OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION 

The Tojg Bridge Construction Is Nearly Complete, but 

Several Contract Issues Need to Be Addressed

March 1, 2010

SIGAR Audit-10-7 Contract Performance and Oversight
SIGAR Audit-10-7 Contract Performance and Oversight Page i

 

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

March 1, 2010

General David Petraeus, USA

Commander, U.S. Central Command

General Stanley A. McChrystal

Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, and 

 Commander, International Security Assistance Force 

Lieutenant General David Rodriguez

Commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command

 

This report discusses the results of our audit of the Farah Provincial Reconstruction Team’s 

$1.745 million contract to construct a bridge across the Farah River. It includes four

recommendations to help ensure U.S. resources are appropriately accounted for and that the 

bridge is safe and usable when completed. 

A summary of our report is on page ii. This performance audit was conducted under the authority 

of Public Law No. 110-181 and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. When preparing 

the final report, we considered comments on a draft of this report from U.S. Forces-Afghanistan 

(USFOR-A). In its comments, USFOR-A partially concurred with three of the recommendations and 

concurred with the fourth. However, USFOR-A indicated that the Farah PRT has taken or is taking 

steps that substantially address our recommendations. The comments are reproduced in appendix 

II of this report.

John Brummet

Assistant Inspector General for Audits

Office of the Special Inspector General

 for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGAR Audit-10-7 Contract Performance and Oversight Page ii

 Special inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

i

.

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What SIGAR Reviewed

Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are a key tool in helping Afghanistan become a self-sustaining, moderate state. To enable PRT 

commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements, PRTs may use Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program (CERP) funding. This report focuses on the efforts of the U.S.–led Farah PRT to construct a 300-meter bridge across 

the Farah River near Tojg village in Farah Province using CERP funding. A firm, fixed-priced, $1.745 million construction contract was 

awarded in September 2007. In August 2008, the follow-on PRT Commander questioned the usefulness of the bridge and 

recommended that the project be cancelled; however, after an investigation, the PRT’s command authority directed that the project 

continue. In this light, SIGAR examined the status of the bridge construction, focusing on several contract issues. SIGAR also examined 

PRT plans for turning the bridge over to the Afghan government. SIGAR reviewed available contract files, interviewed Farah PRT and 

other U.S. officials, and conducted an on-site inspection in June 2009. Since the inspection, SIGAR has corresponded with the current 

Farah PRT Commander to update information. SIGAR performed this performance audit in Afghanistan, from May 2009 to February 

2010, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

 SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

What SIGAR Found 

In December 2009, the Farah PRT estimated that the Tojg Bridge was 80 percent complete. However, due to work site flooding, the 

bridge completion date has been delayed to September 2010, with the PRT approving two 6-month extensions with no change in 

contract price. The PRT did not address the contractor’s spring 2009 request for an extension until SIGAR asked about it in December 

2009. In addition, the Farah PRT had not developed a plan for turning over the bridge and an associated gravel plant worth at least 

$300,000 to the appropriate Afghan ministry. Moreover, during SIGAR’s June 2009 site inspection, a SIGAR engineer raised several 

issues regarding the safety and usability of the bridge. Specifically, concrete testing and other quality control measures were 

inadequate to ensure the structural integrity of the bridge and land ownership rights of the bridge approaches were not documented. 

According to the Farah PRT’s current Commander in December 2009, these issues are being addressed, but, in some instances, SIGAR 

was unable to review documentation to support the Commander’s assertions. For example, as of the date of this report, the PRT had 

not provided SIGAR a signed modification to the contract for the second extension or documents showing clear land ownership rights.

SIGAR concluded in a September 2009 report on CERP monitoring (SIGAR-09-5) that incomplete files hampered adequate monitoring 

and management of CERP projects. Incomplete contract files have also contributed to the challenges the Farah PRT is currently 

addressing in executing this contract. 

Finally, sustainment of the bridge by the Afghan government remains a concern. Until after our visit in June 2009, the PRT had not 

involved the appropriate Afghan ministry in the construction of the bridge, although applicable guidance encourages PRTs to do so. In 

December 2009, the PRT Commander told SIGAR that although the Farah District Public Works Department was struggling to provide 

engineering support due to a lack of funding, equipment, and personnel, it had been present on every PRT site visit to the Tojg Bridge 

since October 2009.

