J. S84039/18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

REAFEAL FIELDS, : No. 366 EDA 2018

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the PCRA Order, December 29, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0014201-2010

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OTT, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 20, 2019

Reafeal Fields appeals from the December 29, 2017 order entered by 

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denying relief pursuant to 

the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After 

careful review, we affirm.

The PCRA court provided the following synopsis of the relevant factual 

history:

Timothy Johnson (“Johnson”) arrived at the Ridge 

Food Market . . . at 10:43 AM on February 11, 2010. 

When he arrived he saw two men, whom he knew as 

June and Shiz, on the corner. Johnson started 

walking down the street toward 26th Street and then 

heard about three gunshots. He turned around and 

saw the decedent, a friend of his, lying on the 

ground and June and Shiz running away. Johnson 

identified June and Shiz as [Kelvin] Bryant and 

[appellant], respectively.
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Philadelphia Police Officer Patrick Gereaghty 

(“Officer Gereaghty”) arrived first at the scene, 

where he found the decedent face-down in the snow 

and unresponsive. Officer Gereaghty transported 

him to Temple University Hospital, where he was 

pronounced dead at 2:31 PM.

Both [appellant] and Bryant later told Amin Payne 

(“Payne”) that they had killed the decedent. 

[Appellant] and Bryant told Payne that after they had 

spoken with Johnson outside the store, they had 

killed the decedent over drug territory: “They did 

not want him selling drugs on Bailey Street.” 

[Appellant] and Bryant told Payne that Bryant had 

used his 9mm and that [appellant] had used a 

.38 caliber revolver.

Later that evening, Bryant and [Milique] Wagner 

were inside Bryant’s mother’s apartment with Payne 

and Herman Adams (“Adams”), where they were 

heat-sealing bags of drugs. Bryant received a phone 

call, and he and Wagner went outside. A short time 

later, Payne looked out the window and, not seeing 

Bryant and Wagner, went outside and looked down 

the street. He saw Bryant and Wagner at the corner 

of 25th Street and Cecil B. Moore Avenue speaking 

with King and then saw them “just pull out on the 

boy and shoot him up.” The two then ran down the 

street and turned up 26th Street. Adams testified at 

trial that he heard the gunshots about ten minutes 

after Bryant and Wagner had left the apartment. 

Bryant called Payne thirty minutes later and told 

him, “I had to holler at another one.” A few days 

later, Bryant told Payne, “I killed the one, I might as 

well get the rest. I got to get them out of the way.”

At the scene, police recovered a sandwich bag 

containing four smaller ziplock bags, each containing 

a green, leafy substance, and two heat-sealed bags 

containing an off-white, chunky substance. Police 

Officer Flade testified that, in his experience, the 

substances appeared to be marijuana and crack

cocaine. Twenty-seven cartridge casings were also 
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found, all fired from two 9mm semi-automatic 

handguns.

All three defendants left Philadelphia after 

February 11, 2010 and were arrested outside the 

county. Detective James Burke (“Detective Burke”) 

testified that on February 20, 2010, he went to 

1712 North Marston Street in Philadelphia, where he 

found Nikki Williams (“Williams”), [appellant’s] 

girlfriend and mother of his children. [Appellant] 

resided at that location, but was not there. 

Detective Burke told Williams that [appellant] was 

wanted, and that he should call Detective Burke or 

turn himself in to police. Ultimately, Detective Burke 

found [appellant] at a house in Norristown, 

Pennsylvania on March 3, 2010. When he was 

arrested, [appellant] gave 1712 North Marston 

Street as his address.

PCRA court opinion, 6/19/18 at 3-5 (footnotes and citations to the record 

omitted).

