A TTORNEY S FOR A PPELLANT S A TTORNEY S FOR A PPELLEE S

Gavin M. Rose Gregory F. Zoeller ACLU of Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana David L. Steiner Jacquelyn Bowie Suess Deputy Attorney General India napolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana

______________________________________________________________________________ 

# In the 

# Indiana Supreme Court

_________________________________ No. 49S02

- 1107

- PL

- 437

S HEILA P ERDUE , ET AL ., Appellants (Plai ntiffs below)
,

v.

M ICHAEL A. G ARGANO , 1 ET AL ., Appellee s (Defendants b e low)

.

_________________________________ Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 4 9 D 10

- 0 803

- PL

- 13340

The Honorable David J. Dreyer , Judge

_________________________________ On Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 4 9 A0 2

- 100 3

- PL

- 25 0

_________________________________

March 2 2 , 2012
Dickson, Justice.

In this challenge to the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration 's (FSSA) a utomated system of processing clai ms for Medicaid, Food Stamps, and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) benefits, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and hold that the FSSA's denial notices are insufficiently explanatory but that the FSSA may deny an appl i cation

1 In the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the named defendant

- appellee was Anne W. Murphy in her official capacity as the Secretary of the Family and Social Serv ices Administration. Ms. Murphy

was succeeded by Michael A. Gargano as Secretary in the intervening time . As such, Mr. Ga r gano has been au t omatically substituted for Ms. Murphy as the defendant

- appellee pursuant to Indiana Appe l late Rule 17(C)(1).2

for Food S tamp benefits when the applicant fails to cooperate in the eligibility determination

process. We affirm in part the trial court's grant of Perdue's motion for summary judgment and
hold that Sheila Perdue is entitled to reasonable accommodation s in applyin g for benefits but that
this does not necessarily require providing a caseworker or case management servi c es.

The plaintiffs brought this class action complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief alleg ing violations of their federal statutory and c onstitutional rights. The plaintiffs co n sist of
three plaintiff

- c lasses (Class A, Sub

- class A, and Class C) and Sheila Perdue individually. The

p laintiffs in Class A and Sub

- class A allege that the notices used by the FSSA to inform appl icants 2 for Medic aid, Food Stamp, and TANF benefits of an adverse determination of eligibil i ty vi olate thei r rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and federal Medicaid regulations

. 3 These plaintiffs contend that the adverse action notices do not provide a sufficient explanation of the reasons for the FSSA's elig i bility
determination. The plaintiffs in Class C al lege that the FSSA violates federal Food Stamp law
when it denies plaintiffs ' applications for benefits based upon a determination that the applicant
has "fail ed to cooperate" in the application process. 4 These plaintiffs contend that fe d eral law only permits an applicant to be denied benefits for affirmatively " refus ing to cooperate. " Alte rnatively, the plaintiffs in Class C claim that
, even if the FSSA's grounds for determining that the plaintiffs have "failed to cooperate" in the application process are sufficient to support a determ ination that the plaintiffs have "refused to cooperate," the FSSA has v iolated the due process rights of the plaintiffs by providing the incorrect reason for the agency's adverse eligibility d etermination. Lastly, Sheila Pe r due claims that, in discontinuing her Food Stamp and Medicaid benefits, the FSSA violated her rights u nder the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

2 For simplicity, "applicant(s)" is used to refer to both first

- time applicants seeking initial certification of eligibility and current benefits recipients seeking recertification of eligibility. Adverse determ inations are generally termed "denials" for new ap plicants and are termed "discontinuations" for current beneficiaries. The processes for certification and recertification are described in detail elsewhere in the opinion. 3 Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that the FSSA has violated Title 42, S ection 4 31.205(d) of the Code of Federal Regula tions, which pertains to Medicaid . Appellants' Br. at 25 n.11. Section 431.205(d), however, mandates only that the Medicaid hearing procedures comply with "the due process standards set forth by Goldberg v. Kelly , 3 97 U.S. 254 (1970) ." 42 C.F.R. § 431.205(d). As such, the plaintiffs' stat utory claim under Section 431.205(d) is duplicative of their constitutional due process claim.

4 The plaintiffs argue that an adverse eligibility determination based on an applican t's "failure to cooperate" contravenes the require ments of Title 7, S ection 2015(c) of the United States Code and Title 7, S ection 273.2(d)(1) of the Code of Federal Regulations.3

("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § § 12101

– 12300, and Section 794 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("RA")
, 29 U.S.C. § 794 , by failing to a c commodate her disability as required by the Acts

. 5

In the trial court, t he plain tiffs moved for summary judgment as to all three claims. The
State filed a response requesting that the trial court deny summary judgment to the plaintiffs and
instead enter summary judgment in favor of the State as to all three counts in accordance with
I n diana Trial Rule 56(B)

. 6 The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion as to Class A and Sub

clas s A finding that due process was satisfied by the FSSA's "multi

- step proces s for eligibility
d e termina tion " and entered summary judgment for the State. Fin dings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Summary Judgment, Appellants' App'x at 29 , 37

. As to Class C, the trial court granted summary judgment to the p laintiffs
, concluding that federal Food Stamp law only permits a d enial of benefits where the applicant h as " refused to cooperate. " See i d

. at 30

– 31, 37. Accordin gly, the trial court permanently enjoined the FSSA from "terminating, denying, or discont i nuing the Food Stamp applications or benefits of the members of Class C based on a n alleged 'failure to

coo p e rate ' with the agency." Id. at 37

– 38. Finally, as to Sheila Perdue , the trial court granted her motion for summary judgment , concluding that the FSSA had failed to accommodate her disabi lities in violation of the ADA and the RA

. Id. at 36

– 37

. The cou rt " permanently e n joined [ the
FSSA ] from terminating, denying, or discontinuing the Medicaid, Food Stamp, and TANF appl ications or benefits of Sheila Perdue based on an alleged 'failure to cooperate' with the agency unless and until the agency provides [he r] with a caseworker or case management services ad equate to ensure that [her] individual disabilities are accommodated by the agency ." Id. at 38. The plai n tiffs filed an appeal as to Class A and Sub

- class A, and the State cross

- appealed as to
Class C an d Sheila Perdue. The Court of Appeals r e versed the trial court as to Class A and Sub

Class A concluding that due process entitles applicants to notice of the "sp e cific reason for [the
FSSA ' ]s denial deci sion " and affirmed the trial court as to the claims of Class C and Sheila Pe rdue finding that the trial court had merely ordered the FSSA "to follow the law." Perdue v. Mu rphy , 938 N.E.2d 766, 775

– 76, 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). We granted tran s fer and now reverse

5 29 U.S.C. § 794 is commonly referred to as Section 504 of the Rehabilitat ion Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93

- 112, 87 Stat. 355.

