J-S61029-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN RE: B.K.C., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: K.D., BIRTH MOTHER 

 No. 412 WDA 2016 

Appeal from the Order February 19, 2016 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Orphans' Court at No(s): Cp-02-AP-0000140-2015 

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 02, 2016 

K.D. (Mother) appeals from the order entered in the Court of Common 

Pleas of Allegheny County, which involuntarily terminated her parental rights 

to her minor son, B.K.C. (born November 2011).1 After careful review, we 

affirm. 

 B.K.C. has resided with S.C. (Paternal Grandmother) since his birth. 

Initially, Father and Mother also resided in the home with B.K.C. Allegheny 

County Children, Youth and Families (CYF) became involved with B.K.C. in 

December 2013 when B.K.C.’s sibling was born, and both Mother and 

newborn tested positive for illegal substances. Paternal Grandmother was 

awarded custody of B.K.C. in February 2014. Mother and Father both have 

a history of drug addiction. Father regained custody of B.K.C. in September 

____________________________________________ 

1

 Father’s parental rights to B.K.C. were involuntarily terminated at the same 

proceeding. Father, however, is not a party to this appeal. 
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2014, after he had become sober for a period of time and was living with 

Paternal Grandmother. Father relapsed, and custody of B.K.C. was returned 

to Paternal Grandmother. B.K.C. has remained in Paternal Grandmother’s 

custody since January 2015. 

CYF developed a family service plan (FSP) for Mother, which involved, 

among other things, cooperating with CYF, recovering from substance 

abuse, stabilizing her mental health, and maintaining her relationship with 

B.K.C. 

To address her addiction to heroin, Mother became involved with a 

methadone maintenance program in August 2013. She attended an 

outpatient program before being incarcerated briefly. She completed an 

inpatient treatment program in 2014, after which she relapsed. Mother 

entered a second inpatient program at Family Links, where she was 

successful enough to transition to the related outpatient program in 

September 2015. However, Mother was discharged from the program about 

two months later because she was unable to attend her group sessions three 

times per week as required. Mother was also required to appear for urine 

screens as part of the FSP goal to address her drug addiction. Mother 

consistently had negative screens from September 2015 to December 2015. 

Then she had three no-shows, which the agency counted as positive tests. 

 While Mother was completing the inpatient program at Family Links, 

her visitation with B.K.C. was fairly consistent. However, following her 

discharge from the program, Mother has attended scheduled visits 
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approximately half the time. Mother’s visits were reduced to once per week. 

Mother has occasionally visited B.K.C. at other times that Paternal 

Grandmother arranged. However, Mother has not progressed beyond 

supervised visits with B.K.C. Mother’s mental health treatment has 

consisted of one hourly session per month at the methadone clinic since her 

discharge from Family Links. Mother has also been evaluated on separate 

occasions by two licensed psychologists, Dr. Lawson Bernstein and Dr. Neil 

Rosenblum. 

CYF filed a petition seeking to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental 

rights under 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(2), (a)(5) and (b)2 of the Adoption Act3

____________________________________________ 

2

 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 provides the following: 

(a) General rule. — The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds: 

. . . 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions 

and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

cannot or will not be remedied by the parent. 

. . . 

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with 

an agency for a period of at least six months, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of the 

child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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on September 1, 2015. Following a hearing on February 19, 2016, the court 

terminated Mother’s parental rights to B.K.C., finding grounds for 

termination existed under both subsections 2511(a)(2) and 2511(a)(5) and 

that termination was in the best interests of the child under subsection (b). 

 Mother filed a timely appeal, in which she raises the following issue for 

our review: 

Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of 

law in concluding that Allegheny County Children, Youth and 

Families met its burden of proving that termination of [b]irth 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of 

time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the 

parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable 

period of time and termination of the parental rights would 

best serve the needs and welfare of the child. 

. . . 

(b) Other considerations. — The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), and (b). 

3

 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2910. 
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Mother’s parental rights best serve[s] the needs and welfare of 

the child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)[?] 

Brief of Appellant, at 5. 

In a proceeding involving the involuntary termination of parental 

rights, 

the burden of proof is on the party seeking termination to 

establish by clear and convincing evidence the existence of 

grounds for doing so. The standard of clear and convincing 

evidence is defined as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty 

and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in 

issue.” It is well established that a court must examine the 

individual circumstances of each and every case and consider all 

explanations offered by the parent to determine if the evidence 

in light of the totality of the circumstances clearly warrants 

termination. 

