[Cite as Henderson v. Synenberg, 2014-Ohio-4089.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

No. 100910

TROY HENDERSON 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 

vs. 

JOAN SYNENBERG, ET AL.

 DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES

JUDGMENT:

AFFIRMED 

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CV-13-803591 

BEFORE: Stewart, J., Blackmon, P.J., and McCormack, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 18, 2014 
FOR APPELLANT

Troy Henderson, pro se 

11040 Clark Road 

Chardon, OH 44024 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Brendan R. Doyle 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

The Justice Center 

1200 Ontario Street, 8th Floor 

Cleveland, OH 44113 
MELODY J. STEWART, J.: 

{¶1} In 2012, the grand jury returned an indictment charging plaintiff-appellant 

Troy Henderson with counts of grand theft, receiving stolen property, forgery, and 

tampering with records. At the same time, Henderson and the mother of his child were 

engaged in a child custody dispute in the juvenile division of the court of common pleas. 

Henderson claimed that the judge who presided over the criminal case, 

defendant-appellee Joan Synenberg, revoked his bond, detained him in jail, ordered him 

to undergo a psychiatric examination, and then placed him under supervised release “due 

to civil matters from the juvenile custody case.” After Henderson was acquitted of all 

criminal charges, he brought this complaint against Judge Synenberg, Cuyahoga County, 

and probation officer Catrina Lockhart, alleging that their actions interfered with his civil 

rights and adversely affected his ability to present his case before the juvenile division. 

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint. Henderson appeals 

setting forth seven assignments of error, see appendix, that challenge the trial court’s 

decision to dismiss his complaint and to stay discovery pending a ruling on the motion to 

dismiss. We affirm the decision of the trial court. 

 I 

{¶2} In Henderson’s first two assignments of error, he asserts that the trial court 

abused its discretion and committed reversible error in granting the appellees’ motion to 
dismiss because it did not relate to the proper amended complaint. He asserts also that 

he provided sufficient claims. 

{¶3} Henderson filed a complaint and two amended complaints. The defendants 

filed a motion to dismiss both the complaint and the first amended complaint, but did not 

renew their motion to dismiss in response to the second amended complaint. Henderson 

argues that the defendants’ failure to renew the motion to dismiss for the second amended 

complaint deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the motion to 

dismiss. 

{¶4} Henderson filed his complaint on March 22, 2013. The defendants obtained 

leave to plead until June 17, 2013. On June 12, 2013, Henderson filed his first amended 

complaint, but the defendants claimed that they were not served with the amended 

complaint until June 26, 2013. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint 

on June 17, 2013, and on July 10, 2013, they filed a motion to dismiss the amended 

complaint. On that same day, July 10, 2013, and after the defendants filed their motion 

to dismiss the amended complaint, Henderson filed his second amended complaint. 

{¶5} Civ.R. 15(A) states that “[a] party may amend its pleading once as a matter of 

course within twenty-eight days after serving it or, if the pleading is one to which a 

responsive pleading is required, within twenty-eight days after service of a responsive 

pleading or twenty-eight days after service of a motion under Civ.R. 12(B), (E), or (F), 

whichever is earlier.” 
{¶6} When Henderson amended his complaint on June 12, 2013, he did so under 

the version of Civ.R. 15 that was then in effect (the current version of Civ.R. 15 took 

effect July 1, 2013). That version of the rule allowed him to amend his complaint once 

as a matter of course and without leave of court as long as no responsive pleading had 

been filed. Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Grass Valley Group, Inc., 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. 

C-010133 and C-010423, 2002-Ohio-1614. The defendants had yet to plead, so the 

amended complaint was effective. 

{¶7} But having once amended his complaint, Henderson could not do so a second 

time without first obtaining leave of court or the opposing party’s written consent. He 

received neither, so his second amended complaint, filed July 10, 2013, was out of rule. 

Nevertheless, the court’s judgment entry dismissing the action referred only to the July 

10, 2013 amended complaint and the defendants’ second motion to dismiss the June 12, 

2013 amended complaint. It does not appear, however, that the court considered in any 

way that Henderson filed an amended complaint on June 12, 2013, and that the 

defendants’ second motion to dismiss referred to that complaint and not to the July 10, 

2013 complaint. 

