National Guard or Reserve unit. 

So they are all treated the same, and I would say that they are 

in very good shape, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, thank you. Thank you, General. 

This question, the next one, is for either of our witnesses. I hope 

you can expand on the issues surrounding the northern distribution network. We know that it costs 2.8 times more to transport 

equipment through the northern distribution network. But the 

Pakistan ground route is closed so we are limited to options. 

Now, what risk in the proposed fiscal year 2013 budget, and in 

the outyears, are we assuming by including these transportation 

costs in the OCO account? Whichever one. 

General PANTER. Let me start, and then you can pile on, Ray. 

Well, it is a concern of us, and it is a great concern. If we can’t 

negotiate a successful—negotiate the reopening of the PAK GLOC 

[Pakistani Ground Lines of Communication], we have to default, 

and rely on the NDN, northern distribution network or increased 

strat [strategic] airlift. Both are expensive propositions, and it increases the deployment, or redeployment. 
7 

There is always that sensitive issue about the nations. We are 

dealing with the NDN [Northern Distribution Network] network, in 

itself. If, for some reason, that there is additional political strain 

related to these countries, that restricts the flow as well. Redeployment timelines, by not being able to use the PAK GLOC, will increase. Along with, as you mentioned, ma’am, the cost, as well. 

Despite all these challenges, though, TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command] and CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command], 

they do have mitigation strategies in place. And I would be more 

than happy to talk about those, as well. There are quite a few of 

them, but negotiations are ongoing, as you know, to reopen the 

PAK GLOC. 

Ray, you want to pile on? 

Ms. BORDALLO. General. 

General MASON. Yes, ma’am. The PAK GLOC is critical, and it 

has been closed since November. The good news is, because of a lot 

of really great planning our logistic situation is in very good shape. 

Fuel, we watch very closely. 

But back to the issue of retrograde out of Afghanistan. We are 

getting it out by air. So as aircraft come in—and we fill aircraft as 

they depart, both Air Force aircraft as well as commercial aircraft—we are using every available aircraft to go back out again. 

The northern distribution network, it is three to four times more 

expensive because it is three to four times lengthier. It is very complicated, a variety of different methods—rail, ferries, truck. So a 

significant amount of changing, and loading and unloading. So that 

adds to the cost, as well. 

We are in the process right now, with our partners at Transportation Command, to run a series of proof of principles to do 

backhaul. Right now, everything that comes in through the northern distribution network by ground comes one way. And the trucks 

go back empty because of the diplomatic clearances and we haven’t 

really established that line. 

So we are in the process of doing that. We have got several hundred vehicles and containers that are moving back on the northern 

distribution network working through the diplomatic clearances. 

The State Department is significantly helping us. The CENTCOM 

commander, TRANSCOM commander, have visited those countries. 

So that is looking very good. Once we get that done, I think we 

will begin to get the exflow back out of the northern distribution 

network. But that is going to rise the cost. So the PAK GLOC is 

still critical. We need to continue to negotiate and try to get that 

back open, as well. We need both methods to get out of Afghanistan. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So you are on top of it then. 

General MASON. Yes, ma’am. The team is. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I have one final question, Mr. Chairman. 

This question, again, is for either of our witnesses. The fiscal 

year 2013 president’s budget calls for a reduction in the end 

strength of the Marine Corps and Army, as well as a force structure change in many of our services. What criteria are being used 

to determine what equipment presently used in Afghanistan will be 

needed for future forces? 
8 

And further, how does our pivot to the Asia Pacific region impact 

that assessment? I hope our witnesses can be specific about what 

types of equipment would be needed in the Asia Pacific as well as 

for the future forces broadly. So either one of you. 

General PANTER. Ma’am, I will start because, as you may well 

know, we completed our force structure review 18 months ago. It 

was a detailed and conscious look at what the Marine Corps would 

look like at post-OEF. We took it to 186,200; from 202,000 down 

to 186,200. And then further budget pressure caused us to take it 

a little bit further, to 182,100. 

We thought, we have confidence, that we have rightsized our Marine Corps at 182,000. We can still meet the national missions assigned to us. Related to reset, this 182,000 force—knowing what 

that is—has helped to inform what we are resetting to. Now, you 

also may know that we swung a lot of equipment when we got out 

of Iraq over to Afghanistan. 

In fact, 42 percent of the equipment set we brought over from 

Iraq into Afghanistan, that stuff has essentially been in the fight 

for 10 years. We know what we are going to map that equipment 

back to. We are going to divest some of this equipment because it 

is worn out or is combat losses, or is planned for military sales— 

about 21 percent of that equipment set. 

So even though we are going down to 182,000, and we are divesting of some equipment, we know where we need to plug the gaps 

and holes to get the readiness of the force, across the board, back 

up. 

General MASON. Yes, ma’am. Very similar to the Marine Corps, 

we are in the process of doing our force structure alignment. Decisions have not been made yet by the secretary and the chief. We 

are looking at restructuring out brigade combat teams to potentially a third maneuver battalion. We now have two maneuver battalions in each brigade. 

We are also looking at adding another engineer battalion. So that 

is going to drive the equipment we want to take out. But we are 

not waiting on that. We will need all those types of equipment that 

are there. The question is the quantities of them. We know we are 

going to need MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles], 

we know were going to need Humvees, we are going to need tactical vehicles. Certainly all the helicopters that are there. So it is 

really focusing in on the quantities. 

The way we are managing that is, we have a responsible retrograde task force, headed up by a three-star. And he is our connection to the theater. We send him the demand signal as to how we 

need out and when we need it. And we communicate that into the 

units. And so that is the priority we want to come back to the depots to get reset. 

In terms of your question in the Pacific, I think any battlefield 

we are going to go on we are going to have an IED [Improvised Explosive Device] threat. So MRAPs are going to be as critical in that 

part of the world as they have been in the last 10 years, last 8 

years, in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

So one of the things we are doing is looking at our Army 

prepositioned sets. The chief and the secretary have directed us to 

do a full worldwide review of all that, with the focus on the new 
9 

national military strategy about do we have the right amount in 

the Pacific. So potentiality for additional prepositioned sets in the 

Pacific, potentially training sets, our float brigade, which is called 

an Army Prepositioned Number 3, we have a light brigade and a 

sustainment brigade afloat. We may need to relook that for additional capability. So the equipment we take out of Iraq and Afghanistan, some of that will be placed against APS [Army Pre-positioned Stocks], and will allow units then to rotate into the Pacific 

for training events or a contingency. 

The last thing is similar to General Panter; the divesture. Those 

old systems that we no longer need, we are going to divest of those. 

And that will save us and OPTEMPO [Operations Tempo] and 

O&M [Operations and Maintenance] dollars in the outyears. And 

so only have the equipment we absolutely need. We don’t need to 

have a bunch of equipment parked in motor pools beyond our requirements. 

So we have a divesture process we are going through, as well. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. Thank you, generals. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Madeleine. 

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Runyan, is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you, Chairman. And gentlemen, thank you 

for being here, and your service. 

Going back to when Ms. Bordallo was saying a little bit about, 

obviously, the northern route we are having to take out is obviously 

more expensive. To what degree does escalating fuel prices affect 

those estimates to actually go through that route? 

General Mason. 

General MASON. Yes, sir. Fuel prices are a driver for transportation command and air mobility command. I don’t have the exact 

dollar figures at my hand, but I can get those. The fuel price is so 

dynamic up and down, and so TRANSCOM has to pay those fuel 

prices, as you know. 

The Defense Logistics Agency provides those. Normally, the Defense Logistics Agency sets the price of fuel at the beginning of the 

year, and that stays for that entire year. But because fuel has been 

so dynamic, they have been given leeway by OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] to adjust those during the year. 

I think they have done at least one adjustment. By fixing it at 

the beginning of the year, it allows the services to budget for that. 

I, and the G–4 [Army Logistics], pay for what is called ‘‘second destination transportation charges.’’ That is where a lot of the retrograde dollars for transportation are paid through. 

So I watch it very closely. SDT, second destination transportation, is increasing. And if we don’t get the PAK GLOC open it 

is going to is going to exponentially increase. 

Mr. RUNYAN. And that being said, not having that open, are 

there decisions that are made to maybe leave equipment behind 

that you wouldn’t because it is just more cost-effective just to leave 

it there and not pay the extra money to go out the other way? 

General MASON. Absolutely, sir. We, in fact, did that significantly 

in Iraq to the tune of about a billion dollars that we, through a 

number of mechanisms; either through excess defense articles, or 
10 

foreign excess personal property, that we gave to the Iraqi army 

and police to get them up and running. 

We are not going to have the same opportunity in Afghanistan, 

we don’t think, to be able to transfer large quantities of equipment 

to the Afghan police and military. They just don’t have the infrastructure to accept that. So the vast majority we are going to have 

to pull out. There is a certain amount of equipment we will be able 

to either sell or donate to the Afghans. 

