If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re CARLISLE/CHASE/HUNTER/JONES, Minors June 6, 2024

No. 368318

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2015-518727-NA

Before: GARRETT, P.J., and SERVITTO and REDFORD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court’s September 13, 2023 order after the 

preliminary hearing. The order continued the trial court’s August 29, 2023 order, which removed

mother’s six children from her care. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Respondent is the mother of KC, KCC, DC, TH, TJ, and TLJ. TGH is the biological father 

of TJ, TLJ, and TH and was a respondent in the petition. DMC is the biological father of KC and 

KCC and was also a respondent in the petition. DRC is the biological father of DC and was not a 

respondent in the petition.

The trial court first acquired jurisdiction over TJ, TLJ, and TH (the only children 

respondent had at that time) after the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a 

petition for temporary wardship in 2015. The petition alleged that respondent, TJ, TLJ, and TH 

were residing in a home without any legal right or permission to reside in the home, the home was 

without working electricity or a working furnace, respondent was provided services to rectify the 

unsuitable living conditions but failed to do so, and two previous Child Protective Services (CPS) 

investigations substantiated physical abuse allegations against respondent. The trial court found 

reasonable cause to believe that the immediate removal of TJ, TLJ, and TH from respondent’s care 

was necessary to protect the children’s safety and welfare. Respondent was ordered to complete 

parenting classes, individual therapy, and a psychological evaluation, and to obtain and maintain 

suitable housing and income. Respondent completed the services and the trial court returned TJ, 

TLJ, and TH to respondent’s care and terminated the court’s jurisdiction in January 2016.
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In August 2023, petitioner filed a petition for child protective proceedings requesting that 

the trial court take jurisdiction over TJ, TLJ, TH, KC, KCC, and DC under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and 

(2). The petition alleged, among other things, that CPS had received a referral of improper 

supervision but respondent refused to allow CPS to enter her home to assess its suitability for the 

children. CPS observed the children to be dirty and unkempt. Respondent was neglecting TH’s 

mental health needs by failing to ensure he received his necessary medications. The petition 

alleged that on May 30, 2023, respondent called police and asked them “to take [TH] before she 

kills him, or he kills her.” When police arrived, respondent “was holding a knife and threatened 

to stab [TH] if he came close to her.” The responding officers noted the home was “filthy” and 

saw a young child running through the home naked. Two days later, police were again summoned 

to the home. TH refused to go inside out of fear of being physically abused by respondent. TH 

also reported that respondent deprived him of food. Further, respondent’s home lacked working 

electricity, petitioner attempted to provide services to respondent but respondent was 

uncooperative, and respondent failed to benefit from prior services.

Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court found that petitioner made reasonable 

efforts to prevent the removal of respondent’s children from her care and that it was contrary to 

the welfare of the children to remain in respondent’s care. The trial court ordered the removal of 

the children from respondent’s care and placed the children in the care of the DHHS, except DC, 

who was placed with his nonrespondent father. Respondent now appeals.1

II. ANALYSIS

Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred by determining that petitioner presented 

sufficient evidence to support the removal of respondent’s children from her care under MCR 

3.965(C)(2) and (3) and MCL 712A.13a(9). Respondent further argues the court clearly erred by 

removing the children from her care because the trial court failed to make the required factual 

findings to order removal of the children under those provisions. We disagree.

When a trial court orders the removal of a child from a parent’s care and places the child 

in foster care, the trial court “must make explicit findings that ‘it is contrary to the welfare of the 

child to remain at home,’ MCR 3.965(C)(3), and ‘reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the 

child have been made or that reasonable efforts to prevent removal are not required,’ MCR 

3.965(C)(4).” In re Benavides, 334 Mich App 162, 168; 964 NW2d 108 (2020). This Court 

reviews a trial court’s factual findings for clear error. Id. at 167. A trial court’s finding “is only 

clearly erroneous if an appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 

been made.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “This Court reviews de novo questions 

 

1 On appeal, appellees argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the instant appeal. The latest 

removal order was entered on September 13, 2023. Per the Claim of Appeal and the register of 

actions, appointed counsel was requested on September 22, 2023. The claim of appeal was filed 

on October 23, 2023. Under these circumstances, even though the claim of appeal was not filed 

until October 23, 2023 (40 days after the removal order), because appointed counsel was requested 

within 21 days of the date of removal, this Court treats the claim as timely filed.
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of law, including the interpretation and application of our court rules.” In re 

McCarrick/Lamoreaux, 307 Mich App 436, 445; 861 NW2d 303 (2014).

