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UNDERCOVER STOREFRONT OPERATIONS: CONTINUED OVERSIGHT OF ATF’S RECKLESS INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 2, 2014 

Serial No. 113–151 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

DOC HASTINGS, Washington 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

KERRY L. BENTIVOLIO, Michigan 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MATTHEW A. CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

TONY CARDENAS, California 

STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

Vacancy 

LAWRENCE J. BRADY, Staff Director 

JOHN D. CUADERES, Deputy Staff Director 

STEPHEN CASTOR, General Counsel 

LINDA A. GOOD, Chief Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on April 2, 2014 ................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

B. Todd Jones, Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 5 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 8 

APPENDIX 

Opening Statement of Chairman Issa ................................................................... 58 

Opening Statement of Rep. Cummings .................................................................. 62 

April 1, 2014, letter to the committee by the Federal Law Enforcement 

Officers Association, submitted by Rep. Cummings .......................................... 64 

April 1, 2014 letter to ATF from Josephine Terry, submitted by Chairman 

Issa ........................................................................................................................ 66

December 12, 2013, letter to Attorney General Holder from The Arc, submitted by Chairman Issa ..................................................................................... 69 

U.S. DOJ ‘‘Report on Operation Fearless and Related Matters,’’ submitted 

by Rep. Chaffetz ................................................................................................... 73 

April 1, 2014, letter to Chairman Issa from U.S. DOJ, submitted by Rep. 

Gosar ..................................................................................................................... 78 

Follow up questions and answers from U.S. DOJ ................................................ 83 

(1) 

UNDERCOVER STOREFRONT OPERATIONS: 

CONTINUED OVERSIGHT OF ATF’S RECKLESS INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES 

Wednesday, April 2, 2014, 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Darrell Issa 

[chairman of the committee], presiding. 

Present: Representatives Issa, Mica, Turner, Jordan, Chaffetz, 

Amash, Gosar, Meehan, DesJarlais, Farenthold, Massie, Collins, 

Meadows, Bentivolio, DeSantis, Cummings, Maloney, Norton, 

Tierney, Clay, Connolly, Speier, Duckworth, Kelly, and Grisham. 

Staff Present: Jen Barblan, Majority Senior Counsel; Molly Boyl, 

Majority Deputy General Counsel and Parliamentarian; Lawrence 

J. Brady, Majority Staff Director; Lawrence J. Brady, Majority 

Staff Director; Ashley H. Callen, Majority Deputy Chief Counsel for 

Investigations; Sharon Casey, Majority Senior Assistant Clerk; 

Steve Castor, Majority General Counsel; John Cuaderes, Majority 

Deputy Staff Director; Carlton Davis, Majority Senior Counsel; 

Adam P. Fromm, Majority Director of Member Services and Committee Operations; Linda Good, Majority Chief Clerk; Tyler Grimm, 

Majority Senior Professional Staff Member; Christopher Hixon, Majority Chief Counsel for Oversight; Mark D. Marin, Majority Deputy Staff Director for Oversight; Ashok M. Pinto; Majority Chief 

Counsel, Investigations; Andrew Rezendes, Majority Counsel; 

Laura Rush, Majority Deputy Chief Clerk; Jessica Seale, Majority 

Digital Director; Jonathan J. Skladany, Majority Deputy General 

Counsel; Peter Warren, Majority Legislative Policy Director; Rebecca Watkins, Majority Communications Director; Aryele Bradford, Minority Press Secretary; Jennifer Hoffman, Minority Communications Director; Peter Kenny, Minority Counsel; Elisa LaNier, Minority Director of Operations; Juan McCullum, Minority 

Clerk; Dave Rapallo, Minority Staff Director; and Valerie Shen, Minority Counsel. 

Chairman ISSA. The committee will come to order. 

The Oversight Committee exists to secure two fundamental principles. First, Americans have the right to know that the money 

Washington takes from them is well spent. Second, Americans deserve an efficient and effective government that works for them. 

Our duty on the Oversight and Government Reform Committee 

is to protect these rights. Our solemn responsibility is to hold govVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:12 Dec 11, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\91533.TXT APRIL
2 

ernment accountable to taxpayers because taxpayers have a right 

to know what they are getting from the government. 

Our job is to work tirelessly in partnership with citizen watchdogs to deliver the facts to the American people and bring genuine 

reform to the Federal bureaucracy. 

Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare recesses of 

the committee at any time. 

Today’s witness, Mr. B. Todd Jones, took over as the head of the 

ATFE as Acting Director and later as the first Director in the wake 

of Operation Fast and Furious and the scandal that surrounded it. 

His mission was to change the culture at ATF and move the 

agency in the right direction. This was no small task. Two and a 

half years into his tenure, it is safe to say the ATF still has a long 

way to go. 

Just over a year ago in Milwaukee, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reported on Operation Fearless, an undercover, storefront operation conducted by the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in Milwaukee, Wisconsin during the Director’s tenure. 

Everything about Operation Fearless was wrong. ATF agents allowed convicted felons to leave the store armed and dangerous. 

Three weapons, including a machine gun, I repeat, not a semiautomatic weapon often called a machine gun, a machine gun was stolen from an ATF vehicle. 

The storefront was burglarized and $39,000 worth of merchandise was stolen all because the ATF neglected to install an alarm 

system. ATF exploited a mentally handicapped person with an IQ 

in the mid 50s to assist in the storefront operation and then arrested this poor limited capacity individual for his involvement. 

When we learned about this, Chairman Goodlatte, Chairman 

Sensenbrenner, Senate Ranking Member Grassley and I immediately wrote the ATF requesting more information. Only after receiving our letter did the Director that day order an internal review, even though ATF management was aware of all the operation 

problems. 

In April 2013, ATF briefed committee staff on this operation. 

ATF assured us that the botched operation was ‘‘an isolated incident.’’ In December 2013, however, we learned that ATF mismanaged similar undercover operations across the country stretching from Portland, Oregon to Albuquerque to Wichita to Atlanta to 

Pensacola, Florida. 

These other storefront operations followed an incredibly reckless 

pattern. Agents allowed felons to leave the store with weapons, 

agents exploited mentally handicapped people and agents failed to 

take precautions to protect the stores from theft. 

ATF’s dangerous tactics may actually be increasing crime in your 

neighborhood. When ATF undertook these operations they do not 

inspire public confidence. Rather, they make America wonder if 

ATF is a reliable partner to keep the streets safe. 

The Milwaukee operation, Fearless, was part of the ATF’s Monitored Case Program. The Monitored Case Program was created 

after Operation Fast and Furious to ensure careful oversight of 

field operations from ATF headquarters. Unfortunately, it is clear 

that in the case of Operation Fearless, the Monitored Case Program failed and failed miserably. 

3 

Today’s hearing will explore whether other cases are slipping 

through the cracks at ATF even though Monitored Case programs 

exist to prevent just that. Effective leadership requires accountability. Accountability ensures that mistakes are not repeated. 

Three years after the death of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry, 

ATF has yet to fire anybody for their roles in Operation Fast and 

Furious. I personally find that inexcusable. Today, we will learn 

whether ATF has held any employees accountable for dangerous, 

mismanaged Operation Fearless. 

We have been down this path before. ATF has promised to 

change its culture, implement new policies and procedures and 

hold agents accountable for their actions. What good are these new 

policies and procedures if they too fail? What good are promises of 

accountability if the accountability never occurs? What message 

does it send to the hard working ATF agents who get it right? You 

can be reckless and jeopardize public safety in furtherance of your 

investigation but you will not be disciplined or certainly not fired. 

The Director now faces the difficult task of moving the agency 

forward from its most recent scandal and hopefully, finally, restoring integrity to the ATF. 

I now recognize the Ranking Member for his opening statement. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to welcome today’s witness, the Honorable B. Todd 

Jones, who was confirmed and sworn in last summer as the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. 

For seven years, since 2006, the ATF did not have a Senate-confirmed Director. I welcomed Director Jones’ confirmation and I 

know he has been extremely busy addressing many of the Bureau’s 

problems and challenges that he inherited. 

ATF plays a critical role in enforcing our Nations firearms laws 

and combating illegal firearms trafficking and other crimes. Its 

agents, investigators and support staff work to protect the American people from gun violence that has ravaged communities across 

the country and, as a matter of fact, has ravaged the very community that I have lived in for the last 32 years. 

ATF personnel played a key role in responding to the Navy Yard 

shooting, the Boston Marathon bombing, the Sandy Hook tragedy 

and the Aurora movie theater attacks. In the words of Chairman 

Issa, I want to thank all of those ATF agents publicly right now 

who get it right. 

Given the inherent dangers associated with conducting operations that target violent criminal organizations, the ATF must 

take on a certain degree of risk. Our hearing today is focused on 

ensuring that the Bureau properly manages this risk while protecting the safety of its personnel and especially the surrounding 

communities. 

Today, we will hear about one type of operation, the undercover 

storefront. The ATF officials explained that the Bureau has used 

this investigative technique successfully over many years. By working deep inside communities that are being terrorized by violent 

gangs and drug cartels, ATF agents contend that they have been 

able to make a significant difference for the residents of these various neighborhoods. 

4 

I am hoping that during his testimony this morning the Director 

will explain to us exactly what is so special about these types of 

programs and why are they required to get to certain types of problems. 

Over the last year, however, there have been numerous allegations involving storefront operations in several cities. In January 

2013, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reported that an undercover 

storefront operation in Milwaukee purchased weapons at above 

market prices, including weapons that were recently purchased at 

retail outlets. 

It also reported that three ATF-issued firearms were stolen from 

the trunk of an agent’s vehicle, including an automatic weapon 

that was never recovered. It was also reported that some defendants were incorrectly identified and charged and that the operation 

netted primarily low level individuals on firearms and drug 

charges. 

Last December, the Journal Sentinel highlighted additional allegations in five cities: Albuquerque, Atlanta, Pensacola, Portland 

and Wichita. According to these reports, some of these operations 

allegedly targeted individuals with mental disabilities. One operation was located near a school and some others allowed felons to 

leave the premises with firearms they brought into the store. 

I understand that as soon as these press reports came out, then 

Acting Director Jones order the Bureau’s Office of Professional Responsibility and Security Operations to fully investigate these allegations. Last March, this office issued a detailed report that found 

many deficiencies with these operations. 

According to the report, ‘‘These deficiencies caused a loss of property, created risk to the public and officer safety and led to the improper arrest of four individuals.’’ The report found that ‘‘The absence of comprehensive written guidelines and best practices for 

the operation of an under cover storefront was a contributing factor 

in many of the deficiencies in Operation Fearless.’’ 

It also found that the primary cause of deficiencies not being 

identified and corrected was the failure of the case agent and the 

first-line supervisors to report those problems. 

I am hopeful that Director Jones will address the issue of accountability and the issue of people reporting up. We found in Fast 

and Furious there were some issues with that. The question becomes has that been corrected. 

In response to these findings, Director Jones and ATF prepared 

a comprehensive manual incorporating lessons learned from the 

Milwaukee operation and best practices from many other successful 

storefront operations. The Bureau will also require a personal 

briefing between agents and ATF headquarters, as well as on-site 

inspections of the storefronts. 

As I close, I hope that the committee will hear more today about 

ATF’s responses to the serious allegations, the reforms that ATF 

has implemented and additional measures ATF can take to have 

safety in high risk operations. 

ATF certainly has had its share of problems over the years. Our 

focus today should be one ensuring that the agency continues its 

path towards reform. I understand the Department of Justice InVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:12 Dec 11, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\91533.TXT APRIL
5 

spector General is also investigating the Milwaukee operation and 

I hope we can obtain the results of that review soon as well. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to place in the 

record a letter sent to the committee yesterday from the Federal 

Law Enforcement Officers Association. 

Chairman ISSA. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I yield, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. The gentleman yields back. 

Members may have seven days in which to submit opening statements for the record. 

I now ask unanimous consent that the letter sent yesterday to 

ATF by Brian Terry’s family be placed in the record. Without objection, so ordered. 

Chairman ISSA. I would ask that Mr. Jones also be provided a 

copy if he doesn’t already have it. 

Mr. MICA. Personal privilege. 

Chairman ISSA. The gentleman is recognized. 

Mr. MICA. I want to introduce a very, very special guest, somebody who is read about in the history books, who is my guest 

today. The gentleman sitting back here is Joe Kittinger, who held 

the record of a man jumping from space. He has had almost every 

honor you can imagine nationally and internationally, a part of the 

National Aviation Hall of Fame. Joe is here with his wife, Sherri. 

Joe, raise your hand so everyone can see you. Thank you for being 

with us today. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

We now welcome our witness, the Honorable B. Todd Jones, the 

first full Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives. 

Pursuant to committee rules, I ask the witness to please rise and 

take the oath. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are 

about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth? 

[Witness responds in the affirmative.] 

Chairman ISSA. Mr. Jones, you are a returning witness, so you 

know the routine. We won’t shut off the clock but hopefully you 

will use close to the five minutes. 

The gentleman is recognized. 

STATEMENT OF B. TODD JONES, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF 

ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES 

Mr. JONES. Chairman Issa, Ranking Member Cummings and 

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear 

today. 

I am pleased to be here to discuss the progress ATF has made 

in implementing reform and to discuss our undercover storefront 

operations. 

As you all know, ATF’s principal mission is to protect our communities from violent criminals who engage in acts of arson, criminally misused explosives and illegally possessed and used firearms. 

We accomplish this mission through both the enforcement of the 

criminal law and regulation of the firearms and explosives industries. 

6 

When violent crime shakes our Nation, ATF is there to work side 

by side with our law enforcement partners providing our specialized skills, tools and experience. As was mentioned, in the past two 

years alone, ATF has provided crucial support to our federal and 

local partners in the investigation of the Boston Marathon bombing 

and the horrific mass shootings in Aurora, Colorado, Newtown, 

Connecticut and the Washington Navy Yard. 

Equally important though, we work with these partners to address the less visible, but no less devastating daily violence that 

plagues our cities and towns, large and small. Across the country, 

ATF pursues the most violent criminals, particularly those who engage in organized gang violence or illegally supply those gangs 

with firearms. 

A few of these successes are highlighted in the full written statement we have submitted. 

Our agents put their lives on the line on a daily basis. As they 

investigate our Nation’s most violent criminals, they must make 

difficult and often instantaneous decisions every day, constantly 

balancing public safety, their own safety and the integrity of the 

operation. 

Of all the activities undertaken by ATF agents in the field, none 

is more risk laden or potentially more valuable than under cover 

work. ATF agents working under cover have infiltrated and 

brought down notorious motorcycle and street gangs, thwarted 

murder for hire plots and removed thousands of guns from the 

hands of criminals. 

The committee has asked that I address one under-cover tactic 

in particular, the use of storefront operations. A storefront operation is a valuable investigative technique in which the under cover 

law enforcement officers or agents operate a business that is calculated to identify and proactively intervene with criminals and 

criminal activity in high crime areas and hot spots. They are also 

conducted as joint operations with other federal, State and local 

law enforcement agencies and prosecutors. 

ATF conducted 37 storefronts between 2009 and 2013. ATF had 

one storefront active in 2013 and currently we have no active storefront operations. 

