ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Ian W. Thompson

Mooresville, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

V. Samuel Laurin III

Bryan H. Babb

Joel T. Nagle

Bose McKinney & Evans LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana 

In the

Indiana Supreme Court 

No. 49S02-1410-PL-643

LORA HOAGLAND, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF

AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,

Appellant (Plaintiff below),

v.

FRANKLIN TOWNSHIP COMMUNITY

SCHOOL CORPORATION,

Appellee (Defendant below).

Appeal from the Marion County Circuit Court, No. 49D02-1111-PL-42082

The Honorable Theodore M. Sosin, Judge

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-1301-PL-44

March 24, 2015

David, Justice.

After a budget deficit, Franklin Township Community School Corporation decided to 

discontinue transportation services to and from school for the majority of its public school students. 

A class action suit was brought by the parents of students who attend public schools in Franklin 

School Corporation. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that discontinuing transportation 
is prohibited under the Indiana Constitution. The plaintiffs’ specific challenge was based upon 

Article 8, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution (the Education Clause), which provides: 

Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a 

community, being essential to the preservation of a free government; 

it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all 

suitable means, moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural 

improvement; and to provide, by law, for a general and uniform 

system of Common Schools, wherein tuition shall be without 

charge, and equally open to all. 

IND. CONST. art. 8, § 1. However, the express terms of the Education Clause grant the duty of 

developing a system of common schools to the General Assembly. Therefore, the body of law that 

establishes our system of common schools is based upon the policy decisions of our legislature. 

This Court has neither the ability nor the duty to establish requirements for this system of common 

schools, aside from determining when an action clearly violates a constitutional mandate. In the 

case before us today, we find no constitutional requirement for school corporations to provide 

transportation to and from school. Since Franklin School Corporation did not violate a 

constitutional mandate, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Franklin 

School Corporation. 

Facts and Procedural History

In 2010, Franklin Township Community School Corporation was faced with a large budget 

deficit. Due to this shortfall, the School Corporation Board voted to discontinue transportation 

services for the majority of students1 attending its public schools. This decision was implemented 

1 As discussed below, the legislature has provided that a small percentage of students who meet certain 

criteria are required to receive transportation. See Ind. Code § 20-27-12-4 (2014) (school corporations 

“shall provide transportation” for certain homeless students); Ind. Code § 20-50-3-5 (2014) (school 

2

 
during the 2011-2012 school year, at which point a private entity, Central Indiana Educational 

Service Center (CIESC), began providing transportation services to students for a fee. CIESC 

charged a non-refundable registration fee of $20.00 per student to apply for transportation, in 

addition to an annual fee of $475.00 for a single child and $405.00 for each additional child.

Parents could choose to use CIESC transportation services and pay the fees, or find alternative 

transportation for their child(ren). If parents wanted CIESC to provide transportation, they had to

enter into a “Parents’ Supplemental Transportation Contract,” which provided that the parents and 

the bus driver were entering an agreement pursuant to and in compliance with Indiana statutes.2 

Lora Hoagland and Donna Chapman, parents of students who attend Franklin Township 

public schools, brought suit against Franklin School Corporation and CIESC. Hoagland’s 

complaint asserted that Franklin School Corporation violated the Education Clause of Indiana’s 

Constitution when it discontinued transportation services. Hoagland sought an injunction and a 

declaratory judgment asserting that the School Corporation’s discontinuation of bus services is 

unconstitutional because it denies children an education where tuition is without charge. She also 

sought monetary damages that were incurred from having to transport her children to and from

school. Shortly thereafter, on November 15, 2011, Hoagland filed for class certification in order 

to bring a class action suit against Franklin School Corporation. In June 2012, class certification 

was obtained and two classes of plaintiffs were certified: 1) all parents or guardians of students 

enrolled in Franklin School Corporation public schools who paid the CIESC bussing fees; and 2) 

all parents and guardians of students enrolled in Franklin School Corporation public schools who 

did not pay the bussing fees, but whose child(ren) would have ridden the bus to school were it not 

corporations “shall provide transportation” for certain students in foster care); and 511 I.A.C. 7-36-8 (2014) 

(“students with disabilities shall be transported . . .”). 