The PCRA court also summarized the following procedural history:

On February 6, 2013, following a jury trial before 

[the trial court, appellant] was found guilty of 

murder of the first degree, criminal conspiracy, and 

possessing instruments of crime.[Footnote 2] That 

same date, [the trial court] sentenced [appellant] to 

the mandatory term[Footnote 3] of life imprisonment 

for murder of the first degree.[Footnote 4] On 

February 19, 2013, [appellant] filed post-sentence 

motions, which [the trial court] denied on May 21, 

2013. On May 29, 2013, [appellant] appealed his 

judgment of sentence to [the] Superior Court, and, 

on February 6, 2015, [the] Superior Court affirmed 

the judgment of sentence. [Appellant] did not seek 

further appellate review, therefore, his judgment of 

sentence became final on March 9, 2015, at the 

expiration of the period for filing a Petition for 

Allowance of Appeal. 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(3) (a 

judgment of sentence becomes final “at the 

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary 
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review in the Supreme Court of the United States 

and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the 

expiration of time for seeking the review.”).

[Footnote 2] 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] §§ 2502(a), 

903, and 907(a), respectively.

[Footnote 3] 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1102(a)(1).

[Footnote 4] As to the remaining charges, 

[the trial court] imposed concurrent 

sentences as follows: as to the conviction 

for criminal conspiracy, [the trial court]

sentenced [appellant] to a term of not 

less than five years nor more than ten 

years[’] confinement; as to the conviction 

for PIC, [the trial court] sentenced 

petitioner to a term of not less than one 

year nor more than five years[’] 

confinement.

[Appellant] filed the instant timely counseled PCRA 

petition on March 7, 2016. Following several 

continuance requests by counsel in order to 

supplement and amend [appellant’s] claims, counsel 

filed an amended petition on February 10, 2017. 

After several requests by the Commonwealth for 

additional time to respond, the Commonwealth filed 

a motion to dismiss on September 1, 2017. 

Following a review of the pleadings, [the PCRA court] 

found that [appellant’s] claims lacked merit, and, on 

November 28, 2017, provided [appellant] a notice 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 ([“]907 Notice[”]) of its 

intent to deny his claims and dismiss his petition 

without a hearing. [Appellant] did not respond to 

the 907 Notice. Therefore, on December 29, 2017, 

[the PCRA court] dismissed [appellant’s] petition 

consistent with the 907 Notice. This timely appeal 

followed.

Id. at 1-2 (citations to exhibits omitted; additional footnotes omitted).
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The PCRA court ordered appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant 

complied. The PCRA court subsequently filed an opinion pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

[I.] [Whether] [t]he PCRA court erred because the 

record supported [appellant’s] trial counsel 

ineffectiveness claim regarding trial counsel’s 

failure to consult with [appellant] about the 

possibility of requesting DNA testing on the 

black knit hat collected near the shooting 

scene and subsequently requesting the 

discussed DNA testing[?]

[II.] [Whether] [t]he PCRA court erred because the 

record supported [appellant’s] trial counsel 

ineffectiveness claim regarding trial counsel’s 

failure to object to the trial court’s flight 

instruction as it related to [appellant?]

[III.] [Whether] [t]he PCRA court erred because the 

record supported [appellant’s] appellate 

counsel ineffectiveness claim regarding 

appellate counsel’s failure to raise, brief, and 

argue the record-based claim that the trial 

court erred by refusing to issue a Kloiber

instruction in connection with 

Timothy Johnson’s identification[?]

[IV.] [Whether] [t]he PCRA court erred because the 

record supported [appellant’s] cumulative 

prejudice claim[?]

Appellant’s brief at 3-4 (citations omitted).

PCRA petitions are subject to the following standard of review:

“[A]s a general proposition, we review a denial of 

PCRA relief to determine whether the findings of the 
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PCRA court are supported by the record and free of 

legal error.” Commonwealth v. Dennis, [] 17 A.3d 

297, 301 ([Pa.] 2011) (citation omitted). A PCRA 

court’s credibility findings are to be accorded great 

deference, and where supported by the record, such 

determinations are binding on a reviewing court. 

