AUDIT REPORT

Audit of NRC’s Oversight of 

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Safety

OIG-11-A-12 May 19, 2011

All publicly available OIG reports are accessible through

NRC’s Web site at: 

http:/www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-gen/
UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

OFFICE OF THE

INSPECTOR GENERAL

May 19, 2011

MEMORANDUM TO: R. William Borchardt

Executive Director for Operations

FROM: Stephen D. Dingbaum /RA/

Assistant Inspector General for Audits

SUBJECT: AUDIT OF NRC’S OVERSIGHT OF INDEPENDENT 

SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATIONS SAFETY 

(OIG-11-A-12)

Attached is the Office of the Inspector General’s (OIG) audit report titled, Audit of NRC’s 

Oversight of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSIs) Safety. 

The report presents the results of the subject audit. Agency comments provided at the 

April 26, 2011, exit conference have been incorporated, as appropriate, into this report.

Please provide information on actions taken or planned on each of the 

recommendations within 30 days of the date of this memorandum. Actions taken or 

planned are subject to OIG followup as stated in Management Directive 6.1.

We appreciate the cooperation extended to us by members of your staff during the 

audit. If you have any questions or comments about our report, please contact me at 

415-5915 or Sherri Miotla, Team Leader, Nuclear Materials & Waste Safety Team, at 

415-5914.

Attachment: As stated 
Electronic Distribution

Edwin M. Hackett, Executive Director, Advisory Committee 

 on Reactor Safeguards

E. Roy Hawkens, Chief Administrative Judge, Atomic Safety 

 and Licensing Board Panel

Stephen G. Burns, General Counsel

Brooke D. Poole, Director, Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication

James E. Dyer, Chief Financial Officer

Margaret M. Doane, Director, Office of International Programs

Rebecca L. Schmidt, Director, Office of Congressional Affairs

Eliot B. Brenner, Director, Office of Public Affairs

Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary of the Commission

R. William Borchardt, Executive Director for Operations

Michael F. Weber, Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Waste,

 Research, State, Tribal, and Compliance Programs, OEDO

Darren B. Ash, Deputy Executive Director 

 for Corporate Management, OEDO

Martin J. Virgilio, Deputy Executive Director for Reactor

 and Preparedness Programs, OEDO

Mary C. Muessle, Acting Assistant for Operations, OEDO

Kathryn O. Greene, Director, Office of Administration

Patrick D. Howard, Director, Computer Security Office

Roy P. Zimmerman, Director, Office of Enforcement

Charles L. Miller, Director, Office of Federal and State Materials

 and Environmental Management Programs

Cheryl L. McCrary, Director, Office of Investigations

Thomas M. Boyce, Director, Office of Information Services

Miriam L. Cohen, Director, Office of Human Resources

Michael R. Johnson, Director, Office of New Reactors

Catherine Haney, Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety

 and Safeguards

Eric J. Leeds, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Brian W. Sheron, Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

Corenthis B. Kelley, Director, Office of Small Business and Civil Rights

James T. Wiggins, Director, Office of Nuclear Security

 and Incident Response

William M. Dean, Regional Administrator, Region I

Victor M. McCree, Regional Administrator, Region II

Mark A. Satorius, Regional Administrator, Region III

Elmo E. Collins, Jr., Regional Administrator, Region IV
Audit of NRC’s Oversight of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Safety

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

The United States has entered a period where the national policy for 

storing, reprocessing, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel is being 

reexamined. With the prospect of spent nuclear fuel being stored at 

reactor sites for the foreseeable future due to the uncertainty surrounding 

the proposed Yucca Mountain repository program, the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) has been reviewing the issues associated with longterm storage. 

An independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) is an NRC licensed

facility designed and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear 

fuel and other radioactive materials associated with the spent fuel. An 

ISFSI typically consists of a concrete storage pad, storage containers 

(casks), and any support facilities. 

The majority of ISFSIs are located at operating reactor sites. Other 

ISFSIs are located away-from-reactors and typically operate at sites 

where decommissioning related to reactor operations is complete. As of 

April 2011, there were ISFSIs storing spent nuclear fuel or preparing to 

store spent nuclear fuel in the near term at 57 different locations across 

the United States. Of these ISFSI sites, 47 were located at operating 

reactors and the remaining 10 were located away from an operating 

reactor.

