J-E01001-17

2017 PA Super 294

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

LEROY MALDONODO

Appellee No. 1191 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered March 25, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003453-2014

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, PANELLA, SHOGAN, LAZARUS, OLSON, 

DUBOW, MOULTON AND SOLANO, JJ.

OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 12, 2017

The Commonwealth appeals from the March 25, 2015 order precluding 

it from introducing at trial two jail call recordings in which Appellee, speaking 

Spanish, allegedly made inculpatory statements. This sanction was imposed 

because the Commonwealth ostensibly failed to comply with an earlier order 

to provide Spanish-to-English transcriptions of 464 other recorded phone 

calls in addition to the two calls the Commonwealth intended to use. We 

reverse.1 

____________________________________________

1 The Commonwealth timely appealed from the March 25, 2015 order 

imposing the instant sanctions and has certified, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-E01001-17

- 2 -

The instant charges arose from an alleged robbery. Following 

postponements for reasons unrelated to the instant dispute, trial was set for 

February 10, 2015. On February 8, 2015, Appellee filed a motion for 

discovery sanctions. This motion represented that Appellee had requested in 

April 2014, inter alia, “any and all written or otherwise recorded statements 

attributed to the defendant, as well as any transcripts and recordings of any 

electronic surveillance.” Motion for Discovery Sanctions, 2/8/15, at ¶ 3. The 

assistant district attorney had provided, on February 6, 2015, digital copies 

of 466 calls placed by Appellee while he was incarcerated. These tapes 

spanned November 13, 2013, to November 19, 2014. The Commonwealth 

informed counsel at that time that it intended to introduce a total of six 

minutes from two of these phone calls. 

On February 10, 2015, the trial court held a hearing. Counsel argued 

that the Commonwealth was required to produce transcriptions of each call, 

translated into English, based upon the theory that she “ha[s] an obligation 

and a duty [to review], and my client has a right for me to review all of the 

tapes, not just the six minutes that the Commonwealth wants to use.” N.T. 

Motions Hearing I, 2/10/15, at 13. The Commonwealth countered that it 

had provided counsel with a translation of the portions of the phone calls 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

311(d), that the order will terminate or substantially handicap its 

prosecution. 
J-E01001-17

- 3 -

that it intended to introduce at trial, “not for official evidence . . . [but] for 

[counsel’s] benefit so that [counsel] can know exactly what is on the two 

phone calls[.]” Id. at 14-15.2 

The trial court declined to impose sanctions, but granted a 

continuance so that defense counsel could review the tapes. The 

Commonwealth thereafter agreed to provide official transcriptions of “these 

tapes.” However, as we shall explain, the parties take different views of 

what, if anything, the Commonwealth promised to transcribe when the 

prosecutor made this statement.

[COMMONWEALTH]: Your Honor, in the meantime, I’m going 

to have these tapes officially transcribed by a certified 

translator, not from the court, and provide a copy to Counsel in 

the meantime.

I would obviously ask for the fastest date possible. I know you 

have a busy calendar. I think it would take me no more than 30 

days to get these transcribed.

. . . . 

[APPELLEE]: I would ask the tapes to be provided 60 days prior 

to trial, the transcripts.

THE COURT: We’re just going to give it a regular date because I 

don’t know if he can send it to you 60 days prior if we give it a 

shorter date.

____________________________________________

2 The assistant district attorney spoke Spanish and provided this initial 

translation. Later, Spanish-speaking detectives prepared a separate 

transcription. 
J-E01001-17

- 4 -

[APPELLEE]: If we have a short date, Your Honor, could it be 30 

days prior to trial?

[COMMONWEALTH]: That’s fine.

THE COURT: Okay. Corrine, let’s see if we can find a date.

What I’m going to say is that they have to be passed three 

weeks prior to trial because I want to make sure there is enough 

time for the transcription to be completed and done right so that 

you can review it.

Id. at 21-22. The court did not enter a separate written order; however, the 

docket sheet contains an entry stating, “Commonwealth to get prison calls 

transcribed and passed to Defense 3 weeks prior to trial.” Docket entry, 

2/10/15. 

The Commonwealth did not have any calls transcribed by a certified 

translator. As a result, Appellee filed a second motion for sanctions, 

claiming that the trial court “held that the Commonwealth must translate all 

of the tapes provided and provide such tapes to the defense three weeks 

prior to trial.” Motion for Sanctions II, 3/20/15, at 2, ¶ 8 (unnumbered, 

emphasis added). The motion represented that, on March 2, 2015, the 

prosecutor informed defense counsel that his office lacked the resources to 

translate the tapes and suggested to counsel that she review the translation 

with her client so the parties could “agree on a version that accurately 

presents the contents of the phone calls.” Id. at 3, ¶ 9. Appellee rejected 

this notion, claiming that it would “force [Appellee] to provide evidence 

against himself and to aid in his own prosecution[.]” Id. at 3, ¶ 1. 
J-E01001-17

- 5 -

At another hearing, the prosecutor explained to the court that he had 

requested a certified translator, but his superiors refused to pay the fee. 

