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LIBYA AT A CROSSROADS:

A FALTERING TRANSITION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 25, 2014

Serial No. 113–206

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Anne W. Patterson, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State ................................................................ 7

The Honorable Derek Chollet, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense .................................... 18

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Anne W. Patterson: Prepared statement ..................................... 10

The Honorable Derek Chollet: Prepared statement .............................................. 20

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 40

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 41

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Statement 

by A Omar Turbi .................................................................................................. 42

(1)

LIBYA AT A CROSSROADS:

A FALTERING TRANSITION 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 25, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. After 

recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5 minutes 

each for our opening statements, I will then recognize our distinguished chairman, Mr. Royce, for as much time as he may consume. Thank you, Mr. Royce, for being with us. I will then recognize other members seeking recognition for 1 minute. We will then 

hear from our witnesses and without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statements will be made a part of the record. Members may 

have 5 days to insert statements and questions for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules. The chair recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

The Arab Spring uprising in the Middle East and North Africa 

of 2011 brought with them a period of brief hope for the future of 

democracy in the region. Millions across many nations demanded 

changes to the way their countries were being run and in many 

cases run by dictators who held a stranglehold on power for decades, unrelenting and unyielding. In some countries, the people 

managed to usher out the ruling party and for a moment, it appeared as though we were ready to see democracy rule the day. 

However, the lack of infrastructure, the lack of democratic institutions in these countries, as well the lack of political will have all 

but dashed those hopes and Libya, unfortunately, is one of the 

prime examples of this. Once Gaddafi was removed from power, 

those seeking to reform the government quickly proved that they 

were not up to the task and the country fell into a further state 

of disunity as armed militias battled for supremacy and control 

over Libya’s future. 

Libya has been plagued by instability, both political and economic, and its factious nature has left it on the verge of a civil war 

that poses very real and serious and imminent national security 

challenges for us in the United States. To make matters worse, the 

porous nature of its borders has allowed extremists to flock to 

Libya, adding an even greater complexity to the downward spiral 

2

and increasing the likelihood of an all out civil war. Libya has become a terrorist safe haven and the worst case scenario for all who 

had hoped that the Arab Spring would bring democracy to the region. We are now witnessing this crisis in Iraq and we certainly 

cannot afford for both nations to become entrenched safe havens for 

extremists to destabilize the region and attack our allies and our 

national security interests. 

With the prevalence of so many weapons readily available to all, 

foreign fighters are flocking to Libya by the droves and we are seeing Libyan weapons showing up in conflicts across the entire region. So what must the United States do to help Libya avert a possible civil war, bring the political factions together to help resolve 

their differences, stabilize the security situation in the country, 

fight back the influx of extremists and shore up its borders and secure U.S. national security interests? 

The problem in Libya is that there are multiple crises going on 

at the same time, all with their sets of issues, but all linked together and the fate of Libya resides in successfully navigating not 

one or some, but all of these issues. Libya cannot secure its borders, nor can it repel the extremist invasion. It cannot take advantage of its oil revenues and reserves and it cannot stabilize or stimulate its economy. The political factions remain deeply divided. And 

as such, the state building process has stalled, the government has 

not been able to establish a means to protect its borders and control the extremists or make the much needed economic reforms. 

Today, the people of Libya are voting to choose members of a 

new Parliament. We hope that this is a new step forward into the 

path to stability, but as long as the security situation remains tenuous so, too, will the political transition stall and the economy falter. It is a seemingly unending spiral that leads to only further deterioration unless something is done immediately. The United 

States must remain engaged rather than continue its hands-off policy in Libya. We must find ways to work with the political parties 

to resolve their issues so that they can form a government that can 

de-escalate tensions and the fighting and finally get Libya back on 

the transition to democracy. After all, it was the administration 

that played a large role in the ouster of Gaddafi, but then left as 

quickly as we got there, leaving in our wake the mess for the Libyans to clean up themselves, knowing that they hadn’t the organization or the ability to do so. 

What we are witnessing today is in part a consequence of that. 

And we now face an uphill battle that the administration cannot 

sidestep or sit on the fence and hope things work in our favor. We 

must prevent Libya from turning into another Iraq and we must 

avoid this from becoming yet another tragic strategic defeat in the 

Middle East and North Africa for U.S. foreign policy. 

And without objection, Mr. Deutch passed his turn for now and 

I am pleased to yield to the chairman of our committee, Mr. Royce. 

Thank you again for being here, Mr. Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, thank you, chairwoman and Mr. Deutch, thank 

you very much and also welcome, Ambassador Anne Patterson, 

good to see you, and Mr. Chollet. 

Last month, the President made a case for collective action, if 

you saw that speech. And indeed, coalitions were mobilized during 

3

the first Gulf War. More recently, coalitions helped end a war in 

Sierre Leone and hit al-Qaeda in Mali. We should always look to 

share the cost of actions which we take. But part of being a leader 

means holding our coalition partners accountable, making sure 

they fulfill the commitments they make. Unfortunately, this administration has failed in the role in Libya. It has been clear since the 

beginning that it was singularly focused on getting rid of Gaddafi, 

on ousting Colonel Gaddafi. The administration’s lack of interest in 

leading has allowed our coalition partners to fail. 

Despite the acknowledged weaknesses of the Libyan transitional 

government, this administration allowed NATO to head home 

knowing the job was not done. The United Nations didn’t fare any 

better. The U.N. mission didn’t fulfill even the modest task it was 

given. The EU was charged with border security, a commitment 

that was made, but never kept. The EU didn’t send border security 

assistance teams into Libya until 2013 and only sent a portion of 

what was promised. 

If the administration’s policy was to let others take action, then 

the U.S. was to make sure others fulfilled their commitments. 

There is no doubt that the Libyans have done a lousy job guiding 

their country during the transition. And ultimately, the Libyans 

must take ownership of their future. But we can and we should be 

supportive. Assisting Libya today will require that we sit down 

with allies and partners to assess the needs. We must be clear with 

our allies about our shared goals and objectives and what is expected of each other. 

We also need to be realistic about our own ability to accomplish 

our diplomatic objectives in such a dangerous environment. The 

protection of our diplomats must be a priority as we consider how 

to engage in Libya. We learned the hard lesson of the dangers of 

expeditionary diplomacy in Benghazi. 