And some that is very old equipment will be divested through the 

Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service that DLA [Defense 

Logistics Agency] manages. They have got sites all over Afghanistan. Some of it they could sell locally, some of it would be cut up 

for scrap that is battle-damaged. And then they will also ship some 

out. 

But I think the vast majority of what is in Afghanistan, because 

of the conditions there, we probably are going to have to move out 

of that country. Now, we could move into the local, you know, countries that border it. And we are significantly looking at that, and 

there are opportunities there. 

Mr. RUNYAN. So you are saying there is not a significant chunk 

that you would consider leaving behind if you couldn’t get it out 

through the south? 

General MASON. I don’t think so, at this point; not a considerable 

amount. There will be some amount, but we think there are about 

50,000 vehicles in Afghanistan. The vast majority of those will 

probably have to be retrograded, sir. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you very much. 

General PANTER. Sir, if I may pile on that question a little bit. 

Our triage efforts in Afghanistan, which we are doing better this 

time from the lessons learned from Iraq, we are trying to send it 

to the right place the first time to avoid some of this secondary 

transportation cost that General Mason talks about. 

Relating to our fuel cost factored into the decision to leave a 

piece of equipment or to move it, it is considered. It is most definitely considered. But I have to be straight up with you. If it is a 

hard requirement, and there is not a production line and that piece 

of equipment is needed, we will probably come to the decision that 

we will send it where it is needed to enhance the readiness wherever that piece of equipment needs to go. 

Thank you. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you. 

Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from New York is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GIBSON. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman. And great to be with 

the distinguished panelists today, too. 

Help me get caught up. There are three areas where I need the 

latest on where we are at. The first has to do with, as was mentioned earlier in the testimony, the new equipment we have. 

MRAP, for example. And then also there have been some transformation changes with regard to tables of organization. 

So how is that impacting now in the reset, when you look at the 

installation? So motor pool sizes, barracks and all that? And cer-
11 

tainly, you know, that can be a significant cost, making that 

change in footprint back here in the United States. 

General PANTER. I will start off. 

General MASON. Okay. 

General PANTER. And you pile on. Sir, you are absolutely right. 

After 10 years of combat, we have learned that some of our TEs 

[Theater Equipment], the legacy TEs, are not what we need now, 

or for the future. A good example, com [communications] equipment—the requirement for com equipment and ground tactical vehicles—has increased. 

This is the nature of warfare now, distributed operations where 

you have smaller units going out. They need that C2 [Command 

and Control] capability. In fact, sir, you might not recognize a company command post today if you walk into it from your time. Tremendous enhancements. We have to adjust, and it is a ongoing 

process of adjusting our TE. 

You are absolutely right. There is an impact at the installations 

on the back end of this stuff, and we are attempting to factor that 

in as we consider our MILCON [military construction] projects 

General MASON. Sir, as you know, we have modularized every 

unit in the Army. We finished that over the last, basically, 8 years. 

Kind of started that in 2001 and 2002. And one of the centerpieces 

of that was the brigade combat team. We made it 100 percent mobile, we made it 3 days’ of supply. And that drove the truck requirement. 

So TRADOC, Training and Doctrine Command, is looking at 

what should the brigade of the future look like. Should we adjust 

it some? Does it really need to have 100 percent mobile? Could it 

be 80 percent mobile? Could it carry two days’ supply and be sufficient? 

We are finding that in combat that is maybe more what we want. 

So TRADOC is working that through, they are modeling it. That 

will drive the amount of trucks. So we are on iteration three of our 

Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Study. We have got about 260,000 vehicles, tactical vehicles. 

That is probably not what we are going to need in the outyears. 

So that is part of that divesture piece. So that will drive down the 

amount of vehicles that we take in the motor pool. That is one key 

piece there. At the installations, one of the things we are doing to 

optimize that is, the directors of logistics that do the maintenance 

on our installations are currently OPCON [operational control], 

under the Operational Control of Army Materiel Command. 

They were under Installation Management Command. And in 1 

October they will be fully underneath AMC [Army Materiel Command]. So AMC will be able to workload the entire capability 

across the Army, the industrial and the sustainment maintenance 

from one location, and be able to see all that. And then drive it towards effectiveness and efficiency. 

So that is moving out in a really good pace. 

Mr. GIBSON. And so among the things being considered, I had 

heard—and I don’t know this to be confirmed, but that there is consideration—of changing the BCT [Brigade Combat Team], possibly 

another infantry battalion. And then, of course, that will have im-
12 

pacts on barracks and other things. Certainly things we are going 

to have to watch in terms of cost. 

General MASON. Absolutely, sir. And we are working that very 

deliberately. The chief is looking at those standing up, over time. 

You know, we have discussed taking down eight brigade combat 

teams, but that is probably going to be the headquarters. Of course, 

the two brigades in Germany have already been announced. The 

other four brigades will be announced, I think, over the following 

years. 

So we are looking through, you know, that third battalion. The 

leadership is convinced that is what we need for the warfighting 

capability; that is what the last 8 years have convinced us of, and 

certainly the engineers. So we are working our way through the 

MILCON. 

We clearly recognize that MILCON dollars are short, and so we 

are trying to do what we can on our installations. Our installations 

are in great shape, and it is a matter of shuffling around and working our way through there. So the team is working the numbers 

and the physics and geography of what we can do in our installations. 

And where do we put those brigades, and that third battalion. 

Mr. GIBSON. Okay, very well. That certainly helps, and I appreciate the update. 

I will throw these others out. I am not sure I am going to have 

time for it, but you talked about OCO. And, you know, over the 

past decade we had the REF [Rapid Equipping Force] and the RFI 

[Rapid Fielding Initiative] programs. I would be interested to know 

how that bodes for the future. 

And then also just a very simple question. We had assumptions 

on half-life of equipment, OPTEMPO hours before we would replace. Have we adjusted those assumptions? Because certainly, 

that is going to have impact not only on current readiness, but also 

on procurement in the future. Has that changed, based on the war? 

General MASON. Both the rapid equipping force and rapid fueling 

initiatives have been great successes, both from the individual soldier and from the unit standpoint. So the Army is going through 

a process of whether you are going to keep REF as a rapid acquisition process. 

My opinion is, it is a capability we probably need to keep in the 

force and be able to rapidly get it through there. Back to the assumptions on the health of the equipment coming out of theater. 

Because we put significant special repair activities in-theater that 

has infused health into our vehicles and our equipment coming 

back. 

So some of this equipment is actually in better shape than we 

thought it was going to be. Some of it is worse. But generally, it 

is in pretty good shape because we put capability downrange, depot 

kinds of capability. It came out of TACOM [Tank-automotive and 

Armaments Command] and AMCOM [United States Army Aviation 

and Missile Command] and MICOM [United States Army Missile 

Command]. 

On the base, fix as far forward as possible. And that has really 

made a big difference. 
13 

General PANTER. If I could answer this from a joint perspective, 

we have learned to maximize the use of joint capability better than 

we have in the past. The fix forward concept, we rely on Army Materiel Command with the maintenance and repair of our equipment 

in Afghanistan with the hope that we can vector some of that stuff 

back to home stations to avoid some of these extra transportation 

costs going through the depot. 

But what has changed and shifted, which I think is the basis of 

your question, is the reliance on DLA. Things like AMC, things like 

maximize the use of that as a joint force. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. I thank the gentleman. 

Generals, thank you so much for your testimony. And now I have 

just got a few wrap-up questions if could offer them to you and ask 

your response on. The first thing, and you have touched on this a 

little bit. But can you bring into focus for us the experience that 

you have learned from your experience in Iraq, the lessons you 

have learned that have informed our retrograde operations in Afghanistan? 

General MASON. Sir, I reference what the lessons we learned 

from Iraq to transpose over to Afghanistan. Command and control, 

number one. You have got to have the right infrastructure with the 

right leaders. And I mentioned earlier about the responsible retrograde task force. General Dunwoody, the AMC commander, sent 

her deputy three-star into Kuwait to oversee that operation. 

And that provided the right level of leader and staff to synchronize that, in coordination with Army Central Command. I also 

mentioned the retrograde reset and redistribution lists we use that 

determines where this equipment is going to go. So we provide 

those to theater so they can see what the requirement is. 

And then AMC can see, at the depot, where it is coming. We put 

teams as far forward in the battle space as possible to help those 

units. Because while retrograding, and we want them to focus on 

that, their main job is to conduct combat operations. So we are 

helping them with that. 

And it was recently approved to put the CENTCOM materiel retrograde element—a force of about 2,000 people—into theater, and 

they will focus purely every day on retrograde. The fourth thing I 

would say is that we need to provide, and are providing to the theater, good distribution instructions. 