2 Indiana Code Section 20-27-6-3 (2014) provides in pertinent part, “[t]he parents of public school students 

not provided bus transportation by the school corporation may contract jointly with a school bus driver to 

provide transportation under a parents’ supplemental transportation contract.” 

3

 
for the fees. Hoagland was appointed as the class representative for the non-paying class. 

Chapman was appointed as the class representative for the paying class. 

Shortly after receiving class certification, the Indiana General Assembly amended Indiana 

Code Section 20-27-5-2, which took effect July 1, 2012. The amendment provided in pertinent 

part, “no fee may be charged to a parent or student for transportation to and from school. However, 

a fee may be charged for transportation to and from an athletic, a social, or another school 

sponsored function.” Ind. Code § 20-27-5-2(b) (2014). However, part (a) of that same statutory 

section was not amended and continued to provide that “. . . a school corporation may provide 

transportation for students to and from school.” Ind. Code § 20-27-5-2(a) (emphasis added). 

CIESC filed a motion to dismiss for, among other things, the failure of both plaintiffs to 

state a claim for which relief could be granted. The trial court granted CIESC’s motion to dismiss, 

and the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial on interlocutory appeal. Chapman v. Cent. Indiana 

Educ. Serv. Ctr. and Franklin Twp. Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 49A05-1209-PL-478, Slip Op. at *2 

(Ind. Ct. App. April 30, 2013).3 Accordingly, CIESC ceased being a party to the suit. 

Franklin School Corporation and Hoagland then filed cross motions for summary 

judgment. Hoagland asserted several arguments. The primary position Hoagland argued was that 

the Education Clause requires school corporations to provide transportation for students to and 

from school. Hoagland also argued that this claim would not be barred by the Indiana Tort Claims 

Act (ITCA) because that statute is inapplicable. However, if it were determined that the ITCA 

3 Chapman had specifically challenged the contract the she had entered into with CIESC to provide 

transportation for her child to and from school. Chapman, No. 49A05-1209-PL-478, Slip Op. at *1. The 

Court of Appeals noted that Chapman had paid the fee and received the bus services from CIESC, and the 

contract between the parties was completed. Id. at *2. The Court of Appeals determined that Chapman 

failed to allege why the CIESC contract was an adhesion contract, why it was illegal, why it unlawfully 

limited parents’ remedy, and how it was void against public policy. Id. Accordingly, the alleged facts were 

incapable of supporting a claim for relief. Id. 

4

 
applied, Hoagland argued that the plaintiffs had substantially complied with the notice 

requirements under the ITCA. Finally, Hoagland argued that under the Education Clause the 

plaintiffs’ have a private right of action to pursue money damages. Franklin School Corporation 

argued that the Education Clause does not create a duty upon the school corporation to provide 

transportation services, but even if there were a duty, the Education Clause provides no private 

right of action to pursue money damages for breaching that duty. In addition, Franklin School 

Corporation argued that the ITCA would provide immunity against Hoagland’s claim because the 

Act protects the exercise of discretionary functions, and the plaintiffs failed to provide notice as 

required by the ITCA. 

The trial court denied Hoagland’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary 

judgment for Franklin School Corporation. The trial court determined that there was no 

constitutional duty to provide bussing because state law provides that transportation is an optional 

service. The trial court also concluded that the Parents’ Supplemental Transportation Contract 

with CIESC did not provide a cause of action or relief in damages. Additionally, the trial court 

found that the Education Clause did not provide a private right of action for money damages, and 

the plaintiffs’ claims were barred for the failure to provide timely notice under the ITCA. 

Hoagland appealed, arguing in opposition to each of the findings reached by the trial court. 

A unanimous Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed and remanded part to the trial 

court. Hoagland v. Franklin Twp. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 10 N.E.3d 1034 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). The 

Court of Appeals affirmed that Hoagland had no private right of action for monetary damages 

under the Education Clause. Id. at 1040. Contrary to the trial court, the Court of Appeals held 

that the ITCA, “[b]y its express language,” only applies to tort claims, and “Hoagland’s claim 

sounds in Indiana’s Education Clause, not tort law . . . .” Id. at 1039. Thus, the ITCA did not bar 

Hoagland’s state constitutional claim. Id. at 1040. Lastly, the Court of Appeals held that Franklin 

School Corporation acted unconstitutionally when it ceased providing students with transportation 

to and from school. Id. at 1043-44. The Court of Appeals relied upon the text of the Education 

Clause, relevant statutes, and Nagy ex. rel. Nagy v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 844 

N.E.2d 481 (Ind. 2006), to reach the conclusion that transportation to and from school is “part and 

5
parcel of a public[-]school education,” which a school corporation cannot discontinue without 

violating the Education Clause. Hoagland, 10 N.E.3d at 1044. 

