# EUR-Lex - 52012PC0770 - EN

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# 52012PC0770

**Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitely the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel originating in Russia and Turkey /* COM/2012/0770 final - 2012/0357 (NLE) */**

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

1) Context of the proposal

110 || · Grounds for and objectives of the proposal This proposal concerns the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community[1] ('the basic Regulation') in the proceeding concerning imports of certain tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel originating in Russia and Turkey.

120 || · General context This proposal is made in the context of the implementation of the basic Regulation and is the result of an investigation which was carried out in line with the substantive and procedural requirements laid out in the basic Regulation.

139 || · Existing provisions in the area of the proposal By Regulation (EU) No 699/2012 the Commission imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel originating in Russia and Turkey.

141 || · Consistency with other policies and objectives of the Union Not applicable.

2) Consultation of interested parties and impact assessment

|| · Consultation of interested parties

219 || Interested parties concerned by the proceeding have had the possibility to defend their interests during the investigation, in line with the provisions of the basic Regulation.

|| · Collection and use of expertise

229 || There was no need for external expertise.

230 || · Impact assessment This proposal is the result of the implementation of the basic Regulation. The basic Regulation does not provide for a general impact assessment but contains an exhaustive list of conditions that have to be assessed.

3) Legal elements of the proposal

305 || · Summary of the proposed action On 1 November 2011, the Commission announced by a notice (‘notice of initiation’), published in the Official Journal of the European Union, the initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports into the Union of certain tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel originating in Russia and Turkey. The anti-dumping proceeding was initiated following a complaint lodged on 20 September 2011 by the Defence committee of the Steel Butt-Welding Fittings Industry of the European Union (‘the complainant’ on behalf of producers representing more than 40% of the total Union production of certain tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel containing evidence of dumping and of material injury resulting there from. On 31 July 2012, the Commission imposed, by Regulation (EU) No 699/2012, a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Union of certain tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel originating in Russia and Turkey ranging from 2,9 % to 23,8 %. The enclosed Commission proposal for a Council Regulation imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty ranging from 2,9 % to 23,8 % contains the definitive conclusions regarding dumping, injury, causation and Union interest. The continuation of the investigation has confirmed the essential provisional findings. It is proposed that the Council adopt the attached proposal for a Regulation which should be published in the Official Journal of the European Union by 29 January 2013 at the latest.

310 || · Legal basis Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community.

329 || · Subsidiarity principle The proposal falls under the exclusive competence of the Union. The subsidiarity principle therefore does not apply.

|| · Proportionality principle The proposal complies with the proportionality principle for the following reasons:

331 || The form of action is described in the above-mentioned basic Regulation and leaves no scope for national decision.

332 || Indication of how financial and administrative burden falling upon the Union, national governments, regional and local authorities, economic operators and citizens is minimized and proportionate to the objective of the proposal is not applicable.

|| · Choice of instruments

341 || Proposed instruments: regulation.

342 || Other means would not be adequate for the following reason: The above-mentioned basic Regulation does not provide for alternative options.

4) Budgetary implication

409 || The proposal has no implication for the Union budget.

2012/0357 (NLE)

Proposal for a

COUNCIL REGULATION

imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty
and collecting definitely the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain
tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel originating in Russia and Turkey

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No
1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from
countries not members of the European Community[2]
('the basic Regulation'), and in particular Article 9
thereof,

Having regard to the
proposal submitted by the European Commission after having consulted the
Advisory Committee,

Whereas:

A.        PROCEDURE

1.           Provisional measures

(1)       On
31 July 2012, the European Commission ('the Commission'), by Regulation (EU) No
699/2012[3]
(‘the provisional Regulation’) imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty on
imports of certain tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel originating in
Russia and Turkey.

(2)       The
proceeding was initiated by a notice of initiation[4]
published on 1 November 2011, following a complaint lodged on 20 September 2011
by the Defence committee of the
Steel Butt-Welding Fittings Industry of the European Union ('the
complainants') on behalf of producers representing more
than 40 % of the total Union production of certain tube and pipe
fittings of iron or steel.

(3)       As set out in recital (15)
of the provisional Regulation, the investigation of dumping and injury covered
the period from 1 October 2010 to 30 September 2011 (‘investigation period’ or
‘IP’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered
the period from 1 January 2008 to the end of the IP (‘period considered’).