N.T. Motions Hearing II, 3/25/15, at 5. Instead, he had Spanish-speaking 

detectives create an additional transcript to replace the previous version. 

Appellee’s counsel reiterated her contention that counsel was “still 

completely handicapped in the sense that I don’t have the other 464 calls 

that are still not provided to me.” Id. at 6-7. The trial court granted the 

motion and precluded the Commonwealth from introducing any of the tapes. 

The Commonwealth filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied.

The Commonwealth simultaneously filed a notice of appeal and a 

concise statement of matters complained of on appeal. The trial court 

authored its opinion in response, and the matter is ready for our review. 

The Commonwealth presents the following issue:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in suppressing audio 

recordings of defendant's telephone calls made in prison unless 

the Commonwealth also translated the calls from Spanish to 

English and created translated transcripts of the recorded 

statements?

Commonwealth’s brief at 4.

The Commonwealth asserts that it was required only to disclose the 

two tapes which it informally translated, and avers that it supplied Appellee 

with the full set of tapes as a matter of policy and professional courtesy. 

The Commonwealth further argues that the other 464 calls are not material, 

in that they “are personal conversations that have no relevance to any issue 
J-E01001-17

- 6 -

in this case.” Commonwealth’s brief at 15. Concomitantly, the 

Commonwealth asserts it cannot possibly be sanctioned for refusing to 

transcribe and translate something it was not required to turn over in the 

first instance. Additionally, the Commonwealth maintains the trial court was 

not authorized to require the Commonwealth to prepare transcriptions and 

translations of any call in that the criminal discovery rule speaks only to 

evidence that actually exists. Finally, the Commonwealth states that 

Appellee was not prejudiced by its failure to supply a certified translation. 

I

Applicable law and standard of review

We first set forth the basic principles governing the Commonwealth’s 

discovery obligations in a criminal case. The applicable rule of criminal 

procedure declares a preference for informal discovery, contemplating that 

the parties will “make a good faith effort to resolve all questions of 

discovery, and to provide information required or requested under these 

rules as to which there is no dispute.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(A). Rule 573 states 

that informal discovery must take place before a party may request 

discovery via motion. Upon motion by the defendant, the rule delineates the 

items that the Commonwealth must supply: 

(B) Disclosure by the Commonwealth.

(1) Mandatory. In all court cases, on request by the defendant, 

and subject to any protective order which the Commonwealth

might obtain under this rule, the Commonwealth shall disclose to 
J-E01001-17

- 7 -

the defendant's attorney all of the following requested items or 

information, provided they are material to the instant case. The 

Commonwealth shall, when applicable, permit the defendant's 

attorney to inspect and copy or photograph such items.

(b) any written confession or inculpatory statement, 

or the substance of any oral confession or 

inculpatory statement, and the identity of the person 

to whom the confession or inculpatory statement 

was made that is in the possession or control of the 

attorney for the Commonwealth;

. . . . 

(g) the transcripts and recordings of any electronic 

surveillance, and the authority by which the said 

transcripts and recordings were obtained.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 573.

Rule 573 does not abridge or limit the Commonwealth’s duty to 

provide discovery pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and 

its progeny. “In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that the 

suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 

request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or 

to punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 

Commonwealth v. Burke, 781 A.2d 1136, 1141 (Pa. 2001) (quotation 

marks omitted). “There are three components of a true Brady violation: 

The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is 

exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been 

suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must 

have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999).
J-E01001-17

- 8 -

However, the rule imposes greater obligations upon prosecutors than 

the Brady requirements. For instance, (B)(1)(b) requires production of a 

defendant’s written confession. Nevertheless, our cases frequently analyze 

whether a particular discovery sanction was justified by analyzing whether 

the evidence was required to be disclosed pursuant to Brady. See e.g. 

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 122 A.3d 367 (Pa.Super. 2015) (reversing 

order precluding Commonwealth from introducing evidence, analyzing

Brady). That one would draw upon Brady principles in determining 

materiality is unsurprising since the rule limits disclosure to “material” items, 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B), and “material for Brady purposes” has a particular 

meaning. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Willis, 46 A.3d 648 (Pa. 2012) 

(noting that admissibility at trial is not a prerequisite to disclosure under 

Brady). 

If the Commonwealth has violated its discovery obligations, the trial 

court is authorized to impose sanctions: 

(E) Remedy. If at any time during the course of the 

proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a 

party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order 

such party to permit discovery or inspection, may grant a 

continuance, or may prohibit such party from introducing 

evidence not disclosed, other than testimony of the defendant, 

or it may enter such other order as it deems just under 

the circumstances.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 573 (emphasis added).
J-E01001-17

- 9 -

Presently, the Commonwealth disclosed all of the evidence by 

disseminating to Appellee digitized copies of all of Appellee’s prison calls. 

