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88–917PDF 2014

TWENTY–YEARS OF U.S. POLICY ON NORTH

KOREA: FROM AGREED FRAMEWORK TO

STRATEGIC PATIENCE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 30, 2014

Serial No. 113–214

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

AMI BERA, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Glyn Davies, Special Representative for North Korea Policy, 

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State ............. 6

The Honorable Robert King, Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights, 

Office of the Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea, U.S. Department of State ........................................................................................................ 14

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Glyn Davies: Prepared statement ................................................ 8

The Honorable Robert King: Prepared statement ................................................ 16

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 36

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 37

(1)

TWENTY–YEARS OF U.S. POLICY ON NORTH 

KOREA: FROM AGREED FRAMEWORK TO 

STRATEGIC PATIENCE 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 30, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. CHABOT. Good afternoon and welcome to this afternoon’s 

subcommittee hearing. I want to thank Mr. Ami Bera for serving 

as today’s ranking member and also thank our distinguished witnesses for being here. It has taken 6 months for our schedules to 

align, so we hope this afternoon’s hearing is a productive one. 

In March, this subcommittee held a hearing to examine the findings of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry Report on 

human rights in North Korea. Anyone would be hard pressed to 

deny the extent of human rights abuses being committed by the 

most repressive totalitarian regime on earth. The report, the first 

of its kind, was a shocking wake-up call for the international community to take action—for the U.S. to take action. Unfortunately, 

it’s been over 5 months and we’re still waiting for some pretty significant action on this. 

North Korea is one of the greatest security threats to the peace 

and stability of Asia and one of the United States’ most vexing security challenges. It is also one of the greatest policy failures of the 

past two decades. 

This year marks the 20th anniversary since the United States 

and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework, which called on 

North Korea to freeze operation and construction of nuclear reactors suspected of being part of a covert nuclear weapons program. 

While this agreement framed our relations for about 8 years, from 

North Korea’s vantage point it was a ruse, as the entire time 

Pyongyang continued to develop its uranium-enrichment capabilities. 

Then, in an effort to continue nuclear negotiations with North 

Korea, we took a multilateral approach and began the Six-Party 

Talks. Once again, concession after concession, this method of negotiation also failed and has been stalled since December 2008. 

2

So where are we today? North Korea has tested three nuclear devices since 2006, the most recent in early 2013, and has declared 

itself a nuclear armed state. Belligerent and threatening rhetoric 

from Pyongyang’s dilettante leader has escalated since he took the 

Kim throne in December 2011. It has launched nearly 100 ballistic 

missiles, artillery and rockets combined since the beginning of this 

year. And its web of illicit activities and dealings with terrorist organizations around the world has expanded. Ultimately, North Korea’s proliferation of nuclear weapons and support to groups that 

oppose Western interests continues unfettered and without limitation. 

Most of the world’s attention today is locked on Ukraine, where 

Russia is supporting the infiltration of rebel troops into Crimea 

and Eastern Ukraine; and the Middle East, where Hamas 

operatives in Gaza are trying to wipe Israel off the map. But we 

must also look East. It should come as no surprise that just this 

past weekend, it was reported that Hamas militants are negotiating a weapons deal worth hundreds of thousands of dollars with 

North Korea for missiles and communications equipment. This relationship was first made public in 2009 when 35 tons of surfaceto-surface rockets and rocket-propelled grenades were destined for 

Iran, which then planned to smuggle to Hezbollah in Lebanon and 

Hamas in Gaza. And last week, a U.S. Federal judge ruled that 

North Korea, in concert with Iran and Syria, was responsible for 

providing materials and assistance to Hezbollah terrorists who 

fired rockets into Israel during an offense that occurred in 2006. 

But again, nothing is being done to obstruct these weapons sales 

or the cargo ships traversing the world’s oceans with weapons in 

the cargo bay. 

Over the years, North Korea has branded itself as a one-stop 

shop for missile and nuclear materials and technology—the ultimate facilitating bad guy—providing whatever its anti-American 

friends want so long as it gets the oil, cash and materials it needs 

to maintain the power of the Kim regime. It is not a secret that 

North Korea has long cavorted with the likes of Iran and Syria, 

and in fact helped build Syria’s nuclear facility destroyed by Israel 

in 2007. North Korea’s last nuclear test, where Iranian nuclear experts were reportedly present, also underlined the harsh reality—

North Korea’s weapons capabilities are advanced and possibly more 

advanced than Iran’s, further highlighting the tremendous failure 

of efforts made by every administration since the early 1990s. 

As the evidence continues to mount of the grave threat that 

North Korea poses to the rest of the world, the Obama administration’s official position is that North Korea is ‘‘not known to have 

sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airline’s flight in 1987.’’ Even more staggering, on July 20th, Secretary Kerry noted that North Korea was ‘‘quieter’’ than previous 

years and that the U.S. is indeed ‘‘moving forward’’ with efforts to 

denuclearize North Korea. According to our records, the past few 

months have been one of the most historically active periods by 

North Korea in terms of testing missiles, including U.N. restricted 

ballistic technology. I don’t think North Korea’s recent behavior can 

be called ‘‘quiet.’’

3

Simply put, the administration’s do nothing ‘‘strategic patience 

policy’’ is crumbling to pieces waiting for North Korea to beseech 

for negotiations aimed at limiting its nuclear and missile potential. 

Kim Jong-un has no interest in denuclearization. Outsourcing our 

North Korea policy to China, North Korea’s top trading partner 

and source of revenue, has also yielded little progress, but we are 

still sitting idly by, waiting for Beijing’s patience with Pyongyang 

to wear thin. 

The ongoing pursuit of restarting Six-Party Talks is futile. It has 

been 6 years and at this point, we are only wasting time as 

Pyongyang augments its fissile material stockpile and improves its 

missile and nuclear capabilities. The administration refuses to impose tougher and more targeted sanctions on North Korea like 

those on Russia, Zimbabwe, Iran, Cuba, Sudan, and Belarus because it believes doing so would ‘‘unnecessarily hinder its ability to 

conduct foreign policy.’’ It won’t list the world’s most prolific money 

launderer, counterfeiter, and state drug trafficker as a country of 

Primary Money Laundering Concern, but Iran and Burma are; and 

our current policy has done nothing to help the North Korean people. I remain disappointed that so little has been done to hold the 

Kim regime responsible for its horrific human rights abuses detailed in the U.N. Commission of Inquiry Report. 

North Korea is a grave threat to the United States and our allies 

in Asia. We cannot continue to wait for North Korea to decide it 

wants to negotiate. A non-nuclear North Korea is an elusive goal 

if the administration maintains its current strategic trajectory. The 

Kim regime is responsible for the horrific deaths of people not only 

within North Korea, but around the world. It is time to put our resources together and act. Rewarding North Korea for ‘‘reversible 

steps’’ on the pretense that it will commit to denuclearization has 

failed before, so let us not ‘‘buy the same horse twice.’’

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and I yield to the 

ranking member, Mr. Bera, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Chairman Chabot. Thank you for calling 

this important hearing. I also want to thank the witnesses today 

for your service to our country and your patience in what has to 

be one of the most diplomatic challenges in terms of moving North 

Korea forward. 