6 Indiana Trial Rule 56(B) provides, in relevant part: "When any party has moved for summary judgment, the court may grant summary judgment for any other party upon the issues raised by the m otion although no m o tion for summary judgment is filed by such party."4

the trial court as to Class A and Sub

- Class A and as to Class C, and also affirm in part the trial

court as to She i la Perdue

.

The parties do not dispute the underlying facts of this case , which are s ummarized herein. The FSSA is charged with, among other things, administering the Medicaid, Food S tamp, and TANF programs for the S tate of Indiana. Each of these programs provide we l fare benefits to
individuals and families in need of financial assistance in Indiana . To be deemed eligible for a particular pro gram , an individual must be certified as e ligible by the FSSA and recertified e i ther annually or semi

- annually depending on the particular program. The processes for initial certification and recertification are virtually identical, though recertification generally requires less i nformation from the applicant.

The first step in the certification process is an interview between an FSSA caseworker and an applicant, which is scheduled by the FSSA's computer system. The interview is conduc ted either over the telephone or in

- person, depending on th e county where the applicant r e sides. During the interview, t he caseworker and the applicant explore potential areas of eligibil i ty for particular programs and discuss the types of information and verification documents n e cessary to establish eligibility. The applicant then receives State Form 2032 entitled "Pending Verific a tions for Applicants/Recipients" specifying the particular documentation that is required by the agency
to establish eligibility. 7 Form 2032 lists several categories of information ( e .g., "Age, Citize nship, Immigration Status " ; "Relationship/Identity"; "Bank Accounts/ Financial Holdings") for which the FSSA might request documentation . Each category provides examples of the types of
documents that an applicant can submit as verificatio n of the required inform a tion. Next to each listed category is a box that can be checked to indicate the specific categories of documentation required to establish a particular applicant's eligibility . In some cases the caseworker who co nducts the interv iew will include additional hand

- writ t e n notes in the margins indicating particular
documents needed for a determination

. Form 2032 expressly states that appl i cants are permitted to submit documents other than those specifically requested that provide the same i n formation.

7 It is unclear from the designated materials whether Form 2032 is given to the applicant at the i nterview, if it is conducted in

- person, or sent via the mail subsequently.5

It also directs applicants to call their interviewer if they have questions and provides the inte rviewer's name and contact info r mation.

If the applicant fails to submit all of the necessary documentation within the designated time per iod, the application for benefits is denied or, in the case of recertification, the applicant's
benefits are discontinued

. 8 Once such a determination has been made, the FSSA sends the appl icant a notice of adverse action informing the applicant of the age ncy's d ecision. The notice co ntains the name of the applicant, the program name for which benefits were sought, the date of the applica tion, and the code(s) with the corresponding standardized explanation of the reason (s) for
the adverse action ("reason c odes") (e.g., "Failure to cooperate in verifying income"; "Failure to cooperate in verifying the value of resources"). The notice does not provide any additional e xplanation of the reason s for the denial. At the top of the notice is a toll

- free 1

- 800 tel ephone
number and the mailing a d dress for the FSSA.

We review an appeal of a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment using the same standard applicable to the tri al court. Wilson v. Isaacs , 929 N.E.2d 200, 202 (Ind. 2010).
Ther e fore, s umma ry judgment is appropriate only if the designated evidence reveals "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Appellate review of summary judgment is limited t o evidence de signated to the trial court. Ind. Trial Rule 56(H). All facts and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence designated by the parties must be construed in the light most f a vorable to the non

moving party. Mangold ex rel. Mangold v. Ind. Dept. of Natural Res

. , 756 N.E.2d 970, 973 ( Ind. 2001). We do not defer to the trial court's determination of the law. Wilson , 929 N.E.2d at
202

– 03 (citing Freidline v. Shelby Ins. Co. , 774 N.E.2d 37, 39 (Ind. 2002) )

.

1. Due Process and Adverse Action No tices

The p laintiffs in Class A and Sub

- class A argue that the notices used by the FSSA to i nform class member

- applicants that they have been denied Medicaid, Food Stamp, or TANF pr o-

8 For simplicity, both den ials and discontinuances of benefits are referred to collectively as "den ials."6

gram benefits violate their rights u n der the Due Process Clause of the Fo urteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Title 42, S ection 431.205(d) of the Code of Federal Regul ations pertaining to Medicaid. They argue that the reason codes fail to adequately explain the agency's reasons for denying benefits . Specif ically, they challenge six reason codes:

 Failure to cooperate in establishing eligibility (Code 309) 9

 Failure to cooperate in verifying income (Code 315)

 Failure to cooperate in verifying the value of resources (Code 484)

 Failure to verify Indiana residenc y (Code 574)

 Failure to cooperate in verifying assistance group composition (Code 587)

 Failure to submit medical information necessary to establish eligibility (Code 595) Appellants' Br. at 12; Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Jud gment , Appellees ' App'x at 364

– 65

. The plaintiffs contend that due process requires "notice spe cifying which specific document or documents [an applicant] is alleged to have failed to provide "
so that individuals can make informed decisions about whet her to appeal an adverse determin ation. Appellants' Br. at 31. We agree that due process requires a more detailed explanation of the reasons underlying an a d verse determination

.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment declares that no State shall " d eprive any pe r son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend.
XIV , § 1. D ue process requires a two

- part inquiry : "The first inquiry in every due process cha llenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a pr o tected interest in 'property' or 'liberty. ' Only after finding the deprivation of a pro tected interest do we look to see if the State's proc edures comport with due process." Am

. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan , 526 U.S. 40 , 59 , 119 S. Ct. 977, 989, 14 3 L. Ed. 2d 130, 149 (1999) (citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV
, § 1 and Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 332 , 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976)) (cit a tions omitted)

.

Both parties a c knowledge that the entitlement benefits at issue in this case (Medicaid
, Food Stamp, TANF) are properly characterized as "property" interests within the meaning of the

9 The State notes that the FSSA has discontinued the use of this particular reason code. Noneth eless, we agree with the plaintiffs that this fact is not relevant to the dispos ition of this issue for two re asons: First, as the plaintiffs argue, the code has potentially served as the basis for termination in some of the class

- members cases. Second, as the Court of Appeals concluded, 938 N.E.2d at 770 n.4, the FSSA's discontinuat ion of the code was entirely voluntary and the FSSA has made no formal commitment to r efrain from using the code again in the future.7

Due Process Clause. Appellants' Br. at 24; Appellees' Br. at 16. We agree. There is no question that these entitlement benefits are "property" entitled to t he full panoply of due process prote ctions. See Atkins v. Parker , 472 U.S. 115, 128 , 105 S. Ct. 2520, 2528, 86 L. Ed. 2d 81, 92 (1985) (r e cognizing Food Stamp benefits as a protected property interest) ; Mathews , 424 U.S. at
332 , 96 S. Ct. at 901, 47 L. Ed . 2d at 31

– 32 (recognizing Social Security disability benefits as a
pr o tected property interest) ; Goldberg v. Kelly , 397 U.S. 254, 261

– 62 , 90 S. Ct. 1011, 1017, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287, 295

– 96 (1970) ( recognizing federal welfare benefits as a protected property i nte rest); see also Sullivan , 526 U.S. at 60 , 119 S. Ct. at 990, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 150 (recognizing the property interests in Goldberg and M a thews ).