Nonetheless, the trial court prohibited inclusion of the two material tapes, 

presumably under the emphasized catch-all provision. We apply the 

deferential abuse of discretion standard to any employed remedy. “The trial 

court has broad discretion in choosing the appropriate remedy for a 

discovery violation.” Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 130 A.3d 697, 718 

(Pa. 2015). The term discretion 

imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill so as to 

reach a dispassionate conclusion, and discretionary power can 

only exist within the framework of the law, and is not exercised 

for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judges. 

Discretion must be exercised on the foundation of reason, as 

opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary 

action. Discretion is abused when the course pursued represents 

not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is 

manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or 

where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill will.

Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 712 A.2d 749, 751 (Pa. 1998) (citation 

omitted).

II

Trial court’s justifications for sanction

Since the trial court has broad discretion in choosing a discovery 

remedy, we begin with examining why the court imposed the sanction. The 

trial court set forth two alternative theories justifying the sanction, and we 

address each in turn. The first theory relied upon contractual law principles, 
J-E01001-17

- 10 -

with the trial court stating that the Commonwealth promised to provide 

certified transcriptions and translations of all 466 calls. The second theory 

relied upon a finding that transcriptions and translations were needed so 

that trial counsel could effectively discharge her duties under the Sixth 

Amendment. 

III

First rationale: A contract to provide discovery

A

Sanctions for breaking a purported promise to transcribe all calls

We begin with the contractual theory, as the trial court reasoned that 

the Commonwealth could be sanctioned for its failure to provide certified 

transcriptions and translations of all calls as it purportedly promised to do, 

regardless of whether the Commonwealth was required to supply those 

materials under the law.

The key dispute is what, if anything, the Commonwealth promised to 

do when the assistant district attorney stated at the first sanctions hearing, 

“Your Honor, in the meantime, I’m going to have these tapes officially 

transcribed by a certified translator[.]” N.T. Motions Hearing I, 2/10/15, at 

21. The trial court apparently interpreted this statement to mean that the 

Commonwealth promised to provide certified transcriptions of all tapes, as 

opposed to the two it intended to introduce at trial. The trial court states 

that “[T]he parties reached a binding agreement for the Commonwealth to 
J-E01001-17

- 11 -

provide defense counsel with written transcriptions[.]” Trial Court Opinion, 

9/17/15, at 10 (citing Commonwealth v. Hemingway, 13 A.3d 491 

(Pa.Super. 2011)).

Both parties extensively address this theory and invoke contractual 

law principles. “Both [A]ppellee and the lower court relied on this 

representation, and the agreement was memorialized by a court order 

evident in the docket. The Commonwealth never contested that [an] 

agreement was made before the trial court.” Appellee’s brief at 17. The 

Commonwealth, on the other hand, claims that there was not an agreement 

at all. “It is settled that for an agreement to exist, there must be a meeting 

of the minds.” Commonwealth’s brief at 22. The Commonwealth highlights 

that, in context, the statement referred only to the two tapes in question, 

since the volume of the other calls was such that a translator would have to 

“transcribe and translate more than 15 Spanish-language recordings a day, 

seven days a week” to comply with the thirty-day time period mentioned by 

the prosecutor. Commonwealth’s brief at 14. 

Appellee, like the trial court, relies upon Hemingway as controlling 

the question of whether sanctions are authorized based on a breach of a 

promise to supply discovery. We find that Hemingway is distinguishable. 

Hemingway involved a Commonwealth appeal from an order precluding 

thirty-four witnesses from testifying due to the prosecution’s failure to 

provide the five co-defendants with transcripts of the witnesses’ grand jury 
J-E01001-17

- 12 -

testimony. At a pretrial conference, the Commonwealth had agreed to 

provide copies of the grand jury testimony transcripts by a particular date. 

The order outlining that agreement explicitly stated that the failure to do so 

would result in an order preventing those witnesses from testifying. Id. at 

494. The Commonwealth provided the materials four days late. Consistent 

with its earlier order, the trial court precluded the Commonwealth from 

calling the witnesses.

The Commonwealth appealed, and we observed that the trial court 

could validly sanction the failure to abide by the order even though the order 

resulted from the Commonwealth’s own agreement to provide the materials 

by the specific date. Id. at 498. However, we determined that the sanction 

was unwarranted since the Commonwealth had substantially complied with 

the order, and, looking at the “specific facts of this case and the rationale 

behind the . . . order, we are constrained to agree . . . that this sanction 

yielded too extreme a result.” Id. at 502. Pertinent to the instant appeal, 

we made this additional observation: 

This does not mean that a trial court cannot preclude evidence 

or testimony when a binding agreement is reached between the 

parties, the parties have actual knowledge of the sanction that is 

to be employed for failing to abide by the terms of the 

agreement, and one or more of the parties abjectly refuse to 

comply. However, the record does not support such a finding in 

the instant case.