This Court granted Franklin School Corporation’s petition to transfer. We summarily 

affirm the Court of Appeals in its holding that Indiana’s Education Clause does not provide an 

individual with a private right of action for monetary damages. Hoagland, 10 N.E.3d at 

1040; See also Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2). We also summarily affirm the Court of Appeals’ 

holding that the ITCA does not govern Hoagland’s state constitutional claim. Id. at 1039-40. The 

remainder of the Court of Appeals’ opinion is vacated. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). Therefore, 

the only issue to be addressed by this Court is whether the Education Clause imposes a duty upon 

Franklin School Corporation to provide transportation to and from its public schools. 

Standard of Review

“[Q]uestions arising under the Indiana Constitution are to be resolved by examining the 

language of the text in the context of the history surrounding its drafting and ratification, the 

purpose and structure of our Constitution, and case law interpreting the specific provisions.” Nagy, 

844 N.E.2d at 484 (citing Ratliff v. Cohn, 693 N.E.2d 530, 534 (Ind. 1998)). The “intent of the 

framers of the Constitution is paramount in determining the meaning of a provision,” and 

considering the purpose behind the adoption of a provision allows this Court to best ascertain what 

the provision was designed to prevent. Boehm v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Ind. 

1996) (internal citations and quotation omitted). This requires “[t]he language of each provision 

of the Constitution [to] be treated with particular deference, as though every word had been 

hammered into place.” Embry v. O’Bannon, 798 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Ind. 2003) (quoting City 

Chapel Evangelical Free Inc. v. City of South Bend, 744 N.E.2d 443, 447 (Ind. 2001)). Moreover, 

“central authority over schools and school affairs being in the General Assembly, its discretion 

should be respected by local authorities and the courts, unless there is a clear violation of some 

section of the constitution.” Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch. v. State ex. rel. New Haven Public Sch., 159 

N.E.2d 708, 709 (Ind. 1959) (string citation omitted). 

6
Additionally, an interpretation of Indiana’s Constitution is conducted independently by this 

Court. City of Indianapolis v. Wright, 371 N.E.2d 1298, 1300 (Ind. 1978). However, we may 

look to other states that have interpreted similar constitutional provisions in their own state as

persuasive authority over this Court’s interpretation of Indiana’s Constitution. Id. (citing Allen v. 

Van Buren Twshp. of Madison Cnty., 184 N.E.2d 25, 30 (1962)).

Discussion

I. Article 8, Section 1—the Education Clause

“It has always been the policy of this state to foster and encourage education . . . .” Fort 

Wayne Cmty. Sch., 159 N.E.2d at 709. The heart of this policy is derived from the Education 

Clause of Indiana’s Constitution, which provides for a “common school system.” IND. CONST. art. 

8, § 1. In order to achieve a system of common schools, the Indiana Constitution provides in 

pertinent part, “it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all suitable means, 

moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvement; and to provide, by law, for a general 

and uniform system of Common Schools, wherein tuition shall be without charge, and equally 

open to all.” Id. (emphases added). 

In accordance with this constitutional mandate, this Court has long recognized that “[t]he 

General Assembly of this state is under a constitutional imperative duty to provide by law for a 

general and uniform system of common schools.” Ehle v. State, 191 Ind. 502, 507, 133 N.E. 748, 

750 (1922). The General Assembly has two express duties under the Education Clause. Bonner 

ex. rel. Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 520 (Ind. 2009). “The first is the duty to encourage

moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricultural improvements. The second is the duty to provide

for a general and uniform system of open common schools without tuition.” Id. These duties are 

similar to those that were provided in Indiana’s first Constitution, which imposed upon the General 

Assembly the duty to “provide, by law, for a general system of education, ascending in a regular 

gradation, from township schools to a state university, wherein tuition shall be gratis, and equally 

open to all.” Id. at 520; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. 9, § 2. However, we acknowledged that “[a] 

7
comparison of the two suggests that the 1851 revision was actually less expansive, referring to 

only a system of common schools instead of a general system of education through college, and 

describing tuition as ‘without charge’ instead of its Latin equivalent, ‘gratis.’” Bonner, 907 N.E.2d 

at 521. 