SIGAR Audit-10-7 March 2010

The Tojg Bridge Construction Is Nearly Complete, 

but Several Contract Issues Need to Be Addressed

What SIGAR Recommends 

To help ensure both effective accounting of U.S. resources and the safety and usability of the Tojg Bridge when it is completed in 

September 2010, SIGAR recommends that the Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and International Security Assistance 

Force, direct the Farah PRT to implement the following four recommendations:

1) Establish accountability for the gravel plant and associated equipment to ensure the sustainability of the plant.

2) Ensure that necessary quality control and quality assurance procedures are performed and adequately documented.

3) Ensure that the land rights associated with the bridge approaches are documented and transferred to the Afghan government.

4) Address the deficiencies in the contract files per applicable guidance.

In commenting on a draft of this report, USFOR-A partially concurred with recommendations one, two, and four, and concurred with 

recommendation three. Nevertheless, based on the actions the Farah PRT has taken or plans to take in response to our findings, our 

recommendations are being addressed.

 Tojg Bridge, January 2010 

Source: Farah PRT, Jan. 2010.
SIGAR Audit-10-7 Contract Performance and Oversight Page iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background 1

Several Contract Issues Need to Be Addressed 4

Sustainability Remains a Concern 11

Conclusion 11

Recommendations 12

Comments 12

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 14

Appendix II: Comments from U.S. Forces-Afghanistan 15

FIGURES AND PHOTOS

Figure 1: International Security Assistant Force Regional Commands in Afghanistan 2

Figure 2: Key Events Related to the Tojg Bridge Construction Contract 4

Photo 1: Tojg Bridge Project Site, as of May 27, 2009 4

Photo 2: First Reinforced Concrete Arch in Place 5

Photo 3: Concrete Arches in Fabrication Pit 6

Photo 4: Tojg Bridge Construction, as of January 2010 6

Photo 5: Gravel Plant Associated with the Tojg Bridge Contract 7

Photo 6: Reinforcement Bar Cage for a Concrete Arch in a Fabrication Pit 8

Photo 7: Connection of a Concrete Arch to its Pier 9

ABBREVIATIONS

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program

GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

USFOR-A U.S. Forces-Afghanistan

USNCE U.S. National Command Element, Kandahar Airfield
SIGAR Audit-10-7 Contract Performance and Oversight 

The Tojg Bridge Construction Is Nearly Complete, but Several Contract Issues 

Need to Be Addressed

Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are a key tool in helping Afghanistan become a self-sustaining, 

moderate state. As joint civil-military organizations operating under the leadership of the Commander, 

U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and International Security Assistance Force, U.S. PRTs assist the

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) to increase its capacity to govern by 

encouraging good governance and enabling reconstruction and development. To help achieve these 

missions, PRTs coordinate reconstruction activities with the provincial government. To enable U.S.-led 

PRT commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements, PRTs may 

use Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding from the Department of Defense. 

This report focuses on the U.S.-led Farah PRT’s efforts to construct a $1.745 million bridge near the Tojg 

Village in Afghanistan’s Farah Province using CERP funding.1 We examined the status of the 

construction, particularly whether the Farah PRT had addressed outstanding contract issues—some 

affecting the bridge’s safety and usability. We also examined the PRT’s plans for turning the bridge and 

related facilities over to the appropriate Afghan government authorities. 

We conducted an on-site inspection of the Tojg Bridge in June 2009, reviewed available contract files

provided by the Farah PRT, and interviewed various stakeholders, including Farah PRT personnel and 

others overseeing the Tojg Bridge construction, and Farah provincial officials. Since our site inspection, 

we have corresponded with the current Farah PRT Commander.

2 We performed our work from May

2009 through February 2010, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

More details of our scope and methodology are provided in appendix I.

BACKGROUND

In September 2007, the Farah PRT awarded a $1.745 million, CERP-funded, firm fixed-price contract3

 

1 The Farah PRT includes about 100 military service members and representatives from the Departments of 

Agriculture and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

to

build a 300-meter bridge across the Farah River near the Tojg Village, about 45 kilometers southwest of 

Farah City. This contract was awarded to an Afghanistan company formed from several firms (referred 

to as the Joint Venture) in Farah Province. According to project documentation, the bridge was to be 

completed within 720 days after receiving a Notice to Proceed, or by September 20, 2009. To provide 

2 At the Farah PRT, the military command and military members have rotated three times since the initiation of the 

Tojg Bridge construction contract.