As General Panter mentioned, telling them exactly where it 

needs to be shipped to so you can get the velocity in the system 

and use your transportation very effectively. So there is a series of 

lessons learned. I would say it is mainly command and control really turns the day. 

General PANTER. Sir, if I could add that we view this is commander’s business about accountability of equipment. And I think 

it is fair to say the United States Army sees it the same way. 

Something else we have done, we are more aggressive in assessing 

the condition of our equipment that we are about to return in Afghanistan than we did in Iraq. 

We shipped a lot of stuff from Iraq that probably was not worth 

shipping, that we had been better off to divest it. We don’t want 

to make those mistakes again. Decisions are being made from an 
14 

enterprise perspective, based on the commandant’s priority where 

to send this equipment. 

If it is to the III Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa, or it 

is to Camp Pendleton in California, those decisions are being made 

early on, based on the need, based on the readiness condition of 

those units. We have data assist teams that are going forward and 

have been going forward to help cleanse the data so we have accurate records of what we have on hand, so we have a full visual of 

what is facing us to be sent home. 

Some of this is tactical. We told the commanders. We put a 10 

percent tax on some of the forward operating bases. Roll 10 percent 

back, but don’t put yourself at risk. But we know there is some excess stuff out there to try and get this mountain of things down. 

Every time there is an opportunity for opportune lift related to 

strat [strategic] lift, we are trying to maximize that. We are 

triaging and putting equipment in marshalling areas so if we get 

a chance to put something on the plane we will be in a position and 

we don’t have to delay or we miss an opportunity for that. 

Last, the reset strategy that the commandant signed off on, on 

1 January, I think it links the tactical, the operational and strategic aspect of this thing. So the Marines know that there is a bigger picture here. There is a bigger operation going on here. That 

whether they are accessing a piece of equipment in theater or fixing it or whatever they are doing in-theater, there is an in-state to 

it. 

And the enterprise, from a larger perspective, we are attempting 

to get it where it is needed the most. 

Over? 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

General MASON. Chairman, if I could offer a couple of amplifying 

points, and to jump on top of that. It is commander’s business, and 

what General Scaparrotti and the commanders downrange are saying is, ‘‘Commander, you own everything on your forward operating 

base. That is your home, and so these containers that may have 

been there when you got there, you gotta open them up, you gotta 

look inside of them.’’ 

So it is about leadership. Secondly, it is about rehearsals. We 

just finished a major rehearsal ‘‘rock drill,’’ we call it, in Qatar, 

with CENTCOM use of 4-alpha. I had a team there to talk through 

the processes of retrograde and getting the right equipment out 

there. So rehearsals. 

About every 6 months we have been doing those, and we may 

have to do those more often as we get closer to 2014. Thirdly, we 

have partnered with the both the Army Audit Agency and GAO 

[United States Government Accountability Office] to provide us a 

third set of eyes—another, you know, outside set of eyes—to watch 

us, see what we are doing, give us feedback. 

They are embedded in there with use of 4-alpha. We did that in 

Iraq. We found that very successful. The honest broker to say you 

have got some problems here, and maybe you don’t see them, 

maybe you have got some blind spots. And then finally, internally 

to me, I do a weekly video teleconference with theater. 

Every Wednesday morning, just did one this morning. I sit with 

ARCENT [United States Army Central], and use of 4-alpha, United 
15 

States Forces Afghanistan. We talk about where we are at, where 

are the gaps, where are the friction points, how can we help them, 

what help do they need from us. So those processes continue to be 

focused on that reset. 

Mr. FORBES. You know, we hear a lot about the term ‘‘reset,’’ but 

how important is reset to the readiness of the force, from a strategic point of view? And how imperative is it that we make that 

investment, and do it? 

General MASON. Sir, it is key and central. We have rode our 

equipment hard. It requires reset. You, the Congress, have funded 

that over the last 10 years significantly, both in terms of maintenance but also in terms of procurement for the battle losses. 

And we took significant battle losses in helicopters, tanks, 

Humvees, MRAPs. So replacing that equipment is part of reset. 

And that has been magnificent. It has also provided us the opportunity to infuse technology. So when we bring something back to 

the depot, not only do we reset it in the sense of repairing what 

happened in theater, but at the latest technologies there. 

A new transmission, a new suspension system. And as you know, 

we have continued to put significant weight on our vehicles with 

armor. So being able to put the latest suspension system in, to infuse that readiness. And right now, the age of our fleets, the track 

fleet, is about three to 4 years old in terms of the amount of reset 

help we have put into it. 

The tactical wheeled vehicle fleet is very similar. And our readiness rates show it, both in-theater—we are consistently in the the 

upper 80s to 90 percent on readiness rates of our wheeled fleet, 

and—and the MRAPs. And in good shape in the helicopter fleet; 75 

percent to 80 percent. Very good. 

Similar back here at home. So that reset is central to the readiness of our army now, and in the out-years. 

General PANTER. Sir, if I may add some comments to that. If we 

don’t get the reset—a subset of OCO, of this strategic reset that we 

talk about, 2 to 3 years beyond the end of the war—it is going to 

take us longer to reset our force. Instead of a bell curve that you 

would see, you will see a flat line. 

This will take us five, six, seven, 8 years to fix the readiness 

issues that we have in the Marine Corps. We might have to consider going to a tiered readiness because it will take us that long 

to have units that are capable and have the sufficient readiness 

rating that would be next in the batter’s box to deploy. 

There will be other—it would manifest itself in things like maybe 

lack of training because we won’t have the equipment that we 

would need for training. It would force us to make other hard 

choices related to the budget if we don’t have that support there 

to reset our force. 

Mr. FORBES. When we look at the amount of dollars to do the 

reset, General, what are we talking about for the Army? General 

Mason? 

General MASON. Sir, if you are referring to the total amount—— 

Mr. FORBES. Yes. 

General MASON [continuing]. At worst case—at worst case—it could be up in the $15 billion to $16 billion range. I think it is 

going to be less than that. I don’t know exactly where it is going 
16 

to be, but I think it is significantly less than that. And the reason 

I say that is because, again, as we go through the force structure 

changes and we look at the requirements for units—and I talked 

about divesture earlier, for example wheeled vehicle fleets—we 

know we are going to take our vehicles down, we are going to take 

units out of the force structure. 

So we are not going to reset all that equipment. Number one, because there won’t be a requirement for it. Number two, some of 

that equipment will be unrepairable. So it will be beyond repairable so we won’t repair that particular equipment. It will all be 

based on our priorities. 

We are looking at it very closely. We are certainly going to reset 

the helicopter fleet. We need every one of those. We are going to 

reset our MRAPs. We are going to divest some MRAPs, but the 

vast majority of those MRAPs we will need. The tanks and Bradleys, we have already done those. 

It is the radios, it is all that other equipment that we are really 

going to have to focus on and work through the eaches of what that 

requirement is going to be. So much less than $15 billion, but not 

exactly sure where it is going to fall in, at this point. 

Mr. FORBES. Would it be fair to say that even though it would be less than $15 billion, it is probably going to be at least $12 billion, or more? 

General MASON. Sir, I hesitate to say. But I think it could be in the $10 billion to $12 billion, sir. We have got some work to do and 

really look through it. Looking at what the equipment looks like as 

it comes out of theater is going to drive that number in many ways. 

And while we can do some inspection in-theater, most of that 

equipment is out being used every day. So you really don’t know 

’til it gets back to the depot, ’til you get a full inspection on it, do 

you really get an idea of what it is going to cost to take care of that 

equipment. 

Mr. FORBES. We can’t peg exactly how much, but can we get 

close on what years that we think probably the highest spike would 

be? 

General MASON. Sir, the mandate—to be generally done with 

combat operations by 2014—if you add 2 more years to that, as we 

discussed, I think the high point is going to be in the ’15 [2015], 

’16 [2016] timeframe. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. 

General Panter. 

General PANTER. Sir, our requirement is $3.2 billion. We continuously refine that. The commandant has made it clear to us just ask 

for what we need. And that is part of that refinement, continuous 

refinement. But it is $3.2 billion. That is from that strategic reset 

post, the war being over. 

We think our spike—a little different—is going to be ’14 [2014] 

and ’15 [2015]. 

Mr. FORBES. Fourteen [2014] and ’15 [2015]? 

General PANTER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. You know, General Mason, you mentioned the importance for our commanders in opening up those boxes that are 

there and finding out what is in them. One of the boxes all of us 

have been reluctant to open is this box of sequestration, you know. 
17 

But we know it is the law right now and we know, based on the 

law, it is kind of across the board cuts. Assuming that stays the 

law, assuming it is not changed, what does that do to your reset? 

General MASON. Sir, it significantly impacts it. If we don’t get 

OCO, and we have to take it out of the base, it is devastating, it 

is catastrophic. We will take significant risks with our swing forces. 