{¶8} With the court having based its dismissal on the July 10, 2013 second 

amended complaint, we have to treat its ruling on that complaint as an implied grant of 

leave to file the second amended complaint. Although the second amended complaint 

was filed on the same day as the defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint, 

the timestamp shows that it was filed after the motion to dismiss the amended complaint. 
This means that the defendants’ motion to dismiss did not actually refer to the second 

amended complaint. Nevertheless, the basis for the motion to dismiss remained the 

same, and there was no substantive difference between the first and second amended 

complaints. (Henderson deleted two paragraphs in his factual allegations, neither of 

which had any bearing on his causes of action.) Given the irregularity in the way 

Henderson amended his complaint a second time, we have no basis for finding the court 

erred by dismissing the second amended complaint. 

 II 

{¶9} We next consider Henderson’s assignments of error relating to the dismissal 

of claims against Judge Synenberg. The court held that the claims against Judge 

Synenberg were related to a criminal case involving Henderson that was properly pending 

before her, rendering her immune from suit. Henderson maintains that the court erred by 

finding that he failed to plead a cognizable claim for relief against her. 

{¶10} A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted tests the legal sufficiency of a claim. State ex rel. Hanson v. 

Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 548, 605 N.E.2d 378 (1992). When 

deciding a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, the court must take all of the factual allegations of the 

complaint as true and decide whether the plaintiff has argued any set of facts that could 

support a claim for relief. Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 

N.E.2d 753 (1988); O’Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 

245, 327 N.E.2d 753 (1975), syllabus. 
{¶11} In Borkowski v. Abood, 117 Ohio St.3d 347, 2008-Ohio-857, 884 N.E.2d 7, 

paragraph one of the syllabus states: 

When a judge acts in an official judicial capacity and has personal and 

subject-matter jurisdiction over a controversy, the judge is exempt from 

civil liability even if the judge goes beyond, or exceeds, the judge’s 

authority and acts in excess of jurisdiction. Civil liability attaches only if 

the judge acts in an absence of all jurisdiction. 

{¶12} Henderson alleged that Judge Synenberg interjected herself into the juvenile 

division proceedings by detaining him, thus preventing him from representing himself in 

the juvenile division. None of her actions, however, were done outside of her 

jurisdiction as a judge of the court of common pleas presiding over criminal proceedings. 

 As alleged in the complaint, she ordered Henderson detained in a holding cell, ordered 

him to undergo a psychiatric evaluation, placed him under house arrest, and ordered him 

to see a probation officer. Assuming for purposes of the motion to dismiss that these 

actions were true, they were nonactionable because Judge Synenberg’s actions occurred 

in her official capacity as a judge presiding over Henderson’s criminal case. That those 

actions had collateral consequences to Henderson’s civil case does not detract from Judge 

Synenberg’s authority to take them. She is thus immune from any liability with regard to 

those actions. 
 III 

{¶13} Regarding the claims against Cuyahoga County and probation officer 

Lockhart, the court also found that these claims were not set out with specificity and that 

Henderson failed to state any plausible claim for entitlement to relief. In addition, the 

court found that the county, as a governmental entity, was immune from liability under 

R.C. 2744.02 and that Lockhart, as a probation officer, had absolute immunity for actions 

taken within the scope of her employment. 

 A 

{¶14} There is a three-tiered analysis to determine whether a political subdivision 

is entitled to immunity from civil liability pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744. Hubbard v. 

Canton City School Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 451, 2002-Ohio-6718, 780 N.E.2d 543, ¶ 

10. We first determine whether the entity claiming immunity is a political subdivision 

and whether the alleged harm occurred in connection with a governmental or a propriety 

function. If the political subdivision is entitled to immunity, we next consider whether 

the plaintiff has shown that there are any exceptions to immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B). 

If there are exceptions to immunity, we then consider whether the political subdivision 

can assert one of the defenses to liability under R.C. 2744.03. Cater v. Cleveland, 83 

Ohio St.3d 24, 28, 697 N.E.2d 610 (1998). 

{¶15} There is no question that the county is a political subdivision. See R.C. 

