IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2022 WY 33

 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2021

March 8, 2022

IN THE INTEREST OF: 

RH,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

S-21-0189

Appeal from the District Court of Albany County

The Honorable Tori R.A. Kricken, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Thomas B. Jubin, Jubin & Zerga, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee:

Bridget L. Hill, Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General; Joshua 

C. Eames, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Catherine M. Mercer, Assistant 

Attorney General.

Before FOX, C.J., and DAVIS*, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

FOX, C.J., delivers the opinion of the Court; KAUTZ, J., files a specially concurring 

opinion.

*Justice Davis retired from judicial office effective January 16, 2022, and, pursuant to 

Article 5, § 5 of the Wyoming Constitution and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-1-106(f) (LexisNexis 

2021), he was reassigned to act on this matter January 18, 2022.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are 

requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of 

any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the 

permanent volume.
1

FOX, Chief Justice.

[¶1] The State filed a delinquency petition against RH when he was sixteen years old and 

thereafter agreed to a deferred prosecution. After RH successfully completed the terms of 

his deferral, the juvenile court dismissed the delinquency petition, and RH petitioned the 

court for expungement of his record pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-241 (LexisNexis 

2021). The court concluded that RH was ineligible to have his record expunged because 

the delinquency petition charged him with a violent felony, and it denied the petition. We 

reverse.

ISSUE

[¶2] The sole issue is whether Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-241 allows expungement of a 

juvenile record where a delinquency petition was dismissed, but the delinquent act charged 

was a violent felony.

FACTS

[¶3] On June 18, 2019, sixteen-year-old RH and his twelve-year-old cousin were staying 

with their grandparents, who lived in Albany County, Wyoming. That evening they spent 

the night alone in an RV on the grandparents’ property and played a game in which the 

loser had to remove an article of clothing. The game progressed to the point where both 

were nude and touching each other, and RH penetrated his cousin’s vagina and anus with 

his penis. As a result, the State filed a delinquency petition against RH charging him with 

first degree sexual assault of a minor. 

[¶4] Pursuant to a consent decree, the State agreed to defer the delinquency petition 

against RH, and he was placed on probation for one year.1 The consent decree provided 

that upon successful completion of the probationary period, the charges in the delinquency 

petition would be dismissed. RH successfully completed his probation, and the State 

moved to terminate the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and to close and seal the file. The court 

granted that motion and ordered its jurisdiction terminated and the file closed and sealed.

[¶5] On April 22, 2021, RH petitioned to have the record of the juvenile delinquency 

proceedings against him expunged. As grounds for expungement, the petition asserted:

6. Petitioner has reached the age of majority, having 

turned 18 years old on March 13, 2021. He has not been 

convicted of any felony, nor is any proceeding involving a 

felony pending or being instituted against him.

1 Before the parties agreed to enter into the consent decree, RH was evaluated by Chuck Denison, PhD, a 

forensic psychologist. Dr. Denison found no signs of psychosexual deviance in RH and concluded there 

was no need for a psychosexual evaluation. Nonetheless, one was done during RH’s probationary period. 

That evaluation concluded that RH was a low risk to reoffend, and the evaluator recommended against 

sexual offender specific treatment.
2

7. Petitioner has been fully rehabilitated. He attended 

counseling and he wrote a heartfelt letter of apology. Petitioner 

has been attending school and is working to succeed 

academically. His mother reports that his anxiety attacks have 

abated and [RH] appears to be doing well. He continues to have 

counseling available on an as-needed basis. He is in the 

onboarding training process to work as a customer service 

representative. . . . 

[¶6] The State objected to RH’s petition for expungement. It contended that RH was 

statutorily ineligible to have the record of the dismissed delinquency petition against him 

expunged because the petition charged him with a violent felony. The juvenile court agreed 

and denied RH’s petition. RH timely appealed the ruling to this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶7] Whether RH is eligible to have his juvenile record expunged depends on our 

interpretation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 14-6-241. Questions of statutory interpretation are 

questions of law that we consider de novo. Matter of Adoption of ATWS, 2021 WY 62, ¶ 8, 

486 P.3d 158, 160 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Matter of Adoption of MAJB, 2020 WY 157, ¶¶ 9, 

13, 478 P.3d 196, 200–01 (Wyo. 2020)).