2.           Subsequent procedure

(4)       Subsequent to the
disclosure of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it
was decided to impose provisional anti-dumping measures ('provisional disclosure'),
several interested parties made written submissions making their views known on
the provisional findings. The parties who so requested were also granted the
opportunity to be heard.

(5)       The
Commission continued to seek and analyse all information it deemed necessary
for its definitive findings.

3.           Sampling

(6)       In the absence of any
comments concerning the sampling of Union producers, unrelated importers and
exporting producers, the provisional findings in recitals (5) to (11) of the
provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

4.           Measures in force in respect
of other third countries

(7)       It is reiterated that definitive anti-dumping measures are
in force in respect of certain tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel
originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea
and Thailand, and following circumvention practices also in respect of certain
tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel originating in the People's Republic of
China consigned from Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Taiwan (with
certain exceptions)[5]. The countries
mentioned in the preceding sentence shall hereafter be referred to as
'countries under anti-dumping measures'.

B.         PRODUCT CONCERNED AND
LIKE PRODUCT

(8)       As set out in recital (17)
of the provisional Regulation, the product concerned is tube and pipe fittings
(other than cast fittings, flanges and threaded fittings), of iron or steel
(not including stainless steel), with a greatest external diameter not
exceeding 609,6 mm, of a kind used for butt-welding or other purposes,
currently falling within CN codes ex 7307 93 11, ex 7307 93 19 and ex 7307 99
80 ('the product concerned').

(9)       In the absence of any
comments concerning the product concerned and the like product, the provisional
findings in recitals (17) to (20) of the provisional Regulation are hereby
confirmed.

C.     DUMPING

1.      Russia

1.1.   Normal value

(10)     One Russian exporting
producer claimed that only data obtained from Russian companies should have
been used in the dumping margin calculations and that it is not accurate to use
data from Turkish companies. It should be recalled that in the absence of
cooperation by any Russian exporting producer, the normal value for Russia has
been established in accordance with Article 18(1) and 18(5) on the basis of the
facts available, i.e. information obtained from those Turkish exporting
producers that use Russian seamless steel pipes and tubes as input for the
production of the product concerned. The claim is therefore rejected.

(11)     In the absence of any other
comments concerning the determination of normal value, the provisional findings
in recitals (22) to (25) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

1.2.   Export price

(12)     In the absence of any
comments concerning the determination of export price, the provisional findings
in recitals (26) and (27) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

1.3.   Comparison

(13)     In the absence of any comments concerning the comparison of
export price and normal value, the provisional findings in recitals (28) and
(29) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

1.4.   Dumping margin

(14)     One Russian exporting
producer claimed that the provisional anti-dumping duty of 23,8% is not
justified in light of the fact that the company only exports steel elbows to
the Union and even those in only very small quantities. However, steel elbows
are part of the product subject to this investigation and this has not been
contested by any interested party. In addition, the criterion to consider
imports into the Union as negligible as referred to in Article 5(7) and Article
9(3) of the basic Regulation is only considered on a country-wide level and not
individually per company. The claim is therefore rejected.

(15)     Another Russian exporting
producer claimed it has not been dumping and that this is reflected by the fact
that on multiple occasions it has lost tenders to Union competitors for
supplying elbows and bends. As mentioned above, it is recalled that no Russian
exporting producer cooperated in this investigation and therefore the dumping
calculations for Russia were made in accordance with Article 18(1) and Article
18(5) of the basic Regulation on the basis of the facts available. Even if the
claim is considered, it should be noted that the loss of tenders to Union
competitors does not contradict the finding about dumping by the Russian
exporting producer. The claim is therefore rejected.

(16)     In the absence of any other
comments concerning the dumping margin calculation, the findings in recitals
(30) and (31) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

(17)     The
country-wide dumping margin finally determined, expressed as a percentage of
the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, is the following:

Company || dumping margin

All companies || 23,8 %

2.      Turkey

2.1.   Normal value

(18)     In the absence of any
comments concerning the determination of normal value, the provisional findings
in recitals (32) to (40) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

2.2.   Export price

(19)     One exporting producer
claimed that the profit margin achieved on the ocean freight, i.e. the
difference between the freight charged to its customers and the freight paid by
the exporting producer to the shipping company, should be included in the
export price. However, pursuant to Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation the
export price shall be the price actually paid or payable for the product when
sold for export from the exporting country to the Union. A profit margin
achieved on the transport of the product to the customer cannot be considered
as part of the export price of the product itself. The claim is therefore
rejected.

