United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 14-1934

SIRVA RELOCATION, LLC and AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

CHARLOTTE GOLAR RICHIE, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER 

OF THE MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Howard, Chief Judge,

Selya and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.

Jonathan C. Bond, with whom Miguel A. Estrada, Gibson, Dunn 

& Crutcher LLP, Stephen D. Rosenberg, and The Wagner Law Group

were on brief, for appellants.

Carrie M. Benedon, Assistant Attorney General, with whom 

Maura Healey, Attorney General of Massachusetts, was on brief, for 

appellees.

Mala M. Rafik, S. Stephen Rosenfeld, Rosenfeld, Rafik & 

Sullivan, P.C., Anne L. Josephson, and Kotin, Crabtree & Strong, 

L.L.P. on brief for American Civil Liberties Union of 

Massachusetts, Community Legal Aid of Central and Western 

Massachusetts, Health Law Advocates, Jewish Alliance for Law and 
Social Action, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Economic 

Justice, Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association, 

Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, and National Alliance on 

Mental Illness of Massachusetts, amici curiae in support of 

appellees.

July 20, 2015
- 3 -

SELYA, Circuit Judge. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 

(1971), the Supreme Court enunciated a doctrine of abstention. 

Fidelity to that doctrine requires federal courts, in the absence 

of extraordinary circumstances, to refrain from interfering with 

certain state proceedings. See id. at 43-45. The Supreme Court 

recently revisited the Younger doctrine, clarified its operation, 

and narrowed its scope. See Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 

S. Ct. 584 (2013). This case affords us our first opportunity to 

consider the impact of Sprint on Younger abstention.

The court below, ruling with the benefit of Sprint, held 

that Younger abstention was appropriate here and dismissed the 

federal court action. See Sirva Relocation, LLC v. Tynes, No. 13-

12530, 2014 WL 3892202, at *7 (D. Mass. Aug. 7, 2014). The federal 

plaintiffs appeal. After positioning this case within the Younger

framework, considering the factors limned in Middlesex County 

Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423 

(1982), and evaluating the applicability vel non of possible 

exceptions to Younger abstention, we affirm the district court's 

decision to abstain. Along the way, we clarify our own case law 

concerning the exception to the Younger doctrine for facially 

conclusive claims of preemption. 
- 4 -

I. BACKGROUND

This appeal is the latest bout in a prolonged legal 

struggle concerning fringe benefits offered by plaintiff-appellant 

Sirva Relocation, LLC (Sirva) to its work force. We briefly 

rehearse the history and travel of the dispute.

Sirva (a company that provides moving and housing 

solutions) offers a complement of benefits to its employees through 

a group benefit plan. The plan, which is underwritten by 

plaintiff-appellant Aetna Life Insurance Company (Aetna), includes 

a long-term disability (LTD) component. Employees who elect LTD 

coverage and become totally disabled receive monthly payments 

equal to a portion of their pre-disability income. Pertinently, 

the LTD plan (the Plan) provides disparate benefits depending on 

the nature of an employee's disability: employees who become 

totally disabled prior to age 62 may receive benefits until age 65 

if their disability stems from a physical impairment, whereas those 

who become totally disabled from a mental or psychological 

condition are generally entitled to receive LTD benefits for a 

maximum of 24 months.1

In September of 2004, Sirva hired David Knight as 

director of global sales. Knight chose to participate in the 

 

1 We say "generally" because the Plan makes an exception, not 

relevant here, for employees who are hospitalized beyond 24 months 

as a result of a mental or psychological condition.
- 5 -

benefit plan and enrolled in the LTD component. In November of 

that year, Knight took a leave of absence due to mental illness. 

Knight was subsequently found to be totally disabled and began 

receiving disability benefits. By May of 2005, Knight had 

exhausted his short-term disability benefits, and Aetna informed 

him that LTD payments would commence. Aetna's letter noted that 

if Knight's disability was in any way attributable to a mental 

condition, his LTD payments would cease 24 months after the onset 

of the disability unless he was hospitalized at that time. See

supra note 1.

In December of 2006, Aetna informed Knight that he had 

exhausted his LTD benefits and that payments had been terminated. 

Aetna's letter noted that the Plan was subject to the Employee 

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–

1461, and that Knight had the right to seek internal review of the 

benefits termination. It went on to explain that if Knight was 

unhappy with the outcome of that review, he could sue under ERISA. 

See id. § 1132(a).