Storefronts are staff, equipment and resource intensive and require significant planning and coordination. The success of the 

storefront is also dependent upon a strong partnership and ongoing 

collaboration with our local law enforcement partners. 

The storefronts to be discussed here today identified and built 

cases against criminals and would be criminals in each and every 

location. As a result of our storefront operations in Albuquerque, 

Atlanta, Milwaukee, Pensacola, Portland and Wichita, over 250 defendants have been convicted and over 1,300 firearms recovered. 

These defendants have over 350 previous felony convictions. 

These convictions and the firearms recoveries undoubtedly made 

the communities and the people who live there safer. 

I acknowledge, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, 

that there were deficiencies in our execution and management of 

some past activities in certain storefronts, but I want to assure you 

that public safety is the utmost importance to me and our current 

team at ATF. 

7 

We recognize that storefronts and other under cover operations 

require stringent oversight in all facets of planning and execution. 

We have put in place several policy and operational changes, created a tighter process for the authorization, management, oversight 

and review of under cover operations, including storefronts. 

As an organization, we are committed to learning from the past 

and using some of those hard learned lessons to improve, adapt 

and ensure we do not repeat the mistakes of our predecessors. 

In addition to our own efforts, ATF has and will continue to cooperate with all inspector general reviews and investigations. Some 

of the specific reforms we have instituted pursuant to our own initiatives are outlined in our written submission, but the important 

point is putting policy into practice. That is what we have been 

working on very hard for the last several years. 

It is one thing to put policies on paper but another thing to make 

them real and put them into practice. All ATF employees, including 

me, are accountable for their actions and must act at all times with 

professionalism, integrity and commitment to the agency’s vital 

public safety mission. 

While I firmly believe we are on the right path, I am also realistic, Mr. Chairman, and recognize that meaningful change takes 

time. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I want to conclude 

by saying that ATF is proud to be at the front line against violent 

crime that we are recognized across the country for our expertise 

and take great pride in our successes that reduce gun violence and 

remove violent offenders from the streets. 

I am humbled by the exceptional work done every day by ATF 

special agents, industry investigators and the support staff in combating violent crime. In the face of sustained criticism over the last 

several years, the dedicated men and women of ATF have continued day in and day out to work tirelessly to enhance the safety for 

all Americans. They and their families have my deepest gratitude 

for their sacrifices that this often thankless work requires. I am 

honored to be here today to represent ATF. 

Thank you for your interest. I am sure you have questions which 

I will do my best to address. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:] 

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Chairman ISSA. Thank you, Director Jones. 

I too want to reiterate the importance of the work that the men 

and women of the ATF do and how much we appreciate the many 

who take the risk to do the right thing in the right way. 

Let me go through a couple of questions. No surprise, the first 

one is a little related to Fast and Furious. Everybody at the Department of Justice, from yourself to the Attorney General, is living 

under the specter of Fast and Furious and how it discredited the 

men and women who do these jobs otherwise right. 

To make the record clear, was anyone fired as a result of Fast 

and Furious? 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, I can say publicly in this forum that 

everyone involved with ATF and the chain of command has either 

been disciplined or is no longer with the agency. 

Chairman ISSA. Okay, but the answer of fired is no, is that correct? Say yes or no. 

Mr. JONES. As a result of the Inspector General’s report, the answer is no. 

Chairman ISSA. No one was fired, some chose to retire, so let us 

go to a particular individual of interest, William Newell. The IG 

recommended he be removed but in a settlement, we have learned 

he was demoted from SES to GS–13. Did you approve that settlement? 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, we provided to the committee in great 

detail a confidential document of the processes we followed internally following the release of the IG’s report. It outlines with some 

particularity all of the individuals that were identified in that report and the actions taken. 

I am not at liberty in this public forum to get into details. 

Chairman ISSA. Director, you are here pursuant to a subpoena 

specifically because Congress does not afford you that choice on the 

Privacy Act by the statute itself. More importantly, we know what 

occurred. My question simply was one that you can answer and has 

nothing to do with privacy. Did you make that decision? 

Mr. JONES. The process at ATF involves a professional responsibility board. 

Chairman ISSA. Director, I understand. I am only asking did you 

influence or have an input into that call of his not being fired, his 

continuing to draw a paycheck and eventually retire at his high 

pay as an SES? 

Mr. JONES. I did not. 

Chairman ISSA. You did not. Did your number two have that influence? 

Mr. JONES. The process involves the Bureau deciding official and 

the ultimate decision-maker is the Deputy Director with appeal to 

me should the employee not be satisfied. 

Chairman ISSA. But the employee was satisfied and number two 

made the call, is that fair to say for the public record? 

Mr. JONES. That is fair to say. 

Chairman ISSA. Similarly, the Professional Review Board proposed that Hope McAllister receive a 14-day suspension, which I 

consider pretty minor. This was reduced to a letter of reprimand. 

Would that also have gone through your deputy? 

14 

Mr. JONES. Again, Mr. Chairman, the process is pretty well delineated in terms of the rights of the employees to grieve and the 

ultimate decision being made with my involvement with the Senior 

Executive Service being a little different than anyone who is not 

a member of the SES ranks. 

Chairman ISSA. The Professional Review Board proposed that 

David Voth be demoted to a non-supervisorial special agent position. In settlement, he was demoted. Again, that would have been 

the same process you are alluding to? 

Mr. JONES. It was the process and it was followed. 

Chairman ISSA. So McAllister, Voth and Newell, none were fired, 

all received certainly less than what the American people would expect. 

Let me move on to the five separate undercover storefront operations with the Milwaukee one being the best known. 

At this point, I am going to ask unanimous consent that the letter dated December 12, 2013 from the organization and nonprofit 

called ARC for people with intellectual and developmental disabilities addressed to the Attorney General be placed in the record 

along with excerpts from their website. Without objection, so ordered. 

Chairman ISSA. I am going to read to you Director Jones, something from that letter in which Attorney General Holder they say 

decides that it is appalling and unfortunate. They say, speaking of 

the intellectually disabled, people with low IQs, ‘‘They typically 

have limited if any understanding about their involvement in crime 

or the consequences of being involved in a crime. With few options 

for or opportunities to build safe relationships, their strong need to 

be accepted by peers in their own communities can create a unique 

vulnerability that people without IDD do not experience.’’ 

Have you become familiar with the effects that agents can have 

by buddying up to people with IQs in the 50s as a result of these 

operations? 

Mr. JONES. I think it is important to point out that we not target 

the developmentally disabled. When we run an undercover operation, we have very limited control over who comes in the door. I 

can tell you that my review of the circumstances, I have met with 

ARC and talked with them about the concerns with enhanced 

training, but all of these issues that have been identified in the 

media with respect to developmentally disabled individuals being 

targeted are the result of defense pleadings during the process. 

I am a former prosecutor. Oftentimes in investigations, the criminal investigators have no idea what the individual’s intellectual capacity is. 

Chairman ISSA. But your agents worked with these people including, at least one individual who had to be tutored, I understand, through what a machine gun was so they could send him 

out to buy one so they could then arrest him. 

Director, we have had a good relationship, you have a big job but 

I am going to ask you one closing question. Are you actually telling 

us that it is just an accident that your people managed to find people with extremely low IQs? These are people who are barely functional, who clearly demonstrate their special needs and limitations, 

very, very limited people. 

15 

In the 70s and 80s, you might say he is just not the brightest 

ball; in the 50s and 60s, these are people severely handicapped who 

just want to buddy up, who really exhibit a type of behavior that 

most people in America are somewhat familiar with, even if it 

doesn’t enter their lives. 

You are saying that your agents don’t look for these people who 

are so vulnerable they can just buddy up and get them to do these 

things? Are you saying that under oath here today? 

Mr. JONES. No, I am not saying that. 

Chairman ISSA. So your agents do target people with low IQs because they are susceptible, exactly as this letter say, to the kind 

of influence and what is most appalling to us is after they use 

these people often in dangerous positions, they then in many cases 

arrested the same people they had put in and talked into doing 

these crimes, is that correct? 

Mr. JONES. No, that’s not correct. 

Chairman ISSA. That is what the Milwaukee Sentinel says and 

it is what the evidence seems to show. 

I am going to let all of us continue on and hopefully I will come 

back to you. 

Mr. Cummings? 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Picking up where the Chairman left off, we had admitted evidence into the record earlier, this letter from the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, Jon Adler is the national president. 

This morning when I was reading this, there was a paragraph 

which kind of struck me because I too am very sensitive to what 

the Chairman just asked about, people with low IQs, having my 

own experience in my own family. 

This is what Mr. Adler said, and I wonder if you agree with this. 

In this letter, he says, ‘‘It has been alleged that ATF targeted and 

exploited the mentally and incapacitated to facilitate storefront 

connections to perspective criminals. That is beyond absurd and no 

one in the field administers impromptu, Jeopardy-style quizzes to 

assess the IQ of perspective criminal elements. Prisons are occupied by criminals with IQs ranging from moron to genius. 

‘‘Anyone experienced in law enforcement will tell you that the 

former is the most difficult to use as a cooperator. Furthermore, 

criminal elements don’t provide their Myers Briggs assessments to 

law enforcement and agents are left with making a variety of critical assessments of those they are dealing with in real time, including threat levels and safety issues.’’ 

‘‘Nonetheless, neither the ATF nor any federal law enforcement 

component is in the practice of exploiting mentally incapacitated 

individuals.’’ 

I didn’t say that. Mr. Adler, the National President, said that. Do 

you agree with that? Do you have any issue with what he said 

there? 

Mr. JONES. Thank you for the opportunity to further explain 

some of the things the Chair was talking about. 

We do not target developmentally disabled or mentally challenged individuals. We target criminal behavior. When you are running an uncover storefront operation with all of the bells and whistles to make sure you can maintain the integrity of the operation, 

16 

you have all kinds of individuals walking in the door. You have no 

idea. 

I think it is interesting to note that the media reports about this 

targeting of individuals really is based primarily on defense motions that were filed and the culling of the public record and there 

is no awareness by the special agent at that time. All of these individuals were brought to trial and all of them raised claims in the 

context of sentencing advocacy about their intellectual capacity. 

That is not unusual. 

I have been a defense lawyer too but that is after the fact, after 

someone has pled guilty. None of them claimed they were incompetent to stand trial. 

That is not to excuse the sensitivity involved and the enhanced 

training that may be involved not only with the developmentally 

disabled but people with mental illness. There was an article today 

in the New York Times that talked about the challenges to law enforcement, State, federal and local, and particularly with ATF 

doing violent crimes type of operations where we are having interactions with people on the street much like State and local law enforcement officials. 

It is a huge challenge for individuals who are in a law enforcement capacity to make determinations about someone’s mental illness or their mental capacity. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Director, I would like to ask you about the specific action you took when you became of these allegations. When 

the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel published its first story in January 

2013, you directed ATF’s Office of Professional Responsibility and 

Security Operations to conduct an investigation, is that right? 

Mr. JONES. That is correct. I gave them 30 days. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Had you known about it before then? 

Mr. JONES. I had two indicators before that. One was some indication that a storefront in the St. Paul Field Division had been burglarized. That storefront closed down in September and it had been 

burglarized. I do have recollection about seeing the storefront being 

burglarized. 

I also had an indicator in the report about the stolen weapons 

but that was the extent of the red flags that were going off. I think 

the third thing was when we did see that there were landlord tenant issues in part flagged in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel about 

how we left the storefront, that is when we dispatched internal affairs to go out and do a deep dive and look at what was going on 

in Milwaukee. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I think the Chairman would be interested in 

hearing this also. I said it in my opening statement. Can you explain what is so unique about the storefronts and what problems 

does it get to that you have to bring that kind of operation into 

play? 

Mr. JONES. It is an undercover technique that really is designed 

to do several things. One is to gather intelligence in the area that 

you locate the store, gather intelligence about crime gun trafficking, about criminal activity, it is also an opportunity to remove 

crime guns from the streets. That is in an ideal world but it is primarily an information, intelligence gathering technique and it is an 

opportunity to remove crime guns from the street. 

17 

Mr. CUMMINGS. In Baltimore where we have had a pretty high 

crime rate and had cooperation from ATF and many other agencies, 

one of the things I have always thought about and am concerned 

about, I live where The Wire was filmed, you talked about intelligence. If there is a drug operation going on and—using this hypothetically—fighting each other for territory, how do you get information to prevent a murder? 

Would this kind of operation be helpful then? People look at murder rates in cities, but the question is how would police even know? 

Would this kind of operation go to that, too? 

Mr. JONES. This is just a tool in the toolbox. There are other 

things that we do, other undercover types of operations. There is 

Title III telephone intercepts and then there is the good old fashioned investigation where people take information, they pull the 

threads, they use confidential informants and build a case brick by 

brick. That takes information. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. The Chairman talked about this. We have an 

agency that has been under the microscope, that has been highly 

criticized and it is also an agency that didn’t have a permanent director for years. This was an agency that some would like to see 

disappear. 

It seems to me that one of the problems that I saw in Fast and 

Furious was that information did not filter up to the top. What is 

new now? What have you done to address that so that when you 

come before us, you can be held accountable? 

We were in situations before where the top people knew nothing 

about what was going on down below. I was curious to where we 

are now with that and did we learn anything from that, did we 

learn anything from these storefront situations. When you pulled 

together your recommendations for how you do business now, how 

is that different, if at all? 

Mr. JONES. A lot has changed. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, change takes time. One of the things I believe is really important to understand is the list that is required to turn policy and 

procedure into practice. 

When I came on as Acting Director in September 2011, the Monitor Case Program had been on paper in July 2011. It was a paper 

program, those were the fundamentals. We took a lot of action with 

the pen right out of the blocks. 

In addition to the pen, you need the people. You need to get the 

right people in the right spots, you need to construct a team and 

you need to emphasize the focus over and over again, that this has 

to be real. This has all taken place in an environment over the last 

several years and we have had tremendous turnover in the organization and a very challenging budget environment. We are grateful 

that we do have a fiscal year 2014 budget so that we can plan. 

This is an organization, as you pointed out, that had not had continuous leadership. Now, between acting and being confirmed, I 

have 30 months on the job. I very much have the blocks beat. I own 

it for good or bad. When something is wrong, I am going to take 

action to fix it. 

Those remedial steps don’t always happen overnight. We have 

been working very hard with our team to make sure we are learning from mistakes, that some of the systemic challenges that were 

18 

pointed out in the OIG Fast and Furious Report are fixed and they 

stick. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Ohio. 

Mr. JORDAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Jones, are you familiar with the name Catherine 

Engelbrecht? 

Mr. JONES. I think that is an individual—yes. 

Mr. JORDAN. Are you familiar with the fact that she testified in 

front of this committee eight weeks ago and her testimony under 

oath was that in 16 years of operating her business, the only interaction she had with the Federal Government was filing her annual 

tax returns. She filed for tax exempt status for two organizations 

she was involved in creating, True the Vote and Kingstreet Patriots 

and then just all kinds of interaction with the Federal Government. 

OSHA visits her place of business. That never happened in the 

first 16 years but then OSHA visits her place of business twice. 

The IRS audits both her personal and business records for two 

years. The FBI pays her six visits, two in person and four on the 

phone. Another organization, your organization, pays her two visits 

as well. 

