[Cite as Y.A.B. ex rel. E.E.W. v. Wallace, 2023-Ohio-551.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

MONTGOMERY COUNTY

Y.A.B. ex rel. E.E.W., JR.

 Relator

v. 

JUDGE HELEN WALLACE et al.

 Respondents

C.A. No. 29529

DECISION AND FINAL JUDGMENT 

ENTRY

February 17, 2023

______________________________________________________________________

PER CURIAM:

{¶ 1} This matter is before the court on the merits of relator Y.A.B.’s request for a 

writ of prohibition against the respondents, Judge Helen Wallace and Magistrate Paula 

Durden of the Montgomery County Juvenile Court. Upon consideration of the evidence 

and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that no writ shall issue.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} Y.A.B., also known as E.E.W., Jr., is an inmate incarcerated in Kentucky. 

Relator is a child support obligor with respect to his daughter, S.N.W. On March 28, 2016, 

in Case No. 2016-1971, the Montgomery County Juvenile Court adopted the Montgomery 

County Child Support Enforcement Agency’s administrative order establishing relator’s 

child support obligation. On January 14, 2019, the juvenile court adjudicated S.N.W. to 

be a dependent child in Case No. 2018-5826. In Case No. 2018-5826, the juvenile court 

found that it had previously addressed child support in Case No. 2016-1971. Thus, 

relator’s obligation to support S.N.W. has been continuous since March 28, 2016, 
although the amount he has been ordered to pay each month has been modified and 

there have been changes in child custody. 

{¶ 3} The essence of relator’s claim is that he lacks “minimum contacts” with the 

State of Ohio such that the respondents’ exercise of personal jurisdiction over him offends 

constitutional guarantees of due process. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 

U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (establishing minimum contacts test). In 

February 2019, after the juvenile court found S.N.W. to be a dependent child, relator 

began to assert challenges to the juvenile court’s personal jurisdiction. This action, filed 

on July 11, 2022, is his latest attempt to contest the matter. 

{¶ 4} On August 9, 2022, the respondents moved to dismiss this action pursuant 

to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). This court overruled the motion. Relator’s pro se complaint was hard 

to decipher, but we could not exclude the possibility that, presuming the factual 

allegations to be true and making all reasonable inferences in his favor, relator might 

prevail on the merits. See, e.g., Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn., Ohio Conference v. Ohio Bur. 

of Emp. Servs., 83 Ohio St.3d 179, 181, 699 N.E.2d 64 (1998). Further, we did not 

possess the evidence necessary to determine how the juvenile court had acquired 

personal jurisdiction over the relator. Our review was limited to the complaint and the 

materials appended thereto. See, e.g., Thomas v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., Inc., 2011-

Ohio-6712, 969 N.E.2d 1284, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.). Thus, we ordered the respondents to file an 

answer, which they filed on September 8, 2022.

{¶ 5} Subsequently, on September 13, 2022, we ordered the parties to submit 

evidence and brief the merits. The parties have submitted their evidence and their briefs. 

Therefore, the matter is ripe for our consideration.
Writ of Prohibition Elements

{¶ 6} A writ of prohibition is "‘an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of 

superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior tribunal commanding it to cease abusing 

or usurping judicial functions.’" State ex rel. Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 73, 701 

N.E.2d 1002 (1998), quoting State ex rel. Burtzlaff v. Vickery, 121 Ohio St. 49, 50, 166 

N.E. 894 (1929). For a writ of prohibition to issue, a relator must establish that (1) the trial 

judge has exercised judicial power or is about to do so; (2) the trial judge lacks authority 

to exercise that power; and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for which no 

adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Sponaugle v. Hein, 

153 Ohio St.3d 560, 2018-Ohio-3155, 108 N.E.3d 1089, ¶ 23. If the trial judge's lack of 

jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous, a relator does not need to establish that there is 

a lack of an adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Ford v. Ruehlman, 149 Ohio St.3d 34, 

2016-Ohio-3529, 73 N.E.3d 396, ¶ 62. Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of 

jurisdiction, a relator's ability to appeal generally bars relief in prohibition. Johnson v. 

Sloan, 154 Ohio St.3d 476, 2018-Ohio-2120, 116 N.E.3d 91, ¶ 24.