3 The contract was awarded by the Farah PRT’s Project Purchasing Officer, who is responsible for the procurement 

and contract administration of the Tojg Bridge contract.
SIGAR Audit-10-7 Contract Performance and Oversight Page 2

the large quantity of properly sized gravel, the Joint Venture developed a rock quarry and gravel plant. 

The plant consisted of a rock crusher, conveyors, and material handling capability and was situated near 

the Farah PRT. 

A useable bridge had not been in the area for more than 100 years. For much of the year, the river’s 

water flow allows people to safely cross. However, during the rainy season the water level rises up to 

6 feet, creating a hazard. The PRT reported that eight to ten persons are killed each year attempting to 

cross when water levels are high. According to project documentation, in addition to providing safe 

passage across the Farah River, the Tojg Bridge will link other Farah districts to Farah City, the capital

(see fig. 1). By reducing travel time to Farah City, the Tojg Bridge would enhance (1) economic activity, 

(2) security responsiveness for the Afghan National Army and National Police, and (3) access to 

government services such as medical facilities and schools. The bridge was heavily supported by the 

local Shura leader and provincial government. In a meeting with SIGAR representatives, the current 

provincial governor also strongly supported the project. 

Figure 1: International Security Assistance Force Regional Commands in Afghanistan 

Sources: NATO, “ISAF and Afghan National Army Strength & Laydown,” 

www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf, accessed Sept. 30, 2009. The location of the bridge site is 

representational and not meant to be geographically precise.

Note: RC stands for Regional Command, which are geographic regions defined by the International Security 

Assistance Force. Farah Province is within the ISAF Regional Command-West area of responsibility. The Farah PRT 

operates from a compound on the outskirts of Farah City. 
SIGAR Audit-10-7 Contract Performance and Oversight Page 3

In March 2008, the military members of the PRT rotated. Despite the asserted benefits of the Tojg 

Bridge, the next Farah PRT Civil Affairs Officer and PRT Commander questioned whether to proceed with 

the Tojg Bridge construction due to concerns about the usefulness of the bridge. For example,

• In April 2008, the Farah PRT’s Civil Affairs Officer questioned the benefits of the Tojg Bridge project 

in a Memorandum for the Record. He stated that the project was a poor use of resources and 

would not achieve the benefits intended. The Civil Affairs Officer recommended that the bridge be 

constructed at a different site.

• In August 2008, the Farah PRT Commander wrote a Memorandum for the Record that said the 

project had been mishandled from the start and that the bridge would have minimal, if any, positive 

effects for the GIRoA. The Commander questioned the decision to make large contract payments to 

finance the construction of a private gravel plant. The PRT Commander pointed out that, as of July 

2008, the PRT estimated that the bridge was only 1 percent complete even though the Joint Venture 

had been paid more than $576,000 or 33 percent of the total contract value.4

 The Commander 

recommended that the Tojg Bridge contract be terminated. 

In light of these concerns, the Commander of U.S. National Command Element (USNCE) at Kandahar 

Airfield ordered an investigation.

5 On November 24, 2008, the USNCE Commander directed that the 

Tojg Bridge construction project continue with enhanced PRT oversight after reviewing the results of the 

investigation and additional documentation provided by the PRT, and conducting discussions with the 

parties involved, including the PRT Commanders. In his Memorandum for File, the USNCE Commander 

noted that early documentation on the Tojg Bridge project was lacking. However, he determined that 

“significant PRT-initiated control measures can alleviate these missteps” and that the gravel plant was 

an implied part of the bridge project. The USNCE Commander added that upon completion of the Tojg 

Bridge both the bridge and the gravel plant should be turned over to the appropriate GIRoA authority. 

See photo 1 for the layout of the Tojg Bridge project site.

 

4 This large disparity was primarily due to the previous PRT Commander’s decision to finance construction and 

operation of the gravel plant using contract payments.

5 Oversight of the Farah PRT CERP projects was the responsibility of USNCE at Kandahar Airfield near Kandahar City 

about 430 kilometers east of the Farah PRT. 
SIGAR Audit-10-7 Contract Performance and Oversight Page 4

Photo 1: Tojg Bridge Project Site, as of May 27, 2009

Source: U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, Afghanistan Engineer District.