(20)     In the absence of any other
comments concerning the determination of export price, the provisional findings
in recitals (41) to (43) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

2.3.   Comparison

(21)     The Turkish Steel
Exporters' Association (ÇIB) claimed that the significant price differences
between seamless and welded pipe fittings have not been properly taken into
account in the comparison between export price and normal value. However, all
cooperating companies have submitted information on a transaction-to-transaction
basis with regard to sales of seamless and welded fittings. This information
has been explicitly used for the comparison between export price and normal
value. In other words, seamless fittings have only been compared with seamless
fittings and welded fittings have only been compared with welded fittings.
Therefore, the claim is rejected.

(22)     In the absence of any other
comments in respect of comparison, the findings in recital (44) of the
provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

2.4.   Dumping margins

(a)     Dumping margin
for companies investigated

(23)     It is recalled that the
individual dumping margin provisionally established for one of the three
cooperating exporting producers was determined on the basis of a comparison of
a weighted average normal value with the company's weighted average export
price of the product concerned to the Union. In the absence of any comments concerning
the determination of this company's dumping margin, the provisional findings in
recital (46) of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

(24)     For the two other
cooperating companies the dumping calculations in their respect showed that the
companies conducted targeted dumping in terms of a given time period as well as
in respect of given customers and regions. Indeed, there was a clear pattern of
their export prices which differed significantly among different purchasers,
regions as well as time periods (up to 30% for identical models of the product
concerned). Furthermore, the dumping calculation based on the comparison of a
weighted average normal value to a weighted average of export prices in accordance
with the method provided in Article 2(11) first part of the first sentence of
the basic Regulation did not reflect the full degree of dumping being practised
by the two producers concerned, as demonstrated in recital (27) below. The
dumping margin could also not be established by a comparison of individual
normal values and individual export prices to the Union on a transaction-to-transaction
basis in accordance with Article 2(11) second part of the first sentence of the
basic Regulation, given the lack of sufficient domestic transactions for normal
value corresponding to the export transactions as demonstrated in recital (28)
below.

(25)     Therefore, in order to
reflect the full amount of dumping being practised by the two companies
concerned, in accordance with Article 2(11) of the basic Regulation, the normal
value established on a weighted average basis was compared in their case to
prices of all individual export transactions to the Union. Given that such
method of comparison is an exception to the two first methods provided in
Article 2(11) of the basic Regulation, the Commission carefully checked whether
the conditions to resort to it were clearly met in this case. The detailed
dumping calculations, including the established export price patterns, have
been disclosed. None of the Turkish exporting producers contested the
underlying data.

(26)     However, both cooperating
companies, the ÇIB and the Turkish Government, claimed that insufficient
explanation has been provided as to the targeted dumping established for the
two Turkish exporting producers and that in any event, any pattern of export
prices was unintended. In a hearing with the Hearing Officer, requested by the
two Turkish exporters, detailed explanations have been provided to the two
companies with regard to the establishment of targeted dumping and the
underlying dumping margin calculations. The Commission also clarified that even
if unintentional[6],
their practices had the effect of targeted dumping. It is noted that the basic
regulation does not require the investigating authority to identify potential
reasons for targeted dumping, such as currency fluctuations, different regional
pricing policies etc. The mere establishment of patterns of export prices differing
significantly among different purchasers, regions or time periods, is
sufficient[7].
Further to the hearing, company-specific explanations have also been disclosed
to the two companies. Moreover, a Note Verbale has been sent to the Permanent
Delegation of Turkey to the EU with clarifications on the establishment of
targeted dumping and the methodology applied for the dumping margin
calculation. Furthermore, in another hearing with the Hearing Officer,
requested by the ÇIB, detailed explanations have been provided to the ÇIB with
regard to the establishment of targeted dumping and the underlying dumping
margin calculations.

