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i 

87–863 2014

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–100] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR 

AND LAND FORCES HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2015 GROUND FORCE 

MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 2, 2014 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois 

PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

JOHN WASON, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

JULIE HERBERT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, April 2, 2014, Fiscal Year 2015 Ground Force Modernization 

Programs ............................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, April 2, 2014 ....................................................................................... 21 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2014 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 GROUND FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ................................................ 2 

Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ...................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Barclay LTG James O., III, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G– 

8; accompanied by MG Michael E. Williamson, USA, Military Deputy to 

the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) ................................................................................................................... 4 

Dee, Tom, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Expeditionary Programs 

and Logistics Management .................................................................................. 6 

Walters, LtGen Glenn M., USMC, Deputy Commandant for Programs and 

Resources .............................................................................................................. 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Barclay LTG James O., III, joint with MG Michael E. Williamson ............. 25 

Walters, LtGen Glenn M., joint with Tom Dee .............................................. 38 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 57 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Enyart ........................................................................................................ 64 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 61 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 GROUND FORCE MODERNIZATION 

PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 2, 2014. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:18 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R. Turner 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. The hearing of the Subcommittee on Tactical Air 

and Land Forces will come to order on ground and rotorcraft force 

modernization programs. 

The subcommittee meets to receive testimony on the Army and 

Marine Corps modernization requests for fiscal year 2015. 

I want to welcome our witnesses: Lieutenant General James Barclay, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G–8; Major General Michael Williamson, Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the 

Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology); Mr. Tom Dee, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Expeditionary Programs and 

Logistic Management; and Lieutenant General Glenn Walters, 

United States Marine Corps, Deputy Commandant for Programs 

and Resources. 

General Barclay, it is nice to see you again. 

General Williamson, congratulations on your new position. I understand you will be pinning on your third star in just a couple of 

days. 

Thank you all for your service, and we look forward to your testimony. 

Today, we will cover a broad portfolio of modernization programs, 

to include ground combat systems, tactical vehicles, rotorcraft, and 

individual gear such as body armor. 

Based on this current fiscal environment, the military services 

are having to accept greater risk in modernization programs in the 

near term. That is the new fiscal reality. Programs that were top 

priorities a year ago are now being terminated or delayed, and 

modernization portfolios are being significantly restructured. 

This hearing will provide an opportunity for our witnesses to inform us of the many challenges they are facing in acquisition and 

industrial base management. 

We all know that when the military goes into harm’s way that 

they fight in a joint environment. In other words, the full power of 
2 

all the services come together in order to accomplish our national 

security objectives. 

What is less understood, especially outside the jurisdictions of 

the defense committees, is how the services depend on each other 

from an industrial base perspective, especially for ground, rotorcraft, and individual equipment platforms such as body armor. 

For example, decisions that the Army makes about Abrams 

tanks or Stryker combat vehicles could affect the Marine Corps 

ACV [Amphibious Combat Vehicle] program. Decisions the Navy 

makes about Black Hawk helicopters could affect how the Army is 

procuring helicopters. All the military services are dependent upon 

the same body-armor and tactical-wheeled-vehicle industrial bases. 

The point I am making is that certainly Congress takes criticism 

for the perceived parochial support of one platform over another, 

but the reality is, although we certainly support American jobs in 

our districts, the bigger picture of concern and oversight isn’t about 

the survival of one platform versus another; it is about, what capabilities does an Army Brigade Combat Team or Marine Expeditionary Brigade need in order to meet the needs of our commandant commanders so that they can meet our national security 

requirements? 

It is within that context, once we understand the threats and required capabilities, that we then must understand what industrial 

base capability is needed now and in the future in order to provide 

the right capability to our military at the right time. 

I want to highlight this point about our defense industrial base 

because I believe there is a general misunderstanding outside of 

those who serve our defense committees. This industrial base cannot be turned on and off like a light switch. And it is the purview 

of this committee and our subcommittee’s responsibilities to look 

into the industrial base and find ways that we need to preserve the 

industrial base for the service of all of our service branches. 

We all understand that sequestration is still the law, but my concern is that if we don’t like what is reflected in this year’s budget 

request, we are certainly going to be facing even more difficulty in 

the upcoming year. This is part of our challenge and part of our 

discussion today and the questions that we will be having of this 

panel. 

I want to thank each of you for being here and for your expertise 

as we look to the issues of not only what do each of the service 

branches need, what is the industrial base that supports them, and 

what is the interconnectivity of that industrial base and how it 

needs to be preserved. 

With that, I turn to Ms. Sanchez for her remarks. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, everybody, for being here today. 

Today’s hearing, of course, will cover our Army and Marine 

Corps ground system modernization programs. And this is a broad 

range of topics, covering everything from individual equipment 

such as body armor, Abrams tanks, Stryker vehicles. 
3 

However, in looking at the fiscal year 2015 budget, I do see some 

general trends, many of them which are troubling to me. 

First, it is clear that the modernization of the Army and the Marine Corps ground equipment is under serious budget pressure. 

And it looks to me as if these accounts are becoming the bill payer 

for both services’ overall budget shortfalls. 

With only a few exceptions, almost every major program in this 

area has been scaled back, delayed, or terminated, in large part, 

I believe, because of a lack of funding. For example, the Army is 

terminating the Ground Combat Vehicle program, delaying its 

high-priority tactical network programs, dramatically scaling back 

wheeled vehicle upgrades, and slowing down production of Apache 

attack helicopters. 

The Marines: Purchases of new Joint Light Tactical Vehicles 

[JLTV] are delayed. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle program is 

being scaled back. And I don’t see a lot of new investment in most 

areas. 

And the second trend that I see is both services’ ability to actually field new systems through the normal acquisition process. In 

the area of large-scale acquisition, Category I programs, we continue to start things with a big fanfare, and then we end up terminating because of cost growth, because of changing priorities, because of shifting service requirements. 

And, in addition, constantly changing senior service leadership 

priorities appear to be making it very difficult for the respective 

service acquisition officials to keep programs funded in the budget 

long enough to actually see these new capabilities in the field. As 

a result, both the Army and the Marine Corps keep funding new 

programs but don’t seem to get those programs across the finish 

line. 

And you know the examples. In the Army, the termination of the 

Ground Combat Vehicle was the most recent example, where we 

spent more than a billion dollars and we have nothing to show for 

it. The Marine Corps has spent more than $3 billion over 20 years 

trying to field a vehicle to replace the current Amphibious Assault 

Vehicle, but we still haven’t gotten anything new for our Marines. 

The third trend I see which is disturbing is the needless duplication between the Army and Marine Corps equipment. To name a 

few, both the Marine Corps and the Army are working on separate 

multi-mission radar systems, separate precision mortar rounds, 

and separate 120-millimeter tank ammunition. 

The Army and the Marine Corps also don’t use the same helicopters, despite obvious similarities between the missions that they 

conduct with these helicopter fleets. One example is the fact that 

the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy all use UH–60 Black Hawk 

helicopters of various models, but the Marine Corps continues to 

request hundreds of millions for upgrades to its aging fleet of 

H–1 helicopters. 

And, in some cases, I am sure that duplication or differences in 

equipment are appropriate and necessary, but I think that there 

may be a way in which, if we are really looking for moneys, we 

should work more closely together on that. 
4 

I don’t want to end on a sour note, because I am certainly a pretty big optimist, so I will just say that there are some areas where 

I have seen success. 

Body armor, as you know, has been a big priority in looking at 

and being on this committee. So in the area of body armor and protective equipment, both the Army and the Marine Corps now have 

well-established research and development efforts and a healthy inventory of high-quality equipment. But I remain concerned of the 

ability for the services to maintain those investments in protective 

equipment. 

Both services have also done a good job while keeping the Joint 

Light Tactical Vehicle program on track. It is a model of how competition and stable requirements and thorough testing can lead to 

successful acquisition programs. 

So, you know, I know I am going to have some questions because 

these trends, for me, are a little alarming, but I look forward to today’s hearing. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

We will turn to General Barclay, who will then be followed by 

Mr. Dee and General Walters. 

General Barclay. 

STATEMENT OF LTG JAMES O. BARCLAY III, USA, DEPUTY 

CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY, G–8; ACCOMPANIED BY MG 

MICHAEL E. WILLIAMSON, USA, MILITARY DEPUTY TO THE 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY) 

General BARCLAY. Sir, Chairman Turner, Congresswoman 

Sanchez, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I would like 

to thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Army’s fiscal year 

2015 President’s budget request as it pertains to the Army modernization program. 

On behalf of our Secretary, the Honorable John McHugh, and 

our Chief of Staff, General Ray Odierno, Major General Williamson 

and myself look forward to discussing the Army’s fiscal year 2015 

modernization budget. 