Id. at 503. 
J-E01001-17

- 13 -

Appellee argues that the aforementioned passage applies herein 

because, unlike in Hemingway, the Commonwealth did not comply with its 

promise to any extent. We find that the case is inapposite. The 

circumstances of this case are quite different since a criminal defendant is 

entitled to review a witness’s grand jury transcripts following his or her 

testimony at trial. Pa.R.Crim.P. 230(B)(2).3 Thus, Hemingway is better 

understood as a case about when the defendants would receive the 

transcripts, not, as here, whether they would receive those items at all. 

Moreover, as the Commonwealth aptly notes, the instant court order 

required the Commonwealth to generate evidence. “Nothing in the rule 

obliges the Commonwealth to create transcripts so that it has something to 

disclose.” Commonwealth’s brief at 16 (emphasis in original). In 

comparison, grand jury testimony must be recorded and transcribed by a 

court reporter. Pa.R.Crim.P. 556.8(A) (“Proceedings before an indicting 

____________________________________________

3 Rule 230. Disclosure of Testimony Before Investigating Grand Jury

 . . . .

(B) Defendant in a Criminal Case:

. . . . 

(2) When a witness in a criminal case has previously testified 

before an investigating grand jury concerning the subject matter 

of the charges against the defendant, upon application of such 

defendant the court shall order that the defendant be furnished 

with a copy of the transcript of such testimony; however, such 

testimony may be made available only after the direct testimony 

of that witness at trial.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 230.
J-E01001-17

- 14 -

grand jury, other than the deliberations and voting of the grand jury, shall 

be recorded by a court reporter or by a suitable recording device, and a 

transcript made.”). Therefore, the quoted caveat from Hemingway cannot 

be divorced from the grand jury context. 

Additionally, even assuming that the Commonwealth’s ambiguous 

promise to transcribe “these calls” referred to all 466 of the calls as opposed 

to the two calls it intended to introduce at trial, there is no indication that 

the Commonwealth had knowledge of the sanction for noncompliance. 

Hence, Hemingway does not support Appellee’s position. 

B

Appellee’s alternative contractual theory

In his substituted en banc brief, Appellee now argues that the sanction 

was justified because the Commonwealth was required to provide certified 

translations of only the two material calls.

In its renewed argument to this Court en banc, the 

Commonwealth sets up a fallacious straw man, claiming that the 

trial court and the Panel of this Court required the 

Commonwealth ‘to transcribe and translate, at its own expense, 

464 recordings of irrelevant and inadmissible prison telephone 

calls defendant made on other occasions.’ However, the record 

shows that the trial court ordered the Commonwealth to 

transcribe and translate only the two pertinent audio recordings.

Appellee’s brief at 6. 

This statement is rather remarkable considering Appellee continuously 

represented to the trial court that the Commonwealth was obligated to 
J-E01001-17

- 15 -

transcribe all 466 calls. Indeed, Appellee himself interpreted the trial court’s 

February 10, 2015 order as requiring transcription of all the calls. In his 

response to the Commonwealth’s motion to reconsider the sanction, 

Appellee stated “The [c]ourt’s initial ruling was legally sound and should be 

enforced. The Commonwealth should be required to produce English 

transcripts for all the tapes.” Appellee’s Response to the Commonwealth’s 

Motion for Reconsideration, 4/5/15, at 2. 

Plainly, the trial court interpreted the prosecutor’s ambiguous 

statement, “I’m going to have these tapes officially transcribed by a certified 

translator,” to refer to all 466 calls. In the interest of judicial economy, we 

proceed to examine whether the Commonwealth was required to supply 

certified transcripts of the two material calls.4 

The Commonwealth argues that the order cannot be justified even on 

these limited grounds because it cannot be ordered to provide evidence in a 

form demanded by the defense, i.e., a transcription prepared by a certified 

translator. The Commonwealth argues that such an order is inconsistent 

with Commonwealth v. Robinson, 122 A.3d 367 (Pa.Super. 2015). We 

agree.

____________________________________________

4 The Commonwealth does not concede that it even promised to supply 

certified translations and transcriptions of the two material calls. Rather, it 

describes the quoted statement as “the Commonwealth’s statement of intent 

to transcribe” those calls. Commonwealth’s brief at 13.
J-E01001-17

- 16 -

 Robinson involved a Commonwealth appeal from an order 

sanctioning the Commonwealth for failing to provide transcripts of victims’ 

interviews. The Commonwealth had charged multiple defendants with 

various counts of physical and sexual abuse of minor victims. Id. at 370. 