Today, terrorists are using Libya as a training ground and a base 

to destabilize the entire region. Weapons and people from across 

North Africa including Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in the Maghreb 

are meeting up in Libya and they are organizing in Libya. We 

know terrorists are actively trying to destabilize Tunisia and Egypt 

and Algeria. We know terrorists trained in Libya are fighting both 

in Syria and in Iraq. Libya is rapidly slipping into chaos. And as 

we have seen in Iraq, a terrorist element in control of valuable natural resources poses a serious threat to the state, to its neighbors 

and to the United States. Madam Chairwoman, I would ask unanimous consent if I could——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Not an objection. 

Mr. ROYCE. This unanimous consent is for a statement of Mr. 

Omar Turbi to be included as part of the official record. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman, for 

joining us. Without objection, we will make that a part of the 

record. We appreciate your time. 

And now I am pleased to yield to my good friend, the ranking 

member of our subcommittee, Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thanks for calling 

today’s hearing. Assistant Secretaries Patterson and Chollet, welcome to the committee. And we are so pleased to have the opporVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:22 Oct 14, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\062514\88458 SHIRL
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tunity discuss recent events in Libya and U.S. strategy toward 

Libya going forward. 

Since the 2011 ouster of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya struggled to 

find its political footing, to put it mildly. What began as a promising transition to democracy has resulted in a series of rushed 

elections that has yielded a largely powerless central government. 

Today, Libyans will again vote to elect a new representative body 

to replace the deadlocked General National Congress. But one must 

ask whether Libyan people are still invested in elections. Despite 

U.S. assistance focused on building up state institutions which 

have been virtually nonexistent for 40 years, Libya is struggling to 

create a strong central government that can provide both security 

and services to its people. The power vacuum left an opening for 

a well armed and well funded militant groups to seize control. In 

late 2013, the level of violence dramatically increased, resulting 

from the brazen abduction of the Libyan prime minister. 2014 has 

been marred by both political and security setbacks. The General 

National Congress has been unable to meet due to attacks by gunmen. The Ambassador of Jordan was kidnapped in Tripoli. Prime 

Minister Zeidan was ousted in a no confidence vote. A successor 

has yet to be named and a successor has yet to be named to acting 

Prime Minister Al-Theni and many important ministerial positions 

continue to remain unfilled. 

As a result of the turmoil, militias have been emboldened. Militants have seized control of many of Libya’s oil production facilities. Pauses in oil production have resulted in a reported loss of 

$30 billion creating a massive shortfall for this oil-based economy. 

In May, former exile, General Hifter and forces loyal to him, began 

launching attacks on militia groups in and around Benghazi. What 

exactly are General Hifter’s intentions and despite his proclamation of wanting to restore security to Libya, many believe that his 

long-term goal is to seize government power. U.S. policy toward 

these actions has been unclear, as officials have expressed concern 

about his actions, but haven’t condemned them. I hope Assistant 

Secretary Patterson, you can offer some clarity here today. 

The general lawlessness and lack of state security has given rise 

to the notion that Libya is now a safe haven for terrorists. The implications of this cannot be ignored. North Africa’s porous borders 

will provide easy transport of fighters and weapons. Libyan fighters radicalized in Syria or Iraq could easily return to Libya or any 

of its North African neighbors. Terrorist groups like Ansar alShari’a are recruiting from Libya’s rural regions. These factions 

and others, many loosely affiliated with al-Qaeda, have reached 

nearly 250,000 strong. This political chaos and devolving security 

situation has many asking, quite frankly, why the U.S. continues 

to remain invested in Libya. I believe, as I stated, that the implications of letting Libya become a failed state or a terrorist safe haven 

are far too great for our national security. It is strategically positioned as a transit point between North Africa and the Middle 

East, and has water access to Europe. 

Counterterrorism cooperation between our allies in these regions 

has to be a top priority, but do we even have a viable Libyan counterterrorism institution to partner with? Clearly, the deteriorating 

security situation poses the most immediate challenge, but the only 

5

way that the Libyan Government can stabilize the security situation long term is through strengthening institutions that will legitimize the government in the eyes of the Libyan people. Libya, unlike many of its Arab Spring neighbors, doesn’t need U.S. dollars. 

It needs U.S. expertise. 

Assistant Secretary Patterson, I look forward to hearing how we 

are continuing to provide assistance and operate programs that 

help build state institutions, strengthen rule of law and good governance. And I hope you will address whether the conditions set 

forth on the nearly $100 million of assistance we are providing continue to be met. 

As we continue our efforts to train and build a capacity of the 

general purpose force, how can we ensure that these troops are 

committed to taking responsibility for Libya’s security? We are unfortunately seeing the effects of an apathetic military in Iraq. 

Assistant Secretary Chollet, I hope you will expand on the current status of our training programs, whether any progress has 

been made, and what kind of coordination is taking place among 

our European partners who are assisting these efforts. We know 

that the path to true democracy doesn’t simply include holding 

some elections. The Libyan people spent 40 years under Gaddafi’s 

brutal rule and they need to chart their own path forward. But I 

do believe that the United States is equipped to provide the kind 

of technical assistance needed to increase the capacity of the Libyan Government. 

The deteriorating security situation has made it challenging for 

U.S. personnel to operate in Libya and the American public’s view 

of Libya is undoubtedly and rightfully colored by the tragic events 

of September 12, 2012. This is precisely why we look to you both 

today to help all of us and help the American people understand 

why what happens in Libya in the coming months and years directly affects the United States. I thank you both for being here 

today and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch, for that 

opening statement. 

Mr. Chabot, our subcommittee chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair. Ambassador Patterson, 

having chaired this committee in the last Congress, I have enjoyed 

working with you both in Egypt when I visited there a couple of 

times following the revolution and in your current capacity and you 

certainly have not shied away from the world’s hot spots and we 

appreciate your service. 

As disappointments go, Libya ranks pretty high on the list. I 

traveled there in 2012, a little less than a month before our friend 

Chris Stevens and three other brave Americans were murdered in 

Benghazi and while the security situation was tenuous at best, 

there did seem to be some sense of optimism among the Libyans 

I met with at that time. Gaddafi was dead and gone. Elections had 

been held and a new generation of leaders was convening to plan 

the future of a democratic Libya. Sadly, things have gone downhill 

since then. 

