FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 04-10226 Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.

v.  CR-03-00062-1-HG

DANIEL KUUALOHA AUKAI,

OPINION Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

Helen Gillmor, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted En Banc

March 21, 2007—San Francisco, California

Filed August 10, 2007

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Chief Judge, Alex Kozinski,

Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Michael Daly Hawkins,

Barry G. Silverman, Susan P. Graber,

M. Margaret McKeown, Kim McLane Wardlaw,

William A. Fletcher, Ronald M. Gould,

Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Jay S. Bybee, Consuelo M. Callahan,

Carlos T. Bea, and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bea;

Concurrence by Judge Graber

9647
COUNSEL

Pamela O’Leary Tower, Esq., Honolulu, Hawaii, for

defendant-appellant Daniel Kuualoha Aukai. 

Thomas J. Brady, Esq., Assistant United States Attorney, District of Hawaii and John A. Drennan, Esq, United States

Department of Justice Criminal Division, Appellate Section,

Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellee the United States of

America. 

OPINION

BEA, Circuit Judge: 

More than 700 million passengers board commercial air9650 UNITED STATES v. AUKAI
craft in the United States each year.1

 The Transportation

Security Administration (“TSA”) is given the task of ensuring

their safety, the safety of airline and airport personnel and, as

the events of September 11, 2001, demonstrate, the safety of

the general public from risks arising from commercial airplane flights. To do so, the TSA conducts airport screening

searches of all passengers entering the secured area of the airport. We have previously held such airport screening searches

are constitutionally reasonable administrative searches. Today

we clarify that the reasonableness of such searches does not

depend, in whole or in part, upon the consent of the passenger

being searched. 

I.

A.

On February 1, 2003, Daniel Kuualoha Aukai arrived at the

Honolulu International Airport intending to take a Hawaiian

Airlines flight from Honolulu, Hawaii, to Kona, Hawaii. He

proceeded to check in at the ticket counter but did not produce

a government-issued picture identification. Accordingly, the

ticket agent wrote the phrase “No ID” on Aukai’s boarding

pass. 

Aukai then proceeded to the security checkpoint, at which

signs were posted advising prospective passengers that they

and their carry-on baggage were subject to search. He entered

the security checkpoint at approximately 9:00 a.m., placed his

shoes and a few other items into a plastic bin, and voluntarily

walked through the metal detector or magnetometer. The parties agree that the magnetometer did not signal the presence

of metal as Aukai walked through it. Nor did his belongings

trigger an alarm or otherwise raise suspicion as they passed

1

See Bureau of Transportation Statistics, February 2007 Airline

Traffic Data, http://www.bts.gov/press_releases/2007/bts022_07/html/

bts022_07.html (last visited May 18, 2007). 

UNITED STATES v. AUKAI 9651
through the x-ray machine. After walking through the magnetometer, Aukai presented his boarding pass to TSA Officer

Corrine Motonaga. 

Pursuant to TSA procedures, a passenger who presents a

boarding pass on which “No ID” has been written is subject

to secondary screening even if he has passed through the initial screening without triggering an alarm or otherwise raising

suspicion. As it was performed here, secondary screening

consists of a TSA officer passing a handheld magnetometer,

known as a “wand,” near and around the passenger’s body. If

the wand detects metal, it sounds an alarm. The TSA officer

then discerns the cause of the alarm, using techniques such as

feeling the outside of the passenger’s clothes in the area that

caused the alarm and, if that area is near a pocket, directing

the passenger to empty his pocket.

Because Aukai’s boarding pass had the “No ID” notation,

Motonaga directed Aukai to a nearby, roped-off area for secondary screening. Aukai initially complied but complained

that he was in a hurry to catch his flight which, according to

the boarding pass, was scheduled to leave at 9:05 a.m., just a

few minutes later. Although Aukai went to the roped-off area

as directed, he did not stay there. When Motonaga noticed

that Aukai had left the area and was gathering his belongings

from the plastic bin, she instructed Aukai that he was not

allowed to retrieve his property and that he had to stay in the

roped-off area. 