Turning next to the question of what process is due, t he fundamental requirement of pr ocedural due process i s the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful

manner. Goldberg , 397 U.S. at 2 67 , 90 S. Ct. at 267, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 299

. W hen a depriv a tion is contemplated , "these principles require that a recipient have timely and adequate notic e detailing
the reasons for a proposed termination , and an effective opportunity to defend by confron t ing any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally." Id. at 267

– 68
, 90 S. Ct. at 267, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 299 (emphasis added)

. 10

Detailed notice, however, is not required in all instances. T he S u preme Court held , in
Atkins
, that less detailed notice is required when a deprivation is unintentional because the state "could not give notice of a [deprivation] that was simply the c onsequence of an unintended mi stake." 472 U.S. at 12 7 n.30 , 105 S. Ct. at 2528 n.30, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 92 n.30

. I n Atkins
, Co ngress amended the Food Stamp Act to red uce the earned income deduction, which necess i tated
the reduction or termination of benefit s to many existing Food Stamp recipients. Id. at 118
, 105
S. Ct. at 2523 , 86 L. Ed. 2d at 86

. Accordingly, the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare
mailed notice s to affected recipients informing them that their Food Stamp ben e fits were being
reduc ed or terminated pursuant to t he statutory change

. Id. at 120 , 105 S. Ct. at 252 4 , 86 L. Ed.

10 The State urges us to apply Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. , 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (195 0), to assess the constitutional adequacy of the notices at issue here. Mullane is limited, however, to evaluating the "adequacy of the method used to give n o tice," not the content of that notice. Dusenbery v. United States , 534 U.S. 161, 168, 122 S. Ct. 694, 699, 151 L. Ed. 2d 597, 605 (2002) (emphasis added).8

2d at 8 7

. S ome of the reductions and terminations in benefits , however, resulted not from the statutory amendment but from "inadvertent errors

. . . made in calc ulating benefits." 11 Id. at 127
, 105 S. Ct. at 2528 , 86 L. Ed. 2d at 92

. Obviously, because these depriv a tions were unanticipated
and un intended, the notice s contained no reference to the miscalculations. In response to the r ecipients' claim that the not ices were inadequate, the Court concluded that the notices were sufficient as to the deprivations precipitated by the inadvertent miscalculation of benefit amounts b ecause the no tices " plainly informed each household of the opportunity to request a fair he aring and the right to have its benefit level fr o zen if a hearing was requested." Id. at 128 , 105 S. Ct. at 2528, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 92

. The Court did not offer any general principles for distinguishing "i nadvertent error s " from other types of errors . H owe ver, based on the facts of Atkins
, the "ina dvertent error" exception appears to be a narrow one , appropriately limited to accidental depriv ations.

Here, t he plaintiffs challenge the denial of their benefits on grounds that they have failed to cooperate in the certification process or failed to submit certain required information. Neither the plaintiffs nor the State contend that the deprivations (i.e., the denials of benefits) were in any way inadvertent or accidental. Instead, the plaintiffs allege that at least some of these depriv ations were intentional but based on erroneous information. As such, Atkins 's " i n advertent error " exception does not apply to the notices at issue in this case because they were not accidental

. We must, therefore, continue o ur analysis under the more strenuous notice require ment of Gol dberg

.

In a trio of cases , the Seventh Circuit defined the contours of Goldberg 's adequate notice requirement

. See Vargas v. Trainor , 508 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. den ied , 420 U.S. 1008
, 95 S. Ct. 1454, 43 L. Ed. 2d 767 (1975); Banks v. Trainor , 525 F.2d 837 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. den ied , 424 U.S. 978
, 96 S. Ct. 1484, 47 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1976) ; Dilda v. Quern , 612 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. den ied , 447 U.S. 935
, 100 S. Ct. 3039, 65 L . Ed. 2d 1130 (1980). 12 In Va r-

11 Apparently, the simultaneous occurrence of the statutory change and the miscalculation was c oincidental and not causally connected. Atkins , 472 U.S. at 127

– 28 , 105 S. Ct. at 2528, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 92

.

12 The Seventh Circuit's approach has been followed by several other jurisdictions addressing the adequ a cy of notices in similar contexts

. See, e .g. , Kapps v. Wing , 404 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2005); Ortiz v. Eichler , 794 F.2d 889 (3rd Cir. 1986), aff'g O rtiz v. Eichler , 616 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Del. 1985); Schroeder9

gas , t he Seventh Circuit examined notices issued by the Illinois Department of Public Aid to r ecipients of public assistance benefits informing them that their benefits were being reduced or

te r minated. 508 F.2d at 486

– 87. T he notices read , in relevant part, "'The amount of assistance you receive for October, 1974, will be reduced to the amount shown on the enclosed card.'" Id.
at 487. The notice explained that the reduction was "'because of changes in your needs or living

a rrangement which occurred between January 1, 1974, and the current month, but which were not entered on your record so as to effect [sic] your check.'" Id. No additional explanation of the reasons for the action was given. Id. The court found the noti ces to be inconsistent with the r equirements of due process and held that a notice informing an applicant of a reduction or term ination of benefits must "state the reasons for the proposed ac tion. " Id. at 490. The court re asoned that, in the absence of a reasoned explanation for the reduction or termination of benefits, "many of the mistakes that will inevitably be made will stand uncorrected" because of the "h uman tendency

. . . to assume that an action taken by a government agency in a pecuniary transa ction [(such as the calculation of we l fare benefits)] is correct." Id.

One year later, in Banks
, the Seventh Circuit elaborated more precisely the due process requirement , first articulated in Vargas , to inform applicants of the reasons for an adverse det e rmination

. Banks involved a reduction in benefits to existing recipients precip i tated by a change to the method by which benefits were calculated. 525 F.2d at 839. The Ill i nois Department of Public Aid sent affected beneficiaries a notice informing the m that their benefits would be r educed as a result of the change

. Id. The notice stated that the recipient's benefits would be r educed and provided only the recipient's income, the benefit amount u n der the old method, and
the benefit amount under the new method. Id

. The court found the notice "deficient" under

v. Hegstrom , 590 F. Supp. 121 (D. Or. 1984); Baker v. State, Dept. of Health and Soc

. Servs

. , 191 P.3d 1005 (Alaska 2008); see also Escalera v. N.Y.C. Hous

. Auth. , 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970) (ho lding that due process requires detailed notice of the reasons for terminations of tenancies in the public housing co ntext). The Sixth Circuit expressly declined to follow the Seventh Circuit's view of adequate notice in Ga rrett v. Puett , 707 F.2d 930, 93 1