As part of the investigation, the victims were interviewed by the Philadelphia 

Children’s Alliance (“PCA”). These interviews were taped, copied, and 

provided to all defendants. The trial court subsequently granted defendants’ 

request to order the Commonwealth to prepare verbatim written 

transcriptions of all interviews. We reversed, citing, in part, the Brady

doctrine of accessibility discussed supra. Since the defendants had equal 

access, we concluded that nothing obligated the Commonwealth to provide 

the evidence in a particular form. 

Instantly, the Commonwealth provided Appellees during 

discovery with DVD copies of all the victims' PCA interviews. 

Despite this disclosure, Appellees filed motions to compel as well 

verbatim written transcripts of all video interviews, alleging the 

transcripts were necessary for effective cross-examination and 

impeachment of the victims because playing the video interviews 

during cross-examination would be inefficient and cause 

unnecessary delay. The court granted the motions and ordered 

the Commonwealth to transcribe the interviews. When the 

Commonwealth ultimately demurred, the court precluded the 

Commonwealth from calling the victims to testify at Appellees' 

respective trials. We think the court's action was in error.

The Commonwealth has no duty to provide evidence in a 

form that the defendant demands for the convenience of 

the defense. Appellees had no general right of discovery. Once 

the Commonwealth disclosed the victims' video DVD interviews, 

the evidence was no longer in the exclusive control of the 
J-E01001-17

- 17 -

Commonwealth. Thus, the evidence was equally available

to Appellees in a source other than a written transcript. 

Id. at 373 (emphases added; quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Appellee responds that Robinson is inapplicable because the trial 

court ruling therein terminated the case, while here the Commonwealth is 

merely precluded from introducing the two recordings, and thus the remedy 

was “not extreme, as it does not end the Commonwealth’s prosecution.” 

Appellee’s brief at 17. We are not persuaded. Robinson did not hold that 

the scope of the remedy was too drastic in light of the violation. Rather, it 

concluded that there was simply no violation to sanction in the first place 

due to the equal access. The same holds true herein. 

We recognize that the trial court was concerned that counsel did not 

actually have access to these calls, as counsel could not understand the 

calls. In Robinson, the interviews were presumably in English and readily 

understood by the attorneys. Thus, we agree that Robinson is not directly 

controlling to that extent. 

However, we cannot agree that certified translations are per se 

required. Robinson holds that a defendant is not entitled to evidence in the 

form he wishes, which is precisely the argument Appellee now makes.5 “The 

____________________________________________

5 We note that Pa.R.Crim. 573(B)(1)(g) requires disclosure of material 

“transcripts and recordings of any electronic surveillance, and the authority 

by which the said transcripts and recordings were obtained.” In this case, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-E01001-17

- 18 -

Commonwealth’s refusal to have a certified interpreter translate and 

transcribe the relevant phone calls into English was an issue of fundamental 

fairness.” Appellee’s brief at 12. Appellee does not explain why fairness 

dictates a certified translation, as opposed to an accurate one, at this 

stage of the proceedings. The Commonwealth correctly notes that Appellee 

has confused what the Commonwealth intends to introduce with what it 

actually introduces at trial. Rule 573’s remedial provision applies at any 

point in the proceedings. If the Commonwealth’s transcriptions supplied in 

discovery deviated from what it actually introduced at trial, nothing prevents 

Appellee from seeking sanctions at that time. 

When addressing whether a remedy is an abuse of discretion, we have 

stated that, “[t]he remedy in the criminal proceeding is limited to denying 

the prosecution the fruits of its transgressions.” In re York County Dist. 

Attorney's Office, 15 A.3d 70, 73 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citation omitted). We 

fail to see any transgression whatsoever under these facts. Appellee does 

not claim that the supplied transcriptions were inaccurate in any way, and he 

refused to speak to his attorney about the matter. Appellee’s Response to 

the Commonwealth’s Motion for Reconsideration, 4/5/15, at 2 (“[Appellee] 

should not be required to help the Commonwealth translate the prison tapes 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

the Commonwealth voluntarily created and provided a transcription, and we 

need not reach the separate question of whether this provision would 

otherwise require the Commonwealth to create one.
J-E01001-17

- 19 -

in any capacity.”). Appellee invokes a number of federal decisions for the 

proposition that “before conversations in a foreign language may be 

submitted to a jury, issues must be addressed about the accuracy of 

the translation[.]” Appellee’s brief at 13 (emphasis added). His citations 

do not support his argument as a matter of persuasion. Consider the 

following passage from United States v. Morales-Madera, 352 F.3d 1 (1st 

Cir. 2003), a case cited by Appellee:

Commonly, the transcripts and the English translations of those 

transcripts are produced by the government and copies are then 

given to the defendant. Sound trial management and 

considerations of fairness caution that the government provide 

these copies to defense counsel adequately in advance, so that 

disputes concerning the reliability of the transcription in 

the original language and of the English translation may 

be brought to the attention of the district court or 

resolved by agreement. Counsel, of course, may agree to 

the accuracy in both senses.