However, neither version of the Education Clause provided for a free public school system. 

“A free public school system implies a level of educational subsidization that the framers at least 

did not endorse and at most rejected outright.” Nagy, 844 N.E.2d at 485. The framers decided 

that schools would not be completely subsidized, and instead “a more modest, and perhaps less 

controversial” approach was taken, which provided for “a uniform statewide system of public 

schools that would be supported by taxation.” Id. at 489. Accordingly, the framers did not intend 

for every aspect of public education to be free. 

As the text of the Education Clause provides, the General Assembly is tasked with 

establishing the laws that make up a system of common schools. Thus, the legislative branch is 

left with “considerable discretion in determining what will and what will not come within the 

meaning of a public education system.” Nagy, 844 N.E.2d at 491. Due to this discretion, we have 

emphasized that the legislature is to “adopt the best [school] system that can be framed; but they, 

and not the courts, are to judge what is the best system.” Id. (quoting Robinson v. Schenck, 102 

Ind. 307, 318, 1 N.E. 698, 705 (1885)). 

Although the courts do not establish education policy, over a century ago this Court 

addressed an argument that is substantially similar to the issues presented today. A writ of 

mandamus was sought to compel a township trustee to use certain funds to provide free 

transportation for students in a recently consolidated school district. State ex. rel. Beard v. Jackson, 

168 Ind. 384, 385, 81 N.E. 62, 63 (1907). The parties argued that “unless free transportation is 

furnished to and from said school, many of said children will be unable to attend . . . .” Id. at 386, 

63. The Court looked to applicable statutes to determine if there was any duty upon the school 

trustee to provide transportation. The Court explained, “[a] duty arising out of statute must not be 

merely permissive or discretionary, but the statute must require the act to be done . . . .” Id. at 387, 

8
63. The act of 1899, which imposed compulsory school attendance, provided that students who 

lived a certain distance from school were not bound by the compulsory attendance statute, unless 

free transportation was provided. Id. at 387, 64. However, the Court explained that the 1899 act 

was superseded by the 1901 statute, which omitted the section requiring free transportation. Id. 

The Court emphasized that “[t]he only reference to free transportation of school children found in 

statutes prior to the act of 1907” involved transferring students to a school corporation closer to 

their residence, unless free transportation were provided. Id. at 387-88, 64. (emphasis added). 

Yet, “[t]his indefinite allusion in no way indicates by whom or by what means such free 

transportation may be furnished, and comes far short of a requirement that the same shall be 

provided.” Id. at 388, 64. The Court held that the relevant statutory framework imposed no duty 

to provide free transportation to students to and from school. Id. at 390, 64. 

Also in Jackson, the Court briefly referenced the Education Clause, only to note that an 

obligation imposed upon one school trustee to provide free transportation would become a legal 

obligation for all others, which the court dismissed by explaining that one trustee is not compelled 

to continue providing free transportation just because a predecessor did so. Id. at 388-89, 64. The 

Court never indicated that anything within the Education Clause would require transportation 

services to be provided. Rather, “[i]f the furnishing of such free transportation under the law be 

deemed expedient, the Legislature should enjoin the duty upon the appropriate officers, authorize 

the levy of adequate taxes to meet the expenses thereof, and prescribe the conditions and 

limitations under which the same is to be provided.” Id. at 389-90, 64. Furthermore, “[t]he 

requisite legislation cannot be supplied by the court, school officers, or local tribunals, but must 

emanate from the lawmaking body, and be general and uniform in its application.” Id. at 390, 64.