Id., at 305 (citations omitted). To obtain PCRA 

relief, appellant must plead and prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence: (1) his conviction or 

sentence resulted from one of more of the errors 

enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9543(a)(2); (2) his 

claims have not been previously litigated or waived, 

id., § 9543(a)(3); and (3) “the failure to litigate the 

issue prior to or during trial . . . or on direct appeal 

could not have been the result of any rational, 

strategic or tactical decision by counsel[,]” id., 

§ 9543(a)(4). An issue is previously litigated if “the

highest appellate court in which [appellant] could 

have had review as a matter of right has ruled on 

the merits of the issue[.]” Id., § 9544(a)(2). “[A]n 

issue is waived if [appellant] could have raised it but 

failed to do so before trial, at trial, . . . on appeal or 

in a prior state postconviction proceeding.” Id., 

§ 9544(b).

Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 444 (Pa. 2015).

On appeal, appellant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel by both 

his trial counsel and his counsel on direct appeal. Under the PCRA, an 

individual is eligible for post-conviction relief if the conviction was the result 

of “ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the 

particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no 

reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). When considering whether counsel was 

ineffective, we are governed by the following standard:
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[C]ounsel is presumed effective, and to 

rebut that presumption, the PCRA

petitioner must demonstrate that 

counsel’s performance was deficient and 

that such deficiency prejudiced him. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668 [] (1984). This Court has described 

the Strickland standard as tripartite by 

dividing the performance element into 

two distinct components. 

Commonwealth v. Pierce, [] 527 A.2d 

973, 975 ([Pa.] 1987). Accordingly, to 

prove counsel ineffective, the petitioner 

must demonstrate that: (1) the 

underlying legal issue has arguable 

merit; (2) counsel’s actions lacked an 

objective reasonable basis; and (3) the 

petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s 

act or omission. Id. A claim of 

ineffectiveness will be denied if the 

petitioner’s evidence fails to satisfy any 

one of these prongs.

Commonwealth v. Busanet, [] 54 A.3d 34, 45 

([Pa.] 2012) (citations formatted). Furthermore, 

“[i]n accord with these well-established criteria for 

review, [an appellant] must set forth and individually 

discuss substantively each prong of the [Pierce] 

test.” Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 979 A.2d 

908, 910 (Pa.Super. 2009).

Commonwealth v. Perzel, 116 A.3d 670, 671-672 (Pa.Super. 2015), 

order vacated on other grounds, 166 A.3d 1213 (Pa. 2017).

I.

First, appellant contends that his trial counsel, Andres Jalon, Esq., 

rendered ineffective assistance because he did not request pretrial DNA 

testing of a black knit hat found at the scene of the shooting. Specifically, 
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appellant argues that the black knit hat “could possibly provide exculpatory 

information if subjected to DNA testing.” (Appellant’s brief at 8.) Appellant 

further argues that his claim has arguable merit because “the gunman’s 

identity was at issue.” (Id. at 11.)

In his argument, appellant relies on our supreme court’s decision in 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 899 A.2d 1060 (Pa. 2006). In Williams, the 

court determined that the defendant’s PCRA claim had arguable merit 

because the DNA testing at issue would have challenged the victim’s 

identification of the defendant. Id. at 1064. Williams, however, is 

distinguishable from the case presently before us. The victim in Williams

was raped four times and the defendant alleged ineffective assistance of 

counsel for failing to request DNA testing. Id. at 1062. The DNA testing at 

issue in Williams had the ability to “settle whether there will be a conviction 

or not. It [could have] demolish[ed] the prosecution’s case, [or] it [could 

have] cast it in concrete as well.” Id. The PCRA court concluded that the 

DNA testing at issue here would not have been as conclusive as the DNA in 

Williams.

Indeed, as the PCRA court notes, 

[T]he evidence in question was a black knit cap 

found at the scene of the shooting. While 

[appellant] offered evidence that one witness 

described the shooter to police[Footnote 14] as 

having worn a black knit cap at the time of the 

shooting, this was insufficient to establish that the 

cap found at the scene is the same cap which was 

worn by the shooter. Upon this record, [the PCRA 
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court] found nothing to establish that the hat 

recovered at the scene was actually connected to the 

shooting, and not a merely unrelated hat which had 

been discarded in the area for an unknown period of 

time. In order for DNA testing on the found hat to 

have any relevance to [appellant’s] case, there must 

be evidence to establish that this is not merely a hat, 

but, rather, the hat. See Pa.R.E. 401 (providing 

that evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to 

make a fact more or less probable than it would be 

without the evidence,” and if “the fact is of 

consequence in determining the action.”); 