(27)     In fact, the investigation
has established for each of the two exporting producers three clear patterns of
export prices covering the vast majority of their export sales to the Union,
i.e. export prices differed significantly among different purchasers, regions
as well as time periods, as it was demonstrated by the underlying data
disclosed to the parties. This was the result of a thorough examination of the
exceptional circumstances of this case on the basis of which it was considered
necessary to resort to targeted dumping. Having established significant export
price differences, and whereas only one of these three patterns of export
prices would be sufficient to resort to the weighted average to all individual
export transaction comparison methodology, this comparison method was
considered appropriate in this particular case. Furthermore, for each of the
two companies, the total amount of dumping established by comparison of the
weighted average normal value with the weighted average export price of the
product concerned to the Union (the first symmetrical method) significantly
differs from the amount of dumping established by comparison of the normal
value established on a weighted average basis with prices of all individual
export transactions to the Union (the asymmetrical method), as it was
demonstrated by the underlying data disclosed to the parties. Therefore it can
be concluded that the use of the first symmetrical method would have the effect
of inappropriately disguising the targeted dumping which took place during a
specific time period, in specific regions and to specific customers. In other
words, the dumping margin established by the first symmetrical method would not
reflect the full degree of dumping being practiced by the two companies
concerned.

(28)     The dumping margin could
also not be established by a comparison of individual normal values with
individual export prices to the Union on a transaction to transaction basis in accordance
with Article 2(11) second part of the first sentence of the basic Regulation
(the second symmetrical method). This method involves identifying individual
domestic transactions, which are comparable to individual export transactions,
taking into account factors such as sales quantity and transaction date. Given
the lack of sufficient domestic transactions for normal value corresponding to
the export transactions, it was not possible to establish the dumping margin on
the basis of the second symmetrical method. Therefore, given the establishment
of a pattern of export prices which differed significantly among different
purchasers, regions or time periods and given that the two symmetrical methods
would not reflect the full degree of dumping, it has been concluded, in
accordance with the second sentence of Article 2(11), to establish the dumping
margin on the basis of the asymmetrical method.

(29)     Both cooperating companies
and the ÇIB claimed that it was unjustified to compare export prices converted
in Turkish Lira, given the fact that sales to the Union have been made in Euro
while Turkish Lira is only used for accountancy reasons. It was argued that
currency exchange fluctuations between Euro and Turkish Lira have had a
significant effect on the price determinations which would inevitably affect
the result of export price comparison between different time periods in an
unjustified manner. However, the Commission's consistent practice is to carry
out export price comparison and dumping margin calculations in the accounting
currency of co-operating exporting producers in the exporting country. It
should be noted that costs and domestic prices used as a basis for normal value
are expressed in Turkish Lira. Consequently, the comparison of export prices
with the normal value is carried out in that currency. Thus, the only logical
approach to establish a pattern of export prices, within the framework of the
same dumping calculation, is to use the same export prices already expressed in
Turkish Lira. In addition, as stated above, the basic Regulation does not
require an analysis of possible reasons of targeted dumping, such as exchange
rate fluctuations[8].
The claim is therefore rejected.

(30)     Both cooperating exporting
producers claimed that, in order to establish a pattern of export prices,
weighted average prices of comparable product types should be taken into
account rather than arithmetic average prices. However, Article 2(11) of the
basic Regulation refers to a pattern of export prices and not to a pattern of
weighted average export prices or a pattern of export values. The use of a
weighted average export price would distort the analysis by taking into account
the volume of exports instead of only the export prices. In any case, even when
weighted average prices are used instead of arithmetic average export prices,
still a pattern of export prices could be established which differs
significantly among different purchasers, regions as well as time periods. Two
parties contested the significance of differences in patterns of export prices,
if any, in case weighted averages are used. It is noted that the parties do not
contest the factual findings based on the arithmetic average, which is the
appropriate methodology as explained above. This claim is therefore rejected.

(31)     The ÇIB claimed that the
application of zeroing is unjustified by referring to a WTO Appellate Body
Report[9]
in which the zeroing practice was found to be contrary to the WTO Anti-Dumping
Agreement. The General Court[10]
has, however, confirmed that the findings of the Bed Linen Report are not
applicable in a situation of targeted dumping. Indeed, the Bed linen Report
concerns only the zeroing technique in the context of the first symmetrical
method and cannot be considered to deal with this mechanism when it is used in
the context of the asymmetrical method. Therefore, even if, as the WTO Appellate
Body found, it might indeed be contrary to Article 2.4.2 of the 1994
Anti-dumping Code and unfair to employ the zeroing technique in the context of
the first symmetrical method, and especially in the absence of an export price
pattern, it is not contrary to that provision or to Article 2(11) of the basic
Regulation, or unfair within the meaning of Article 2(10) of that Regulation,
to employ the zeroing technique in the context of the asymmetrical method,
where the two conditions for applying that method are met. Furthermore, the
zeroing technique has proved to be mathematically necessary in order to
distinguish, in terms of its results, the asymmetrical method from the first
symmetrical method. In the absence of that reduction, the asymmetrical method
will always yield the same result as the first symmetrical method. This claim
is therefore rejected.