Aukai then appealed to TSA Officer Andrew Misajon, who

was to perform the secondary screening, explaining again that

he was in a hurry to catch his flight. Misajon nonetheless had

Aukai sit in a chair and proceeded to use the wand to detect

metal objects. At some point, Misajon had Aukai stand, and

when Misajon passed the wand across the front of Aukai’s

body, the wand alarm was triggered at Aukai’s front right

pants pocket. Misajon asked Aukai if he had anything in his

pocket, and Aukai responded that he did not. Misajon passed

9652 UNITED STATES v. AUKAI
the wand over the pocket a second time; again the wand alarm

was triggered. Misajon again inquired whether Aukai had

anything in his pocket; again Aukai said he did not. Misajon

then felt the outside of Aukai’s pocket and concluded that

something was inside the pocket. Misajon could also see the

outline of an unknown object in Aukai’s pocket. At some

point during this screening process, Aukai informed Misajon

that he no longer wished to board a plane and wanted to leave

the airport. 

At this point, TSA Supervisor Joseph Vizcarra approached

Misajon and asked whether he needed assistance. Misajon

related the events and Vizcarra asked Misajon to pass the

wand over Aukai’s pocket again. When the wand alarm again

was triggered, Vizcarra directed Aukai to empty his pocket.

Aukai again protested that he had nothing in his pocket. Using

the back of his hand, Vizcarra touched the outside of Aukai’s

pocket and felt something in the pocket. He again directed

Aukai to empty his pocket. This time Aukai reached into his

pocket and removed either his keys or change, but a bulge

was still visible in his pocket. Vizcarra directed Aukai to

remove all contents from his pocket. After claiming at first

that there was nothing more, Aukai finally removed an object

wrapped in some form of tissue paper and placed it on a tray

in front of him. 

Suspecting that the object might be a weapon, Vizcarra

summoned a nearby law enforcement officer. Vizcarra then

unwrapped the object and discovered a glass pipe used to

smoke methamphetamine. The law enforcement officer

escorted Aukai to a small office near the security checkpoint.

Aukai was placed under arrest and was searched incident to

his arrest. During the search, the police discovered in Aukai’s

front pants pockets several transparent bags containing a

white crystal substance. Aukai eventually was taken into federal custody, where he was advised of and waived his

Miranda rights, and then gave a statement in which he inculpated himself in the possession of methamphetamine.

UNITED STATES v. AUKAI 9653
B.

Aukai was indicted for knowingly and intentionally possessing, with the intent to distribute, 50 grams or more of

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and

841(b)(1)(A)(viii). Aukai filed a motion to suppress the evidence found incident to his arrest at the airport and the statement he later made, which the district court denied. Aukai

then pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement that

preserved his right to appeal the denial of his suppression

motion. The district court sentenced Aukai to a term of

imprisonment of 70 months and a term of supervised release

of 5 years. Aukai timely appealed. 

II.

We review de novo the district court’s legal basis for denying a motion to suppress, but review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d

612, 615 (9th Cir. 2005) (as amended).

III.

[1] The Fourth Amendment requires the government to

respect “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons

. . . and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A search or seizure is ordinarily

unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of

wrongdoing. While such suspicion is not an ‘irreducible’

component of reasonableness, [the Supreme Court has] recognized only limited circumstances in which the usual rule does

not apply.” City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37

(2000) (citations omitted). However, “where the risk to public

safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches

calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable’—for example,

searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and

other official buildings.” Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305,

323 (1997) (holding Georgia’s requirement that candidates for

9654 UNITED STATES v. AUKAI
state office pass a drug test did not fit within this exception)

(citing Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489

U.S. 656, 674-76 & n.3 (1989) (upholding warrantless drug

testing of employees applying for promotion to positions

involving drug interdiction)). Thus, “where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the

normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance

the individual’s privacy expectations against the Government’s interests to determine whether it is impractical to

require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in

the particular context.” Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66. 