As mentioned, this year marks the 20th anniversary of the 

agreed framework between the United States and North Korea. 

Our foreign policy toward North Korea has always been challenging, given that North Korea’s posture in the region is inconsistent and at times aggressive. That said, throughout the years we 

have tried on numerous occasions to negotiate with North Korea on 

denuclearization, while also promoting the strategic patience approach. However, I continue to be very concerned, as the chairman 

has mentioned, with North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, its aggression toward our allies in South Korea and Japan, and its dismal 

human rights record. 

North Korea’s testing of ballistic missiles and nuclear tests 

throughout the last 15 years is unacceptable and poses serious security concerns in the region. Earlier this month, North Korea fired 

more than 100 rockets and artillery shells toward South Korea’s 

border presumably in protest of joint U.S. and South Korean miliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Oct 29, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\073014\88917 SHIRL
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tary exercises. And our allies in Japan, even as they attempt to 

promote diplomatic dialogue with North Korea on resolving the abductions of Japanese citizens, the Korean People’s Army launched 

short-range missiles into the Sea of Japan in late June. These type 

of provocative actions toward our allies are deeply concerning. The 

U.S.-China relationship, along with our trilateral relations with 

South Korea and Japan is crucial in solving the inter-Korean conflict. We have to take an original approach and we have to work 

together with our partners in the region. 

The conflict has multilateral implications and therefore is not 

only a U.S. interest. As the world’s greatest democracy, we must 

take a tougher stance with the international community on North 

Korea’s threatening antics. North Korea must view our partnership 

as a regional effort to support a peaceful and stable Pacific region. 

We have to put the pressure on the North Korean Government 

with stricter sanctions so we can engage in diplomatic dialogue and 

make positive steps toward denuclearization. We should also encourage North Korea to enforce the 2005 Six-Party Talk agreements. North Korea should be sincere with its commitment to the 

2005 joint statement and allow IAEA inspectors to renew their activity in the country. 

I am also concerned with North Korea’s deplorable human rights 

record. North Koreans do not have freedom of speech, movement, 

or religion and are also subject to chronic starvation and a dismal 

public health system. The U.S., based on our values as Americans, 

should remain a strong supporter and leader within the global community in promoting human rights. 

I look forward to reviewing our actions, positions, and policies toward North Korea as we work on denuclearization and our human 

rights record. Mr. Chairman, with that, I would like to yield back 

and thank you for calling this hearing. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, the gentleman yields. The gentleman 

from California is recognized for an opening statement. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. King, welcome home. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding these hearings. It was just a few 

months ago that you and I were at the DMZ and also discussing 

North Korea with President Park and with Prime Minister Abe. 

North Korea doesn’t trade with us, doesn’t need us. It needs China 

from which it obtains enormous subsidies. We should be trying to 

change the behavior of North Korea directly and more importantly 

China with a combination of carrots and sticks, even though the 

North Korean Government is despicable and politically we could all 

try to outdo each other and who could be more opposed to the government, both carrots and sticks are called for. 

On the carrot side, we ought to discuss with North Korea a nonaggression pact. They have asked for that in the past. It isn’t our 

usual way of conducting State Department business, but it is something they want, something we can give them. And if they ever see 

that Mr. Cheney might be Vice President again, they might appreciate an official U.S. position against invasion. 

Second, we can tell the Chinese that even if there is unification, 

no American military forces will be stationed north of the 38th parallel. 

5

As to sticks, we have to look at the lopsided trade relationship 

with China, access to the U.S. markets is not guaranteed by the 

U.N. charter. North Korea may not be quite as dangerous as other 

states because it is not as ambitious as Iran. It seeks only to oppress its own people. But with a erratic government shown to be 

even more erratic in the last 6 months, and a growing nuclear 

stockpile, we have ever reason to try to trim the danger posed by 

North Korea. I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. I would now 

like to introduce our distinguished panel here this afternoon. Ambassador Glyn Davies is the Special Representative of the Secretary of State for North Korean policy. He was appointed in January 2012 to facilitate high-level engagement with our other SixParty Talk partners. He serves as a senior emissary for U.S. engagement with North Korea. He also oversees U.S. involvement in 

the Six-Party Talks process, as well as other aspects of our security, political, economic, human rights, and humanitarian assistance policy regarding North Korea. 

Special Representative Davies is a career member of the Senior 

Foreign Service and served as the Permanent Representative of the 

United States to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the 

United Nations office in Vienna. His prior assignments include 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East 

Asian and Pacific Affairs and Executive Secretary of the National 

Security Council staff and we welcome you this afternoon, Mr. Ambassador. 

I will next introduce Robert King. Ambassador Robert King became the Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues in 

November 2009 following confirmation by the United States Senate. Ambassador King works under Ambassador Davies and has 

the lead on human rights and humanitarian affairs. Prior to his 

appointment, Ambassador King worked on Capitol Hill for 25 

years—24 of those years as chief of staff to Congressman Tom Lantos. He was concurrently staff director of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, Democratic staff director of the committee, and held various professional staff positions 

on the committee since 1993. Ambassador King holds a Ph.D. in 

International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He has authored several books and numerous articles on international relations and we welcome you here 

this afternoon as well, Mr. Ambassador. 

I am sure you are both familiar with the 5-minute rule so I won’t 

take a lot of time. The yellow light will come on and it means you 

have 1 minute and we hope you wrap up as close as possible when 

the red light comes on and we will limit ourselves to 5 minutes as 

well. 

We will begin with you, Ambassador Davies. You are recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

6

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GLYN DAVIES, SPECIAL 

REPRESENTATIVE FOR NORTH KOREA POLICY, BUREAU OF 

EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE 

Mr. DAVIES. Chairman Chabot, thanks so much. Representative 

Bera, and members of the committee, thanks so much for inviting 

me and my colleague, Ambassador King, to testify today on U.S. 

policy toward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK for 

short, commonly known as North Korea. 

The North Korean regime is a global pariah. It works against the 

interests of its own people, its neighbors, and the world. 

Mr. CHABOT. Would you mind pulling the mic just a little bit 

closer? 

Mr. DAVIES. Sure, absolutely. 

Mr. CHABOT. I want everybody in the room to hear. 

Mr. DAVIES. Here we go, is that better? 

Mr. CHABOT. That is better. 

Mr. DAVIES. It violates its obligations by pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, posing a growing threat to the United 

States, our friends and allies, and the global nonproliferation regime. It devotes an enormous amount of its scarce resources to 

weapons, to a massive standing army, and to vanity projects, all 

while nine out of ten North Koreans suffer. 

We have no illusions about the nature of the regime. We have 

refused to reward its provocations with concessions. We have instead tightened sanctions and told the DPRK that neither its occasional charm offenses nor its more frequent aggressive behavior 

will lead us to accept a nuclear armed North Korea. Like all recent 

administrations, we are open to engagement when possible, but 

will apply pressure as needed. 

Despite DPRK backtracking, we remain committed to authentic 

and credible denuclearization talks, but talks won’t succeed until 

Pyongyang recognizes and demonstrates that it will live up to its 

promises. Regrettably, the DPRK increasingly rejects meaningful 

negotiations. Instead, it has unleashed multiple provocations that 

have drawn condemnation and increased its isolation. Just in recent weeks, it has conducted repeated ballistic missile launches in 

violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions. These followed similar launches earlier this spring, punctuated on March 30 with 

threats to conduct a new type of nuclear test. 