Id. at 8 (emphasis added). Herein, Appellee expressly refused to address 

the accuracy of the transcript provided by the Commonwealth, and, in fact, 

claimed that agreeing to the accuracy of the transcript in any way would 

violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

Reviewing an offer of proof with his attorney to discuss the accuracy of 

what the Commonwealth has already transcribed is not the equivalent of 

forcing Appellee to translate the tapes. Appellee’s argument would 

transform, for example, a pre-trial stipulation to the accuracy of a lab test 

for drugs into a violation of the Fifth Amendment. Since Appellee refused to 
J-E01001-17

- 20 -

even consider whether the supplied transcriptions and translations were 

accurate, it is difficult to see how he was prejudiced in any way. 

C

Applying contractual law principles under these circumstances undermines 

Rule 573’s purpose

While we are satisfied that the sanction cannot be justified on the 

contractual basis, we do not hold that an actual binding agreement or a 

promise to supply discovery that is not otherwise mandated by law is 

immaterial to remedies. Rather, in these circumstances, where there is 

much ambiguity, we find that injecting contractual law principles is 

unwarranted. Rule 573 states a preference for informal discovery and 

encourages the parties to resolve all discovery disputes in good faith.6 

Forcing the Commonwealth to honor a purported promise to translate all 466 

calls, or provide certified translations of the two material calls at its own 

expense, without analyzing whether it was actually obligated to do so would 

simply encourage future litigants to avoid good faith efforts, knowing that 

those efforts might be later construed as a binding promise. According to 

the trial court and Appellee’s logic, the Commonwealth would be in a 

____________________________________________

6 We do not suggest that bad faith efforts are irrelevant to remedies or 

whether the Commonwealth has prosecuted the case with due diligence as 

required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. There is no suggestion herein that the 

prosecutor’s statement was made in bad faith, as the prosecutor’s superiors 

refused to pay the translator’s fee. 
J-E01001-17

- 21 -

superior legal position before this Court if it had withheld the evidence it 

determined was non-material and forced Appellee to fully litigate the 

discovery issues. Clearly, such an outcome would do violence to the rule’s 

preferences. Moreover, we have previously held that review of a discovery 

remedy requires an analysis of what the Commonwealth’s discovery 

obligations were. See Commonwealth v. Jordan, 125 A.3d 55 (Pa.Super. 

2015) (en banc) (reviewing, where trial court sanctioned Commonwealth for 

failing to abide by order to disclose identity of confidential informant, 

whether trial court could lawfully order disclosure). 

We recognize that Hemingway, supra suggests that a promise to 

provide discovery is itself a pertinent consideration to the question of 

remedies. We do not dispute that general proposition. Rather, in this case, 

where the scope of the Commonwealth’s asserted promise is unclear and 

there is no knowledge whatsoever of a sanction for failing to turn over the 

material, we do not think Rule 573’s purpose would be served by upholding 

the sanction under this theory.

Having concluded that the contract theory cannot justify the sanction 

under these facts, we turn our attention to whether the Commonwealth was 

required to provide transcriptions of all phone calls in the first instance. 
J-E01001-17

- 22 -

IV

Trial court’s alternative rationale: Sixth Amendment

The trial court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion establishes that it also 

imposed sanctions due to its belief that the Commonwealth was required not 

only to disclose all calls, but also provide translated transcriptions as an 

independent constitutional command outside the realm of discovery caselaw. 

The trial court reasoned: 

In this case, the prison tapes are discoverable, on request by 

defense counsel to the Commonwealth, under Pa.R.Crim.P. 

573(B)(1)(b) as an inculpatory statement or Pa.R.Crim.P. 

573(B)(1)(g) as a recording of any electronic surveillance. The 

trial court has broad discretion in deciding the admissibility of 

evidence and in choosing the appropriate remedy for a discovery 

violation. Under Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(E), "if at any time during the 

course of the proceedings, it is brought to the attention of the 

court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court 

may order such party to permit discovery or inspection, may 

grant a continuance, or may prohibit such party from introducing 

evidence not disclosed, other than testimony of the defendant, 

or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the 

circumstances." In fact, the Sixth Amendment demands that in 

all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 

effective counsel and to be confronted with the witnesses against 

him. U.S. Const. amend. VI. Thus, Defendant's Sixth 

Amendment rights would be violated without a timely 

produced transcription of the tapes and render counsel 

ineffective. 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/17/15, at 9 (emphasis added). The trial court also 

stated that “[T]he Rule of Completeness demands that a defendant 

possesses a right to admit the rest of the transcript so that the defendant 

may provide context for an allegedly inculpatory statement or correct 
J-E01001-17

- 23 -

misleading evidence[.]” Id. at 11. Hence, the trial court determined that 

the Commonwealth was required to provide transcriptions of all 466 tapes so 

that defense counsel could adequately prepare for trial. 