SEVERAL CONTRACT ISSUES NEED TO BE ADDRESSED

In December 2009, the Farah PRT estimated that the Tojg Bridge was 80 percent complete. Due to work 

site flooding, the completion date has been extended to September 2010—about 1 year later than 

originally planned—with the PRT approving two 6-month, no-cost extensions to the original contract 

completion period. However, the PRT did not address the Joint Venture’s spring 2009 request for an

extension until we raised the issue in December 2009. In addition, the PRT had not completed a plan for 

turning over the bridge and gravel plant to the GIRoA. See figure 2 for a timeline. 

Figure 2: Key Events Related to the Tojg Bridge Construction Contract 

Source: SIGAR analysis of Farah PRT data.

Contract Award

PRT Rotation

PRT Commander 

Recommended 

Contract Termination

PRT Rotation

USNCE Directed PRT 

to Proceed with 

Contract Execution

SIGAR Inspection

PRT Rotation

Projected Contract 

Completion 

Date

$500K

$750K

$1,000K

$250K

Original Contract 

Completion Date

Gravel Plant 

Operations Began

Sep-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Oct-08 Jan-09 Apr-09 Aug-09 Nov-09 Feb-10 May-10 Sep-10

Contract 

Payments

Hwy 118 to 

Farah City

First installed arch

Arch fabrication and laydown area

Pier foundations under construction
SIGAR Audit-10-7 Contract Performance and Oversight Page 5

Moreover, during our June 2009 site inspection, a SIGAR engineer raised several matters regarding the 

safety and usability of the bridge that remained to be addressed. In particular, 

• Concrete strength testing procedures and other quality control measures were inadequate to 

ensure the long-term structural integrity of the bridge.

• Ownership rights of the land leading to the bridge were not clearly established.

In corresponding with the Farah PRT’s current Commander in November and December 2009, we found 

that these matters are being addressed. However, in some instances, the contact files were incomplete,

and we were not able to obtain documentation to support the PRT Commander’s assertions. For 

instance, quality assurance files for documenting material testing were incomplete. These issues need 

to be addressed before the Tojg Bridge construction is completed. 

Consideration of the Joint Venture’s Requests for Extension of Completion Date Was Delayed

As indicated in the Farah PRT Commander’s August 2008 memorandum and other documentation, the 

Joint Venture had not planned for seasonal flooding in its contract bid and timeline for completion. In 

the spring of 2008, floods affected the work site. After the USNCE Commander directed that the Tojg 

Bridge contract be continued, the Farah PRT Project Purchasing Officer approved a 6-month, no-cost 

extension on February 11, 2009. This moved the contract completion date to March 13, 2010. 

However, the worksite was affected again by flooding in the spring of 2009 (see photos 2 and 3). 

Photo 2: First Reinforced Concrete Arch in Place

Source: SIGAR, June 11, 2009.

Note: Debris from flooding remains on the reinforcement bars and on top of the pier.
SIGAR Audit-10-7 Contract Performance and Oversight Page 6

Photo 3: Concrete Arches in a Fabrication Pit 

Source: SIGAR, June 11, 2009.

Note: Three concrete arches are in a pit used to fabricate the arches. Silt from the spring 2009 flooding has filled 

at least a third of the pit. 

In spring 2009, the Joint Venture requested a second extension to the contract completion period. 

However, the PRT had not addressed the Joint Venture’s request at the time of our site inspection in 

June 2009. Thus, the PRT lost an opportunity to influence the efforts of the Joint Venture. After we 

raised concerns about the PRT’s delay in June 2009 and again in December 2009, PRT officials informed 

us that they were addressing the Joint Venture’s request. A no-cost extension is under review by the 

Kandahar Airfield Legal Department. In December 2009, the PRT estimated that the bridge construction 

was 80 percent complete with substantial progress being made (see photo 4). 

Photo 4: Tojg Bridge Construction, as of January 2010

Source: Courtesy of the Farah PRT.
SIGAR Audit-10-7 Contract Performance and Oversight Page 7

Ownership and Use of the Gravel Plant Remained Unclear Until February 2010

In his November 2008 Memorandum for File, the USNCE Commander determined that the gravel plant 

(see photo 5) was an implied part of the bridge project and should be turned over to the appropriate 

GIRoA authority. During our site inspection in June 2009, however, we raised concerns over the PRT’s 

lack of progress in documenting the equipment and facilities that comprise the gravel plant and the lack 

of involvement by the GIRoA. 