Burden of Proof

{¶ 7} Y.A.B., as the relator, has the burden of proving his claim by clear and 

convincing evidence. State ex rel. Federle v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Elections, 156 Ohio St.3d 

322, 2019-Ohio-849, 126 N.E.3d 1091, ¶ 10. “The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 

Clause ‘limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a 

nonresident defendant.’" LG Chem, Ltd. v. Goulding, 167 Ohio St.3d 488, 2022-Ohio2065, 194 N.E.3d 355, ¶ 12, quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 

U.S. 286, 291, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). Nevertheless, only in “extremely 
rare cases” will a writ of prohibition issue based on a lack of personal jurisdiction over a 

non-resident defendant. State ex rel. Suburban Constr. Co. v. Skok, 85 Ohio St.3d 645, 

647, 710 N.E.2d 710 (1999). There must be a “‘complete failure to comply with 

constitutional due process’” for the writ to issue. Id., quoting Fraiberg v. Cuyahoga Cty. 

Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Div., 76 Ohio St.3d 374, 378, 667 N.E.2d 

1189 (1996). 

The Evidence

{¶ 8} With respect to the presentation of evidence, “[t]he admission or exclusion of 

relevant evidence is within the court’s sound discretion.” State ex rel. Dawson v. BloomCarroll Local School Dist., 131 Ohio St.3d 10, 2011-Ohio-6009, 959 N.E.2d 524, ¶ 18, 

citing State ex rel. Gilbert v. Cincinnati, 125 Ohio St.3d 385, 2010-Ohio-1473, 928 N.E.2d 

706, ¶ 35. Ordinarily, “[t]he evidence in an original action, except habeas corpus, shall be 

submitted to the court by means of an agreed statement of facts, stipulations, depositions, 

interrogatories, requests for reproduction of documents, and requests for admissions.” 

Loc.App.R. 8(E). In this case, the evidence is limited to a collection of records of the 

juvenile court in Case Nos. 2016-1971 and 2018-5826.1

{¶ 9} The respondents have submitted what they assert to be the complete record 

in the two juvenile court cases. Relator submitted a smaller sample of records from the 

same cases. Although the parties did not formally stipulate to the evidence in this matter, 

no objection has been raised to our consideration of all the records. Therefore, in our 

1 Relator’s complaint was not verified and, therefore, does not constitute 

evidentiary material. See Johnson v. Clark Cty. Aud., 2020-Ohio-3201, 155 N.E.3d 199, 

¶ 39 (2d Dist.) (complaint and attached exhibits, which were verified by an affidavit, were 

properly before the trial court for purposes of summary judgment motion).
discretion, we evaluate relator’s claim using the entire evidentiary record. Compare State 

ex rel. Spencer v. E. Liverpool Planning Comm., 80 Ohio St.3d 297, 301, 685 N.E.2d 

1251 (1997) (“the court of appeals may consider evidence other than that listed in Civ.R. 

56 when there is no objection”) with State ex rel. Harris v. Capizzi, 2d Dist. Montgomery 

No. 29278, 2022-Ohio-3661 (exhibits attached to the complaint and motion to dismiss did 

not constitute evidence at the merits stage when no other evidence was submitted despite 

the parties’ reliance on them).

Analysis

{¶ 10} We note here that relator’s brief does not make use of the evidentiary record 

to support his legal argument. Indeed, the brief does not advance beyond the bald 

assertion of a lack of minimum contacts found in relator’s initial pleading. Much of the 

brief is filled with sovereign citizen arguments that merit (and receive) no consideration at 

all. See State v. Few, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25969, 2015-Ohio-2292, ¶ 6 (rejecting 

appellant's "sovereign citizen" arguments as "wholly frivolous"). In contrast, the 

respondents have demonstrated that the evidence supports their argument that their 

exercise of personal jurisdiction over the relator is authorized by law. 2

{¶ 11} The evidence reflects that on March 28, 2016, in Case No. 2016-1971, the

juvenile court registered and adopted an administrative support order filed by the 

Montgomery County Child Support Enforcement Agency. The administrative order 

establishes child support with respect to S.N.W. and designates relator as the obligor. 