“At the preliminary hearing, the court must decide whether to authorize the filing of the 

petition and, if authorized, whether the child should remain in the home, be returned home, or be 

placed in foster care pending trial.” In re Benavides, 334 Mich App at 167 (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). A trial court may also adjourn the preliminary hearing for the purpose of 

securing the appearance of a parent, MCR 3.965(B)(1).

2 When a trial court adjourns a preliminary 

hearing without deciding whether to authorize the petition, “the court may make temporary orders 

for the placement of the child when necessary to assure the immediate safety of the child, pending 

the completion of the preliminary hearing and subject to [MCR 3.965(C)] . . . .” MCR 

3.965(B)(11).

Both MCR 3.965(C)(2) and MCL 712A.13a(9)3provide for the placement of children in 

foster care as follows:

The court may order placement of the child into foster care if the court finds all of 

the following:

(a) Custody of the child with the parent presents a substantial risk of harm to the 

child’s life, physical health, or mental well-being.

(b) No provision of service or other arrangement except removal of the child is 

reasonably available to adequately safeguard the child from the risk as described in 

subrule (a).

(c) Continuing the child’s residence in the home is contrary to the child’s welfare.

(d) Consistent with the circumstances, reasonable efforts were made to prevent or 

eliminate the need for removal of the child.

(e) Conditions of child custody away from the parent are adequate to safeguard the 

child’s health and welfare. [In re Williams, 333 Mich App 172, 182-183; 958 

NW2d 629 (2020), quoting MCR 3.965(C)(2).]

When the court is “merely assuming jurisdiction over the child and not terminating the parent’s 

rights in that child,” the evidentiary standard applicable to the trial court’s findings under MCR 

3.965(C)(2) and MCL 712A.13a(9) is a preponderance of the evidence. In re Williams, 333 Mich 

App at 183 (quotation marks and citation omitted). A trial court “must make a record of its 

findings as to each and every factor sufficient for this Court to conduct a meaningful review,” but 

 

2 The trial court did so in this case to secure the presence of DMC.

3

“MCR 3.965(C)(2) is identical in substance to MCL 712A.13a(9).” In re Benavides, 334 Mich 

App at 168 n 2.
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the trial court “is generally not obligated to articulate extensive findings regarding every 

conceivable detail.” Id.

At the preliminary hearing, CPS Investigator Chasity McKnuckle testified that respondent 

had multiple encounters with law enforcement in which respondent threatened to stab and kill TH, 

who was then only nine years old and had ADHD and a behavior disorder, and reported that she 

hit TH with sticks and other objects in the house. McKnuckle further testified respondent’s home 

was unsuitable for the children because it lacked running water, a working furnace and working 

electricity, and when McKnuckle observed the children, they appeared unclean, and their clothes 

were dirty. According to McKnuckle, respondent refused to allow McKnuckle to enter the home 

to assess its suitability for the children, but law enforcement also observed respondent’s home and 

reported that it was not suitable or livable. McKnuckle testified that respondent reported that she 

did not have any food in her home for the children and respondent also asked her for beds. 

McKnuckle also testified that they had two team meetings, but respondent became irate at the 

second meeting, as she often did with McKuckle, yelling and swearing, and the meeting had to be 

discontinued.

Respondent denied the allegations that her home had no electricity or running water, but 

admitted that at times, she did not have sufficient food in the house for the children. When asked 

why she would not allow CPS in her home to perform an assessment, respondent had no response 

except that she would have sent pictures. The trial court explained that if respondent wanted to 

allow a CPS worker, DHHS worker, or police officer into her home to show that her home was 

suitable, she was welcome to do that as soon as the next day, and the court would get the report.