Photo 5: Gravel Plant Associated with the Tojg Bridge Contract 

Source: SIGAR, June 12, 2009.

At the time of our site inspection and in the months afterwards, the PRT did not develop a 

comprehensive list of assets necessary to sustain gravel plant operations. Based on contract 

documentation, we found that the Joint Venture defined the gravel plant’s equipment and facility 

requirements after contract award by requesting a $300,000 payment for a list of equipment to be 

purchased. The PRT made the payment in November 2007. After several discussions, in January 2010, 

the current PRT reiterated its position that this equipment will be turned over to the GIRoA. 

The plant began operations in May 2008 and has been supplying gravel to numerous projects around 

the province as well as for the bridge construction. In July 2008, the PRT determined that the Joint 

Venture had earned at least $380,000 for gravel delivered to other projects. In addition, in December

2009, the Farah PRT indicated that the GIRoA Ministry of Public Works had become involved. However, 

the PRT had not developed a plan for training personnel to operate and maintain the plant or for turning 

over plant operations. The PRT needs to facilitate a smooth turnover to avoid an interruption in 

production because the gravel plant is already contributing to the economic activity of the province.

In commenting on a draft of this report, USFOR-A disagreed with the USNCE Commander’s November 

2008 determination that the gravel plant was an implied part of the contract and should be turned over 
SIGAR Audit-10-7 Contract Performance and Oversight Page 8

to the appropriate GIRoA authority. USFOR-A noted that the gravel plant and related equipment were 

not referenced in the Tojg Bridge construction contract. Further, according to USFOR-A, in February 

2010, the Farah PRT, the appropriate GIRoA ministries, and the Joint Venture agreed that the Joint 

Venture will retain full rights to the gravel plant. 

Material Testing of Structural Components Was Not Documented

During our site inspection, discussions with the Joint Venture’s Concrete Superintendent and PRT 

personnel revealed that proper material testing was not occurring. For example, the superintendent 

stated that to test the concrete placed in the arches (see photo 3), they took test cylinders to a nearby 

village and used a press to put weight on them. Since the cylinders did not break, he concluded that 

they were strong enough. This testing method will not accurately estimate the strength of the concrete 

placed in various sections of the bridge. The design requires that pressure be applied until the test 

cylinder breaks. The value of the force at that point is used to estimate the concrete strength. 

We also noted that weekly engineer reports required by the contract were not being provided. Such 

contractor quality control reports should include documentation such as material test results, the 

quality of stone, and verification that concrete reinforcement bars are properly positioned prior to 

concrete placements (see photo 6). 

Photo 6: Reinforcement Bar Cage for a Concrete Arch in a Fabrication Pit 

Source: SIGAR, June 11, 2009.

We found no indications that the welds connecting the concrete arches to the pier foundations would 

be completed by qualified welders or tested (see photo 7). 
SIGAR Audit-10-7 Contract Performance and Oversight Page 9

Photo 7: Connection of a Concrete Arch to its Pier

Source: SIGAR, June 11, 2009.

Note: The arch is held in place on the pier by a temporary weld, which is marked by the oval. The photo also 

shows evidence of damage from the spring flooding with some reinforcement bars still bent over from the 

flooding.

Documentation of the PRT quality assurance efforts was lacking. The available reports documented 

some deficiencies in quality, but follow-up and corrective actions, if any, were not documented. 

Although the PRT reported conducting frequent meetings and providing verbal feedback to the Joint 

Venture in June 2009, the meetings were not documented in the files. The PRT staff recognized that the 

documentation was deficient and indicated that the PRT had insufficient resources to document all of its 

quality assurance activities. This lack of documentation could hamper efforts to effectively oversee 

quality control and influence the work of the Joint Venture, especially following PRT rotations. Without 

documentation of these quality control efforts, the PRT cannot ensure the structural integrity of the 

bridge.