We find that the trial court’s ruling is a misapplication of the law, and 

therefore represents an abuse of discretion warranting reversal. 

A

Disclosure applies only to material evidence

First, the trial court misunderstood the Commonwealth’s discovery 

obligations. Pursuant to both Brady and Rule 573, the Commonwealth was 

only required to disclose material evidence. Nonetheless, Appellee 

represented, and the trial court accepted, that he was entitled to 

transcriptions of all calls in order to engage in a fishing expedition to find out 

whether any of the calls provided helpful context. Simply put, Appellee did 

not establish that the calls were material, and, since the Commonwealth 

represented that the calls were immaterial, then it need not have provided 

them.7 In this respect, we note that Appellee speaks Spanish, can review 

____________________________________________

7

 The Commonwealth asserts that 464 of the 466 calls do not contain 

material evidence as a matter of law. Nothing in the record corroborates or 

dispels that conclusion, as the trial court determined it was required to turn 

over all the material on the theory that potentially relevant Brady items 

were contained within the calls. The record obviously does not contain 

transcriptions of all calls since that very point is at issue. It is more accurate 

to state that the Commonwealth has represented, for purposes of its 

discovery obligations, that the remaining 464 calls are immaterial. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-E01001-17

- 24 -

the calls, and can assist counsel in identifying any helpful material within 

those calls. 

The fact that the Commonwealth provided more than it was required 

cannot be used to its detriment. To hold otherwise would create perverse 

incentives. Brady claims typically arise following conviction, when the 

defendant seeks a new trial based on the failure to turn over evidence. 

However, as the United States Supreme Court has stated, the post-trial 

Brady standard logically applies to what must be disclosed pre-trial. 

First, in advance of trial, and perhaps during the course of a trial 

as well, the prosecutor must decide what, if anything, he should 

voluntarily submit to defense counsel. Second, after trial a 

judge may be required to decide whether a nondisclosure 

deprived the defendant of his right to due process. Logically the 

same standard must apply at both times. For unless the 

omission deprived the defendant of a fair trial, there was no 

constitutional violation requiring that the verdict be set aside; 

and absent a constitutional violation, there was no breach 

of the prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose.

Nevertheless, there is a significant practical difference between 

the pretrial decision of the prosecutor and the post-trial decision 

of the judge. Because we are dealing with an inevitably 

imprecise standard, and because the significance of an item of 

evidence can seldom be predicted accurately until the entire 

record is complete, the prudent prosecutor will resolve 

doubtful questions in favor of disclosure. But to reiterate a 

critical point, the prosecutor will not have violated his 

constitutional duty of disclosure unless his omission is of 

sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's 

right to a fair trial.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________
J-E01001-17

- 25 -

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1976) (emphases added). 

See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) (“[A] prosecutor anxious 

about tacking too close to the wind will disclose a favorable piece of 

evidence. This is as it should be.”). 8 

Herein, the Commonwealth provided Appellee with the unfettered 

ability to review all of the calls despite its averment that 464 of them were 

immaterial, and, therefore, not subject to disclosure. To repeat our 

observation supra, it would do disservice to the rule’s purpose to punish the 

Commonwealth for erring on the side of disclosure. Access to the material 

obviously placed Appellee in a better position, despite the Commonwealth’s 

assurances that 464 of the calls were immaterial, than no access at all. 

The Commonwealth prudently erred on the side of disclosure and 

permitted Appellee to go on a fishing expedition, but the trial court 

determined that the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office must pay for the 

fishing pole, too. This was erroneous. 

B

Discovery obligations are satisfied if the defendant has access

Compounding its materiality error, the trial court ignored the legal 

consequences flowing from the fact of disclosure. Fundamentally, both 

____________________________________________

8 Tacking is a sailing technique used when the wind is blowing against the 

desired direction of the vessel. 
J-E01001-17

- 26 -

Brady and the rule are designed to ensure that the defendant has access to 

material evidence and the ability to review that information. As the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed: “Brady and its 

progeny permit the government to make information within its control 

available for inspection by the defense, and impose no additional duty on the 

prosecution team members to ferret out any potentially defense-favorable 

information from materials that are so disclosed.” United States v. 

Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2005).9 

Emphasis on access is further reflected by the rule’s text requiring the 

Commonwealth, when applicable, to “permit the defendant’s attorney to 

inspect and copy or photograph [discovery materials].” Pa.R.Crim.P. 

573(B)(1). The rule’s Comment states that defendants shall not be charged 

for copies of materials, yet permits the Commonwealth to ask the trial court, 

on a case-by-case basis, to order the defendant to pay some of the 

discovery costs:

The attorney for the Commonwealth should not charge the 

defendant for the costs of copying pretrial discovery materials. 

However, nothing in this rule is intended to preclude the 

attorney for the Commonwealth, on a case-by-case basis, from 

requesting an order for the defendant to pay the copying costs. 