Over the past 3 years, the Army has absorbed several budgetary 

reductions in the midst of conducting operations overseas and rebalancing the force for a wider array of missions called for by the 

President’s defense strategy. And during this period of fiscal and 

strategic uncertainty, our goal has been to maintain the proper balance between end strength, readiness, and modernization across 

the Total Army. 

We are reducing our end strength as rapidly and as responsibly 

as possible, while at the same time doing our best to meet our 

operational requirements. Additionally, we need to concentrate 

funds on rebuilding readiness at the same time. However, to do 

this, we must accept greater risk in our modernization programs in 

the near term. 

As a result of this, the research, development, and acquisition investments have declined 37 percent since the fiscal year 2012 budget planning cycle. Historically, the Army’s RDA [Research, Development and Acquisition] account has averaged about 22 percent of its 
5 

obligation authority, and for fiscal year 2015, the RDA account is 

at 17 percent, or about $20 billion of obligation authority. 

And regardless of the austere fiscal conditions, it remains the 

Army’s responsibility to ensure every soldier deployed is equipped 

to achieve decisive overmatch. And to do this, the Army has developed several initiatives that guide equipment modernization. 

We are using incremental improvements to modernize our critical systems, and we will build new systems only by exception. We 

are divesting older systems and niche capabilities to decrease the 

sustainment cost and generate additional resources that we can invest in our modernization and readiness posture. 

We are also procuring smaller quantities, because the Army cannot afford to equip and sustain the entire force with the most advanced equipment. And we are focusing our science and technology 

investments where we are technology makers and reducing the 

S&T where we are the technology takers. 

These guiding principles ensure the Army will maximize every 

dollar towards putting the best equipment in the hands of our soldiers. 

First and foremost, the soldier and the squad is the centerpiece 

of Army equipment modernization, from which we build outward 

by enabling them with the network and key equipment. And within 

this year’s budget request, we seek to empower and unburden the 

soldier through funding for enhanced weapon capabilities, nextgeneration optics and night-vision devices, and advanced body 

armor and individual protection equipment. 

We will modernize the network to improve soldier decisionmaking with information and connectivity down to the lowest tactical level. Our priorities include the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical [WIN–T] systems, the family of network radios, and 

the Joint Battle Command-Platform. Investments in the network, 

however, are not untouched by resource constraints. And, as a result, we will delay a portion of our WIN–T Increment 3 and reduce 

investments in the tactical radio systems. 

We are committed to developing and fielding the Armored Multipurpose Vehicle to replace our obsolete M113 family of vehicles and 

augmenting our wheeled fleet through the Joint Light Tactical family of vehicles, the JLTV. 

We also have the Paladin Integrated Management remaining a 

significant priority. And we will continue funding a third brigade 

set of double-V hull Strykers while supporting incremental upgrades to existing double-V hull power and mobility. 

A new infantry fighting vehicle remains a key requirement for 

the Army. However, due to significant fiscal constraints, the Department will conclude the Ground Combat Vehicle program upon 

completion of the technology demonstration phase, expected in 

June of 2014. 

Instead, the Army will now focus its efforts on refining concepts, 

requirements, and key technologies in support of a future infantry 

fighting vehicle. This will include investment in vehicle components, subsystem prototypes, and technology demonstrators. In the 

distant future, we anticipate initiating a new combat vehicle program informed by these efforts as resources become available. 
6 

The Army will also restructure aviation formations to achieve a 

leaner, more efficient and capable force that balances operational 

capability and flexibility across the Total Army. 

The Army National Guard will transfer all AH–64 Apache helicopters to the Active Army, where they will be teamed with unmanned systems for armed reconnaissance and continued traditional attack role. 

The Active Army will transfer 111 UH–60 Black Hawk helicopters to the Army National Guard, which will significantly improve its capabilities for support of civil authorities, homeland defense, and disaster response. 

The UH–72 Lakota will replace the TH–67 training helicopter 

fleet. We will divest almost 900 legacy helicopters, including the 

entire Kiowa Warrior and TH–67 training helicopter fleets. 

The Active Army’s overall helicopter fleet will decline by 23 percent, almost 700 helicopters, while the Army National Guard’s fleet 

will decline by 8 percent. The resulting Active and Reserve Component force mix will result in better and more capable formations 

which are able to respond to contingencies at home and abroad. 

And, in closing, we are adjusting to those resources that have 

been cut, which means we must accept greater risk in our Army 

modernization. The Army’s ability to modernize equipment relies 

on sufficient, consistent funding. While the Bipartisan Budget Act 

of 2013 provided greater budget certainty for fiscal year 2014 and 

2015, reductions in the modernization accounts continue to challenge the Army. 

And the forecast in the future beyond 2015 is questionable. Without Congress’ intervention, sequestration-level budget caps will return in fiscal year 2016 and impose greater risk on Army equipment modernization, leaving our soldiers less prepared in an unpredictable world. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, again, thank you 

for your steadfast and generous support of our outstanding men 

and women in the United States Army and the Army civilians and 

their families, and we look forward to your questions today. 

Thank you. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Barclay and General 

Williamson can be found in the Appendix on page 25.] 

Mr. TURNER. General, thank you for your very clear statement. 

Those are very particular words that I think charge us. 

We are going to go to Mr. Dee and then come back to General 

Walters. 

STATEMENT OF TOM DEE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 

THE NAVY, EXPEDITIONARY PROGRAMS AND LOGISTICS 

MANAGEMENT 

Mr. DEE. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to address the Marine Corps 

ground force modernization and the acquisition programs that support the future capabilities of our Marines. 

Lieutenant General Walters and I have submitted a joint statement for the record, so, with your permission, I will be very brief 

in my opening remarks. 
7 

As you have pointed out, the fiscal environment resulting from 

the BCA [Budget Control Act], although mitigated somewhat in the 

near term by the Bipartisan Budget Act, has presented us with 

challenges as we plan for and execute the modernization of our 

ground force. 

Given the Marine Corps role as America’s expeditionary force in 

readiness, we necessarily place a priority on current readiness and 

crisis response. Nevertheless, our capability-development community and our programmers, led by General Walters, diligently strive 

to appropriately balance the varied Marine Corps capability portfolios within the available resources provided to them. 

Similarly, the Marine Corps acquisition community diligently endeavors to squeeze every dime out of every dollar and deliver the 

very best warfighting capabilities for the least cost. In the service 

with the smallest investment account, there is no alternative. 

And we are proud of what our acquisition Marines have accomplished this past year. 

Under program leadership of the Army, the Joint Light Tactical 

Vehicle team was recognized by USD(AT&L) [Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics] with the David 

Packard Excellence in Acquisition Award for its success at reducing 

both development and procurement costs while also reducing schedule. JLTV is on schedule to begin production in 2015. 

Our G/ATOR, Ground/Air Task-Oriented Radar, program successfully completed its developmental testing and is preparing for 

its first LRIP [low-rate initial production] contract award with an 

IOC [initial operating capability] in fiscal year 2017. 

We went into full production and began fleet delivery of the Enhanced Combat Helmet, which delivers the best-performing protective capability per ounce of any helmet ever fielded. 

We completed intensive and very deep technical and cost analysis of our ACV program, providing Marine Corps leadership with 

the detailed and objective information that they needed to decide 

the future shape of the Marine Corps’ top ground program priority. 

And in partnership with the Navy, our CH–53 Kilo is on schedule to record its first flight this year. And when it achieves IOC in 

fiscal year 2019, it will triple the external lift capacity of the legacy 

CH–53 Echo. 

So, although just a few examples of the efforts of the Navy and 

the Marine Corps acquisition force, often in partnership with the 

Army, they are representative of the diligence with which the acquisition force strives to achieve the very most with every dollar 

that the American taxpayer, as represented by this committee, entrusts to us. 

So thank you for this opportunity to appear today, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Dee and General Walters 

can be found in the Appendix on page 38.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

General Walters. 
8 

STATEMENT OF LTGEN GLENN M. WALTERS, USMC, DEPUTY 

COMMANDANT FOR PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES 

General WALTERS. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez, 

distinguished members, it is my pleasure to speak to you today regarding the Marine Corps’ modernization efforts. 

Throughout our 238-year history, the Marine Corp has answered 

our Nation’s call to be the most ready when the Nation is least 

ready. Today, we operate freely throughout the world, responding 

to the wide spectrum of threats, doing so from the sea, oftentimes 

in austere environments. 

