FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LINDA AHLMEYER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 06-15654

v. D.C. No.  CV-05-00557-ECR NEVADA SYSTEM OF HIGHER

EDUCATION; MIKE REED, OPINION

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Edward C. Reed, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

January 18, 2008—San Francisco, California

Filed February 18, 2009

Before: John T. Noonan, William A. Fletcher, and

Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bea

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COUNSEL

Jeffrey A. Dickerson, Reno, Nevada, for the appellant. 

Mary Phelps Dugan, General Counsel, Nevada System of

Higher Education, Reno, Nevada, for the appellee. 

OPINION

BEA, Circuit Judge: 

Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., to promote the

employment of older persons and prohibit arbitrary discrimination by employers based on age. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b).

Congress crafted a detailed administrative scheme with complex enforcement mechanisms to accomplish these goals.

When a district court dismissed Linda Ahlmeyer’s ADEA

claim because it was barred by the Eleventh Amendment,

Ahlmeyer moved to amend her complaint so she could vindicate the same alleged wrong—workplace discrimination

based on her age—through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district

court denied Ahlmeyer’s motion as futile and, pursuant to the

parties’ stipulated dismissal of Ahlmeyer’s remaining claims,

entered an order dismissing the claims with prejudice.

Because we hold the ADEA is the exclusive enforcement

mechanism for claims of age discrimination in employment,

we affirm. 

AHLMEYER v. NEVADA SYSTEM OF HIGHER ED. 1921
I. Factual and Procedural Background

On October 17, 2005, Ahlmeyer filed a complaint in district court against the Nevada System of Higher Education

(“NSHE”) and her former supervisor Mike Reed. The complaint alleged that Ahlmeyer, who was over forty years old,

was not allowed to take classes during work hours and was

denied requests for an assistant, unlike her younger coworker.

Ahlmeyer also contended she was written up and given substandard evaluations based on actions for which younger

employees were not reprimanded. The complaint contained

three claims, only one of which is at issue in this appeal:1 the

NSHE violated the ADEA. 

The NSHE and Reed moved for partial summary judgment

on Ahlmeyer’s ADEA claim, on the basis that the claim was

barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the federal Constitution.2

In response, Ahlmeyer moved to amend her complaint and

replace the ADEA claim with a § 1983 claim against Reed

personally, based on claimed age discrimination in violation

of the Equal Protection Clause. Under Kimel v. Florida Board

of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), the district court concluded

1Ahlmeyer also contended (1) the NSHE unlawfully retaliated against

her after she filed a complaint with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission

and (2) Reed violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by engaging in adverse actions

against Ahlmeyer as a result of her Nevada Equal Rights Commission

complaint, which constituted protected speech on a matter of public concerns. The parties stipulated to the dismissal of these claims, and Ahlmeyer appealed only the district court’s denial of her motion to amend her

complaint. 

2The Eleventh Amendment provides as follows: “The Judicial power of

the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or

equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”

Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, states are sovereign entities immune

from lawsuits of individual citizens; Congress can abrogate this immunity

only if it unequivocally states its intent to do so and acts “pursuant to a

valid exercise of power.” See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S.

44, 54-55 (1996). 

1922 AHLMEYER v. NEVADA SYSTEM OF HIGHER ED.
Ahlmeyer’s ADEA claim against the NSHE was barred by the

Eleventh Amendment. Therefore, the district court granted the

NSHE’s and Reed’s motion for partial summary judgment

and dismissed Ahlmeyer’s ADEA claim. The district court

also denied Ahlmeyer’s motion to amend her complaint, holding the ADEA creates an exclusive remedy for age discrimination by employers; no claim for relief for age

discrimination exists under § 1983. On March 23, 2006, the

parties stipulated to dismissal of the remaining claims, and the

district court entered an order dismissing the claims with prejudice. 

Ahlmeyer appealed the district court’s denial of her motion

to amend. She contends the ADEA does not preclude her

§ 1983 claim against Reed individually. 

II. Jurisdiction

As a preliminary matter, the NSHE and Reed contend this

court lacks jurisdiction to hear this case, because Ahlmeyer

did not appeal from a final decision of the district court as

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This claim is without merit. It

cannot be disputed that the district court’s March 23, 2006,

order dismissing all remaining claims in the action constituted

a final decision of the district court. The NSHE and Reed contend this court lacks jurisdiction, however, because Ahlmeyer’s notice of appeal did not expressly reference the

March 23, 2006, order. 