Libya has abundant energy resources and port facilities that 

could jump start a domestic economy that was for so long controlled by a dictator. A safe and stable Libya could become a magVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:22 Oct 14, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\062514\88458 SHIRL
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net for investment and tourism, but right now that is an area that 

seems to be a pipe dream. 

I hope today we can have some productive discussion about how 

very dangerous and unstable Libya can get from here to there. 

And Madam Chair, I would note that I have a judiciary hearing 

on the unprecedented numbers of children and young people coming across our southern border and so I will be sharing my time 

back and forth here. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And I 

know that there are many subcommittees and committees meeting 

at this time, so thank you so much. 

Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts is recognized. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to the 

ranking member as well for holding this hearing and to our witnesses, thank you. Wonderful to see you both again. Appreciate 

your tremendous service to this country. 

I am looking forward to your testimony today. It is obviously an 

extraordinarily important topic as you have heard from my colleagues. The one question I might add on top of this is trying to 

take a bit of a longer view as well. We have had a number of hearings in this committee over the course of the past 18 months or so 

about U.S. policy in various countries in North Africa and the 

Sahel. If you look at demographics, if you look at access to opportunity, if you look at the longer term and about the next decade 

or so you are having probably close to 100 million people coming 

of age trying to find work with very little access to transportation, 

food, security, healthcare or a job. 

And so yes, as we are focused on and rightfully, the immediate 

impacts of trying to create a safe and secure Libya, as we are 

throughout much of this region, what are we doing to try to make 

sure we are not putting out fires here every day for the next 10, 

15, 20 years? 

Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Weber of 

Texas is recognized. 

Mr. WEBER. I am ready to get going. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, sir. Mr. Connolly of 

Virginia is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you for 

holding this hearing. I just think that in some ways this hearing 

is very timely and very opportune, but Libya is a bit of a morality 

tale about how limited our reach can be. There are lots of people 

who wanted us to intervene in a very robust way during the Arab 

Spring, but I am not sure, even had we done that, the outcomes 

we are looking at today would have been very different. And that 

is the problem. It is great to feel wonderful in the beginning of a 

revolution, but generally a lot of revolutions have bad outcomes or 

less than desirable and noble outcomes. And I think we are seeing 

that in Libya today. 

So I am going to be very interested in hearing the testimony, but 

what is our part to leverage and influence the future course of 

Libya in a way that we hope is democratic and open and inclusive 

and that serves our interests as well those of Libya’s? 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

7

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. Mr. DeSantis of 

Florida. Dr. Yoho. Let us go. Thank you. 

And now we are pleased to introduce our panelists. First, we welcome back a good friend of our subcommittee, Ambassador Anne 

Patterson, who is Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. Ambassador Patterson has been our U.S. Ambassador to El 

Salvador, Colombia, Pakistan, and most recently, Egypt. She has 

also served as Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Deputy Inspector General at the 

State Department. Welcome, Madam Ambassador. 

We also have with us Mr. Derek Chollet who is the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Prior to this 

position, he served in the White House as Special Assistant to the 

President and Senior Director for Strategic Planning on the National Security Council staff and at the State Department as the 

principal Deputy Director of the Secretary’s Policy Planning staff. 

Thank you both for being here. As I said, your remarks will be 

made a part of the record and feel free to summarize. We will begin 

with you, Honorable Ambassador Patterson. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ANNE W. PATTERSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, 

Ranking Member Deutch, members of the subcommittee, for inviting me to discuss the situation in Libya and the administration’s 

response. 

Libya’s transition faces significant challenges that will require 

intensive engagement by the U.S. and our international partners 

for many years. Since the fall of the Gaddafi regime, Libyans have 

been struggling to build a stable and effective democratic government that provides a secure environment and economic opportunity. The stakes for the United States, as well as for the Libyan 

people, are substantial. 

Libya is a relatively large country with a comparatively small 

population whose unifying ties are relatively weak and where 

strong, local and tribal ties make national unity difficult. During 

the past 3 years, the national government has been unable to provide adequate security and services for its people. Weapons from 

Gaddafi’s substantial caches have floated on to the market, some 

traveling across borders into the Sinai and into Syria. 

The security vacuum has permitted over 100 militias and other 

armed groups dissatisfied with the government to target critical oil 

infrastructure, disrupt the economy, and incite tensions between 

Islamist and secularist groups. Judges, politicians, and civic leaders are routinely murdered. Working with our colleagues at DoD 

and the FBI, militia leader, Ahmet Abu Khattala, was removed 

from the battlefield and will face U.S. justice. 

Amidst this chaos, Libya’s oil production, the sole source of government revenue, has fallen to 20 percent of capacity around 

280,000 barrels per day. These disruptions have severely hampered 

Libya’s economy and ripple through the entire country, amounting 

to up to $30 billion in lost revenue. 

8

U.S. national security interests require vigorous U.S. engagement to support Libya. We are pursuing several important initiatives to try and arrest further political and security instability and 

to help revive Libya’s private sector so it can play a crucial role in 

stabilizing the country and we would like to do more. 

First, in the immediate term, we are urging Libyans to agree to 

general principles to build consensus and guide the remainder of 

the political transition and stressing that political differences must 

be settled through dialogue and compromise. Ambassador David 

Satterfield is meeting intensively and working closely with key Libyan stakeholders, U.K. special envoy Jonathan Powell, and with 

U.N. and international envoys. 

Second, we are working with Libya, its neighbors, and the international community to strengthen Libya’s internal security and 

tightening border security. 

Finally, once there is sufficient political stability and security, we 

have created a framework that partner countries will use to coordinate their assistance in key areas. We are also encouraging the 

U.S. private sector to come in and help rebuild Libya’s economy 

and its institutions. 

Despite the many worrying events, we do see some positive steps 

occurring in Libya’s economy and in its democratic transition. Last 

week, I spoke at a symposium at the Wilson Center that focused 

on rebuilding Libya’s economy. The experts and Libyan ex-patriots 

acknowledged the many challenges Libya poses for companies interested in investing there. But they also underscore Libya’s great 

economic potential and how Libyans generally want U.S. companies to invest there. 

We are currently providing more than $100 million in assistance 

to Libya. Given the government’s historic weaknesses, one of our 

crucial missions is to train Libyans in the fundamentals of public 

administration and finance. We have also focused our efforts together with our European partners on promoting democratic processes that are crucial for long-term stability and we have been providing targeted technical security assistance such as securing and 

neutralizing Gaddafi era chemical weapons stockpiles. Libya is now 

free of all weapons of mass destruction. 