Our ability to deploy at a moment’s notice is supported by our 

investment in modernization—modernized equipment. We see this 

not just as buying new equipment but as an investment in our Marines, our most important resource. When our Marines have the 

best, most modern equipment, they can meet every mission we give 

to them. Through the generosity of Congress, much of what the 

Marines deploy with today is the best and most modern equipment. 

Over the past decade of combat, the cost to equip a Marine has 

increased by almost six times, but we are providing Marines with 

better equipment and more of it. In 2000, the basic set of equipment we sent Marines who deployed included 14 items totaling 

about $2,400 in today’s dollars. Today, Marines deploy with 45 

items that cost about $13,700. 

We have given the Marines more capability to operate, a radio 

set, an upgraded first aid kid, improved body armor, cold-weather 

gear, and the list goes on and on. 

We also recognize the importance of mobility through better performance and lighter weight for individual equipment. As we better 

equipped our Marines over the past decade, we have become mindful to find the right balance between performance, weight, and affordability. We have worked hand-in-hand with the Army to find 

the best solution, leveraging each other’s research and development 

efforts on individual protective equipment. 

We are currently working to field the Enhanced Combat Helmet, 

the Modular Scalable Protective System, and Improved Modular 

Tactical Vests. 

Even with a significantly modernized individual equipment set, 

many of our ground vehicles have been worn from over a decade 

of sustained conflict and have either been reset or will be reset over 

the next few years. Reset will provide a bridge until our major acquisition efforts begin to deliver significant quantities. 

As described in my prepared statement, our ground tactical vehicle portfolio will replace several aging platforms. Working with the 

Army, we continue to develop the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, replacing the Humvee. We are also replacing our 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicles [AAVs] with the Amphibious Combat Vehicle, or ACV, the Marine Corps’ top ground modernization priority. 

The program has been refined to reflect a family-of-systems approach that will permit amphibious operations rapidly from further 

offshore while enhancing protective mobility for the mission on 

land. We will do this in a phased approach in concert with a revision of our concept of operations for littoral maneuver. 
9 

The first phase will leverage work done on the earlier Marine 

Personnel Carrier program. We examined nondevelopmental 

wheeled combat vehicles that can provide several capabilities we 

desire: maneuverability, protection, and limited water mobility. 

In parallel with the development of the first phase, we will mitigate near-term risk in the high-end amphibious operations by fully 

funding survivability upgrades in a limited number of our AAVs. 

This will allow the AAV to serve as an effective bridge until it 

is replaced by the second phase of ACV. The effort will continue research and development to explore capabilities that will better enable us to conduct extended-range littoral maneuver from ship to 

shore. 

As we have modified our ACV program, our necessity for lift by 

sea or by air for our ground vehicle portfolio remains constant. For 

our aviation programs, that means following through on our 

multiyear procurement of the MV–22 and continuing research and 

development of the CH–53K Heavy Lift Replacement program. For fiscal year 2015, we are requesting $1.53 billion to procure 

19 MV–22s. For the entire multiyear procurement program, we will 

be purchasing 93 and saving approximately $1 billion when compared to single-year procurements. For the CH–53K, we are requesting $573 million. That will continue EMD, engineering and manufacturing development. The dollars will be used to continue development test flights, deliver the 

final engineering development model aircraft, and start assembly of 

four systems demonstration test articles. 

All of these investments are critical to the Marine Corps’ ability 

to maintain near-term readiness. However, full implementation of 

sequester-level caps outlined in the Budget Control Act will force 

us into a less ready force while also imposing severe restrictions on 

our modernization efforts. We are proud of our reputation of frugality and remain one of the best values for the defense dollar, but 

we will sacrifice our modernization in order to be the most ready 

Marine Corps for the Nation. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Walters and Mr. Dee 

can be found in the Appendix on page 38.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, General. 

General Williamson, again, congratulations on your upcoming 

third star. 

I have a relatively long question, but it is just one. And I will 

limit myself to one, because there is a relatively long statement in 

setting up the question. 

But before I do, I would certainly want to acknowledge and 

thank again General Barclay for your comments on the budgetary 

challenges, your statement of ‘‘during this period of fiscal and strategic uncertainty.’’ 

The fiscal uncertainty is obviously something that we should be 

tackling. Strategic uncertainty, we will never be able to determine 

what those who might threaten us do, but the issue of fiscal uncertainty is something that we are imposing upon ourselves—not just 

lower numbers, but the issue of uncertainty. 

And I appreciate your calling on Congress to give you that certainty and address the issue of sequestration in 2016. You should 
10 

not be facing either a cliff coming after 2015, making you cut a 

glide path through 2015, nor should you be facing the threat of 

what everyone has testified before this entire committee and subcommittee as being unacceptable levels of funding in which our 

military would not be able to function and would significantly damage readiness. 

General Williamson, the question of uncertainty also falls upon 

our industrial base. Because, as your posture is uncertain, then it 

falls upon the industrial base for uncertainty. And that affects investment, that affects employees, people in even their personal 

plans. 

But I would like to take a moment to elaborate just a little more 

on one of the industrial base concerns that I have and that I raised 

during my opening statement. 

As you know, Congress has leaned forward on many critical national security issues that have included providing additional funding beyond what the Department of Defense [DOD] has requested 

for current operations. We have done so in body armor; up-armored 

Humvees; Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected Vehicles, or MRAPs; 

and critical ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] capabilities. All these come to mind in areas where Congress has 

leaned in and increased the funding above what the Department of 

Defense has requested that all came out to be critical capabilities. 

In many cases, the requirement process hadn’t caught up and 

validated the need for this funding, but ultimately these congressional actions proved to be invaluable in addressing the needs of 

the warfighter. It is in this context that the committee views previous initiatives directed at the industrial base for the Abrams 

tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and Stryker Combat Vehicles, as 

well as others. 

Take the Joint Systems Manufacturing Center, JSMC, at Lima 

as an example. Now, this is not in my congressional district, but 

it is in Ohio and I do have familiarity with it. 

Last year, the Army testified that it was not their intent to close 

this facility. The Army indicated that the real issue was based on 

constrained resources, and they were going to rely on foreign military sales [FMS] alone to keep the facility viable until the next 

major Abrams tank upgrade came along in 2019. 

Because of the uncertainty in foreign military sales, Congress 

took the position that foreign military sales alone was an unacceptable level of risk. So the Army and Congress were agreeing that 

the facility should not close, but Congress and the Army were in 

disagreement as to whether or not the foreign military sales alone 

would be sufficient to keep the facility open. 

To be fair, the Army has taken considerable strides in addressing 

some of the committee’s concerns. For example, with this budget 

request, the Army has moved the next major series of upgrades to 

some of their major weapons systems, called engineering change 

proposals, or ECPs, from 2019 to 2017, which, by the way, is something that this committee recommended last year. 

I am still concerned about the timing of when some of the foreign 

military sales funding will be available, and we are taking a close 

look at that. But I am glad to see that the Army is now taking 

positive actions in better managing its industrial base. Again, the 
11 

industrial base cannot be flipped on and off like a switch. And if 

we disagree as to the certainty or uncertainty of foreign military 

sales, then the outcome could be incredibly detrimental to our industrial base. 

However, I am still wondering if there aren’t things that we can 

do or things that you could do with our help that are acquisitionreform-related, as opposed to just looking at the issue of is your 

number right or is our number right. 

For example, it is my understanding that when a foreign government wants to buy Abrams tanks using FMS funding that they are 

required to pay a usage fee, which is sent directly to the U.S. 

Treasury. 

Now, I asked why these funds can’t be kept at the facility, with 

the production base support funding line versus facility maintenance, which then could be used for such things as critical safety 

and environmental deficiencies requirements. My understanding is 

that the Department’s position is the government may not retain 

proceeds, either in the form of credits or cash, from the rental of 

government property. To allow the Army, in this case, to retain the 

process would be an improper augmentation of its funds and a violation of Title 31 U.S. Code, Section 3302(b), which I am certain 

you are more familiar with than I am, which is also called the 

‘‘miscellaneous receipts’’ statute. 

I am still in the process of gaining more information about this 

subject and how it crosses the committee’s jurisdiction, but it seems 

to me interesting that if we are going to look to foreign military 

sales to support our industrial base, that it is odd that we should 

also look to foreign military sales as a revenue source that supports 

other areas of the government than our defense posture. 

So my question gets to this: During this limited resource environment, how can we find more efficient ways to utilize the commercial sector, the depots, and government-owned, contractor-operated 

facilities such as the Joint Systems Manufacturing Center so we 

can try to avoid these spikes and peaks? And they will continue to 

put these critical facilities at risk. And do you have thoughts as to 

what should we be doing in acquisition reform so that we can get 

beyond the lever of on and off or the lever between your number 

and our number? 