(32)     Further, the ÇIB claimed
that the use of zeroing causes a violation of the lesser duty rule. It was
argued that, because of the zeroing practice used, margins of dumping have been
calculated at a level higher than they should actually have been.

(33)     However, the use of zeroing
in the asymmetrical method does not preclude the application of the lesser duty
rule. For all three cooperating companies the dumping margins, regardless of
the methodology used, have been compared with the companies' injury elimination
levels to ensure that the lower of the two would determine the duty. The claim
is therefore rejected.

(34)     In the absence of any other
comments in respect of the dumping margins for companies investigated, the
findings in recitals (47) and (48) of the provisional Regulation are hereby
confirmed.

(b)     Dumping margin
for non-cooperating companies

(35)     In
the absence of any comments concerning the dumping margin for non-cooperating
companies, the provisional findings in recital (49) of the provisional
Regulation are hereby confirmed.

(36)     The country-wide dumping
margins finally determined, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier
price, duty unpaid, are the following:

Company || dumping margin

RSA || 9,6 %

Sardogan || 2,9 %

Unifit || 12,1 %

All other companies || 16,7 %

D.        INJURY

1.           Union production, Union
industry and consumption

(37)     In the absence of any
comments with regard to Union production, Union industry and consumption the
content of recitals (51) to (54) of the provisional Regulation is hereby
confirmed.

2.           Imports from the countries
concerned

3.1.   Cumulative assessment of the effects
of the imports concerned

(38)     Following provisional
disclosure, the ÇIB argued that the cumulative assessment of dumped imports
from the two countries concerned is not warranted. In principle, they echoed
the comments made by the Turkish exporting producers following
the initiation and claimed that imports from Russia and Turkey show different
trends in terms of volume and prices.

(39)     It is reiterated in this
regard, as already stated in recital (59) of the provisional Regulation that
the investigation established that while imports from Turkey are relatively
stable in terms of volumes, imports from Russia are increasing in absolute
terms. However, given the contraction in demand in the period considered, the
market shares of imports from both countries are increasing.

(40)     At the same time their
pricing do not appear to be substantially different, with Russian average
prices being somewhat lower but very close to the average Turkish prices. It is
also reiterated in this regard that for companies in both countries the
investigation established significant undercutting of up to ca. 30% (see
recital (65) of the provisional Regulation). Consequently, the claim is
rejected.

(41)     The ÇIB also argued that
imports from Turkey should be considered insignificant and pointed out that in
a previous case concerning a similar product – namely in "pipe and tube
fittings from the PRC, Croatia, Slovakia, Taiwan and Thailand"[11] – imports from Slovakia and
Taiwan have been considered insignificant (although they were above de
minimis threshold) and therefore not cumulated with dumped imports from
other countries.

(42)     It is noted in this regard
that in the case mentioned above imports from Slovakia and Taiwan were indeed
found to be dumped and despite being above the 1% market share threshold they
were not cumulated with other dumped imports. The situation in that case,
however, was very different from the current one, as imports from Slovakia and
Taiwan were actually sharply losing their market share and where not considered
significant when compared to the volume of imports from the other countries and
consequently were considered not to be causing injury. In contrast, in the case
at hand imports from both Turkey and Russia are increasing their market share
and are comparable to each other in terms of volumes. Consequently, the claim
is rejected.

(43)     The ÇIB also argued that
imports from Turkey and Russia are not similar in terms of conditions of
competition as there are "differences in geographical concentration of
sales". They have provided statistics showing that during the IP Turkey
has concentrated over 70% of their sales on Spain, France, Italy and Poland,
while Russia concentrated almost all of their sales on Czech Republic and Germany.

(44)     It is noted in this regard
that differences in geographical concentration of sales cannot be considered to
be an indication of different conditions of competition. Given that the
European Union is a single market, the point of entry of any imports will
normally not be decisive for the competitiveness of these imports with each
other and vis-à-vis the like product. It is also reiterated with respect to
conditions of competition that price-wise Russian and Turkish imports are similar
and were both found to undercut Union prices and that their channels of sales
are similar. Consequently, the claim is rejected.

(45)     In the absence of any other
comments with regard to cumulative assessment of the dumped imports from the
countries concerned the content of recitals (55) to (60) of the provisional
Regulation is hereby confirmed.

