ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS

Appellate Court

Pikovsky v. 8440-8460 North Skokie Boulevard Condominium Ass’n, 2011 IL App (1st)

103742

Appellate Court

Caption

TAMARA PIKOVSKY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. 8440-8460 NORTH

SKOKIE BOULEVARD CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., and

ROSEN REALTY AND MANAGEMENT, INC.,Defendants-Appellees

and Third-Party Plaintiffs (Maintenance Hot Line, Inc., and Canopy

Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Canopy Snow Plowing, Third-PartyDefendants).

 District & No. First District, Second Division

Docket No. 1-10-3742

Filed

Rehearing denied

December 27, 2011

February 2, 2012

Held

(Note: This syllabus

constitutes no part of

the opinion of the court

but has been prepared

by the Reporter of

Decisions for the

convenience of the

reader.)

Summary judgment was properly entered for defendant condominium

association in plaintiff’s action for the injuries she suffered when she

slipped and fell on the “icy snow mounds” on the rear-entrance sidewalk

going to the building where her condominium unit was located, since the

Illinois Snow and Ice Removal Act barred her negligence claim against

defendants and the snow removal and disposal ordinance of the city

where the condominium was located did not apply to the sidewalk where

plaintiff fell, because that sidewalk was on private property and was not

a “public way.” 

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 08-L-62033; the

Hon. Roger G. Fein, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on

Appeal

Parad Law Offices, P.C., of Northbrook (Boris Parad, of counsel), for

appellant.

Wiedner & McAuliffe, Ltd., of Chicago (Richard J. Leamy, Jr., Robert H.

Fredian, John E. Bauman and Kristen A. Schank, of counsel), for

appellees.

Panel JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Presiding Justice Quinn and Justice Connors concurred in the judgment

and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 This appeal arises from a July 14, 2010 order entered by the circuit court of Cook County

which granted defendants-appellees 8400-8460 North Skokie Boulevard Condominium

Association, Inc., and Rosen Realty Management Inc.’s (Skokie and Rosen) motion for

summary judgment. On appeal, plaintiff-appellant Tamara Pikovsky (Tamara) argues that:

(1) the trial court erred in finding that the Illinois Snow and Ice Removal Act (745 ILCS 75/1

et seq. (West 2008)) barred her negligence claim against Skokie and Rosen; (2) Skokie and

Rosen violated the Skokie obstructions and snow removal and disposal ordinances (Skokie

Code of Ordinances §§ 90-49, 90-51 (2002)); and (3) the trial court erred in finding that the

IllinoisSnowand Ice Removal Act preempted the Skokie obstructions and snow removal and

disposal ordinances. For the following we reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit

court of Cook County.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 8460 North Skokie Boulevard is a building on the corner of Skokie Boulevard and Lee

Street in the town of Skokie, Illinois. The rear entrance to the building is accessible through

a sidewalk that is adjacent to the building’s parking lot (rear entrance sidewalk). The rear

entrance sidewalk abuts the Lee Street sidewalk. In 2008, the building was owned and

controlled by 8440-8460 North Skokie Boulevard Condominium Association, Inc. The

building was managed byRosen Realty and Management, Inc. On October 18, 2007, Skokie

and Rosen entered into a contract with CanopyEnterprises, Inc., d/b/a CanopySnow Plowing

(Canopy). The contract prescribed that Canopywould plow away the snow in the parking lot

of the building during the winter from November 15, 2007 through April 1, 2008. On

November 10, 2007, Skokie and Rosen entered into a contract with Maintenance Hot Line,

Inc. (Maintenance Hot Line). The contract prescribed that Maintenance Hot Line would

provide daily, weekly, monthly and seasonal janitorial services for a period of one year.

-2-
Maintenance Hot Line’s duties included removing snow from the Lee Street sidewalk.

Neither contract provided for snow removal on the rear entrance sidewalk. The Canopy

contract stated that Canopy would provide snow removal services for area other than the

parking lot at an extra cost upon request. Skokie and Rosen never requested that Canopy

remove snow from the rear entrance sidewalk.

¶ 4 On February 21, 2008, Tamara was a resident of 8460 N. Skokie Boulevard, Skokie,

Illinois. On that day, Tamara was returning home from a visit with her mother and attempted

to use the rear entrance sidewalk to get to the building. Tamara claims that she slipped and

fell on the rear entrance sidewalk due to “icy snow mounds.” As a result of the fall, Tamara

suffered a fractured left hip and remained in the hospital from February 21 to February 27,

2008. Tamara claims that the icy snow mounds were formed by snow that was plowed from

the parking lot onto the rear entrance sidewalk that leads to the building. During his

deposition, George Lipp (Lipp), co-owner of Canopy, stated that sometimes he plowed snow

from the parking lot onto the rear entrance sidewalk and other times he plowed snow to the

perimeter of the parking lot. Lipp stated that Canopy was never asked to deposit snow in

anothermanner. Tamara also claims that the snow and ice mounds were melting and freezing

over on the rear entrance sidewalk during the entire winter and that the piles could reach up

to four or five feet high.