– 32 (6th C ir. 1983), aff'g 557 F. Supp. 9 (M.D. Tenn. 1982). Garrett is best understood, however, as a so

- called "mass change" case because the notices were precip i tated by a legislative change to the program. Ortiz , 794 F.2d at 894 ; Baker , 191 P.3d at 1011 n.29

. A distinction between "individual eligibility determinations" and "legislatively mandated substantive change[s] in the scope of [an] entire program" was explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court in Atkins . 472 U.S. at 129
, 105 S. Ct. at 2528

– 29, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 92

– 93 . There, the Court held that "the legislative determination provides all the process that is due" with respect to notice of the reasons for a deprivation caused by a "mass change" in the law governing an entitlement program like F ood Stamps. Id. at 130, 105 S. Ct. at 25 29, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 93 (internal quot a tion marks omitted)

.10

Goldberg and Vargas because it "did not contain a breakdown of income and dedu c tions so that recipients could determine the accuracy of the computations." Id. at 84 1

– 4 2. Without notice of
the in dividualized factors ( e.g., income, deductions, etc.) underlying the calc u lations
, the court reasoned, recipients lacked prote c tion against "agency error and arbitrariness." Id

. at 842.

The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed Vargas and Banks in Dilda
, holding th at due process r equir es more than a statement of the "ultimate reason" for the adverse state action. 612 F.2d at 1057. The court rejected the notice proposed by the S tate in Dilda because it failed to provide
the factual information underlying the comp o n ents of the recipient's benefit amount reasoning
that "'[u] nless the welfare recipients are told why their benefits are being r e duced or terminated, many of the mistakes that will inevitably be made will stand uncorrected, and many recipients will be unjus tly deprived of the means to obtain the necessities of life.'" Dilda , 612 F.2d at 1057 (quoting Vargas , 508 F.2d at 490).

We are persuaded that the Seventh Circuit's approach should be applied in this case

. P roviding affected individual s with notice exp laining in detail the reasons underlying the state's
adverse decision empowers i n dividuals to protect their own interests and complements the state's efforts to achieve accuracy

. " The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbit rary action by government

. " Wolff v. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539, 558 , 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2976, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 952 (1974) (citing Dent v. West Virginia , 129 U.S. 114, 123 , 9 S. Ct. 231, 233, 32 L. Ed. 623 (1889))

. Toward this end, the Supreme Court has repea tedly singled out the right to a meaningful hearing as the most reliable bulwark against such arbitrariness. See
, e.g. , Zinermon v. Burch , 494 U.S. 113, 127 , 110 S. Ct. 975, 984, 108 L. Ed. 2d 100, 115 (1990);
M a thews , 424 U.S. at 333 , 96 S. Ct. at 902, 4 7 L. Ed. 2d at 32 ; Goldberg , 397 U.S. at 267
, 90 S.
Ct. at 1020, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 299 . Yet, in the absence of an explanation of the reasons underlying the state's action, it is implausible to expect that an individual could prepare, let alone present, a

so und d e fense. T he inability to p repare a defense correspondingly undermines the effec tiveness of any judicial remedy because it is less likely that a complete record of the issue will be deve loped for judicial review

. 13 There is no second bite at the apple

. The Constitution does not gua r-

13 Goldberg suggests that one of the primary functions of an administrative hearing is the deve lopment of a complete factual record and a comprehensive opini on explaining the agency's action to facil itate judicial review. See 397 U.S. at 267, 90 S. Ct. at 1020, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 298.11

antee the right to two hearings

. 14 Goldberg
, 397 U.S. at 267 n.14 , 90 S. Ct. at 1020 n.14, 25 L.
Ed. 2d at 298 n.14 ("Due process does not, of course, require two hearings.").

With these principles in mind, we now turn to the actual notices at issue in this case. The brief explanations contained in the reason codes employed by the State fail to pr o vide any insight
into the factual bases for the State's adverse benefit determinations. T he reason codes do provide

some infor mation to applicants in that the codes offer , i n brief and general terms, the intermed iate conclusions necessitating a denial

. Yet, these are merely the "ultimate reason s " for the den ial . L ike the n o tices at issue in Dilda , 612 F.2d at 1056, the FSSA's n otices fail to provide any explanation of how this "ul timate reason" was reached

. Vargas , Banks , and Dilda make clear that a constitutionally adequate explanation must include the individualized factual bases unde rlying an adverse determination. See Dild a , 612 F.2d at 1057 (holding that a notice of a d verse action is constitutionally inadequate if it lacks the individualized calculations underlying the benefit award) ; Banks , 525 F.2d at 842 (holding that due process requires notice of the individ ualized fa ctors underlying an adverse determination); Vargas , 508 F.2d at 490 (holding unconst itutional a notice that lacked a reasoned explanation for an agency's adverse action).

Ortiz v. Eichler is instructive here. 616 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Del. 1985)
, aff'd
, 794 F.2d 889 (3 d Cir. 1986)

. 15 At issue in Ortiz were notices providing only "a one se n tence explanation for the agency's action, such as, 'children's wages exceed eligibility limit,' or 'you are over the gross income eligibility limit,' or 'you did not provid e a protective payee as requested.'" 616 F

. Supp

. at 1061 (citations omitted). In applying the Seventh Circuit 's doctrine, the court held :

At a minimum, due process requires the agency to explain, in terms compr ehensible to the claimant, exactly what th e agency proposes to do and why the agency is taking this action. If [the state] finds that a claimant has not performed some action that the regulations require, the notice must explain what the claimant was required to do and how his or her actions fail ed to meet this standard.

14 The Due Process Clause requires a "fair hearing." Goldberg , 397 U.S. at 266, 90 S. Ct. at 1020, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 298. Presumab ly then, the state is required to provide a second hearing if the first was only cursory. See id. at 266

– 67, 90 S. Ct. at 1020, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 298

– 99. Here, however, the FSSA's

n o tice of denial offers a "fair hearing" in the first instance.