Today in Libya, voters went to the polls to elect a new legislature 

to be called the Council of Representatives. Today’s elections are a 

milestone in Libya’s transition and a symbol of Libya’s continued 

commitment to democracy. 

Libya’s constitutional drafting assembly has also begun drafting 

a new Constitution which we are hopeful will create a new Constitution that will include separation of powers and respect for the 

dignity of all Libyans. 

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, we approach our 

diplomatic engagement with Libya with our eyes wide open. To 

protect our national security interests and to preserve broad future 

opportunities for U.S. companies, we need a sustained, diplomatic 

engagement with Libya. We will continue to consult with the Congress as we go forward, but we will need to broaden our support 

to Libya with a range of programs in the months ahead. It is my 

view that we will need to expand our in-country diplomatic and development presence and activities. 

9

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Patterson follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Madam Ambassador. 

Mr. Chollet. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DEREK CHOLLET, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. CHOLLET. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking Member 

Deutch, members of the subcommittee. I am grateful to speak to 

you this afternoon about Libya and the Defense Department’s approach for addressing Libya’s immense security challenges. I will 

focus my remarks on four issues: The general purpose force, counterterrorism training, border security, and our efforts to secure the 

U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. 

First, the key factor in Libya’s transition is security and the successful development of the Libyan armed forces. Last year, at the 

request of the then Libyan prime minister, the United States committed to help train a Libyan General Purpose Force of 5,000 to 

8,000 personnel. This kind of force will help the Libyan Government form its core military. Libya has committed to fully fund this 

training which is estimated at roughly $600 million over the duration of the program which can take up to 8 years. In this effort, 

when started, will be executed by our Africa command. And I want 

to stress that building Libya’s military is not an American effort 

alone. It has strong international support from others including the 

United Kingdom, Italy, and Turkey which have all begun training 

and have committed to training a combined 7,000 personnel in the 

coming years. And just yesterday, 255 troops trained by Italy completed their training and returned to Libya. 

So although the United States stands by this commitment, 

progress has been slow. Several factors have hampered the execution of our training mission. The most important is Libya’s political 

turmoil and a deteriorating security situation which makes it difficult to have the necessary U.S. personnel on the ground in Tripoli 

to execute this program. Other factors include a lack of vetted 

training candidates, a lack of pledged Libyan funding, and weak security institutions. 

To help build Libya’s security institutions and enhance military 

professionalism, the Defense Department recently had 40 Libyan 

military personnel attending U.S. professional education courses, 

including senior service colleges via the IMET program. And additionally, the Libyans have funded a national security seminar for 

25 Libyan military leaders to be students at NDU, National Defense University, last year. We also hope to provide defense advisors to the Libyan Ministry of Defense in the future via the Ministry of Defense Advisor Programs and the Defense Institution Reform Initiative. 

Now in addition to this effort to build a general purpose for us, 

the second line of effort is working with the Libyan Government to 

develop its counterterrorism capacity through the Global Security 

Contingency Fund. And this will help train several hundred Libyan 

special forces personnel. 

Third, as was mentioned, Libya’s border regions have become 

major areas of instability and the cross border movement of violent 

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migrants is deeply concerning. This is especially a worry to those 

countries such as Egypt and Italy, who are the recipients of the 

flow of Libya’s weapons and people. And with congressional support 

we have developed a program to help build Libya’s border security 

capacity through the Global Security Contingency Fund. And we 

are coordinating our efforts with the European Union who has focused its program on border security. 

And fourth, on Embassy security, we maintain a laser focus on 

the immense challenges and risks of operating in an uncertain security environment and we will do what it takes to protect our people and to bring to justice those who do us harm. Given our concerns about security in Tripoli, we have placed additional U.S. military forces in the region to respond to a variety of contingencies 

and stand ready to respond as needed. Alongside our efforts to prevent attacks, we also maintain an unrelenting commitment to hold 

accountable to those who harm Americans. 

And Madam Chair, as this committee knows, and as Ambassador 

Patterson mentioned, on June 15th the U.S. captured Abu 

Khatallah who was a key figure in the September 11, 2012 attacks 

in Benghazi. The success of this mission was due to the combined 

efforts of our military, law enforcement, and intelligence personnel, 

and as the President stressed just last week, with this operation, 

the United States has once again demonstrated that we will do 

whatever it takes to see that justice is done when people harm 

Americans. 

Madam Chair, Ranking Member Deutch, and members of the 

subcommittee, after the fall of Gaddafi in the fall of 2011, President Obama made clear that ‘‘we are under no illusions. Libya will 

travel a long and winding road to full democracy and there will be 

difficult days ahead. And we have been living through those days 

recently. But the United States, together with the international 

community, is committed to the Libyan people.’’ And so with this 

in mind, we continue to support Libya’s transition and to do so we 

will work closely with the Libyans, our international partners, and 

the Congress. Although our efforts have been complicated by 

Libya’s tumultuous politics and tense security environment, we remain committed to strengthening Libya’s security institutions. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Chollet follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much to both of our witnesses and I will begin with the question and answer period. 

Thank you. 

Libya is as unstable as ever and the current government, as you 

testified, Mr. Chollet, is unable to provide security for its own institutions, infrastructure, or exercise control over its vast and porous 

borders. Our efforts to strengthen the defense capabilities of the 

Libyan Government is this General Purpose Force, but we haven’t 

even begun training them 3 years after Gaddafi. So what were we 

doing these past 3 years while Libya became the wild, wild West? 

Why didn’t we remain engaged, knowing that the Libyan people 

would be ill equipped, ill prepared to face the immediate challenges 

and how has our disengagement contributed to the current situation on the ground? 

We know that Gaddafi had a large stockpile of weapons and even 

sealed stockpiles of chemical weapons and that once he fell, it was 

a mad dash to try to recover those. We even allocated over $40 million in an effort to keep them out of terrorist hands, yet Libyan 

arms have been used not only in Libya, but in Mali, in Algeria, Tunisia, Chad, Lebanon, and Syria, probably everywhere else. 

Furthermore, Qatar was shipping weapons to Libyan rebels despite an arms embargo on Libya during the 2011 uprisings and we 

did nothing to stop that. In fact, many sources say we condoned it. 