NRC’s safety oversight program for spent fuel storage is designed to 

prevent radiation-related deaths and illnesses, and protect the 

environment. The oversight program includes inspections and 

assessments of licensee and vendor activities with a focus on minimizing 

risk to public health and safety. NRC periodically inspects the design, 

fabrication, and use of dry cask storage systems by sending inspectors to 

licensee and cask vendor facilities. Inspectors follow agency guidance 

that contains objectives and procedures to use for each type of inspection. 

Upon completion of these inspections, NRC issues reports to document 

the inspection findings.
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PURPOSE

The audit objective was to determine if NRC has the requisite processes 

in place for reviewing ISFSIs safety. Appendix B contains information on 

the audit scope and methodology.

RESULTS IN BRIEF

The nuclear industry is expecting that by 2025 all commercial nuclear 

power plants in the United States will have operational ISFSIs at their 

sites. Currently, there are 104 operating nuclear reactors in the United 

States. This unprecedented growth in operational ISFSIs, coupled with an 

uncertainty surrounding the fate of a national high-level waste repository,

brings NRC’s oversight of ISFSI safety to the forefront. NRC's oversight 

program for ISFSI safety is designed to prevent radiation-related deaths 

and illnesses and protect the environment. Although there have been no 

significant issues at ISFSIs, the Office of the Inspector General identified 

opportunities for improvement within the ISFSI safety inspection program 

in the following two areas: 

ISFSI safety inspector training. 

Frequency of routine ISFSI inspections.

Opportunities Exist To Improve ISFSI Safety Inspector Training

NRC conducts ISFSI safety inspections with regional, resident, and 

headquarters-based inspectors. The training requirements for these 

inspectors vary. Although it is NRC’s policy to assign only trained and 

qualified individuals with the knowledge and aptitude to perform onsite 

inspection activities consistent with agency expectations, there is no 

formalized agencywide training program for ISFSI safety inspectors. 

When ISFSI safety inspectors do not have a consistent understanding of 

agency inspection requirements, oversight can be compromised. 

Specifically, there is an increased potential for inadequate inspections to 

occur, which could result in an increased risk to public health and safety. 
Audit of NRC’s Oversight of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Safety

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Routine ISFSI Inspection Frequency Varies Among Regions

The period between routine ISFSI inspections varies among regions from 

1 to almost 6 years. Although NRC expects a level of consistency in the 

performance of ISFSI inspections, inspection frequencies vary because 

the frequency required to conduct routine ISFSI inspections is not clearly 

defined. Routine ISFSI safety inspections could be delayed indefinitely 

without clearly defined inspection frequency guidance, potentially 

increasing the risk to public health and safety.

RECOMMENDATIONS 

This report makes two recommendations to improve the agency’s 

oversight of ISFSIs safety. A consolidated list of these recommendations 

appears in Section IV of this report.

AGENCY COMMENTS 

An exit conference was held with the agency on April 26, 2011. At this 

meeting, agency management provided supplemental information that has 

been incorporated into this report as appropriate. As a result, agency 

management stated their general agreement with the findings and 

recommendations in this report and opted not to provide formal comments 

for inclusion in this report.
Audit of NRC’s Oversight of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Safety

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

IMC Inspection Manual Chapter

ISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

OIG Office of the Inspector General
Audit of NRC’s Oversight of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Safety

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................. i

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS.........................................iv

I. BACKGROUND.................................................................. 1

II. PURPOSE ......................................................................... 5

III. FINDINGS........................................................................... 6

A. OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE ISFSI

SAFETY INSPECTOR TRAINING ....................................... 6

B. ROUTINE ISFSI INSPECTION FREQUENCY 

VARIES AMONG REGIONS ........................................... 14

IV. CONSOLIDATED LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS......... 17

V. AGENCY COMMENTS..................................................... 17

APPENDIX

A. WASTE CONFIDENCE DECISION ....................... 18

B. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY............................. 20
Audit of NRC’s Oversight of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Safety

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I. BACKGROUND

The United States has entered a period where the national 

policy for storing, reprocessing, and disposal of spent nuclear 

fuel1is being reexamined. With the prospect of spent nuclear 

fuel being stored at reactor sites for the foreseeable future due 

to the uncertainty surrounding the proposed Yucca Mountain 

repository program, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

has been reviewing the issues associated with long-term 

storage. 