On several occasions, we have addressed various challenges under the Education Clause, 

and the discretion afforded to the legislature resonates throughout many of these 

cases. See Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1222-23 (Ind. 2013) (determining that the General 

Assembly has enacted “a body of law directed at providing a general and uniform system of public 

schools. . . . [and] [t]he school voucher program does not replace the public school system, which 

remains in place and available to all Indiana schoolchildren in accordance with the dictates of the 

9
Education Clause”) (citation omitted); Bonner, 907 N.E.2d at 522 (holding that Education Clause 

“does not impose upon government an affirmative duty to achieve any particular standard of 

resulting educational quality . . . [rather, that] determination is delegated to the sound legislative 

discretion of the General Assembly”); and Robinson, 102 Ind. at 307-11, 1 N.E. at 698-701

(determining that there is no constitutional restriction upon legislature to delegate authority, in 

local school matters, to local officers; due to this, legislature itself does not have to levy school 

tax, but city common council may do so). 

However, this Court did find a violation of the Education Clause in Nagy. In Nagy, a 

school corporation imposed a $20 student service fee on all students in grades Kindergarten 

through Twelve. 844 N.E.2d at 482. The fee went into a general fund that covered expenses such 

as nurses, media specialists, and alternative education. Id. at 483. Every student was charged the 

fee. Id. A complaint was filed against the school corporation alleging that this fee violated the 

Indiana Education Clause, among other things. Id. The issue became whether the fee constituted 

charging tuition. Id. This Court first noted that, unlike other states, the Indiana Constitution does 

“not . . . provide for a free school system,” but only provides that tuition shall be without 

charge. Id. at 485. However, 

Where the legislature . . . has identified programs, activities, 

projects, services, or curricula that it either mandates or permits

school corporations to undertake, the legislature has made a policy 

decision regarding exactly what qualifies as a part of a uniform 

system of public education commanded by Article 8, Section 1 and 

thus what qualifies for funding at public expense. 

Id. at 492 (emphasis added). The Court determined that the imposed fee covered expenses that the 

General Assembly had already determined were “part and parcel of a public school education and 

by extension qualify for public funding.” Id. Ultimately, the fee was found to be unconstitutional 

because it was equivalent to being charged for attending a public school and obtaining a public 

education. Id. at 493. 

10
In the current case, Hoagland argues that the legislature has permitted school corporations 

to provide transportation, which demonstrates its policy decision that transportation is part and 

parcel of a uniform system of public schools and should be publically funded. Taking Nagy one 

step further, Hoagland claims that not only could the school corporation not charge a fee for 

transportation, but the school corporation may not discontinue providing transportation to and from 

school. However, Nagy only addresses the limited facts of that case, i.e., whether charging a 

general student fee was the equivalent to charging tuition. Nagy does not address in any way 

whether school corporations are required to provide transportation. As such, Nagy is not 

controlling where the specific issue is whether a school corporation can discontinue transportation 

services to and from school. If anything can be drawn from Nagy, it would be the emphasis put 

upon the discretion afforded to the legislature in defining education policy. See Nagy, 844 N.E.2d 

at 491 (reiterating that the General Assembly has “considerable discretion in determining what 

will and what will not come within the meaning of a public education system.”) 

In the current case, although we need not address the fee charged by CIESC because it has 

already been deemed impermissible by the legislature, it seems pertinent to note that the fee 

charged by CIESC is also distinguishable from the fee charged in Nagy. First, the fee in Nagy

went into a general fund that covered costs for several mandatory, in addition to discretionary, 

services the school corporation was required to provide. See Nagy, 844 N.E.2d at 492; See also

511 I.A.C. 4-1.5-5 (2012) (“[s]chool corporations shall provide student assistance services . . .”); 

511 I.A.C. 4-1.5-6 (2012) (“[s]chool corporations shall provide health services . . .”); and 511 

I.A.C. 6.1-5-6 (2013) (“[a]ll schools shall have a media program . . .”) (emphases added). Second, 

the fee itself in Nagy was mandatory and was “imposed generally on all students, whether the 

student avails herself of a service or participates in a program or activity or not,” which makes the 

fee equivalent to tuition. 844 N.E.2d at 493. Here, the fee solely covered transportation, which is 

a permissive service only. Additionally, the fee was only charged to those students who chose to 

benefit from the optional transportation services. 