A notice of appeal generally must specify the “judgment,

order, or part thereof being appealed.” Fed. R. App. P.

3(c)(1)(B). Nonetheless, this court repeatedly has held “a mistake in designating the judgment appealed from should not

bar appeal as long as the intent to appeal a specific judgment

can be fairly inferred and the appellee is not prejudiced by the

mistake.” Lynn v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 804 F.2d

1472, 1481 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “In determining whether ‘intent’ and ‘prejuAHLMEYER v. NEVADA SYSTEM OF HIGHER ED. 1923
dice’ are present, we apply a two-part test: first, whether the

affected party had notice of the issue on appeal; and, second,

whether the affected party had an opportunity to fully brief

the issue.” Id. 

Ahlmeyer’s notice of appeal meets both of these requirements. First, the notice of appeal stated precisely the issue

presented to this court: whether the district court erred in

denying Ahlmeyer’s motion to amend her complaint. Second,

the NSHE and Reed had the opportunity fully to brief the

issue on appeal and did so. Therefore, this court has jurisdiction to hear Ahlmeyer’s claim. 

III. Motion to Amend 

A. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s denial of a motion to amend a

complaint for abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Buckley, 356

F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004). Although five factors generally are considered when assessing the propriety of a motion

to amend,3 futility of amendment alone can justify the denial

of a motion. Id. A district court’s exercise of discretion based

on an erroneous interpretation of the law constitutes an abuse

of discretion. In re Arden, 176 F.3d 1226, 1228 (9th Cir.

1999). 

B. Preclusion Standard for § 1983 Claims

Ahlmeyer attempted to assert her age discrimination claim

against Reed as an action under § 1983 to vindicate her constitutional right to equal protection. Her claim can proceed

only if the ADEA is not the exclusive remedy for claims of

age discrimination in employment. 

3The five factors are bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing

party, futility of amendment, and whether the plaintiff has previously

amended the complaint. Johnson, 356 F.3d at 1077. 

1924 AHLMEYER v. NEVADA SYSTEM OF HIGHER ED.
[1] Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in relevant part, that

“[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage of any State . . . subjects . . . any

citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution

and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” Section 1983

claims are not available, however, where Congress has

evinced an intent to preclude such claims through other legislation. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n (Sea Clammers), 453 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1981). This

congressional intent can be inferred when Congress has

passed a sufficiently comprehensive legislative scheme to

address violations of a given right. Id. (“When the remedial

devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent

to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983.”).

C. Every circuit to consider the issue views the ADEA

as the exclusive remedy for claims of age discrimination in employment. 

[2] While this court has not ruled whether the ADEA is the

exclusive remedy for age discrimination in employment

claims, every other circuit to consider the question has so

held. The leading case to hold the ADEA precludes § 1983

actions in the area of age discrimination in employment is

Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Department, 868 F.2d 1364

(4th Cir. 1989). We find the reasoning of Zombro particularly

persuasive. 

In Zombro, a police officer asserted a § 1983 claim contending the Baltimore City Police Department (“Department”)

discriminated against him on the basis of age when the

Department transferred him to a “job of lesser status.” Id. at

1365. The district court granted summary judgment in favor

of the Department. Id.

AHLMEYER v. NEVADA SYSTEM OF HIGHER ED. 1925
[3] On appeal, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the ADEA’s

complex enforcement scheme and observed, “If a violation of

substantive rights under the ADEA could be asserted by way

of a § 1983 action, the aggrieved party could avoid [the] specific provisions of the” ADEA.4

Id. at 1366. Moreover, the

“assertion that constitutional rights have somehow been

infringed does not ipso facto defeat the coverage, application

and exclusivity of a comprehensive statutory scheme enacted

by Congress to redress the alleged violation of rights.” Id. at

1368. The Fourth Circuit found the ADEA’s remedies sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate congressional intent to

preclude § 1983 actions in the area of age discrimination in

employment. See id. at 1368-69. Finally, the court examined

the text and history of the ADEA and found it “implausible

that Congress would have intended to preserve the private

cause of action under § 1983 for age discrimination when that

cause of action would severely undermine, if not debilitate,

the enforcement mechanism created by Congress under the

ADEA.” Id. at 1369. The court concluded the ADEA forecloses § 1983 claims and affirmed the district court’s grant of

summary judgment. Id. at 1365, 1369. 