Knight did not pursue further claims review but, rather, 

filed a charge of discrimination with the Massachusetts Commission 

Against Discrimination (MCAD) in September of 2007. He complained 

that the appellants (Sirva and Aetna) had discriminated against 

him on the basis of disability in violation of Massachusetts 

General Laws chapter 151B and the Americans with Disabilities Act 
- 6 -

of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213. The crux of his complaint 

was that the appellants paid disparate LTD benefits depending on 

whether an employee suffered from a physical or a mental 

impairment.

The appellants promptly moved to dismiss Knight's 

complaint. They argued that the chapter 151B claim was preempted 

by ERISA and that the ADA claim failed on the merits. The MCAD 

did nothing until April of 2010, when the Investigating 

Commissioner denied the appellants' motion without prejudice. Her 

rescript asserted, without meaningful elaboration, that factual 

questions concerning both ERISA coverage and the merits precluded 

dismissal.

The appellants filed a timely answer and position 

statement reiterating their defenses. The MCAD took no further 

action for nearly two years. At that time, an MCAD investigator 

requested from the appellants documents concerning both ERISA 

coverage and the merits of Knight's complaint. The appellants 

quickly supplied the requested information. 

In October of 2012, the Investigating Commissioner found 

that probable cause existed to credit Knight's allegations and 

ordered the parties to participate in a conciliation conference, 

warning that failure to attend could result in sanctions or 

immediate certification of the charge for a public hearing. A 

summary of the MCAD's investigation accompanied the finding. The 
- 7 -

appellants sought reconsideration of the probable cause finding, 

renewing their argument that the chapter 151B claim was preempted 

and, therefore, the MCAD lacked jurisdiction to proceed. The MCAD 

denied reconsideration and ordered the parties to proceed with 

discovery.

In May of 2013 — almost six years after the commencement 

of the MCAD proceeding — the Investigating Commissioner certified 

the case for public hearing and added the MCAD's name to the 

caption. Following a pre-hearing conference, the MCAD scheduled 

the public hearing for January of 2014.

At that juncture, the appellants repaired to the United 

States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Their 

federal complaint named as defendants the Commonwealth of 

Massachusetts, the MCAD, its commissioners (in their official 

capacities), and Knight. The complaint entreated the district 

court to declare that ERISA preempted the chapter 151B claim and 

any further MCAD investigation of the charge. On that basis, the 

appellants asked the court to enjoin the MCAD proceeding. The 

MCAD and Knight moved to dismiss the complaint, exhorting the 

district court to abstain.

While the case was pending, the Supreme Court decided 

Sprint. The district court secured supplemental briefing and then 

heard oral arguments. The court reserved decision and, in a 

thoughtful memorandum, ruled that abstention was required. See
- 8 -

Sirva, 2014 WL 3892202, at *4-7. Consequently, it dismissed the 

case. See id. at *7. This timely appeal ensued.

II. ANALYSIS

The appellants attack the district court's decision to 

abstain on three fronts. First, they claim that the MCAD 

proceeding is not the sort of proceeding to which Younger applies. 

Second, they claim that even if the proceeding comes within 

Younger's orbit, the Middlesex factors defeat abstention. Third, 

they claim that, in all events, an exception to Younger for 

facially conclusive allegations of preemption permits a federal 

court to enjoin the MCAD proceeding. All of these claims were 

rejected by the district court, and that court's rulings engender 

de novo review. See Rio Grande Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc. v. Rullan, 

397 F.3d 56, 68 (1st Cir. 2005). 

A. The Evolution of the Younger Doctrine.

Unpacking the appellants' asseverational array requires 

some exploration of the evolution of the Younger doctrine. We 

start from the settled premise that the pendency of a state-court 

action generally does not preclude a federal court from addressing 

the same subject matter. See Co. River Water Conserv. Dist. v. 

United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). This is consistent with 

the tenet that federal courts have a "virtually unflagging 

obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them." Id.

Nevertheless, this obligation is not absolute — and the Supreme 
- 9 -

Court has developed a small cluster of doctrines that either 

require or allow federal courts to defer to state proceedings in 

particular circumstances. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 

517 U.S. 706, 716-18 (1996). Younger abstention reflects one such 

doctrine. 

In Younger, the Justices held that principles of equity 

and comity demand that a federal court abstain from entertaining 

a suit that seeks to enjoin a state criminal prosecution as 

violative of federal law so long as the state proceeding affords 

an adequate opportunity to raise the federal defense and abstention 

will not cause irreparable harm. See 401 U.S. at 43-46. In a 

companion case, the Justices made pellucid that the same principles 

encumber a federal court's ability to order declaratory relief. 

See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69-70, 72-73 (1971).

The Supreme Court subsequently extended the Younger

doctrine to certain quasi-criminal proceedings, see Huffman v. 

Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 594 (1975), and certain proceedings 

involving the enforcement of state-court orders and judgments, see

Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1987). Similarly, 

some state administrative proceedings may trigger Younger

abstention. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City 

of New Orleans (NOPSI), 491 U.S. 350, 369 n.4 (1989). 

Over the years, the Court has recognized a handful of 

exceptions to the Younger doctrine. Abstention is inappropriate, 
- 10 -

for example, when a state proceeding is brought in bad faith, that 

is, for the purpose of harassment. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-

54. So, too, a federal court need not stay its hand if the state 

forum provides inadequate protection of federal rights. See Gibson

v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575, 578-79 (1973). Abstention is 

likewise inappropriate when a state statute is "flagrantly and 

patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions." 

Younger, 401 U.S. at 53 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 

(1941)). 

In Middlesex, the Court added a further gloss. It 

explained that a federal court must abstain when there is an 

ongoing state proceeding (judicial in nature), which implicates 

important state interests and provides an adequate opportunity to 

raise federal defenses. See 457 U.S. at 432. Thereafter, lower 

courts sometimes loosely applied the three Middlesex factors as an 

exclusive test for determining the applicability of the Younger 

doctrine. See, e.g., Brooks v. N.H. Supreme Court, 80 F.3d 633, 

638 (1st Cir. 1996). 

Recently, the Supreme Court clarified the range of state 

proceedings that may suffice to trigger Younger abstention. The 

Court explained that Younger applies only to "exceptional" state 

proceedings, Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 588, and the Middlesex factors 

do not operate as a free-standing test, see id. at 593. Giving 

independent life to the Middlesex factors would transmogrify 
- 11 -

Younger from a narrow exception to the federal courts' duty to 

exercise their jurisdiction into a rule mandating abstention in 

the case of "virtually all parallel state and federal proceedings." 

Id. 

The Sprint Court held that only three types of state 

proceedings trigger Younger abstention: (i) criminal prosecutions, 

(ii) "civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions," 

and (iii) proceedings "that implicate a State's interest in 

enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts." Id. at 588. 

If a proceeding does not fit within this taxonomy, Younger

abstention will not lie. See id. at 593-94.

However, the Sprint Court did not entirely abandon the 

Middlesex factors. Although those factors cannot alone bear the 

weight of abstention, they constitute "additional factors 

appropriately considered by [a] federal court before invoking 

Younger." Id. at 593. 

We distill from Sprint a three-step approach to Younger

abstention. To begin, a federal court must ascertain whether a 

particular state proceeding falls within the Younger taxonomy. If 

so, the court must then take the second step and consider whether 

the Middlesex factors support abstention. And if these two steps 

leave the case on track for abstention, the court must take the 

third step and determine whether any of the isthmian exceptions to 

the Younger doctrine apply.
- 12 -

B. The Taxonomy Question.

We move now from the general to the specific. The 

appellants' opening salvo posits that the MCAD proceeding does not 

engage the gears of Younger abstention at all. In their view, the 

MCAD is a neutral arbiter adjudicating a private dispute between 

an employer and an employee. 

The parties agree that the only Sprint niche into which 

the MCAD proceeding might fit is the category for civil enforcement 

proceedings resembling "criminal prosecution[s] in important 

respects." Id. at 592 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

Sprint Court described the hallmarks of such proceedings. For one 

thing, such a proceeding is "characteristically initiated to 

sanction the federal plaintiff . . . for some wrongful act." Id. 

For another thing, "a state actor is routinely a party to the state 

proceeding and often initiates the action." Id. Finally, an 

investigation is typically undertaken, culminating in a formal 

charge or complaint. See id. 

This court has applied the Younger analysis to MCAD 

proceedings in several earlier cases. See, e.g., Colonial Life & 

Accident Ins. Co. v. Medley, 572 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2009); Local 

Union No. 12004 v. Massachusetts, 377 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2004). 

But these cases predate Sprint and do not directly address the 

question of whether MCAD proceedings are sufficiently akin to 
- 13 -

criminal prosecutions to trigger abstention. We begin with that 

question. 

We find instructive the Supreme Court's decision in Ohio 

Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 

U.S. 619 (1986). There, a teacher filed a complaint with a state 

civil-rights agency alleging that her employer had discriminated 

against her on the basis of sex. See id. at 623-24. The agency 

notified the school that it was conducting an investigation into 

the matter and urged settlement, warning that a failure to settle 

could lead to formal adjudication. See id. at 624. After finding 

probable cause to believe that discrimination had occurred, the 

agency forwarded a proposed conciliation agreement. See id. When 

the school failed to respond, the agency initiated an 

administrative proceeding by filing a complaint. See id.