[2] Under this rationale the Supreme Court has repeatedly

upheld the constitutionality of so-called “administrative searches.”2

 In New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), the

Supreme Court upheld the warrantless search of a junkyard’s

records, permits, and vehicles. The Supreme Court reasoned:

“Because the owner or operator of commercial premises in a

‘closely regulated’ industry has a reduced expectation of privacy, the warrant and probable-cause requirements, which

fulfill the traditional Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness for a government search have lessened application

. . . .” Id. at 702 (internal citation omitted). Thus, New York’s

interest in regulating the junkyard industry, in light of the rise

of motor-theft and comprehensive motor vehicle insurance

premiums, served as a “special need” allowing inspection

without a warrant. Id. at 708-09; see also id. at 702. The regulatory statute also provided a “constitutionally adequate sub2The Supreme Court has not specifically held that airport screening

searches are constitutionally reasonable administrative searches. On three

occasions, however, the Supreme Court has suggested that airport screening searches are constitutionally reasonable administrative searches. See

Miller, 520 U.S. at 323; Edmond, 531 U.S. 47-8 (“Our holding also does

not affect the validity of border searches or searches at places like airports

and government buildings, where the need for such measures to ensure

public safety can be particularly acute.”); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 675 n.3

(approving of lower court decisions upholding airport screening searches

where there was no reason for suspicion). 

UNITED STATES v. AUKAI 9655
stitute for a warrant” because the statute informed junkyard

operators that inspections would be made on a regular basis

and limited the discretion of inspecting officers. Id. at 711. 

In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.

444 (1990), Sitz challenged the constitutionality of suspicionless sobriety checkpoints conducted on Michigan’s highways,

contending that the program violated the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable seizures. Id. at 447-48.

The Supreme Court upheld the sobriety checkpoints because

“the balance of the State’s interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which [the sobriety checkpoints] can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of

intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped,

weighs in favor of” finding the sobriety checkpoints constitutionally reasonable. Id. at 455. 

[3] Significantly, the Supreme Court has held that the constitutionality of administrative searches is not dependent upon

consent. In United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), the

Supreme Court upheld the warrantless search of a pawn shop

owner’s gun storeroom. The search was authorized by a federal gun control statute. The Court held that, “[i]n the context

of a regulatory inspection system of business premises that is

carefully limited in time, place, and scope, the legality of the

search depends not on consent but on the authority of a valid

statute.”

3

Id. at 315. Thus, “[w]hen a [gun] dealer chooses to

engage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept a

federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to

effective inspection.” Id. at 316. 

[4] We have held that airport screening searches, like the

one at issue here, are constitutionally reasonable administra3The gun shop search in Biswell was authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)

(1968). See Biswell, 406 U.S. at 311-12. Airport screening searches are

mandated by a federal law. See 49 U.S.C. § 44901; 49 C.F.R. § 1540.107.

9656 UNITED STATES v. AUKAI
tive searches because they are “conducted as part of a general

regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, namely, to prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent hijackings.”

United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973); see

also United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 178 (3d Cir.),

cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 111 (2006); Marquez, 410 F.3d at 616.

Our case law, however, has erroneously suggested that the

reasonableness of airport screening searches is dependent

upon consent, either ongoing consent4 or irrevocable implied

consent.5

[5] The constitutionality of an airport screening search,

however, does not depend on consent, see Biswell, 406 U.S.

at 315, and requiring that a potential passenger be allowed to

revoke consent to an ongoing airport security search makes

little sense in a post-9/11 world.6 Such a rule would afford terror4

See Davis, 482 F.2d 910-11 (stating that airport screening searches are

“valid only if they recognize the right of a person to avoid search by electing not to board the aircraft”); United States v. Homburg, 546 F.2d 1350,

1352 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating that “a party may revoke his consent to be

searched any time prior to boarding the plane, even when he has passed

beyond the initial screening point, if he agrees to leave the boarding

area”). 

5

See United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d 899, 902 (9th Cir.