I sent you a letter six weeks ago asking for documents relating 

to the visit ATF made to Ms. Englebrecht’s place of business and 

you have yet to respond to us. Is there a reason why you cannot 

get us those documents? 

Mr. JONES. I can check into what the delay is in the response. 

Mr. JORDAN. It has been six weeks, Mr. Jones. It would seem to 

me to be a pretty simple search. You put the name Englebrecht in 

your computers, come up with the documents and get them to 

Chairman Issa and myself. 

Mr. JONES. I understand that Ms. Englebrecht’s interaction with 

us—I cannot speak for any of the other federal agencies—involved 

a license request, a qualification inspection and then a follow up. 

Mr. JORDAN. She had that license for 12 years. Why did you suddenly decide to go visit her. The previous 12 years you never had 

any interaction with her, then you visit her in February 2012 and 

April 2013. Why did you visit her on those dates? Why did you visit 

her twice in 13 months when for the first 12 years, you never paid 

her any visits? 

Mr. JONES. Congressman, I will get back to you on the letter. 

Mr. JORDAN. Let me read what the Inspector General’s report 

said about how ATF goes out and looks at federal firearms licensees compliance inspections. It says you look for a high risk indicator. Is that true? 

Mr. JONES. That is one of the factors. 

Mr. JORDAN. High risk indicators says this: such as a high number of guns used in crime scenes traced back to the licensee, numerous multiple sales by a federal firearms licensee to a single individual, thefts or losses of firearms, location in a high crime area, 

tips from State or local law enforcement agencies, do you know if 

you had any of those circumstances or any of those indicators or 

any of those present before you went to visit Ms. Englebrecht? 

19 

Mr. JONES. I don’t have information sufficient in front of me to 

answer that. 

Mr. JORDAN. I can tell you, none of them were and yet you show 

up. In 12 years, no one ever heard from ATF in 12 years and then 

suddenly, she applies for tax exempt status and you knock on her 

door twice in 13 months. 

Mr. JONES. Congressman, I wish I had better answers. 

Mr. JORDAN. This is a pretty important issue. It has been front 

and center in the news for over a year now. I do too. 

Imagine what this lady felt like. She gets the full weight of the 

Federal Government coming down on her, her family and her business and all she is trying to do is get a tax exempt status that had 

been routine for 15 years. Suddenly, the Federal Government is 

saying no, no, no, you are not going to get that tax exempt status 

and we are going to send four federal agencies out to harass you, 

including yours. 

Mr. JONES. Congressman, it is unfortunate that you and Ms. 

Englebrecht think it is harassment. From our perspective, it is part 

of our regulatory function. 

Mr. JORDAN. Don’t you think it is unusual that four federal agencies visited her in that short time frame? 

Mr. JONES. I cannot speak for other agencies other than ATF. 

Mr. JORDAN. Let me ask you this. Did anyone at the White 

House encourage ATF to pay Ms. Englebrecht a visit in Dallas, 

Texas? 

Mr. JONES. No. 

Mr. JORDAN. Did any other federal agency talk to you or anyone 

at ATF and encourage you to inspect and visit Ms. Englebrecht? 

Mr. JONES. No. 

Mr. JORDAN. Did any member of Congress contact you or anyone 

at ATF and encourage you to go out and visit and inspect Ms. 

Englebrecht’s federal firearms license? 

Mr. JONES. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. JORDAN. No knowledge of anyone contacting you at all? 

Mr. JONES. No. 

Mr. JORDAN. Have you talked to any other federal agency about 

what you learned or discovered when you visited Ms. Englebrecht’s 

place of business? 

Mr. JONES. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. JORDAN. What did you discover when you visited there in 

February 2012 and April 2013? 

Mr. JONES. It was a qualification inspection. I have no idea based 

on what I have. 

Mr. JORDAN. Were there any citations, any problems, any fines, 

anything that you discovered? 

Mr. JONES. I don’t know. 

Mr. JORDAN. Our standing is there is not. We talked with Ms. 

Englebrecht. In fact, we had her sit in that same chair and answer 

questions from this committee. 

Let me ask one other question. Did Tom Perez have any input 

into your agency’s determination to go inspect and investigate Ms. 

Englebrecht’s place of business? 

Mr. JONES. No. 

Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

20 

Chairman ISSA. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. JORDAN. I would be happy to yield. 

Chairman ISSA. I also signed onto that letter and was disappointed we did not receive further answers before this hearing. 

I will say that in light of the deliberate and verified targeting of 

conservative groups by Lois Lerner and the IRS, we cannot take coincidence, things which occur which appear to be linked to somebody’s application as a conservative for an IRS application. There 

were leaks from the IRS of names of contributors, including a constituent of the Ranking Member, that were damaging and appear 

to be deliberate. 

I hope you understand that when we see a pattern by an agency 

and then we see coincidences, it is our committee’s requirement to 

fully explore what appear to be unusual anomalies. We are not accusing you of anything but we do need the specifics of both classified and unclassified, if necessary, so that we can understand how 

such an anomaly occurred. 

Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Jones, can you give us a date when you can get 

those documents to the Chairman and myself and the entire committee? 

Mr. JONES. We will work with staff and your staff to figure out 

the specifics. 

Mr. JORDAN. Sooner or later? Is it going to be as soon as next 

week? 

Mr. JONES. As soon as we can. 

Mr. JORDAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. I only want your commitment that you will provide them. 

Mr. JONES. I have been cooperative with both your staffs and 

committee members in providing information as quickly as we can. 

I hope you understand there is a process. I do know that we have 

to get better answering the mail. 

We have worked very hard and have changed some of our processes to get better in answering the mail because we know you 

need information and we have it but we also have a certain process 

and level of sensitivity. 

Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chairman, again, this is simple. This is one individual, Catherine Englebrecht and the documents relating to why 

after 12 years of never showing up at her place, why you decided 

to go twice in 13 months. Any document that has Englebrecht mentioned in it, we want that information. That is a pretty simple 

search. 

I think you can have it to us in a week, a day maybe, but here 

we are six weeks later and you are telling us we will try to do it 

as soon we possibly can. We heard that last week from John Thomson at the IRS. He told us two years. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

We now go to the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Director Jones. We are so glad you are in place and 

confirmed after seven years of Acting Director at the ATF and we 

finally have a confirmed Director. Thank you. 

I think it is quite notable that in your brief tenure, you have already made a huge change. As I understand it, 23 field special 

21 

agents in charge, out of 25, are new under your leadership; 38 new 

headquarters senior executives are new under your leadership; to 

say nothing of looking at the storefront operations and making reforms there. 

You can look up Ms. Englebrecht. I remember that hearing too. 

She seemed to think that it was outrageous that the government 

was out to get her because she wasn’t notified of an OSHA inspection at her manufacturing plant. Of course the statute is clear, that 

would actually be a violation of law if OSHA had given advance notice of when they were coming. 

She was found to have nine serious violations. She was not inspected for a period of time. We only have 2,200 OSHA inspectors 

for 8 million workplaces. It is not unusual that there can be a gap 

of as much as 20 years before a firm might actually be inspected. 

She settled, by the way. The original fine was $24,850 and she 

settled for $14,910, so other than that, the government is out to get 

her. 

Director Jones, did you volunteer to come and testify before this 

committee? 

Mr. JONES. I appear with an invite from the Chair. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Were you subpoenaed to come here? 

Mr. JONES. I believe there was a subpoena issued but I was coming before the subpoena was issued. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So you are not here as an unwilling witness? 

Mr. JONES. No. I look forward to answer your questions. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. The Chairman has alleged ATF has not been cooperative in this investigation, so let me go through that. 

On April 15, ATF provided committee staff with a briefing by an 

Assistant Director with operational knowledge of the Milwaukee 

operation. Is that correct? 

Mr. JONES. After Internal Affairs did their report with a 30 day 

turnaround, I believe they finished in March and we had a briefing 

because of some of the confidentiality issues. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. On April 15? 

Mr. JONES. On April 15. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You were certainly cooperative with that? 

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. At the briefing, your staff provided an overview 

of the detailed report that you ordered from the Office of Professional Responsibility and Security Operations. Is that right? 

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. On April 30th, the Department of Justice provided additional information in response to the committee’s request 

answering questions about the operation and your knowledge of it. 

Is that right? 

Mr. JONES. That is my understanding. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. The Department provided documents in response 

to the committee’s request including ATF’s policies for the storage 

of firearms and vehicles and for conducting a storefront operation. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. JONES. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. On May 31, the Department provided additional 

information, including steps ATF had taken for improvements to 

22 

planning and oversight over undercover storefront operations. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You did not provide the report from the Office of 

Professional Responsibility at that time. Is that correct? 

Mr. JONES. I believe that is correct, although it has been—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Don’t jump ahead of me. At that time, you did 

not provide it? 

Mr. JONES. That is correct. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. The reason you didn’t provide it was 

Mr. JONES. We were fixing things. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And you were in the middle of a criminal investigation? 

Mr. JONES. Yes, we were. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You didn’t want to compromise that criminal investigation, that would be a bad thing and the outlandish risk that 

somebody in this committee might leak it or use it? 

Mr. JONES. Once we produce information that could compromise 

a criminal investigation, there is always sensitivity when we have 

parallel investigations and requests outstanding from Congress, 

from the Inspector General and their active criminal investigations. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. That report has now been provided to the committee, is that correct? 

Mr. JONES. With some redactions, yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. On March 19, the Chairman issued the subpoena. In his letter to you, he accused you of ‘‘a complete lack of 

cooperation with the committee’s investigation.’’ He stated, ‘‘not 

once have you or your staff responded to any of these letters and 

produced even a single document.’’ Is that an accurate statement 

of your relationship with this committee? 

Mr. JONES. I would hope that our relationship is appropriate and 

professional and that the information that we provide is done in a 

timely manner. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. But the fact is, Director Jones, you and your staff 

have made yourselves available to this committee and you have 

produced documents, including the one we just talked about, is that 

correct? 

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So it is not accurate to say you have not produced a single document or that you have been completely uncooperative with this investigation or is it? 

Mr. JONES. That is not accurate, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank you and I thank you for your service, Director Jones. We wish you all the success. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. Mr. Connolly, would you like to take the witness 

stand? You seem to be not only good at giving testimony, but you 

are very good at getting Mr. Jones to give known answers. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, I have learned from the best. 

Chairman ISSA. I have never been able to get Mr. Jones to answer something yes or no but you are a master and I congratulate 

you. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the Chair. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

23 

We now go to the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Chaffetz. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director, thank you for being here. Congratulations on being appointed and confirmed. We need you in this position and wish you 

nothing but the best. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. We want to thank the men and women who serve 

on the front lines in very difficult situations dealing with nefarious 

characters and God bless them for the work they do. 

I would ask unanimous consent to enter into the record an Office 

of Professional Responsibility and Security Operations Report on 

Operation Fearless dated March 21, 2013, simply the executive 

summary on pages 14 and 15. 

Chairman ISSA. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Director, is it safe to say that the analysis to take away from 

Fast and Furious was that it was fatally flawed and disastrous, 

how would you characterize what happened with Fast and Furious, 

in just a word or two? 

Mr. JONES. Fast and Furious? 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Yes. 

Mr. JONES. That is why I am here. It was a lack of oversight and 

a leadership failure. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. If you look at what happened on Operation Fearless, how would you characterize it? 

Mr. JONES. It was on a smaller scale because there is no comparison between Fast and Furious and what happened in Fearless. 

I am not excusing the things in our internal affairs report and we 

have taken remedial action to fix those things like we have every 

time we have identified them. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. It was flawed as well, too, correct? 

Mr. JONES. It was flawed, there were mistakes that were made. 

It did result in prosecutions, it did result in guns coming off the 

street. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. But it is certainly not the poster child of what it 

should be doing and certainly not the fix we hoped it would be. 

Mr. JONES. No. That operation had its flaws. 

Chairman ISSA. Would the gentleman yield? 

Didn’t it also result in a machine gun going on the street that 

has never been found, a yes or no would be good, like Mr. 

Connolly? 

Mr. JONES. Context is important too, Mr. Chair. I think it is important to note that the agent’s vehicle was broken into between 

noon and three o’clock and the safe was broken into. It was unfortunate and weapons were lost, there were some recovered and 

there are some weapons that are still out there. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Do you recall when Bernard, otherwise known as 

B.J. Zapor, was appointed as the special agent in charge of the 

Phoenix office? 

Mr. JONES. I believe last year Mr. Zapor moved to the Phoenix 

office. He was the Deputy Assistant Director of the Central but he 

moved to be Special Agent in Charge of the Phoenix Field Division. 

24 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. What I find curious, Director, that here we have 

the Phoenix office probably the highest profile on the heels of Fast 

and Furious and yet this same person was in charge of an office 

that was executing on Operation Fearless. 

Here you have an interim report dated March 21, 16 fundamental deficiencies, and you take the person who is in charge of 

one of those offices and put him in charge of Phoenix. 

Mr. JONES. Congressman, unlike Fast and Furious, there were 

very poor communications going on between the SAC in St. Paul 

and what was happening in Milwaukee. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. But you took Mr. Milanowski who supervised the 

Milwaukee office and you put him in Phoenix as well. 

Mr. JONES. I sure did. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Why do you do that? If this thing is so flawed, 

you agree that it was flawed. With Operation Fearless, you took 

the people who were overseeing the Milwaukee operation, the SAC 

and then the person in charge of the Milwaukee office and they get 

to go to Phoenix. You have to clean that place up. 

I don’t understand how we take two people responsible for that 

and put them in charge of Phoenix. I don’t see the accountability, 

I don’t see anybody getting fired. We are taking mentally handicapped people and putting tattoos on their necks. We have missing 

weapons. We have locations opening in proximity to schools in violation of the law. We have stolen agent weapons. We have an agent 

whose personal contact information was left in one of these offices. 

We are enticing people across State lines to engage in prostitution type things. I could go on for ten minutes listing the allegations. Where is the accountability? 

Mr. JONES. You have aggregated a lot of information without the 

opportunity to talk about some of those things in specifics. I can 

tell you that the individuals that were in the St. Paul division and 

the movements that were made were made for very good reasons 

based on their records of performance. That is not to excuse the 

mistakes made in Fearless. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. You don’t have anyone more qualified than Mr. 

Zapor and Mr. Milanowski to oversee probably the most critical office on the heels of Fast and Furious after you have an internal report dated March 21 with 16 deficiencies listed. You don’t have 

anyone better than that to go and run that office? 

Mr. JONES. There is solid leadership in the Phoenix field division 

and a lot of oversight down there. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So you have total confidence in Mr. Zapor and 

Mr. Milanowski? 

Mr. JONES. I do. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Chairman ISSA. Director, you said context was important. Would 

you let everyone understand what the gentleman inferred about 

the tattoo on the severely disabled person? 

Mr. JONES. If you are talking about Operation Kraken in Portland, Oregon. I think it is important to note that the issue with respect to competency did not arise until the case morphed into litigation mode and defense counsel brought up the issue of intellectual capacity. 

I think with respect to the tattoo, that was a mistake. 

25 

Chairman ISSA. Context is important. Just tell the story so everyone on the dais knows because not everyone knows and certainly the public doesn’t know, what the agents did and what the 

judge did. 