With respect to MCR 3.965(C)(2)(a), the trial court found that an order removing the 

children from respondent’s care was necessary because the children were at a substantial risk of 

harm or were in surroundings that presented an imminent risk of harm and the children’s 

immediate removal from those surroundings was necessary to protect the children’s health and 

safety. With respect to (C)(2)(b), the trial court found that no provision of service or other 

arrangement except removal of the children was reasonably available to adequately safeguard the 

children from the risk of harm to the children’s lives, physical health, or mental well-being. The 

trial court’s findings were supported by McKnuckle’s and respondent’s testimony that there was 

not enough food in the house for the children, and by McKnuckle’s testimony that respondent’s 

home lacked running water and electricity and respondent refused to allow McKnuckle to enter 

the home to assess its suitability for the children. The trial court’s findings also have support in 

that respondent’s children were removed from her care in 2015 because the family home was 

unsuitable for the children and respondent received services in the course of that proceeding, but 

respondent failed to benefit from the services provided because the instant petition was 

necessitated, in part, by the same circumstances giving rise to the 2015 removal, and the testimony 

that petitioner attempted to establish a service plan for respondent in this instance but was unable 

to do so because respondent became irate and uncooperative.

With respect to (C)(2)(c), the trial court found that it was contrary to the children’s welfare 

to remain in respondent’s home. This was supported by McKnuckle’s testimony that respondent 

required assistance to obtain beds for the children but refused to allow McKnuckle to complete a 

home assessment so that beds could be ordered, and that respondent’s home lacked running water 

and working electricity. McKnuckle’s testimony that she observed the children to be unclean and 
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their clothes were dirty and her testimony (and respondent’s) that respondent reported that she did 

not have food in the home for the children also supports the trial court’s findings. Further, the trial 

court noted the evidence demonstrated that respondent was physically and verbally abusive to TH, 

including threatening to stab and kill TH. Though respondent argues that this evidence 

demonstrates only that respondent was unable to care for TH, this Court has repeatedly recognized 

that “how a parent treats one child is probative of how that parent may treat other children.” In re 

Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 323; 964 NW2d 881 (2020). Accord In re LaFrance Minors, 306 Mich 

App 713, 730; 858 NW2d 143 (2014). Thus, respondent’s physical and verbal abuse of TH was 

probative of how respondent may treat her other children, and the trial court could properly infer 

from the evidence of respondent’s abuse of TH that it was contrary to the welfare of all of the 

children to remain in respondent’s care.

With respect to (C)(2)(d), the trial court found that reasonable efforts were made to prevent 

or eliminate removal of the children from respondent’s home. McKnuckle testified that multiple 

team meetings were held for the purpose of providing respondent with services to prevent removal 

but respondent ended one team meeting early due to a minor car accident and was irate and 

uncooperative during the second team meeting. McKnuckle also delivered groceries to 

respondent’s home when respondent reported that she lacked adequate food for the children, and 

it appeared that respondent’s home lacked running water and electricity but respondent refused to 

allow McKnuckle to enter the home to assess its suitability for the children. Further, respondent 

required assistance obtaining beds for the children but refused to allow McKnuckle to assess her 

home despite McKnuckle advising respondent that a home assessment was required before 

McKnuckle could order beds for the children. Though respondent argues that reasonable efforts 

were not made to prevent removal, the record evidence supports the trial court’s determination that 

petitioner made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the children, including attempts to 

establish a service plan and assess respondent’s home, but respondent refused to cooperate with 

CPS and the DHHS.

Finally, with respect to (C)(2)(e), the trial court found that the conditions of the children’s 

placements outside of respondent’s home were adequate to safeguard the children’s health and 

welfare. McKnuckle testified that KC and KKC were placed with their paternal uncle, TH was 

placed at Harbor Oaks Hospital, DC would be placed with DRC, and the DHHS was locating 

placement for TJ and TLJ. The trial court ordered respondent’s children to be placed in the care 

of the DHHS, except DC, who was placed in the care of his nonrespondent father, DRC. The trial 

court further ordered that the DHHS conduct a home study on any relatives with whom the children 

were placed. No testimony was presented demonstrating that the children’s placements were 

inadequate to protect the children’s health and welfare, nor does respondent argue on appeal that 

the children’s respective placements were inadequate. The evidence presented at the preliminary 

hearing was sufficient to support the removal of the children from respondent’s care under MCR 

3.965(C)(2) and MCL 712A.13a(9). Thus, the trial court made the requisite factual findings to 
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order removal of the children under MCL 712A.13a(9) and MCR 3.965(C)(2) and did not clearly 

err by ordering the removal of respondent’s children from her care.

Affirmed.

/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto

/s/ James Robert Redford