General. 

General WILLIAMSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question. 

And so there are a couple parts to the answer, but I want to start 

with one of the comments that you made, and that is this notion 

of risk. 

So when you start to have a conversation about the industrial 

base, you have to understand really where the risks lie. And what 

has to happen at this point is that we can’t offer a solution that 

just relies on FMS, as you have stated, but I believe there has to 

be a three-pronged attack on this. 

One, FMS provides us a lot of capability, and it is important in 

terms of adding that capacity, that work into our industrial base. 

So it is an answer. And I would be the first to tell you, having dealt 

with FMS, foreign military sales, directly for the last year, that not 

all FMS cases come through. And so I acknowledge that. And so 

that can’t be the only plan. 
12 

The second part, though, I would offer is, there are some efficiencies that we probably need to look at. So when I talked about 

risk earlier, the thing that we have to identify is, where is the risk? 

Is that in the skill sets, critical skill sets? Is that in the tooling and 

the special machinery that is used in these facilities? Is it a combination of the two? And so what do we have to do, what is the 

minimum level that we have to have operating at any of these facilities? 

And then, in terms of acquisition reform, one of the things we 

have to look at is, is there enough or is there too much specific 

statute, rules, police forces, where money can and cannot go, that 

adds to the overhead costs associated with running these facilities? 

But the good news, sir, is that this committee has asked us to look 

at acquisition reform, and so we are doing some research in that 

area. 

And so when you take a look at not only the research that has 

been done by the Department of Defense in their sector-by-sector, 

tier-by-tier study, what we had a third party do in the early A.T. 

Kearney results that help us to understand the industrial base, 

and then a third aspect where the AMC Commander, the Army 

Materiel Commander, General Via, and my boss, Ms. Shyu, have 

started to go to each facility to start to get detailed understanding 

of what are the cost drivers, what is causing the overhead costs, 

and where are there opportunities. 

I think as we work along all three of those fronts—leveraging 

FMS when it is available; we have done some things, as you have 

indicated, by ECPs where we have been able to smooth those peaks 

and valleys so that we can assure some level of work and some capacity throughout these facilities; and then, third, find opportunities where changes in some of our acquisition rules policy may 

allow us to reduce the overhead costs—I think these three things 

will help us in looking at not only the efficiency piece but also the 

effectivity. 

And so the combination of those things are what I believe will 

allow us to maintain these national assets. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. I look forward to continuing this discussion, because I think both your insight and the financial circumstance we are in just require that we pursue these and actually 

find solutions that we can implement. So thank you for your expertise. 

General WILLIAMSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. I will turn to my ranking member, Loretta Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Chairman Turner. 

And, again, thank you, gentlemen. 

This question is about body armor and the industrial base, because last year we tasked the Army with a review of the current 

body armor and soldier protection equipment and the industrial 

base and the outlook for future development and procurement— 

production and procurement. 

And the committee asked for this analysis based on the end of 

a large-scale—two wars, land wars, outfitting everybody, et cetera. 

And now we are looking at bringing back some of the end 

strength—bringing down some of the end strength, et cetera, and 
13 

body armor and what it is going to look like and how we are going 

to procure it. 

The briefing that was provided to Congress painted a mixed picture. On one hand, it showed that the Army has a solid plan to invest about $178 million in research and development over the next 

5 years and that it is also starting a new program, the Soldier Protection System, to integrate new protective equipment. However, 

the briefing also pointed out that there is probably not enough 

funding in the budget for procurement of the new body armor to 

keep the two current domestic producers or vendors that we have 

producing this. 

So my question is, how much additional funding would we need, 

in your opinion, in this fiscal year 2015 to keep both of these vendors in production? And, in your opinion, is it good to have that 

competition going or have these two vendors going? And if we went 

down to just one vendor, will that make it more difficult in the future if we have to ramp up in the way that we needed to do for 

Iraq and Afghanistan? 

General WILLIAMSON. Ma’am, so I would like to start by saying, 

the answer for me is that competition is always better. And so, 

maintaining an industrial base that provides us with choice is obviously going to help us to get a better price. 

The challenge that I have in this case is really tied to the item. 

And so you have to look at this, kind of, from two lenses. The first 

lens is from an RDT&E [research, development, test and evaluation] look. So our drive is, how do you improve the protection level 

of that equipment and, at the same time, how do we drive the cost 

down and the weight down? 

So if you look from 2007 to 2014, there has been a significant 

drop in weight and increase in protection. And what has allowed 

us to do that is the investment in the research and development 

and the ability for people, organizations, companies, vendors to 

manufacture. And so we have to have both of those capabilities. 

But the first question that I ask to the folks who do the work 

here is, I don’t understand—tell me what happens when you store, 

for instance, that body armor. And so, how quickly do you see deterioration? How fast do we have to recycle and replace? So, obviously, there are those things that are damaged, lost, that you have 

to do replacement, but is there some life expectancy for this material that affects its protection capability? 

And so, understanding all of those pieces of the set that we have 

today, the set that we are going to need in the future and the ability for industry to manufacture that, helps us to shape our engagement with the vendor community. And so I think my short answer 

is that, obviously, I would like to maintain that competition. The 

challenge, as you indicated, though, is the funding level associated 

with the procurement of additional sets and our ability to use 

those. 

We have asked the PO [Program Office] to conduct that study. 

They are starting to get some of the feedback from that. And I 

would be happy to bring that information in to you as we get 

smarter on what the industrial base looks like and the capacity 

that is required as we deal with the risk that we know today and 

expected risk. 
14 

Ms. SANCHEZ. General, before we worked on this body-armor 

issue here on the committee, we had the body-armor issue of just 

our regular law enforcement folks; you know, our police departments and sheriffs, et cetera. And one of the things, you know, 

with respect to body armor, of course, is what kind of wear and 

tear does it take. In that case, we knew that, after 5 years, because 

of sweat and conditions and everything—you know, in fact, we 

passed a grant program that gave Federal funds to the police departments to actually procure body armor for their officers. 

So I think there is a lot of—and what they had is what we kind 

of started with in the military, but we have evolved so much, as 

you know, over the last 10 years, with wraparound and lighter. 

And so I think it is definitely something that we need to continue 

to work. 

And in the time that I have been on this committee looking at 

this issue, I certainly have seen several companies go out of business and drop off because they could not really compete with respect to the weight and the deterrent factor and the wraparound 

and everything. 

So I think we have at least two really, really good companies 

now, who I think will continue to try to outperform each other, and 

I do believe that that is better for us. But how we keep them alive 

during this time where we really don’t know if we will procure or 

not. 

So I go back to that question of, how much do you think in this 

budget that we are talking about would we need to take a look at 

or put in to ensure that at least these two companies stay on their 

feet to duke it out for a while? Do you have any estimate at all? 

And how long will that study that you are anticipating take before 

we will know? 

General WILLIAMSON. Ma’am, at this point, I don’t have a good 

number in terms of what it would take for the industrial base to 

keep two companies going. And so what I would ask is that I be 

given the opportunity to come back and give you some details on 

what we are finding. 

And, if I could, I would also just add that your comment about 

the police force and other organizations that use vests. The other 

aspect that we have to include is how do we capitalize that we are 

not the only organization that is procuring these? So, in addition 

to the other services, when you start to look at police forces and 

security forces, is there a way to leverage them in terms of us 

using the industry to help us drive down cost and, in addition, keep 

the industrial base going. 

And, if possible, I would like to come back and provide that information. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 57.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I will look forward to your ideas on that. Thank 

you—— 

General WILLIAMSON. Thank you, ma’am. 

Ms. SANCHEZ [continuing]. General. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Mr. Bridenstine. 
15 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Army’s artillery schoolhouse is in my State at Fort Sill. And 

I was wondering if you could comment, General Barclay and General Williamson, if you could comment on the Army’s commitment 

to the Paladin Integrated Management [PIM] System and, of 

course, modernization, in general, of artillery systems in the Army. 

General BARCLAY. Sir, I will take the first part, and then I will 

let Michael finish up with it. 

But I will tell you that the PIM—and, as you noticed, it was in 

my opening statement, and it is also in my written statement, 

about the importance of that program to—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I did notice. Thank you. 

General BARCLAY. That ought to tell you that that is one of our 

critical programs, along with the JLTV, that we know that we have 

to continue moving ahead on that. It is very critical to the operational impact but, also, as we look down the road of how we integrate across the different components of the Army. 

So from an operational perspective in equipment modernization, 

the PIM is one of our critical programs that we are continuing to 

push in the future. 