The Supreme Court concluded that the Younger doctrine 

barred the school's subsequent federal action to enjoin the agency 

proceeding on First Amendment grounds. See id. at 628. The Sprint

Court later identified this agency proceeding as the type of civil 

enforcement action that falls within the Younger taxonomy. See

Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 592. 

The proceeding here is materially indistinguishable from 

that described in Dayton. Knight filed an MCAD complaint against 

the appellants; an MCAD investigator sought and obtained documents 

concerning the structure of the Plan; the Investigating 
- 14 -

Commissioner made a finding of probable cause; conciliation 

failed; and the Investigating Commissioner certified the matter 

for public hearing — an action which, under applicable regulations, 

was the functional equivalent of filing a formal complaint, see

804 Mass. Code Regs. 1.20(3). This course of action satisfies the 

Sprint Court's state-involvement and investigation criteria. 

Here, moreover, the MCAD proceeding is aimed at 

sanctioning the appellants for wrongful conduct. See Stonehill 

Coll. v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrim., 808 N.E.2d 205, 216-17 

(Mass. 2004) ("[T]he primary purpose of an [MCAD proceeding] is to 

vindicate the public's interest in reducing discrimination in the 

workplace by deterring, and punishing, instances of discrimination 

by employers against employees."). It is, therefore, "of the sort 

entitled to Younger treatment." Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 592 

(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

The appellants strain to distinguish the MCAD proceeding 

from the proceeding in Dayton. They suggest, for instance, that 

Dayton is distinguishable because the conduct at issue there 

violated Ohio criminal law. That is true as far it goes — but the 

distinction does not take the appellants very far. Neither Sprint

nor Dayton relied on (or even mentioned) such a distinction. And 

though the availability of parallel criminal sanctions may be a 

relevant datum, see ACRA Turf Club, LLC v. Zanzuccki, 748 F.3d 

127, 138 (3d Cir. 2014); Mulholland v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 
- 15 -

746 F.3d 811, 816-17 (7th Cir. 2014), it is not a necessary element 

when the state proceeding otherwise sufficiently resembles a 

criminal prosecution, see, e.g., Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432-35 

(applying Younger to state disciplinary proceeding intended to 

punish lawyer for violating ethical rules). 

In the same vein, the appellants expostulate that the 

MCAD is merely refereeing a private dispute. But contrary to their 

importunings, the fact that Knight initiated the proceeding by 

filing a complaint with the MCAD is not dispositive of the 

question. In Dayton, for example, the agency's investigation was 

sparked by a private complaint. See 477 U.S. at 623-24; see also

Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 592 (observing that a state actor "often

initiates the action" (emphasis supplied)). 

The appellants' further assertion that the MCAD failed 

to conduct an investigation is belied by the record. An MCAD 

investigator requested a trove of documents from the appellants, 

and the subsequent probable cause finding was accompanied by a 

summary of the agency's investigation. 

The appellants next argue that the MCAD proceeding has 

the trappings of a civil proceeding and, thus, does not accommodate 

Younger abstention. This argument is threadbare. Under 

Massachusetts law, an individual who believes that he has been a 

victim of discrimination has "two largely independent avenues for 

redress." Stonehill, 808 N.E.2d at 218 (internal quotation mark 
- 16 -

omitted). He may either file a complaint with the MCAD and rely 

exclusively on the agency's processes or remove the case to state 

court and maintain a private action in his own name. See id. at 

216-17. 

Where, as here, an individual elects to travel along the 

first avenue, the agency prosecutes the charge, see Mass. Gen. 

Laws ch. 151B, § 5, and "proceeds in its own name," Joulé, Inc. v. 

Simmons, 944 N.E.2d 143, 148 (Mass. 2011). The agency can settle 

the dispute without the complaining party's consent. See 804 Mass. 

Code Regs. 1.15(6)(b). If settlement proves to be infeasible, the 

agency can issue a formal complaint in its own name. See id.

§ 1.20(3).

While the MCAD may allow the parties to engage in 

discovery, that discovery is intended primarily to "assist[] the 

Investigating Commissioner." Id. § 1.13(7)(a). And even though 

the MCAD is empowered to seek relief on behalf of the victim of 

the alleged discrimination, the primary purpose of any such relief 

is to effectuate the goals of Massachusetts anti-discrimination 

law. See Joulé, 944 N.E.2d at 149-50; Stonehill, 808 N.E.2d at 

216-17; cf. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294-96 (2002) 

(discussing parallel federal scheme). The state-centric nature of 

MCAD proceedings is underscored by the fact that an aggrieved 

individual must intervene in the public hearing in order to 
- 17 -

"advance a claim of discrimination in [his] own name." Joulé, 944 

N.E.2d at 151; see 804 Mass. Code Regs. 1.20(4).