2744.01(F). The governmental function at issue in Henderson’s complaint is less clear 

— the court found that Henderson’s complaint made no specific allegations against 
Cuyahoga County and broadly viewed his allegations as referencing its operation of a 

court system and jail. The operation of a court system and jail is a governmental 

function, see R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(f) and (h), so the claims made against the county relate 

to governmental functions for which the county is immune from damages in a civil action. 

 

{¶16} There are no exceptions to immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B) for the acts 

alleged in the complaint, nor has Henderson argued that any exist. Exceptions to 

immunity under that section exist for negligent operation of motor vehicles; negligence 

with respect to a proprietary function; failure to keep roads in repair and free from 

obstructions; negligent failure to keep public buildings and their grounds free of physical 

defects; or that liability is expressly imposed by R.C. 2744.02(B)(5). 

{¶17} The complaint alleged that the “defendants” engaged in malicious acts or 

omissions or acted outside the scope of their official duties, but it made no specific 

allegations that the county engaged in any acts that would qualify as exceptions to tort 

immunity under R.C. 2744.03(B). The county thus remains immune from liability, and 

the claims against it were properly dismissed. 

 B 

{¶18} The court likewise did not err by holding that Lockhart was immune from 

liability. The court correctly noted that a probation officer “is protected under the 

umbrella of absolute immunity for actions taken within the scope of her employment.” 

McCormick v. Carroll, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83770, 2004-Ohio-5969, ¶ 20. The 
claims made against Lockhart were conclusory and lacked specificity. But even 

construing them as broadly as possible, the claims against Lockhart alleged that she 

implemented a house arrest order and electronic monitoring; administered urine tests; 

required Henderson’s attendance at meetings with the probation officer; and imposed 

costs associated with supervised release. All of these actions fell within the duties of a 

probation officer, so Lockhart remained immune from suit. 

 IV 

{¶19} The last issue for discussion is Henderson’s argument that the court erred by 

granting the defendants’ motion to stay discovery pending the resolution of their motions 

to dismiss. 

{¶20} We agree with the defendants that the court did not abuse its discretion by 

staying discovery. Absolute immunity is not just immunity from damages; it is immunity 

from suit. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991). When a 

defendant makes a facial challenge to the sufficiency of a claim, a motion to dismiss 

based on a failure to state a claim should be resolved before discovery begins — doing so 

spares the party asserting immunity from having to engage in the kind of litigation that is 

to be avoided by the grant of immunity. The conclusory nature of Henderson’s 

allegations coupled with the assertion of immunity were enough to justify the court’s 

decision to stay discovery pending resolution of the motion to dismiss. No abuse of 

discretion is shown. 

{¶21} Judgment affirmed. 
It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant their costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga 

County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

_______________________________________ 

MELODY J. STEWART, JUDGE 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J., and 

TIM McCORMACK, J., CONCUR 

APPENDIX 

Assignments of Error 

I. The Trial Court abused its discretion by granting Appellee[s’] motion to dismiss where 

Appellee’s [sic] did not file a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s second amended complaint. 

II. The Trial Court committed reversible error and committed prejudicial error by 

dismissing Appellant’s Second Amended Complaint where Appellant provided sufficient 

claims governed by Civil Rule 8. 

III. The Trial Court committed prejudicial error by granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss 

pursuant to immunity where Appellant provided sufficient facts for exceptions to bypass 

judicial and statutory immunities. 

IV. The Trial Court deprived Appellant’s Constitutional due process rights by granting 

Appellees’ motion to dismiss where Appellant averred facts to overcome a motion to 

dismiss. 

V. The Trial Court deprived Appellant of his due process and equal protection rights by 

dismissing Appellant’s Second Amended Complaint where there was [sic] sufficient facts 

against Defendant Synenberg with respect to subject matter, personal and criminal 

jurisdiction issues, abuse of authority, acts and omissions in a wanton and reckless matter 
and questionable official duties of a criminal judiciary during and prior to the criminal 

trial court obtaining criminal law jurisdiction over State v. Henderson, Crim. Case No. 

554594. 

VI. The Trial Court deprived Appellant of his Constitutional Due Process and Equal 

Protection Rights to discovery from opposing parties by granting Appellees’ motion to 

stay on discovery. 

VII. The trial court erred as a matter of law by dismissing the Appellant’s Second 

Amended Complaint where Appellant averred Constitutional and Title 29 violations of 

Ohio statutes.