Mr. JONES. There as an individual, as I understand it, in Operation Kraken who on their own volition got a tattoo that was the 

logo for the storefront store and subsequently was reimbursed by 

the storefront in the undercover mode. That is my understanding. 

Chairman ISSA. The judge’s understanding was that the individual was talked into getting a tattoo which was basically bought 

by your agents. The judge ordered that you pay to have it re 

moved. Isn’t that correct? 

Mr. JONES. That’s correct. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

We will now go to the gentlelady from Illinois, Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Director Jones, for being here. 

I am going to assume that when you come across processes and 

procedures within the agency that are substandard or sub par that 

you would be committed to investigating them and perhaps coming 

up with better procedures. Is that correct? 

Mr. JONES. That is correct. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Let us talk about what we have been talking 

this morning, the involvement of persons with developmental and 

mental disabilities. 

I am deeply, deeply concerned this has happened. I understand 

your statement that many of these persons are not being recruited 

by your agents but, in fact, are people they come across in the 

course of doing their jobs. 

What training do your agents have with how to deal with persons with developmental and mental disabilities once they encounter them? 

Mr. JONES. That was the topic of discussion with ARC and that 

is something we are looking at. Unfortunately, one of the things 

that happened in a poor budget environment is training. Training 

is not what it should be and I think not unique to ATF. 

When you talk about developmentally disabled or people with 

mental illness, there is not enough training of law enforcement officers to recognize and deal with in situations of stress or in undercover operations about how to deal and not deal with individuals. 

It is a very difficult challenge because oftentimes you cannot tell 

on the surface whether or not somebody has issues of that nature. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Have you conducted an internal investigation 

into this issue? 

Mr. JONES. The general issue, no. We have talked internally 

about developing better training regimes for folks, particularly in 

the undercover setting. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. What about in the particular case of the individuals who were enticed into participating, the case of the individual who had the tattoo, the case of the gentleman with the IQ 

in the mid-50s? 

If your IQ is in the mid-50s, it is very clear that you are developmentally disabled. Have you done a formal investigation into those 

instances? 

26 

Mr. JONES. Other than the Milwaukee operation, all of these 

other storefronts identified in the media that are of concern predated my arrival, so my level of knowledge about some of those instances is not as deep. 

I do know that the Inspector General has for review some of 

those storefront operations. We will work with them once they peal 

back the layers of the onion about the circumstances. Again, the 

media reports are not as wholesome with respect to the whole 

store. 

A lot of the issues that have been raised about peoples’ mental 

capacity only came to light during the trial process and sometimes 

in the sentencing process as part of mitigation for the sentencing. 

This is not a circumstance where there are people who are obviously challenged walking into the storefront operation. These are 

after the fact knowledge that we learn of based primarily on the 

assertion of defense counsel. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. You don’t think that your agents dealing with 

an IQ in the 50s knew he was developmentally disabled? 

Mr. JONES. To be honest with you, I don’t know what they 

thought. I have never met the individual. I don’t know other than 

the fact that they were competent to stand trial, they pled guilty, 

they were sentenced for criminal conduct and during the sentencing process, issues were raised about their intellectual capacity. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. People with far higher IQs than 50 can also be 

intimidated in the trial process to confess just through the stress 

situation. 

My question to you is, is there an IG investigation that is looking 

into this issue, correct? 

Mr. JONES. Part of what the Inspector General at the Department of Justice is looking into is this set of storefronts and looking 

at the details as to what happened when, and why. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Leadership starts from the top. What commitment have you made personally to pursue this particular issue 

whether it is to figure out what the situation was, to figure out 

what kind of training can be done even on a limited budget basis? 

I am sure ARC would probably be willing to cooperate with you 

to provide some of that training or at least help you structure 

something. What commitment have you made to show the entire 

agency that this is important to you and is something that is not 

acceptable conduct among your agents? 

Mr. JONES. We have met with ARC. We are in discussions with 

them about developing an appropriate training package. We have 

put out word through our internal processes about situational 

awareness on the issue, but it really is on the go forward a matter 

of enhancing the level of knowledge and understanding to the 

agents who are out there as to what they need to be on the look 

out for and how to deal with situations like that. It is a training 

issue and we are working on that. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. I am out of time, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. The gentlelady yields back. 

We will now go to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

27 

Director Jones, I have a couple of questions about the operation 

in general. How long did this go on? 

Mr. JONES. Which operation? 

Mr. MICA. The storefronts? How long were the storefront operations going on? 

Mr. JONES. It depends on the storefront. 

Mr. MICA. The whole program. How many did you have, 30 

some? 

Mr. JONES. Thirty-seven storefronts between 2009 and 2013. 

Mr. MICA. That would be about a four or five year period that 

this operation went on. 

We have referred to some of the worse, egregious incidents that 

took place in Milwaukee. I think there were seven places that were 

cited at least in the report I have, Portland, Phoenix, Albuquerque, 

Wichita, Atlanta and Pensacola, all of which had botched operations. Is that sort of a given? 

Mr. JONES. I wouldn’t describe them as botched. The one I have 

the most knowledge of was Milwaukee. 

Mr. MICA. Each of them had names. We have gone from Fast and 

Furious. I guess Milwaukee was given Operation Fearless. I think 

it should be renamed Operation Fearless and Brainless from what 

we have heard here today. Some of the things that went on are astounding. 

How much money did they spend in this program, can you tell 

me, during the four or five years, a million, half a million, any 

idea? Can you provide the committee with the amount? 

Mr. JONES. I believe some documents we have produced do give 

some indication as to the cost. 

Mr. MICA. There were 36 of these storefronts, 7 had horrible experiences. It doesn’t sound like Wichita had an exactly glorious operation. A known criminal came in with two AK–47s and we only 

bought one. He was a known felon and was let out on the street 

with the one that wasn’t purchased. Are you aware of that case? 

Mr. JONES. I do have some knowledge. 

Mr. MICA. AK–47, we bought one. I am told we paid such a high 

price. I want to find out how much we paid for these, that actually 

where we had these operations, we had little crime waves. I heard 

you could get these weapons purchased at a higher than black market rate, so ATF was buying them at a high rate and we had little 

crime sprees. 

I have asked the staff to also look at these different operations 

but there was a spike in crime in those neighborhoods. Are you 

aware of that? 

Mr. JONES. I know one of the indicators we have in terms of 

monitoring and making sure a storefront is operating, is it manufacturing crime. 

Mr. MICA. I am interested in the results. How many weapons 

were seized in the whole program, do you know, or purchased, not 

seized? 

Mr. JONES. I think in the six operations that are of particular interest to the committee, including Fearless, that were approximately 1,300 weapons taken off the street. 

Mr. MICA. I would like to see for the whole period of time what 

number of weapons. 

28 

You said there were some indictments, how many indictments 

and arrests? 

Mr. JONES. We can get that specific information back to you. 

Mr. MICA. I would think that would be the first thing you would 

tell the committee, how many arrests there were, the cost of the 

operation, how many indictments—do you know how many indictments we had? 

Mr. JONES. In the six storefronts under discussion, 250 defendants were convicted, over 1,300 firearms were recovered and the 

defendants had over 350 prior felonies. These are oftentimes not 

first time offenders. 

In Milwaukee, there were 16 federal defendants and 10 State defendants and 150 firearms. In Pensacola, which was February to 

October 2011, 78 defendants convicted, 275 firearms recovered. 

Mr. MICA. I am told the operations also had such a bad reputation that when the FBI was contacted about participating that they 

shied away or denied a cooperative effort with ATF. Are you aware 

of that? 

Mr. JONES. I don’t have sufficient knowledge to know why that 

happened. I am not going to speculate as to what occurred to have 

our federal law enforcement partners pull out on that. 

I do know there were concerns expressed about data deconfliction 

and certain investigative concerns but I am not in a position to explain anything. 

Mr. MICA. It sounds like the whole thing went haywire. Again, 

I would like to see for the record how much it cost and what the 

results were for the whole period of time. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. The gentleman yields back. 

We now go to the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Jones, thank you for being here today to give us your 

perspective as the Director and formerly, the Acting Director, as a 

former US attorney and as a former prosecutor as well. I think 

that is helpful for us. 

I understand in many of these cases, it was local law enforcement that asked the ATF agency to set up these undercover storefront operations in their communities, is that correct? 

Mr. JONES. My understanding is that in all of those operations, 

there was to varying degrees local law enforcement involvement. 

Mr. TIERNEY. For example, in Milwaukee both federal and local 

law enforcement requested the agency’s assistance. They wanted to 

target violent crime and gang crime and that is what led them to 

set up that particular storefront, correct? 

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TIERNEY. I think everyone knows that gun violence is a daily 

challenge in many of our communities. Can you tell us why a local 

law enforcement agency would make that type of request? 

Mr. JONES. Oftentimes, it is a resource issue. Sometimes it is the 

collaborative nature of ATF’s relationship with State and local law 

enforcement. We have excellent relations with State and locals 

across the country and we partner with them on much of the work 

we do in cities large and small. That partnership is very important 

to us. 

29 

Mr. TIERNEY. In your experience, how severe can the gun problem be in local communities where ATF is requested to assist? 

Mr. JONES. That varies. Over the last couple of years, we have 

tried to be more focused in our resources by dedicating resources 

to those places experiencing either in the short or long term higher 

levels of gun violence but I think the partnership we have with 

local law enforcement is critical to our being successful. 

Mr. TIERNEY. In the wake of all the horrific gun violence we have 

experienced in this country, the President developed a series of proposals that were aimed at reducing gun violence without infringing 

on the rights of lawful gun owners. They would provide law enforcement additional tools to prevent and prosecute gun crimes. 

Last year, a bipartisan group of the Congress, 100 Democrat and 

Republican members lead by Representatives Meehan, Maloney, 

Rigell and Ranking Member Cummings, introduced the Gun Trafficking Prevention Act of 2013. That was a bill that would have 

made firearms trafficking a federal crime for the first time and impose stronger penalties for straw purchases. Can you explain what 

straw purchases are? 

Mr. JONES. Straw purchasing essentially is making a misrepresentation on Form 4473 when you purchase a firearm legally that 

you are purchasing it for yourself. 

Mr. TIERNEY. When, in fact, you might be purchasing it for a convicted felon or somebody else who is prohibited from owning a gun? 

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TIERNEY. That bill would have made those penalties stronger. It was supported by law enforcement around the country, was 

based on previous testimony from ATF agents who came before the 

Congress and told us how helpful it would be to finally create a 

federal offense for firearms trafficking. 

Do you believe that would have been one useful tool in fighting 

gun violence? 

Mr. JONES. As a former prosecutor and as now the Director of 

the law enforcement agency responsible for enforcing the Gun Control Act, having a more fulsome federal firearms trafficking statute 

would be very helpful in constructing cases and doing investigations. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Can you talk a little bit about how ATF mission 

could be better accomplished by the adoption or strengthening of 

laws that would help reduce gun violence? Are there other ways we 

could be of assistance? 

Mr. JONES. I don’t want to step out of my lane because of course 

Congress makes the law, we enforce the law and there is lots of 

input into it. I can give you the perspective of a former prosecutor 

and someone who now works with ATF that there are things that 

could be different. 

At the same time, I don’t want to get into advocacy mode that 

is inappropriate. 

Mr. TIERNEY. I respect that and I don’t want to put you in that 

position. 

Let me close by saying we have that Gun Trafficking Prevention 

Act of 2013 that is a bipartisan proposal. It has been supported by 

law enforcement across the country. Perhaps in one of our future 

hearings, rather than delving into conspiracy theories, we could 

30 

talk about why that legislation hasn’t been brought forward and 

passed. 

With that, I yield back my time. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman for yielding back. 

We now go to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Farenthold. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you, Chairman Issa. 

Director Jones, thank you for being here. I know that is an uncomfortable seat sometimes. We may rename it the hot seat. 

I want to step back and get a big picture idea. Can you refresh 

my memory? What was the stated goal of your storefront operations? 

Mr. JONES. It is a business calculated to identify and proactively 

intervene with criminals and criminal activity in high crime areas. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. You open these storefronts and attempt to buy 

back guns from criminals? 

Mr. JONES. That is a piece of it. Its primary value is intelligence 

gathering. Oftentimes the storefronts are wired for video and 

audio, people make admissions, we can identify them, and we can 

run criminal histories to see if they are prohibited on some occasions. 

It is designed to attract a certain criminal element so that we 

can gather intelligence as to what is happening outside of the 

storefront. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. A normal goal of law enforcement is to move 

up the chain. Rather than getting the petty street criminal, you 

want to move up the chain to more serious offenders. That is normal operation for law enforcement, isn’t it? 

Mr. JONES. Sometimes. If you are interested in sort of an enterprise theory of investigation to take out a whole gang, but sometimes you are talking about a single trigger puller who has a reputation in the community of just being a bad actor. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. We had testimony in this committee about Operation Fast and Furious that what they were really after was taking down a drug lord in Mexico or abroad. What concerns me is, 

are we developing a mentality where we are after the more serious 

offenders, damned the consequences? 

We saw in Fast and Furious we let guns walk across the border 

with tragic results. In this we see ATF encouraging people to saw 

off a shotgun, having to train someone in what an automatic weapon is. 

Shouldn’t we be focused on getting the job done? When we start 

going beyond that, it is like we get in trouble. 

Mr. JONES. I think it is important that storefront operations, the 

ones we are talking about and the many others that are highly successful, are just a tool in a toolbox that we have. They are not the 

end all to be all. There are other undercover operations. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. I remain concerned that it is the Rudy 

Giuliani theory, if we fix the broken windows, the big stuff starts 

to take care of itself. Are we going for big headlines and big busts 

that may go forward with a political agenda or can we get down 

to the nitty gritty? 

In a speech, you said, ‘‘It was time for the ATF to bring our A 

game to protect the American people and public from violent crime 

31 

and on my watch, that is what we are going to do.’’ Was Operation 

Fearless your A game? 

Mr. JONES. No, it wasn’t the A game and we could do better. I 

freely admit that. We have learned lessons from Fearless. One of 

the reasons we dispatched internal affairs is to peal back the onion 

and see what went wrong, validate some of the things that worked 

and know what didn’t work. 

I think it is significant to note that we hit the pause button on 

storefronts until we can get them right. Now, if we can’t do them 

right, we don’t do them. If we can’t do them right, we don’t them. 

If they are not sited right, if they are not resourced right, if they 

are not staffed right, if there isn’t an intelligence purpose for it 

other than to generate numbers, we are not doing them. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. As we go forward, we have been having trouble from the Attorney General in getting Fast and Furious information. Are you willing to work hard with this committee to make 

sure we get to the bottom of these things so they don’t happen 

again? 

Mr. JONES. I have read the Fast and Furious OIG report several 

times, including the last couple of weeks, and I fully understand 

some of the systemic issues. That is my challenge. There is ongoing 

litigation. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. We just cannot let this happen again. 

I have one other quick question that a constituent wanted me to 

ask you. We are getting reports of trouble with imports of 7N6 Russian surplus ammunition, yet we are not seeing anything from your 

agency about this. Are you planning on implementing a new policy 

on that? I know that is kind of out in left field. 