1986) (holding that “[t]he requirement in Davis of allowing passengers to

avoid the search by electing not to fly does not extend to a passenger who

has already submitted his luggage for an x-ray scan . . . . [;] he must elect

not to fly before placing his baggage on the x-ray machine’s conveyor

belt”); Torbet v. United Airlines, Inc., 298 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002)

(holding that a potential airline passenger irrevocably consents to a secondary search that is inclusive of the initial screening because he

impliedly consents to an inclusive secondary search by submitting to the

screening process). 

6The concurrence fears that references to 9/11 and terrorists are irrelevant and will invite future litigants to challenge our holding if and when

the threat of organized terrorist activity at our airports recedes. But the

present threat of organized terrorists using the 9/11 tactic of hijacking

commercial aircraft, intending to use the aircraft as a weapon, is relevant

UNITED STATES v. AUKAI 9657
ists7

 multiple opportunities to attempt to penetrate airport

to the reasonableness of the search procedures employed. This new terrorist tactic was the impetus behind the Aviation Transportation Security Act,

Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 110, 115 Stat. 597, 614-15 (2001), which authorizes

the airport screening at issue in this case. See H.R. Rep. No. 107-296, at

53-54 (2001) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 589, 590

(“The conferees further note the terrorist hijacking and crashes of passenger aircraft on September 11, 2001, which converted civil aircraft into

guided bombs for strikes against the United States, required a fundamental

change in the way it approaches the task of ensuring the safety and security of the civil air transportation system.”). Here, the search procedures

employed included the completion of secondary screening on a passenger

who had stated he no longer wished to fly. The concurrence may well be

correct that as an original proposition, the present threat of terrorism is not

necessary for this procedure to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. That had not been our circuit’s law prior to 9/11; an intending passenger could refuse to be searched at the airport if he stated he had

changed his mind and no longer wished to fly. See Homburg, 546 F.2d at

1352. The adoption of a contrary rule based on a factual situation not

present—elimination of the historical fact of 9/11 and the lack of an organized terrorist threat—would be speculative. Since we must decide “cases

and controversies” only, we should decide only whether the secondary

search of Aukai was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment under the

circumstances presented and state why. That is what we have strived to do.

What search procedures will be “reasonable” when terrorists are no longer

threatening us, or when technology is developed that eliminates the present threat, should be decided when, if ever, that happy day dawns. We

should also be wary to eliminate historical facts such as 9/11. Orwell

warned us: “Who controls the present controls the past . . . .” George

Orwell, 1984, Book Three, Chapter II (1949). 

7

“Terrorists” are those persons who engage in or attempt to engage in

acts of “terrorism”, as that term is defined in the Homeland Security Act

of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 101, 116 Stat 2135, 2141 (2002): 

The term “terrorism” means any activity that— 

(A) involves an act that— 

(i) is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical

infrastructure or key resources; and 

(ii) is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of

any State or other subdivision of the United States; and 

9658 UNITED STATES v. AUKAI
security by “electing not to fly” on the cusp of detection until

a vulnerable portal is found. This rule would also allow terrorists a low-cost method of detecting systematic vulnerabilities

in airport security, knowledge that could be extremely valuable in planning future attacks. Likewise, given that consent

is not required, it makes little sense to predicate the reasonableness of an administrative airport screening search on an

irrevocable implied consent theory. Rather, where an airport

screening search is otherwise reasonable and conducted pursuant to statutory authority, 49 U.S.C. § 44901, all that is

required is the passenger’s election to attempt entry into the

secured area8 of an airport. See Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315; 49

C.F.R. § 1540.107. Under current TSA regulations and procedures, that election occurs when a prospective passenger

(B) appears to be intended— 

(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 

(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or

coercion; or 

(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,

assassination, or kidnapping. 

116 Stat 2135, 2141. 

8

“Secured area” is defined as the “portion of an airport, specified in the

[TSA] airport security program, . . . where aircraft operators and foreign

air carriers . . . enplane and deplane passengers . . . .” 49 C.F.R. § 1540.5.