3.2.   Volume, market share of the dumped
imports concerned, their import prices and undercutting.

(46)     In the absence of any
comments with regard to volume and market share of the dumped imports
concerned, their import prices and undercutting, recitals (61) to (65) of the
provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

(47)     It is reiterated that the
dumped product concerned originating in the countries concerned sold in the
Union undercut the Union industry's prices by up to ca. 30 %.

3.           Situation of the Union
industry

(48)     Following provisional
disclosure the ÇIB and the Turkish Government claimed that given that the Union
industry increased their market share by some 3% between 2008 and the IP, the
Commission should have concluded that the Union industry did not suffer
material injury in the period considered.

(49)     It is noted in this regard
that firstly, it was clearly recognised in the provisional Regulation (see for
example recitals (72), (86) or (91) of the provisional Regulation) that there
was a slight increase in the market share of the Union industry. Secondly, the
recital (72) of the provisional Regulation clarifies that the increased market
share is a reflection of the fact that the sales volumes of the Union producers
dropped slightly less than the consumption in the period considered.

(50)     Moreover, apart from
falling stocks referred to below, it is the only injury indicator that shows a
positive development over the period considered. Consequently, the claim is
rejected.

(51)     The Turkish government also
claimed that a dropping closing stock of the sampled Union producers is an
indication of a non-injurious situation of the Union industry.

(52)     It is noted in this regard
that indeed as stated in recital (79) of the provisional Regulation the closing
stock of the sampled Union producers decreased by 18% between 2008 and the IP.

(53)     At the same time it is
recognised that a drop in stocks could be seen as a positive sign but only in a
situation when sales would be growing at a faster pace than production.
However, this is not the case in the current investigation. To the contrary,
the drop in stocks in this case is just a reflection of production volumes
dropping at a faster pace than sales. In this situation the drop in stocks
cannot be seen as a positive development. Consequently, the claim is rejected.

(54)     In the absence of any other
claim or comments, the content of recitals (66) to (88) of the provisional
Regulation including the conclusion that Union industry has suffered material
injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation is hereby
confirmed.

E.         CAUSATION

1.           Effect of the dumped imports

(55)     In the absence of any
specific comments, recitals (90) to (93) of the provisional Regulation are
hereby confirmed.

2.           Effect
of other factors

(56)     Following the provisional
disclosure the ÇIB and the Turkish Government claimed that the actual cause of
any injury suffered by the Union industry would be low priced imports from
other third countries and in particular from countries under anti-dumping
measures.

(57)     In this regard it is noted
that, as already stated in recital (96) of the provisional Regulation, imports
from the eight countries under anti-dumping measures continued to penetrate the
Union market although their market share declined from 21 % in 2008 to 17 % in
the IP. The average prices of those imports are generally lower than those of
the dumped imports from the countries concerned. Even when the applicable
anti-dumping duty is taken into account, the prices of those imports remain low
and comparable with the prices of Russian and Turkish imports and are below the
average prices of the Union producers.

(58)     However, it is noted that
for the countries under anti-dumping measures (as for all third countries) only
limited statistical information and average prices are available and the established
price difference is not necessarily conclusive and may be a result of a
different product mix. Moreover, imports from countries under anti-dumping
measures show a clear downward trend. Hence, the conclusion that they were not breaking
the causal link between injury to the Union industry and the increased dumped
imports from Turkey and Russia.

(59)     With regard to imports from
other third countries their market share declined during the period considered
from 7 % in 2008 to 6 % in the IP while Russia and Turkey increased. The
average prices of those imports were generally higher than the dumped imports
from the countries concerned and close to the average prices of the Union
producers and as such are considered not to break the causal link between
injury to the Union industry and the increased dumped imports from Turkey and
Russia. Consequently, the claim is rejected and the provisional conclusion that
imports from third countries are not breaking the causal link is confirmed.

(60)     The Turkish Government also
argued that any injury suffered by the Union industry would be caused by the
increased cost of production resulting from contraction in demand.

(61)     It is noted in this regard
that, as already stated in recitals (101) of the provisional Regulation, the
financial and economic crisis of 2008/2009 is in all likelihood the reason
behind the decreased consumption for pipe fittings. The consumption has dropped
by over 40 % between 2008 and 2009 and remained at this low level
throughout the rest of the period considered (although slightly increasing in
the IP). Given that fixed costs make up to 40 % of the manufacturing costs of
the Union producers, the decreased demand, sales and output result in
significantly higher unit manufacturing costs. This obviously has had an
important impact on the profitability of the Union industry.