Mr. JONES. It is kind of out in left field. Brownsville is wonderful, by the way, but we will look into that if you will give us more 

context. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. We will get with you. 

I am out of time. I will yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. The gentlelady from Illinois, Ms. Kelly. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Director Jones. 

As we assess the problems in Milwaukee, I would like to know 

how this investigative technique has been used in other cities to 

target violent crime. You stated in your testimony that since 2009, 

ATF has conducted 37 undercover storefronts. 

Did the use of undercover storefronts only begin in 2009? 

Mr. JONES. No. It is an investigative technique that really has 

its genesis going back as far as 20 years in south Florida during 

the height of the trafficking in Florida. We have very good people 

to do it. They are not always in the right place to do it and make 

sure it is done right. We have had very successful storefronts 

around the country. 

Ms. KELLY. This technique has been used under other administrations like the Bush Administration? 

Mr. JONES. I think the administration and the politics has less 

to do with it than the public safety value of using this as an undercover technique. It has been used for a long time. 

Ms. KELLY. How do you measure the success of these operations? 

Mr. JONES. I think one measurement of success is the people who 

end up coming into court. There were some successful operations 

32 

in other parts of the country that did identify and end in conviction 

for very long sentences of armed career criminals, people with extensive records. 

There have been instances where storefronts have brought in 

people who are on the cusp of committing egregious acts of violence. I think the intelligence value and the way that people have 

been brought in, the trigger pullers and the traffickers of crime 

guns get pulled into this and giving us an opportunity to build a 

case around that person, eventually indicting them and hopefully 

sending them to prison. 

Ms. KELLY. It is my understanding that the Pensacola police 

chief made a very strong statement about the outcome of an operation you did there in 2011, ‘‘The value of this operation is immeasurable and we may never know how many lives this may have 

saved.’’ Do you agree with the police chief that the undercover operation might have saved lives? 

Mr. JONES. I do agree with the police chief. It is very difficult to 

talk about the what if circumstance, but we do know there was 

good work done at a very fundamental level and trigger pullers and 

traffickers were pulled off the street and into the criminal justice 

system. 

Ms. KELLY. We already talked about some of the other places 

where storefront operations occurred. Are you satisfied with the results in Albuquerque, Atlanta and some of the places we talked 

about, Portland and Wichita? 

Mr. JONES. Again, I have deeper knowledge about some rather 

than others, but I do know that all of these operations resulted in 

criminals going to jail in the end and making the community safer. 

Ms. KELLY. Also, we talked a lot about the storefronts, but what 

other tools are in the toolbox to get illegal firearms off the street 

and out of the hands of violent criminals? 

Mr. JONES. One of the things we are doing particularly in Chicago is developing firearms trafficking techniques to see the flow 

in the black market of firearms. The crime gun pool is very deep 

and it is quite a challenge, doing things from the trafficking, following the gun, identifying FFLs who may be supplying crime 

guns, identifying individual traffickers in the black market who 

may be supplying crime guns 

We have worked real hard with folks in the northern districts of 

Illinois and in the northern districts of Indiana to study the firearms trafficking patterns and trying to intervene to cut off, to the 

extent we can, the supply and also make sure those engaged in unlicensed dealing, people selling guns on the black market, get our 

full attention so we can at least drain a little bit out of the crime 

gun pool. 

Ms. KELLY. Representing that area, I am very glad to hear that. 

When I was a State legislator, that was the first bill I passed, dealing with straw purchases, so I know how very important that is. 

Thank you so much. I yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. The gentlelady yields back. 

We now go to the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Meadows. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Jones, in your testimony, I know we are highlighting the six 

different storefront operations today but I think you said ‘‘other 

33 

highly successful storefront operations.’’ What are the other highly 

successful storefront operations? 

Mr. JONES. The one that immediately comes to mind—I do not 

want to overstep because some of these are still in the moment. 

Mr. MEADOWS. According to your testimony, there are no active 

storefronts right now, so I don’t know that we would be putting 

anyone in jeopardy. 

Mr. JONES. Once they close down and it goes into prosecution 

mode. 

Mr. MEADOWS. What are the other highly successful ones? 

Mr. JONES. The one that immediately comes to mind, because I 

just saw a recommendation for an award, is Smoking Guns II in 

Miami Gardens in the southern district of Florida. That was very 

successful in taking out— 

Mr. MEADOWS. What is successful? How do you define success? 

Mr. JONES. Identifying a deadly armed criminal group engaged 

in both firearms trafficking and drug trafficking in south Florida. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Do you have storefront operations in Chicago? 

Mr. JONES. We don’t have any current storefront. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Have you had them in Chicago? 

Mr. JONES. As I sit here today, I cannot definitively say. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I don’t think you have. How about in Los Angeles? Have you had in the city of Los Angeles storefront operations? 

Mr. JONES. Again, I can’t off the top of my head say that we have 

never had or have not had a storefront in Los Angeles. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Did you prepare to come and provide testimony 

today? 

Mr. JONES. Yes, I did. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Wouldn’t you assume some of that, out of the 37 

storefront operations, that you would be able to figure out which 

ones you have actually had or not? 

Mr. JONES. My focus was on the ones—— 

Mr. MEADOWS. I know where your focus was. In your testimony 

you talked about 37. You say today you can’t tell me whether you 

had one in Los Angeles, Chicago or New York. Have you have any 

storefront operations in any of those three cities? 

Mr. JONES. Without certainty, right here now, I can’t say. 

Mr. MEADOWS. What is your best guess? 

Mr. JONES. I don’t like to guess when I am sitting here under 

oath. 

Mr. MEADOWS. You have staffers behind you. Do they know if 

you have had any storefront operations in any of those three cities? 

I don’t believe you have but have you had any? 

Mr. JONES. We will find out. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Under what matrix do you decide where to put 

storefront operations? 

Mr. JONES. Primarily by the intelligence needs and the commitment of locals to work with us. 

Mr. MEADOWS. You are saying in those three cities, you might 

not have had the commitment of locals to work with you? 

Mr. JONES. It is a technique that we use on occasion but it is not 

the only technique that we use. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Let me tell you the reason I ask. Those three, according to the Center for Disease Control Prevention, according to 

34 

their report, are the top three cities in terms of gun-related violence. Yet you don’t seem to have storefront operations in the very 

top three in our Nation in terms of gun-related violence. 

The President even talks about Chicago. Yet you don’t have operations there. Why would that be? 

Mr. JONES. Because we are using other types of investigative 

techniques in those major metropolitan areas where the dynamics 

on the ground and the opportunities to identify bad guys are a lot 

different than in smaller venues. 

Mr. MEADOWS. That is exactly what I thought you would say. 

There is not a direct correlation between storefront operations and 

gun related violence is what you are saying. 

Mr. JONES. Depending on the venue you open, if you pick the 

right spot, yes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Those are the top three, you have no storefront 

operations, so there is not a direct correlation in terms of selling 

out of a storefront versus the number of deaths that happen according to gun-related violence? There is no empirical evidence that 

would suggest that? 

Mr. JONES. It is a technique. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I understand technique. Is there any empirical 

data or evidence to that effect because where you are placing these 

would suggest there is not. 

Mr. JONES. We have placed them all around the country. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Why didn’t you place them in the top three gunrelated, violent, murder capitals of our country? Why wouldn’t you 

place them there? If there was a direct correlation, why wouldn’t 

you place them there? 

Mr. JONES. One thing that immediately comes to mind is in those 

larger urban areas, you have very difficult deconfliction issues 

going on because a lot of people are playing in the same territory. 

There are safety risks involved with this type of undercover technique, both in terms of maintaining its integrity, sharing information. 

Mr. MEADOWS. If the Chairman will indulge this last question? 

Chairman ISSA. Briefly. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Is it easier for an ATF agent to blend in in Wichita, Kansas than it is in New York City? 

Chairman ISSA. I am not sure if he can. 

Mr. JONES. I can’t answer that. In some of these storefronts, we 

bring in undercovers from different parts of the country. One reason we don’t often have local law enforcement in an undercover capacity in a place like Milwaukee where they weren’t behind the 

counter is because they work in Milwaukee and may run into 

somebody they have arrested. 

Maintaining the integrity of the undercover operation does sometimes require bringing in people from out of town because they are 

not known. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

At this time, we go the gentlelady from California, Ms. Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Thank you, Director Jones. 

I think this hearing helps me solidify is the importance of having 

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35 

man. I don’t know about you but I want to know how much money 

we are spending on this kind of activity. Mr. Jones, maybe you can 

tell us. How much do you budget for storefronts a year? 

Mr. JONES. We don’t budget for storefronts. We budget for operations. In looking at some of the basic information on this, there 

is the cost of the site. 

Ms. SPEIER. We need to find out how much you spend. You have 

37 of these storefronts. I certainly would like and probably the 

Chair as well documentation to tell us how much was spent on 

these storefronts and what was recovered as a result. 

I was with our U.S. attorney this morning who said you actually 

had a very successful one in Gilroy, California called Operation 

Garlic Press. Where do you come up with these clever names? 

Chairman ISSA. Gilroy and garlic, that is not all that clever. 

Ms. SPEIER. It is about taking advantage of the fact that it is the 

garlic capital of the world. 

She indicated to me that there were some 92 persons that were 

charged or at least found to be gun running. I think we need to 

have a better sense and a better accountability of how much money 

is being spent on each of these operations and why certain areas 

are picked and others are not. 

Chairman ISSA. Would the gentlelady suspend for a moment? 

Ms. SPEIER. I certainly will. Just give me extra time. 

Chairman ISSA. Director Jones, there has been a series of questions on a bipartisan basis. Maybe to cut short the need for those 

questions, would you agree to prepare a secure briefing for the 

committee that would include essentially what Ms. Speier is talking about but expanding on cost, all of the operations and obviously 

because the earlier briefing we had alleged there was only one in 

Milwaukee that was flawed and now we have similar situations in 

others, a more expansive ability to answer questions on the good, 

the bad and the ugly, if you will of these various operations around 

the country? 

Is that something you could give us a timeline and commit to 

that we would make the committee available? 

Mr. JONES. I think it would be of value to educate because I 

think these storefronts in particular are the ones that had issues 

but as Congresswoman Speier says, there have been some successful storefronts. They are a valid technique. 

I think it would be of value. We can work with staff to get that 

in the appropriate venue because again, we always have law enforcement sensitive, we have techniques and don’t want to inadvertently educate bad guys. 

Chairman ISSA. I would appreciate it. Today’s hearing, Ms. 

Speier and I are both aware, is on some flaws that you are working 

on but I think it would be helpful. We would probably bring this 

room into a secure mode and a time to be arranged if your folks 

before the end of the hearing can give us an estimate, we will make 

that time available in a few weeks. 

Ms. Speier, thank you. It was time to ask the question. The 

gentlelady’s time fully continues. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. 

I also want to alert you to a program called Operation Lipstick 

that started in Boston. It is a program focused on women. Since 

36 

more than 50 percent of gun trafficking cases involve straw purchases, and guns purchased by women are two times as likely to 

be used to commit a crime, they are working in the communities 

to try and get the word out to women who tend to be the girlfriends 

and wives to go in and buy the guns, that they become accomplices 

of crime as well. I think it is one of the kinds of activities that we 

should be looking at as well. 

I also want to point out that you have the ability to recommend 

to the President that he no longer allow the importation of Russian 

bullets or assault weapons. George H.W. Bush did that by Executive Order. It was enhanced by President Clinton. It expired under 

President George W. Bush. So the importation of the guns and bullets continues. 

We have a case in California where a State senator was willing, 

for a campaign donation, to provide an SEI undercover agent with 

guns and shoulder missiles from the Philippines. We have some 

other areas we can look at and I hope you will take that into account. 

The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel suggested that the ATF storefront operation was actually generating crime. I would like for you 

to respond to that allegation. 

Mr. JONES. That is a concern when we design a storefront operation. We need to have indicators, for example, from the local police 

department as to whether or not there has been a spike in burglaries. For example, we know there were issues with respect to 

folks who purchased weapons and then resold them. 

That is always a phenomena that you have to maintain a certain 

level of risk to make sure that is not happening. 

Ms. SPEIER. Let me ask you this. Were they actually selling or 

purchasing guns for sky high prices? 

Mr. JONES. From what I have seen, the prices were comparable 

to the black market price. The price that we paid in these operations for a gun really is not what is listed at lawful FFL; it is a 

black market gun. These are crime guns, so there is value on them. 

If it has an obliterated serial number, for example, it has great 

value. 

Ms. SPEIER. For clarification, were any of these firearms that 

were purchased and sold at those storefronts? 

Mr. JONES. No. 

Ms. SPEIER. I think that is very important. 

Mr. JONES. We do not sell. It is one way. We buy the weapons. 

We do not sell the weapons. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. 

My time has expired. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentlelady. 

We now go to the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Bentivolio. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Cummings and distinguished members of the committee. 

As we all know, one ‘‘aw, shucks’’ can wipe out a thousand 

‘‘attaboys.’’ In my experience working with ATF over the years, it 

has always been professional, brave and valiant, but after reading 

this testimony, I cannot even get my head around what happened 

in this case. 

37 

When I was preparing for this hearing yesterday, I actually 

thought my staff was playing an April Fool’s joke on me. The operation could not have been this botched; this investigation could not 

have been this mishandled. I am not sure where to even begin. 

I do know I have a frame of mind right now after reading and 

hearing this testimony. I would join any member of Congress who 

sponsors a bill to keep guns out of the hands of ATF agents. With 

that in mind, I have just a few questions. 

ATF agents recruited mentally handicapped people or people 

with an IQ in the 50s to assist with this operation. Later these individuals were arrested for their involvement. I taught special education when I was a teacher and was surrounded by these kids. 

They are some of the best, most caring and nicest people who try 

their best and want to please. I am appalled that you would use 

these individuals like this and then arrest them later. 

Does ATF even regret using these individuals in this way? 

Mr. JONES. Hindsight is 20/20, Congressman. There are lessons 

to be learned. As I mentioned earlier, there are opportunities for 

us to do better in terms of situational awareness training and making sure we do it right. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. In my experience, there is a difference in individuals with low IQ. It is pretty easy to spot. You would think anyone with any life experience could just ask the simple question, is 

this the person we should be using for this operation. You are 

going to discontinue using individuals in this way that have this 

low IQ? 

Mr. JONES. To the extent we know that up front at that stage, 

in an investigation, of course. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Has ATF apologized to any of these individuals? 

Mr. JONES. I know the person in particular from the Portland operation, we have had some interaction with them but many of the 

individuals are in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, unfortunately, so the opportunity for interaction is limited. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. In the storefront location in New Mexico, ATF 

agents gave lessons in how to identify a machine gun. At the location in Kansas, ATF agents told a man how to saw off the end of 

a shotgun. Is it normal for ATF agents to teach heroin addicts and 

drug dealers how to tell the difference between a machine gun and 

a semiautomatic weapon? 

Mr. JONES. I think it is important to note that when these ATF 

agents are in an undercover capacity, they have to go into role unless you want to blow the integrity of the operation. Again, you 

have to make decisions about the cost benefit analysis. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Talking about your decisions, earlier you mentioned that before you go into any operation, you do a risk analysis. 

Did I hear that correctly? You evaluate the risk? 