The DPRK says it wants talks without preconditions. Translation: It seeks open-ended Six-Party Talks to gain acceptance as 

a nuclear weapons state, and to camouflage its secret weapons development. We are not interested in talks unless their primary 

order of business is implementing North Korea’s September 2005 

promise to denuclearize. 

The Republic of Korea is squarely at the center of our efforts. 

There is no daylight between us on what we expect from North 

Korea. President Obama, speaking in South Korea in April, expressed support for President Park’s vision of peaceful, progressive 

unification. The U.S.-ROK alliance in its 60th year is stronger than 

ever. Our day-to-day combined efforts to maintain peace and stability on the peninsular send a strong deterrence signal to North 

Korea that the security it seeks is not to be found in nuclear weapVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Oct 29, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\073014\88917 SHIRL
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ons. Our growing U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral security cooperation 

also sends a powerful message of deterrence to Pyongyang. 

As North Korea’s last remaining protector and patron, China, 

has a key role to play in convincing North Korea to denuclearize. 

That is why North Korea remains at the top of our bilateral agenda 

with Beijing. Secretary Kerry raised it prominently there in early 

July. 

We welcome the steps that PRC has taken to oppose Pyongyang’s 

nuclear weapons program. Since 2012, China has voted for two new 

rounds of U.N. sanctions and last year, published a 900 item control list banning their export to North Korea. Together with our allies and partners, we seek to show North Korea its nuclear program stands in the way of the secure future it says it wants. We 

continue to increase the cost of its illicit activities by unilaterally 

tightening sanctions. We work closely with the U.N. Security Council and like-minded partners to ensure full implementation of the 

four key Security Council resolutions. 

The July 2013 seizure by Panama of a huge cache of military 

gear demonstrates U.N. sanctions are effective. 

The welfare of North Korea’s people is an essential focus of U.S. 

policy. The vast majority suffer from the Government’s self-impoverishing military-first policy. The U.N. Commission of Inquiry’s sobering report detailed the systematic, widespread, and gross 

human rights violations being committed by the DPRK. 

My colleague, Robert King’s tireless efforts for many years demonstrate that human rights is a constant focus for us. There are 

three U.S. citizens that are being held by North Korea. Their continued detention is a serious stumbling block to approved U.S.-

DPRK relations. We will continue to advocate for their freedom and 

thank Congress for its steadfast support in these efforts. 

Mr. Chairman, we aim to convince the DPRK to comply with its 

obligations, end its isolation, and respect of the rights of its people. 

Each outrageous North Korean act discredits the assertion it is 

driven to act belligerently by others’ hostility. It is now clearer 

than ever that North Korea is developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles merely to prolong the Kim regime and to obtain benefits from the international community. North Korea alone is responsible for North Korean actions and resolving the DPRK nuclear program is a multilateral task. 

Just as North Korea’s original aggression against the South was 

met with a strong response from the United Nations, standing up 

to North Korea today requires a concerted effort by the entire 

international community. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and members of the panel for 

the opportunity to appear before you today and I am happy, obviously, to take your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Davies follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Ambassador Davies. And we 

will now turn to Ambassador King. You are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT KING, SPECIAL 

ENVOY FOR NORTH KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS, OFFICE OF 

THE SPECIAL ENVOY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH 

KOREA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. KING. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Congressman 

Bera, members of the committee. Thank you for this invitation to 

testify with Ambassador Davies on U.S. policy on North Korea. I 

will focus on human rights aspects of our policy on which there has 

been broad bipartisan cooperation. 

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and committee members, for 

your interest in the North Korean human rights issues for the 

hearings that you have held, for the meetings that you have held 

both here and in Seoul and Tokyo with victims and their families. 

North Korea remains a totalitarian state which seeks to dominate all aspects of its citizens’ lives including denial of basic freedoms and human rights. Reports portray a vast network of political 

prison camps where individuals are subjected to forced labor under 

horrific conditions and the government commits human rights violations that include extrajudicial killing, enslavement, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, abduction of foreign citizens as well as 

rape, forced abortion and other sexual violence. 

This past year, we have made significant progress on our efforts 

to increase international pressure on the North, to improve its 

human rights. In March of last year, the U.N. Human Rights 

Council established a landmark Commission of Inquiry to examine 

grave, widespread, and systematic violation of human rights in 

North Korea. Refugees from North Korea gave the Commission 

first-hand accounts of abuse and violence and leading international 

experts described the government policies that repress their people. 

Public hearings were held in Seoul, Tokyo, London, and here in 

Washington, DC, video and written transcripts of those hearings 

are available on the U.N. Web site. 

The Commission’s final report was one of the strongest and finest 

reports that the U.N. has produced. The Commission concluded 

that the gross violations of human rights have been and continue 

to be committed by the North Korean Government and its officials. 

And in many cases, those violations meet the high standard, the 

high threshold required for proof of crimes against humanity and 

international law. 

The Commission formally presented its final report of the 

Human Rights Council in March of this year. After hearing from 

the Commission, the Council overwhelmingly approved a resolution 

calling for accountability for those responsible for the abuses and 

for the creation of a field office under the High Commissioner for 

Human Rights to preserve and document evidence of these human 

rights abuses. South Korea has agreed to host this office. 

Building on this momentum in April, the United States with 

Australia and France convened the first ever U.N. Security Council 

discussion of human rights in North Korea. The Commission presented its report. Two North Korean refugees spoke of their perVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Oct 29, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\073014\88917 SHIRL
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sonal experiences. Eleven of the 13 Security Council members who 

attended that meeting expressed support for the report and called 

for accountability for the crimes that it outlined. 

As I participated in the various U.N. meetings this past year, 

two things have struck me. First, it is clear that the North is feeling the growing international pressure. The mounting condemnation of its human rights record has struck a chord in Pyongyang. 

Second, with a growing number of countries critical of North Korean human rights, the only countries who defend the North are 

the world’s worst human rights violators: Belarus, Cuba, Iran, 

Syria, Zimbabwe. 

Mr. Chairman, another key human rights matter that I want to 

raise is our effort to increase access to information by the North 

Korean people. That country is one of the most closed societies on 

this planet. Internet access is reserved for a tiny, tiny elite. It is 

illegal to own a radio or television set that can be tuned to any 

channel other than the official government media. Anyone caught 

listening to foreign radio or television will be sent to a reeducation 

camp. 

Despite these consequences of listening to foreign media, 35 percent of North Korean refugees and travelers listen to foreign radio 

broadcasts in North Korea. Foreign DVDs are now being seen by 

even larger numbers. Eighty-five percent of those interviewed have 

seen foreign, primarily South Korean media. Some 2 million cell 

phones for North Koreans to communicate with each other, although only domestic calls are permitted and phone use is carefully 

monitored. 