Unsurprisingly, many of these weapons fell into the hands of terrorists. How did we fail to recover Gaddafi’s arms and actually end 

up indirectly supplying the terrorists with even more weapons? 

And what is the status of our efforts on that front now? How heavily armed are these groups today? 

Ambassador Patterson, today, the people of Libya are going to 

the polls, as we have said, to select members of their new Parliament. However, it seems that the administration is bent on 

keeping its hands off policy in Libya despite seeing where that has 

gotten us. Reuters published an article last night about our policy 

in today’s election and it quotes an unnamed U.S. Government official saying that our policy won’t change significantly no matter 

what the outcome of the elections are and the administration has 

acknowledged there is only so much that it can do in Libya. Is that 

our Libya policy? We help create the mess, but we are going to 

keep as far away as possible that we can’t do anything to right the 

ship? 

And the rapidly deteriorating security situation certainly looms 

heavy over this election. The timing of the election was also rushed 

as they were only announced last month. What has the administration done to help the Libyans ensure that the elections are credible 

and that the results will be truly representative of the people of 

Libya? Can you give us the latest assessment on the elections? 

What are the major issues? How do we plan to deal with the new 

government to reverse course in Libya? Thank you to both. 

Mr. Chollet? 

Mr. CHOLLET. Thanks, Madam Chair. On the issue of Libyan 

weapons, for many years it has been a great concern of ours. The 

amount of weapons in Libya and the flow of those weapons outside 

of Libya, whether it is headed toward Mali or across into Egypt. 

We have had some successes, particularly, for example, on the 

29

chemical weapons issue which was a very concerning situation 

after the fall of Gaddafi and through our efforts we helped secure 

the chemical weapons facility in Wadan, but then very importantly 

over the course of 2013 spent about $50 million to help destroy 

weaponized munitions that had been undeclared prior to the fall of 

Gaddafi, so identify those, secure those munitions and then ultimately destroy them. That was administered through our Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. 

Secondly, on MANPADS, shoulder fired air defense missiles, 

again, Libya had a tremendously large stockpile of these weapons 

that Gaddafi had amassed. And the Department of Defense, working very closely with our partners in Department of State, spent 

roughly $40 million to help identify and destroy large stocks of 

those MANPADS. So we feel as though even though we are still 

very concerned, there are some successes we have had. 

Very quickly on the General Purpose Force and the training effort, as I said in my statement we are not where we want to be 

on that effort. There are many reasons for that. It is only a year 

ago that the Libyans asked for assistance in training such a force, 

so we have worked very hard, the Department of Defense through 

my office, through AFRICOM, but with our State Department colleagues as well on scaling up this effort. One of the reasons why 

it has been slow is because our Libyan partners and the lack of capacity on their end to help hold up their end of the bargain in 

terms of paying for this program. As I mentioned, it is about $600 

million, at least our piece of it, to be scoped. 

It is important to note that our allies with the gun training, modestly, are doing so out of pocket. The Libyans have not paid them 

so the training that they are doing is something they are doing out 

of their own budgets. But the second issue, I would just say the 

problem of identifying and vetting Libyan personnel. We want to 

make sure that the folks that we do train are qualified and capable 

of being trained and one of the challenges we face is given the security environment we can’t have the personnel on the ground in 

Tripoli right now to help execute this program. So there is a chicken and an egg situation here where security is a huge problem, but 

because of the lack of security, we can’t have the necessary personnel on the ground to help execute programs to improve Libyan 

security. So that is the dilemma we face. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. Ambassador Patterson? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Madam Chairman, I heard this morning that 97 percent of the polls opened on time. Participation seems 

steady, but slow, but it is 112 degrees there, so they are hoping 

that participation will go up in the afternoon. I think, Madam 

Chairman, that we have tried to be very much engaged in this electoral process. We trained over 400 election observers. We provided 

three advisors to the Electoral Commission through IFA, a very respected institution. National Democratic Institute is working with 

political parties to train particularly young people and women, and 

to do capacity training. And then we have funded civil society organizations who are promoting voting mobilization and voter education. So we have tried and I can talk about the Constitution process, too. So we have tried to totally lean forward and support this 

30

election process which is going okay so far and we are hoping that 

it will result in a new legislature in a few weeks. 

Madam Chairman, we have a program should the political situation and security situation stabilize, to very substantially increase 

our presence and our involvement in Libya because the range of 

what they need, as Mr. Deutch noticed, is technical assistance 

more than money. They have a crying need for assistance on issues 

like public finance and budget management or managing the revenues from the petroleum sector. And we are very anxious to be engaged with them in those areas. So we are planning to up our capacity there. 

As Derek says, a lot of it comes down to the amount of risk we 

are willing to take and the amount of people we are willing to put 

on the ground. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. And now I turn to the 

ranking member. Mr. Deutch, for his questions. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Assistant Secretary 

Patterson, why is the U.S. in Libya? What are our interests? What 

is our strategy for operating there if the current security situation 

remains unchanged? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. The most urgent, if I could say, the 

most urgent objective we have is counterterrorism. Because it is 

critical that Libya not become essentially an ungoverned space and 

become a threshold to attack our allies and neighbors, mostly immediately Tunisia and Algeria, but also there has been a very dramatic effect on Egypt as arms have flowed in from Libya into the 

Sinai and affected Israel’s security. There is an issue of regional 

stability, particularly again with Egypt and Tunisia. The Libyan 

people deserve, after decades of a ruthless dictator, a better life in 

democracy and we certainly want to contribute to that. 

And then there is the effect, I think, on our European allies with 

migration from Libya into Europe. But I would say the most urgent 

objective there is the counterterrorism objective. 

Mr. DEUTCH. So just to continue that, Mr. Chollet, are we seeing 

fighters from Libya going to Syria for training and then returning 

to Libya and are there fighters from other North African countries 

going to Libya for training and then going back to their countries? 

Mr. CHOLLET. Congressman, I think clearly Libya has become a 

magnet and it has been for many years and several years now a 

magnet for extremists, terrorists to go there. It is a vacant lot in 

many places in Libya and that tends to attract those types of people. 

In terms of the flow both in and out, I would like to actually get 

back to you on that, maybe even provide you a classified answer 

if I could, because clearly it is something that is concerning and I 

know as Ambassador Patterson mentioned with our European allies and in particular, the Italians who are seeing a tremendous 

migration flow coming up out of Libya. Some of them are Libyans, 

but some of them are from other African countries that are using 

Libya as a transit point. The Italians are very worried that among 

those migrants will be extremists. So far, we have not seen that, 

but that is something we have got to be watching carefully just 

given the sheer volume of people flowing up north through the 

Mediterranean from Libya. 