General WILLIAMSON. So, sir, I have to start by saying, as an air 

defense artillery officer, I also know that the school has moved up 

to Oklahoma. 

And here is where I would start. And that is, the PIM program 

is critically important for us. As you can see in the budget, we have 

invested substantial dollars in not only supporting that program 

from an RDT&E position, but what you really see in there is that 

we are starting to produce those PIMs, and you will see 66 of those 

coming off the line. 

And so I am impressed with the program. It is one of the programs that I would admit had a rocky start, but I would tell you 

now that it is performing very well. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. General, do you think it would be appropriate 

to do multiyear procurement of PIM for the purposes of getting it 

to the field sooner and at a lesser cost per unit? 

General BARCLAY. Sir, again, I think both of us will comment. I 

mean—but from a programming perspective, we have had great 

success in multiyear programs. And your support from Congress in 

allowing us to do that has allowed us to save a great bit of dollars. 

So far, most of those programs, as you know, have been in the 

aviation arena, on the multiyear. But in this era we are in, with 

fiscal uncertainty and reduced dollars, anything we can do. And if 

the multiyears allow us to continue modernization at the levels we 

know we need to, then I would say we will look at that every opportunity we get. 

General WILLIAMSON. Sir, the only thing I would add is, purely 

as an acquisition view, is that multiyear gives me a lot of leverage 

in a negotiation. And so, as you know, there are some rules that 

are applied, that we don’t do multiyears unless it returns a significant savings. And so the opportunities to use those we fully support. 

But, again, what I would offer is that the challenge we have is 

understanding the funding that would be available and to be able 

to steady-state that. But just like the question on competition, so 
16 

multiple vendors are a good thing; multiyear in the right negotiation is also a very good thing. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Roger that, gentlemen. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Williamson, again, congratulations on your third star. 

I want to talk to you a little bit about the procurement process, 

especially through the use of NGREA [National Guard and Reserve 

Equipment Account] funding. Can you tell me whether or not there 

has been a review of the validity of the plan that General Barclay 

put forward to transition—to move equipment such as the LUH– 

72s and the Apaches from the Guard to the Active Duty when 

those systems are either upgraded with NGREA funds or purchased, as in 2008 for the 72s, with NGREA funds? 

General BARCLAY. Ma’am, I will address, and then I will let 

Michael do it. 

But, first of all, we are taking or moving no LUHs out of the National Guard. Under this Aviation Restructure Initiative, all of the 

LUHs, 72s, that the National Guard has remain in the National 

Guard. So all those special mission aircraft that they have added 

some special mission equipment using NGREA-type funds to do 

that will remain within the Guard. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Okay. 

General BARCLAY. So all the LUHs that are going to move into 

the training are coming out of the Active Component, and then we 

are going to procure some more LUHs to finish out, round out that 

number that is needed for that. So we are not moving any of that. 

And on the Apaches, as you know, there are no NGREA funds 

that go. Those are all straight Army funds as we program those 

systems. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. As you move the—I have neither Apaches nor 

LUHs in my State, so no dogs in that hunt for me. But as you 

move the Apaches out of the combat aviation brigades, you are fundamentally changing the nature of those brigades so that they are 

no longer similar to Active Duty ones, which then means that you 

have now taken the attack—part of the attack capacity away from 

the National Guard’s divisions. So now you have fundamentally affected the composition of what a division is in the National Guard. 

Can you talk a little bit about the decision to go that route? And 

is that something that obviously is acceptable? Because now it is 

not just about the Apaches, it is about the composition of an entire 

division. 

General BARCLAY. Yes, ma’am. We looked very hard at that in 

doing our analysis. And there will be active Apaches on line with 

the National Guard divisions and those combat aviation brigades. 

You and I, as Black Hawk pilots, will tell you that Apaches are not 

the only combat aircraft. Most—— 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Yeah, I have seen videos of them hanging the— 

hanging the missiles on Black Hawks and had my fantasies, too, 

General. 
17 

General BARCLAY. No, it is not just hanging missiles on them. It 

is the combat mission roles they do and those assaults and stuff, 

so—— 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Right. 

General BARCLAY. So by moving those Apaches out, you know, it 

doesn’t mean that we will not keep them on line. And there will 

be, again, a multi-mission combat, but, again, it will be active 

Apaches aligned to the National Guard divisions. 

And we are not changing the name; those brigades in the Guard 

continue to be combat aviation brigades. Because they have Chinooks that do combat missions, Black Hawks that do combat missions, they have Medevac, and we all know that Medevac go into 

some of the most, you know, strenuous missions that we have on 

the battlefield. 

But, yes, we did look at that. But again, it is based on the fiscal 

constraints we had to meet the overall operational demands of the 

Total Army, to best-case where we could turn to meet those demands. And so, with the design that we have presented, we think 

we have met that. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. But, I mean, ultimately, you are still taking 

the attack capacity away from those combat—from those aviation 

brigades. I mean, it is—air assault pilots, we like to think we are 

as bad—that we are as big a stud and as bad as the Apache guys. 

They may disagree with us. But when you take the Apaches out, 

you have taken away the guns, that capacity. So it does fundamentally change, and I think we need to be clear that that is what is 

happening. 

I am going to, with my remaining time, talk to General Walters, 

just very briefly, if you could. 

General Amos was up here a couple weeks ago and spoke about 

the Marine Corps’ ground vehicle strategy, and he gave a very 

nuanced description that I thought was well thought out. And, you 

know, my understanding is that it is a mix of acquiring the JLTV 

and maintaining and recapitalizing of the MRAPs and the uparmed Humvees until full acquisition of the JLTV is completed, at 

which point the Humvees, I think, will be phased out. 

You know, I know that the JLTVs, they are a long-term solution, 

and obviously you are trying to bridge that gap with the uparmored—with the Humvees and MRAPs in the meantime. But I 

am concerned about a potential capabilities gap, especially with a 

legacy system like the Humvees. 

Could you update us on the Humvee sustainment and modernization efforts? And is it being sufficiently resourced in order to 

fill that gap in the meantime? 

You know, I am just basically concerned that you are trying to 

balance a number of different programs simultaneously as you are 

trying to work towards the JLTV. 

General WALTERS. No, ma’am. Thanks for the question. And you 

are right, we are trying to balance three different legs on the same 

stool. 

We are partnering with the Army on the JLTV. That is not going 

to deliver for a while. We have about 24,000 Humvees in our inventory right now in varying conditions. As we draw down and as we 

reduce our force, we have done the analysis to date that says we 
18 

are going to need about—in light vehicles, we need about 17,000. 

I know these numbers don’t wow the Army, but they are big for 

us. We need about 17,000 of these things. 

So we are in for about 5,500 JLTV. We are in for a Humvee SMI 

[Sustainment Modernization Initiative] to put back the capability 

on the up-armored Humvee that it used to have when it wasn’t armored. We have about 6,800 of those. You add those two together, 

and that is about 12,000, if you will accept my Marine math for a 

moment. That is about 12,000, so we need about another 5,000 vehicles to get that 17,000. And those are going to be the legacy, you 

know, platforms that we will hold around, and those will be the 

first ones that roll off. 

All of this is colored by our requirement to come in in September 

of this year with a new Ground Combat Vehicle strategy. So that 

is the analysis that is going on right now. The numbers I just gave 

you are our current position. 

So as we go through this and we see that there could be decisions 

made, and what I think you are alluding to is, should we be buying 

more JLTVs and less of these or more, absolutely, that will be an 

option. And then the requirements folks will come in, we will get 

the strategy done, and then we will see if we can fiscally afford it. 

Thank you. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

General Barclay, I had the opportunity in December to travel to 

Fort Rucker, Alabama, with Congresswoman Roby. And we certainly recognize you as the senior aviator in the Army, and we 

know you are very familiar with the Army’s aviations needs and 

Fort Rucker and, of course, the restructuring initiative. 

So, for the record, let me just go down part of what you had said 

in your opening statement about the Aviation Restructure Initiative. It includes divestiture of the OH–58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters and TH–67 helicopters, consolidation of all AH–64 Apache 

helicopters in the Active Component, as Ms. Duckworth was saying, as well as providing additional UH–60 Black Hawks to the National Guard and additional LUH–72 Lakotas for the Active Component. 

The Army’s and Office of the Secretary of Defense assessment is 

that by reducing from seven types of rotorcraft to three and divesting the oldest platforms while preserving the most capable, survivable, and modern aircraft, the Army can retain its ability to meet 

warfighting demands and any Title 32 domestic or emergency response requirements from State governments. 

As currently proposed, as you indicated in your statement, the 

ARI reduces the Active Component rotary-wing by 32 percent and 

the National Guard fleet by 8 percent. So, General, my question to 

you is, is this eliminating excess capacity or actual capability? 