Because of the closed nature of North Korea, our international 

media efforts are among the most effective we have of breaking the 

government’s information monopoly. Thank you for continuing congressional support, for the Broadcasting Board of Governors and 

the media that it supports including Radio Free Asia and the Voice 

of America. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to reiterate one point that Ambassador Davies has made. We have no greater priority than the welfare and safety of U.S. citizens abroad. We continue actively to seek 

the release on humanitarian grounds of Kenneth Bae, Matthew 

Miller, and Jeffrey Fowle, so that they may be reunited with their 

families. 

Just as important as it is that North Korea address the issues 

that Ambassador Davies has talked about in terms of security and 

nuclear issues, it also must address its egregious human rights violations. The choice is clear. If North Korea does not take this action, it will continue to face greater isolation, condemnation, and 

increasing pressure from the international community. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. King follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Members 

will now have 5 minutes to ask questions and I will begin with myself. 

Ambassador Davies, on July 20th, Secretary Kerry was quoted as 

saying that North Korea has been quieter. I wouldn’t describe the 

historic number of missiles and rocket and artillery launches this 

year—so far nearly 100—as quiet. I also don’t believe that solely 

because North Korea hasn’t staged another nuclear test this year 

that we would necessarily call Pyongyang’s behavior quiet. Can you 

perhaps clarify why Secretary Kerry is describing North Korea as 

such and tell us how you can justify that classification? 

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, the Secretary said a lot of things. 

That was one thing he said and I think that to kind of place it back 

in context, the Secretary was referring to the fact that we are now 

some time on from the last major strategic provocation by North 

Korea. It has been a while since they have either launched a three 

stage intercontinental ballistic missile or tested a nuclear device. 

Mr. CHABOT. Do you think he would want to rephrase that perhaps differently or would you? 

Mr. DAVIES. I think in context it is easy to understand what the 

Secretary was saying which is that the cooperation, the collaboration, the diplomacy that we have been conducted with South Korea, 

China, and other partners in the process has gotten the message 

through to Pyongyang that when it acts strategically, when it tests 

a nuclear device and it is the only country on earth to have done 

it in this century, when it launches a three stage intercontinental 

ballistic missile that the world will react, it will react strongly and 

unanimously. So I think that is what the Secretary is referring to. 

It is absolutely the case and the Secretary has also spoken to this 

as have other senior officials, that North Korea’s recent behavior 

is unacceptable. The fact that it continues time after time to launch 

these ballistic missiles, violates U.N. Security Council resolutions, 

that cannot be countenanced——

Mr. CHABOT. I would certainly agree with you and the administration that it is unacceptable. I certainly wouldn’t have called it 

quieter, but that is okay. 

I am going to turn to Ambassador King if I can at this time. Ambassador, you have done a commendable job representing the North 

Korea human rights portfolio. I also recognize the difficulties you 

face since the administration doesn’t make the human rights issue, 

in my view, enough of a top priority. I think at best it is a secondtier issue behind nuclear proliferation, even if it is given sometimes 

lip service by calling it a top priority and constant focus. As such, 

I am disappointed that following the release of the U.N. Commission of Inquiry Report—in my view—little has been done. No 

human rights sanctions, no executive orders, and no move for a 

vote in the Security Council. Ambassador King, can you tell us 

what is being done at this time to hold North Korea accountable 

for the mass atrocities described in that report? I mean, it was a 

horrific thing to read, and there has been so little movement since 

the report’s release. Also, are you aware that there are three Americans currently detained in Pyongyang? I am deeply concerned particularly about their well-being and safety and one of those individuals, Jeffrey Fowle, he is from right outside my district in Ohio. I 

21

am told he is being brought to trial, accused of carrying out hostile 

acts against the country. Can you provide us with an update about 

this situation and where in the process the administration is to get 

these individuals released out of North Korea? And I certainly understand in a forum like this, you have to be careful because we 

don’t want to jeopardize their situation or put them in any more 

jeopardy than they already are. So I understand that, but to the 

degree that we can, in a forum like this, I would appreciate some 

comment. 

Mr. KING. Thank you very much for the question, Mr. Chairman. 

With regard to the attention that we give to North Korea human 

rights, I believe it was Lyndon Johnson that said, ‘‘You have got 

to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time.’’ I think that 

is what we are trying to do in terms of pushing on both the nuclear 

issue, but also pushing on the human rights issue. And I think as 

we have talked earlier, there is a lot that has been done this year 

with the release of the report. We have been attempting to use the 

U.N. report to continue to put pressure on North Korea. In the 

U.N. Security Council, we have already had an informal meeting 

where we have had 13 of the 15 members attend, discuss the report 

and discuss its recommendations. 

We are also in the process of looking toward activity in Geneva. 

We will continue our pressure in Geneva, the Human Rights Council on the human rights report. We are also going to have discussions in the General Assembly in October at which the Commission 

of Inquiry’s report will be discussed. There will be a resolution that 

will be prepared and adopted in the General Assembly by the end 

of this year. We are very active in terms of looking at how we 

might further push this forward in terms of action with the Security Council. 

With regard to sanctions, we are looking at sanctions. One of the 

issues that we need to do is try to do whatever we do in concert 

with other countries. Sanctions by the United States alone are very 

limited effectiveness. We have very little relationship with North 

Korea. We have very little trade. We have very little economic connection. And to the extent that we can work together with our allies and jointly adopt sanctions and look at actions that we can 

take together, I think the more effective those issues will be. 

A brief quick comment. The three Americans who are being held 

in North Korea are of great concern to us. We have communicated 

with the North Koreans our concern. We have requested repeatedly 

that they be released on humanitarian grounds. This includes Mr. 

Fowle, as well as Kenneth Bae and Matthew Miller. We are hoping 

to be able to have some progress on that. We continue to press the 

North Koreans. We have continued to work through the Swedish 

Government which takes care of our interest with regard to American citizens there. I briefed your staff on this. I know you were 

aware of that. If there is anything that we can provide you directly, 

I would be happy to come up and talk with you about that. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you for that. I would like to continue to follow up with you at the staff level on Mr. Fowle, in particular, but 

all of them. Thank you very much. 

I now recognize the acting ranking member, the gentleman from 

California, Mr. Bera. 

22

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Chairman Chabot. Ambassador Davies, in 

your opening testimony, I think you laid a framework that said any 

movement forward really starts with the framework that was laid 

out in the 2005 Six-Party Talks. That is a starting point for us to 

move forward. 

Also, Ambassador King and Ambassador Davies, in describing 

North Korea, you described them as global pariah. We described 

the crimes against humanity, the human rights violations. And it 

is from this vantage point when you look at the Kim regime, it is 

a regime that is less focused on its people and more focused on 

itself. I empathize with the difficulty of these negotiations. We can 

continue to further isolate North Korea, but we have also seen 

when we do that isolation how the Kim regime responds in provocative manners. I think you accurately lay out that this is not a 

U.S.-North Korea negotiation. This is a U.S.-Japan-Korea-ChinaRussia negotiation in the framework of regional stability. And of 

those countries, we all have a vested interest in creating a stable 

region, but the key really in this case lies with an active engagement on China’s behalf. 

I guess, Ambassador Davies, I would like you to comment on the 

talks that we have had with China, how China is viewing the new 

North Korean regime, and comment on China’s role in moving 

these conversations forward. 

Mr. DAVIES. I would be happy to do that, sir. Thanks so much. 