In re Adoption of S.M., 816 A.2d 1117, 1122 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). As to our standard of review, “[w]e review a trial court’s decision 

to involuntarily terminate parental rights for an abuse of discretion or error 

of law. Our scope of review is limited to determining whether the trial 

court’s order is supported by competent evidence. In re Adoption of 

G.L.L., 124 A.3d 344, 346 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations omitted).

Here, it is not contested that CYF presented sufficient evidence of 

grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights to B.K.C under section 

2511(a). However, as we noted in In re K.J., 936 A.2d 1129 (Pa. Super. 

2007), before granting a petition to terminate parental rights under section 

2511(b), a court must: 

carefully consider the intangible dimension of the needs and 

welfare of a child—the love, comfort, security, and closeness—
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entailed in a parent-child relationship, as well as the tangible 

dimension. Continuity of relationships is also important to a 

child, for whom severance of close parental ties is usually 

extremely painful. The trial court, in considering what situation 

would best serve the child[]’s needs and welfare, must examine 

the status of the natural parental bond to consider whether 

terminating the natural parents’ rights would destroy something 

in existence that is necessary and beneficial. 

Id. at 1134. The court must consider “whatever bonds may exist between 

the children and [parent], as well as the emotional effect that termination 

will have upon the child[.]” In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 229 

(Pa. Super. 2002). 

 Instantly, the record reveals that B.K.C.’s strongest relationship is with 

Paternal Grandmother. B.K.C. has lived in Paternal Grandmother’s home 

since he was born. She provides for his needs, including caring for him 

physically and emotionally and maintaining stable living accommodations. 

However, both Dr. Bernstein and Dr. Rosenblum were of the opinion that 

Mother had a bond with B.K.C. despite missing visits and not being in a 

position to care for B.K.C. 

 While both psychologists agreed that a bond existed between Mother 

and B.K.C based on their observations and evaluations of her, they differed 

over how strong the bond appeared to be and whether termination of her 

parental rights would be in B.K.C.’s best interest. Dr. Rosenblum testified 

that although B.K.C. does not rely on Mother to meet his day-to-day needs, 
J-S61029-16 

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a subsidized permanent legal custodianship (SPLC)4 would be optimal, since 

it could preserve the bond between Mother and B.K.C.

5

 See N.T. 

Termination Hearing, 2/19/16, at 107, 120. 

Dr. Bernstein indicated that “the relationship between grandmother 

and child was stable and secure and most significant for [B.K.C] at this time 

in his young age in life. And to compromise that by separating the child 

from his grandmother could be potentially traumatic.” Id. at 91. Dr. 

Bernstein also found Mother to be less engaged with B.K.C. than Dr. 

Rosenblum had observed. Ultimately, Dr. Bernstein stated that “[he] 

support[ed] the Court moving forward with the termination of [Mother’s] 

parental rights.” Id. at 75. 

 In determining that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in 

B.K.C.’s best interest, the trial court noted that it “judiciously evaluated the 

bond between Mother and Child and determined that there was no indication 

that an emotional bond exists to the extent that the termination of parental 

rights of Mother would cause Child to suffer extreme emotional 

consequences.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/16, at 6. A.C.H., supra; 

____________________________________________ 

4

 SPLC arrangements involve custody of a dependent child being awarded to 

a custodian who is provided a financial subsidy to care for the child. 

Parental rights are not terminated. 

5

 Mother has four children with four different fathers. Mother’s oldest child 

was adopted by her parents. A maternal uncle and his wife were awarded 

permanent legal custody of her two other children. 
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compare G.L.L., supra at 349 (“[T]he negative impact of keeping G.L.L. in 

foster care was outweighed by the permanent damage he would sustain 

were Mother’s parental rights terminated.”). 

In G.L.L., we upheld the ruling of the lower court that had denied 

involuntary termination of parental rights based upon its best-interest 

analysis. There, as here, “we cannot re-weigh the evidence or the credibility 

assessments made by the trial court.” Id. at 348. Instantly, the trial court’s 

decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights is supported by the record, 

including the opinion testimony provided by Dr. Bernstein. Accordingly, we 

discern no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/2/2016