General BARCLAY. Well, sir, I will tell you that we really didn’t 

have excess capacity, but what we could not afford was to sustain 

seven different models. 

We had an aging training fleet. We had an aging Kiowa Warrior 

fleet for the armed reconnaissance mission that we had tried to replace that did not produce any vendors that could meet those re-
19 

quirements. So, based on the fiscal constraints we were under, the 

only thing we could do was to consolidate and then take this initiative to streamline, take out older airframes, and get us down to 

those that we can afford within the fiscal constraints that we are 

under and still meet the mission set. 

So I think, as we looked across the board and did the analysis, 

both with Fort Rucker and we also had the National Guard in as 

we were doing analysis to look at the numbers, the options that we 

came up with, this was the best case that we could do within the 

dollar amount that we were given. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you for the clarity of that. 

General Walters, could you give us an answer with respect to the 

Marine Corps and what decisions they are making in their rotorcraft programs that we might need to have highlighted? 

General WALTERS. Yes, sir. Thanks. 

I mentioned the V–22 multiyear; it is very, very hot on our mind 

that we need to maintain that. I worry about that, because if we 

get sequestered, you know, the mechanical nature of that busts 

that, and then instead of—for example, we are asking for 19 in fiscal year 2015, part of a multiyear. If we were sequestered in 

2015—I know we are facing that in 2016, but if we were sequestered in 2015, you know, we—— 

Mr. TURNER. Hopefully you are not facing that in 2016. 

General WALTERS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. It is currently on the books, but hopefully you are 

not facing that. 

General WALTERS. There is an old axiom in the military, sir, that 

you plan for the worst and hope for the best. But I think it is an 

exemplar of what worries us about our rotary-wing aircraft programs. 

We asked for 19. If we somehow got sequestered—thank God, we 

didn’t. Thank you very much for doing that in 2015. But if we did 

get sequestered in 2015, then I wouldn’t have enough—we would 

bust the multiyear one. And instead of the dollars we are putting 

in there buying 19 of those aircraft, we had to go to single-year procurement. And for the same number of dollars, I would have to— 

I could only probably buy 17, so I am losing 2. You do that across 

the 5 years, so I have lost two squadrons’ worth of aircraft over a 

5-year period. 

We are very concerned—or we are not very concerned—we are 

watching very closely our 53-Kilo program. That is the key to our 

future. That thing is going to lift everything we need to off the 

ships. And we are trying to keep our H–1 program on track. 

So those are our three biggies: V–22, 53–K, and the H–1. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

General Williamson, the Army continues to declare that fielding 

of the network is your highest priority when it comes to modernization. Yet the fiscal year 2015 request for two major network programs is lower than prior years. These programs are WIN–T and 

HMS [Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit] radios. And it 

would seem to me that lower funding means less systems being 

fielded to the warfighters. 

Can you please elaborate on this? And how long would it take 

the Army to field this network across the country? 
20 

General. 

General WILLIAMSON. So both of those programs, obviously, are 

critical to the Army. And the challenge that we have is, when you 

start to look at that, the cost associated with both, it is an area 

where we have taken some risk, but not, I think, excessive risk. 

So the intent is, with those lower numbers that will go out, we 

will hit the most critical units as quickly as possible. We have reduced some of the capability. So, as General Barclay indicated, 

some of the things that we would have done in WIN–T Increment 

3, which enhanced not only some of the bandwidth capability but 

the levels and the mobility associated with that, we have accepted 

some of that risk and combined some of that capability into the 

current increment. 

On the HMS Manpack—on the HMS programs, whether it is the 

vehicle radios or the manned portable radios, it will affect the density, if you will, of how many of those we get out to units. 

And so I am not going to sit here and tell you that it doesn’t 

come with some risk, but we do believe that the approach that we 

have taken gets the capability out to the Army, if not the entire 

Army, faster. 

General Barclay. 

General BARCLAY. Well, sir, I think, you know, in our opening 

statements, we are still committed to the network, but the lack of 

funding has caused us to delay these out. 

And so, if you look at the forehand, I guess if you look at the 

HMS radio or handheld radio, I mean, we are looking at, probably 

it is going to be out to 2026. I mean, so that has pushed that way 

out. So all of those, as you said in your opening statement, all— 

everything is being moved, you know, to the right, and it is because 

of the fiscal constraints we are under. 

But we are not backing away from our commitment to the network and its overall importance. As the Chief and the Secretary 

have testified, the soldier and the squad are the centerpiece of all 

of our modernization. And the network around them is what will 

make them powerful and be able to meet those mission sets. So 

that is why we are committed to it. It is just the timeline based 

on funding. 

Mr. TURNER. That is the end of our questions. I do want to ask 

if anyone has any closing remarks or any additional remarks that 

they would like to make for the record. 

Seeing none, then this hearing will be closed. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

[Whereupon, at 3:18 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 2, 2014 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 2, 2014 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

APRIL 2, 2014 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

General WILLIAMSON. The Army is committed to maintaining competition for combat helmets and body armor such as hard armor ceramic plates and ballistic vests. 

The Army uses a combination of modernization and sustainment funds to incentivize competition and maintain the industrial base capacity. The Army’s current 

requirement for body armor and helmets has been satisfied. Further, the Army is 

experiencing a reduction in demand due to the drawdown of combat forces in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and an associated reduction in Overseas Contingency Operations funding. In order to maintain competition and industrial base capacity, the Army must balance this reduction in demand, while maintaining production at the Minimum Sustaining Rates from multiple vendors. Due to competing 

priorities, the Army is not currently funded to maintain a minimum of two competing vendors for hard armor plates. This is an assumed risk, and it will take additional time to ramp up the industrial base to the previous levels of production during the height of the Operation Iraqi Freedom and OEF conflicts if that is needed. 

We are exploring various stockage levels to mitigate that risk. 

The Army is supporting a Secretary of Defense led study in accordance with Section 146 of the Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act, which in part 

will evaluate the U.S. personal protective equipment industrial base and its ability 

to sustain competition and innovation. We look forward to seeing how we can use 

the result of that study to help shape our near term strategies. 

Regarding the existing stockpile of personal protective equipment, the Army is 

conducting limited surveillance testing on body armor and helmets to attempt to 

broadly determine their lifespan. This is a complex issue because no single piece of 

body armor is subjected to the exact same wear and tear, and environmental conditions. We will not be able to establish service life from this limited testing, but the 

analysis may enable us to establish a shelf life for future body armor requirements. 

[See page 14.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 2, 2014 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. Please elaborate on your enduring requirements for MRAP vehicles 

and what the long-term strategy is for incorporating these vehicles into the fleet. 

General BARCLAY. The Army has an enduring requirement for 11,133 MRAP Family of Vehicles which includes 2,548 route clearance vehicles and 8,585 protected mobility vehicles. The Army also has current Foreign Military Sales (FMS) requests 

for 4,000 MRAPs, and an additional 5,000 vehicles are being made available to other 

U.S. Government agencies, offered through new FMS requests or under the Excess 

Defense Articles program. The 2,548 route clearance vehicles include the Buffalo, 

Husky, Medium Mine Protected Vehicle Type I (Panther/RG33L+) and MMPV Type 

II (RG31). These vehicles will be employed within formations designed to execute 

Route Clearance (RC) and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) missions and will be 

managed as a separate Family of Vehicles (FoV) 

The 8,585 protected mobility vehicles include the MRAP All Terrain Vehicle 

(MATV), the MaxxPro Dash and MaxxPro ambulance. These variants will be employed as Key Leader Vehicles across the force, in Mission Dependent Augmentation 

Sets (MDAS) stored in Army Preposition Sets for use in future contingencies, in select table of organization (TOE) units and within the training base. 

The Army carefully considered current and future requirements and its ability to 

man, equip, train and sustain MRAPs to determine which vehicles should be retained as the Army’s enduring capability of protected mobility, route clearance and 

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) platforms. Beginning in 2009 and culminating 

in 2013, the Army conducted a series of three studies to determine its requirements 

for MRAP combat vehicles. 

The requirements were derived from comprehensive reviews of battlefield performance, Soldier and leader feedback and careful analysis of mission flexibility and 

sustainment costs. The Army selected the best performing and most technologically 

advanced vehicles, while divesting those that are not ‘‘best fit’’ for enduring requirements. 

Mr. TURNER. It has been reported that the Army fielded a Modular Catastrophic 

Recovery System (MCRS) in Afghanistan. I understand this is a modified HEMTT 

recovery system. I understand that as part of the MRAP vehicle program, a recovery 

wrecker variant has been developed and produced. Why can’t the MRAP wrecker 

variant be used for the MCRS requirement? Was there an Analysis of Alternatives 

that included an upgraded MRAP recovery vehicle? 