China and North Korea are not at their best historical comment 

right now. China was very vocal and active beginning over 2 years 

ago when the new third generation of leadership took over in 

Pyongyang in signaling to the North Korean regime that they 

would not support North Korea taking provocative acts and North 

Korea went ahead and did it. So in a sense North Korea has not 

been a good partner of China’s of late. And this has triggered, I 

think, a debate in China about the nature of its relationship with 

North Korea. The Chinese have begun to take acts that are somewhat remarkable in the historical scheme of things, publicly signaling and warning North Korea not to engage in strategic provocations, publishing this 900 item control list which is somewhat 

dramatic, cutting off banking relations with the Foreign Trade 

Bank of North Korea, also imposing strictures on some customs 

controls and so forth. 

So our role in this is to work with the Chinese to try to figure 

out and this is the top down. The President has been very engaged 

in this from the Sunnylands Summit of last summer on forward 

and a series of meetings with Xi Jinping how can the United States 

and China in a bilateral diplomacy, but also working with our 

other partners and the five parties to convince North Korea that 

its future does not lie in pursuing these weapons of mass destruction. Its future lies in living up to the promises that it made in the 

middle of the last decade abandoning the weapons, coming back 

into the fold of the international community, behaving better as an 

international actor, and the Chinese have done these unprecedented things. We have said to China that we appreciate it very 

much. We said there is only one problem with the acts that China 

has taken and that is, of course, that they haven’t yet worked to 

fundamentally change the calculus of Pyongyang. So this is a work 

23

in progress. But we have made progress. And we are going to keep 

at it. 

I think the new leadership in Beijing understands they can’t retain the status quo forever and this is a case where I think if we 

keep at it, in a multilateral endeavor, with the ROK at the core of 

our concerns and our diplomacy, China also quite central that we 

can ultimately make progress. 

Mr. BERA. And if we look at this North Korean regime that is 

provocative and potentially unstabling in the region, as inter-trade 

and inter-dependence, increasing trade between Korea and China, 

Japan and China, ourselves and China, our economies are increasingly interconnected in trade and we all benefit from a stable region that allows trade to occur. There is a real—China has to recognize that an unstable region is not in China’s interest and really 

creates some problems. So we do have to move forward in a regional conversation. We do have to move forward in partners. And 

I hope China is there increasing the pressure and isolating North 

Korea that they are on the wrong path. Thank you. I will yield 

back. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. Thank you very 

much. We will now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, 

Mr. Perry, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thanks for 

being here. I was a little late, so I missed your testimony, but listened to some of the answers to the questions. It just gave me some 

new questions and some new things to think about. 

Mr. Davies, you talked about we have made gains. And one of 

my questions is going to be this strategy of strategic patience and 

many would contend that it really hasn’t done anything and my 

question would be what are the significant results of that? 

Quite honestly, I feel like asking what are the significant or insignificant results from the context, maybe I should first ask this 

strategy of strategic patience what is the time frame of this? Are 

we looking at like 1,000 years? Or 100 years? Is this my lifetime? 

Because convincing North Korea’s leadership that this isn’t their 

pathway to the future, who are we kidding? 

Does anybody in this room think that these people have the same 

mindset about their future that the people in here have? The leadership? Maybe peasants, maybe the under class, maybe the people 

cited in the Human Rights Council report have that view of some 

brighter future possibly and that it should change. 

What would motivate the people at the top to change anything? 

I am really curious. Let me give you a question. What are the significant or insignificant results? How long is this strategy supposed 

to go and what makes you think that these folks would change 

their mindset whatsoever? 

Mr. DAVIES. Well, a couple of things. Strategic patience is like a 

bumper sticker that gets stuck on a car and just doesn’t get taken 

off even when the views of the driver change. I have been at this 

job 21⁄2 years. I have never described our policy as strategic patience. So it predates me. It is inaccurate. 

Secretary of State, when he was asked about it when he first 

came into office said no, that is not our policy. Our policy is strategic impatience with North Korea. We are going to continue to do 

24

everything we can not to sit down and have a coffee klatch with 

them and try to convince them of the logic of it, but to use pressure 

in particular, to point out to them that there is only one way forward. It is the peaceful diplomatic path forward. It is living up to 

their obligations, commitments, and promises that they made freely 11 years ago and it is going down this path of denuclearization. 

So I think what they care about most in Pyongyang, this regime, 

is surviving. They want to preserve the status quo. They don’t want 

anything to rock their boat. They are now—it is the world’s only 

historical example of a dynastic communist system, father to son, 

now in the third generation. They want to keep that party obviously going on. 

What we are doing, what we are seeking to do with China, South 

Korea, Japan, Russia and the rest of the international community 

is pump up the volume of a message to North Korea that that is 

the road to ruin for North Korea, that trying to pour scarce resources into the development of these expensive weapon systems 

while also trying to feed their people which they have not been able 

to do adequately for now almost a generation isn’t going to work. 

So what they need to do is give up these weapons, begin to play 

by the rules, begin to live up to their own promises——

Mr. PERRY. Listen, I don’t mean to just completely interrupt you 

and I am trying to listen. I have got a limited amount of time, but 

pumping up the volume on rhetoric, they are hoping to keep it 

going. And as far as the West or somebody in the West or our coalition partners telling them that it is not going to work from their 

perspective at the top, well, it has worked for three generations. 

We are not going to rock the boat. And with all due respect, folks, 

the Human Rights Council includes the likes of Cuba and the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo, and some of these bad actors 

that abuse their own citizenry and acting like that is going to be 

a vehicle to shake North Korea’s leadership off its foundation. 

I would like to have whatever you folks are drinking and eating 

every day because you have got a wonderful view of some rose-colored future. To me, we are the United States. Now listen, I am not 

trying to pose—this is a 20-year-old failure in my opinion or so it 

is not fair to impose all this upon you, but taking the same actions 

of the past, okay, it is not strategic—to me, it is strategic apathy 

or avoidance or something. I don’t know what it is, but doing the 

same over and over again for the next 20, 30, 40 years and expecting a different outcome, if I were here in 40 years, we are going 

to be having the same conversation. You can go ahead and comment, but I am frustrated. 

Mr. DAVIES. Look, again, we are not just talking about diplomatic messaging and sending them nice letters. We are talking 

about cutting off the inputs to their weapons programs through 

sanctions, through interdiction. And there have been successes 

there. When Panama rolled up the largest shipment of North Korean conventional weapons in July of last year on a Korean freighter trying to go through the Panama Canal, that was an indicator 

that the rest of the world gets the message, when 80 countries condemned North Korea’s decision to test a nuclear device beginning 

of last year and took action to join with the sanctions regime interVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:56 Oct 29, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\073014\88917 SHIRL
25

nationally to impose costs on North Korea, that is what we are 

talking about here. 

No, we are not talking about some kind of a hortatory attempt 

to convince them through a high school debating society. We are 

talking about taking actions that reduce their running room, that 

cut off their resources, that prevent them from selling the weapons 

systems that they need to sell in order to get the inputs for their 

weapons programs. 