15 In affirm ing the District Court, the Third Circuit explicitly approved the District Court's anal ysis regarding the due process requirements for adequate notice. 794 F.2d at 894 (" We are pe r suaded that the district court's formulation was the product of thoughtful analysis supported by reasoned dec i sions in other courts.").12

Id. at 1061

– 62. There is little difference between the notices struck down in Ortiz and the la nguage of the reason codes at issue here. Neither " explain what the claimant was required by the regulation to do and how his or her a ctions failed to meet this standard." Id. Instead, each pr ovides the applicant only with the predicate conclusion s necessitating a denial of benefits. Due process requires that the notice provide the individualized reasons underlying this predicate co nc lusion. 16

The State responds that the reason codes provided in the adverse action notices are only half of the picture. They argue that the notice to applicants should be understood to include not only the formal denial notices but also Form 2032, settin g forth the specific documents needed to

e s tablish eligibility. They argue that, taken together, Form 2032 and the formal denial notices provide applicants "very specific notice

. . . . [that] could har d ly be in more explicit detail." 17

16 In determining the "specific dictates of due process," we must weigh (1) the private interest, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest and the probable value of additional proced ures in redu cing that risk, and (3) the government interest. Mathews , 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S. Ct. at 903, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 33

. Our analysis under the Seventh Circuit's reasoning is consistent with our own balancing of the Mathews interests: The individual interest at stake in the determination of eligibility for public welfare programs like Med i caid, Food Stamps, and TANF is unquestionably heavy given that the purpose of these programs is to supplement a person's ability to obtain basic necessities. By con trast , the go v ernment's interest is relatively minimal in terms of providing an explanation of the reasons for an adverse determ in a tion. Having evaluated an a p plicant's eligibility, the State necessarily already knows why it is denying benefits. All that is left fo r the State to do is communicate that explanation in its entirety to a p plicants. It is hard to imagine how this can be particularly burdensome in light of the fact that no add i tional effort on the part of the State is required to ascertain the reason for an adverse determination and given that the State already provides a written notice to applicants. Finally, the risk of erroneous deprivation is pote ntially high, especially because the State must rely heavily on the applicant to provide the in formation needed to establish eligibility. The individual applicant's ability to accurately provide the necessary do cuments is heavily dependent upon the specificity of the request made in Form 2032. The more general the request, the more likely it is th at an applicant will fail to provide all of the necessary information, pa rticularly in situations involving households with multiple persons. Thus, the provision of a more detailed explanation by the FSSA in a notice of adverse action will enable applican ts to rectify any omi s sions that would otherwise lead to erroneous depriv a tions of benefits.

17 The State's argument echoes the rationale employed by the trial court, which reasoned that the "multi

- step process for eligibility determination" satisfies due p r o cess requirements. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Summary Judgment, Appellants' App'x at 29. The trial court considered the "multi

- step process" to include the following: [A]n initial interview, verbal instructions for what is needed to esta blish eligibility, written n o tice of what is needed to establish eligibility (the Form 2032), the availability of a toll free 1

- 800 number for assistance, the submission of the materials by the client, evaluation of the submi t ted materials, and, if the mat erials submitted by the client are inadequate to establish eligibility, a n otice of adverse a c tion. Id.13

Appellees' Br. at 17. In essence, the State is arguing that an adverse action notice can include information provided to the applicant before the agency actually assesses the applicant's eligibi lity for the benefit. We disagree that information communicated preceding the actual adverse d etermination can be considered in assessing the adequacy of the notice provided after such dete rmination.

The State primarily relies on Rosen v. Goetz , 410 F.3d 919 (6th Cir. 2005), to su p port its argument that Form 2032 and the formal de nial notices, when taken toget h er, satisfy due process.
In Rosen , the S tate of Tennessee implemented a program aimed at r e ducing the fiscal impact of its supplemental Medicaid program, TennCare, which extended Medicaid bene fits b e yond the federally manda t ed minimum levels. 410 F.3d at 922. To achieve the reduction, Tennessee d ecided to eliminate three of the seventeen TennCare eligibility categories, resulting in the dise nrollment of 323,000 existing program beneficiaries. Id. At issue in the case was whether Te nnessee's proposed disenrollment process complied with federal Medicaid reg u lations and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 923. The plaintiffs in that case cha l lenged, among other things, the notice s issued by Tennessee as violative of due process

. Id. at 931. Like the plaintiffs in this case, the Rosen plaintiffs argued that the notices failed to provide sufficient explanation of the reasons for the termination. Id. W hen disenrolling existing beneficiaries u nder the reduction program, Tennessee first sent beneficiaries a "Termination Notice" and later
sent a second letter that referenced the first notice and provid ed more information co n cerning the
reason for the discontinuation. Id. at 931. The court rejected the p laintiffs' claim
, holding i nstead that due process is satisfied where notice is made in two letters, not just one, at least where
the first notice " references and brings to the attention of recipients" the second. Id

.

Rosen contemplates only a situation where both notices were provided after an adverse
determination is made by the agency. See id. Rosen does not provide any guidance as to the permissibility of providing full notice in multiple correspondences where , like the State a r gues here, one porti on of the notice precedes the making of the adverse determination. Such amalg amated n o tice was rejected by the Alaska Supreme Court in Baker v. State, Dep artment of Health
and Social Services , where the Alaska Department of Health and Human Services a r gue d that adequate notice, for purposes of due process, could include the written notice of a d verse action14

and the i n formation applicants already had about the eligibility process and about themselves. 191 P.3d 1005, 1009 (Alaska 2008). The court reasoned t hat the agency "cannot presume that recipients already have a basis for understanding why services are being reduced; whatever i nformation the department is required to provide must be part of the writ ten notice i t self

. " Id

. at
1010. We agree. Merely of fering applicants information from which they could potentially d educe the reasons for a denial is no process at all. Notice must be una m biguous so that applicants can know the precise reason for which they were denied benefits and can determine the accur acy of the State's determination. Form 2032 offers no additional i n formation concerning the reasons for the S tate's deci sion in a particular case

. It in no way e x plains the underlying reasons for the FSSA's denial of benefits. At best, Form 2032 aids th e applicant in d e ducing the reasons for the denial, but it does not inform the applicant of the specific reason for the adverse determ i nation

. 18

We therefore hold, as a matter of law
, that the notices used by the FSSA to inform ind ividuals that their appli cations for Medicaid, Food Stamp
, or TANF benefits have been d e nied do not satisfy the requirements of due process. Accordingly, the Class A and S ub

- class A plai n tiffs were entitled to summary judgment on this issue, and the State's motion for summary jud g ment should have been denied.

2. Food Stamp Law

On cross

- appeal, the S tate appeals the trial court's order enjoining the FSSA from "term inating, denying, or discontinuing the Food Stamp applications or benefits of the members of
Class C based on an all eged 'failure to cooperate' with the agency." 19 Findings of Fact, Concl u-

18 At oral argument before this Court, there was discussion about whether the presence of a 1

- 800 telephone number on the denial notices , where applica nts could seek more information regarding the re asons for their termination, could satisfy the adequate notice requirement of due process. The ability to proactively inquire as to the reasons , however, has been unequivocally rejected by the Seventh Circui t as well as many other courts as an inadequate remedy for an otherwise deficient n o tice

. Kapps , 404 F.3d at 126; Vargas , 508 F.2d at 489 (" Under such a procedure only the aggressive receive their due process right to be advised of the reasons for the pro posed action.") ; Ortiz , 616 F. Supp. at 1062 ("[T]he burden of providing adequate notice rests with the state, and it cannot shift that burden to the individual by provi ding inadequate notice and inviting the claimant to call to receive complete n o tice.") ; Schroeder , 590 F. Supp. at 12 8

. We agree that this is the co r rect view of due process. 19 Class C challenges the FSSA's use of each of the codes challenged by Class A except for "Fai lure to submit medical information necessary to establish eligibility" an d challenges two additional codes:15

sions of Law, and Summary Judgment, Appellants' App'x at 37

– 38. The trial court held that the State could only deny an application for Food Stamp benefits on a finding that the applic ant had

" refused to cooperate. " See id. Before the trial court, the Class C plaintiffs' only claim was that
the S tate had improperly denied them Food Stamp benefits for failing to cooperate in the eligibi lity determination process because such a basis fo r denial is contrary to federal law. The plai ntiffs made no claim that, even if "failure to cooperate" were a proper basis for denial, the State's "failure to cooperate" determination did not comply with the requirements of federal law. The
State contend s that federal law does " not prohibit the agency from denying benefits when a client
has failed to co o

perate by failing to supply necessary documentation for eligibility during the
time frames esta b lished in the federal regulations." Appellees' Tr ans . Br. at 13. 20 We agree with
the State's view of the r e levant Food Stamp law

.