So we need to reset what is coming out of theater, so if we don’t 

get those dollars through OCO we would have to go into the base. 

Which means the forces that we might have to use for another contingency somewhere in the world, their readiness rate is going to 

go down. 

I guess I would equate it to—you know, we are going to take 

72,000 soldiers out of the Army, but we are going to take it over 

about a 5-year period. It is going to be very deliberate, we are 

going to work our way through it, we are going to do the right 

things for our soldiers as they exit our great Army. 

If you go to sequestration, I think you are talking about taking 

80,000 soldiers out in 1 year. I mean, that is the kind of scenario 

that could play itself out. You are talking rifts like we did at the 

end of Vietnam. I mean, those are the kinds of things that I think 

could be on the horizon. 

I hope they are not. I don’t want to go there. But I think it is 

as the Secretary of Defense has said, it would be catastrophic. 

Mr. FORBES. General Panter. 

General PANTER. Yes, sir. I think it is so significant that we 

would have to relook at our national military strategy. We would 

probably have to reduce our force a further 15,000 to 20,000 marines. 

Mr. FORBES. General Panter, where would that put you in terms 

of—— 

General PANTER. Well, that would—you back off 20,000 from 

182,000, that puts you in our 1970s profile, which was not healthy 

at all. In fact, it was a hollow force, sir, if you remember then. We 

couldn’t train then. I would see a similar thing because we couldn’t 

afford the fuel to train, we couldn’t afford the Class V, the ammo, 

to train. 

Very similar things, I would think, might be manifested if we 

have to go to this. We would break faith with our marines. We 

have a plan now to get down to the size that we need to be. It is 

based on voluntary mechanisms. We would be forced, like the 

United States Army, to go to involuntary means. 

And we would consider that breaking faith with our marines and 

family. We would have to consider, as I mentioned before, tiered 

readiness, which we do not want to do. The inability to train, having sufficient equipment, having sufficient O&M, personnel shortages. 

It just would not position the Marine Corps to be the expeditionary force in readiness that the Nation expects. Thank you. 

General MASON. I would offer one other thing, Chairman. The 

chief’s guidance to the Army is prevent, shape, and win. If you go 

to that kind of a scenario, his ability—the Army’s ability—to prevent war, deter an enemy would be at risk. Our ability to shape 

with our allies and those potential enemies around the world, and 

then to win. 
18 

Each one of those, then, is going to be, I think, at risk. And that 

is not a good situation. 

Mr. FORBES. Madeleine, do you have any other questions? 

Ms. BORDALLO. I have no questions. [Off Mike.] 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

Does the gentleman from New Jersey have any additional questions? If not, gentlemen, we want to thank you so much, once 

again, for your service. Thank you, for this is an important record 

for us as we go into this markup that we need to do. We hope we 

are going to be able to hold those funds for you because we know 

how important it is for you to be ready. 

And we thank you for your time here today. And with that, we 

are—oh, let me just ask you. Do either of you have anything else 

you would like to add that we didn’t ask or that you weren’t able 

to have time to clarify? 

General PANTER. No, sir. We appreciate the opportunity to answer your questions and to have this part of the record. Thank you. 

General MASON. Sir, the only thing to add is it is an honor to 

be here, and stand with our great congressional teammates. And 

I consider you teammates, and I can’t think of any higher accolade 

to be a member of a team. So thanks. Good to be here, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. And with that—— 

General MASON. Ms. Bordallo, and—— 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 28, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 28, 2012 

(23) 

Statement of Hon. J. Randy Forbes 

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Readiness 

Hearing on 

The Navy’s Readiness Posture 

March 22, 2012 

I want to welcome all of our members and our distinguished 

panel of experts to today’s hearing focused on materiel reset. I 

want to thank our witnesses for being with us this afternoon. General Mason, I understand this is your first time testifying in your 

new capacity as the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Logistics, 

welcome. 

I also understand, General Panter, that this is likely your last 

time to testify before this subcommittee before your retirement. We 

thank you for your service and wish you the best as you transition. 

I believe it is important that you are all here with us today. Resetting our force is a strategic imperative and one that will require 

a continued commitment from this subcommittee and this Congress 

beyond combat operations. In light of shrinking defense budgets, 

the Budget Control Act’s looming sequestration, and the Administration’s announcement of an accelerated drawdown in Afghanistan, I believe this hearing is very timely. 

Last year we spent a great deal of time exploring our current 

state of readiness and discussing how we remain prepared to meet 

the challenges we are likely to face in the future. Time and time 

again, we heard of a force that Gen. Breedlove described as being 

‘‘on the ragged edge.’’ We learned that one of the major drivers behind this degraded force was a lack of materiel readiness. 

Today we again explore readiness, this time, in the context of 

reset and its importance to ensuring a capable future force. Complicating this effort is the reduction of $754 billion in the Department 

of Defense’s 10-year budget, leading the DOD to cancel many of its 

most advanced systems like the CG(X) next-generation cruiser program, the F–22, and the Army’s Future Combat System. 

DOD has also made tough decisions on force structure and civilian personnel, shrinking the Marine Corps by more than 25,000 

marines, the Active Army by 72,000 soldiers. In short, this means 

that resetting the force is now more important than ever. The Administration is arguing that we can afford a smaller force, one with 

less capacity, so long as we have a more capable force. 

Let us be clear, failure to reset the force undermines this position 

and will leave us with a smaller and less-capable force. If we do 

not get this right, the implications will be far-reaching and longlasting. Many tough decisions still lie ahead, and I remain concerned that because the Department has not begun planning for a 
24 

possible sequestration, we only have a small sense of how truly catastrophic sequestration could be. 

We all have a responsibility to ensure our men and women in 

uniform are given the tools necessary for the job we have asked 

them to do. I look forward to learning more about reset and its importance to the warfighter. 
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 28, 2012 

(47) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. 1) What are the consequences of not fully executing reset? 

General MASON. One consequence of not fully executing Reset is that a piece of 

equipment already used in theater may not be ready for use in the next contingency. 

Another consequence is that battle losses may not be replaced, thus impacting 

equipment on-hand readiness. 

Mr. FORBES. 2) How important is reset to keeping the organic industrial base viable? 

General MASON. Reset currently assists in meeting core requirements that are 

necessary to maintain critical skill sets of our artisans and our capabilities. 

Core requirements funded in our base programs sustain the long-term viability 

of our organic industrial base 

Mr. FORBES. 3) Are there items you believe are of a higher reset priority? Are 

there units that are higher priority for reset equipment? 

General MASON. Yes, there are some items like our major combat platforms and 

high demand critically short systems that have a higher priority for equipment reset 

than other items. And there are also units that have a higher priority for the reset 

of equipment based on projected deployment schedule. 

To address these priorities, the Army has established a very deliberate Retrograde, Reset, and Redistribution (R3) process for equipment, focused on 

transitioning from the needs of the current conflict to full spectrum operations and 

training. The R3 synchronizes retrograde, reset, and redistribution efforts across the 

Army to restore readiness. The process identifies retrograde priorities to assist 

Army Central (ARCENT) in retrograde planning, synchronizes retrograde of equipment out of theater with its repair, and subsequent redistribution to support training and equipment readiness (ARFORGEN) requirements. Equipment is returned to 

the Force in accordance with the priority established by the Deputy Chief Staff, G3 

Dynamic Army Priority List. 

Mr. FORBES. 4) What is your reset strategy and plans for mine resistant ambush 

protected (MRAP) vehicles? 

General MASON. The Secretary of the Army has designated Red River Army Depot 

as the Center for Industrial and Technical Excellence for MRAPs. MRAPs will remain a critical fleet of multi-mission platforms in the Army that will require 

sustainment through the Reset program. The FY13 President’s Budget requests almost $2 Billion ($927M OPA and $1B OMA) to fund sustainment of deployed 

MRAPs and upgrades to consolidate variant types, reduce MRAP fleet sustainment 

costs, and facilitate Type Classification and Full Materiel Release for MRAP enduring force vehicles. Primary upgrades include survivability through additional 

underbody armor; mobility with suspension upgrades; and safety improvements. 

MRAP Reset will return the platforms to 10/20 standard. Following Reset, the platforms will be issued to units, training sites, or placed into Army Pre-Positioned 

Stocks. 

Mr. FORBES. 5) How does Reserve Component equipment factor into reset? 

General MASON. The Reset process enhances equipment operational readiness and 

equipment levels regardless of component. All units, regardless of component, are 

equipped with the most capable equipment that the Army has to offer. 

Reserve component equipment is repaired or replaced as required. Equipment 

that requires depot-level repair due to its condition is repaired and redistributed according to Army priorities. The Army uses funds appropriated for Sub Activity 

Group 137 to support the Reset of equipment for all three components. 