Viewed through this prism, the participation of the 

appellants and Knight by means of pleadings, motion practice, and 

discovery does not disqualify the MCAD proceeding from Younger

protection. Unlike the proceeding at issue in Sprint, which was 

initiated to settle a private dispute and involved no state-driven 

investigation or formal charge, see 134 S. Ct. at 592-93, the MCAD 

proceeding exhibits all the essential hallmarks of a civil 

enforcement action that is "more akin to a criminal prosecution 

than are most civil cases," id. at 593 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). That Knight's lawyer helped in the MCAD's investigation 

does not alter the fundamental character of the proceeding. Cf.

NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 371 (explaining that in classifying an agency 

action as legislative or judicial, "[t]he nature of the final act 

determines the nature of the previous inquiry" (quoting Prentis v. 

Atl. Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 227 (1908))).

We also reject the appellants' contention that defects 

in this particular proceeding place it beyond Younger's embrace. 

They point out that the order setting the matter for public hearing 

fails to address certain required issues, see 804 Mass. Code Regs. 

1.20(3); that the record contains no order formally designating 

Knight's counsel as an agent of the MCAD, see id. § 1.09(5)(b)-

(c); and that protracted delay in the investigation transgressed 
- 18 -

agency regulations, see id. § 1.13(1), (3). But these alleged 

shortcomings, though regrettable, are beside the point; courts 

ordinarily should look to the general class of proceedings in 

determining whether Younger abstention applies. See NOPSI, 491 

U.S. at 365. Garden-variety procedural defects in the roll-out of 

a particular proceeding do not change its fundamental character.

The appellants have one last shot in their sling. They 

say that the Dayton Court found abstention appropriate only after 

deciding whether the First Amendment barred the agency proceeding. 

See 477 U.S. at 628. Arguing by analogy, the appellants insist 

that the district court should not have abstained without first 

resolving their claim that the MCAD proceeding is wholly preempted.

This argument misreads Dayton. While the Dayton Court 

stated that the Ohio agency did not violate any constitutionally 

assured right simply by investigating the reason for the teacher's 

discharge, see id., the Court left it for the agency to determine 

whether further inquiry would offend the First Amendment, see id. 

What happened here is fully compatible with the Dayton

Court's approach. The MCAD has jurisdiction to investigate and 

adjudicate the chapter 151B claim (if only to determine whether 

it, and thus any further agency action, is preempted by ERISA). 

To say more about the taxonomy issue would be 

supererogatory. The MCAD proceeding is plainly the sort of civil 

enforcement action that fits within the Younger design. 
- 19 -

C. The Middlesex Factors.

This brings us to the question of whether the Middlesex

factors support abstention. The first Middlesex factor asks 

whether there is an ongoing state proceeding that is judicial in 

nature. That is obviously so here: the MCAD completed an 

investigation, issued a formal complaint, conducted a pre-hearing 

conference, and scheduled an adjudicative hearing. These actions 

conclusively show the existence of an ongoing state proceeding 

that is judicial in nature. See id. at 624, 627-28. 

The second Middlesex factor asks whether the proceeding 

implicates important state interests. This inquiry need not detain 

us. The Supreme Court has squarely held that a state's interest 

in eradicating discrimination in the workplace is of sufficient 

magnitude to satisfy this factor. See NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 365 

(citing Dayton, 477 U.S. at 628). The appellants' suggestion that 

Massachusetts has no real interest in this proceeding because ERISA 

preempts it is circular and, thus, without merit. See id. at 365 

(expressly rejecting similar reasoning). 

The last Middlesex factor deals with the adequacy of the 

opportunity to raise federal defenses in the state proceeding. 

The appellants point to the extensive delays in the MCAD's 

processing and investigation of Knight's allegations and argue 

that this egregious foot-dragging has deprived them of a meaningful 

opportunity to raise their preemption defense.
- 20 -

To be sure, the MCAD proceeding has moved at a snail's 

pace. And though the third Middlesex factor is generally deemed 

satisfied as long as no state procedural rule bars the assertion 

of a federal defense and the state affords a fair opportunity to 

raise that defense, see Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 430-32 (1979), 

adjudicative delay may (at least in theory) be so extraordinary 

that it justifies federal-court intervention, see id. at 432; cf.