Federal law states that "no household shall be eligible to participate in the [Food Stamp] program if it refuses to cooperate in providing information to the State agency that is ne cessary for making a determination of eligibility or for completing any subsequent review of its eligibi lity. " 21 7 U.S.C

. § 2015(c) (emphasis added). I t is simply not accurate , as the p laintiffs a s sert, that "federal law is explicit " that Food Stamp appli cations may only be denied where a household refuses to cooperate. Appellants' Opp ' n to Trans. Br. at 11 ( referring to 7 U.S.C. § 2015(c) )

. Section 2015(c) merely codifies the rather commonsense n o tion that a household is ineligible for Food Stamp benefi ts if it refuses to cooperate . Section 2015(c) does not attempt to comprehe nsively announce every basis on which a state could deny a household ben e fits. See id. Even so,
h ad Congress intended to so limit the basis for denial, it could have done so easi ly. Congress could have said, for example, "A household shall be denied benefits only if it refuses to coope rate." Instead, Section 2015(c) employs a straightforward conditional statement to exclude an y-

"Failure to complete a personal interview required to establish eligibility" (Code 585) and "Failure to r eturn a signed redetermination form" (no three

- digit code specified). Appellants' Br. at 12; Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Su p port of Motion for Summary Judgment , Appellees' App'x at 365.

20 On transfer, the plaintiffs argue that the State has waived this substantive argument because the State's only argument on cross

- appeal was that the evidence designated by the pl aintiffs to the trial court was insufficient to support summary judgment. We disagree. When reviewing an appeal of summary judgment, the case is before us as it was before the trial court. See Wilson , 929 N.E.2d at 202. Because the State properly raise d this argument in its cross

- motion for summary judgment, Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellees' App'x at 398

– 99, the arg u ment has not been waived.

21 The Food Stamp program is also referred to as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program ( "SNAP"). See generally 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011

– 2036.16

one who refuses to cooperate from eligibility for th e Food Stamp pr o gram while leaving open other possible bases for disqualification

. See id.

The Food Stamp program's implementing regulations contemplate both refusal and fai lure to cooperate as a basis of denial

. 22 Section 273.2(d)(1) of the Food Stamp regulations pr ovides:
If the household refuses to cooperate with the State agency in completing [the e ligibility ] process, the application shall be denied at the time of refusal. For a d etermination of refusal to be made, the household must be able to co operate, but clearly demonstrate that it will not take actions that it can take and that are r equired to complete the application process. For example, to be denied for refusal to cooperate, a household must refuse to be interviewed not merely failing [si c] to appear for the interview. If there is any question as to whether the hous e hold has merely failed to cooperate , as opposed to refused to cooperate, the household shall not be denied, and the agency shall provide assistance required by paragraph (c)(5 ) of this section.
7 C.F.R. § 273.2(d)(1) (emphasis added). Section 273.2(d)(1) simply reaffirms the co n ditional language contained in Section 2015(c) of the statute and elaborates its meaning

. See id. (" If the household refuses to cooperate

. . . , the application shall be d e nied at the time of the refusal." (emphasis added)). This Section merely establishes a pr e sumption that a house hold should be
considered as having failed to cooperate unless there is no "question" that the household has r efused to c ooperate. See i d. Again, the language of the presumption is cond i tional. Id. (" If there is any question as to whether the household has merely failed to cooperate , as opposed to refused to cooperate, [ then ] the household shall not be denied

. . . ." (em phasis added)). As such, Section 273.2(d)(1) clearly contemplates at least two bases for the denial of ben e fits: refusal and failure to cooperate. The key difference between the two grounds for denial created by Section 273.2(d)(1) is tha t the agency mus t deny benefits at the time the applicant r e fuses to cooperate.
Id.

Our understanding of Section 273.2(d)(1) is guided by Section 273.2(h) which addresses

22 Federal law directs the Secretary of Agriculture to "establish uniform national standards of el igibility

. . . for participation by households in the [Food Stamp program]." 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b). State agenci es responsible for administering the program are prohibited from "impos[ing] any other sta n dards of eligibility as a condition for partic i pating in the program." Id.17

delays in eligibility determinations caused by the state or the household. 23 Id. § 273.1(h). Se ct ion 273.2(h)(2)(i) provides : "If by the 30 th day [following the date an applic a tion is filed] the State agency cannot take any further action on the application due to the fault of the household
, the household shall lose its entitlement to benefits for the month of application." Id. § 273.1(h)(2) (i) (emphasis added)

. A delay is considered the "fault of the household if the
household has failed to complete the application process even though the State agency has taken all the action it is required to take to assist the household." Id. § 273.1(h)(1)(i) (emphasis ad d ed). "The State agency has the option of sending the household either a notice of denial or a notice of pending status on the 30 th day. " Id. § 273.1(h)(2)(i)(A) (emphasis added)

. Thus, where t he a pplicant

- household "fail[s] to complete the application process " (i.e., fails to coop e rate) the state has the "op tion" of either denying the application or allowing the application to remain pending,
with notice to the household accordingly. Id. This interpretation is buttressed by Section 273.10(g)(1)(ii), which expressly acknowledges the power of the state agency to " elect [] to use a notice of denial when a delay [is] caused by the household's failure to take action to complete the application proce ss [(i.e., fails to cooperate)]." Id. § 273.10(g)(1)(ii) (emphasis added). The i nterpretation urged by the p laintiffs' would i g nore these provisions altogether. 24

For these reasons, we hold that federal law permit s the FSSA to deny benefits to appl icant 's who fail to cooperate in the eligibility determination process. We therefore reverse the tr ial cou r t's grant of s ummary judgment to the plaintiffs on this i s sue. 25

23 Section 273.2(h) applies only to initial applications for benefits ; Section 273.14(e) addresses delays during the recertification process. 7 C.F.R. §§ 273.2(h), 273.14(e). Because the two are substa ntially similar in language and effect, we deal only with Section 273.2(h) for simplicity.