In December 2009, the Farah PRT stated that the contractor was required to test the concrete cylinders 

only if directed by the Contracting Officers Representative. However, according to the PRT, during the 

fabrication of the arches and piers the Joint Venture had been taking test cylinders and storing them 

pending a request to have them tested. The PRT has now directed the Joint Venture to test the 

cylinders. Although the design required the tests to be made approximately 28 days after placement, 

the PRT’s planned procedure should be adequate for an engineer to confirm the structural integrity of 

the concrete. The PRT is also exploring how to verify that welds will meet design criteria and, at the

request of the PRT, the Joint Venture began providing weekly engineer reports. If the PRT follows 

through with these actions, the Joint Venture’s quality control procedures should be adequate to ensure

the structural safety of the completed bridge.
SIGAR Audit-10-7 Contract Performance and Oversight Page 10

Ownership of the Land Leading to the Bridge Was Not Addressed

During our site inspection, a man from Tojg Village told us that he owned the land on one end of the 

bridge. Through an interpreter, he stated that he was very happy that the bridge was being constructed 

and he would let the government use his land for free. The Farah PRT confirmed that the ownership of 

the land under the bridge approaches had not been verified. The governor indicated that he could assist 

the PRT to coordinate with the Ministry of Public Works and address land ownership issues. The land 

rights to the bridge approaches will be critical to the use of the bridge. In December 2009, the Farah 

PRT indicated that the Tojg Village area Shura leader is helping to develop the appropriate documents to 

provide the land rights. 

Contract Files Are Incomplete

The Farah PRT Project Purchasing Officer was not maintaining contract files as required by CERP 

guidance.

6

 Although the background information and progress reports cited in this report were in the 

files, signed copies of some of the correspondence and other key documents were missing. In our 

September 2009 report on CERP monitoring, we found that incomplete contract files were a problem.7

 

In particular, incomplete files hampered adequate monitoring and management of CERP projects.

Incomplete documentation contributed to each of our concerns. The PRT was initially unable to provide 

a signed copy of the first extension, and approval of the Joint Venture’s spring 2009 request for the 

second extension was not formally documented. The PRT has not developed a comprehensive list of 

gravel plant assets that will be turned over to GIRoA. Quality control and quality assurance documents 

were incomplete, which led to uncertainties about the structural integrity of the bridge construction. 

Although the USNCE Commander noted the incomplete documentation in his November 2008 

memorandum, we found no indication that the Farah PRT had taken action to make the files more 

complete before June 2009.

The files were also missing the proposals or bids and other competition documentation. This 

documentation can be critical when negotiating modifications to the contract or ensuring that the 

contractor has not substituted less expensive material. Due to vague contract specifications, the joint 

venture was allowed to set some key contract requirements through communications subsequent to 

contract award. With little signed documentation, the Project Purchasing Officers assigned to this 

contract did not have the normal controls in place for avoiding or detecting fraud or for ensuring that 

the government receives the products and services intended by the original contracting officer.

 

6 The Standard Operating Procedures for CERP (version 2, page 11) issued April 17, 2006, requires the Project 

Purchasing Officer to maintain CERP project documents for 5 years. 

7 See SIGAR, Increased Visibility, Monitoring, and Planning Needed for Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

in Afghanistan (SIGAR-09-5, Sept. 9, 2009). We recommended that U.S. Forces–Afghanistan develop and 

implement a process to systematically collect and track information for CERP projects, implement a solution for 

centralizing CERP records, and develop and implement a plan to address the management of large-scale projects of 

$500,000 or higher.
SIGAR Audit-10-7 Contract Performance and Oversight Page 11

In June 2009, the Farah PRT’s Project Purchasing Officer stated that he had limited training in 

procurement and had received no oversight of his procurement responsibilities. He asserted that this 

was also true for his predecessors. In addition, the PRT has changed leadership and responsibility for 

the Tojg Bridge construction contract three times since September 2007 when the contract was signed. 

The lack of training and turnover of personnel likely contributed to the loss of documentation and 

incomplete contract files.

SUSTAINABILTY REMAINS A CONCERN

According to International Security Assistance Force guidance, PRTs are to identify and implement 

projects through the appropriate GIRoA ministries to build governance capability and enhance GIRoA 

leadership and ownership of projects. PRTs are also to guide and mentor from “behind and 

underneath,” ensuring Afghan leadership and ownership.

8

 

Although the PRT had facilitated a trip to the bridge site for the Farah governor, no GIRoA ministry 

representative had been on site or involved in the design and construction of the bridge as of June 2009. 

The bridge construction provided an opportunity to acquaint GIRoA officials with the design of the 

bridge and necessary actions to procure similar improvements. By involving the appropriate ministry, 

sustainment issues can be addressed early during the life of the project as required by the International 

Security Assistance Force guidance. This is especially critical for the gravel plant equipment and related 

facilities, which has created a new capability for the provincial economy. 