(62)     At the same time, any
negative impact of higher unit manufacturing cost was clearly deepened by the
fact that the prices of the Union industry were dropping subject to severe
price pressure and significant undercutting by the dumped imports from Turkey
and Russia. In a normal market situation the Union industry should have a
possibility to minimise the impact of any unit cost increase by at least
keeping the normal price level, which was clearly not possible in the situation
of exerted price pressure by artificially cheap dumped imports from the countries
concerned.

(63)     Consequently, the claim is
rejected and it is definitely concluded that any negative effect of contraction
in demand is not such as to break the causal link between the injury suffered
by the Union industry and the dumped imports from Russia and Turkey.

(64)     In the absence of any other
claim or comments, the content of recitals (94) to (106) of the provisional
Regulation, including the conclusion that the dumped imports from the countries
concerned have caused material injury to the Union industry within the meaning
of Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation is hereby confirmed.

G.        UNION INTEREST

(65)     Following the provisional
disclosure the ÇIB claimed that imposition of any measures would lead to a
situation in which ERNE Fittings, a complainant would have a monopoly-like
position in the Union market.

(66)     It is noted in this regard
that ERNE is only one of two complainants and that the second one – INTERFIT –
is similar in size to ERNE. In addition, data in the provisional Regulation concerning
the sampled Union producers also included a third Union producer – Virgilio
CENA & Figli. Moreover, there is a significant number of smaller companies
in the Union producing and selling the product under investigation and there
are significant imports from other sources. Given the above, it is considered
that there is no risk of monopolisation of ERNE's position.

(67)     In the absence of any other
comments, recitals (107) to (117) of the provisional Regulation, including the
conclusion that no compelling reasons exist against the imposition of measures
on the dumped imports from the countries concerned are hereby confirmed.

H.        DEFINITIVE MEASURES

1.           Injury elimination level

(68)     In the absence of any
specific comments, recitals (118) to (120) of the provisional Regulation are
hereby confirmed.

2.           Definitive measures

(69)     In view of the conclusions
reached with regard to dumping, injury, causation and Union interest, and in
accordance with Article 9 of the basic Regulation, it is considered that a definitive
anti-dumping duty should be imposed on imports of the product concerned
originating in Russia and Turkey at the level of the lowest of the dumping
margin and injury elimination level found, in accordance with the lesser duty
rule, which is in all cases the dumping margin.

(70)     For Russia, in the absence
of cooperation by Russian exporting producers, a country-wide dumping margin
was calculated as explained in recitals (21) to (31) of the provisional
Regulation and hereby confirmed.

(71)     For Turkey, given that the
level of cooperation was considered to be relatively low, the residual dumping
margin was based on a reasonable method leading to a margin which is higher
than the highest among the individual margins of the three cooperating
companies as explained in recital (49) of the provisional Regulation and hereby
confirmed.

(72)     On the basis of the above,
the proposed duty rates are :

Country || Company || Definitive anti-dumping duty

Russia || All companies || 23,8 %

Turkey || RSA || 9,6 %

|| Sardogan || 2,9 %

|| Unifit || 12,1 %

|| All other companies || 16,7 %

(73)     The individual company
anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the
basis of the findings of the present investigation. Therefore, they reflect the
situation found during that investigation with respect to these companies.
These duty rates (as opposed to the country-wide duty applicable to ‘all other
companies’) are thus exclusively applicable to imports of products originating
in the countries concerned and produced by the companies and thus by the
specific legal entities mentioned. Imported products produced by any other
company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation
with its name and address, including entities related to those specifically
mentioned, cannot benefit from these rates and shall be subject to the duty
rate applicable to ‘all other companies’.

(74)     Any claim requesting the
application of an individual company anti-dumping duty rate (e.g. following a
change in the name of the entity or following the setting up of new production
or sales entities) should be addressed to the Commission[12] forthwith with all relevant
information, in particular any modification in the company’s activities linked
to production, domestic and export sales associated with, for example, that
name change or that change in the production and sales entities. If
appropriate, the Regulation will then be amended accordingly by updating the
list of companies benefiting from individual duty rates.

(75)     All parties were informed of
the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to
recommend the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of
certain tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel originating in Russia and
Turkey and the definitive collection of the amounts secured by way of the
provisional duty ('final disclosure'). They were also granted a period within
which they could make representations subsequent to this disclosure.