31

Mr. DEUTCH. Assistant Secretary Patterson, getting back to the 

know how that we can provide, what civil society programs are ongoing where we are taking the lead and where have we had positive impact? What else can we be doing to impact civil society in 

a positive way? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. I think we have had a positive effect on 

the election process. I think we have had a positive effect on NDI 

training the parliamentarians and we plan to do more of that. IRI, 

for instance, is working with the Ministry of local government to 

work on local councils on decentralization. We have given a number 

of grants to civil society for small municipalities to encourage dialogue, to train, for instance, city councils and efforts like how to undertake a budget. 

We are going to send up a number of—we have had women empowerment programs which have been quite successful, although 

very limited. And these are precisely the sorts of things that have 

had a limited impact, but we very much would like to expand. And 

they are not wildly expensive either. You can get a lot of bang for 

your buck here. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Can you just go back and connect the dots then between these types of civil society programs and the reasons that it 

is important for us to be in Libya? How do these programs help address the rationale that we have to be in Libya to begin with? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Because, sir, there is essentially, no—

let me put it this way, there are extremely limited government 

structures. And I think we were all taken by surprise when 

Gaddafi left, about the sheer lack of government institutions. So 

when civil society is mobilized and for instance when we empower 

these local councils and work with these local councils, they can 

make local government more responsive and learn how to engage 

with local government. 

I think on the training, for instance, the parliamentarians or the 

political parties, this is entirely virgin territory. If we can train a 

political party, train people how to participate, it will help build 

Libyan institutions and we need to do it very broadly and aggressively. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And finally, when you say it is a good return, good 

bang for the buck, can you give some numbers to that? How much 

do those sorts of programs cost? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Well, we have given grants, for instance, through NEFE and through USAID. We have given small 

grants, $15,000, $20,000, and some larger investments in the electoral process. But you can do a lot. Women’s empowerment, for instance, all over the region, we have given very small grants, 

$25,000, $50,000 to NGOs to train women to start their own businesses and that is, I think, a very productive use of our funds. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Very helpful. Thank you, both. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. And we 

will turn to Mr. Weber of Texas. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you, Madam Chair. Secretary Patterson, in 

August 2011, Secretary Clinton—well, before I go there, let me do 

this. Recent unrest in Egypt. Of course, you saw the regime go 

down. You saw the military get involved. You saw Morsi go and 

32

Sisi come up. Has that impacted Libya in any way? Do we see any 

kind of influx from Egypt since it borders Libya? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. The Egyptians are very concerned about 

their border with Libya. It is about 700 miles essentially of sand. 

They have upped their presence on the border. They have a UAV 

base now on the border, so yes, they are quite concerned about 

that. I think there has been some success in stopping the weapons 

flow, but there were plenty of weapons that flowed into Egypt before they were active on the border. 

Mr. WEBER. How many UAVs do they have—would you hazard 

a guess? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. I don’t know, but I can get that figure. 

They are quite new and they were supplied by a neighboring country. They are quite new. 

Mr. WEBER. And who manufactured those UAVs? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. I think they are a Chinese manufacturer, but supported by the United Arab Emirates. They were basically a military-assistance program from the United Arab Emirates. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay, do we have good intel on the ground in Libya? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. We have better and better intel on the 

ground, like most of these situations. And I can talk to you about 

that later. But let me be clear, there are huge portions of space in 

Libya that we do not have good information about, but our intelligence picture as is usually the case in these situations, the more 

you look, the more you learn. And I think our intelligence picture 

has gotten substantially better over time. 

Mr. WEBER. How would you describe the relationship between 

the current Egyptian regime, if you will, and the Libyan regime? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. I think it is professional and cordial, 

but what the Egyptians are extremely concerned about is the fighting in eastern Libya spilling over into their territory. So that is a 

major strategic concern for the Egyptians, but they have relations 

with the government. They have a large number of guest workers 

in Libya, always have had, and that is an important source of remittances. 

Mr. WEBER. And are they maintaining forces along that 700-mile 

stretch? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. They have maintained some forces 

there, but it is very hard to patrol, 700 miles of sand, of a border 

that is essentially unprotected. 

Mr. WEBER. I am kind of going to back into my original question. 

In 2011, Secretary Clinton stated that ‘‘the Libyan people made 

this revolution and they will lead the way forward, but they deserve our help. From the beginning, the United States has played 

a central role in marshalling the international response to the crisis in Libya. The United States will stand with the Libyan people 

and our international partners in the weeks and months ahead to 

help the Libyans write the next chapter in their history.’’

Disappointingly, the decision to ‘‘stand with our international 

partners’’ seems to have been interpreted as allowing them, that is 

the Libyan people, to fail. Does the administration, in your view, 

bear any responsibility for the unfulfilled commitments, i.e., of our 

allies, NATO, U.N., European Union, EU? And what does ‘‘allowing 

33

others to lead’’ mean if the United States is not going to hold the 

others accountable for their commitments? Are we setting a dangerous precedent here? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Mr. Weber, I think all our international 

partners have found this situation extraordinarily difficult. And we 

have had a very high degree of cooperation, particularly with our 

European allies and also with the U.N. But let me give you a specific example on police training. I think it is widely recognized that 

the Libyans are desperate for professional police force because basically the militia performed that function. But our international 

partners have tried to do that. And what they have run into is tribal and ethnic conflict. They have run into difficult issues of vetting 

because they don’t want to take people in their territory who are 

problematic. So I think it has been a challenge for everybody concerned to move forward in Libya. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Connolly is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Ms. Patterson, is 

there a Libyan Government? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. There is a prime minister. He is—yes, 

he is a transitional prime minister. There is a Parliament that will 

dissolve itself when the new Parliament comes into office. There is 

a constitutional drafting committee that seems like a relative 

bright spot. They have principles. They are meeting in committee. 

They are formulating the principles of the new Constitution. So 

there is some semblance of a government, yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I mean the fact that people have titles 

doesn’t form a government. I mean wasn’t the Parliament just sort 

of temporarily abducted recently? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. And the prime minister, too. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And the prime minister. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, the last prime minister. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So they don’t have a functioning police force. 