____________________________________________

9 With respect to the “within the Commonwealth’s control” aspect, we 

express no opinion whether the jail calls were otherwise accessible to 

Appellee. The litigation in this case concerns the Commonwealth’s 

obligations once it obtained the calls.
J-E01001-17

- 27 -

In these cases, the trial judge has discretion to determine the 

amount of costs, if any, to be paid by the defendant

Comment, Pa.R.Crim.P. 573. While this comment would appear to be 

directed at cases involving voluminous documentary evidence, its insertion 

makes plain that the purpose of discovery is satisfied when the defense has 

access to the evidence. Nothing requires the Commonwealth to sift through 

the provided materials on the defendant’s behalf. 

C

The Commonwealth was not required to aid counsel’s investigation

Finally, the trial court’s ruling did not distinguish between the fact of 

access and the duty of investigation, but instead collapsed them. This too 

was erroneous.

The prosecution must disclose a police report containing exculpatory 

information, but it need not draw arrows directing counsel’s eyes to the 

helpful paragraphs. The Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance 

of counsel assumes, since counsel is presumed effective, that the attorney 

will read the materials and find the helpful information. This is why 

ineffectiveness claims can be premised upon a failure to adequately 

investigate and review the materials provided to the defense. Thus, the 

onus is on counsel to review all materials to which she has access. See 

Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 712 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc) 

(noting that it can be per se unreasonable for defense attorney to conduct 
J-E01001-17

- 28 -

no investigation into known witnesses); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 

(1985) (discussing prejudice inquiry “where the alleged error of counsel is a 

failure to investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence”). 

However, the court herein mistakenly transformed the Sixth 

Amendment guarantees of effective counsel and confrontation of witnesses 

into a generic pre-trial right of discovery. The trial court cites no authority 

for that proposition, and we are aware of none. “The Sixth Amendment 

concerns implicated in the Brady rule focus on whether the prosecutor's 

failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence deprived the defendant of a 

fair trial.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 727 A.2d 1089, 1094 (Pa. 1999) 

(citing Agurs, supra); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) 

(“There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case[.]”); 

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53 (1987) (plurality) (“The ability to 

question adverse witnesses, however, does not include the power to require 

the pretrial disclosure of any and all information that might be useful[.]”).

As the trial court recognized, counsel had a duty to investigate the 

supplied material. The court erred by merging counsel’s duty to investigate 

with the Commonwealth’s duty to disclose.10 If the Commonwealth is secure 

____________________________________________

10 As a general proposition, the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective 

assistance of counsel requires a lawyer to “undertake reasonable 

investigations or make reasonable decisions that render particular 

investigations unnecessary.” Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d 717, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-E01001-17

- 29 -

from a post-trial Brady challenge on the grounds that the evidence was 

disclosed and accessible to defense counsel, it cannot simultaneously be 

precluded from entering portions of that evidence due to sheer speculation 

that counsel, despite that equal access, would presumptively fail to examine 

that material.11 To hold otherwise would be to invert the presumption of 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

735 (Pa. 2000) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 

(1984)). The trial court failed to recognize that counsel had access to an 

obvious source of information in determining what reasonable investigations 

were necessary: her client, since he was a party to each call and spoke the 

language.

11 Equal access paired with the Commonwealth’s assurances of immateriality 

would not necessarily preclude the finding of a Brady violation after trial. In 

United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197 (3d. Cir. 2005), our sister court 

discussed the analytical problems under Brady when a defendant raises a 

post-trial Brady claim, had access to the material, but was assured that the 

material was not helpful: 

Conceptually, we find ourselves at the intersection between two 

particular branches of the Brady doctrine. Our jurisprudence has 

made clear that Brady does not compel the government to 

furnish a defendant with information which he already has or, 

with any reasonable diligence, he can obtain himself. It is 

equally clear, however, that defense counsel's knowledge of, and 

access to, evidence may be effectively nullified when a 

prosecutor misleads the defense into believing the evidence will 

not be favorable to the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. 

Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682, 690 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding suppression 

where government appraised defense counsel of the existence of 

certain tapes but also stated that those tapes would be of “no 

value”); Hughes v. Hopper, 629 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 

1980).

At issue, then, is whether the representations made by the 

various government attorneys compel a finding of suppression, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-E01001-17

- 30 -

effectiveness, create a presumption of prejudice, and discourage disclosure. 

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the trial court committed a clear 

abuse of discretion in misconstruing the applicable law.

Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/12/2017

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

where every other pertinent consideration-i.e., (1) the 

mountainous piles of documents, which belonged to Pelullo, (2) 

the government's lack of specific knowledge about the existence 

of favorable, material evidence, and (3) defendant's extended 

access to, and purported knowledge of, particular documentsweighs against such a finding.

Id. at 213 (quotation marks omitted).