DISCUSSION

[¶8] The Juvenile Justice Act allows for the expungement of juvenile records. It provides 

in relevant part:

(a) Any person adjudicated delinquent as a result of having 

committed a delinquent act other than a violent felony as 

defined by W.S. 6-1-104(a)(xii), under the provisions of this 

act may petition the court for the expungement of his record in 

the juvenile court upon reaching the age of majority. Any 

petition filed under this section shall be verified by the 

petitioner, served upon and reviewed by the prosecuting 

attorney, and no order granting expungement shall be issued 

prior to the expiration of twenty (20) days after service was 

made.

* * * 

If an objection is filed and after investigation the court finds 

that the petitioner has not been convicted of a felony since 

adjudication, that no proceeding involving a felony is pending 

or being instituted against the petitioner and the rehabilitation 
3

of the petitioner has been attained to the satisfaction of the 

court or the prosecuting attorney, it shall order expunged all 

records in any format including electronic records in the 

custody of the court or any agency or official, pertaining to the 

petitioner’s case. 

* * *

Upon entry of an order the proceedings in the petitioner’s case 

are deemed never to have occurred and the petitioner may reply

accordingly upon any inquiry in the matter.

* * *

(d) The record of a minor admitted to a diversion 

program or granted a deferral pursuant to Wyoming statute 

may be expunged in the same manner and subject to the same 

limitations as provided in subsection (a) of this section by 

petition to the court ordering the diversion program or deferral.

(e) A record of arrest, charges or disposition of a minor 

resulting in dismissal, declined prosecution or otherwise not 

resulting in a conviction or an adjudication of delinquency or 

an adjudication of being a child in need of supervision may be 

expunged in the same manner and subject to the same 

limitations as provided in subsection (a) of this section by 

petition to the court.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-241 (LexisNexis 2021) (emphasis added).

[¶9] RH was not adjudicated delinquent, so if he is eligible to have his juvenile court 

record expunged, it is under either subsection 14-6-241(d), which applies to deferrals, or 

(e), which applies to dispositions resulting in dismissal. Subsections (d) and (e) each direct 

that the records “may be expunged in the same manner and subject to the same limitations 

as provided in subsection (a).” To determine RH’s eligibility, we must therefore determine 

what is meant by the phrase, “subject to the same limitations as provided in subsection 

(a).”2

2 The phrase, “in the same manner,” is not the focus of the dispute in this case. Manner means “mode of 

procedure.” Manner, Merriam-Webster https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/manner, (last visited

2/1/2022). The procedure for expungement is straightforward. In a nutshell, upon reaching the age of 

majority, the individual seeking expungement must file a petition with the appropriate court and serve it 

upon the prosecuting attorney. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-241(a). If an objection is filed, a hearing is required, 
4

[¶10] “‘When we interpret statutes, our goal is to give effect to the intent of the legislature, 

and we attempt to determine the legislature’s intent based primarily on the plain and 

ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute.’” Orosco v. State, 2022 WY 15, ¶ 13, 

503 P.3d 51, 55 (Wyo. 2022) (quoting EME Wyo., LLC v. BRW East, LLC, 2021 WY 64, 

¶ 23, 486 P.3d 980, 987 (Wyo. 2021)). We have also said that while the plain language of 

a statute ultimately controls our interpretation, “[s]tatutes that provide for the care and 

discipline of juveniles are generally given a liberal and practical construction in favor of 

the child’s welfare.” Vaughn v. State, 2017 WY 29, ¶ 9, 391 P.3d 1086, 1091 (Wyo. 2017) 

(citing KP v. State, 2004 WY 165, ¶ 27, 102 P.3d 217, 225 (Wyo. 2004)). Our search for a 

statute’s plain meaning is guided by the following:

We . . . construe each statutory provision in pari materia, 

giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence according to 

their arrangement and connection. To ascertain the meaning of 

a given law, we also consider all statutes relating to the same 

subject or having the same general purpose and strive to 

interpret them harmoniously. We presume that the legislature 

has acted in a thoughtful and rational manner with full 

knowledge of existing law, and that it intended new statutory 

provisions to be read in harmony with existing law and as part 

of an overall and uniform system of jurisprudence. When the 

words used convey a specific and obvious meaning, we need 

not go farther and engage in statutory construction.