There is not really a functioning army. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. No, their militia basically provide that 

function. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And there are lots of different militias? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Some of which are friendly and some might be 

less friendly? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Some are friendly, some are less friendly, all are outside essentially the rule of law. I think our intelligence community counted something like 125 separate militia. 

But the leadership, what is surprising, Mr. Connolly, is not just 

leadership, there was nothing in the bureaucracy. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. So any time you wanted a contract 

signed and some of our businesses have really dramatic stories 

about this. You wanted a contract signed. You wanted a dispute resolved. You wanted to do what any government would consider normal business. It was almost impossible and that is what our corporations have run into, but they say with endurance, you can 

probably get this done. But there is nothing below this. 

34

Mr. CONNOLLY. I am very sympathetic with that which is why 

I was maybe not as enthusiastic about the original revolution, not 

because I like Gaddafi, or that regime, but the question always is 

okay, what happens after? 

Now what you just described is it is hard for me to see much of 

a difference between the Libya you are describing today and the 

Libya I visited 2 years ago. I mean it sounds like nothing has 

changed. When I landed in Tripoli, a militia guarded the airport. 

They were the security at the airport. We were talking about civil 

engagement and we were very excited about empowering women 

and other groups in society. And we were hopeful about elections 

that were pending. We were hoping a functional government might 

emerge from that. And I am not trying to lay blame, but it just 

sounds to me like not much has happened in Libya in 2 years. We 

are still talking the same language about the same hopes and not 

much has materialized other than maybe a deterioration in the internal security situation. Would that be a fair statement? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. I think it would certainly be a fair 

statement that there has been a deterioration in the political situation and in the security situation, but Mr. Connolly, I don’t see any 

real alternative to U.S. policy except to push ahead on these objectives. We have to stay there. We have to try and engage with the 

political actors who want to participate in political life and we have 

to try and improve the security situation. 

Again, I think our overriding security and national interest simply demand that we try. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I agree with you, Ms. Patterson. But I guess 

what I am asking is what are reasonable milestones for measuring 

progress though? If, in fact, in the 2 years since I have been there 

we have seen deterioration rather than progress and that happens. 

Well, we don’t want to be having this hearing 10 years hence saying well, yes, nothing has changed. The militias are still running 

it and there isn’t a functional government and there is no army. 

And civil society, we are still trying to push for it, but not much 

has happened. I mean at what point do we say well, no, here are 

some real milestones we have to help them reach or they have to 

reach and that is the organizing principle for us and our allies in 

terms of aid investments and training programs and the like. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. I think one of our first milestones 

would be formation of the General Purpose Force to have some true 

national security apparatus that could protect the population that 

was truly national in scope. And that strikes me as our most urgent priority and guideline as you would say that we have to do. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chollet, would you mind commenting and 

then my time is up. 

Mr. CHOLLET. Yes, sir. I would agree with Ambassador Patterson 

in terms of that initial milestone. I would say two of the things 

that have changed is what I mentioned previously which is the 

chemical weapons that have been undeclared were secured and 

many of the MANPADS, thousands of the MANPADS, were identified and destroyed. Those were two of the most urgent issues we 

faced——

Mr. CONNOLLY. I am sorry, I didn’t hear the second one. 

35

Mr. CHOLLET. The MANPADS, the shoulder fired air defense 

missiles. Thousands of those were identified and destroyed thanks 

to your support through funding to the State Department and to 

the Defense Department we were able to get that done. Now I don’t 

want to sugarcoat it. We still have huge concerns about Libya’s security, but some of these training efforts that are underway, moving too slow, we are frustrated by the bureaucratic dysfunction 

within Libya. If we can get that underway a year from now, hopefully we will be able to report on progress. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And one observation, I do think what has unfolded since the revolution in my opinion actually justifies the reluctance of the Obama administration to get too far into Libya despite importunities to the contrary because it was not at all clear 

what would succeed and Gaddafi, and what our leverage was. I 

mean sometimes we listen to rhetoric up here or in the press and 

even around the world and you would think somehow America is 

all powerful and just with the whisk of a wand we can make everything better and we can dictate the terms of how it gets better. 

That is not the case. And Libya is a great example of that. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. Mr. DeSantis. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Secretary Patterson, back in 2009, Gaddafi was considered by both the Bush administration, the Obama administration, a lot of senior Republicans, I know in the Senate as being a key counterterrorism 

outlier. And I know there was a lot that happened in the intervening periods, but as we look at Libya today compared to that 

2009 period where there seemed to be a lot of agreement in Washington from what I can tell, do Islamist Jihadists have a wider 

berth to operate in Libya today than they did 5 years ago? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Sure. If I might add, these societies run 

by ruthless dictators were never viable. They were always going to 

come crashing down. So we will just have to deal with that and 

there is no going back. But yes, they have now a terrorist safe 

haven in parts of eastern Libya. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And there has been discussion about weaponry 

going to Syria and some of these other places. Is it the case that 

over the last 5 years Islamic Jihadists have had a greater access 

to weapons within Libya? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Everyone has had greater access to Libyan weapons. I think Gaddafi must have had enormous caches that 

were underestimated, but a lot of it has leaked onto the black and 

gray market as well. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So it just seems to me—and then Ansar al-Sharia, 

the group responsible for the Benghazi attack in 2012, were they 

allied with Gaddafi or were they part of the ‘‘rebels’’ from 2011 as 

far as you can tell? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. I don’t know the answer to that, Congressman. I will have to get back to you. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I know we picked up Abu Khattala. The administration had—I think it was under—we were under the impression 

in Congress that the administration’s position about responding to 

the Benghazi attack was that they did not have the legal authority 

to conduct a kinetic attack against Ansar al-Sharia. Is that correct? 

36

Is that the administration’s position in terms of how they see their 

authority if they wanted to engage kinetically as a reprisal for the 

Benghazi attack? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Congressman, I think we better refer 

that question to the Justice Department. I would feel more comfortable with that. This gets into some tricky legal issues that I am 

not fully competent to answer. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And is Abu Khattala, is he currently under the 

cognizance of the Defense Department or the Justice Department 

right now? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Again, Congressman, we should refer 

that question to the Justice Department which is managing this 

case. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Can you say, Mr. Chollet, if the Defense Department has control over him? 