The secured area includes the “sterile area,” which “means [the] portion

of an airport defined in the [TSA] airport security program that provides

passengers access to boarding aircraft and to which the access generally

is controlled by TSA . . . through the screening of persons and property.”

Id. Because of security concerns, the Government has not made public the

details of “airport security programs.” See 49 U.S.C. § 114(s); 49 C.F.R.

§ 1520.5. Hence, we do not speculate on how far such “sterile” and “secured” areas extend from the airplane boarding gate to the street door. Suffice it to say that such “secured area” extends at least as far as the point

at which a prospective passenger places hand luggage on a conveyor belt

for inspection, Torbet, 298 F.3d at 1089, or passes through a magnetometer, Marquez, 410 F.3d at 617. We accept the Government’s position at

oral argument, on this point. See infra note 9. 

UNITED STATES v. AUKAI 9659
walks through the magnetometer or places items on the conveyor belt of the x-ray machine.9

 The record establishes that

Aukai elected to attempt entry into the posted secured area of

Honolulu International Airport when he walked through the

magnetometer, thereby subjecting himself to the airport

screening process. 

[6] To the extent our cases have predicated the reasonableness of an airport screening search upon either ongoing consent or irrevocable implied consent, they are overruled.

IV.

[7] Although the constitutionality of airport screening

searches is not dependent on consent, the scope of such

searches is not limitless. A particular airport security screening search is constitutionally reasonable provided that it “is no

more extensive nor intensive than necessary, in the light of

current technology, to detect the presence of weapons or

explosives [ ] [and] that it is confined in good faith to that

purpose.” Davis, 482 F.2d at 913. We conclude that the airport screening search of Aukai satisfied these requirements. 

[8] The search procedures used in this case were neither

more extensive nor more intensive than necessary under the

circumstances to rule out the presence of weapons or explosives. After passing through a magnetometer, Aukai was

directed to secondary screening because his boarding pass

was marked “No ID.” Aukai then underwent a standard

“wanding procedure.” When the wand alarm sounded as the

9The Government asserted during oral argument that regulations and

procedures tying this election to an earlier point in time, i.e., entering the

airport screening line or the presentation of a boarding pass and I.D. to a

TSA officer, would pass constitutional muster. Changes in technology or

gains in knowledge as to terrorist operations may prompt the TSA or its

successors to claim the need for recognition of danger at an earlier point

in the boarding process. However, such a claim, and whatever legal issues

it might raise, are not now before us. 

9660 UNITED STATES v. AUKAI
wand passed over Aukai’s front right pants pocket, TSA Officer Misajon did not reach into Aukai’s pocket or feel the outside of Aukai’s pocket. Rather, Misajon asked Aukai if he had

something in his pocket. When Aukai denied that there was

anything in his pocket, Misajon repeated the wanding procedure. Only after the wand alarm again sounded and Aukai

again denied having anything in his pocket did Misajon

employ a more intrusive search procedure by feeling the outside of Aukai’s pocket and determining that there was something in there. 

At that point, TSA Supervisor Vizcarra became involved.

Vizcarra asked Misajon to pass the wand over Aukai’s pocket

again. When the wand alarm again sounded, Vizcarra directed

Aukai to empty his pocket. Aukai again protested that he had

nothing in his pocket. Using the back of his hand, Vizcarra

touched the outside of Aukai’s pocket and felt something

inside. Vizcarra again directed Aukai to empty his pocket.

This time Aukai reached into his pocket and removed either

his keys or change, but a bulge was still visible in his pocket.

Vizcarra directed Aukai to remove all contents from his

pocket. After first claiming there was nothing more, Aukai

removed an object wrapped in some form of tissue paper and

placed it on a tray in front of him. Suspecting that the item

might be a weapon, Vizcarra unwrapped the item, discovering

drug paraphernalia. 

Like the Third Circuit, we find these search procedures to

be minimally intrusive. See Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 180 (holding similar search procedures to be “minimally intrusive,”

explaining that the procedures are “well-tailored to protect

personal privacy, escalating in invasiveness only after a lower

level of screening disclosed a reason to conduct a more probing search”). 