Orosco, 2022 WY 15, ¶ 13, 503 P.3d at 55 (quoting EME, 2021 WY 64, ¶ 23, 486 P.3d at 

987).

[¶11] Subsection 14-6-241(a) begins, “Any person adjudicated delinquent as a result of 

having committed a delinquent act other than a violent felony as defined by § 6-1-

104(a)(xii), under the provisions of this act may petition the court for the expungement of 

his record in the juvenile court upon reaching the age of majority.” The district court 

interpreted the first clause of this phrase to also apply to any person who petitions for 

expungement of a juvenile record under subsections (d) or (e). This would mean that if the 

act for which there is a record but no adjudication or conviction was a violent felony, the 

individual would not be eligible to have that record expunged. The district court reasoned:

The Court finds the language of Wyoming Statute § 14-6-

241(a) unambiguous. The legislature clearly intended to be 

eligible for expungement of juvenile records only those 

petitioners who fall outside the limitations of subsection (a). 

and the court may then order expungement based upon certain findings. Id. If no objection is filed, the court 

may summarily order the expungement if it finds that the petitioner is eligible. Id.
5

Those limitations include language prohibiting expungement 

of delinquent acts which would constitute a violent felony, 

even if the petitioner was not adjudicated as having committed 

the act and some other disposition occurred, as specified in 

subsections (d) and (e). Even without adjudication, subsections 

(d) and (e) are subject to the violent felony exclusion included 

in subsection (a). Any other interpretation would negate the 

necessity of subsections (d) and (e).

[¶12] We disagree with the district court’s interpretation. We fail to see any interpretation 

that does not apply the violent felony restriction of subsection 14-6-241(a) to subsections 

(d) and (e) that would negate the necessity of subsections (d) and (e). The parties agree, 

and it is apparent from the statute, that the purpose of adding subsections (d) and (e) was 

to broaden the types of juvenile records that are eligible for expungement. Subsections (d) 

and (e) were added to the statute in 2019. 2019 Wyo. Sess. Laws 97, ch. 29, sec. 1. Before 

that amendment, the statute provided no mechanism for the expungement of juvenile 

records in those cases in which there was no adjudication or conviction. Subsection (a), by 

its plain terms, applied only to a “person adjudicated delinquent,” and subsections (b) and 

(c) applied to records of convictions in municipal and circuit courts. Subsections (d) and 

(e) thus filled that gap, and they would do so regardless of whether subsection (a)’s violent 

felony restriction applied. We thus reject the district court’s interpretation.

[¶13] We are likewise unpersuaded by the State’s argument. It argues that the limitations 

found in subsection 14-6-241(a), which subsections (d) and (e) incorporate, include the 

violent felony restriction.3 It contends:

While the violent felony restriction references adjudications, 

this does not prevent it from applying to deferrals or dismissals 

where the charges involve violent felonies, because the 

implications of subsections (d) and (e) are that the limitations 

in subsection (a) can, and should, be adjusted to apply to 

situations that do not end in adjudication.

[¶14] This Court is not at liberty to adjust statutory provisions. Black Diamond Energy of 

Del., Inc. v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 2020 WY 45, ¶ 35, 460 P.3d 740, 750 

(Wyo. 2020) (“A court cannot, under the guise of its powers of construction, rewrite a 

statute, supply omissions, or make other changes.”) (quoting Triangle Cross Ranch, Inc. v. 