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Was one of those highly successful operations in 

a storefront the one located within 1,000 feet of a middle school? 

If, that’s the case, why wasn’t a risk analysis done for that? Why 

would you put one of these storefront operations where you have 

criminals coming in with these guns and rifles within 1,000 feet of 

a middle school? 

38 

Mr. JONES. If I am correct in my recollection, I think the case 

you are discussing is the Portland operation. It was sited poorly in 

terms of its proximity to a school. Current state is making sure the 

location is not only secure, but you avoid situations like that. That 

is after the fact. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. So you have an ongoing? 

Mr. JONES. Three years ago. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. After action review, what went right, what went 

wrong and how could we do better? 

Mr. JONES. Yes. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. You have a policy in place applying those things 

you have learned for future operations? 

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir, already in place. 

Mr. BENTIVOLIO. Seems like once again you are learning the lessons of how not to do an operation on a regular basis. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

We now go to the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Clay. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me thank also for conducting this hearing to allow me to 

publicly thank Director Jones and the men and women of ATF for 

putting their lives on the line on a daily basis to protect communities throughout this country. 

One example I would like to share with my colleagues is the 

storefront operation conducted in my hometown of St. Louis, Missouri. The St. Louis and East St. Louis metropolitan area is consistently ranked in the top five most dangerous cities in overall violent crime. 

Director Jones, in your testimony, you highlighted that in April 

through July 2013, ATF led a 15 week surge including a storefront 

operation to reduce violent crime in my district. According to several news outlets and other accounts, this surge was successful. Let 

me repeat for my colleagues, this surge was successful. 

The storefront operation was successful, resulting in 159 defendants being charged of which 78 percent were previously convicted 

felons. In addition, 267 firearms and significant quantities of illegal 

narcotics were taken into ATF custody. 

This enforcement action had a significant impact on violent crime 

as an analysis by the St. Louis City Police Department comparing 

crime statistics from January through July 2012 to statistics for 

the same time frame in 2013 revealed that murder was down 15.7 

percent, robbery was down 22.3 percent; and aggravated assault 

was down 22.6 percent. 

Director, my first question is, in enforcement actions like this one 

in St. Louis, how much of a priority does ATF place on working cooperatively with local law enforcement to address public safety and 

law and how important is it to reducing violent crime? 

Mr. JONES. I think it is absolutely critical. The opportunity we 

had last year to work an enhanced enforcement operation in St. 

Louis was probably one of the better operations we have done in 

my tenure because we brought the full package. 

We brought in experts who know how to do a storefront; we 

brought in experts who did undercover. We worked very closely not 

39 

only with the St. Louis Police Department but also the East St. 

Louis Police Department. 

I think it is an example of the pivot that we have made on two 

things: having a focus, a unified effort with our State and locals in 

getting the resources we need to the spot. Unfortunately, what we 

did in St. Louis cannot be replicated all around the country and it 

is one of the things we have moved to with the mobility model so 

we can bring access from around the country to do it and do it 

right or not do it at all. That is particularly important when we do 

undercover operations. 

Mr. CLAY. That is why I take this opportunity to say thank you 

to you and the men and women of the ATF speaking on behalf of 

my constituents who want to live in a safer environment, who want 

their neighborhoods cleaned up, who want those illegal weapons 

taken off the streets. 

What is the impact of violent crime on the youth and people of 

color in a city like St. Louis and what success is ATF having in disrupting and dismantling gang violence in areas that you target? 

Mr. JONES. Unfortunately, there are pockets of violent gun crime 

that increasingly are involving younger individuals. I call it more 

disorganized crime. It is blocks, turf and it is ingrained. The challenges are in St. Louis, Memphis, Chicago. 

There are areas around the country where we are working very 

closely to do two things, identify traffickers so we can disrupt the 

crime gun pool and identify the worse of the worse in terms of the 

trigger pullers who are often not only teaching downstream a culture of violence but also perpetrating violence themselves. It is the 

armed career criminals in these communities who are of particular 

interest to us. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Chairman, we should be supporting these efforts and not trying to conduct witch hunts. 

Chairman ISSA. I am sure the gentleman knows we are not. 

Would the gentleman yield to the Ranking Member? 

Mr. CLAY. Certainly. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you, Mr. Clay. I am glad you mentioned 

that. 

I thought I would go back to what the Chairman said earlier 

with regard to the briefing you are going to give us. In light of 

what Mr. Clay just said, I think it is extremely important that we 

give out some of the good stuff that is happening. 

I can tell you living where I live, many feel sometimes like they 

are in a terror zone and it is hard. Trying to get to the very people 

Mr. Clay talked about is so very, very important. If the ATF has 

a way of doing it right, I am glad you said what you said, do it 

right or not at all, it sounds like the kind of tool that would be 

very, very helpful in neighborhoods like the one I live in. 

I am really looking forward to that and I am looking forward to 

all the changes you are making to make sure you get it right. I 

hope we will have that briefing very soon. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

We now go to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. DeSantis. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

40 

Welcome, Director. 

In August 2013, you were sworn in, is that correct? 

Mr. JONES. Time flies. I think it was August. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I mention that because I am going to ask about 

some of the issues my colleague from Ohio, Mr. Jordan, asked in 

terms of ATF’s visit to this woman in Texas. 

I just want to clarify whatever happened during those instances 

happened before you came onboard. At this point we are asking 

you, in terms of responding to Mr. Jordan’s letter, to be transparent about what happened. If nothing sinister happened, nothing 

sinister happened. 

We are in a situation where this woman applied for tax exempt 

status for two conservative leaning groups. After having never had 

any interaction with law enforcement for 20 years, she was visited 

by the IRS, OSHA, FBI, ATF and Texas’ version of the EPA. 

This committee has been consumed with dealing with targeting 

done by the Internal Revenue Service. We have had high officials 

in the IRS who have refused to testify and we have had trouble 

getting documents. I hope you will be a force for transparency. 

I understand they had a license for 12 years. Basically, it is a 

precision metal cutting company. They did the firearms license, 

thinking maybe we will do firearm parts at some point. They never 

actually manufactured any firearms parts. Even though they had 

a license for a while, ATF audited them in February 2012. Do you 

know the reason why that audit took place? 

Mr. JONES. Now that I have had an opportunity to look at the 

timeline, my understanding is that Ms. Englebrecht’s business was 

issued a Plan B firearms license by ATF in October 2009. In February 2012, they had a routine compliance inspection. There were 

some minor recordkeeping errors and a warning letter was issued. 

Then in April 2013, we conducted a follow up inspection and there 

were no violations, over a period between 2009 and 2013, as simple 

as it sounds, coincidence and explanations, irrespective of what 

other agencies were doing. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I understand that. 

How common is it that given they were not involved in firearms 

manufacturing at all, I understand they had the license thinking 

they may do it, devoting the resources to auditing them versus 

using resources in other areas. I would imagine you guys have limited resources and know you cannot possibly deal with every issue 

out there, what went into or do you know what went into the decision to focus those two visits on Englebrecht Enterprises given that 

they weren’t even manufacturing any firearm parts vis a vis doing 

that in other areas that may have been more pressing in terms of 

the threat they posed to the public? 

Mr. JONES. I think there are two things to keep in mind. The investigative function, the regulatory function, we have approximately 700 investigators around the country and thousands of licensees both FFLs and FELs and they do have a punchlist. 

If you read the IG report, you know sometimes we have things 

fall behind simply because of the volume. We have discretionary 

time when we can focus on naughty FFLs, those few that are 

naughty and then there is the nondiscretionary time. 

41 

A 2009 FFL license issued after a qualification inspection and 

coming down for a routine compliance inspection within 12 years, 

I am not sure which field position would cover that but I know both 

Dallas and Houston field divisions have a pretty vibrant inspection 

schedule because of the number of licensees down there. 

Mr. DESANTIS. You would definitely state that it would be inappropriate if her filing for tax exempt status for conservative leaning 

organizations influenced ATF in any way, you would admit that 

would be totally inappropriate if something like that were to happen? 

Mr. JONES. That is not part of our practice. We have our hands 

full trying to keep up with the volume of inspections required, 

qualifications, follow up compliance and people work very hard on 

the inspections front. They are doing the best they can. That is not 

into the mix of who ends up on the compliance inspection. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I appreciate your time today. I would just reiterate the Chairman and Mr. Jordan, if you could just get us answers to that letter in due time, we would really appreciate that. 

I yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

We now go to the gentlelady from New York, Mrs. Maloney. 

Mrs. MALONEY. I thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for 

holding this hearing. 

Director Jones, welcome. 

I know the nature of today’s hearing is about ATF’s undercover 

storefront operations but we have never had the Director of the 

ATF before. I would like to ask you some questions related to ATF 

hearings we have held before specifically on the problem of gun 

trafficking. 

In 2001, the House Oversight Committee had one of your special 

agents, Peter Forcelli. I asked him whether criminal penalties were 

so weak that federal prosecutors are discouraged from pursuing 

cases involving the so-called straw purchasers, those who buy guns 

and sell to known felons and others who legally cannot have them. 

He testified in his written and oral statement that the current 

straw purchasing laws ‘‘are toothless.’’ That is what he said. He 

further said that existing gun laws do not provide law enforcement 

officials the tools they need to successfully stop the flow of illegal 

guns to Mexico. He also testified that in his view, Operation Fast 

and Furious was a partial consequence of these deficiencies. 

It is an issue of great concern in the country. Ms. Speier mentioned the lipstick cases where they are trying to inform women 

but shortly after Sandy Hook, in western New York in 2012, a 

week or two afterwards, there was a terrible case where a prior 

felon was released and a straw purchaser got him a bunch of guns. 

He then put his house on fire and when the police and fire department came to put the fire out, he mowed them down, shot 

them. Certainly if this woman had known there would be real penalties, I doubt she would have been out there buying guns for him. 

These agents testified in that hearing that don’t even bother to 

prosecute or refer for prosecution because the penalties are so weak 

that you are not even doing anything. It is almost not worth the 

time of law enforcement. 

42 

In response to that, I offered a bill that made trafficking in guns 

a felony. I find it almost unbelievable that trafficking in illegal 

guns is not a felony. It increases the penalties on straw purchasing. 

An incredible amount of law enforcement across the country 

came out in support of this legislation. It is bipartisan. An NRA 

member, Scott Rigell, is one of the prime leaders on this, as well 

as Ranking Member Cummings and a former prosecutor from 

Pennsylvania, Representative Meehan, has been very active on it. 

It seems to me if we don’t give the tools to law enforcement their 

job, the testimony from these agents was we don’t even bother to 

prosecute because the penalties are so weak, it is not worth our 

time to pursue it. 

My question is, do you think we should have stronger laws and 

penalties against straw purchasers? Do you think it would stop the 

practice that has been such a terrible problem in our country? According to an ATF report in 2000, ‘‘straw purchasing is the most 

common channel of illegal gun trafficking, accounting for almost 

half, 46 percent of all investigations.’’ 

Do you think stronger penalties would help bring down that 

number? If you could comment on it, I think it is a very important 

issue. Keeping guns out of the hands of criminals should be a top 

priority. 

Law abiding people can own guns. It is not aimed at them. It is 

for criminals, drug dealers, gang dealers. 

Mr. JONES. Congresswoman, I think that is one of our focuses in 

our overall mission. As I mentioned before, a federal firearms trafficking statute would be helpful. I know there are increasing efforts 

across the country by U.S. attorneys, with whom we work closely, 

to do more straw purchasing or providing a gun to a prohibited person. I know that the U.S. Sentencing Commission has recently revised their guidelines. 

To get back to your point, a federal firearms trafficking statute 

would be helpful. I would push back a little bit about these cases 

are not being done. I think they are being done by U.S. attorneys 

around the country. The challenge is more getting the fact pattern. 

The lipstick phenomenon, a criminal defendant who has no criminal history who may be in a relationship with a bad guy and ends 

up in federal court for the first time is different from someone who 

has a pattern of purchasing weapons, doing the sort of aggregation 

and selling them on the black market. 

Mrs. MALONEY. The testimony of your agents was that it was a 

slap on the hand or a paper notice. Possibly we should do a joint 

GAO request to find out how straw purchasers are treated when 

they are convicted. That was the point they made. They don’t try 

to convict because the penalties are so weak. 

The bill we worked on increases penalties. I believe it is supported by your department and other law enforcement. I think it 

is worth looking at. I think a GAO report of what does happen to 

traffickers would help. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentlelady. 

We now go to the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Collins. 

Mr. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is an issue for me. I thank you for your service and also the 

military as well. 

43 

As I was growing up one of the things I always found was when 

one officer did something wrong, everything else got tight and you 

were basically assuming that everybody was the same. 

This disturbs me in the sense that the storefront operations were 

overall looked after from DC but handled in the agency in the different areas. I am going to concentrate specifically on Atlanta because some of your comments today are not consistent with actions 

that happened in Atlanta and I want to talk about that. 

Atlanta Blaze, the storefront operation, bought stolen goods, including guns stolen from police squad cars. How many stolen police 

weapons did ATF agents in Atlanta recover? 

Mr. JONES. I know a bit about Atlanta Blaze because it is one 

of the historical ones. It is not something that was going on when 

I came onboard. 

Mr. COLLINS. I understand that but today’s hearing title was undercover storefront operations involving all of these. I would have 

expected you to have been at least briefed on all the ones that were 

going on especially given the problems that existed in many of 

them. 

Mr. JONES. I do understand that in Atlanta there were some 

weapons that ended coming into the storefront that were the result 

of thefts steps from other police officers. 

Mr. COLLINS. What did the ATF agents do with the weapons 

when they purchased them and where are those weapons now? 

Mr. JONES. I believe the case is completed. I am not certain as 

I sit here today where the weapons are now. 

Mr. COLLINS. Are you aware that the Atlanta Police Department 

spent considerable resources interviewing witnesses and attempted 

to recover the weapons because ATF agents did not report the guns 

as recovered? Why didn’t the ATF properly return the guns to the 

Atlanta Police Department? 

Mr. JONES. I am not aware of that. 

Mr. COLLINS. Did you look over these storefront operations before 

coming to testify today? 

Mr. JONES. I spent a lot of time with Fearless, I spent less time 

with the four that occurred before I got onboard at ATF. 

Mr. COLLINS. Knowing that this was overall, I am concerned in 

the sense that this was a storefront and there were multiple operations to know this. 

Going back to another one, there was an ATF agent who bought 

one high point pistol stolen from a police car Christmas 2010. As 

of November 2013, the Fulton County police department still had 

the firearm listed as stolen. A representative said the department 

had not received any notification that the weapon was recovered. 

I will ask the question and I will assume the answer at this 

point, has the agency returned it to Fulton County? 

Mr. JONES. I am not sure. 

Mr. COLLINS. Has the AFT informed Fulton County that the ATF 

had recovered this weapon? 

Mr. JONES. I am not certain. 

Mr. COLLINS. This is why I said earlier the interesting part to 

me was that in St. Louis, there seems to be this wonderful cooperation between local enforcement and the ATF but in Atlanta, there 

wasn’t and right now we are still looking at this. 

44 

I will ask another question. Does ATF have a policy about notification of other law enforcement agencies when weapons or other 

possessions are obtained by ATF agents either by purchase through 

a storefront operation or otherwise? 