[9] The duration of the detention associated with this airport screening search was also reasonable. Witnesses testified

that Aukai entered the checkpoint area at approximately 9:00

UNITED STATES v. AUKAI 9661
a.m. and that the entire search at issue—starting from when

Aukai walked through the checkpoint until the TSA’s efforts

to rule out the presence of a weapon resulted in the discovery

of drug paraphernalia—took no more than 18 minutes.

Although longer than detentions approved in other cases, see,

e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 448 (average delay of 25 seconds);

United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 546-47

(1976) (average detention of 3-5 minutes), the length of

Aukai’s detention was reasonable, especially in light of

Aukai’s conduct, because it was not prolonged beyond the

time reasonably required to rule out the presence of weapons

or explosives.10 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407

(2005) (stating that a seizure can become unlawful if it is

“prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete

[its] mission”). 

[10] Accordingly, we hold that the airport screening search

of Aukai was a constitutionally reasonable administrative

search. 

AFFIRMED.

GRABER, Circuit Judge, with whom HAWKINS and

WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, join, specially concurring: 

I concur in the result and nearly all of the reasoning in the

majority opinion. I write separately, however, because I cannot join the majority’s irrelevant and distracting references to

9/11 and terrorists. Daniel Aukai is no terrorist and yet,

whether in 1997 or 2007, the search that law enforcement personnel conducted of his person falls squarely within the confines of a reasonable administrative search. 

10We note that the detention in this case was prolonged, not by delay

on the part of the TSA officers conducting the screening, but by Aukai’s

repeated lies as to the contents of his pocket. 

9662 UNITED STATES v. AUKAI
The majority holds, and I agree, that once a passenger

enters the secured area of an airport, the constitutionality of

a screening search does not depend on consent. That legal

conclusion rests firmly on Supreme Court precedent and on

the government’s interest in ensuring the safety of passengers,

airline personnel, and the general public. For decades, nefarious individuals have tried to use commercial aircraft to further a personal or political agenda at the expense of those on

board and on the ground.1 And the threat continues to exist

that individuals, whether members of an organized group or

not, may attempt to do the same. In my view, references to a

“post-9/11 world,” maj. op. at 9657, do not advance the analysis. Nor is there any legal significance to whether or not an

individual is a terrorist. See maj. op. at 9657-59. By relying

on those factors, the majority unnecessarily makes its solid

holding dependent on the existence of the current terrorist

threat, inviting future litigants to retest the viability of that

holding.

1

See, e.g., 4 Cuban Gunmen Hijack Airliner, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17,

1959, at 1 (reporting the hijacking of a Cuban domestic airliner by four

individuals, who forced the pilot to fly them to Miami, Florida); Youth

Tries to Hijack Jetliner, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1965, at 1 (discussing an

attempt by a 16-year-old to hijack a National Airlines flight, during which

he attempted to shoot an aide to the federal space program); Gunman Is

Foiled in Jet Hijacking, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1968, at 1 (recounting an

attempt by a lone gunman to hijack a Delta Air Lines flight from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to fly to Cuba); Arabs Hijack a Dutch Jet, With 288

Aboard, to Libya, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1973, at 1 (covering the hijacking

of a KLM Air Lines flight over the Middle East); 2 Hijack Soviet Jet,

Force It to Finland, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1977, at 1 (noting the hijacking

of a Soviet airliner by two armed gunmen, who forced the plane to land

in Helsinki, Finland); German Jet Forced to Fly to Istanbul, N.Y. Times,

Mar. 27, 1985, at A11 (reporting the hijacking by a lone gunman of a Lufthansa flight from West Germany); Craig R. Whitney, The Crash of Flight

103, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1988, at A1 (discussing the explosion of Pan

Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland); 4 Injured as Crew on Cargo Jet

Fights Off Attempted Hijacking, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1994, at A12

(describing the attempted hijacking of a Federal Express airplane by a disgruntled employee). 

UNITED STATES v. AUKAI 9663