Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

In re Commitment of Vance, 2017 IL App (3d) 160683

Appellate Court 

Caption

In re COMMITMENT OF JAMES VANCE (The People of the State 

of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. James Vance, RespondentAppellant).

District & No. Third District

Docket No. 3-16-0683

Rule 23 order filed

Motion to publish

allowed

Opinion filed

July 3, 2017

August 8, 2017

August 8, 2017

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Tazewell County, No. 05-MR-91; 

the Hon. Paul P. Gilfillan, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Samuel L. Snyder, of Peoria, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael M. Glick and 

Brian McLeish, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the 

People.
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Panel JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justice Wright concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 Respondent, James Vance, appeals from the trial court’s order, finding that probable cause 

did not exist to warrant an evidentiary hearing to determine if respondent was no longer a 

sexually violent person. On appeal, respondent argues that the court erred in granting the 

State’s motion for a finding of no probable cause. We affirm.

¶ 2 FACTS 

¶ 3 In September 2009, respondent was adjudicated a sexually violent person under the 

Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2008)) and 

committed to the Department of Human Services (DHS). After a December 2009 dispositional 

hearing, the court ordered respondent placed in a secure facility for institutional care and 

custody. 

¶ 4 On May 4, 2016, Dr. Richard Travis conducted a 77-month reevaluation as required by the 

Act. Following his evaluation, the State filed a motion for a finding of no probable cause to 

believe that respondent was no longer a sexually violent person under section 65 of the Act 

(725 ILCS 207/65(b) (West 2016)) and attached Dr. Travis’s reevaluation report in support of 

its claim. 

¶ 5 In his report, Dr. Travis concluded that respondent should continue to be found a sexually 

violent person and remain in DHS custody. He based his evaluation on numerous sources, 

including his review of respondent’s criminal history, an interview with respondent, and DHS 

treatment progress reports. 

¶ 6 Travis noted that respondent’s underlying sexual offense occurred from January to June of 

1993. During those six months, defendant sexually assaulted his five-year-old stepdaughter by 

penetrating her mouth, vagina, and anus with his penis on several occasions. Respondent also 

revealed to investigators that three years before he assaulted his stepdaughter he sexually 

assaulted an eleven-year-old girl. He was charged with four counts of aggravated criminal 

sexual assault and pleaded guilty to one count. The trial court sentenced him to 20 years in 

prison. After his release in 2003, respondent violated his parole twice by leaving home without 

permission and having direct contact with a minor. 

¶ 7 Based on his review of the record and respondent’s interview, Travis concluded that 

respondent met the American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 

Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, DSM-5 (2013) criteria for (1) pedophilic disorder, 

nonexclusive type, sexually attracted to females; (2) other specified personality disorder, with 

antisocial and histrionic features; (3) alcohol use disorder and cannabis use disorder, in 

sustained remission in a controlled environment; and (4) other specific anxiety disorder, 

limited-symptom attacks. Travis opined that respondent continued to pose a substantial risk of 

reoffense and that “his current dynamic risk factors and treatment needs fall within the high 

range.” 
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¶ 8 Travis also used the Static-99R and Static-2002R evaluations. Respondent’s scores on both 

actuarial assessments placed him in the low to moderate risk category. However, respondent 

displayed several additional factors shown to increase risk of reoffense, including (1) sexual 

interest in children, (2) any personality disorder, (3) MMPI Pd Scale elevated, (4) general 

self-regulated problems, (5) poor problem solving skills, (6) employment instability, (7) 

substance abuse, (8) pro-criminal attitudes, (9) childhood behavior problems, (10) attitudes 

tolerant of sexual crimes, and (11) violation of conditional release. In support of the additional 

risk factors, Travis reported that respondent violated the conditions of his mandatory 

supervised release by having contact with and kissing a minor female. He also noted that 

respondent was arrested in 2005 for a parole violation and that a search of his residence 

produced a videotape containing numerous images of naked children. Travis concluded that 

these additional risk factors supported the use of a “high risk/high needs” designation as 

respondent’s risk assessment. 

¶ 9 Travis reported that no protective factors decreased respondent’s risk of reoffense. He 

noted that respondent had not completed sex offender treatment and failed to attend treatment 

to address his sex offense history. Although respondent began participating in sex offense 

specific treatment, he withdrew from the program during the review period. Travis also stated 

that respondent’s age of 49 did not merit reduction in his risk assessment beyond that already 

reflected in his actuarial scores. 

¶ 10 After reviewing respondent’s commitment history and DHS treatment reports, Travis 

stated that respondent’s condition has not changed since the most recent reexamination. He 

highlighted respondent’s sporadic participation in sex offense treatment and noted that 

respondent “is not yet fully engaged in sex-offense-specific treatment.” He also noted that 

respondent had previously reported disturbing sexual thoughts about his offending history and 

recently indicated that those troubling thoughts and nightmares continued. Travis concluded 

that respondent had not made sufficient progress in treatment to merit conditional discharge. 

¶ 11 Respondent filed a motion seeking the appointment of an independent expert, which the 

trial court granted. On June 17, 2016, respondent then filed his response to the State’s motion 

for a finding of no probable cause. At a subsequent status hearing in September, counsel for 

respondent informed the court that respondent would not be using the report authorized by his 

independent expert, Jane Velez, and would only be using her as a consultant. 