Mr. JONES. I know that we do run traces at a storefront. 

Mr. COLLINS. That is not what I asked. I asked do you have a 

policy of notifying other agencies when they recover or buy stolen 

police equipment? 

Mr. JONES. I don’t want to step out of bounds here and say for 

certain that we do but I would be surprised if we did not have a 

policy about recovering weapons that are traced back to a law enforcement. 

Mr. COLLINS. That is concerning in itself. I am going to ask that 

be made available to my office and the committee as soon as possible. That should be an easy find. I wonder if there is someone behind you who probably already has that information. If you don’t 

have a policy, that needs to change. If you do have a policy, I would 

ask why it is not being followed in this situation. 

Talking about the cooperation between agencies in St. Louis that 

my colleague spoke of, why was this run so seemingly different in 

Atlanta where you have other law enforcement agencies spending 

a lot of time trying to track down their own weapons when ATF 

had the weapons? Why is there such a disconnect here? 

Mr. JONES. Let me first say we have good working relationships 

with Atlanta and Fulton County and all over Georgia. 

A disconnect and an individual circumstance, an isolated circumstance about the repording mechanism, going back and people 

looking for weapons and not cooperating, that is disappointing to 

me to hear. I understand your concerns about the lack of communication. 

Mr. COLLINS. I am still concerned about where these weapons actually are. You used an interesting word a moment ago. Based on 

the questions about the woman who was investigated, you said, you 

keep a list and you used the word naughty part. It is very interesting to me because I think that wording is good because it reminded me of the song we’re making lists, we’re checking it twice 

to see who is naughty or nice and maybe the naughty part here 

was they applied for a C4 permit. That might be why they got more 

scrutiny than they should have. 

This Atlanta operation bothers me. I do want to hear those answers and please get those to my office and the committee as soon 

as possible. 

Thank you for your service. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

We now go to the gentlelady from New Mexico, Ms. Grisham. 

Ms. GRISHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Jones, I appreciate that several times during this hearing, you have talked about the problems you are aware of, your obligation and efforts with ATF and that these efforts be productive 

and minimize risk to the public and maximize the operation and 

to take responsibility for the things that don’t work. 

I absolutely appreciate that. Considering as many of us have the 

focus on local operations and that ATF did conduct a storefront operation in Albuquerque in 2010, I think I share an obligation to the 

45 

same degree to assure that the problems with the Inspector General and the ATF and the public are adequately addressed. 

Like many other members here today, I am specifically concerned 

about how our agency interacts with persons with mental illness or 

mentally disabled individuals. I want to get right to policies and 

training. 

It is my understanding that the FBI and local law enforcement, 

in fact I know unequivocally that local law enforcement in Albuquerque uses CIT, crisis intervention teams and their effort is to 

calm persons who have a mental illness, disorder or an issue in 

lieu of arresting them. We know that minimizes risk frankly on 

both sides. 

I did a quick search right here in the committee to see how easy 

it is to find what kind of training and policies exist. In fact, it is 

clear that there is substance abuse recognition, cultural sensitivity, 

there is training on developmental disorders, personality disorders 

and I could go on because the list I found in a quick search was 

fairly exhaustive giving me the impression that there is a considerable body of training to help someone identify when they are dealing with a population or individual in this situation. 

I want to know do folks at ATF take part in this training? 

Mr. JONES. As stated before Congresswoman, that is something 

that is really important to us given some of the things we have 

learned over the last year or so. It is not only unique to ATF but 

I think the Albuquerque Police Department and police departments 

around the country are in a position where they need to have enhancement about not just people who are developmentally disabled 

but people with mental illness because those circumstances, particularly in the work ATF does, where you have street level interaction, it is important to have. 

Ms. GRISHAM. You repeatedly say that what you do is deal with 

sort of conduct, that there is no way to identify an individual per 

se. I also recognize you have to be cautious about creating an environment where there is discriminatory in every operation. 

You have known for quite some time. These trainings have been 

available and around for a long time, at least a decade. That is my 

personal knowledge in my community. I guess we could argue 

today in a place like Albuquerque they might need some significant 

retooling but did you do that a year and a half ago, are you doing 

that training right now given the circumstances? 

Mr. JONES. Absent specific public safety threat, we don’t target 

developmentally challenged individuals. As you mentioned, we target convicts. 

Ms. GRISHAM. You are clearly engaged now in a situation where 

you know you have these problems and as a result, it seems to me 

that training is a good thing. Are you engaging ATF in these training protocols that clearly exist in like operations and for like law 

enforcement officials in the Department of Justice and in local police forces? 

Mr. JONES. We have had discussion about how we integrate that 

into our training. 

Ms. GRISHAM. But you haven’t done it, you are looking at it? 

Mr. JONES. The ones that you identified, the sort of prepackage, 

whatever the Los Angeles Police Department has done. 

46 

Ms. GRISHAM. I am going to guess that these are packages, if we 

are going to call them that, I would hope these are sophisticated, 

evidence-based training protocols that exist in the Department of 

Justice that should be readily available for a model like ATF. I am 

flabbergasted that they are not available to you and that you are 

not utilizing them. 

It seems to me you guys don’t have any written policies or procedures to deal with these issues. I would ask, because my time is 

up, the following. My expectation is that you share a role in making sure we have best practices, we mitigate risk both to officers 

and absolutely to the public, that you immediately replicate these 

policies and procedures, make them relevant to the operations you 

are responsible for and you bring the evidence that you have a protocol and a program in place for training immediately back to this 

committee for our review and discussion. 

I don’t understand why that is not the case. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentlelady. 

We now go to the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Gosar. 

Mr. GOSAR. Director, thank you for being here. 

What was the ATF like before you were sworn in? 

Mr. JONES. Generally speaking, I had a lot of interaction going 

back 20 years from an AUSA time. ATF was one of those organizations I enjoyed working with both as a prosecutor and as a US attorney the first and second time. 

I have a lot of respect for the work they did with me personally 

and Minnesota generally. The developments that happened in certain field divisions in your part of the world is unfortunate. 

Mr. GOSAR. That is where I want to go. Wouldn’t you agree we 

had some bad habits down in the Phoenix field office? 

Mr. JONES. Sometimes bad things happened. 

Mr. GOSAR. You said there were not. There are those of us on one 

side of the law and those on the other side of the law have to be 

held accountable in the same way, wouldn’t you agree? 

Mr. JONES. Yes. 

Mr. GOSAR. Looking at it from the outside—I am a dentist and 

a politician, Mr. Jones, so I look at structure. You have to hold people accountable for improper decisions, do you agree? 

Mr. JONES. I agree with that, sir. 

Mr. GOSAR. There are certain actions that require termination? 

Mr. JONES. Depending on the actions, in the government setting, 

yes, there are certain things that would cross that line. The public 

sector has a little bit more structure than the private sector in 

terms of terminating somebody’s employment. 

Mr. GOSAR. The lack of faith from the private sector or our constituents is that bureaucrats are not held to the same accountability. Would you agree with that? 

Mr. JONES. Not necessarily. 

Mr. GOSAR. If you get on main street America, they find that bureaucrats have a whole different aspect of accountability. 

First, I would like to enter into the record a letter to you from 

Josephine Terry, Brian Terry’s mom. 

Chairman ISSA. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. GOSAR. I want to highlight some of the inquisitions here. 

47 

You are familiar with Inspector General Michael Horowitz’s comprehensive report or review of ATF’s Operation Fast and Furious 

and related materials, are you not? 

Mr. JONES. I am. 

Mr. GOSAR. In that case, and I want to cite for her because she 

does it so eloquently, ‘‘identified several current Department of Justice and ATF employees who bore particular responsibility for the 

many mistakes made in Operation Fast and Furious. These employees included ATF agents Hope McAllister, David Voth, George 

Gillett, William Newell, Emory Hurley, and Michael Morrissey. 

‘‘I understand these individuals have continued their employment with the Department of Justice despite the findings of the Inspector General’s report.’’ 

It has come to our attention that the ATF’s Professional Review 

Board had previously recommended termination for some of these 

individuals. Is that true? 

Mr. JONES. We provided that information. 

Mr. GOSAR. Is that true, yes or no? 

Mr. JONES. That material has been provided. 

Mr. GOSAR. Yes or no. 

Mr. JONES. That material has been provided. 

Mr. GOSAR. That was a yes, right? 

Mr. JONES. Yes. 

Mr. GOSAR. Why weren’t these followed through? 

Mr. JONES. I am not quite sure I understand. 

Mr. GOSAR. Were there any terminations? For example, let’s take 

one, William Newell. Were they then fired? 

Mr. JONES. There are people who have retired, there are people 

who have been disciplined. 

Mr. GOSAR. I would like to enter in the record a letter from the 

U.S. Department of Justice to you, Mr. Chairman, dated April 1, 

2014 outlining summaries. 

Chairman ISSA. Without objection, it will be placed in the record. 

Mr. GOSAR. It doesn’t show that. There is no accountability for 

Fast and Furious. 

From the guy who ran his own dental practice on accountability, 

it seems when we come into the place of service, the head of the 

ATF, that it is dysfunctional at least when you start looking at the 

Phoenix office, when you have such a quandary with Fast and Furious, we would actually hold people accountable. 

This was hardly unaccountable. The Brian Terry family has no 

answers whatsoever, wouldn’t you agree? 

Mr. JONES. It is unfortunate that communication has not been 

what it should be in terms of anyone who has lost a person in the 

line of duty. 

Mr. GOSAR. I want to highlight it even further because you had 

a conversation with the gentleman from Atlanta. 

The Terry family was talking to Michelle Terwilliger, a special 

FBI agent, about communication and about Atlanta. It seems you 

have problems all the way around in communication with other law 

enforcement officers. 

‘‘Imagine to the shock, I am learning that the members of the 

ATF field division and the US Attorney’s Office in Arizona had chosen to keep the important piece of information about one of those 

48 

guns found at the Brian Terry murder was not brought forward.’’ 

Once again, a gentleman was talking about Atlanta not talking. 

We understand there were problems in Milwaukee with the FBI 

and communications. Does ATF have a problem playing with other 

law enforcement offices? 

Mr. JONES. No. 

Mr. GOSAR. My question to Mr. Meadows is why would we want 

to play in Chicago with the highest rate of death with guns, why 

would we want to work with those? It is just an exercise in communication. 

Chairman ISSA. The gentleman’s time has expired but you may 

answer. 

Mr. JONES. We work very closely with federal, State and local in 

Chicago and every place that we are in. Our partnerships with 

both our federal brothers and sisters within the department and at 

the local police level are actually critical to our performing our mission. That partnership includes communication. 

While it is not perfect across the country and while personalities 

do impact sometimes that level of communication, organizationally, 

that is something we highly value and couldn’t do our job without 

that partnership. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

We now go to the gentlelady from the District of Columbia. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Jones. 

I was at another hearing but I did want to be here to hear your 

testimony and at least ask a question. 

First of all, I commend the ATF for looking to innovative risk 

bearing ways to get at gun running in our society. I am going to 

defer to your expertise. I know this much, thugs consistently outsmart law enforcement. We can stay ahead of them by tailoring to 

the location to what you think will work there. 

If all we do is second guess without having the available expertise, then I am not sure we will get at this. I am not going to tell 

you or wonder why you haven’t done one of this storefronts and 

this or that city. I would like to know off the record whether there 

has been any such storefront here in the District of Columbia. I 

would appreciate your writing our office on that question. 

We would be a city not unlike Milwaukee. Milwaukee, like the 

District, has declining crime. They had one of these storefronts. I 

don’t know if we do but they had one and some guns were stolen 

from an agent’s vehicle. That is one of the risks that you always 

have when there is a storefront or for that matter, in any area 

where there are people who want to get at guns and use them. 

After the Milwaukee experience, you ordered the Office of Professional Responsibility and Security Operations to conduct a full investigation. I have seen that report. I am pleased to say it pulls 

no punches. 

I do know that the field agents, in the absence of guidance, were 

trying to put together ways on their own of how to run a storefront 

operation. That bothered me, that there was no guidance on something as risky and I think, frankly, worth the innovation as one of 

these operations. 

49 

After that Professional Responsibility report, did you take any 

action in response, Mr. Jones? 

Mr. JONES. We took actions both with respect to reviewing how 

they were operated. We took action with respect to the lessons 

learned both from a resource standpoint, from a management 

standpoint and we took action to try to minimize the chance that 

those issues identified in Milwaukee didn’t happen again. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Jones, there was no written guidance. Did you 

develop a manual or other operations guidance after the Milwaukee 

incident? 

Mr. JONES. That is one of the things that did emerge from that, 

the level of understanding, because we have a cadre of experienced 

agents but sometimes that knowledge is difficult. One of the things 

we have done is generate sort of a best practices manual. 

That is separate and apart from what is in our order with respect to undercover operations and specifically storefront operations. That is more the parameters of what the rules of the road 

are. This secondary document and the follow on training, when 

they are done, is sort of a go by. 

It is law enforcement sensitive but it does talk about the things 

that you should consider, the things that need to be considered to 

successfully operate a storefront. That has been memorialized in a 

storefront operations manual. 

Ms. NORTON. I am not sure the committee staff has had an opportunity to review this manual. Have you submitted the manual? 

Mr. JONES. I believe because of the sensitivity with the methodologies that it may have been reviewed. We have had staff over 

to ATF headquarters to look at manuals. 

Ms. NORTON. I would appreciate your submitting the manual so 

the committee could take a look at it. I think it would help, with 

some the questions that have been raised, for people to know there 

is written guidance and how that guidance proceeds. 

Chairman ISSA. If the gentlelady would yield? 

Ms. NORTON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. I would certainly join with you. I do want to be 

careful that manuals that are not available to the public, if we take 

them into the committee as committee documents, then they become broadly available normally. 

Ms. NORTON. I certainly didn’t think they would become broadly 

available because then the thugs would have them. 

Chairman ISSA. If the members of your staff would like an in 

camera review and after an in camera review you want specific 

portions to be provided to the committee, I would join with you in 

it but I would prefer that we continue the process whenever we 

have that kind of sensitive information of having staff see it and 

only if we believe we need some portion do we request that portion. 

It is also less burdensome on the agency. 

Mr. JONES. I understand there was an invite to have staff come 

over to our shop and look at it. As the Chair mentioned, if anything 

peaks your interest, we can follow up but there is a certain level 

of sensitivity about an operational manual. 

Ms. NORTON. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you, Mr. 

Jones. 

50 

I would like my staff to be able to see some of this as well because as I said, this is a city that had high gun incidents go down 

and we would be very interested in looking at what you are doing 

with respect to the storefronts. 

As long as my staff could also see that, I would certainly understand the admonitions of the Chairman and Mr. Jones. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. We will now go to the gentleman from Kentucky, 

Mr. Massie. 

Mr. MASSIE. Mr. Jones, thank you for coming to testify today. It 

is quite an honor and opportunity to be able to ask you questions. 

I am an avid gun collector. I try to convince my wife that these 

are investments but she says how are they investments if you are 

never going to sell them. She has a point but it causes me to wonder and also watching some collectors who have been prosecuted 

and arrested but collectors and the firearms dealers and the ATF, 

itself, wouldn’t be better served if we had some very bright lines 

drawn between what is a straw purchaser and who is not, and also 

who is and is not a dealer. 