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations 

An independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) is an 

NRC licensed facility designed and constructed for the interim 

storage of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive materials 

associated with the spent fuel. An ISFSI typically consists of a 

concrete storage pad, storage containers (casks), and any 

support facilities.2 The casks are typically steel cylinders that 

are either welded or bolted closed. The steel cylinder provides 

a leak-tight containment of the spent fuel. Surrounding each 

cylinder with additional steel, concrete, or other material 

provides radiation shielding to workers and members of the 

public. The casks can either be stored vertically on a storage 

pad or horizontally in concrete storage bunkers (see Figure 1). 

 

1

Spent nuclear fuel or spent fuel means fuel that has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor 

following irradiation, has undergone at least 1 year's decay since being used as a source of 

energy in a power reactor, and has not been chemically separated into its constituent 

elements by reprocessing.

2 NRC regulations allow the storage of spent fuel in both pool-type wet storage and dry casks. 

There is one pool-type wet storage ISFSI in the United States. 
Audit of NRC’s Oversight of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Safety

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Figure 1. Dry cask storage 

Source: NRC

The majority of ISFSIs are located at operating reactor sites. 

Other ISFSIs are located away-from-reactors and typically 

operate at sites where decommissioning related to reactor 

operations is complete. As of April 2011, there were ISFSIs 

storing spent nuclear fuel or preparing to store spent nuclear 

fuel in the near term at 57 different locations across the United 

States. Of these ISFSI sites, 47 were located at operating 

reactors and the remaining 10 were located away from an 

operating reactor.

Recent Regulatory Action

On December 23, 2010, NRC’s Commission published its 

generic determination that, if necessary, spent fuel generated in 

any reactor can be stored safely and without significant 

environmental impacts for at least 60 years beyond the licensed 

life for operation (which may include the term of a revised or 

renewed license) of that reactor. This storage would occur in a 
Audit of NRC’s Oversight of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Safety

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combination of spent fuel storage pools or dry casks at either 

onsite or away-from-reactor ISFSIs. Appendix A of this report

contains an overview of this decision, known as the Waste 

Confidence Decision. 

Figure 2. ISFSI at the Dresden Nuclear Power Plant 

Source: Holtec International Web site 

NRC’s Oversight of ISFSI Safety

NRC's safety oversight program for spent fuel storage is 

designed to prevent radiation-related deaths and illnesses, and 

protect the environment. The oversight program includes 

inspections and assessments of licensee and vendor activities 

with a focus on minimizing risk to public health and safety. NRC 

periodically inspects the design, fabrication, and use of dry cask 

storage systems by sending inspectors to licensee and cask 

vendor facilities. Inspectors follow agency guidance that 

contains objectives and procedures to use for each type of 

inspection. Upon completion of these inspections, NRC issues 

reports to document the inspection findings. 
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Roles and Responsibilities

The Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Division 

of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation, Rules, Inspections,

and Operations Branch, at NRC headquarters maintains overall 

management of the spent fuel storage inspection program. The 

branch develops inspection policy, procedures, and guidance on 

spent fuel storage. Additionally, the branch conducts 

inspections of spent fuel storage system vendors and provides 

technical and programmatic assistance to the NRC regions in 

conducting safety inspections of ISFSIs. The branch has 

recently begun an independent self-assessment focusing, in 

part, on the ISFSI safety inspection process.

Performing ISFSI safety inspections is primarily a regional 

responsibility. Each of NRC’s four regional offices manages, 

plans, schedules, and implements an ISFSI safety inspection 

program. Staff trained in various disciplines conduct these 

inspections throughout the regions. For example, some regions 

use health physicists, while others use reactor inspectors. 