The history and text of the Education Clause, along with precedent interpreting it, compels 

this Court to remain cognizant that a system of common schools is left to the “sound legislative 

11
discretion of the General Assembly, and where . . . the exercise of that discretion does not run 

afoul of the Constitution, it is not for the judiciary to evaluate the prudence of the chosen 

policy.” Meredith, 984 N.E.2d at 1222. As this Court has done many times, we will address 

whether the challenged actions in this case run afoul of the Education Clause. 

II. Indiana Constitutional Requirements for Public School Transportation 

The specific issue before this Court is whether the Education Clause mandates Franklin 

School Corporation to provide transportation to and from its public schools. The General 

Assembly has enacted legislation regarding the transportation of students to and from school. The 

relevant statutory language provides:

(a) The governing body of a school corporation may provide transportation 

for students to and from school. 

(b) If the governing body of a school corporation: (1) provides 

transportation; or (2) contracts with an education service center . . . to 

provide transportation; no fee may be charged to a parent or student for 

transportation to and from school. However, a fee may be charged for 

transportation to and from an athletic, a social, or another school 

sponsored function. 

Ind. Code § 20-27-5-2 (emphases added). As mentioned above, it was not until this case was 

pending that the General Assembly amended this statutory section to expressly provide that if 

transportation is provided, no fee may be charged. Thus, that amendment did away with any 

question of whether the fees charged by CIESC were permissible; it is clear based upon the plain 

language of the statute that the CIESC transportation fee is prohibited.4

4 Franklin Township School Board complied with this statutory amendment by approving a debtrefinancing plan and resumed bussing of its students for the 2012-13 school year. 

12

 
As to the separate issue of who is responsible for providing transportation, the legislative 

language expressly states that school corporations “may” provide transportation, demonstrating 

that this is a permissive action, and the school corporation may choose to not provide 

transportation. Compare State, Indiana Civil Rights Comm’n v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 

716 N.E.2d 943, 947 (Ind. 1999) (stating that “[w]hen the word ‘shall’ appears in a statute, it is 

construed as mandatory rather than directory unless it appears clear from the context or the purpose 

of the statute that the legislature intended a different meaning”) (citation omitted); with Bivins v. 

State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 946 (Ind. 1994) (determining that “[t]he statutory language utilized is 

permissive, not compulsory, in stating that the jury ‘may recommend’ the death penalty upon 

completion of the evaluation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances”) (emphases added). 

Furthermore, no other statutory sections within Title 20 suggest a legislative intent that 

school corporations are required to provide all students with transportation to and from school. 

Specific categories of students are required by statute to be provided transportation. However, for 

the majority of the student population, other provisions throughout Title 20 express the permissive 

nature of providing transportation. Under Indiana Code Section 20-26-5-4(10) (2014), the 

governing body of a school corporation has the power to determine when transporting children to 

and from school is necessary. Additionally, “[t]he parents of public school students not provided 

bus transportation by the school corporation may contract jointly with a school bus driver to 

provide transportation under a parents’ supplemental transportation contract.” Ind. Code § 20-27-

6-3(a) (emphasis added). Thus, the legislature has provided alternative means for students to be 

transported to and from school. 

Since it cannot be disputed that the statutory language allows a school corporation to 

discontinue transportation services, next we evaluate whether this violates the Education Clause. 

Hoagland asserts that since students are required to attend school, transportation to school is an 

integral part of public education. This Court does not dispute that being present at school is 

necessary to avail oneself of the benefits of the education offered there. However, that does not 

necessarily lead to the conclusion that the school corporation alone must provide transportation 

under the Education Clause. 

13
This Court determined over a century ago in Jackson that school corporations were not 

compelled to provide transportation. 168 Ind. at 390, 81 N.E. at 64. Although Jackson primarily 

addressed whether transportation was required by statute, we find no basis from deviating from 

the rationale provided in Jackson as we now determine whether the Education Clause itself 

compels school corporations to provide transportation. Jackson plainly states that if free 

transportation by the school corporation was deemed mandatory, the legislature must establish that 

requirement by law. Id. at 389-90, 64. The Court reached that conclusion despite acknowledgment 

of the Education Clause. We therefore reiterate that legislation governing student transportation 

to and from our public schools “cannot be supplied by the court, school officers, or local tribunals, 

but must emanate from the lawmaking body . . . .” Id. at 390, 64. Here, the legislature has crafted 

laws that allow school corporations to choose whether or not to provide transportation. As we 

concluded in Jackson, nothing within these laws expressly requires school corporations to provide 

transportation. Id. at 389-90, 64. 