(76)     Following the final
disclosure, submissions were received from the complainant as well as from two
cooperating exporting producers from Turkey and the ÇIB. Both Turkish producers
and the ÇIB requested and have been granted hearings.

(77)     The complainant agreed with
all findings as disclosed. The oral and written comments submitted by two
Turkish exporters and the ÇIB were a reiteration of the comments already made
following the provisional disclosure. It is noted that none of the interested
parties contested the underlying data.

(78)     A justification and a reply
to the claim for the application of the asymmetrical method including zeroing in
the dumping calculation is provided in recitals (24) to (33) above. The use of
Turkish Lira for the establishment of export price patterns is explained and
the relevant claim addressed in recital (29) above. The use of arithmetical
average prices instead of weighted average prices in identifying patterns of
export prices is explained and the relevant claim addressed in recital (30)
above . The claim to include the profit margin
achieved on the ocean freight into the export price is described and dismissed
in recital (19) above. The claim that no cumulative assessment of Turkish and
Russian imports is warranted in view of differences in geographical
concentration of Turkish and Russian sales is described and dismissed in
recitals (43) and (44) above. The claim that Union industry suffered no injury
given their increased market share is addressed and dismissed in recitals (48)
to (50) above.

(79)     Given that following the
final disclosure no arguments that would influence the outcome of the
assessment of the case were brought forward, no modification of the findings as
detailed above is warranted.

I.          DEFINITIVE
COLLECTION OF THE PROVISIONAL DUTY

(80)     In view of the magnitude of
the dumping margin found and given the level of the injury caused to the Union
industry, it is considered necessary that the amounts secured by way of
provisional anti-dumping duty imposed by the provisional Regulation should be
definitively collected to the extent of the amount of the definitive duty
imposed,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1. A definitive
anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of tube and pipe fittings (other
than cast fittings, flanges and threaded fittings), of iron or steel (not
including stainless steel), with a greatest external diameter not exceeding
609,6 mm, of a kind used for butt-welding or other purposes, currently falling
within CN codes ex 7307 93 11, ex 7307 93 19 and ex 7307 99 80 (TARIC codes
7307 93 11 91, 7307 93 11 93, 7307 93 11 94, 7307 93 11 95, 7307 93 11 99, 7307
93 19 91, 7307 93 19 93, 7307 93 19 94, 7307 93 19 95, 7307 93 19 99, 7307 99
80 92, 7307 99 80 93, 7307 99 80 94, 7307 99 80 95 and 7307 99 80 98) and
originating in Russia and Turkey.

2. The rate of the
definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net free-at-Union-frontier
price, before duty, of the products described in paragraph 1 and manufactured
by the companies listed below, shall be as follows:

Country || Company || anti-dumping duty || TARIC additional code

Russia || All companies || 23,8 % || -

Turkey || RSA Tesisat Malzemeleri San ve Ticaret AŞ, Küçükköy, Istanbul || 9,6 % || B295

|| Sardoğan Endüstri ve Ticaret, Kurtköy Pendik, Istanbul || 2,9 % || B296

|| UNIFIT BORU BAĞLANTI ELEM. END. MAM. SAN. VE TİC. AȘ, Tuzla, Istanbul || 12,1 % || B297

|| All other companies || 16,7 % || B999

3. Unless otherwise
specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

Article 2

The amounts secured by way of provisional
anti-dumping duty pursuant to Commission Regulation (EU) No 699/2012 on imports
of certain tube and pipe fittings of iron or steel originating in Russia and
Turkey shall be definitively collected.

Article 3

This Regulation shall enter into force on
the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the
European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding
in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels,

For
the Council

The
President

[1]               OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51.

[2]               OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51.

[3]               OJ L 203, 31.7.2012, p. 37.

[4]               OJ C 320, 1.11.2011, p. 4

[5]               OJ L 275, 16.10.2008, p. 18
and OJ L 233, 4.9.2009, p. 1.

[6]               T-274/02,
Ritek, § 57.

[7]               T-274/02,
Ritek, § 60.

[8]               T-274/02, Ritek, § 51 – last sentence.

[9]               WTO
Appellate Body Report,
European Communities – Anti-Dumping
Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India

[10]             T-274/02,
Ritek, § 98-103

[11]             OJ L 234, 3.10.1995, p.4.

[12]             European
Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate H, Office N105 08/20,
1049 Brussels, BELGIUM.