But we are also talking about keeping a hand open to North 

Korea if they have this change of mind. That is the diplomacy part 

of it. I was engaged in negotiating with them at the beginning of 

2012. We cut a very modest deal with them that could have given 

them a chance back to what they claim they want which is security 

guarantees and all the rest of it and they chose not to take it. Instead, they launched a rocket in honor of the 100th anniversary of 

his grandfather’s birth. That was his choice to make. The result of 

it was near universal condemnation and action taken by nation 

states. 

It is a little bit like watching paint dry. I understand that. The 

Cold War took three generations. Sometimes, these problems are so 

pernicious that they simply take the patient application of increasing amounts of pressure accompanied by diplomacy in order to get 

these actors to realize that they are going down a path that leads 

them nowhere. And so that is our strategy. If there is an alternative, we are all ears. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. And I would like 

to associate myself with the frustrations of the gentleman from 

Pennsylvania. I think they are well said. 

The gentleman from Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, if we are associating ourselves with frustration, I am frustrated, too, and I am sure you are and I am sure 

everyone in the audience is. I am not quite sure what the relevance 

of our frustration is to try to fashion an efficacious public policy 

that creates change. And I would like to explore that with both of 

our witnesses. 

First of all, as you know or may know, we managed a bill the 

other day on the floor, Chairman Royce and myself, that passed 

unanimously adding to the sanctions regime on North Korea and 

I assume you both probably were aware of that and I welcome your 

reaction. I assume you support it and hopefully if it becomes law, 

we can use it as another tool in the kit bag. 

Ambassador Davies? 

Mr. DAVIES. For us, it is a bit of a third rail to be commenting 

on pending legislation, so I am going to steer clear of that with 

your permission. I think sanctions are a tool that is of value and 

I think we have demonstrated that through the actions we have 

taken both unilaterally and working with our partners around the 

world. We remain very open to further sanctions and options, when 

and if they make sense to deploy them, to use them. I am committed to finding a multilateral way forward. I wish there were a 

silver bullet we could fire to solve this problem. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. DAVIES. Smarter people than me would have figured it out 

long ago. 

26

Mr. CONNOLLY. Let us explore that just a little bit. Where do you 

think the pressure points are? I heard what you were saying about 

China which was quite intriguing, but in some ways if China has 

lost leverage over the regime of Pyongyang, well then where are 

the pressure points that the West can turn to or South Korea can 

turn to to try to rein in behavior or reward good behavior, punish 

bad behavior? I mean where are those leverage points? 

Mr. DAVIES. Well, China hasn’t lost leverage. They have just decided there are limits to the leverage that they are willing to exercise. So when it comes to food and fuel for North Korea, China is 

absolutely critical in that respect. So there is more that China 

could do. But we think it works much better if the world and in 

particular the neighbors of North Korea act together on this, supported by the rest of the international community. 

The Achilles heel of North Korea is the fact that it doesn’t have 

sufficient fossil fuels. It is unable to feed itself because it has broken its own economic system, hollowed it out over the years. And 

so in terms of ways to put pressure on them, these are some of the 

ways that we can use to do that. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And I appreciate that, but I was thinking about 

the normal kinds of leverage when you look at sanctions regimes, 

we are looking at it on Russia right now. Well, the ruble is exchanged. They have a stock market. They have external investment. They had trade flows, all of which can now be influenced in 

a way they were not as influenced when they were the Soviet 

Union. So they are feeling some heat. 

We don’t really have that kind of leverage with the North Korea 

regime, do we? 

Mr. DAVIES. We have limited leverage because we have almost 

no trade with them. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. DAVIES. That is correct. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And of course, they use their nuclear program as 

leverage over the West in terms of food supplies, emergency food 

supplies and the like. 

Mr. DAVIES. That is correct. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. 

Mr. DAVIES. But I should say one of the biggest points of leverage we have is the strength of our alliance relationships and in 

particular with the Republic of Korea because it is their peninsula, 

but also with Japan and staying strong and solidarity building up 

our alliance and our ability to defend our friends and ourselves 

against North Korean threats is a huge part of what we have. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Let me just in the last minute I have got, explore 

China’s relationship again. If I understood your testimony in a 

sense there has been a reassessment in China about the nature of 

the relationship with the regime in Pyongyang. Is that your testimony? 

Mr. DAVIES. They are debating it, that is correct. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay, they are debating it. Do you believe that 

as part of that debate the new leadership in Beijing is—well, first 

of all, the economic ties to South Korea are far more important for 

Beijing, frankly, than North Korea, is that not true? 

Mr. DAVIES. Many multiples. 

27

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. So given their exposure and the fact that 

they are stakeholders in the success of the capitalist Korea economy, are they, do you believe, more open to pressuring the North 

for say market reforms, similar to their own? 

Mr. DAVIES. They have been trying to convince North Korea for 

years to engage in reform of their economy and the North Koreans 

have resisted that. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. What leverage are the Chinese prepared to use 

to rein in belligerent behavior, try to achieve some of those market 

reforms, and are they prepared, do you believe, in some kind of 

timetable to move eventually toward an accommodation with the 

South, if not outright reunification with the South? 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired, but you can answer the question. 

Mr. DAVIES. I think this is one of the fascinating conversations 

that has sort of occurred during the recent summit meeting between President Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye of South Korea and 

it is fascinating that Beijing is voting with its feet, that now the 

President of China has met multiple times with his counterpart in 

South Korea, has yet to meet with, travel to North Korea. So 

things are beginning to change. I wish they were faster, but these 

are the changes we are observing. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Holding, 

is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HOLDING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Davies, how has 

Rouhani’s regime altered the North Korea-Iran relationship? 

Mr. DAVIES. I am not sure I am qualified to describe what is happening between those two countries other than that we watch very 

closely any proliferation or signs of proliferation that might exist 

between North Korea and his regime. 

Mr. HOLDING. Does the administration have any evidence or reason to suggest that North Korea and Iran have intentionally focused on different aspects of nuclear weapons capability to speed 

up the final results for both countries? 

Mr. DAVIES. Well, sir, with great respect, you are starting to get 

me down deep into intelligence matters and these are the sorts of 

things we would be very happy to brief you on in a closed hearing, 

but again, it is a matter of serious concentration and strong study 

by the administration. 

Mr. HOLDING. Given Iran and North Korea’s cooperation in the 

past, do you think it is likely that North Korea would share any 

future nuclear test data with Iran? 

Mr. DAVIES. You are calling for speculation on the part of the 

witness. I just don’t know. 

Mr. HOLDING. I don’t think we are bound by the Federal rules 

of civil——

Mr. DAVIES. I am sorry. I am trying to be a little glib. But no, 

again, I think intelligence information——

Mr. HOLDING. The witness will answer the question. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Your Honor. You may proceed. 

Mr. DAVIES. Pardon me, would you like to restate that? 

Mr. HOLDING. It is a concern of Iran and North Korea have cooperated in the past. 

28

Mr. DAVIES. I think there is every incentive between them to cooperate in some aspect to this, that is correct. 

Mr. HOLDING. And you don’t think there is any—the Rouhani regime coming in hasn’t changed any of that dynamic there that 

would lead to that—that has led to the cooperation in the past? 

Mr. DAVIES. Not that I am aware of, but one would hope that 

there would be changes. 