You are kind of left to interpret a very gray area. I have always 

wondered wouldn’t it be helpful if Congress defined that line a little bit better for you or somebody did between dealer and collector, 

for instance, the number of sales per year? 

Mr. JONES. It is always helpful to have Congress define in a statute where certain lines are drawn. It is difficult, on occasion, for 

us with regulatory authority to do that with clarity all of the time 

both because of the process and the dynamics as you mentioned. 

Mr. MASSIE. You think it could be helpful if we did. I just think 

it helps people who want to obey the law to have it drawn very 

brightly. That is something I would advocate for. 

This next question may not seem related to this hearing but it 

is because maybe we can avoid another hearing if I could get one 

question answered. 

Are you familiar with Ares Armor recently raided in California? 

They make 80 percent polymer loaders for AR–15s? Are you familiar with them? 

Mr. JONES. I am familiar with that. That is an active criminal 

investigation so I will say up front there are limitations about that. 

Mr. MASSIE. Understood. The search warrant is public and that 

sort of thing so I think we can talk some about it. 

One thing that was requested was a list of their 5,000 customers. 

Ares Armor maintains they are not in the business of manufacturing firearms. If this is true, then what would justify the ATF 

having a list of their 5,000 customers? 

Mr. JONES. I hope you understand, Mr. Massie, that there are 

certain things that are on the public record particularly with the 

TRO. My understanding is the search warrant is still sealed and 

it is an active criminal investigation. 

Generally speaking, I think in those circumstances where we are 

investigating the potential, this is specific to Ares Armor, one of 

the things of interest for someone who may be illegally manufacturing firearms is the list of who they have sold them to, not necessarily to look at the list but to see if there are witness leads 

about the circumstances. 

51 

Mr. MASSIE. That will be up to the court to decide whether Ares 

Armor was manufacturing firearms, not Congress and not the ATF. 

Mr. JONES. I think in between there is prosecutors involved also. 

Mr. MASSIE. Right, but the jury gets to decide. 

Mr. JONES. Yes, they do. 

Mr. MASSIE. If the jury finds they were not manufacturing firearms, can we have some assurance from you that list of 5,000 people they were selling material to won’t be kept by the ATF? 

Mr. JONES. I think in the normal circumstance of investigations 

that would be something that would migrate into a prosecutor’s office and at the conclusion of a case. 

Mr. MASSIE. I would hope the 5,000 names required and if Ares 

was found not to be manufacturing firearms, that would destroy 

that list because the list was otherwise ill gotten. 

A quick question on this particular case in Wichita, Kansas. 

Agents let felons leave the store with guns on at least three occasions. One man brought in two AK–47s to sell but agents only had 

enough money to buy one. The man, a felon, was allowed to leave 

with the other AK–47. This was at Bandit Trading in Wichita, 

Kansas, one of the storefronts. 

Why would ATF agents let a felon leave a storefront with an 

AK–47? 

Mr. JONES. I am not certain of all the circumstances but I think 

in an undercover setting, first and foremost, we may not know the 

individual is prohibited until after the fact. Someone who comes 

into the store, even if there is a suspicion that they are crime guns, 

the status of the person selling the gun isn’t always known. 

Mr. MASSIE. Do you think the agent should have alerted local 

law enforcement that there was a felon in possession of an AK–47? 

Mr. JONES. I think if they had an opportunity with cover teams 

and the right staffing, that the circumstances may warrant away 

from the premises some intervention. 

Mr. MASSIE. According to my information, this weapon was never 

recovered. Is that true? 

Mr. JONES. I am not certain as I sit here today of all the details 

of that particular circumstance other than the fact that there may 

have been a lack of knowledge about someone being prohibited 

when they tried to sell the weapon. 

Mr. MASSIE. If you found out your agents knowingly let a felon 

leave the store with an AK–47, would you be concerned? 

Mr. JONES. Yes. 

Mr. MASSIE. Would you follow up on that for us? 

Mr. JONES. Yes. 

Mr. MASSIE. Thank you. 

I yield back my time. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

Director, I am going to be very brief with one quick round of 

questioning. 

Chairman ISSA. The Monitored Case Program, the subject today, 

how frequently was Operation Fearless briefed to the ATF headquarters, to your knowledge? 

Mr. JONES. We spent a lot of time on the Monitored Case Program because one of the recommendations in the IG report on Fast 

52 

and Furious was the lack of communication as to what was going 

on out in the field. 

The Monitored Case Program we have in place isn’t the same as 

it was a year ago or two years ago. It has grown and we have 

learned more. I think at the core of it is the push/pull dynamic of 

what comes up and how we get it, and what is pulled up and how 

we get it. 

The circumstance with respect to Operation Fearless was it did 

not migrate up the food chain. It got briefed up and not all the information on the ground got briefed to the SAC which means it 

didn’t get to the Deputy Assistant Director. That is a phenomena 

we have worked hard to make sure both by looking at our own case 

management system and proactively engaging with the special 

agents in charge about what is coming up. 

Chairman ISSA. If I could interpret that accurately that would 

mean that the answer to the question of how frequently was headquarters briefed, the answer was you weren’t. It didn’t get to you 

is what you are saying. 

Mr. JONES. There are a number of cases on the Monitored Case 

Program that I don’t get a personal briefing on. 

Chairman ISSA. I actually asked about headquarters so I was including your deputy. 

Mr. JONES. The Deputy Assistant Directors do, based on their region, have regular interaction. Fearless was up to the Deputy Assistant Director in terms of the information flow but I think the 

glitch that we learned was what the special agent was hearing was 

positives and not problems. 

Chairman ISSA. Is it fair to say that although our information 

shows that Operation Fearless was briefed to headquarters nine 

times, that, in fact, those briefings were insufficient to uncover the 

flaws in Operation Fearless? 

Mr. JONES. Yes. 

Chairman ISSA. How often were you briefed on Monitored Case 

programs in a setting in which you knew you were being briefed 

on Monitored cases? 

Mr. JONES. We have monthly meetings. 

Chairman ISSA. Essentially in 12 months, 12 times, roughly? 

Mr. JONES. Yes. 

Chairman ISSA. Were you ever briefed on Operation Fearless separate from the Monitored Case Program in some capacity? Did the 

deputy come in and say I want to talk to you? 

Mr. JONES. Me personally? 

Chairman ISSA. Yes, you personally. 

Mr. JONES. No. 

Chairman ISSA. No. This is redundant somewhat but did you 

ever meet with anybody at main Justice concerning Operation 

Fearless? 

Mr. JONES. No. 

Chairman ISSA. Did you ever meet with anybody at DOJ’s Criminal Division about Operation Fearless? 

Mr. JONES. In terms of time frame? 

Chairman ISSA. If the answer is yes, then the follow up would 

be, when was the first time and what was the subject? 

53 

Mr. JONES. There were discussions with the Justice Department 

and particularly the IG when we launched internal affairs to go out 

there and do the dive but until certain issues came to light, no. 

This was field division, United States Attorney’s office, Milwaukee 

Police Department—February to September of 2012, so it is not an 

extended storefront operation. It was up and down pretty quickly. 

Then the concerns were brought to light. 

Chairman ISSA. Would it be fair to say that your first meeting 

with DOJ, the Criminal Division, would have been after the end of 

Operation Fearless as an ongoing operation? 

Mr. JONES. In terms of the Criminal Division, I don’t recall any 

interaction. I briefed up on challenges we were having and we 

talked to the United States attorney about cases generated out of 

that operation. 

Chairman ISSA. You didn’t talk with anyone at the DAG’s office 

or anyone of that sort? 

Mr. JONES. We have regular meetings, sort of here is where we 

are. 

Chairman ISSA. Is it possible that in the last 12 or 14 months, 

you did have conversations about Operation Fearless with DAG? 

Mr. JONES. I think it would be fair to say we have had conversations about storefronts generally but I don’t recall having specifics 

on this particular operation in Milwaukee. 

Chairman ISSA. Final question, I guess, following up on that. 

This has been an area of interest of the Deputy Attorney General, 

the storefronts and the concerns about operations? 

Mr. JONES. Collectively all the DOJ enforcement community, US 

attorneys and the Deputy Attorney General have had a lot of discussions about managing risk in the last several years. New policies across the board within the Department of Justice are applicable to all law enforcement and US attorney offices. 

There have been discussions with the DAG about managed risk 

and information flow generally. 

Chairman ISSA. Mr. Cummings, do you have anything? 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes. 

Chairman ISSA. If you don’t mind, I will let you close. We will 

go to Mr. Jordan briefly. 

Mr. JORDAN. I thank the gentleman. 

I want to be clear, you were Acting Director of ATF when ATF 

visited Ms. Englebrecht’s place of business. You have been Acting 

Director since August of 2011, to my understanding? Have you 

been Acting Director since August 2011? 

Mr. JONES. My first day in that building was I think the last day 

in August. 

Mr. JORDAN. You were Acting Director when ATF visited Ms. 

Englebrecht in 2012 and 2013? 

Mr. JONES. Yes. 

Mr. JORDAN. I mentioned briefly at the end of my first round Mr. 

Tom Perez. We had a hearing in this committee regarding what 

took place in St. Paul, what we have called the quid pro quo. 

I am interested because Mr. Perez was in the Civil Rights Division and Ms. Bosserman is the person heading the investigation in 

the IRS. I am curious about your interaction with Mr. Perez in 

54 

your role as US attorney but while you were also Acting Director 

of ATF. 

When he contacted you about the Newell case and the fact that 

you had career attorneys recommending intervention, that was 

subsequently changed and you did not intervene based on conversations you had with Mr. Perez. Can you walk me through that 

briefly? 

Mr. JONES. It is more than briefly. I had a lot of discussion during my confirmation process about those interactions. It is fair to 

say I have never talked to Mr. Perez about anything related to Ms. 

Englebrecht. 

Mr. JORDAN. How did it happen you had career attorneys tell you 

we need to intervene, this is a good case, $62 million potential 

fraud against the Federal Government and then you decide not to 

do that? 

During the hearing we had on this issue in this committee, the 

Democratic witness told us that is highly unusual when you have 

career attorneys recommending you take a certain course of action 

and then it is subsequently changed. How was that decision 

reached? Did you agree with Mr. Perez, did you ultimately sign off 

on it, how was it decided? 

Mr. JONES. That is something beyond the scope of why I am here 

today and I am not really prepared to go into a deep dive as to 

what went on with my experiences as United States Attorney. 

Mr. JORDAN. I would argue it has a lot to do with this committee. 

We have spent countless hours investigating the IRS situation and 

how Mr. Perez at the Civil Rights Division, how Barbara 

Bosserman gets to be the lead investigator in the Justice Department investigation of this. We think Tom Perez is involved. I am 

trying to figure out how this may relate. 

We know Mr. Perez flew to St. Paul, got things changed, we 

know the United States Government did not intervene even though 

there were millions of dollars at stake we could have potentially recovered. We know that didn’t happen after Tom Perez talked to you 

and after your career attorneys said we should intervene. I think 

it is highly relevant. 

Mr. JONES. I provided a substantial amount of information to 

Senator Grassley’s staff on the record that I am sure they would 

share with you transcripts of my prior testimony. 

Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank you. 

We will now go to the Ranking Member. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Director, first of all, I want to thank you for your 

testimony. It has been very helpful. I think you shed a bright light 

on the good, the bad and the ugly, and I do emphasize good. There 

is a lot of good here. On the other hand, as you said, it has to be 

done right. 

As I was sitting here, I was thinking you can never say thank 

you enough. Again, I say thank you to you and to the ATF. Let me 

tell you why. On Good Friday of last year, I went to observe an autopsy of a young African American man who had been killed—shot 

to death by so-called friends. I intentionally wanted to go and see 

an autopsy of a gunshot victim. 

55 

It was interesting when I watched that autopsy they apparently 

shot him in the head right behind the ear and it came out over the 

eye, one bullet. When I looked at the hole, I swear it looked to be 

about half the size of a penny on one side but on the other side, 

it looked like the size of a quarter. 

Then they showed me something like a CAT scan of what happened when the bullet went through his head and how everything 

just exploded. I followed that case because I was curious. 

Then I had the situation with my nephew at Old Dominion who 

was murdered three years ago. Some people came into his room at 

5:00 a.m., a third year honor student at Old Dominion, and killed 

him, blasted his head. Two days later, I went to his apartment and 

his brains and blood were splattered all over the walls. 

That is what your folks try to prevent. I want them to know that 

it is so very, very important. They may not get all the thanks and 

they have been through some hell. I know they have. We watched 

the Fast and Furious situation and mistakes were clearly made. I 

was glad to see you come in and that was one reason I went to 

your swearing in because I had so much hope for this organization 

because it is so important. 

I think we need to make sure under all of these circumstances 

that we get it right because I think when anything goes wrong, it 

is wrong but nobody pays a lot of attention to the right. The mission must go on. 

There are kids in my neighborhood who tell me they could get 

a gun if they have the money faster than they can get a cigarette. 

That is real. You all have a tough situation to deal with but I am 

so thankful that the ATF exists because if it didn’t, we would have 

to invent it. 

The expertise that your people bring, the dedication, I don’t want 

what happened with regard to Fast and Furious to have a chilling 

effect on any of them. I want them to understand they have a mission that is bigger than they are. It is about trying to make sure 

people are safe and trying to make sure they address the issues of 

guns being in the hands of the wrong people doing the wrong thing. 

Again, I want to say thank you. I am looking forward to our 

briefing. I am hoping that the policies that your team has brought 

together now or put in place will address the kind of issues that 

came up in Fast and Furious. I am hoping with regard to the storefront situation that things are in place so we don’t have to go 

through this kind of situation again. 

I think the best words you could have said, at least music to my 

ears, are that if we cannot do it right, we are not going to do it 

at all. It reminds me of my first trip to Israel many years ago. They 

had a saying which rings in my head. It said, if we are not better, 

we will not be. I thank you for pursuing the best. 

The Chairman and I were kind of joking about who wants this 

job but we know that it is the love of country, it is the love of trying to make a difference and have an impact in your time on this 

earth. We appreciate it. 

Mr. JONES. With respect to that last comment, I have a lot of 

friends who ask me too but over the last two and a half to three 

years, I have gotten to know this organization. I have been to ever 

field division and met a lot of people outside of headquarters, 

56 

agents, investigators, and support staff. They have a great mission 

and this is really a great organization. 

They understand. We all understand that we have to refill that 

well of credibility because of recent events and mistakes. I share 

with you without any hesitation that the folks at ATF are dedicated to a very important mission. It is probably the most resilient 

law enforcement organization I have ever come across. 

In the face of a lot of adversity related to both enforcement of the 

Gun Control Act to recent snafus and mistakes made and for a lot 

of different reasons, they are tough as nails and are completely 

dedicated to the mission of making our communities safer from gun 

violence, arson and people who would use explosives to hurt folks. 

It is an honor to be at the helm of this organization. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank you for your testimony. 

We are going to stand adjourned. If you don’t mind, the Ranking 

Member and I would like to see you in the back for a couple of minutes. 

Thank you. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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