Routine ISFSI safety inspections may last up to 1 week, while 

pre-operational inspections may last several weeks. 

Figure 3. Fuel assembly loading at the Brunswick nuclear power plant 

Source: Office of the Inspector General, NRC
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For fiscal year 2011, NRC’s ISFSI safety oversight program 

budget (including project management and response to 

incidents and events for headquarters and the regions) consists 

of 11 full time equivalents, equating to a cost of approximately 

$1.65 million. Some staff are not assigned to the ISFSI safety 

oversight program full time; they also perform other duties. As a 

result, there are more than 11 people working on the ISFSI 

safety oversight program. 

II. PURPOSE

The audit objective was to determine if NRC has the requisite 

processes in place for reviewing ISFSIs safety.3 Appendix B 

contains information on the audit scope and methodology.

 

3

The original objective of this audit, as noted in the Office of the Inspector General’s fiscal 

year 2011 Annual Plan, was to determine if NRC has the requisite processes in place for 

reviewing and approving ISFSIs. The objective was narrowed during fieldwork to specifically 

focus on reviewing ISFSIs safety. 
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III. FINDINGS

The nuclear industry is expecting that by 2025 all commercial 

nuclear power plants in the United States will have operational 

ISFSIs at their sites. Currently, there are 104 operating nuclear 

reactors in the United States. This unprecedented growth in 

operational ISFSIs, coupled with an uncertainty surrounding the 

fate of a national high-level waste repository, brings NRC’s 

oversight of ISFSI safety to the forefront. NRC's oversight 

program for ISFSI safety is designed to prevent radiation-related 

deaths and illnesses and protect the environment. Although 

there have been no significant issues at ISFSIs, the Office of the 

Inspector General (OIG) identified opportunities for 

improvement within the ISFSI safety inspection program in the 

following two areas: 

ISFSI safety inspector training.

Frequency of routine ISFSI inspections.

A. Opportunities Exist To Improve ISFSI Safety Inspector Training

NRC conducts ISFSI safety inspections with regional, resident,

and headquarters-based inspectors. The training requirements 

for these inspectors vary. Although it is NRC’s policy to assign 

only trained and qualified individuals with the knowledge and 

aptitude to perform onsite inspection activities consistent with 

agency expectations, there is no formalized agencywide training 

program for ISFSI safety inspectors. When ISFSI safety 

inspectors do not have a consistent understanding of agency 

inspection requirements, oversight can be compromised. 

Specifically, there is an increased potential for inadequate 

inspections to occur, which could result in an increased risk to 

public health and safety. 
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Figure 4. A cask being set on an ISFSI with a Vertical Cask Transporter

Source: Holtec International Web site

Maintaining Technical Excellence and Regulatory Process 

Proficiency

NRC is dedicated to maintaining its technical excellence and 

regulatory process proficiency now and in the future through a 

strategic approach to training, development, and knowledge 

management. NRC’s policy is that only trained and qualified 

individuals, who have the knowledge and aptitude to perform

onsite activities, should perform ISFSI safety inspections. 

Management is responsible for overseeing employees who 

conduct onsite activities by:

Clearly establishing and communicating performance 

expectations.

Providing staff development opportunities.

Ensuring that onsite inspections are conducted as 

intended.

Training Requirements Vary Among Staff 

ISFSI safety inspector training requirements vary among the 

regional, resident, and headquarters-based inspectors. 

Regional inspectors conduct pad construction, pre-operational, 

initial loading, and (with the exception of Region II) routine ISFSI 
Audit of NRC’s Oversight of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Safety

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safety inspections. In Region II, resident inspectors conduct the

routine ISFSI safety inspections. Headquarters inspectors focus 

primarily on inspections of the cask manufacturing program; 

however, they also assist the regional inspectors with ISFSI 

safety inspections. When conducting safety inspections at 

ISFSIs, all inspectors use the same NRC inspection guidance, 

although the training they receive to implement the guidance 

varies. 

Training Requirements

Typically, NRC inspectors qualify to conduct ISFSI safety 

inspections by completing one of the following qualification 

programs:

Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 1245, Operating 

Reactor Programs.