Gibson, 411 U.S. at 575 n.14 (noting that agency delay may obviate 

the need to exhaust administrative remedies). But a federal 

plaintiff's failure to pursue potentially available state judicial 

remedies undermines that plaintiff's ability to demonstrate that 

it had no meaningful opportunity to assert its federal defense. 

See Moore, 442 U.S. at 432; Diamond "D" Constr. Corp. v. McGowan, 

282 F.3d 191, 201-02 (2d Cir. 2002).

While we do not condone the MCAD's lackadaisical 

handling of this matter, the appellants never sought to invoke 

potentially available state judicial remedies (such as a writ of 

mandamus) to ameliorate the delay. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 249, 

§ 5; see also Town of Reading v. Att'y Gen., 285 N.E.2d 429, 431 

(Mass. 1972) ("[M]andamus is a remedy for (administrative) 

inaction . . . ."). Instead, they waited until the MCAD was at 

last poised to hear and decide the preemption issue before they 

sought federal assistance and, we are told, requested a stay of 

the agency proceeding, thereby inviting additional delay. Under 
- 21 -

these circumstances, we must "assume that state procedures [would 

have afforded] an adequate remedy." Pennzoil, 471 U.S. at 15. 

The MCAD consistently has acknowledged that ERISA 

preemption remains an open question in the case. There is no 

compelling reason to believe that, if the public hearing is allowed 

to proceed, the MCAD will not address that question with due 

dispatch. If the agency's answer is not to the appellants' liking, 

they can seek review in the state courts. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 

151B, § 6; 804 Mass. Code Regs. § 1.24(2). That opportunity to 

present their federal claim is sufficient to satisfy the third 

Middlesex factor. See Dayton, 477 U.S. at 629. 

That ends this aspect of the matter. The short of it is 

that all three Middlesex factors support the decision of the court 

below to abstain. 

D. The Preemption Exception.

The final leg of our journey takes us to the handful of 

exceptions to Younger abstention identified by the Supreme Court. 

One such exception is potentially relevant here. That exception 

pertains when state law is "flagrantly and patently violative of 

express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and 

paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort 

might be made to apply it." Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54 (internal 

quotation mark omitted). Though this exception is quite narrow, 

see Rossi v. Gemma, 489 F.3d 26, 35 n.16 (1st Cir. 2007); Dubinka
- 22 -

v. Judges of Superior Court, 23 F.3d 218, 225 (9th Cir. 1994), the 

Court has left open the possibility that a facially conclusive 

claim of preemption may serve to override the Younger mandate, see

NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 366-67. 

Following this lead, we have recognized facially 

conclusive preemption as a potentially valid basis for refusing 

Younger abstention. See Chaulk Servs., Inc. v. Mass. Comm'n 

Against Discrim., 70 F.3d 1361, 1370 (1st Cir. 1995). In the case 

at hand, the appellants ask us to find facially conclusive their 

assertion that ERISA preempts the chapter 151B claim and, thus, 

the MCAD proceeding itself.2 To evaluate this construct, some 

background is helpful. 

ERISA preempts "any and all State laws insofar as they 

. . . relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by the statute. 

29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). This sweeping language preempts a wide 

variety of state laws to the extent that they have the requisite 

connection with an ERISA plan. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 

463 U.S. 85, 95-100 (1983). 

Although many state anti-discrimination laws that relate 

to ERISA plans may beget ERISA preemption, some do not. For 

 

2 In this court, the appellants have not reasserted the 

argument, made below, that ERISA likewise prohibits the MCAD from 

investigating and adjudicating a standalone ADA claim. Because we 

conclude that preemption of the chapter 151B claim is not facially 

conclusive and that the agency may resolve that issue, we have no 

reason to explore this aspect of the matter further.
- 23 -

example, ERISA does not preempt federal anti-discrimination laws

(such as the ADA), see 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d), so state antidiscrimination laws are immune to ERISA preemption insofar as they 

prohibit conduct proscribed by federal law, see Tompkins v. United 

Healthcare of New Eng., Inc., 203 F.3d 90, 96-97 (1st Cir. 2000). 

But to the extent that a state anti-discrimination law prohibits 

more conduct than its federal counterpart, it is preempted when 

applied to an ERISA plan. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 103-04.

There is little question but that the chapter 151B claim

sub judice relates to the Plan: it seeks directly to regulate the 

Plan's contents. Whether preemption of the claim is facially 

conclusive, though, turns on the answers to two ancillary 

questions. First, does the Plan fall at least arguably outside

the realm of ERISA? Second, does the ADA at least arguably 

prohibit an employer from offering disparate benefits based on the 

type of disability that may afflict an employee? If either of 

these answers is in the affirmative, the appellants' claim of 

preemption cannot be deemed facially conclusive. 