Mr. HOLDING. Your report suggests that North Korean energy 

needs have been met by Iran and that Iran’s desire for armaments 

have been met by North Korea. Reports have suggested that cooperation. What do we know about trends in oil consumption by 

North Korea and if they are stockpiling Iranian oil? 

Mr. DAVIES. I am not aware of the provision of Iranian oil to any 

great extent I have got to say to North Korea. I am just not aware 

of that. 

Mr. HOLDING. Switching to Russia a little bit, how have increased tensions between Russia and the West affected Russia’s relationship with North Korea? 

Mr. DAVIES. Well, Russia’s relationship with North Korea fundamentally changed in 1989, 1990 when the Soviet Union disappeared and the client relationship that existed disappeared. And 

so now they have a very, very small economic relationship quite 

frankly. They have a political relationship, but it is not nearly as 

important as that between Beijing and Pyongyang, between China 

and North Korea. 

Mr. HOLDING. So you don’t believe that the Russians have intensified or accelerated any weapons sales to North Korea in recent 

years? 

Mr. DAVIES. I am not aware of anything significant in that regard, no, sir. 

Mr. HOLDING. North Korea skirts international sanctions in a lot 

of different respects. One thing, I believe they are one of the largest 

suppliers of counterfeit cigarettes in the world, believe it or not, 

counterfeit currency as well. Any current administration actions to 

close these loopholes and more rigidly enforce the sanctions that 

you would like to expound on for 1 minute and 10 seconds? 

Mr. DAVIES. Sure. From the standpoint on counterfeit goods, 

there was a day when that was a booming business. I think that 

that day has passed to some extent, that that is something that we 

watch very, very closely, but North Korea will obviously stop at 

nothing to try to gain resources to develop its weapons programs 

and that is why we concentrate so much energy on nonproliferation, not just unilaterally with our friends and allies and partners. 

Mr. HOLDING. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Collins, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In listening to your testimony, I think it is rather interesting, again, with one of the key 

players, with basically the rogueness of North Korea and whether 

their relationship with Iran at least something studied a little bit 

more and I think using your words and I may have gotten this just 

a little bit wrong, but it was something to the effect of study and 

watching what is going on. That to me, and there is something in 

your written testimony that says ultimately, Mr. Chairman, our 

29

policy is to bring to realization that North Korea must take steps 

necessary to end its isolation, respect the human rights of its own 

people, honor its past commitments and national obligations. 

In light of that, what we will call the desirous goal, many experts 

contend that the administration’s strategy of strategic patience or 

basically watch and see, has not yet yielded any significant results, 

but rather has served only to benefit North Korea by offering it 

more time or affording it more time to pursue its own objectives. 

What is the administration’s assessment of its strategy of engagement and strategic patience? 

Mr. DAVIES. Our assessment is that we have made some 

progress, not nearly enough. We have got a lot further to go. 

Mr. COLLINS. What would you say your greatest accomplishment 

is? 

Mr. DAVIES. I think our greatest accomplishment is in achieving 

in just the last couple of years two United Nations Security Council 

resolutions with teeth that had attached with them resolutions. 

These were unanimously achieved. China voted for them. Russia 

voted for them. And Hezbollah, Hamas, Iran, this whole nexus of 

issues which I know is very important to you, we are doing more 

than just studying and watching this. Obviously, what we are 

doing is seeking to disrupt illicit shipments, enforce these sanctions. We are doing it with our partners. We know that they would 

naturally like to deal with each other, but we are doing everything 

we can to prevent that from developing. 

Mr. COLLINS. I think in the end is what other things beyond two 

United Nations resolutions which may or may not have the teeth 

and the enforcement that some would like to see, beyond that, 

what is the next step? What is the next big accomplishment? What 

is the next thing to ensure basically what you said is your own 

goals, is to encourage North Korea to become a model citizen which 

under the current leadership I am not even sure it understands the 

definition of model citizenship. It is a discussion here to have. 

What would be the next process? 

Mr. DAVIES. Well, we would settle for North Korea starting to do 

what it promised to do a long time ago and has tentatively started 

to do in the past which is to take steps in the direction of 

denuclearizing. In other words, freezing their nuclear programs, inviting the IAEA back in to inspect them, eventually leading to the 

dismantlement and elimination of the North Korean nuclear weapons program. That is the foundation of the six party process that 

we have been engaged in for many years and we have made a great 

deal of progress with particularly China, keeping the solidarity of 

Japan and the ROK with us. 

There is no daylight between any of the three of the allies, in 

order to get North Korea moving down that path of 

denuclearization. They are far away from it. And therefore, we are 

in a pressure phase. And that is what we have concentrated a lot 

of energy on is putting pressure on North Korea so that it understands it only has one option and that is the peaceful diplomatic 

option of denuclearization. 

Mr. COLLINS. And I understand there is some issue and I was 

discussing it with my very capable staff this discussion with Iran 

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30

where along the line for North Korea, there is at least some ways 

around what has been ‘‘put in place for strategic containment and 

isolation’’ for them because at this point some of that is just not, 

in fact, if anything, there has been actual—I won’t say regression, 

but there has definitely not been a lot of progress shown. They 

seem to be happily going about the fact that they are isolated and 

would like to get back, but they want to do so on their terms. 

So I guess the concern and the good part about—and I appreciate 

the chairman having this discussion—is just simply the fact of 

working through others which is a good thing, working with others, 

but somewhere there is a gap in the system. Somewhere there 

seems to be again rogue nations, others who will have dealings 

with North Korea and not pursuing these assets and I think that 

is where maybe a situation which there is a much bigger stick 

along with a carrot that maybe can influence this and especially 

with our South Korean partners in this process as well. 

Again, I think it is not an easy situation to answer and I appreciate your answers. Thank you. 

Mr. DAVIES. Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. We will go 

to a second round. I think there will just be two of us here, so we 

should be wrapped up within 10 minutes and I think we are going 

to have votes here shortly. I will begin with myself here. 

Recently, Japan and North Korea have reengaged on the issue of 

Japanese nationals abducted by North Korean agents back in the 

’70s and the ’80s, an issue that froze relations for the past number 

of years. In fact, I met with the Yokota family whose daughter, 

Megumi Yokota, was abducted by North Korean agents back in 

1977 at the age of 13 and I have met with them a number of times 

over the years, as well as a number of the other families. It is truly 

a sad and outrageous story. 

Pyongyang agreed to further investigate the fate of Japanese 

abductees in exchange for Tokyo’s lifting some sanctions which 

they apparently agreed to do. And it is a pretty sad state of affairs 

when you can leverage kidnapped citizens for some relief in sanctions. My question is, what do you think will be the likely outcome 

of this agreement? What is North Korea’s motivation for reopening 

the investigations? And how much advance notice did the administration have before Japan and North Korea reached their agreement? Do you have any concerns about these negotiations considering North Korea’s long record of deception and deceit? 