In December 2009, the PRT Commander told us that officials from the Farah District Public Works

Department had been present on every PRT site visit to the Tojg Bridge since October. However, the 

Commander also noted that the District Public Works Department was struggling to provide engineering 

support to the Farah District due to a lack of funding, equipment, and personnel. 

CONCLUSION

Although the Tojg Bridge is now projected to be completed by September 2010—nearly a year later than

originally planned—a number of contract-related issues remain to be addressed. Specifically, to protect 

the U.S. investment, the PRT had not fully accounted for the gravel plant and associated equipment

worth at least $300,000. In addition, material testing still needs to be adequately documented and the

land rights to the bridge approaches must be addressed. Moreover, the Tojg Bridge contract files are 

incomplete and, until recently, an appropriate GIRoA authority had not been involved in the bridge 

construction or plans for the eventual turnover of the bridge and gravel plant. More attention to 

contract administration and oversight by the Farah PRT would likely have avoided some of the issues we 

found. In December 2009, the Farah PRT Commander reported a number of initiatives, which, if 

followed through, should address these issues and will greatly increase the likelihood that the U.S. 

investment will be adequately accounted for and that the Tojg Bridge will be safe and usable. 

 

8 Ensuring Afghan leadership and ownership are two of several guiding principles provided in the International 

Security Assistance Force PRT Handbook, Edition 4.
SIGAR Audit-10-7 Contract Performance and Oversight Page 12

RECOMMENDATIONS

To help ensure both effective accounting for U.S. resources and the safety and usability of the Tojg 

Bridge when it is completed in September 2010, we recommend that the Commander, USFOR-A and 

International Security Assistance Force direct the Farah PRT to take appropriate actions to implement 

the following four recommendations:

1) Establish accountability for the gravel plant and associated equipment to ensure the sustainability of 

the plant.

2) Ensure that necessary quality control and quality assurance procedures are performed and 

adequately documented, including ensuring that:

a. Testing of critical construction materials is completed,

b. The structural concrete meets design requirements, and

c. Weekly engineer reports that document quality control and corrective actions are prepared.

3) Ensure that the land rights associated with the bridge approaches are documented and transferred 

to the GIRoA.

4) Address the deficiencies in the contract files per applicable guidance. 

COMMENTS

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) provided written comments on a draft of this report. The comments 

are reproduced in appendix II. USFOR-A partially concurred with recommendations one, two, and four 

and concurred with recommendation three. Nevertheless, based on the actions the Farah PRT has taken 

or plans to take in response to our findings, we believe our recommendations are being addressed. 

USFOR-A partially concurred with our recommendation to establish accountability for the gravel plant 

and ensure a smooth transition to minimize disrupting the local economy. In the draft report, we also 

suggested the gravel plant should be turned over to an appropriate Afghan ministry. In its comments, 

USFOR-A disagreed with the USNCE Commander’s November 2008 determination that the gravel plant 

was an implied part of the contract and should be turned over to GIRoA. USFOR-A’s current position is 

that it can find no legal obligation for the Joint Venture to turn the plant and equipment over to GIRoA. 

During our audit we found that funds were advanced by the Farah PRT for the Joint Venture to construct 

the gravel plant and, throughout the course of our audit, the Farah PRT maintained that the plant would 

be turned over to the appropriate ministry. Nonetheless, now that the Tojg Bridge is nearly complete 

and within the contract’s original firm, fixed-price, we do not dispute USFOR-A’s current interpretation. 

Moreover, USFOR-A stated in its comments that in February 2010, the Farah PRT met with the Afghan 

Ministry of Public Works, the Afghan Minister of Economy, and the Joint Venture to discuss the gravel 

plant. According to USFOR-A, the meeting participants “determined and agreed” that if no additional 

funds were provided through the Tojg Bridge contract, that the Joint Venture had full rights to the gravel 

plant’s land and equipment. This meeting effectively addressed the overall intent of our 

recommendation that the Farah PRT work with GIRoA to account for the gravel plant and equipment. 
SIGAR Audit-10-7 Contract Performance and Oversight Page 13

However, given the prior uncertainty over the gravel plant’s ownership and its source of funding, we 

strongly urge USFOR-A and the Farah PRT to fully document their current position for turning the plant 

and equipment over to the Joint Venture and to include this documentation in the contract files. 