IMC 1246, Section VI, Attachment 2, Spent Fuel Storage 

and Transportation Inspector. 

IMC 1246, Section IX, Decommissioning Inspectors.

Region I’s ISFSI inspector qualification program.

Specific regional requirements further add to the variations 

found among these qualification programs. For example, 

Region I’s current qualification program was developed based 

on a need for additional ISFSI training. This qualification 

program requires that inspectors qualify under IMC 1246, 

Section II, Materials Health Physics Inspector. Inspectors-intraining must then successfully perform an ISFSI inspection

while observed by a qualified ISFSI Inspector, review additional

ISFSI related guidance, and be interviewed by the 

decommissioning branch chief. In Region III, inspectors 

typically supplement decommissioning (IMC 1246, Section IX)
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or operating reactor (IMC 1245) qualifications with additional 

ISFSI training found in the Spent Fuel Storage and 

Transportation Inspector (IMC 1246, Section VI, Attachment 2) 

qualification program. 

The NRC programs used to qualify ISFSI inspectors require no 

classroom training in areas such as concrete technology, the 

use of cranes for heavy loads, and welding inspection 

techniques. However, specialized knowledge in these areas 

may be required when conducting critical inspection activities 

such as pad fabrication, dry runs, and initial loading campaigns.4 

As such, some ISFSI inspectors have taken additional training 

in these areas. NRC also utilizes experts in these fields, from 

across the agency, to assist ISFSI inspectors when specific 

needs arise. 

Training in Development

Realizing the need for a formal ISFSI inspector qualification 

process, Region I requested to take the lead in developing an 

agencywide ISFSI safety inspector qualification program. In 

authorizing this request, the Director, Division of Spent Fuel 

Storage and Transportation, Office of Nuclear Material Safety 

and Safeguards, stated that coordinating this effort with the 

other regions will allow for a more consistent qualification 

program for ISFSI inspectors. Region I, with assistance from 

the regions, headquarters, and NRC’s Technical Training 

Center, is currently developing the new ISFSI qualification 

program, although it is not complete.

 

4 NRC conducts pad fabrication inspections to ensure that requirements contained in the 

Safety Analysis Report, Safety Evaluation Report, and license or technical specifications 

have been properly incorporated into construction of the ISFSI storage pad. The Safety 

Analysis Report is submitted by the applicant (licensee) and the Safety Evaluation Report is 

NRC’s response.

NRC conducts dry run inspections to ensure that the licensee has developed, implemented, 

and evaluated preoperational testing activities to safely load spent fuel from the spent fuel 

pool into a dry cask storage system and to transfer the loaded cask to the ISFSI in 

accordance with the requirements for the particular cask storage system used. 

NRC conducts initial loading inspections to ensure that the licensee provides reasonable 

assurance that the spent fuel can be handled, stored, and retrieved without undue risk to the 

health and safety of the public. 
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Inconsistent Understanding of Agency Requirements

Current ISFSI safety inspector training does not provide 

inspectors with a consistent understanding of NRC’s inspection 

requirements. Specifically, NRC staff do not have a consistent 

understanding of the agency’s requirements relating to ISFSI 

inspections, the use of enforcement at ISFSIs, and the role of 

resident inspectors at sites with ISFSIs.

Figure 5. An aerial view of an away-from-reactor ISFSI

Source: Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company

Inconsistent Understanding of ISFSI Inspection 

Requirements

Agency staff does not have a consistent understanding of 

requirements relating to the inspections of ISFSIs. NRC 

procedures require that inspectors assess the overall material 

condition of the ISFSI facility as it pertains to the safe operation of 

the ISFSI. The procedures also require that inspectors verify by 

direct observation that any radioactive material present at the 

ISFSI is properly controlled and stored in accordance with site 

requirements. Among the regions, ISFSI safety inspectors have 

an inconsistent understanding regarding the implementation of 

safety inspection requirements. Specifically, ISFSI safety 

inspectors in one region believe that it is acceptable to walk

around the perimeter of an ISFSI to perform inspection activities, 

rather than actually enter the ISFSI pad. Inspectors from other 
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regions disagree with this inspection methodology, explaining that 

it is important to walk onto the pad in order to assess the 

condition of the casks and to make sure that the airflow cooling 

vents of the casks are unobstructed. For example, birds or

squirrels sometimes block these vents with nests. 