Furthermore, when interpreting a provision of the Indiana Constitution, this Court on 

occasion will look to another states’ interpretation of its own state constitution, if it contains a 

similar provision to Indiana’s Constitution. Allen, 184 N.E.2d at 30. The Supreme Court of North 

Dakota has addressed the issue of student transportation in light of North Dakota’s constitutional 

requirements. In Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, a school corporation was charging fees 

for transportation. 402 N.W.2d 897, 898 (N.D. 1987). Under Article VIII, Section 2 of the North 

Dakota Constitution, “[t]he legislative assembly shall provide for a uniform system of free public 

schools throughout the state . . . .” The Court recognized that it had previously held that textbook 

fees could not be charged because textbooks were part of the education system. Kadrmas, 402 

N.W.2d at 899 (citing Cardiff v. Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist., 263 N.W.2d 105, 113 (N.D. 1978)). 

However, that holding was not determinative of whether transportation was also part of the 

education system. The court broadly addressed transportation to and from school by explaining:

[O]ur laws on this subject demonstrate a long-standing practice of 

state and school district involvement in student transportation. 

However, our laws also clearly demonstrate that the Legislature has 

never required that the state or school districts assume the entire 

14
responsibility or cost of transporting students. Although state and 

school district involvement in providing student transportation has 

been significant, the obligation of transporting students to and from 

school has been shared by the parents or other caretakers of the 

children, and the people of this state have acquiesced in sharing that 

responsibility from the first days of statehood to the present time. 

Kadrmas, 402 N.W.2d at 900 (footnote omitted) (emphases added). The Court determined that 

the shared responsibility of transportation strongly indicated that free transportation under the 

North Dakota Education Clause was not required. Id.

Before reaching its final conclusion, the Court acknowledged that “[n]o one could seriously 

dispute the logic of the assertion that a child must reach the schoolhouse door as a prerequisite to 

receiving the educational opportunity offered therein.” Id. at 901. Yet, that alone does not compel 

the conclusion that transportation is required under the constitution. Id. The Court pointed out 

that “[o]ther important prerequisites to participating in the educational opportunity offered by the 

public school system might include good nutrition and proper immunizations.” Id. at 901-02. But 

ultimately, those services are not mandated by North Dakota’s Education Clause, even though a 

school corporation may choose to provide it. Id. The Court held that charging fees for 

transportation services did not violate its constitution. Id. at 902. 

Significantly, Kadrmas held that free transportation was not mandated by the North Dakota 

Constitution, even though the Education Clause provided for “free public schools,” unlike 

Indiana’s Education Clause, which is more limited in only providing that “tuition shall be without 

charge.” IND. CONST. art. 8, § 1; See also Nagy, 844 N.E.2d at 489-90 (explaining the significant 

distinction between free public schools and tuition being without charge). The conclusion 

in Kadrmas that transportation is not required under North Dakota’s Constitution is premised upon 

the understanding that transportation has always been a shared duty between the schools and 

parents or guardians of the students. We likewise acknowledge that schools systems, parents, and 

other guardians have traditionally shared the responsibility of transporting children to and from 

school. But that alone does not lead to the conclusion that school corporations have a duty under 

Indiana’s Constitution to provide transportation. 

15
We also find Kadrmas persuasive by recognizing that many of the programs, activities, 

projects, services, or curricula a school corporation has the option of providing may facilitate a 

more comprehensive education system. For example, initiatives that attempt to address childhood 

obesity have presented studies demonstrating that “students of a normal weight have higher 

scholastic achievement [and] less absenteeism . . . than their obese counterparts.” Lauren Kaplin, 

A National Strategy to Combat the Childhood Obesity Epidemic, 15 U.C. DAVIS J.JUV. L. & POL’Y

347, 352 (2011) (citation omitted). Additionally, schools “provide the ideal setting to 

institutionalize programs” addressing these problems. Id. at 354. Although many would likely 

agree that addressing childhood obesity at school is good policy that does not mean that Indiana’s 

Constitution mandates its implementation, even if some logical connection can be made between 

addressing obesity and providing a system of common schools equally open to all. 