Mr. DAVIES. Well, we stand with Japan in terms of their desire 

which we completely understand to try to resolve this humanitarian catastrophe. I have met with the Yokotas a number of times 

myself. I was there with our new Ambassador, Ambassador Kennedy, when she first met with the Yokotas and the families of 

abductees, so we understand why not just the government, but the 

people of Japan want this resolved and we support them in their 

efforts to do this. The Japanese have kept us very closely informed 

as they have taken these steps, these limited steps, with North 

Korea. And we have indicated to Japan and we have said publicly 

that we are supportive of all of the efforts that Japan is undertaking as long as they are undertaken transparently. And obviously, what is very important for all of us and it is shared concern 

31

of the Japanese is that we have this paramount concern of the 

North Korean nuclear missile threat and the Japanese have been 

very explicit in indicating to us that they agree with that very 

much. 

We will watch. We are supportive of it. And we will see where 

it heads. North Korea is now on the hook. They have got to conduct 

this investigation that they promised the Japanese that they would 

conduct and so we will be watching very closely to see what kinds 

of results the North Koreans come up with and whether or not it 

meets the tests that the Japanese are imposing on them. 

Mr. CHABOT. Also, Ambassador Davies, in your prepared statement, you said that China is ‘‘North Korea’s last remaining patron.’’ Considering its budding relationship with Russia and illicit 

networks with countries in the Middle East, Iran especially, I wonder if that is completely accurate. And the recent economic trade 

deal between Russia and North Korea comes at a very opportune 

time for Pyongyang. It provides Pyongyang with an economic boost 

that it needs to counter the sanctions and also to counter balance 

the Chinese who have been putting some pressure on them but not 

nearly enough in the opinion of many of my colleagues and I. And 

for Russia, this deal undermines U.S. efforts to cut off North Korea’s financial and economic well being while enhancing its own 

web of influence vis-a`-vis the U.S. in, for example, the Ukrainian 

crisis. Can you tell us what sort of goods Russia is providing to 

North Korea, weapons, or oil, or gas, or food? And how is the Russian-North Korean relationship being considered as part of the administration’s strategic calculus and efforts to effectively pressure 

North Korea since Russia is also trying to bolster ties with China. 

Is anything being done to counter this trilateral cooperation between these nations? 

Mr. DAVIES. Well, Mr. Chairman, actually the Russia-North 

Korea relationship is very, very small in terms of trade. And some 

of the steps that Moscow announced were basically a recognition of 

the existing state of affairs. For instance, they announced some 

debt relief for North Korea. I don’t think anybody in Moscow ever 

expected that they would get that debt repaid to begin with. 

The trade is measured in a few hundreds of millions of dollars 

a year. They have been talking about some new projects that could 

be of interest, infrastructure projects. These are longer term undertakings and so far they are still a bit at the margins. So we stay 

in touch with the Russians. I go out to Moscow and try to talk to 

them about this problem. We have a shared interest in 

denuclearization and this is serious on the part of Russia. Russia 

is a stakeholder in the nonproliferation treaty. They don’t want 

North Korea to develop nuclear weapons. I think they are serious 

about that. We may have tactical differences there that we are 

going to continue to work on. But right now, I think it is fair to 

say that the agreement, the level of agreement that we have on 

strategic issues with Russia outweighs some of these deals that 

they are talking about at the margins right now. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. My time has expired. The 

gentleman from California is recognized. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Chairman. My staff has given me an article from The Hill, from yesterday’s paper that says North Korea 

32

threatens nuclear strikes on the White House. I am not going to 

take that seriously, other than maybe they are watching some 

DVDs from Hollywood as well that are getting smuggled in. But I 

do take seriously that they continue to try to develop longer range 

missile technology and so forth and as they acquire and develop 

that technology, they really are a threat to not only our regional 

partners and allies, but Guam and some of our territories all the 

way to Hawaii that we do have to take very seriously. And that 

does create a sense of urgency in moving things forward. 

My colleague from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, kind of underscored 

the challenge here. Sanctions with a regime that does not seem to 

care about what happens to its people are very difficult and all indications suggest that the Kim regime is not taking the interest of 

the North Korean people at stake here. So they are the ones that 

clearly are suffering. But we have a limited tool box here. So certainly as we ratchet up those sanctions just thinking through various scenarios, Chairman Chabot touched on your opening testimony, Ambassador Davies, where China is North Korea’s last remaining patron. What would happen if China joined us in the sanctions, if we are just thinking through and really did cut North 

Korea off? How would North Korea respond? 

Mr. DAVIES. Well, China has said that they support fully the 

United Nations sanctions And I talked about some of the signs that 

the Chinese are beginning to take really unprecedented action in 

that direction, the signal to North Korea that they will pay a price 

if they don’t come around in particular on the nuclear issue. 

This is why when we talk to the Chinese, we try to talk about 

how we can work in concert to bring pressure to bear on the North 

Koreans in a surgical way because we don’t want to do anything 

to the people of North Korea, but we do want to affect the interests 

of the regime when it comes to obtaining these weapons. And we 

are going to keep at that because we think increasingly the core 

Chinese interests and stability on the Korean Peninsula and our 

core interests in security that these are converging concerns. And 

we are seeing signs for the first time in decades that the Chinese 

also recognize this, that their stability will be affected unless we 

can address proactively North Korea’s pursuit of these weapons. 

And so that is where we are concentrating our energy and we are 

saying to the Chinese there is more you can do. We respect the fact 

that you are going to make decisions about how you do it, but we 

need to do more. And it is more effective if we can do it together 

with our partners. 

Mr. BERA. What we need to do this in partnership is we are increasingly showing North Korea there really is only one path forward, that is de-escalation, denuclearization and becoming a more 

conventional nation. 

Shifting to a different scenario, again, North Korea continues to 

posture with missiles toward the South Korean border and so forth. 

Again, not helpful. What would South Korea’s response be at this 

juncture? I think South Korean has shown incredible restraints, 

given some of North Korea’s provocation in recent years, if in fact, 

there was a misfire accidentally or intentionally that were to land 

in a South Korean city. Seoul is not that far away and what have 

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the South Koreans indicated that their response would be at this 

juncture? 

Mr. DAVIES. The South Koreans are increasingly resolved that 

should there be a provocation on the part of North Korea, that they 

will respond. This is, of course, due to the fact that in 2010 there 

were two deadly attacks by North Korea on South Korea, that resulted in some deaths of South Korean civilians. So this is what 

our alliance with South Korea is all about, ensuring that together 

we can present this united front on the peninsula to North Korea 

and they can understand that they can’t repeat the aggression that 

they portrayed on the South in June 1950, that those days are gone 

and that the best path forward is, in fact, the vision that has been 

laid out by the President of South Korea who has talked about a 

path forward involving peaceful unification, people to people, infrastructure development and so forth and so far Pyongyang, North 

Korea, has rejected that. 

Mr. BERA. And I would want to make sure that the people in 

South Korea know that, as one of our close allies in the region, we 

do stand with them in this and the right to defend themselves. 

Mr. DAVIES. Absolutely. 

Mr. BERA. And to make sure that those listening in North Korea 

understand that we stand with the South Koreans. 

Mr. DAVIES. It is job one for us. That is correct. 

Mr. BERA. Absolutely. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. The gentleman’s time has 

expired. That is the end of the questioning this afternoon. We want 

to sincerely thank our panel, Ambassador Davies and Ambassador 

King for your testimony this afternoon. Members will have 5 days 

to revise their statements or submit questions in writing and if 

there is no further business to come before the committee, we are 

adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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