Mr. FORBES. 6) How accurate do you believe your overall reset liability estimates 

are? 

General MASON. Army has recently reviewed the Reset Liability and remains confident that given the variables that our estimate remains accurate. If contingency 

operations ceased today, the Army estimates it would need $10–15B to complete 

Reset. There are many factors and assumptions that can affect the total future 

Reset Requests, such as battle losses/washout of equipment, the condition of equipment at the time of retrograde and the final determination on what equipment we 

will retrograde from theater. Army conducts an annual Reset Liability study in con-
48 

junction with The Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation within the Office of the Secretary of Defense to revise and re-baseline our Reset estimates. 

Mr. FORBES. 7) How has the Army’s lack of finalized plans regarding the composition and size of its force impacted your reset plans? How can you be sure your plans 

meet the needs of the Army in the future? 

General MASON. With the exception of some select equipment like Tactical Wheel 

Vehicles, radios, and small arms, we do not expect that pending force structure decisions will have a significant impact on Reset. 

Equipment not needed for future contingencies will not be Reset. Our Retrograde, 

Reset and Redistribution (R3) synchronization process closely integrates input from 

across the Army Staff and ensures finalized Reset plans meet the Army’s current 

and future needs. 

Mr. FORBES. 8) How would proposed plans to add an additional maneuver battalion to certain brigade combat teams impact your reset plans? 

General MASON. In general, the proposal to add battalions should not impact 

Reset. 

Mr. FORBES. 9) The budget contains numerous ‘‘efficiencies’’ throughout the maintenance accounts. How confident are you that your Service will realize anticipated 

savings and what are the impacts to reset if you don’t? 

General MASON. I am confident that the Army will continue to find efficiencies 

to improve our operations and reduce costs. Most of our efficiencies are against base 

programs; consequently if the savings are not realized, they will not significantly 

impact our Reset efforts which are funded by Overseas Contingency Operations 

(OCO). 

Mr. FORBES. 10) Last year the Army had to reprogram more than $2 billion in 

reset funding due to executablity issues. How confident are you in the accuracy of 

this year’s budget request and your ability to fully execute any provided funding? 

General MASON. Based on what we know today, the Army is confident in our FY 

2013 budget request. We are also confident in our ability to execute available funding in FY 2012. Factors such as: the amount of equipment that needs to be replaced 

due to battle damage; retrograde lines of communication; operational decisions that 

affect equipment returning from theater on-time; and the condition of that returning 

equipment can affect our Reset execution. 

Mr. FORBES. 11) Can you discuss the potential need for OCO funding following 

the withdrawal of forces and equipment from Afghanistan? 

General MASON. Given the expected pace and challenges associated with the retrograde of equipment from Afghanistan and anticipated workloads for select equipment, we expect Reset will not be complete until 2–3 years after drawdown. This 

estimate takes into account the time it takes to return a piece of equipment back 

to the United States, and the time it takes to perform the required maintenance 

on an item. 

Mr. FORBES. 12) In light of Pakistan’s extended closure of cargo transportation 

routes, what are your concerns about our continued heavy reliance on Pakistan for 

logistical support for operations in Afghanistan? How long will requested funding 

for transportation last if the Pakistani routes remain closed? 

General MASON. Closure of the Pakistan Ground Line of Communication 

(PAKGLOC), which is now in Day 123, has created challenges for sustainment, deployment, and redeployment operations into and out of Afghanistan. The loss of the 

PAKGLOC represents a reduction in throughput capacity for Afghanistan; however, 

due to the hard work of U.S. Transportation Command and U.S. Central Command, 

every commander and Soldier have what they need to complete their mission. We 

owe our ability to continue logistical support to initiatives implemented prior to and 

since the GLOC closure. This included increased use of the Northern Distribution 

Network (NDN), establishing new routes on the NDN, use of sealift in conjunction 

with airlift, and increasing supply levels. These efforts were effective but costly. 

Based on these initiatives, we are experiencing a significant increase in Second Destination Transportation (SDT) costs. Closure of the PAKGLOC illustrates why we 

cannot depend on a single or limited number of lines of communication to support 

our efforts. 

With the unexpected and continued PAKGLOC closure, Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds for SDT are projected to run out by mid May 2012. The Army 

is exploring alternatives to reallocate resources to support this shortfall. 

Mr. FORBES. 13) In April of 2010, the GAO identified several challenges facing the 

Department with retrograde of equipment from Iraq to include: unclear guidance on 

what non-standard equipment will be transferred to the host nation; the inability 

to fully identify its need for contracted services; and visibility over its inventory of 

equipment and shipping containers. What steps have you taken to ensure similar 

challenges don’t frustrate Afghanistan retrograde efforts? 
49 

General MASON. Since the GAO published their report titled: OPERATION IRAQI 

FREEDOM: Actions Needed to Facilitate the Efficient Drawdown of U.S. Forces and 

Equipment from Iraq in April 2010, the Army has made significant improvements 

to our retrograde, contracting and asset visibility processes. Many of these improvements were acknowledged by the GAO in two subsequent audit reports published 

in August 2010 and July 2011. The Army continues to incorporate observations from 

the GAO and apply lessons learned from the drawdown in Iraq to refine plans and 

processes for retrograde efforts in Afghanistan. 

Specific guidance on the disposition of non-standard equipment (NS–E) was provided in a Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) published retrograde 

execution order. NS–E that is identified as excess and does not violate U.S. security 

codes, are eligible for transfer to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 

A key lesson learned from the drawdown in Iraq that is being incorporated in Afghanistan is the establishment of a Fusion Cell. The Fusion Cell synchronizes, coordinates, and gains unity of effort across the operational, logistics, and contracting 

communities to support the drawdown timeline. The Fusion Cell also ensures that 

contracting support organizations and operational units coordinate to determine 

contract support requirements for new contracts, extensions, reductions, and contractor demobilization. 

To manage and maintain accountability and visibility of our equipment, the Army 

uses several automation systems and tools at various command levels. These systems and tools include the Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced (PBUSE), Logistics 

Modernization Program (LMP), Army War Reserve Deployment System (AWRDS), 

Standard Depot System (SDS), and the Logistics Information Warehouse (LIW). In 

addition, a new web-based data tool, Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) Planner, 

was developed based on a recommendation by the GAO, that improves disposition 

management and visibility of equipment and also provides automated equipment 

disposition instructions thus accelerating the overall disposition process. The Materiel Enterprise Non-Standard Equipment (MENS–E) database was also developed to 

link disposition instructions for non-standard equipment with TPE Planner thus 

providing visibility for non-standard equipment and rapid processing of disposition 

instructions. Additionally, commands in theater have implemented an extensive series of mandated property accountability inventories requiring Commanders at 

every level to physically account for all their property and ensure it was recorded 

in one of the Army’s accountable property systems of record ensuring Army-wide 

visibility. 

To maintain visibility over containers, the Army uses the Army Container Asset 

Management System (ACAMS). ACAMS is a management system that accounts for 

Army-owned containers and provides visibility of a container throughout its lifecycle. In the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations, the Integrated 

Booking System-Container Management Module (IBS–CMM) is also used to account 

and provide container in-transit visibility. IBS–CMM allows leaders to track and 

identify containers while in theater and in the Defense Transportation System. Recently, the U.S. Army Central Command (USARCENT) developed a Theater Common Operating Picture system to capture detailed visibility of containers, associated 

costs and billing actions, and disposition actions. 

Significant improvements in retrograde processes were made since the release of 

the April 2010 GAO report resulting in a successful Iraq drawdown. Additionally, 

these improvements have been incorporated into the drawdown efforts in Afghanistan. We recognize that challenges remain in the drawdown from Afghanistan, but 

we are confident that our detailed processes and plans, which are inherently flexible, along with incorporating GAO observations and lessons learned from the drawdown in Iraq, will allow us to remain successful in our Afghanistan retrograde efforts. 

Mr. FORBES. 14) With Army yet to finalize the composition of its future force, how 

confident are you that we are not bringing home unnecessary equipment or leaving 

enduring capabilities behind? 

General MASON. Although the composition of the future force has not yet been approved, many of the types of equipment that are presently in Afghanistan, such as 

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected, Up-Armored High Mobility Multipurpose 

Wheeled Vehicles, and helicopters will be needed by the future force. I am confident 

that we are not leaving potentially enduring capabilities behind in Afghanistan. 

The final approved force resulting from the Total Army Analysis has yet to be decided; however, the Army does know what capabilities will be required for that 

force. As equipment not needed for the final approved force becomes known, this 

equipment will be made available for transfer to the Afghan security forces and con-
50 

sidered for filling Army Prepositioned Stocks requirements, especially for the Pacific 

region in keeping with the shift in strategic focus to that region. 

As future force decisions are finalized, we have the flexibility to amend our retrograde instructions to ensure the proper disposition of equipment. 