The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have reached similar conclusions. See Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131, 1140 (10th Cir.

1998), abrogated on other grounds by Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of

4The court in Zombro referenced the following “specific statutory provisions”: 

A prerequisite to the bringing of a private action is that the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) must be given

sixty days notice. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). This period is designed to

give the EEOC time to mediate the grievance “by informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 626(b). The right to commence a private action, it should be

noted, terminates upon the filing of an action by the EEOC. 29

U.S.C. § 626(c). Finally, notification to the EEOC must be given

within 180 days after the alleged unlawful actions took place,

unless the party is also seeking state relief. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1).

Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1366. 

1926 AHLMEYER v. NEVADA SYSTEM OF HIGHER ED.
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), reaffirmed by Migneault v.

Peck, 204 F.3d 1003, 1004 n.1 (10th Cir. 2000); Lafleur v.

Tex. Dep’t of Health, 126 F.3d 758, 760 (5th Cir. 1997). 

No circuit to consider the issue of whether the ADEA precludes § 1983 claims has reached the opposite conclusion and

allowed a § 1983 claim based on the same conduct to go forward. See Mummelthie v. City of Mason City, Iowa, 78 F.3d

589 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision)

(affirming on other grounds the district court’s decision,

which held inter alia that the ADEA is not the exclusive remedy for age discrimination); Izquierdo Prieto v. Mercado

Rosa, 894 F.2d 467, 470 (1st Cir. 1990) (reversing the district

court’s judgment following a jury trial in favor of the plaintiff

who asserted a § 1983 claim for age discrimination based on

her transfer from television to radio, but not reaching the issue

whether the ADEA precluded actions under § 1983, because

the First Circuit found that the plaintiff failed, “as a matter of

law, to establish any violation of her rights under the Constitution”).

[4] We choose to follow the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit

in Zombro and hold the ADEA precludes the assertion of age

discrimination in employment claims, even those seeking to

vindicate constitutional rights, under § 1983.5

D. The reasoning of the district courts that have held

that the ADEA is not the exclusive remedy for age

discrimination in employment is not persuasive. 

District courts to hold the ADEA is not an exclusive remedy have relied on three main arguments: 1) the presumption

5Every circuit to consider the issue has concluded similarly that the

ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination claims by federal

employees. See, e.g., Briggs v. Potter, 463 F.3d 507, 517 (6th Cir. 2006);

Lafleur, 126 F.3d at 760; Chennareddy v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 315, 318

(D.C. Cir. 1991); Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1369. 

AHLMEYER v. NEVADA SYSTEM OF HIGHER ED. 1927
against the implied preclusion of another statute; 2) the similarity of the ADEA to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e et seq.;

and 3) the fact that preclusion can leave a plaintiff with no

remedy for age discrimination by a state actor. 

1. The comprehensive remedial scheme of the

ADEA overcomes the presumption against

implied preclusion.

Although the implied preclusion of one statute by another

is disfavored, see Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc.,

482 U.S. 437, 442 (1987), the Supreme Court has held that,

“[w]hen the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are

sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate

Congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under

§ 1983,” Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 19-20. The Fourth Circuit in Zombro analyzed the ADEA’s enforcement mechanism and found it “no less specific and comprehensive” than

the statutes at issue in Sea Clammers. Zombro, 868 F.2d at

1366-67. 

The most comprehensive district court opinion holding the

ADEA does not preclude § 1983 claims is Mummelthie v.

Mason City, Iowa, 873 F. Supp. 1293 (N.D. Iowa 1995). The

Mummelthie district court rejected the Fourth Circuit’s use of

the Sea Clammers doctrine in the context of the ADEA.6

Mummelthie, 873 F. Supp. at 1313. The district court reasoned that Sea Clammers applies only to the question of

whether a statute forecloses the use of § 1983 for a violation

of the statute itself, as opposed to the “violation of rights with

an independent source in the Constitution.” Id. The court

found the application of Sea Clammers invalid because it

6Of course, as noted above, the Eighth Circuit’s affirmance was on a

different ground completely. The court avoided the question of whether

the ADEA precludes § 1983 claims, instead finding support in the record

for the “district court’s finding that [the alleged discriminatory] hiring

decision was not based on Mummelthie’s age.” 78 F.3d at 589. 

1928 AHLMEYER v. NEVADA SYSTEM OF HIGHER ED.
resulted in the implied repeal of § 1983 in the area of age discrimination in employment, and “[s]uch repeal by implication

is disfavored.” Id. at 1319. 

