[Cite as State v. Carr, 2021-Ohio-4556.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MAHONING COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

J.C., 

Defendant-Appellant.

 

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

Case No. 21 MA 0028 

 

Criminal Appeal from the 

Mahoning County Court No. 5 of Mahoning County, Ohio 

Case No. 2019 CRB 278 

BEFORE: 

Gene Donofrio, Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Judges. 

JUDGMENT: 

Affirmed 

Atty. Paul Gains, Mahoning County Prosecutor, Atty. Ralph Rivera, Assistant Prosecutor, 

Mahoning County Prosecutor’s Office, 21 West Boardman Street, 6th Floor, Youngstown, 

Ohio 44503, for Plaintiff-Appellee and 

Atty. Michael J. McGee, Harrington, Hoppe & Mitchell, LTD., 108 Main Avenue, SW, 

Suite 500, Warren, Ohio 44481 for Defendant-Appellant. 
 – 2 – 

Case No. 21 MA 0028

 

Dated: 

December 22, 2021 

 

Donofrio, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, J.C., appeals from a Mahoning County Court Number 

5 judgment determining that he had violated the terms of his probation, sentencing him 

to three days in jail, and extending the term of his probation.

{¶2} On January 24, 2020, appellant pleaded guilty to one count of domestic 

violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25, a first-degree misdemeanor. The trial court 

sentenced him to 180 days in jail, with 177 days suspended, and gave him credit for three 

days served. It issued a $100 fine. The court also placed appellant on 12 months of 

reporting probation. A condition of his probation was that he have no contact with his 

children and their mother. 

{¶3} On November 25, 2020, appellant filed a motion for early termination of 

probation. The trial court denied this motion stating that appellant was to satisfy the full 

term of his probation, which would end on January 24, 2021. 

{¶4} The trial court’s docket reflects that on January 22, 2021, the court 

scheduled a probation violation hearing for January 26, 2021. On January 26, the court 

held the hearing where appellant pleaded not guilty to the probation violation. The court 

then set the matter for a February 23, 2021 hearing. 

{¶5} Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the probation violation. He argued that 

because the probation violation hearing was held two days after his probation ended, the 

trial court was without jurisdiction to enforce a probation violation. 

{¶6} Despite his motion to dismiss, appellant subsequently stipulated to the 

probation violation. The trial court sentenced him to three days in jail and an extended 

his term of probation to March 9, 2023. 

{¶7} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on March 18, 2021. The next day, 

the trial court granted appellant’s motion to stay his jail sentence pending this appeal. He 

now raises a single assignment of error. 

{¶8} Appellant’s sole assignment of error states: 
 – 3 – 

Case No. 21 MA 0028

 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED APPELLANT 

TO JAIL TIME AND AN EXTENDED PROBATIONARY PERIOD DUE TO 

THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO 

ENTER INTO ANY SENTENCE OVER APPELLANT. 

{¶9} Appellant argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him on the 

probation violation. He acknowledges that a court can conduct probation violation 

proceedings after the defendant’s term of probation has expired but stresses that notice 

must be properly given to the defendant before the expiration of the probation term. 

Appellant claims he was not given notice in this case of the probation violation 

proceedings until January 26, 2021, which was three days after his probation term 

expired. 

{¶10} An appellate court applies a de novo review to matters involving both 

subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. State v. DaRe, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 16 BE 

0011, 2017-Ohio-7585, ¶ 12; State v. Castner, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29704, 2021-Ohio1048, ¶ 7. 

{¶11} Subject-matter jurisdiction involves a court's power to hear a case, and as 

such the issue can never be waived and may be raised at any time. State v. Mbodji, 129 

Ohio St.3d 325, 2011-Ohio-2880, 951 N.E.2d 1025, ¶ 10. Lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction renders a judgment void. In re J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d 205, 2006-Ohio-5484, 855 

N.E.2d 851, ¶ 10. 

{¶12} Contrary to subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction can be waived. 

Civ.R. 12(H). See also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Kupanoff Imports, Inc., 83 Ohio 

App.3d 278, 281, 614 N.E.2d 1072 (3d Dist.1992). Personal jurisdiction may be acquired 

either by service of process upon the defendant or the voluntary appearance and 

submission of the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court. Maryhew v. Yova, 11 Ohio 

St.3d 154, 156, 464 N.E.2d 538 (1984). 

{¶13} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.25(B)(1), if a court sentences an offender to 

community control sanctions, then “the sentencing court retains jurisdiction over the 

offender and the period of community control for the duration of the period of community 

control.” The court has jurisdiction to impose a sentence once the original period of 

community control expires as long as action is taken to institute a violation hearing during 
 – 4 – 

Case No. 21 MA 0028

the community control period. State v. Johnson, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 09-MA-94, 2010-

Ohio-2533, ¶ 30, citing State v. Shorter, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22188, 2008-Ohio1986, at ¶ 10. 

{¶14} In arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction in this case, appellant relies 

heavily on State ex rel. Hemsley v. Unruh, 128 Ohio St.3d 307, 2011-Ohio-226, 943 

N.E.2d 1014. That case involved an appeal from the appellate court’s dismissal of a writ 

of prohibition that sought to prevent the trial court judge from proceeding on alleged 

violations of community control. Hemsley claimed the trial court lacked subject-matter 

jurisdiction, arguing that his term of community control had expired. 