Pa.R.E. 402 (providing that evidence that is not 

relevant is not admissible). Without such evidence 

linking the cap itself to the shooter, even if the cap 

was tested for DNA and the results were inconsistent 

with [appellant], those results would not be 

exculpatory. As [appellant] did not establish that it 

is more likely than not that the cap recovered from 

the shooting scene was the same cap allegedly worn 

by the shooter, and, therefore, that DNA testing of 

the cap would have been consequential in 

challenging the identification of [appellant], this 

evidence is irrelevant. As DNA testing of the cap 

could not have corroborated [appellant’s] alibi 

defense, and would not have been admissible on this 

record, this claim lack[s] arguable merit, and it fails.

[Footnote 14] Indeed, [the PCRA court] 

notes that [appellant’s] evidence more 

strongly suggests that the cap found at 

the scene was not the same cap worn by 

the shooter: On February 11, 2010, 

Anthony Benton gave a statement to 

[h]omicide [d]etectives asserting that, at 

the time of the shooting, he looked out 

the first floor window of his residence 

after hearing 4-5 gunshots, and saw a 

[b]lack male in his late 20s to early 30s, 

with a full beard, standing near the 

decedent with a gun in his hand and 

wearing a black coat, a black knit hat, 

and blue jeans. Amended PCRA Petition, 

2/10/17, at Exs. 1 and 2. Benton 
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asserted that he then saw the shooter 

run south down Taney Street as he was 

attempting to put the handgun in his 

waistband. Id. Benton asserted that he 

kept his focus on the fleeing shooter “to 

make sure he didn’t come back,” and 

that the shooter’s “face really st[ood] out 

to me.” Id. Considering Benton’s 

opportunity to view the shooter, [the 

PCRA court] finds it telling that nowhere 

in Benton’s account did Benton assert 

anything to suggest that the shooter 

discarded his black cap, or that the cap 

fell off the shooter’s head during his 

flight from the scene.

PCRA court opinion, 6/19/18 at 8-9 (emphasis in original).

Based upon our review of the record, we find that the PCRA court’s 

conclusions are well based in the record. Unlike the defendant in Williams, 

appellant has failed to establish that the DNA evidence from the black knit 

cap would have the ability to either demolish the Commonwealth’s case or, 

inversely, set the Commonwealth’s case in concrete. See Williams, 899 

A.2d at 1064. Accordingly, appellant’s first issue lacks arguable merit.

II.

In his second issue on appeal, appellant argues that Attorney Jalon 

rendered ineffective assistance for failing to object to the trial court’s flight 

instruction to the jury as it related to appellant. (Appellant’s brief at 16.) 

Specifically, appellant contends that the flight instruction was improper 

because the Commonwealth did not present any evidence that appellant 
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knew that he was wanted by the police or that the police had obtained a 

warrant for his arrest. (Id. at 21.)

When reviewing a trial court’s instructions to the jury, we are 

governed by the following standard:

[W]hen evaluating the propriety of jury instructions, 

this Court will look to the instructions as a whole, 

and not simply isolated portions, to determine if the 

instructions were improper. We further note that, it 

is an unquestionable maxim of law in this 

Commonwealth that a trial court has broad discretion 

in phrasing its instructions, and may choose its own 

wording so long as the law is clearly, adequately, 

and accurately presented to the jury for its 

consideration. Only where there is an abuse of 

discretion or an inaccurate statement of the law is 

there reversible error. 

Commonwealth v. Roane, 142 A.3d 79, 95 (Pa.Super. 2016), quoting 

Commonwealth v. Trippett, 932 A.2d 188, 200 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citation 

omitted).

When addressing jury instructions pertaining to flight, we have held 

that:

[a] flight instruction is proper when:

a person has reason to know he is 

wanted in connection with a crime, and 

proceeds to flee or conceal himself from 

the law enforcement authorities, such 

evasive conduct is evidence of guilt and 

may form a basis, in connection with 

other proof, from which guilt may be 

inferred.