¶ 12 At the probable cause hearing, the State argued, based on Travis’s report, that there was no 

probable cause to warrant an evidentiary hearing. Respondent countered that he had attended 

treatment sessions, learned from those sessions, and made sufficient progress for conditional 

release or discharge. 

¶ 13 The trial court stated that it had read and considered the reexamination report and 

concluded there was no probable cause for an evidentiary hearing. The court then granted the 

State’s motion. 

¶ 14 ANALYSIS 

¶ 15 Respondent’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding no probable 

cause was shown to warrant an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he is still a sexually 

violent person. 
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¶ 16 Following a commitment under the Act, the DHS is responsible for evaluating the 

individual’s mental condition within 6 months of the initial commitment and again thereafter at 

least every 12 months. 725 ILCS 207/55(a) (West 2016). The purpose of these examinations is 

to determine if the committed individual has made sufficient progress to be conditionally 

released or discharged. 725 ILCS 207/55(a) (West 2016). 

¶ 17 At the time of each reexamination under the Act, the committed person receives notice of 

the right to petition the circuit court for discharge. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2016). If the 

committed person does not affirmatively waive that right, like respondent in this case, the court 

must “set a probable cause hearing to determine whether facts exist to believe that since the 

most recent periodic reexamination ***, the condition of the committed person has so changed 

that he or she is no longer a sexually violent person.” 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2016). At a 

probable cause hearing, the court only reviews the reexamination reports and hears the parties’ 

arguments. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2016). If the court finds that probable cause does 

exist, it must set an evidentiary hearing on the issue. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(2) (West 2016). 

Since the trial court only considers the reexamination reports and other documentary evidence, 

our review of the court’s finding of no probable cause is de novo. See In re Commitment of 

Wilcoxen, 2016 IL App (3d) 140359, ¶ 28. 

¶ 18 At a probable cause hearing, the trial court’s role is “to determine whether the movant has 

established a plausible account on each of the required elements to assure the court that there is 

a substantial basis for the petition.” (Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks 

omitted.) In re Detention of Stanbridge, 2012 IL 112337, ¶ 62 (quoting In re Detention of 

Hardin, 238 Ill. 2d 33, 48 (2010)). For a respondent to receive an evidentiary hearing under 

section 65(b)(2) of the Act, the court must find a plausible account exists that the respondent is 

“no longer a sexually violent person.” 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(2) (West 2016). Thus, a respondent 

is only entitled to an evidentiary hearing if plausible evidence shows that the respondent (1) no 

longer suffers from a mental disorder or (2) is no longer dangerous to others because his or her 

mental disorder no longer creates a substantial probability he or she will engage in acts of 

sexual violence. Stanbridge, 2012 IL 112337, ¶ 68; 725 ILCS 207/5(f), 15(b) (West 2016). 

Under the Act, “substantially probable” means “much more likely than not.” In re Commitment 

of Curtner, 2012 IL App (4th) 110820, ¶ 37. 

¶ 19 This case advanced to a discharge proceeding after respondent elected not to waive his 

right to petition for discharge. See 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2016). After the filing of the 

State’s motion for a finding of no probable cause, which was accompanied by Travis’s 

reexamination report, the court set the matter for a probable cause hearing. Because respondent 

did not actively petition for a discharge, the probable cause hearing consisted only of a review 

of the reexamination report and arguments on behalf of the parties. See 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) 

(West 2016). 

¶ 20 At the hearing, respondent had to present sufficient evidence to warrant an evidentiary 

hearing to determine whether he is “no longer a sexually violent person.” 725 ILCS 

207/65(b)(2) (West 2016). To satisfy this standard, respondent was required to present 

evidence that he no longer meets the elements for commitment because he (1) no longer has a 

mental disorder or (2) is no longer dangerous to others because his mental disorder no longer 

creates a substantial probability that he will engage in acts of sexual violence. See Stanbridge, 

2012 IL 112337, ¶ 68. 
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¶ 21 Respondent did not satisfy his burden. The evidence at the probable cause hearing 

consisted only of the report provided by the State’s evaluator, Dr. Travis. Travis’s report 

diagnosed respondent with pedophilic disorder and other specified personality disorder. This 

diagnosis was based on Travis’s review of respondent’s records, which indicated that 

respondent suffered from recurrent intense sexually arousing thoughts about his offending 

history with his five-year-old stepdaughter. Respondent’s records also showed that he violated 

his parole and that a search of his residence revealed a videotape with images of naked 

children. Travis documented that respondent was at a high risk of reoffending. Travis’s report 

also stated that respondent withdrew from DHS treatment and failed to complete sex offense 

specific therapy. This evidence established that respondent continued to suffer from a mental 

disorder and that his mental disorder continued to create a substantial probability that he will 

engage in acts of sexual violence. See 725 ILCS 207/5(f), 15(b) (West 2016). Therefore, the 

trial court did not err in granting the State’s motion for a finding of no probable cause to 

warrant an evidentiary hearing. 

¶ 22 CONCLUSION 

¶ 23 The judgment of the circuit court of Tazewell County is affirmed. 

¶ 24 Affirmed.