Mr. FORBES. 15) What steps are being taken while reset and OCO dollars are 

available to posture the depots for a post-reset environment? 

General MASON. We have taken a number of steps to ensure that the depots are 

postured to support Army base requirements in a post-war environment. First, we 

have identified and prioritized our core requirements to ensure we maintain the appropriate skill sets. Next, we are sizing our organic base facilities and workforce to 

meet and sustain our core competencies and workloads. Finally, we continue to pursue proven practices like Lean Six Sigma to ensure that our maintenance depots 

maintain their core competencies and capabilities to meet future requirements. 

The Army’s reliance on OCO is declining as our base depot maintenance budget 

is restored. 

Mr. FORBES. 16) What have you done to make your depots more efficient? 

General MASON. The Army has recognized benefits from our total Continuous 

Process Improvement (CPI) efficiency efforts within our Organic Industrial Base. 

For example, the Army conducted CPI events to improve vehicle hull disassembly 

and disassembly process by creating a one piece flow at Anniston Army Depot. The 

Army has also used CPI to reduce rework as part of the UH–60 [utility helicopter] 

Main Rotor CAT III Blade Sheath Assembly Repair process at Corpus Christi Army 

Depot. 

Mr. FORBES. 17) There has been a fair amount of concern about the erosion of 

the overall U.S. military industrial base. What is your assessment of the industrial 

base? What are the implications for the depots and arsenals, and our ability to reset 

the force? 

General MASON. My assessment of our Organic Industrial Base is that it remains 

relevant, viable and responsive to the needs of the Army and the war fighter. Army 

readiness and sustainment is a direct result of the repair capabilities in theater as 

well as at our depots in support of Army and other Service equipment requirements. 

The implications are that we must maintain these capabilities in the future to 

support future contingencies. Our depots and arsenals have proven to be a great 

success story in our ability to reset force over the last decade. They provide a ready 

and controlled source of technical ability, expertise, and resources necessary to execute depot-level maintenance effectively and efficiently without risks to our equipment readiness. 

The industrial base has been responsive to the current demands of operations in 

two theaters of operation and has accomplished the Reset of equipment returning 

from combat and sustained non-deployed forces. To accomplish this they have rapidly expanded production to levels not realized since the Vietnam War. 

For example, our organic maintenance depots more than doubled their production 

output since the start of the war, executing 26.8 million direct labor hours (DLHs) 

and repairing/overhauling over 93,000 end items; while arsenals have executed 1.9 

million DLHs. 

Mr. FORBES. 18) What impact do high rates of carryover have on reset workload, 

if any? 

General MASON. For select programs, like Tactical Wheel Vehicles, high carryover 

rates slow the repair and return of equipment to units. However, for the majority 

of programs, high carryover rates do not impact reset workload. This has not impacted equipment resourcing as the Army addresses critical requirements through 

redistribution of available assets to ensure units have the equipment they require 

to begin training up in support of their next rotation. 

Carryover allows depots to maintain a consistent workload by inserting carryover 

workload into gaps provided by funding from one fiscal year to another and arrival 

of other workloads. 

The majority of carryover work being performed today is recapitalization programs. These programs are funded with procurement dollars, which have a threeyear life and involve a complex mix of timing, receipt of dollars and equipment, customer schedules, and long lead materiel. 

The Army is aggressively attacking its carryover workload and working to drive 

carryover down. We expect to generate $1.2B of revenue in FY12 and FY13, adding 

shifts were feasible to address this workload. 

The high carryover rates have generally not impacted our reset program. 

Mr. FORBES. 19) What role do you see private-public partnerships playing in 

reset? 

General MASON. Public-private partnerships have provided a crucial role in reset. 

Depots have partnered with industry to accomplish the reset mission which allows 
51 

for a balancing of workload with our commercial partners, complements our capabilities and provides flexibility in accomplishing the reset mission. Partnerships are 

able to adjust to changing requirements more rapidly as a result of the flexibility 

they provide in terms of capability and capacity between industry and government. 

Mr. FORBES. 20) How does reset play into your service’s industrial base 

sustainment strategy? 

General MASON. Reset currently assists in meeting our core requirements that are 

necessary to maintain critical skill sets of our artisans and capabilities. 

Our ability to effectively respond to warfighter (Reset) requirements is built 

around the four primary tenants of our approach: 

Modernization requiring investment in new technology, training and plant equipment at the same rate that the Army modernizes its weapon systems. 

Capacity identifying and aligning core competencies and workloads to support current and future surge requirements while maintaining effectiveness and efficiencies 

at each facility. 

Capital Investment requiring the investment in our facilities to maintain ‘stateof-the-art’ capabilities and quality of work environment (QWE) standards. 

Resource Alignment requiring the Army to prioritize funding to achieve the desired end-states: viable and relevant OIB facilities. 

Mr. FORBES. 21) When do you expect final approval of the Army’s new Organic 

Industrial Base Strategy? 

General MASON. The Organic Industrial Base Strategy is complete and under 

final review by senior Army leadership. Release of the strategy will follow final approval by HQDA. 

Mr. FORBES. 22) What are the consequences of not fully executing reset? 

General PANTER. The full reset of the Marine Corps’ ground equipment is critical 

to protecting the long-term health of the force and meeting the next contingency. 

A decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan has accelerated the degradation of our 

ground equipment well beyond the anticipated total life cycle estimates of most 

items. The Marine Corps estimates, based on usage rates, climate and other factors, 

that one-year of combat operations in theater equates to seven years of use at a 

home station. The full reset of the Marine Corps’ ground equipment is necessary to 

baseline the force, extend the service life of each item, mitigate future readiness impacts and ensure Marines are equipped with the very best equipment. 

The delayed reset of ground equipment resulting from the transfer of the Operation Iraqi Freedom equipment and all of its Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles directly to Afghanistan is a key element of the Marine Corps’ Strategic Reset 

requirement. Failure to conduct a full Reset of the Marine Corps’ Ground Equipment will cause: 

Reduced combat readiness due to premature aging of ground equipment fleet. 

Increased labor hours and expenses at our organic depots and operating force intermediate maintenance activities supported by limited baseline operational and 

maintenance dollars. 

Tiered readiness based on positioning the highest combat ready equipment with 

deployed or soon to be deployed units and continued low readiness for home station 

units. 

Reduced capacity to respond to unanticipated crisis. 

Mr. FORBES. 23) How important is reset to keeping the organic industrial base 

viable? 

General PANTER. Marine Corps Depots at Barstow, California and Albany, Georgia are critical to the success of our reset execution. We view them as a ‘‘force multiplier.’’ Without the unique capabilities of the maintenance centers, equipment reset 

would be costly, less effective, and greatly prolonged. Reset reinforces the necessity 

to retain organic depot capabilities in order to expedite the repair of equipment and 

meet the needs of the Operating Forces. 

The organic maintenance facilities maintain flexible and rapidly adaptable production skills and capabilities to sustain Marine Corps ground equipment inventories to meet service-unique and surge workload requirements. 

Mr. FORBES. 24) Are there items you believe are of a higher reset priority? Are 

there units that are higher priority for reset equipment? 

General PANTER. The answer to both questions is generally yes. In terms of items 

having a higher reset priority, Marine Corps Logistics Command (MCLC), as the activity responsible for Depot Maintenance actions, takes into account equipment demands in support of units in or going to Afghanistan as well as the inventory shortfalls in the operating forces at home station. These considerations influence maintenance scheduling, production and distribution. Generally speaking, ordnance items 

and wheeled vehicles have a high reset priority. Although all attempts are made by 
52 

MCLC in the planning phase to meet war fighter needs, the availability of equipment to support Depot production lines can be a limiting factor. As we drawdown 

and retrograde equipment from Afghanistan, it will be important to vector equipment as quickly as possible to our depots for reset actions. 

The priority for equipping the force is guided and published by the Commandant 

of the Marine Corps in an annual message. In this guidance, it lists the units and 

activities in priority sequence for equipment distribution. At the top of the list are 

units in Afghanistan, followed by units preparing for deployment, and so forth down 

the list. 

Mr. FORBES. 25) What is your reset strategy and plans for mine resistant ambush 

protected (MRAP) vehicles? 

General PANTER. The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) family of vehicles (FoV) is one of the Marine Corps most significant reset issues. Due to the significant capital investment required to fully reset MRAPs, the Marine Corps is currently conducting an in-depth assessment of the post-Afghanistan enduring MRAP 

requirement led by the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration. The Marine Corps’ current MRAP FoV reset strategy is to conduct a full recapitalization of the Service’s enduring requirement. As the final enduring requirement determination is made, the Marine Corps will re-evaluate its strategic liability 

based on current inventory and adjust accordingly. 

Mr. FORBES. 26) How does Reserve Component equipment factor into reset? 