Commonwealth v. Harvey, [] 526 A.2d 330, 334 

([Pa.] 1987). “A defendant's knowledge may be 
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inferred from the circumstances attendant [to] his 

flight.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, [] 838 A.2d 

663, 681 ([Pa.] 2003).

Commonwealth v. Thoeun Tha, 64 A.3d 704, 714 (Pa.Super. 2013).

Here, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it gave a flight 

instruction to the jury because the Commonwealth failed to present 

sufficient evidence that a jury instruction on flight was justified. (Appellant’s 

brief at 21-22.)

On this issue, the PCRA court reached the following conclusion:

Here, Detective James Burke tried to find [appellant] 

at his girlfriend’s house on February 19, 2010. 

[Appellant’s] girlfriend, Nikki Williams, told Detective 

Burke that [appellant] lived there, but was not home 

at the time. Detective Burke informed Williams that 

[appellant] was wanted, that he should turn himself 

in or otherwise contact [the] police, and asked 

Williams to relate this information to [appellant] if 

she was able to make contact with him.[Footnote 15] 

[Appellant] was not arrested until March 3, 201[0], 

when Detective Burke found him at a house in 

Norristown. When he was asked his address after 

his arrest, [appellant] gave Williams’ address. This 

evidence was sufficient to show that [appellant] had 

disrupted his normal pattern of living following the 

shooting in this case.

[Footnote 15] At trial, Detective Burke 

testified that, on February 20, 2010, he 

also approached [appellant’s] 

grandmother, another girlfriend of 

[appellant’s] named Lisa Green, and 

[appellant’s] wife Nicole Carter, at their 

respective residences and that he told 

them all the same information which he 

told Williams. Detective Burke further 

testified that he and other members of 

the Homicide Division, Fugitive Squad, 
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put up wanted posters around 

[appellant’s] neighborhood on that same 

date.

PCRA court opinion, 6/19/18 at 10-11 (citations to the record and 

footnote 16 omitted).

Based on our review of the record, we find that the Commonwealth 

presented sufficient evidence that appellant either knew or had reason to 

know that he was wanted in connection with the February 11, 2010 

shooting. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 

provided the jury with the flight instruction. Therefore, appellant’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim pertaining to counsel’s failure to 

object to the trial court’s jury instructions is without arguable merit.

III.

Appellant next avers that appellate counsel1rendered ineffective 

assistance for failing to raise, brief, and argue before this court “the 

record-based claim that the trial court erred by refusing to issue a 

 

1 Attorney Jalon represented appellant both at trial and on direct appeal.
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Kloiber[

2] instruction in connection with Timothy Johnson’s testimony.” 

(Appellant’s brief at 25.)

“We evaluate whether a Kloiber instruction is necessary under an 

abuse of discretion standard.” Commonwealth v. Sanders, 42 A.3d 325, 

332-333 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 78 A.3d 1091 (Pa. 2013), citing 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 954 A.2d 1194, 1198 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal 

denied, 962 A.2d 1196 (Pa. 2008).

Appellant specifically argues that the trial court erred when it failed to 

give the jury a Kloiber instruction because Johnson: (1) failed to identify 

appellant at the preliminary hearing as one of the men fleeing the scene 

immediately following the shooting; (2) testified at the preliminary hearing 

that he only picked appellant out of a photo array because appellant was 

someone he knew from the neighborhood; (3) failed to testify at trial that 

appellant was one of two men leaving the scene of the shooting; and 

(4) may have mistakenly identified appellant when he actually saw 

 

2 See Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 106 A.2d 820 (Pa. 1954). The Kloiber

court held that in cases where the:

witness is not in a position to clearly observe the 

assailant, or he is not positive as to identity, or his 

positive statements as to identity are weakened by 

qualification or by failure to identify defendant on 

one or more prior occasions, the accuracy of the 

identification is so doubtful that the Court should 

warn the jury that the testimony as to identity must 

be received with caution.