Inconsistent Understanding of ISFSI Enforcement 

Requirements

Agency staff do not have a consistent understanding of 

requirements relating to the use of enforcement at ISFSIs. 

Some ISFSI safety inspectors are unsure if enforcement can

occur during a dry run. Some inspectors consider dry runs free 

from enforcement, while another stated that inspectors act as 

“consultants” during dry runs. A regional branch chief explained 

that NRC’s role during dry runs is that of an “observer” rather 

than an inspector. This branch chief was also unsure if 

enforcement could occur during a dry run. A regional deputy 

division director stated that NRC could cite licensees for 

violations observed during dry runs; dry runs are not free from 

enforcement. 

Inconsistent Understanding of the Role of Resident 

Inspectors at Sites with ISFSIs 

Agency staff do not have a consistent understanding of the role 

of resident inspectors at ISFSIs. OIG interviewed at least one 

resident inspector or senior resident inspector from 45 of the 

operating reactors that have an ISFSI.5 The results of these 64 

interviews follow:

ISFSI Safety Involvement - Overall, 36 percent reported 

being involved with ISFSI safety, while 55 percent 

reported limited involvement. Finally, 9 percent of the 

resident inspectors reported no involvement with ISFSI 

safety.

 

5

Inspectors from each of the 47 reactors sites with ISFSIs were interviewed, although only 

interviews from the inspectors at the reactor sites with ISFSIs currently storing spent nuclear 

fuel were included in the interview results. 
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Management Expectations - Only 28 percent stated that 

NRC management had conveyed any expectations 

regarding their duties pertaining to ISFSI safety. 

ISFSI Hours Allocation – 70 percent stated that there are 

no hours specifically allocated to resident inspectors for 

ISFSI safety inspections. 

ISFSI Training – Approximately 77 percent stated that 

they had received no ISFSI related training, while 22 

percent stated that they had received very generic ISFSI 

training. 

A senior resident inspector stated that determining who is 

responsible for observing various inspection segments during 

cask loading is difficult. The inspector continued that he would 

like to see the responsibilities better defined. Another resident 

inspector stated that he would like to receive ISFSI training; 

currently, the only ISFSI information he receives comes from the 

licensee. 

No Formalized Agencywide Training Program Exists

ISFSI safety inspectors do not have a consistent understanding 

of agency requirements because a formalized agencywide 

training program clearly establishing and communicating 

performance expectations, and requiring training on critical 

inspection activities, does not exist. Although the agency is in 

the process of developing an agencywide formal qualification 

program, this task is not complete. 

Compromised Oversight Can Occur

When training requirements vary among staff, compromised 

oversight of ISFSI safety inspections can occur. Specifically, 

there is an increased potential that inspections will overlook 

discrepancies, resulting in an increased risk to public health and 

safety. 
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Recommendation

OIG recommends that the Executive Director for Operations:

1. Develop and implement a formalized agencywide ISFSI 

safety inspector training program.
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B. Routine ISFSI Inspection Frequency Varies Among Regions

The period between routine ISFSI inspections varies among 

regions from 1 to almost 6 years. Although NRC expects a level 

of consistency in the performance of ISFSI inspections, 

inspection frequencies vary because the frequency required to 

conduct routine ISFSI inspections is not clearly defined. 

Routine ISFSI safety inspections could be delayed indefinitely 

without clearly defined inspection frequency guidance, 

potentially increasing the risk to public health and safety.

Consistency in the Performance of ISFSI Inspections

The expected receipt of applications to construct and operate 

new nuclear power plants, and to dispose of high-level 

radioactive waste, are two of the major challenges potentially 

facing the NRC over the next several years. NRC strives to be 

a stable regulator in an ever changing and dynamic 

environment. To that end, NRC expects a level of consistency 

in the performance of ISFSI inspections. NRC’s guidance not 

only defines inspection program requirements, it also serves as 

a framework intended to achieve consistency in the 

performance of ISFSI inspections. 