The order includes a unique numerical identifier, a SETS number. Further, the order 

2 Relator is generally referred to as E.E.W., Jr., in the juvenile court records except 

those records he submitted pro se to the court. The name Y.A.B. does not appear in the 

juvenile court records until November 2019. 
specifically states that on December 11, 2015, relator “executed the Waiver of Service 

consenting to notice of these proceedings by regular mail at the address [he] provided.” 

Relator’s address in Dayton, Ohio, appears on the administrative support order. 

{¶ 12} The juvenile court records also include the waiver itself. Relator’s “Waiver 

of Service for Administrative Paternity Hearing and Support Establishment Hearing and 

Notice of Objection Process” is dated December 11, 2015. The waiver explains that the 

Montgomery County Child Support Enforcement Agency seeks to establish paternity and 

support with respect to relator’s unborn child. The waiver also includes information about 

a putative father’s rights to object to paternity test results and, if applicable, the 

establishment of an administrative child support order. The waiver states that relator 

understood and agreed that if a support hearing is scheduled, notice of that hearing would 

be mailed to his address, as listed on the waiver. The waiver further reads: “I have read 

this waiver or had this waiver read to me. By signing I affirm that I understand and agree 

with the contents of this waiver.” The waiver appears to be signed by the relator. His

Dayton, Ohio, address and the SETS number both appear on the waiver.

{¶ 13} All this evidence supports the respondents’ argument that relator was an 

Ohio resident, living in Dayton, at the time the child support order was established. There 

is no evidence in the record to support a claim that relator was a non-resident of Ohio 

when the support order was established. Thus, an analysis of minimum contacts with the 

forum, essential to a court’s personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, is not 
applicable. It cannot be doubted that the juvenile court possessed personal jurisdiction 

over the relator, an Ohio resident, when the support order was established.3

{¶ 14} Further, there is no evidence in the record to support a claim that the 

respondents lack continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify and enforce relator’s child 

support obligation in Case No. 2018-5826. See R.C. 3115.202 (duration of personal 

jurisdiction); R.C. 3115.205 (continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify child-support 

order); R.C. 3115.206 (continuing jurisdiction to enforce child-support order). Thus, the 

evidence does not clearly and convincingly support relator’s claim that the juvenile court 

lacks authority to modify or enforce his obligation to support S.N.W. Accordingly, a writ of 

prohibition will not issue against the respondents.

{¶ 15} We offer a final consideration before concluding this decision: relator had 

an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to contest the juvenile court’s exercise 

of personal jurisdiction. A writ of prohibition is not a substitute for appeal. State ex rel. 

Berger v. McMonagle, 6 Ohio St.3d 28, 30, 451 N.E.2d 225 (1983). The juvenile court 

record reflects that relator did not file objections to the March 28, 2016, order establishing 

his child support obligation, nor did he file a notice of appeal. We decline to issue a writ 

when relator could have availed himself of the remedy of direct appeal.

3 Were the matter in doubt, we might find that relator has waived any challenge to 

the respondents’ exercise of jurisdiction, but we need not make that determination. See

Mayhew v. Yova, 11 Ohio St.3d 154, 156, 464 N.E.2d 538 (1984) (a court can obtain 

personal jurisdiction through service of process, a voluntary appearance, or a waiver). 

Relator’s December 11, 2015, waiver of service reads, in pertinent part: “I voluntarily 

submit to Ohio jurisdiction and waive any contest to personal jurisdiction per ORC 

3115.03 and ORC 3115.07.”
Conclusion

{¶ 16} For all the foregoing reasons, relator has not proven that the 

respondents have completely failed to comply with constitutional due process by clear 

and convincing evidence. 

{¶ 17} This action, Montgomery County Appellate Case No. 29529, is 

DISMISSED. 

{¶ 18} Writ of prohibition DENIED. Costs taxed to the relator.

SO ORDERED.

JEFFREY M. WELBAUM, PRESIDING JUDGE

MICHAEL L. TUCKER, JUDGE

RONALD C. LEWIS, JUDGE

To The Clerk: Within three (3) days of entering this judgment on the journal, you 

are directed to serve on all parties not in default for failure to appear notice of the judgment 

and the date of its entry upon the journal, pursuant to Civ.R. 58(B).

JEFFREY M. WELBAUM, PRESIDING JUDGE