{¶15} The Ohio Supreme Court found the judge did not lack jurisdiction to 

conduct the community-control-violation hearing in Hemsley's case. 

{¶16} First, the Court pointed out that the common pleas court has basic statutory 

jurisdiction to proceed on the charged statutory violations. Id. at ¶ 11. The Court relied 

on R.C. 2929.15(B)(1), which provides: “[i]f the conditions of a community control 

sanction are violated or if the offender violates a law or leaves the state without the 

permission of the court or the offender's probation officer, the sentencing court may 

impose upon the violator one or more of the [specified] penalties[.]” Id. The Court noted 

that the common pleas court was the sentencing court for Hemsley. Id. 

{¶17} Next, the Court went on to find that the expiration of Hemsley’s five-year 

period of community control did not divest the common pleas court of subject-matter 

jurisdiction over the community-control-violation hearing. Id. at ¶ 12. It pointed out that 

Hemsley relied on former R.C. 2951.09, which provided that at the termination of the 

probation period, “‘the jurisdiction of the judge or magistrate to impose sentence ceases 

and the defendant shall be discharged.’” Id., quoting 140 Ohio Laws, Part V, 7136, 7561. 

The Court stated that it had held that this provision prevented a common pleas court from 

revoking a criminal defendant's probation and sentencing him after his probationary 

period had expired even if the revocation proceeding was initiated before the probationary 

period expired. Id., citing Davis v. Wolfe, 92 Ohio St.3d 549, 751 N.E.2d 1051 (2001). 

But the Court noted that former R.C. 2951.09 was repealed effective January 1, 2004. Id. 

at ¶ 13. The Court determined, therefore, that former R.C. 2951.09 and Davis were 

inapplicable to Hemsley. Id. The Court then concluded that because R.C. 2951.09 was 
 – 5 – 

Case No. 21 MA 0028

not applicable, the common pleas court was authorized to conduct proceedings on the 

alleged community-control violations even though the proceedings were conducted after 

the expiration of the term of community control, provided that the notice of violations was 

properly given and the revocation proceedings were commenced before the expiration. 

Id. Notice was not an issue in Hemsley and the Court did not address what notice might 

be required. 

{¶18} Appellant asserts that Hemsley requires that the trial court must have 

commenced the probation violation hearing before the expiration of the probation term. 

{¶19} But this court relied on Hemsley in finding that “the trial court does not lose 

jurisdiction to sentence a defendant for a violation of community control just because the 

period of community control expires.” State v. Kubina, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 

0005, 2017-Ohio-8031, ¶ 12. We held that “a court has jurisdiction to impose a sentence 

once the original period of community control expires as long as action is taken to institute 

a violation hearing during the community control period.” (Emphasis added); Id. at ¶ 13. 

{¶20} Moreover, as the Third District has observed: “It is illogical to contend that 

if a court has initiated probation violation proceedings before the probation period has 

expired, that it cannot continue to prosecute after the expiration of the period.” State v. 

Harrington, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-03-34, 2004-Ohio-1046, ¶ 15. 

{¶21} In this case, the trial court’s docket reflects that on January 22, 2021, the 

court took action by scheduling a hearing for January 26, 2021, on the alleged probation 

violation. Appellant claims he was not given notice of the probation violation until January 

26, 2021, several days after his probation expired, at the hearing. But appellant appeared 

at the January 26 hearing and entered a not guilty plea. So he must have had advance 

notice of the hearing or else he would not have appeared. Thus, the trial court initiated 

the probation violation proceedings before appellant’s probation term expired and 

appellant waived any issue with personal jurisdiction by appearing at the hearing and 

entering a not guilty plea. There is no indication on the record that appellant objected to 

personal jurisdiction at the hearing. When a defendant appears before a court and enters 

a not guilty plea, he waives any objections based on personal jurisdiction. State v. 

Pizzuto, 5th Dist. Licking No. 17-CA-31, 2018-Ohio-146, ¶ 22. 
 – 6 – 

Case No. 21 MA 0028

{¶22} Moreover, although appellant initially appeared and entered a not guilty 

plea to the probation violation, at the next hearing he stipulated to the probation violation. 

He not only stipulated to the violation, he also stipulated to the three-day jail term. The 

stipulation is included in the court’s judgment entry, which appellant signed. A stipulation 

made by the defendant during a criminal trial is binding. State v. Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 

404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 147. 

{¶23} In sum, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. The 

court took action to institute a violation hearing during appellant’s community control 

period. Moreover, appellant submitted to the court’s personal jurisdiction by appearing 

before it and later stipulating to the violation and sentence. Accordingly, appellant’s sole 

assignment of error is without merit and is overruled. 

{¶24} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby affirmed. 

Waite, J., concurs. 

Robb, J., concurs. 
[Cite as State v. Carr, 2021-Ohio-4556.]

 

 

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the sole assignment of error

is overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the

Mahoning County Court No. 5 of Mahoning County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be taxed

against the Appellant. 

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in 

this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a 

certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution. 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.