We start and end with the second question.3 In Colonial 

Life, we found facially inconclusive a nearly identical claim of 

 

3 Because this question yields an affirmative answer, we 

bypass the first question and take no view on it. For the sake of 

completeness, however, we note that the MCAD has contended all 

along, albeit without meaningful elaboration, that factual 

disputes abound as to the existence of ERISA coverage.
- 24 -

preemption (a claim that ERISA preempted an MCAD charge that state 

law prohibited providing short-term disability benefits to 

employees with physical, but not mental, disabilities). See 572 

F.3d at 27-28. The appellants have not identified any supervening 

authority that would allow us to second-guess that determination. 

See San Juan Cable LLC v. P.R. Tel. Co., 612 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 

2010) (discussing "law of the circuit" doctrine).

Even so, the MCAD gives Colonial Life too wide a berth. 

It reads that decision as holding that any time a preemption claim 

presents an issue of first impression in this circuit, the claim 

cannot be facially conclusive. While that reading finds support 

in some of Colonial Life's dicta, see, e.g., 572 F.3d at 28-29 

(stating that "the existence of a question of first impression 

regarding the ADA's applicability . . . precludes preemption from 

being facially conclusive"), it is not the holding of the case. 

If it were, Colonial Life would conflict with Chaulk, in which we 

determined that a preemption claim was facially conclusive even 

though the relevant issue (concerning whether the doctrine 

articulated in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 

U.S. 236 (1959), divested the MCAD of jurisdiction over a statelaw gender discrimination claim) was one of first impression in 

this circuit. See Chaulk, 70 F.3d 1361. It would also conflict 

with common sense: whether pigs can fly is a question of first 

impression in this circuit — we have no holding directly on point 
- 25 -

— but the answer to this question is so obvious as to be facially 

conclusive. 

The holding of Colonial Life is far less mechanical. 

The court explained that "the district court's need to conduct a 

'detailed analysis,' including resolving interjurisdictional 

differences" demonstrated that ERISA preemption was not facially 

conclusive. Colonial Life, 572 F.3d at 28. The rule, then, is 

that when a federal statute indisputably preempts a state-law 

claim, preemption is facially conclusive whether or not we have 

previously opined on the question. But when there is room for 

reasonable doubt, the preemption claim is not facially conclusive 

and cannot block abstention. See, e.g., Verizon New Eng., Inc. v. 

R.I. Dep't of Labor & Training, 723 F.3d 113, 118-19 (1st Cir. 

2013) (holding preemption exception inapplicable where federal 

plaintiff was attempting "to extend the doctrine of labor law preemption in[to] a new area" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Drawing the line in this place is consistent with 

Younger, which contemplates that when federal questions are raised 

in a state proceeding, those questions ordinarily should be 

resolved in that proceeding. See 401 U.S. at 45. Only when 

preemption of the state-law claim is beyond reasonable dispute 

does the paradigm shift. See Hughes v. Att'y Gen. of Fla., 377 

F.3d 1258, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004). Even modest ambiguity concerning 

the result of a preemption inquiry precludes this shift. 
- 26 -

Preemption has been held not facially conclusive if, for example, 

there are unresolved factual disputes, see NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 367; 

Colonial Life, 572 F.3d at 27, or if a federal court would be 

required to delve into unsettled complexities of state law, see, 

e.g., GTE Mobilnet v. Johnson, 111 F.3d 469, 478 (6th Cir. 1997), 

or if the reach of a preemption provision is itself uncertain, see

Woodfeathers, Inc. v. Washington County, 180 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th 

Cir. 1999). Enjoining state proceedings in any of these 

circumstances would "defile the basic presumption that state 

courts are fully capable of safeguarding federal constitutional 

rights." Brooks, 80 F.3d at 639. 

In this case, the inquiry reduces to whether the ADA 

conclusively permits an employer to offer disparate benefits based 

on the type of disability that may afflict an employee. The 

appellants say that it does. In support, they point to what they 

describe as the unanimous consensus of federal circuit courts on 

this issue.4 See, e.g., EEOC v. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d 

144, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2000); Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 

Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1116-18 (9th Cir. 2000); Kimber v. Thiokol

Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1101-02 (10th Cir. 1999); Lewis v. Kmart 

Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 172 (4th Cir. 1999); Ford v. Schering-Plough 

 

4 The Eleventh Circuit initially decided the issue the other 

way, but then withdrew the opinion pending rehearing. See Johnson

v. K Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035, 1070 (11th Cir. 2001). No opinion 

on rehearing was ever issued, and the case reportedly was settled.
- 27 -

Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608-10 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metro. Life 

Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1015-19 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc); EEOC

v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1043-45 (7th Cir. 1996); Krauel v. 

Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677-78 (8th Cir. 1996). 

Based on this precedential phalanx, the appellants urge us to find 

facially conclusive the proposition that the ADA permits such a 

differential-benefit scheme and that, therefore, ERISA preempts 

the chapter 151B claim.

Though this argument has some superficial allure, there 

is more to the story. The Supreme Court has never considered 

whether the ADA forbids an employer from offering disparate 

benefits to different classes of the disabled. Moreover, deciding 

this question would entail resolving a complex web of legal issues. 

These issues include whether a totally disabled individual can sue 

under the ADA, see Ford, 145 F.3d at 604-08; whether a 

differential-benefits claim is viable under the ADA, see id. at 

608-10; Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010-14; and what bearing (if any) the 

ADA's safe harbor provision may have on differential-benefits 

claims, see Staten Island, 207 F.3d at 150-51. 

To complicate matters further, there is some reason to 

think that the question is not open-and-shut. Some of the circuit 

court decisions upon which the appellants rely were made over 

strong dissents. See, e.g., Parker, 121 F.3d at 1020-22 (Merritt, 

J., dissenting). Furthermore, many of them were decided before 
- 28 -

Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999), which the 

MCAD envisions as supporting the viability of differentialbenefits claims under the ADA. To assess the soundness of this 

proposition, we would have to untangle the relationship between 

Olmstead and the Court's earlier decisions in Traynor v. Turnage, 

485 U.S. 535 (1988), and Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 

None of the decisions on which the appellants rely has undertaken 

this task. 

Last — but far from least — our prior opinions have left 

open the possibility that an ADA claim based on differential 

benefits may be viable. See Tompkins, 203 F.3d at 95 n.4; Carparts 

Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Ass'n of New Eng., Inc., 

37 F.3d 12, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1994). So, too, district courts in 

this circuit remain divided on the viability of such claims. 

Compare Fletcher v. Tufts Univ., 367 F. Supp. 2d 99, 111 (D. Mass. 

2005) (allowing such a claim to proceed), and Iwata v. Intel Corp., 

349 F. Supp. 2d 135, 149 (D. Mass. 2004) (same), with Colonial 

Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Medley, 584 F. Supp. 2d 368, 380 (D. 

Mass. 2008) (reaching opposite conclusion), and Witham v. Brigham 

& Women's Hosp., Inc., No. 00-268, 2001 WL 586717, at *3-4 (D.N.H. 

May 31, 2001) (same).

Given this littered legal landscape, it cannot be said 

that there is no room for principled disagreement about the 

viability of differential-benefits claims under the ADA. While 
- 29 -

the answer to that question seems much clearer than the MCAD 

admits, it is not the slam dunk that the appellants suggest. In 

short, resolving the preemption question presented here calls for 

exactly the sort of extensive legal analysis that places the 

facially conclusive preemption exception out of reach. 

The conclusion that no exception to the Younger doctrine 

applies here is reinforced by the appellants' utter failure to 

explain how they will be irreparably harmed by allowing the MCAD 

to resolve this matter. That failure is important because the 

common thread that links the various Younger exceptions is that, 

in particular situations, closing the door of the federal court to 

a federal question will result in irreparable harm. See NOPSI, 

491 U.S. at 366; Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 123-24 (1975); 

Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54. And only when it is crystal clear 

that the state tribunal either lacks the authority to proceed or 

can provide no meaningful relief can a party hope to demonstrate 

the degree of irreparable harm needed to justify federal-court 

intervention. See NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 366-67. 

Here, the MCAD is competent to adjudicate the federal 

issues presented in this case and adequate review is available in 

the state courts. The record strongly suggests that the appellants 

will suffer no harm apart from the typical inconvenience that 

accompanies defending against charges that have been lodged. That 

inconvenience is not weighty enough to tip the scales: the Younger
- 30 -

Court admonished long ago that "the cost, anxiety, and 

inconvenience of having to defend against a single [proceeding are 

not] 'irreparable' in the special legal sense of that term. 

Instead, the threat to the plaintiff's federally protected rights 

must be one that cannot be eliminated by his defense against a 

single [proceeding]." Younger, 401 U.S. at 46. 

III. CONCLUSION

We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above, 

we conclude that under Sprint's reformulation of the Younger

doctrine, abstention is appropriate and no cognizable exception to 

abstention pertains. It follows inexorably, as night follows day, 

that the dismissal of this action must be

Affirmed.