State, 2015 WY 47, ¶ 18, 345 P.3d 890, 894 (Wyo. 2015)). We must instead interpret the 

statute according to the legislature’s arrangement of its words, clauses, and sentences. 

EME, 2021 WY 64, ¶ 23, 486 P.3d at 987 (effect must be given to every word, clause, and 

3 We agree with the State that the term limitations, as used in subsections 14-6-241(d) and (e), means 

restrictions. Limitation, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
6

sentence of a statute according to their arrangement and connection) (citing Wyo. Jet Ctr., 

LLC v. Jackson Hole Airport Bd., 2019 WY 6, ¶ 12, 432 P.3d 910, 915 (Wyo. 2019)). The 

legislature’s structure of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-241 does not support the State’s 

interpretation.

[¶15] Subsections 14-6-241(a) through (e) each specify a separate category of juvenile 

records that may be eligible for expungement. Subsection (a) authorizes the expungement 

of the records of a person adjudicated delinquent as a result of an act other than a violent 

felony. Subsections (b) and (c) authorize the expungement of records of a minor convicted 

in municipal or circuit court, and subsections (d) and (e) authorize the expungement of 

records in cases in which there was no adjudication or conviction. Given this structure, the 

question is whether the violent felony language in subsection (a) describes the category of 

records that may be expunged, or is a “limitation” on expungement, as that term is used in 

subsections (d) and (e). We conclude it is the former. 

[¶16] The violent felony language is in the introductory clause of subsection 14-6-241(a), 

separate and apart from the provisions that establish the procedure for expungement and 

the court’s findings. That placement suggests the legislature intended the language would 

serve only to describe the category of records that may be expunged under that subsection. 

The introductory clause is then followed by separate terms that clearly set out the procedure 

to be followed and the findings a court must make before ordering an expungement. 

Specifically, a court must find “that the petitioner has not been convicted of a felony since 

adjudication, that no proceeding involving a felony is pending or being instituted against 

the petitioner and the rehabilitation of the petitioner has been attained to the satisfaction of 

the court or the prosecuting attorney.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-241(a). Given the logical 

purpose of the introductory clause, and the separate listing of required findings, we 

conclude that the reference in subsections (d) and (e) to subsection (a) “limitations” is a 

reference to the separately listed findings a court must make.

[¶17] This interpretation is consistent with the practical interpretation we must give the 

statute “in favor of the child’s welfare.” Vaughn, 2017 WY 29, ¶ 9, 391 P.3d at 1091. A 

stated goal of the Juvenile Justice Act is to “remove, where appropriate, the taint of 

criminality from children committing certain unlawful acts.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-

201(c)(ii)(B). This objective is not served by disallowing the expungement of a juvenile 

record in a case in which a juvenile is arrested for or charged with an offense that 

constitutes a violent felony but is never adjudicated or convicted of that offense. If we

interpreted the violent felony restriction to apply to subsection 14-6-241(e), a minor who 

was arrested for such an offense would be unable to seek expungement even if prosecution 

was declined. This seems particularly incongruous when a minor who is in fact adjudicated 

delinquent, albeit on a charge that is not a violent felony, may seek expungement of his or 

her records. We do not believe the legislature would have intended such a result. See Rosen 

v. State, 2022 WY 16, ¶ 17, 503 P.3d 41, 46 (Wyo. 2022) (“We will not interpret a statute 

in a way that renders any portion meaningless or in a manner producing absurd results.”) 
7

(quoting Delcon Partners LLC v. Wyo. Dep’t of Revenue, 2019 WY 106, ¶ 11, 450 P.3d 

682, 686 (Wyo. 2019)).4

[¶18] For these reasons, the district court erred in interpreting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-

241(d) and (e). We therefore reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

4 Further confirmation of the legislature’s intent may be found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1401. The 

legislature amended that statute at the same time it amended the Juvenile Justice Act’s expungement 

provision. Wyo. Sess. Laws 97, ch. 29, sec. 1. Through that amendment, the legislature authorized the State 

to petition for expungement of juvenile records of arrests or charges that did not result in a deferral or 

conviction, without regard to whether the arrest or charge was for a violent felony. Id.; Wyo. Stat. Ann. 