General PANTER. The Marine Corps’ Reserve Component is critical to the ongoing 

war effort and the future augmentation of our Active Component Marines. An Operational Reserve Component is critical to the Marine Corps total force and reconstitution strategy. Unfortunately, the equipment supporting our Reserve component has 

been significantly worn and degraded in line with the Active component. 

All equipping decisions are prioritized by the Commandant of the Marine Corps’ 

Ground Equipping Priorities. The Commandant’s equipping priorities is a fundamental tenet to guiding the execution of the Marine Corps OEF Ground Equipment 

Reset Strategy and the overall management of the Marine Corps’ ground equipment 

inventory. As equipment completes reset at its optimal repair location, distribution 

will be determined by inventory shortfalls as informed by the Commandant’s priorities. 

Mr. FORBES. 27) How accurate do you believe your overall reset liability estimates 

are? 

General PANTER. We believe our overall reset liability estimates are accurate. The current forecasted ground equipment reset liability of $3.2B is based on the anticipated maintenance condition of each item in theater, the enduring Marine Corps requirement for each item and the item’s forecasted optimal repair location. We continuously and diligently work to refine our reset cost. 

Mr. FORBES. 28) How have force structure reductions and composition changes impacted your reset plans? 

General PANTER. No. The Marine Corps force structure plan to reduce the force 

from 202K to 182.1K will not have an impact on our reset plans. The Marine Corps 

has consistently reported in testimony the prevalence of Home Station equipment 

shortfalls. Despite the reduced force structure, equipment returning from Afghanistan is needed to reconstitute the 182.1K force. A central tenet of the Ground Equipment Reset Strategy is to ensure the reset of ground equipment is integrated with 

equipment modernization objectives, long-term support costs and strategic investment plans. 

Mr. FORBES. 29) The budget contains numerous ‘‘efficiencies’’ throughout the 

maintenance accounts. How confident are you that your service will realize anticipated savings and what are the impacts to reset if you don’t? 

General PANTER. Based upon the efficiencies gained by enacting continuous process improvements and the recent consolidation of our two organic maintenance centers under a single Marine Depot Maintenance Command, the Marine Corps is confident that anticipated savings will be realized. 

Assuming the availability of sufficient reset funding, the Marine Corps has developed an extensive reset strategy and maintains the flexibility to adjust capacity requirements to ensure there are no negative impacts to the maintenance process. 

Mr. FORBES. 30) Can you discuss the potential need for OCO funding following 

the withdrawal of forces and equipment from Afghanistan? 

General PANTER. OCO funding will still be needed after the withdrawal of forces 

from Afghanistan since our baseline budgets cannot and were never intended to absorb the cost of equipment reset. Based on current planning estimates and our experience in Iraq, we anticipate the bulk of our reset execution at our Depots to take 

place 2–3 years after the last Marine leaves Afghanistan. Also, when considering 

the continued need for OCO funding, we must not overlook the unique challenges 
53 

of moving equipment out of Afghanistan as delays will extend our reset actions in 

CONUS. 

Mr. FORBES. 31) In light of Pakistan’s extended closure of cargo transportation 

routes, what are your concerns about our continued heavy reliance on Pakistan for 

logistical support for operations in Afghanistan? How long will requested funding 

for transportation last if the Pakistani routes remain closed? 

General PANTER. At the present time, the closure of the PAK GLOC has not seriously impaired USMC force sustainment. However, we have experienced an increase 

in shipping time and costs while utilizing the Northern Distribution Network 

(NDN). In light of the current situation with the closure of the PAK GLOC and the 

increased reliance on the NDN and multi modal operations, it is in our best interest 

to continue efforts to reopen the PAK GLOC to guard against unforeseen interruptions to the NDN as well as facilitate redeployment and retrograde operations from 

Afghanistan. Right now with the closure of the PAK GLOC, we are looking at extended retrograde timelines and extension of our reset actions and supporting reconstitution objectives. On a positive note, with the significant drawdown of USMC 

forces in Afghanistan by the end of the year, the level of logistical support will significantly decrease for USMC forces and help relieve the pressure on the GLOCs. 

Based solely on both current and projected OPTEMPO, funding for transportation 

is adequate through the remainder of FY12. In order to provide additional transportation options USTRANSCOM has increased the availability of multi-modal shipments employing a combination of airlift, sealift, and ground transportation. At the 

present time, there is a marginal increase in overall transportation cost, but sustainable at our current funding level. 

Mr. FORBES. 32) In April of 2010, the GAO identified several challenges facing the 

Department with retrograde of equipment from Iraq to include: unclear guidance on 

what non-standard equipment will be transferred to the host nation; the inability 

to fully identify its need for contracted services; and visibility over its inventory of 

equipment and shipping containers. What steps have you taken to ensure similar 

challenges don’t frustrate Afghanistan retrograde efforts? 

General PANTER. The Commandant of the Marine Corps signed the Service’s 

ground equipment reset strategy on 01 January 2012. The Strategy culminated from 

a comprehensive 18-month planning effort initiated at the March 2010 OIF Lesson’s 

Learned Symposium to capture the salient lessons learned from the retrograde from 

Iraq as identified in the GAO report. As a result of that conference, the Marine 

Corps published its Guide to Expeditionary Stewardship, to ensure the lessons in 

in-transit visibility, contracted logistics support and equipment accountability were 

identified and integrated into the Service’s Afghanistan Ground Equipment Reset 

Strategy. 

The Strategy utilizes a Ground Equipment Reset Playbook as the conduit between 

service-level guidance and tactical execution. The Playbook links reset to modernization and reconstitution objectives and provides a comprehensive tool that details the 

handling, segregation, packaging and shipment instructions for each of the 98,000 

principle end item in Afghanistan to include non-standard items. The Playbook accurately reflects the service reset strategy for each principle end item in theater, 

aligns reset strategies with the Marine Corps’ Depot Level Maintenance Plan, accurately forecasts the Marine Corps’ reset liability, leverages all available assets in 

theater and requires an in-theater maintenance assessment by identifying each 

item’s optimal repair location to mitigate secondary transportation costs. Marine 

Corps Logistics Command (MCLC), as the executive agent for tactical planning and 

execution, also published a tactical execution plan that effectively ties the Service 

Reset Strategy to the individual Marine in theater. MCLC provides the occupational 

expertise to direct reset actions from theater to home station and provides the Marine Corps with in-transit visibility of assets, reinforces the tenets of the Playbook 

and ensures total asset visibility and accountability in transit. 

Mr. FORBES. 33) What steps are being taken while reset and OCO dollars are 

available to posture the depots for a post-reset environment? 

General PANTER. The Marine Corps recognizes that declining budgets will likely 

leave us with a relatively flat investment portfolio in the post-reset environment. 

Today, however, the Depots are currently operating at increased capacity. We want 

to leverage this capacity while we have it, continue to maximize the use of OCO 

funding, and fix as much equipment as we can. We realize that our capacity will 

be adjusted downward to a peace time posture as we complete retrograde and redeploy our forces from Afghanistan. This approach will prevent a surge in depot maintenance requirements beyond the current FYDP when we anticipate operating at reduced capacity. Based on current planning estimates, we anticipate the bulk of our 

reset execution to occur at our depots in the next two to three years. 

Mr. FORBES. 34) What have you done to make your depots more efficient? 
54 

General PANTER. The Marine Corps recently reorganized its two organic depots 

and created a single Marine Depot Maintenance Command. The single command 

will reduce overhead, reduce operating costs, and ensure the Commandant of the 

Marine Corps has an affordable capability and effective capacity to self-generate 

readiness and rapidly surge to meet wartime demands. 

The Marine Corps expects to reduce depot maintenance overhead costs by 9–13% 

across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). These savings represent 3–5% 

($40M-$60M) of the Marine Corps’ total organic depot operating costs across the 

FYDP. 

Mr. FORBES. 35) There has been a fair amount of concern about the erosion of 

the overall U.S. military industrial base. What is your assessment of the industrial 

base? What are the implications for the depots and arsenals, and our ability to reset 

the force? 

General PANTER. From a USMC perspective, our organic depots at Albany GA and 

Barstow CA eliminate any concerns. However, we do rely on other service depots 

for select commodity repair and have seen no interruptions in support at this time. 

The depots are key to enabling the Marine Corps to fulfill its role as America’s expeditionary force in readiness. The last ten years have provided a greater awareness 

of the impact our organic depots have on our ability to self-generate readiness, surge 

to meet wartime demand, flex to meet emerging threats, and quickly reconstitute 

the force post-conflict. 

The Marine Corps proactively monitors any initiatives that may negatively impact 

the organic industrial base, such as Title 10 legislation changes and maintenance 

efficiencies. Assuming the availability of sufficient reset funding, we are confident 

that the organic industrial base will enable us to effectively reset the force. 