USFOR-A partially concurred with our recommendation to ensure that the necessary quality control and 

quality assurance measures are performed and adequately documented. USFOR-A noted the actions 

the Farah PRT has taken or plans to take to address our recommendation. Most notably, the comments 

state that in February 2010, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers conducted an assessment of the Tojg 

Bridge construction procedures and quality control. USFOR-A’s comments state that the assessment 

verified that the Tojg Bridge quality control procedures have been adequate, which provides reasonable 

assurance that structural concrete placed prior to initiation of testing in August 2009 meets design 

requirements. 

USFOR-A concurred with the recommendation to ensure that the land rights associated with the bridge 

approaches are documented and transferred to the GIRoA. USFOR-A’s comments state that local land 

owners have granted the rights in question. 

USFOR-A partially concurred with our recommendation to address deficiencies in the contract files. 

USFOR-A described actions the PRT has taken that substantially respond to our recommendation. As 

noted in this report and confirmed by USFOR-A’s response, the most critical aspects of the incomplete 

files we noted in June 2009 have been addressed. We did not intend that the current PRT recreate the 

missing documents. 
SIGAR Audit-10-7 Contract Performance and Oversight Page 14

APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report discusses the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction’s review to determine the status of the Tojg Bridge construction contract and address 

several outstanding contract issues.

To conduct this work, we reviewed documentation and conducted interviews with responsible officials 

at Farah, Kandahar, and Bagram, Afghanistan. Specifically, we:

• Conducted an on-site inspection of the Tojg Bridge on June 11, 2009. Personnel from the Farah PRT 

accompanied the SIGAR team. 

• Interviewed the Farah PRT Commander and other knowledgeable members of his staff, the 

governor of Farah Province, the Tojg Village area Shura leader, and the concrete superintendent of 

the Joint Venture constructing the bridge. 

• Reviewed CERP and procurement documentation available from the Commander, U.S. National 

Command Element (USNCE) Kandahar Airfield; the USNCE CERP Manager, Kandahar Airfield; and the 

Farah PRT contract and related files.

• Interviewed the Commander, USNCE, Kandahar Airfield; three different USNCE CERP Managers; and 

personnel in the Regional Contracting Center-South at Kandahar Airfield.

• Interviewed personnel in the office of the Principal Assistant Responsible for ContractingAfghanistan at Bagram Airfield.

Finally, via e-mail in November 2009 through January 2010 with the current Commander of the Farah 

PRT, we updated our information concerning the gravel plant and status of the bridge construction and 

received some additional contract file documentation.

We conducted our work from May 2009 to January 2010 in Farah, Kandahar, and Bagram, Afghanistan in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. These standards require that we 

plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusion based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusion based on our audit objectives. The performance audit 

was conducted by SIGAR under the authority of Section 1229, Public Law No. 110-181, and the Inspector 

General Act of 1978, as amended. 
SIGAR Audit-10-7 Contract Performance and Oversight Page 15

APPENDIX II: COMMENTS FROM U.S. FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
SIGAR Audit-10-7 Contract Performance and Oversight Page 16
SIGAR Audit-10-7 Contract Performance and Oversight Page 17

 

(This review was initiated under SIGAR Project Code 09-IN-004)
_________________________________________________________________________________

SIGAR’s Mission The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan

Reconstruction is to enhance oversight of programs for the 

reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and 

objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of 

taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide 

accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and 

recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and 

other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and 

funding decisions to:

• improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction strategy 

and its component programs;

• improve management and accountability over funds 

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their 

contractors;

• improve contracting and contract management processes;

• prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and

• advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan.

Obtaining Copies of SIGAR To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to 

Reports and Testimonies SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all released 

reports, testimonies, and correspondence on its Web site.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

Abuse in Afghanistan allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and

Reconstruction Programs reprisal contact SIGAR’s hotline:

• Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud

• Email: hotline@sigar.mil

• Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300

• Phone DSN Afghanistan 318-237-2575

• Phone International: +1-866-329-8893

• Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378

• U.S. fax: +1-703-604-0983

Public Affairs Public Affairs Officer

• Phone: 703-602-8742

• Email: PublicAffairs@sigar.mil

• Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs

400 Army Navy Drive

Arlington, VA 22202