Figure 6. Fuel assembly loading at the Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant 

Source: OIG, NRC
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Routine ISFSI Inspection Frequency Varies Among Regions

Currently the time between routine inspections at ISFSIs varies 

from 1 to almost 6 years. Reviewing the two most recent 

inspection reports for all ISFSIs currently storing spent nuclear 

fuel (110 reports), OIG found that the shortest period between 

routine ISFSI safety inspections was 1 year. OIG also found 

that the longest period between routine ISFSI safety inspections 

was almost 6 years. The routine inspection sequence most 

often occurring was a 2-year frequency. 

Routine Inspection Frequency Is Not Clearly Defined 

The frequency required to conduct routine ISFSI inspections is 

not clearly defined. Routine inspections occur once an ISFSI is 

operational. NRC’s IMC 2690 defines routine inspection 

frequencies as “when required” and states that an inspection 

effort should be performed when the activity6occurs at the 

facility. The manual chapter then refers to either an appendix or 

a guidance section of a specific inspection procedure for 

additional clarification. The "when required" performance 

standard described in the appendixes does not specifically state 

a required periodicity. The definition only states that the 

inspection effort “should” be performed when the activity occurs. 

However, “should” does not indicate a requirement that an 

activity “must” occur with any definitive frequency. 

Inspections Could Be Delayed 

Without clearly defined minimum inspection frequency guidance 

for routine ISFSI safety inspections, inspections could be 

delayed indefinitely. Licensees may become complacent 

knowing that NRC is not required to inspect their facility at any 

 

6

ISFSI activities, which occur in four phases, include the following:

Phase 1 - Design, fabrication, and construction.

Phase 2 - Preoperational testing, including dry runs.

Phase 3 - Spent fuel loading and unloading operations.

Phase 4 - Storage monitoring of the loaded ISFSI.
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defined minimum frequency, potentially putting the public’s 

health and safety at an increased risk. Therefore, it is important 

for NRC to clarify its guidance to define a minimum frequency to 

conduct routine ISFSI inspection activities. 

Recommendation 

OIG recommends that the Executive Director for Operations:

2. Modify inspection guidance to include a minimum inspection 

frequency for conducting routine ISFSI safety inspections.
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IV. CONSOLIDATED LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

OIG recommends that the Executive Director for Operations:

1. Develop and implement a formalized agencywide ISFSI 

safety inspector training program.

2. Modify inspection guidance to include a minimum inspection 

frequency for conducting routine ISFSI safety inspections.

V. AGENCY COMMENTS

An exit conference was held with the agency on April 26, 2011. 

At this meeting, agency management provided supplemental 

information that has been incorporated into this report as 

appropriate. As a result, agency management stated their 

general agreement with the findings and recommendations in 

this report and opted not to provide formal comments for 

inclusion in this report.
Audit of NRC’s Oversight of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Safety

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Appendix A

Waste Confidence Decision

On September 18, 1990, NRC issued a decision reaffirming and 

revising, in part, the five Waste Confidence Findings reached in 

its 1984 Waste Confidence Decision. The 1984 decision and 

the 1990 update to the decision were products of rulemaking 

proceedings designed to assess the degree of assurance that 

radioactive wastes generated by nuclear power plants can be 

safely disposed of, to determine when disposal or offsite storage 

would be available, and to determine whether radioactive 

wastes can be safely stored onsite past the expiration of 

existing facility licenses until offsite disposal or storage is 

available. In 2008, the Commission decided to undertake a 

review of its Waste Confidence Decision and Rule as part of an 

effort to enhance the efficiency of combined license proceedings 

for applications for nuclear power plant licensees anticipated in 

the near future by ensuring that the findings are up to date. The 

Commission has considered developments since 1990 and has 

reviewed its five prior findings and supporting environmental 

analysis.7 As a result of this review, the Commission revised 

the second and fourth findings in the Waste Confidence 

Decision. This decision was published in the Federal Register 

on December 23, 2010, and is as follows: 

Finding 2: The Commission finds reasonable assurance 

that sufficient mined geologic repository capacity will be 

available to dispose of the commercial high-level 

radioactive waste and spent fuel generated in any reactor 

when necessary.