The implied preclusion of one statute by another, while disfavored, is not impermissible. In fact, the Sea Clammers doctrine functions as an exception to the presumption against

implied preclusion. The use of the Sea Clammers doctrine is

applicable to the interplay between the ADEA and § 1983, as

the Zombro court convincingly demonstrates. Zombro, 868

F.2d at 1366-67. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has interpreted the Sea Clammers doctrine as applying to constitutional claims when the statutory claim and the constitutional

claim are identical. See Williams v. Wendler, 530 F.3d 584,

586 (7th Cir. 2008). “When Congress enacts a comprehensive

scheme for enforcing a statutory right that is identical to a

right enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a

civil remedy for violations of federal rights (including constitutional rights) under color of state law, the section 1983 lawsuit must be litigated in accordance with the scheme.” Id.

(citing Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 20-21). Because the ADEA

provides broader protection than the Constitution, a plaintiff

has “nothing substantive to gain” by also asserting a § 1983

claim. See id.

Even if Sea Clammers does not apply when a § 1983 claim

seeks to vindicate constitutional, not statutory, rights, the

Supreme Court has held a comprehensively remedial statutory

scheme can preclude the vindication of constitutional rights

through § 1983. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489

(1973) (holding that § 1983 is unavailable to prisoners attacking their imprisonment because Congress passed the more

specific habeas corpus statute); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S.

992, 1009 (1984), superseded on other grounds by Handicapped Children’s Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-372, § 2,

100 Stat. 796 (1986) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1)) (holding that the comprehensiveness of the Education Handicapped

Act (“EHA”) indicates that “Congress intended the EHA to be

AHLMEYER v. NEVADA SYSTEM OF HIGHER ED. 1929
the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert an

equal protection claim to a publicly financed education”). 

[5] We are unable to perceive, and counsel have not

pointed us to, a constitutional claim for age discrimination

that is not vindicated fully by the ADEA. The comprehensive

remedial scheme of the ADEA demonstrates that Congress

intended the ADEA to serve as the exclusive means for pursuing claims of age discrimination in employment. Therefore,

the preclusion of § 1983 claims in this context is required. 

2. Because the ADEA is structurally and functionally distinct from Title VII, the availability of

§ 1983 claims to Title VII plaintiffs is not determinative.

[6] Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides an

avenue for plaintiffs to assert claims for employment discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. In its substantive provisions, the

ADEA mirrors Title VII, which does not deprive plaintiffs of

other avenues for asserting claims of race and sex discrimination. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (“In

fact, the prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec

verba from Title VII.”); Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc.

(1975) (holding that Title VII is not exclusive). In its remedial

provisions, however, the ADEA tracks the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1369. 

The remedial provisions of a statute are particularly significant in the preclusion inquiry. See Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at

19-20 (“When the remedial devices provided in a particular

Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits

under § 1983.”) (emphasis added). The Mummelthie district

court chose to analogize the ADEA to Title VII despite the

differences in the two statutes’ remedial schemes,7 holding

7These differences—such as the availability of compensatory and punitive damages and an emphasis on conciliation and mediation—are discussed infra. 

1930 AHLMEYER v. NEVADA SYSTEM OF HIGHER ED.
that, because Title VII does not preclude actions under

§ 1983, neither should the ADEA. Id. at 1326-27. 

In important ways, however, Title VII and the ADEA do

differ. While both statutes aim to eliminate discrimination in

the workplace, the Supreme Court has recognized that “age,

unlike race or other classifications protected by Title VII,”

may be relevant to an individual’s capacity to work. Smith v.

City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005). “Moreover, intentional discrimination on the basis of age has not occurred at

the same levels as discrimination against those protected by

Title VII.” Id. at 241. Therefore, the ADEA provides “significantly narrow[er]” coverage than Title VII.8

Id. at 233. 

This difference in scope is reflected in the remedies provided by the two statutory schemes. For example, the Civil

Rights Act of 1991 made available compensatory damages for

emotional pain and suffering and punitive damages under

Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(1), (b); see generally

David C. Miller, Alone in Its Field: Judicial Trend To Hold

that the ADEA Preempts § 1983 in Age Discrimination in

Employment Claims, 29 Stetson L. Rev. 573, 586-89 (2000)

(comparing the effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on the

remedies available under Title VII and the ADEA). 