General BARCLAY. The MaxxPro Recovery Vehicle (MRV) has significant capability gaps in mobility and combat towing that impact its ability to conduct recovery 

operations in cross-country terrain. These gaps are identified in the Army Testing 

and Evaluation Command’s Limited User Test Memorandum, dated June 15, 2011. 

The MRV is incapable of recovering a Stryker. Although the Original Equipment 

Manufacturer has developed solutions to these gaps, those solutions will cost approximately $230,000 per MRV to install; therefore the Army will divest MRVs following Operation Enduring Freedom. The MRV was not included in an Analysis of 

Alternatives. MRVs currently in service in Afghanistan will continue to support vehicle recovery and other missions consistent within its proven capabilities. 

The Modular Catastrophic Recovery System (MCRS), consisting of the M983A4 

Light Equipment Transporter (LET) as the prime mover, along with the fifth wheel 

towing recovery device (FWTRD) and the tilt deck recovery trailer (TDRT), provides 

more recovery capability than the MRV. This is a lift-tow recovery system which 

couples with a companion trailer tilt-deck cargo bed permitting swift extraction and 

evacuation of catastrophically damaged vehicles by winching onto TDRT. The LET 

can de-couple from its trailer to permit FWTRD lift of blown-off sub-assemblies for 

loading onto TDRT. As a combined system, the MCRS is capable of evacuating up 

to 35 tons of catastrophically damaged vehicles from the battlefield. The LET is a 

four-axle eight-wheel tactical truck that is designed to haul trailers using the fifth 

wheel coupling. It is equipped with a recovery winch with a rated capacity of 45 

tons. The FWTRD coupled to the LET provides a lift tow capability of 70 tons. The 

MCRS provides the capability for flat tow, lift tow, winching, overturning and up 
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righting and evacuation scenarios for all tactical wheeled vehicles to include the 

Stryker Family of Vehicles. 

Currently, 97 MCRSs have been fielded to support operations in Afghanistan 

under an Urgent Material Release to meet urgent operational requirements. The 

MCRS became a program of record on January 12, 2014. The Army is developing 

the Full Material Release (FMR) package now. An FMR signifies that the Army has 

rigorously tested and evaluated the item and determined it is completely safe, operationally suitable and logistically supportable for use by Soldiers. The target date 

for FMR is second quarter, fiscal year 2015. 

Mr. TURNER. It was two years ago that the Army evaluated replacements for the 

Kiowa Warrior Scout Helicopter and decided to extend the lives of the existing fleet 

instead. Were the results of that evaluation considered when selecting the Apache 

as the new armed scout helicopter? Was a formal analysis of alternatives conducted? 

General BARCLAY. The Analysis of Alternatives conducted following the cancellation of the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter program determined that the best solution for armed reconnaissance was a team of AH–64E Apache helicopters and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). The AH–64 and UAS Manned-Unmanned-Teaming 

solution was not employed at the time because it was unaffordable to buy and sustain additional AH–64s. The reduction in Aviation Force structure now allows the 

Army to employ AH–64s and Shadow UAS that the Army already owns and sustains to meet the Armed Aerial Scout requirement. The AH–64 with its Modernized 

Target Acquisition and Designation System teamed with unmanned platforms is already being employed with tremendous success across Afghanistan. 

Mr. TURNER. What is the future of the Armed Aerial Scout mission? Does the 

Army still intend to develop a new helicopter specific to that role? If so, when? 

General BARCLAY. The Army maintains a valid requirement for the Armed Aerial 

Scout; however we currently do not have the fiscal resources to pursue a new procurement program at this time. The Army will examine the success of Manned-Unmanned Teaming between attack helicopters and unmanned systems and may reconsider the development of an aircraft in the future. 

Mr. TURNER. I have concerns about the viability of the tactical wheeled vehicle 

industrial base. I’m focusing here on the medium and heavy truck fleet. To use the 

Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles as an example, I understand the Army has 

planned a two year production break for FMTVs. There are no funds for new production in fiscal year 2015 and 2016, but you do have funds programmed for fiscal 

years 2017 and 2018. Can you explain the reasons behind this strategy? 

General WILLIAMSON. There are no funds programmed for new production Family 

of Medium Tactical Vehicles in fiscal years 2015 and 2016 (FY15–16). However, 

Overseas Contingency Operations funds have been requested for both fiscal years 

to replace vehicles destroyed by battle or vehicles that are beyond repair due to battle damage. The funds programmed for FY17–18 are procurements for Data Interchange and Force modernization. 

Mr. TURNER. It has been reported that the Army fielded a Modular Catastrophic 

Recovery System (MCRS) in Afghanistan. I understand this is a modified HEMTT 

recovery system. I understand that as part of the MRAP vehicle program, a recovery 

wrecker variant has been developed and produced. Why can’t the MRAP wrecker 

variant be used for the MCRS requirement? Was there an Analysis of Alternatives 

that included an upgraded MRAP recovery vehicle? 

General WILLIAMSON. The MaxxPro Recovery Vehicle (MRV) has significant capability gaps in mobility and combat towing that impact its ability to conduct recovery 

operations in cross-country terrain. These gaps are identified in the Army Testing 

and Evaluation Command’s Limited User Test Memorandum, dated June 15, 2011. 

The MRV is incapable of recovering a Stryker. Although the Original Equipment 

Manufacturer has developed solutions to these gaps, those solutions will cost approximately $230,000 per MRV to install; therefore the Army will divest MRVs following Operation Enduring Freedom. The MRV was not included in an Analysis of 

Alternatives. MRVs currently in service in Afghanistan will continue to support vehicle recovery and other missions consistent within its proven capabilities. 

The Modular Catastrophic Recovery System (MCRS), consisting of the M983A4 

Light Equipment Transporter (LET) as the prime mover, along with the fifth wheel 

towing recovery device (FWTRD) and the tilt deck recovery trailer (TDRT), provides 

more recovery capability than the MRV. This is a lift-tow recovery system which 

couples with a companion trailer tilt-deck cargo bed permitting swift extraction and 

evacuation of catastrophically damaged vehicles by winching onto TDRT. The LET 

can de-couple from its trailer to permit FWTRD lift of blown-off sub-assemblies for 

loading onto TDRT. As a combined system, the MCRS is capable of evacuating up 

to 35 tons of catastrophically damaged vehicles from the battlefield. The LET is a 

four-axle eight-wheel tactical truck that is designed to haul trailers using the fifth 
63 

wheel coupling. It is equipped with a recovery winch with a rated capacity of 45 

tons. The FWTRD coupled to the LET provides a lift tow capability of 70 tons. The 

MCRS provides the capability for flat tow, lift tow, winching, overturning and up 

righting and evacuation scenarios for all tactical wheeled vehicles to include the 

Stryker Family of Vehicles. 

Currently, 97 MCRSs have been fielded to support operations in Afghanistan 

under an Urgent Material Release to meet urgent operational requirements. The 

MCRS became a program of record on January 12, 2014. The Army is developing 

the Full Material Release (FMR) package now. An FMR signifies that the Army has 

rigorously tested and evaluated the item and determined it is completely safe, operationally suitable and logistically supportable for use by Soldiers. The target date 

for FMR is second quarter, fiscal year 2015. 

Mr. TURNER. Years of protracted conflict have taken their toll on the tactical 

wheeled vehicle (TWV) fleet. Thousands of TWVs returning from multiple theaters 

will require some level of recapitalization or replacement. When does the Army plan 

to complete and release an updated TWV acquisition strategy document? 

General WILLIAMSON. The Army’s TWV Strategy will be release in the First Quarter of Fiscal Year 2015. 

Mr. TURNER. Congress has previously urged the Defense Department to consider 

requesting multiyear contracting authority as a means to generate potential cost 

savings and sustain an efficient and cost effective TWV industrial base. Most recently, the Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) requires 

the Defense Department to conduct a business case analysis (BCA) of a multiyear, 

multivehicle TWV contract to determine any potential increases in cost, savings, or 

risks that may derive from such a contract in comparison to standard contracting 

methods. If the required BCA supports a multiyear, multivehicle contract for TWVs, 

would the Army pursue such a contract as a means to increase cost savings while 

continuing to modernize its TWV fleet? 