24 When the applicant refuses to cooperate, Section s 273.2(d)(1) and (c)(5) require that the state provide the applicant with a notice that "inform[s] the household of the State agency's responsibility to assist the household in obtaining required verification." 7 C.F.R. §§ 273.2(c)(5), (d)(1). Where the appl icant only fails to cooperate, the state must comply with Section 273.2(h)(1)(i). Id. § 273.2(h)(1)(i).

25 Because we hold that federal Food Stamp law permits the State to deny benefits when an appl icant fails to cooperate, the State has properly not ified class members of the standard on which their elig ibility determinations were based. Thus, we need not address the plaintiffs' claim that the State has viola ted the due process clause, under the reasoning of Thompson v. Roob
, No. 1:05

- cv

- 0636

- SEB

- VSS
, 2006 WL 2990426 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 19, 2006)

.18 3. Sheila Perdue

The State also challenges the trial court's determination that the FSSA violated Sheila Perdue's rights under the ADA and the RA. In seeking summary judgment, Pe r due challenge d the FSSA's administrative policy decision not to assign sp e cific case

- workers to applicants to help them navigate the application and recertification processes. Perdue allege s that this policy disproportionately impacts disabled individuals and constitutes a failure to accommodate her di sability in violation of Title II of the ADA (42 U.S.C. § § 12131

– 121 65) and Section 794 of the
RA. The State conten ds, however, that Perdue has failed to designate sufficient evi dence to su pport summary judgment. Specifically, the State makes three arguments: (1) Perdue failed to pr ovide evidence establishing that she is "deaf or that her disability was known to the a gency" ; (2) Perdue failed to designate evidence establishing that "but for her disability, she would have r eceived the benefit being sought" ; and (3) Perdue "did not designate any evidence that e s tablished that the [FSSA] intentionally discriminated agains t Perdue, or refused to pr ovide a re a sonable modification to Perdue, or that the rule in question had a disproportionate impact on Pe r due as a disabled person." Appellees' Cross

- Appeal Br. at 36, 38 (emphasis omitted). We agree with
Perdue that the FSSA was required to reasonably accommodate her disability under the ADA
and RA

.

Perdue alleges the following facts in her verified complaint, which she designated as ev idence in her summary judgment motion: Perdue had been receiving Food Stamp and Medicaid
fo r the Disabled benefits for three or four years. In December 2007, the FSSA notified her that she must be recertified for these programs in order to continue receiving ben e fits. As part of the recertification process, she was required to participate in a telephonic inte r view. Perdue timely appeared for the interview. Because she was having difficulty hearing the interviewer over the telephone, she asked the interviewer if she could schedule an in

- person interview. The inte rviewer told her that she coul d not. Perdue then gathered her paperwork and traveled to a nearby FSSA Help Center where she requested assistance completing her recertif i cation forms. None was provided. Perdue then completed the forms herself to the best of her ability and su b mitted them. The State has offered no competing facts.19

Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination against the disabled by "public se r vices." 42
U.S.C. §§ 12131

– 121 65. Se ction 12132 of the ADA mandates that "n o qualified i n dividual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from partic i pation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discri mi n ation by any such entity. " Id. § 1 2132. ADA regulations require a public en tity to " make reaso nable modifications in policies, practices, or proc e dures when the modifications are necessary to
avoid discrimination on the basis of disabil i ty ." 28 C.F.R

. § 35.130(b)(7). Such modifications are required "unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fu ndamentally alter the nature of the service, pr o gram, or activity." Id. Similarly, Section 794 of the RA provides: "No otherwise qualified ind i vidual with a disability

. . . shall, solely by reason
of he r or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be su bjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assi stance

. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The RA's accompanying regulations a lso mandate that a co vered entity "shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limit a tions of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or employee unless the [covered entity] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose a n undue hardship on the operation of its program." 28 C.F.R. § 41.53.

As outlined in the preceding paragraph, to sustain a claim under either the ADA or the
RA , Perdue must demonstrate that (1) she is a "qualified individual with a disabil ity " (2) who

w as excluded from or denied the benefits of the servi c es, programs, or activities of, or otherwise subjected to discrimina tion (3) by a public entity (4) by reason of her disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 ; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 26 The State does not dispute, nor could it, that the FSSA is a "pu b-

26 The requirements imposed on state and local government services by Title II of the ADA and Section 794 of the RA are generally the same, although some differences, which are not relevant here, have been recogn ized. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) ("Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Reh a bilitation Act of 1973 ( 29 U.S.C. 790 et seq. ) or the regu lations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title.") ; Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg , 331 F.3d 261, 272 (2 d Cir. 2003) ("[U] nless one of those su btle distinctions is pertinent to a particular case, we treat claims under the two statutes ident i cally ."); Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose , 192 F.3d 462, 468

– 69 (4 th Cir. 1999) (" The ADA and Rehabilitation Act generally are construed to impose the same requirements due to the similar i ty of the language of the two acts. " But they differ with respect to the " causati ve link between discrimination and adverse action.") ; see also Bragdon v. Abbott , 524 U.S. 624, 631

– 32 , 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2202, 141 L. Ed. 2d 540, 553 (1998) (Section 12201(a) of the ADA "requires us to construe the ADA to grant at least as much protection as provided by20

lic entity

. " See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A), (B) (A "public entity" is "any State or local gover nment" or "any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or local government ."). Nor doe s the State dispute that Perdue was denied Food Stamp and Med icaid benefits by the FSSA. Instead, the State challenges Perdue's status as a "qualified i n dividual
with a dis a bility" and that Perdue was excluded "by reason of" her disability.

As an initial matter, based on the facts presented , there is no issue of material fact that would support the State's argument that Perdue was denied benefits "by reason of" her disability

. While there doesn't appear to be any evidence of intentional discrimination, t he FSSA clearly did not provide any accommodations to Perdue to assist her in applying for benefits, and this failure

to acco m modate disproportionately impacted this plaintiff as a disabled person. The fact that she was unable to participate in the teleph one interview alone places a heavier burden on the dis abled.

Perdue has designated sufficient evidence to support a finding that she is disabled. The ADA defines "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities" a nd includes hearing among major life activities

. Id. § 12102(1) (A)
, (2) (A)

. In her deposition, Perdue stated that she has seventy percent nerve da m age in both of her ears for which she regularly wears hearing aids. She stated that she does not hear well over the telephone and cannot hear people talking at all without her hearing aids . Based on this evidence,
there is no issue of material fact that Perdue is disabled within the mea n ing of the ADA.