Finding 4: The Commission finds reasonable assurance 

that, if necessary, spent fuel generated in any reactor can 

be stored safely without significant environmental 

impacts for at least 60 years beyond the licensed life for 

operation (which may include the term of a revised or 

 

7

Federal Register 75:246 (December 23, 2010) pages 81037-81076. 
Audit of NRC’s Oversight of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Safety

19

renewed license) of that reactor in a combination of 

storage in its spent fuel storage basin and either onsite or 

offsite independent spent fuel storage installations.

The Commission also reaffirmed the three remaining findings. 

The reaffirmed findings follow: 

Finding 1: The Commission finds reasonable assurance 

that safe disposal of high-level radioactive waste and 

spent fuel in a mined geologic repository is technically 

feasible.

Finding 3: The Commission finds reasonable assurance 

that high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel will be 

managed in a safe manner until sufficient repository 

capacity is available to assure the safe disposal of all 

high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel.

Finding 5: The Commission finds reasonable assurance 

that safe, independent onsite spent fuel storage or offsite 

spent fuel storage will be made available if such storage 

capacity is needed.
Audit of NRC’s Oversight of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Safety

20

Appendix B

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The audit objective was to determine if NRC has the requisite 

processes in place for reviewing ISFSIs safety. The audit 

focused on reviewing the oversight and implementation of the 

safety inspection program for dry storage of spent reactor fuel at 

ISFSIs through an examination of documents, interviews, and 

observations.

OIG reviewed relevant Federal legislation pertaining to NRC’s 

regulatory authorities to oversee ISFSIs, including the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization 

Act of 1974; and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. OIG 

also reviewed agency guidance including inspection manual 

chapters, inspection procedures, and office instructions that 

pertain to the inspection of ISFSIs. OIG also reviewed NRC and 

industry reports, briefings, and presentations that address the 

relevant aspects of used nuclear fuel storage and the safety 

inspections of ISFSIs in the United States. 

OIG also reviewed records during the course of the audit. 

Specifically, the audit team reviewed 110 ISFSI safety 

inspection reports to determine the frequency of ISFSI safety 

specific inspections. Documentation pertaining to the allocation 

of resources for the ISFSI safety inspection program was also 

reviewed.

OIG interviewed inspectors and managers from headquarters

(Rockville, MD) and each of the four regions (Region I, King of 

Prussia, PA; Region II, Atlanta, GA; Region III, Lisle, IL; and 

Region IV, Arlington, TX) who participate in activities related to 

ISFSIs. These interviews were conducted to obtain staff 

insights into the oversight and implementation of the ISFSI 

inspection program. More specifically, OIG conducted 

telephone interviews with 64 resident inspectors (including 

senior resident inspectors) working at each of the 45 operating 

reactor sites with ISFSIs storing spent nuclear fuel. 
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21

The audit team also observed the following inspection activities:

Initial fuel loading campaign at the Brunswick nuclear 

power plant in Southport, North Carolina.

NRC inspection at Holtec International Headquarters in 

Marlton, New Jersey.

NRC safety inspection at the Connecticut Yankee Atomic 

Power Company ISFSI in East Hampton, Connecticut. 

 

We conducted this performance audit at NRC headquarters, 

NRC’s Region I office, and at licensees in Regions I and II from 

September 2010 through February 2011 in accordance with 

generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that the audit is planned and performed with 

the objective of obtaining sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for any findings and conclusions 

based on the stated audit objective. OIG believes that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for the report 

findings and conclusions based on the audit objective. Internal 

controls related to the audit objective were reviewed and 

analyzed. Throughout the audit, auditors were aware of the 

possibility or existence of fraud, waste, or misuse in the 

program. The audit work was conducted by Sherri Miotla, Team 

Leader; Robert Woodward, Audit Manager; Kevin Nietmann, 

Senior Technical Advisor; Cathy Colleli, Senior Management 

Analyst; Maxine Lorette, Senior Auditor; Yvette Mabry, Senior 

Auditor; and Kristin Lipuma, Management Analyst.