[7] Compensatory damages for pain and suffering and punitive damages are not available under the ADEA, which

employs its complex enforcement scheme “to help employers

8Ahlmeyer’s § 1983 action frames her age discrimination in employment claim as a violation of her constitutional right to equal protection.

Where claims of discrimination based on race or sex are entitled to heightened scrutiny, age discrimination claims under the Constitution are subject

to rational basis scrutiny. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,

312 (1976) (per curiam). Therefore, a plaintiff asserting an equal protection claim under § 1983 based on age discrimination would face serious

obstacles to proving such a claim and has little to gain by circumventing

the ADEA, which affords more protection in the area of age discrimination than does the federal Constitution. 

AHLMEYER v. NEVADA SYSTEM OF HIGHER ED. 1931
and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the

impact of age on employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 621. Relief under

the ADEA is limited to “judgments compelling employment,

reinstatement, or promotion,” the recovery of unpaid minimum wages or overtime pay, and reasonable attorneys’ fees

and costs. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b). In other words,

the ADEA “was structured to facilitate and encourage compliance through an informal process of conciliation and mediation.” Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1366. Therefore, the narrower

scope of the ADEA is reflected in the more limited relief

Congress afforded plaintiffs. 

E. The fact that plaintiffs asserting age discrimination

against state actors will be left without a remedy

does not foreclose preclusion.

If the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination

in the workplace, then plaintiffs are left without a federal

forum for age discrimination claims against state actors.9See

Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-83 (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars ADEA claims against state actors). This seemingly

contradictory outcome has made several district courts “reluctant” to find preclusion. See, e.g., Mustafa v. State of Neb.

Dep’t of Correctional Servs., 196 F. Supp. 2d 945, 955-56 (D.

Neb. 2002). 

The argument that a plaintiff should not be left remediless

with respect to state actors has been squarely rejected by the

Supreme Court in the related context of Ex Parte Young

actions.10 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44

9A state employee alleging age discrimination in employment is not

without a forum altogether, because he can file an ADEA suit in state

court. See, e.g., Douchette v. Bethel School Dist. No. 403, 818 P.2d 1362

(Wash. 1991) (affirming the court of appeals’ dismissal of the plaintiff’s

discrimination claims, including a claim under the ADEA, as time-barred).

10In Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court held individuals could, in certain circumstances, bring an action for injunctive

relief against state officials directly under the Constitution without violating the Eleventh Amendment. 

1932 AHLMEYER v. NEVADA SYSTEM OF HIGHER ED.
(1996). In Seminole Tribe, the Court first held the provisions

of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) purporting to

authorize suits in federal court against the states were invalid

under the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 72-73. The Court further held the IGRA’s remedial scheme was sufficiently comprehensive to preclude the maintenance of an Ex Parte Young

action against the state. Id. at 74-75. Anticipating the very

argument presented by Ahlmeyer here, the Court stated as follows:

Here, of course, we have found that Congress does

not have authority under the Constitution to make

the State suable in federal court under § 2710(d)(7)

[of the IGRA]. Nevertheless, the fact that Congress

chose to impose upon the State a liability that is significantly more limited than would be the liability

imposed upon the state officer under Ex Parte Young

strongly indicates that Congress had no wish to

create the latter . . . . Nor are we free to rewrite the

statutory scheme in order to approximate what we

think Congress might have wanted had it known that

§ 2710(d)(7) was beyond its authority. If that effort

is to be made, it should be made by Congress, and

not by the federal courts.

Id. at 75 (emphasis added). 

[8] With the ADEA, Congress intended to impose on the

states a liability more limited than that available under

§ 1983. Thus, under Seminole Tribe, courts are not permitted

to second-guess what Congress would have done had it

known legislation authorizing suits against the states would be

held invalid under the Eleventh Amendment. Instead, courts

must analyze the comprehensiveness of a statute—and its corresponding preclusion of other remedies—as it was originally

written. Because the ADEA provides a comprehensive remedial scheme, it should be read as precluding § 1983 actions in

the area of age discrimination in employment.

AHLMEYER v. NEVADA SYSTEM OF HIGHER ED. 1933
Conclusion

[9] We hold the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for claims

of age discrimination in employment, even those claims with

their source in the Constitution. Therefore, the district court

did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Ahlmeyer’s motion

to amend her complaint as futile. 

AFFIRMED.

1934 AHLMEYER v. NEVADA SYSTEM OF HIGHER ED.