Mr. CHOLLET. Sir, he is en route back to the United States. He 

faces criminal charges on three counts and I will refer all questions 

on this really to the Justice Department. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I just wanted to, since you are here, just shift 

gears a little bit. A lot of people are concerned about what is going 

on in Iraq and a lot of focus, justifiably so, is focused on ISIS and 

clearly they are a problem. But I have really been alarmed by reports of the Shiite militias who are now being activated. It seems 

like they are the leading ‘‘defense’’ for the Malaki regime. It seems 

like a lot of the Iraqi army has melted away and most alarmingly 

is the presence of the Quds Force commander in Baghdad. 

When I was in Iraq, as U.S. forces were defeating al-Qaeda in 

western Iraq, you had the Quds Force and you had the Shiite terror groups. They were blowing up hundreds of U.S. service members in Baghdad and eastern Iraq. And it is very, very concerning. 

And so what can you tell me about the footprint of Quds Force in 

particular in terms of being activated to fight against ISIS in Iraq? 

Either one, whichever one wants to take it. 

Mr. CHOLLET. Congressman, I had seen those reports as well 

about the Iranian infiltration within Iraq and particularly among 

the Shia militia. I think what I would like to do, sir, is if we could 

get back to you perhaps in a closed setting and we could give you 

a full brief of our understanding of what is going on, particularly 

regarding the Shia issue. I think you are right to identify it. But 

I think, if we could, that would be the way I would like to handle 

that. 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Congressman, yes, we have had a number of briefings up here with your colleagues, and we would be 

happy to come up here in the next few days and talk to you in a 

closed setting. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Great. And I think that it seems to me when we 

debated Syria we kind of focused on Assad and he is backed by 

Hezbollah in Iran, and rightfully so. And there was not as much 

focus on the people. And I think most of them were more Islamist, 

in nature, fighting. But now that ISIS is moving in Iraq there is 

a lot of focus and again, understandably so. But I kind of feel like 

a lot of people are neglecting the extent to which the Shiite groups 

are anti-American. And, of course, Iran Quds Force and Prime Minister Netanyahu made a point this weekend, we want both of those 

37

groups on both sides to be weak ultimately. We don’t want to 

choose one side or another and strengthen any of them unwittingly. 

So I really appreciate that. I look forward to hearing more and I 

yield back to the chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. DeSantis. Dr. 

Yoho. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for being here 

today, both of you. What is the status of the efforts to draft Libya’s 

new Constitution? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Sir, the Constitution drafting committee, it has about 60 members. Some didn’t take their seats. It 

is meeting in a little town called Bayda which is relatively peaceful. They have developed a set of principles. They have broken 

down into committees to discuss, to specialize and then they will 

go back and draft their Constitution. We don’t know the timeframe, 

but so far so good. And we have been providing some assistance to 

civil society to engage with these drafters. 

Mr. YOHO. Is there are a lot of Libyan civilian participation in 

that or is it the government figures or military figures? In the process of addressing the question such as civilian control of the military and the role of Islamic law, how does that equate in that? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. Yes, those are all in the principles and 

have been discussed in the first stages. The constitutional drafters, 

members were elected. And one thing we have been trying to encourage, as have other international partners, is that these drafters 

engage with the public, with civil society as they draft the Constitution. I will send you a copy of the principles they are working 

off of. 

Mr. YOHO. Do you know if they have property rights involved in 

that or is that going to be a component of that? 

Ambassador PATTERSON. I have seen things on the oil revenues 

and frankly, I can’t remember if they have property rights. But I 

will get back to you. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay, let me switch gears. I would like to talk about 

the MANPADS. The report that I have got and I have read, the 

numbers are skewed. The numbers go all over the place. I have 

seen from 15,000 to over 30,000 MANPADS. A lot of them came 

from the United States of America, the way I understand it. And 

Mr. Chollet, you were talking about how we have spent $40 million 

tracking these down and trying to get rid of them. How is that 

money spent? Is that accounted for? I mean go through the process. 

Are we hiring contractors to do that? Is it our military? Who is actually doing the collection of those in the accountability of that? 

Mr. CHOLLET. Yes, sir, absolutely. I can start. And first, I should 

say in terms of the number of MANPADS and again, this was the 

most urgent issue, one of the most urgent issues we faced several 

years ago right after Gaddafi’s fall, the estimates widely varied, in 

part, because we just didn’t know. Gaddafi was not the world’s best 

bookkeeper in terms of what he actually had in stock and also the 

estimates, the high end which we operated from was an estimate 

driven from our assessment of the amount of MANPADS they had 

acquired since the ’70s. So that did not account for the MANPADS 

they used, the MANPADS that had been stolen, the MANPADS 

that were broken over the past 30-plus years. So nevertheless, it 

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was a State Department administered program. It was done by 

contractors, primarily, but there was a team, a team at the State 

Ambassador, I will let Ambassador Patterson speak to this more, 

that specializes in MANPADS that work out of the Political-Military Affairs Bureau at the Department of State. And they went 

into Libya soon after the fall of Gaddafi and began a program first 

to identify the stockpile, assess what they had and then begin the 

process of destroying those MANPADS. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay, my concern is, you know, I look back at when 

President Obama demanded that Gaddafi must step down. I remember that so succinctly and I see that same thing going now in 

Iraq. Karzai must step down. And for us not to know what is on 

the ground, what is there and what the replacement is going to be 

to fill that vacuum just scares us to death and I know it scares a 

lot of our partners in the Middle East to death. And I don’t want 

to make the same mistakes we made in Libya. You must step down 

and they say be careful what you wish for, because if it did happen, 

we weren’t in a position I don’t feel that we could get somebody in 

there immediately that we could work with. Correct me if I am 

wrong on that. 

Mr. CHOLLET. See, Iraq and Libya are completely different cases. 

I would argue we probably have a better intel picture right now of 

what is going on in Iraq than we did in Libya under Gaddafi, that 

is for sure. And all I can say, sir, again not to in any way minimize 

the challenge we are facing in Libya today, we have shown through 

some of these relatively modest programs that we have been able 

to take care of what we consider to be urgent security threats we 

faced in terms of the chemical weapons and the MANPADS. 

Mr. YOHO. Madam Chair, I yield back. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. I thank the panelists for 

being with us. We enjoy that you are always accessible and we remain committed to working with you to see if we can fix this mess. 

Thank you so much and with that the subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS


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