Moreover, this Court addressed the Education Clause in Bonner and demonstrated the 

adherence we must give to the plain language of the constitution. 907 N.E.2d at 520-22. 

In Bonner, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment to establish that the Education Clause imposes 

a duty upon the state to establish a standard for quality education in public schools. Id. at 518. 

The Court noted that this claim was not brought under any specific provision of the Education 

Clause, but under the entire Education Clause in general. Id. at 520. After looking to the text of 

the constitution, the Court concluded, “its language speaks only of a general duty to provide for a 

system of common schools and does not require the attainment of any standard of resulting 

educational quality.” Id. at 521. The actual phrases “general and uniform,” “tuition . . . without 

charge,” and “equally open to all” set out no apparent requirement that a specific educational 

achievement standard must be met. Id. Simply stated, “[t]he Clause says nothing whatsoever 

about educational quality.” Id. The Court held, “the Education Clause of the Indiana Constitution 

does not impose upon government an affirmative duty to achieve any particular standard of 

resulting educational quality. This determination is delegated to the sound legislative discretion 

of the General Assembly.” Id. at 522. 

There is no dispute that providing a quality education is exceedingly important to the 

citizens of Indiana, and it is equally important to our school corporations, the legislature, and this 

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Court. However, as Bonner holds, what may be presented as good policy is not necessarily a 

constitutional requirement. The legislature makes “policy decision[s] regarding exactly what 

qualifies as a part of a uniform system of public education,” and that will not be disrupted “unless 

there is a clear violation” of the constitution. Nagy, 844 N.E.2d at 492; Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 

159 N.E.2d at 709. In the case before us today, no specific provision of the Education Clause is 

alleged to be specifically violated by a school corporation not providing free transportation. 

Rather, the primary basis of Hoagland’s argument relies upon the proposition that transportation 

is “part and parcel of a public[-]school education,” implying that it cannot be done away with 

without violating the Education Clause. (Resp. to Pet. Tr. at 9 (quoting Nagy, 844 N.E.2d at 492)). 

As in Bonner, the express provisions within the constitution say “nothing whatsoever about 

[transportation].” Bonner, 907 N.E.2d at 521. 

Even if we presume that the argument is based upon schools being equally open to all, the 

decision to cease transportation services does not deny open access to public education. It will 

inevitably require some families to make alternative accommodations, but it will not close the 

schoolhouse doors. Furthermore, students that have more articulable needs (homeless students, 

students with physical disabilities, etc.), will still receive transportation, likely in recognition of 

the fact that it is more difficult to provide transportation accommodations for those students.5 

In summary, the Indiana Education Clause only requires that there be a “general and 

uniform system of Common Schools, wherein tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to 

all.” We cannot read into that provision an intention that school corporations are required to 

transport all students to and from school. Rather, the applicable legislation will govern, and here, 

“[t]he policy of such legislation is exclusively for the General Assembly.” Ehle, 191 Ind. at 508, 

133 N.E.2d at 750. The General Assembly’s “determination of public policy will be afforded wide 

5 This is not to suggest that transporting these students would be constitutionally required. Rather, this 

statement is only a reflection of what current legislation provides. 

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discretion,” and the “wisdom or desirability” of particular legislation “is not a matter for the 

judiciary to determine.” Walton v. State, 398 N.E.2d 667, 670-71 (Ind. 1980) (internal citations

omitted). 

Conclusion

We summarily affirm the Court of Appeals in holding that the Indiana Tort Claims Act 

was inapplicable to Hoagland’s constitutional claim. We also summarily affirm the Court of 

Appeals in holding that the Education Clause does not provide a private right of action to pursue 

monetary damages. We now hold that Article 8, Section 1 of Indiana’s Constitution does not 

mandate school corporations to provide transportation to and from school. Accordingly, we affirm 

the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Franklin School Corporation. 

Rush, C.J., Dickson and Massa, J.J., concur.

Rucker, J., concurs in result only. 

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