General WILLIAMSON. The report you mentioned is in staffing, and we look forward to submitting it by the end of May 2014. If the BCA indicates useful savings 

over the lifespan of already planned purchases, we absolutely expect to consider 

multiyear procurements as an option for future purchases. It is likely that the Joint 

Light Tactical Vehicle will provide significant cost efficiencies by implementing a 

multiyear procurement approach. That program’s strategy has Full Rate Production 

beginning in Fiscal Year 2018. We would make a final determination on a multiyear 

approach at that time. 

Mr. TURNER. What are the Army plans for female specific equipment (to include 

clothing, individual equipment, and body armor) development? To what degree do 

these plans depend on sustainment funding and/or new program funding? 

General WILLIAMSON. The Army has numerous individual equipment and clothing 

items that have been developed or are currently in development to better fit female 

Soldiers. The development of these items relies on Research and Development appropriations. Various improvements to date include the female specific jacket and 

pants of the new Army Physical Fitness Uniform, new female sized Protective Undergarments (which are worn in conjunction with the Protective Outer Garment), 

the Army Combat Uniform Alternate, the Army Aircrew Uniform Alternate and 

Women’s Flame Resistant Undergarments (to be worn by female aviators with the 

Army Aircrew Uniform). 

The Army has also developed and fielded body armor that provides female Soldiers with a better fit, allowing them to perform their missions more effectively. The 

Generation III Female Improved Outer Tactical Vest (FIOTV) continues to provide 

the same unsurpassed ballistic protection of existing Army body armor, while providing eight additional sizes in conjunction with other modifications designed to provide a better fit. These efforts provide female Soldiers critical protection and the improved ability to conduct missions in combat environments. Another program known 

as the Family of Concealable Body Armor consists of two vests for military law enforcement and corrections officers and they will have a female specific sizing chart 

and female variant vests (both types). Finally, the Army will continue to address 

female sizing and fit issues as it develops the new Soldier Protection System. The 

data used to develop the female variant vests (FIOTV) has been shared with our 

industry partners and is being incorporated into the Army’s Soldier Protection System. The Soldier Protection System entered Engineering and Manufacturing Development in fiscal year 2013 (FY13), and is scheduled to enter into Production in the 

3rd quarter FY15. 

Mr. TURNER. I understand the Army has decided to pure fleet the force with 

M4A1 carbines. Does the Army plan to revisit the Individual Carbine program? 

General WILLIAMSON. The Army does not plan to revisit the Individual Carbine 

program at this time. 
64 

Mr. TURNER. Please elaborate on your enduring requirements for MRAP vehicles 

and what the long-term strategy is for incorporating these vehicles into the fleet. 

General WALTERS. The Marine Corps’ enduring requirement for MRAP vehicles 

is approximately 2,500. This number of MRAPs provides the required capabilities 

and adequate capacity to meet the operational demands of post-OEF roles and missions. As the Marine Corps transitions out of Afghanistan and reconfigures and refits to meet the future security environment, we are conducting a detailed review 

of our entire ground combat and tactical vehicle portfolio and strategy to ensure 

that our requirements value lethality and sustainability and align with the protected mobility requirements of the future force. 

Mr. TURNER. Years of protracted conflict have taken their toll on the tactical 

wheeled vehicle (TWV) fleet. Thousands of TWVs returning from multiple theaters 

will require some level of recapitalization or replacement. When does the Army plan 

to complete and release an updated TWV acquisition strategy document? 

General WALTERS. The Marine Corps’ Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle Strategy (GCTVS) provides the basis for planning, programming, and budgeting to provide balanced maneuver and mobility capabilities to the Marine Corps’ Operating 

Forces. We remain committed to the process and continually assess the requirements of the force as we refine the platforms that will be available. The Office of 

the Secretary of Defense requested the Marine Corps update the GCTVS by September 2014. 

Mr. TURNER. What are the Marine Corps plans for female specific equipment (to 

include clothing, individual equipment, and body armor) development? 

General WALTERS. The Marine Corps fields, researches and develops the most capable and functional individual combat and personal protective equipment for all 

Marines, regardless of sex or stature. However, our future body armor system, the 

Modular Scalable Vest (MSV) has incorporated female anthropomorphic data from 

its initiation and will offer sizes that fit the full range of female body types. In addition, the Load Distribution System (LDS) that has been incorporated into MSV better allows female Marines to distribute the weight across their hips and shoulders 

instead of just their shoulders like the current vests. 

Current hard armor technology does not exist to allow ballistic plates to be formed 

in a shape that accommodates the female form and still retain current ballistic capabilities without greatly increasing weight. Several Marine Corps units have procured the Army’s Female Urinary Diversion Device (FUDD) for use by forward deployed female Marines in Afghanistan, but the capability is not registered as a formal requirement or program. The Marine Corps will work with the Army to review 

the use of the FUDD in both services and determine the feasibility and advisability 

of making it a programmed capability for Female Marines. 

Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC) recently conducted surveys to better 

understand the sizing, fit and comfort concerns of current individual ballistic protection systems including torso, armor, pelvic protection and helmets. The survey identified some concerns regarding the fit, function and comfort of the currently issued 

Improved Modular Tactical Vest (IMTV) and Plate Carrier (PC). Data from the surveys is being referenced to enhance the sizing, fit, function and comfort of the IMTV 

and PC. 

MCSC plans additional surveys targeting female and smaller stature male Marines to gain greater insights on the functionality of individual combat and personal 

protective equipment to inform ongoing research and development efforts of current 

and future individual combat and personal protective systems. 

Mr. TURNER. To what degree do these plans depend on sustainment funding and/ 

or new program funding?’ 

General WALTERS. The Marine Corps has not developed or fielded female specific 

PPE; accordingly, sustainment funding is not required. All future requirements 

would depend entirely on new program funding. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ENYART 

Mr. ENYART. Is it still the Army’s philosophy that you train as you fight? 

General BARCLAY and General WILLIAMSON. Yes, ‘‘train as you will fight’’ remains 

a guiding principle of unit training. ‘‘Train as you will fight’’ means training under 

an expected operational environment, or establishing in training what the unit can 

expect during operations to include the culture of an operational environment. The 

purpose of unit training is to build and maintain ready units to conduct unified land 

operations for combatant commanders. Units build flexibility, integration, adaptability, depth and synchronization through the mastery of individual and collective 

tasks under the conditions of the anticipated operational environment. 
65 

The Army trains to provide ready forces to combatant commanders worldwide. 

Collective training provides the full range of experiences needed to produce agile, 

adaptive leaders and Soldiers and versatile units. Training must be relevant, rigorous, realistic, challenging and properly resourced. Collective task proficiency results from developing tactical and technical skills through instruction, experience 

and repetitive practice. 

Mr. ENYART. What cost savings are derived from transferring the Apaches from 

the Reserve to the Active Component? What other rationale other than cost savings 

does the Army have for transferring the Apaches? 

General BARCLAY and General WILLIAMSON. The transfer of AH–64s from the 

Army National Guard (ARNG) to the Active component (AC) is one aspect of the 

Secretary of Defense-approved comprehensive Aviation Restructuring Initiative 

(ARI), which is designed to achieve a leaner, more efficient and capable force that 

balances operational capability and capacity across the Total Army. The low-density, 

high-demand AH–64 Apaches transferring out of the ARNG will be repurposed to 

replace AC OH–58D Kiowa Warriors that are being divested. The transfer will enable the teaming of Apaches with unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) for armed reconnaissance, filling a critical capability need for an Armed Aerial Scout created by 

the elimination of the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter program. In addition, consolidation of Apache airframes in the AC will enable the Army to better meet the 

operational demands of our Combatant Commanders due to the increased operational availability that it will provide due to the reduced dwell times that are required in the AC. 

Necessary savings are generated by divesting three entire fleets of aircraft—the 

OH–58A/C Kiowas; the TH–67 training helicopters and the OH–58D Kiowa Warriors—an overall reduction of 798 aircraft. The Fiscal Year 2015 President’s Budget 

incorporated this reduction. The net effect of the reduction is a 23 percent decrease 

in aircraft to the Active component with only an 8 percent reduction to the ARNG. 

In addition to procurement and modernization cost savings, the Army would also 

avoid the significant operations and sustainment costs of retaining these aging aircraft fleets. ARI avoids approximately $12 billion in imminent costs. If the Army 

were to not execute ARI, we would be forced to retain many of our oldest and least 

capable aircraft while divesting several hundred modernized airframes. Upgrades to 

the Kiowa Warrior would cost over $10 billion. Replacing the legacy TH–67 training 

helicopter would cost another $1.5 billion. In addition, lower procurement rates of 

modernized aircraft would cost the Army approximately $15 billion. These costs 

would be unbearable for the Army under the current budget constraints and would 

risk creating a hollow force, with less overall capability and less investment in modernization. 

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