Lastly , t here is no issue of materia l fact as to whether Perdue is a "qualified indivi d ual with a disability." Under the ADA, a " qualified individual with a disability" is "an ind i vidual

the regulations implementing the Reh a bilitation Act."); McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc. , 119 F.3d 453, 459

– 60 (6 th Cir . 1997) (" In short, the principal distinction between the two statutes is that coverage under the Rehabil itation Act is limited to entities receiving federal financial assistance, while the ADA's reach extends to purely private entities. There may be other differences in the applic ation of the two statutes, including whether the ' solely by reason of

. . . di sability ' standard made explicit in the language of the Rehabilitation Act should be imported into the ADA, which contains no such la nguage.") ; see generally Wis

. Comm

. Servs

. , Inc. v. City of Milwaukee
, 465 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2006) (concluding that case l aw d e veloped under Section 794 of the RA is applicable to Title II of the ADA and vice versa). As such, we address Perdue's claims under the ADA and RA simultaneously as a single claim.21

with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practi ces,

. . . meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the partic i pation in programs or activities provided by a public entity ." Id. § 12131(2). This determination is i nextricably linked with the determination of whether the denial, exclusion, or di s crimination was "by reason of such disability." Alexander v. Choate , 469 U.S. 287, 300 n.19 , 105 S. Ct. 712, 719 n.19, 83 L. Ed. 2d 661, 671 n.19 (1985) ( d iscussing the identical requirements of the RA: "Ho wever, the question of who is ' o therwise qualified ' and what actions constitute ' discrimination ' u nder the section would seem to be two sides of a single coin ; t he u l timate question is the extent to
which a [public entity] is required to make reasonable modific a tions in its programs for the needs
of the handicapped ." ). Both the ADA and the RA seek to "assure evenhanded treatment and the opportunity for handicapped individuals to participate in and ben e fit from [covered] programs

. "
Id. at 304 , 105 S. Ct. at 721 , 83 L. Ed. 2d at 67 4

. Acc ordin g ly , a public entity is not "required to
make 'fundamental' or 'substantial' modifications to accomm o date the handicapped
, [but] it may be required to make ' reasonable ' ones," which i n cludes providing otherwise qualified disabled
individuals with "mea ningful access" to its ben e fits. Id. at 300 , 105 S. Ct. at 72 0 , 83 L. Ed. 2d at
67 1

.

The parties disagree about the precise benefit for which Perdue must be "otherwise qual ified." On the one hand, a plaintiff "must show that, 'but for' [her] disability, [she] would have received the ultimate benefit being sought" in order to maintain a claim under the ADA or RA.
Wis

. Comm. Servs

. , Inc. v. City of Milwaukee , 465 F.3d 737, 755 (7th Cir. 2006). Thus, the State contends, Perdue must demonstrate her eligibi lity to receive the Food Stamp and Med i caid benefits for which she was applying at the time of the alleged violation. On the other hand, Pe rdue argues that any entitlement to benefits she might have is meaningless unless she is able to meaningfully partic ipate in the application process. As such, Perdue contends that she must only
demonstrate her eli gi bility to apply for Food Stamp and Medicaid benefits to satisfy the "othe rwise qualified" requirement . We are persuaded that Perdue is correct and do not b elieve that the accommodation requirements of the ADA and RA were intended to operate so rigidly as the
State would have us co n clude.22

In Choate , the Supreme Court admonishes us that we should not define the benefit

— for
which a disabled individual must sho w they are "otherwise qualified"

— in a manner that "effe ctively denies otherwise qualified handicapped individuals the meaningful access to which they
are entitled

. . . ." 469 U.S. at 301 , 105 S. Ct. at 720, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 672 . Were we to define the
ben efit so narrowly as to encompass only the individual's actual entitlement to Food Stamp or Medicaid benefits, the FSSA would only be required to reasonably accommodate disabled appl icants who could de m onstrate that they are eligible for benefits before app lying for benefits . But this would be placing the cart before the horse. The entire purpose of the application process is to determine the applicant's eligibility. If disabled applicants first had to demonstrate their elig ibil i ty for the program before the agency was required to accommodate them, they would be right
back in the same sit u ation that gave rise to this case in the first place. The agency would have to establish a process for verifying disabled applicants ' eligibility before the agency would be r equired to provide reasonable acco m modations to assist disabled applicants with the application process. In effect, the agency would have to establish an eligibility process for disabled indivi duals to receive accommodations for the eligibility proce ss. This would be absurd and cannot
have been the result i n tended by Congress. Perdue's claim is premised wholly on the notion that
she needs assistance with the application process on account of her disabilities. If she is unable to meet the requir e men ts of the application process without accommodations, she would not be
more able to demonstrate to the FSSA that she is entitled to reasonable accommodations because
she is otherwise eligible for Food Stamp and Medicaid benefits. Because the FSSA does not
know before an applicant's eligibility is determined whether a disabled individual is legally ent itled to benefits
, it must reaso n ably accommodate all disabled individuals during the application

process so as not to inadvertently burden qualified disabled applicants. Perdue has designated sufficient facts to support a finding that she was denied meaningful access to the FSSA's pr ograms because anyone is eligible to apply for Food Stamp and M e dicaid benefits.

Having concluded that the FSSA violated Perdu e's rights under the ADA and RA, the tr ial court ordered the FSSA to provide her with a "caseworker or case management services." Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Summary Judgment, Appellants' App'x at 38 . The trial court's order was premised on the Second Circuit's conclusion in Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg
, that the case management system utilized by New York City in that case represented a reason a-23

ble accommodation. Id. at 36 (citing 331 F.3d 261, 280 (2 d Cir. 2003))

. Henrietta D. , howe v er, doe s not stand for the proposition that a case management system is the only reasonable acco mmod a tion sufficient to accommodate disabled applicants for social services. It stands only for the proposition that such a system is a sufficient reasonable accommod a tion. 331 F.3d at 280. The ADA and RA only require that the FSSA provide meaningful access to the di s abled unless
such " reasonable accommodation

. . . would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program." See id. , 331 F.3d at 281

– 82 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 )

. Thus, the FSSA is not r equired to adopt any specific form of accommodation such as a caseworker or case management
services

. Rather , the FSSA is only required to make reasonable accommodations suff i cient to
accommodate the di s abled.

Conclusion

S ummary judgment s in favor of the State as to Class A and Sub

- class A and in favor of
the p laintiffs as to Class C are reversed
, and summary judgment in favor of Sheila Perdue is a ffirmed in part

. With respect to Class A and Sub

- class A, we g rant the p laintiffs' motion for summary judgment and hold that the notices used by the FSSA to inform applicants that they have been denied Medicaid, Food Stamp, and TANF benefits are unconstitu ti onal under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmen t to the United States Constitution because they fail

to suff i ciently explain the reasons underlying the agency's adverse determination. On this issue, this case is remanded to the trial court to adjudicate the plaintiffs ' related claims for relief. With

r e spect to Class C, we reverse the grant of the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and hold that federal law permits the FSSA to deny an application for Food Stamp benefits when the a pplicant fails to cooperate in the eligibility determination proces s. With r e spect to Sheila Perdue,

we affirm in part the trial court's grant of Perdue's motion for summary judgment to hold that she
is entitled to reasonable accom m odation
, but we decline to requir e that the State necessarily must provide a casewo rker or case management services.

Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, Rucker, and David, JJ., concur.