§ 7-13-1401(a). We can think of no reason the legislature would place a violent felony restriction on 

subsection 14-6-241(e), and not on the State’s authority under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1401(a). In fact, 

subsection 7-13-1401(a) would allow an adult to petition for expungement of his or her record of an arrest 

or charge that did not result in a deferral or conviction, without regard to whether the arrest of charge was 

for a violent felony. It of course makes no sense for the legislature to allow an adult to seek such an 

expungement without the violent felony restriction but impose such a restriction on a juvenile who seeks 

an expungement.
8

KAUTZ, Justice, specially concurring. 

[¶19] I concur in the result of the proposed majority opinion, but I reach that result by a 

different route.

[¶20] At the outset, I find the only issue in this case is whether Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-

241 allows expungement of a juvenile record where the applicant was accused of a violent 

felony but was not adjudicated delinquent because he successfully completed a statutory 

deferral program. The issue stated by the majority, which addresses expungement after 

any dismissal of a delinquency charge based on an accusation of a violent felony, goes 

beyond the facts presented in this case.

[¶21] I conclude that § 14-6-241(a) and (d) (LexisNexis 2021), which together apply to 

this case, are ambiguous. In this regard, I differ from the majority opinion which finds the 

language to be unambiguous. However, when one employs the statutory construction 

analysis presented in the majority opinion to the ambiguity in the statute, the result is the 

one reached by the majority.

[¶22] “A statute is clear and unambiguous if the words are such that reasonable minds are 

able to agree on its meaning in a consistent and predictable fashion. Ambiguity arises if 

the statute is vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations. . . . If we determine 

that the language of a statute is ambiguous, only then will we proceed to the next step; that 

is, the application of general principles of statutory construction to the language of the 

statute in order to construe any ambiguous language to accurately reflect the intent of the 

legislature.” Bohling v. State, 2017 WY 7, ¶ 18, 388 P.3d 502, 506 (Wyo. 2018) (citations 

omitted).

[¶23] Section 14-6-241 provides for expungement of juvenile records. Subsection (a) 

addresses expungement of records for juveniles adjudicated delinquent. Subsection (d) 

addresses expungement of records for juveniles who were not adjudicated delinquent 

because they completed a deferral or diversionary program, such as the one RH competed. 

Subsection (e) does not apply here because it uses more general language about dismissals. 

“Where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern, precedence is 

given to the terms of the more specific statute.” Olsen v. State, 2003 WY 46, ¶ 168, 67 

P.3d 536, 596 (Wyo. 2003). As a result, subsection (e) applies to juveniles who were not 

adjudicated delinquent for other reasons (i.e., a trial verdict in their favor) or who faced 

juvenile charges which were dismissed. Subsection (d), which applies in this case, allows 

individuals who complete a deferral program like a consent decree to obtain expungement 

“subject to the same limitations as provided in subsection (a).” Exactly what constitutes 

“the same limitations as provided in subsection (a)” may be reasonably interpreted in 

varying ways, making the statute ambiguous.
9

[¶24] Subsection (a) states expungement is available to “any person adjudicated 

delinquent as a result of having committed a delinquent act other than a violent felony as 

defined by W.S. 6-1-104(a)(xii).” This statement may be interpreted as a description of 

who may apply for expungement, and not as a limitation on expungement. However, it 

reasonably may be seen as establishing a limitation on expungement which excludes crimes 

defined as violent felonies. The language is not clearly and unambiguously indicative one 

way or the other. Because the language is ambiguous, it is then (and only then) appropriate 

to employ the general principles of statutory construction utilized in the majority opinion 

to determine the intent of the legislature. I concur with the analysis of those principles 

found in the majority opinion and agree that § 14-6-241(d) does not preclude an application 

for expungement by a juvenile who was charged with a violent felony but was not 

adjudicated delinquent because he completed a diversion program.