Mr. FORBES. 36) What impact do high rates of carryover have on reset workload, 

if any? 

General PANTER. Due to the injection of reset workload, on top of previously 

planned workload, there will be higher levels of carryover. MCLC does not anticipate carryover to negatively impact Reset. Because of the injection of Reset in conjunction with pre-planned rotational workload, the Marine Corps will continue to experience high rates of carryover. However, these high rates have a positive impact, 

as it enables the organic facilities to maintain a high level of capacity across the 

production lines and fiscal years to support future reset. 

Carryover as a whole is a regular part of organic depot operations and is not, in 

and of itself, a negative or problematic issue. High carryover doesn’t always equate 

to increased backlog. MCLC initiates various methods to increase capacity to work 

the backlogs, as necessary. 

Mr. FORBES. 37) What role do you see private-public partnerships playing in 

reset? 

General PANTER. The Marine Corps’ organic depots will play a central role in 

reset activities, restoring and repairing equipment for return to the Operating 

Forces. In keeping with standard business practices, we will also leverage other 

DoD depots, commercial vendors, and private-public partnerships when it is most 

cost-effective to do so. 

Mr. FORBES. 38) How does reset play into your Service’s industrial base 

sustainment strategy? 

General PANTER. Reset and sustainment are executed concurrently and are integrated in order to position the Marine Corps for long-term readiness. Acquisition 

Program Managers evaluate and develop customized sustainment strategies where 

there are combinations of depot and field-level maintenance and replacement plans, 

which account for Marine Corps, other Service, and commercial sources of repair capabilities. Additionally, the Marine Corps has developed a Ground Equipment Reset 

Strategy that provides guidance to the various stakeholders to manage the overall 

reset effort. Thus, reset demonstrates the necessity to retain organic depot capabilities in order to meet the operational needs of the Marine Corps. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. 39) The Stryker program is one that has been identified as core for 

Anniston Army Depot. There are 10 variations of the Stryker. One of the pilots has 

been brought to ANAD. I note that in the detailed budget documentation for FY13, 

the Army lists a reduction in funding for 7 Stryker Pilot Programs. Is that because 

funding was provided in FY12 for those 7 programs so that we can expect to see 

inductions into the core mission at the organic depot at ANAD this year or was 

there some other explanation? Also, that accounts for 8 of the 10 Stryker versions. 

Could you tell me what we should expect and the timeline for the other 2 versions. 
55 

I ask because as you know the FY12 NDAA required that the Army establish core 

for mission-essential systems in the organic depots within 4 years of IOC and I am 

told that all 10 versions of the Stryker are critical workload for ANAD. 

General MASON. Yes, the pilots were funded in FY12. National Maintenance Work 

Requirements (NMWRs) are scheduled to be completed in FY13 for the remaining 

two variants: Mobile Gun System and Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, Reconnaissance 

Vehicle. Pilot overhauls for these two systems are funded in FY13; however, due to 

the difficulty of obtaining low density and high demand components required to 

complete the NMWR development effort, the pilot overhauls may not be executed 

until FY14. 

Mr. ROGERS. 40) The Army Sustainment Command has indicated that it would 

like to offer an overarching contracting vehicle that would include activities that go 

beyond those generally managed by the base Directors of Logistics. According to a 

briefing book that I saw, the EAGLE program would include RESET in the contract. 

Could you please explain what aspect of RESET you would include in the EAGLE 

program and how you will guarantee this Committee that you will not conduct 

depot-level maintenance as part of these contracts or that you will not conduct 

maintenance that could be performed in the depots to meet their core requirements? 

I am concerned that EAGLE expressly exempts aircraft maintenance, but fails to 

similarly exempt ground combat vehicle maintenance. 

General MASON. Army Sustainment Command (ASC) and Army Contracting Command—Rock Island (ACC–RI) jointly manage the Enhanced Army Global Logistics 

Enterprise (EAGLE) program. EAGLE’s primary focus is installation field level logistics. It is not the intent to use EAGLE as a depot level/sustainment contract. 

EAGLE will only be used for depot maintenance at the specific request of the LCMC 

and after the requirement is appropriately validated. Depots will have the opportunity to partner with EAGLE prime contractors to execute EAGLE requirements. 

EAGLE is primarily Directorate of Logistics (DOL) centric and as such, there are 

specific designators that separate DOL maintenance from depot level. The purpose 

of EAGLE is to standardize requirements documentation, reduce redundancy, improve small business opportunity, and improve competition for more efficient service 

contracting. The EAGLE program is both a business approach and contracting vehicle for competing and awarding service contracts for maintenance, supply, and 

transportation support. Its primary focus is field-level logistics/maintenance and not 

sustainment level logistics/maintenance associated with depot level workload. ASC 

is the responsible organization for verification and validation of workload placed on 

the EAGLE contract vehicle. As a subordinate to Army Materiel Command (AMC), 

ASC follows AMC’s enterprise RESET workload planning and decision guidance developed during semi-annual and annual conferences. There are checks and balances 

in place to ensure EAGLE is not used to perform depot level work unless that is 

the decision by the authorities responsible for depot workload at AMC. Providing 

the EAGLE acquisition planning, ASC coordinated with the Army Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM) to remove any aviation maintenance capability from the 

EAGLE program. It is our understanding that AMCOM is currently working on a 

contract vehicle similar to EAGLE for aviation maintenance. EAGLE contracting actions require senior leadership approval to place any requirement on contract. By 

itself, EAGLE would not be in a position to contract out any depot maintenance requirements without AMC direction in the form of workload planning. 

Mr. ROGERS. 41) As DOD works to implement the FY12 National Defense Authorization Act, it is my understanding that there will be guidance on the ability of the 

military services to seek waivers for weapons systems considered core or missionessential under the provisions of Section 2464 of title 10. Does the Army plan to 

request any waivers for any systems or sub-systems? Also, could you give the Committee an example or a couple of examples of a weapon system that you consider 

a non-enduring element of the national defense and why you would consider something core or mission-essential, requiring depot-level maintenance, but not an enduring system. Can you help us understand that, please? 

General MASON. The Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), in coordination with 

the Services and the HASC and SASC Professional Staff Members (PSMs), has developed implementing guidance for the FY12 NDAA changes that allows the Services to continue past best practices. 

The Army plans to submit a blanket waiver, in accordance with the OSD implementing guidance, for all weapon systems that are not considered an enduring element of the national defense strategy. Some examples are: (1) the Vehicle Optics 

Sensor System (VOSS), a network of daytime TV, night vision and thermal capability that is able to locate improvised explosive devices (IEDs), snipers and other 

threats at greater stand-off distances; and (2) the Camera Aided Monitor Station 
56 

(CAMS), a low-cost mobile sensor suite tower that offers multiple detection and assessment capabilities. These capabilities are niche systems which are not enduring. 

Consequently, the Army will submit a waiver for these non-enduring systems. 

The Army would not consider a non-enduring element of the national defense a 

core or mission-essential item. 

Mr. ROGERS. 42) I am very concerned about the drastic reduction that the Army 

is taking between FY12 and FY13 in depot maintenance funding for ground combat 

vehicles. Based on the President’s Budget Request, it appears that the Army would 

fund ground combat vehicles at only about 52% of the FY13 level out of the base 

budget and there is no specific FY 13 OCO funding for depot maintenance. However, 

the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary of the Army have both guaranteed 

this Committee and myself that the bulk of Army RESET money would be spent 

in our organic depots and arsenals. Can you please tell me how much of the money 

you are requesting for RESET you are planning to spend on depot maintenance? 

How much of that will be spent on ground combat vehicles? How much of that do 

you plan to spend in organic facilities? 

General MASON. For FY 13, the Army requested approximately $5.445 billion for 

Reset. This request is comprised of $3.688 billion for Operations and Maintenance 

funding and $1.757 billion for Procurement funding. Within the Operations and 

Maintenance account approximately $2.7 billion is requested for Depot Level Maintenance. Of that $2.7 billion roughly $161.9 million is requested for combat vehicles 

(Bradley & Other Tracked Vehicles) of which $59 million will be spent at organic 

facilities. Overall, $1.8 billion of the FY 2013 Reset request is planned for organic 

facilities. 

Mr. ROGERS. 43) I note that the President’s Budget Request for the Army failed 

to include any OCO funding for depot maintenance. Why did the Army choose to 

put all of the OCO associated funding for depot maintenance into the RESET account rather than in the depot maintenance account? 

General MASON. The uses two accounts to fund maintenance performed at depots. 

Land Forces Depot Maintenance (Sub Activity Group 123) is the base budget account for the depot-level maintenance of Army equipment. Reset (Sub Activity 

Group 137) is a true cost of war and requests Overseas Contingency Operations 

funds for war-related depot maintenance requirements. 

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