Id. at 826-827.
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appellant’s brother, Eric Fields, the day of the shooting. (Appellant’s brief 

at 30.)

The PCRA court concluded as follows:

Here, Johnson unequivocally identified [appellant] in 

a statement to police as one of two men standing on 

the corner before the decedent was shot, and then 

running from the scene. Johnson had known 

[appellant] for two years. However, at trial, Johnson 

first said he did not recall who was on the corner or 

who specifically ran away. Later, Johnson admitted 

that he had told detectives that he saw [appellant] 

running away and that that was the truth. He also 

stated on cross-examination that it “could be 

possible” that he confused [appellant] with 

[appellant’s] brother, Eric Fields.

These qualifications do not neccessitate [sic] the 

cautionary instruction under Kloiber. Johnson never 

failed to identify [appellant] as one of the people on 

the corner running from the scene. Although he 

began to recant his original identification at trial, he 

ultimately admitted that what was in his original 

statement was the truth.

In any event, [the trial court] gave the jury the 

following identification instruction:

There were two identifications in this 

case which I will address with you. I am 

referring to the testimony you heard 

from Police Officer Rios, who identified 

Kelvin Bryant from a photo array as the 

person he chased on the night of 

February 11, 2010, and to the testimony 

you heard concerning Timothy Johnson’s 

identification of [appellant] as one of the 

persons he had seen on the corner of 

Ridge and Taney Streets on the morning 

of February 11, 2010.
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As you may recall, on cross-examination, 

Mr. Johnson indicated that he might have 

confused [appellant] with his brother, 

Eric Fields, and indicated that they do 

look alike.

In evaluating the testimony, in addition 

to the other instructions I have provided 

to you for judging the testimony of 

witnesses, you should consider the 

additional following factors.

Did the witness have a good opportunity 

to observe the person he identified? Was 

there sufficient lighting for that witness 

to make those observations? Was the 

witness close enough to the individuals 

to know the physical characteristics or to 

see that it was the person that he 

knows? When the identification was 

made, was it positive or was it qualified 

by any hedging or inconsistencies?

In considering whether or not to accept 

the testimony of these two witnesses, 

you should consider all of the 

circumstances under which the 

identifications were made.

[Notes of testimony], 2/6/13 at 30-31.

PCRA court opinion, 6/19/18 at 13-14 (additional citations to the record 

omitted).

Based upon our review of the record, we find that the PCRA court did 

not abuse its discretion when it refused to provide the jury with a Kloiber

instruction, and we further find that its conclusions are well based in the 

record. Therefore, appellant’s third issue lacks arguable merit.
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IV.

In his fourth and final issue on appeal, appellant raises a cumulative 

prejudice claim. Specifically, appellant contends that the “cumulative 

prejudice from the multiple trial errors rendered [appellant’s] trial 

fundamentally unfair.” (Appellant’s brief at 37.)

[Our supreme court has] often held that “no number 

of failed [] claims may collectively warrant relief if 

they fail to do so individually.” [Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532 (Pa. 2009)] (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Washington, [] 927 A.2d 586, 

617 ([Pa.] 2007)). However, [the court has] 

clarified that this principle applies to claims that fail 

because of lack of merit or arguable merit. 

[Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 952 A.2d 640, 671 

(Pa. 2008)]. When the failure of individual claims is 

grounded in lack of prejudice, then the cumulative 

prejudice from those individual claims may properly 

be assessed. Id.; Johnson, supra at 532 (citing 

Commonwealth v. Perry, [] 644 A.2d 705, 709 

([Pa.] 1994), for the principle that a new trial may 

be awarded due to cumulative prejudice accrued 

through multiple instances of trial counsel’s 

ineffective representation.

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 321 (Pa. 2011).

Here, none of appellant’s three issues pertaining to ineffective 

assistance of counsel was disposed of due to a lack of a showing of 

prejudice. Rather, all three issues failed because they lacked arguable 

merit. Accordingly, appellant’s claim of cumulative prejudice from multiple 

errors is without merit.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/20/19