¶ 5 On July 28, 2008, Tamara filed a complaint for negligence against Skokie and Rosen in

the circuit court of Cook County. Tamara claimed that Skokie and Rosen, as owners,

operators and controllers of the condominium building, failed to exercise reasonable care by

creating an unsafe and dangerous condition of unnatural accumulation on the rear entrance

sidewalk. On August 27, 2008, Skokie and Rosen filed an answer and third-party complaint

for contribution against Maintenance Hot Line and Canopy. In their answer and third-party

complaint, Skokie and Rosen denied all of Tamara’s allegations and pled those same

allegations against Maintenance Hot Line and Canopy. The parties exchanged discovery and

on May 28, 2009, Tamara filed supplemental responses to Skokie and Rosen’s request to

produce and Maintenance Hot Line and Canopy’s request to produce. The supplemental

responses contained a “declaration” by Chad Paul, a resident of 8460 N. Skokie Boulevard. 1

The declaration stated that plow trucks plowed snow onto the rear entrance sidewalk creating

mounds that were icy and dangerous throughout the entire winter. On June 12, 2009, Tamara

was deposed. On July 24, 2009, Lipp was deposed. On February 22, 2010, Umut Ates, owner

of Maintenance Hot Line, was deposed.

¶ 6 On April 30, 2010, Skokie and Rosen filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to

section 2-1005 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West

The declaration is a one-page document that contains eight statements from a resident of 1

Tamara’s building regarding the ice and snow mounds on the rear entrance sidewalk and Canopy’s

plowing procedures. The declaration contains the resident’s signature below the statements and a

verification that is signed by the resident as well. The declaration appears to be an attempt by

Tamara to present a document that functions as an affidavit. The declaration was filed with the trial

court; however, it was not presented to the court and not included in Tamara’s June 2, 2010 response

opposing summary judgment.

-3-
2010)). Skokie and Rosen claimed that the Illinois Snow and Ice Removal Act (the Act) 2

(745 ILCS 75/2 (West 2008)) granted them immunity from liability for negligence arising

out of snow and ice removal on residential sidewalks. On June 2, 2010, Tamara filed a

response to Skokie and Rosen’s motion for summary judgment claiming that: (1) Skokie and

Rosen were not protected by the Act because they never actually attempted to remove snow

from the rear entrance sidewalk and thus are not of the class of owners protected; (2) Skokie

and Rosen breached their duties to remove an unnatural accumulation of snow and ice and

protect the foreseeable plaintiff from harm; (3) Skokie and Rosen violated the Skokie

obstructions and snow and ice removal ordinances (Skokie municipal ordinances) (Skokie

Code of Ordinances §§ 90-49, 90-51 (2002)); (4) the Act does not immunize negligent

removal of snow from the parking lot; (5) Skokie and Rosen’s conduct was willful and

wanton; and (6) Skokie and Rosen have not demonstrated a lack of a genuine issue of

material fact. Tamara did not include the Chad Paul declaration in her response opposing

summary judgment. On July 14, 2010, the trial court issued an order granting Skokie and

Rosen’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court held that the Act provided Skokie and

Rosen with immunity from claims arising from negligent snow and ice removal and that

Skokie and Rosen’s conduct was not willful and wanton. The court also held that the Skokie

municipal ordinances do not apply because: (1) the rear entrance sidewalk is located entirely

on Skokie and Rosen’s property and therefore is not a “public way”; (2) the ordinances are

not public safety measures for which tort liability was intended; and (3) even if one or both

of the ordinances were applicable, they do not supercede or nullify the immunization

afforded by the Act, nor do the ordinances provide a civil remedy.

¶ 7 On August 13, 2011, Tamara filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s order

granting summary judgment. Tamara attached the Chad Paul declaration to her motion to

reconsider. On the same day, Tamara filed a motion for leave to file a first amended

complaint. On September 24, 2010, Skokie and Rosen filed a response to Tamara’s motion

for reconsideration and argued that the Chad Paul declaration should be stricken. On

November 18, 2010, the trial court issued an order denying Tamara’s motion for

reconsideration. The court refused to consider the Chad Paul declaration because Tamara did

not present the declaration to the court, did not include it in her response opposing the

motion for summary judgment, and offered no explanation as to why the declaration was not

available and utilized at the time of the original hearing. Further, the court found that

Tamara’s arguments in her motion to reconsider were the same arguments restated from her

response opposing the motion for summary judgment. The trial court did not rule on

Tamara’s motion for leave to file a first amended complaint. On December 10, 2010, Tamara

filed the notice of appeal.

Canopy also filed a motion for summary judgment on April 20, 2010. However, because

2

the trial court ruled in favor of Skokie and Rosen, it found that the issue of the third-party complaint

against Canopy was moot.

-4-
¶ 8 ANALYSIS

¶ 9 We determine the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in ruling

that the Act barred Tamara’s negligence claim against Skokie and Rosen; and (2) whether

the trial court erred in ruling that the Skokie municipal ordinances were inapplicable in this

case. As a preliminary matter before we consider Tamara’s arguments, we must determine

if this court has jurisdiction. On July 14, 2010, the trial court issued an order granting Skokie

and Rosen’s motion for summary judgment. At this time, Canopy had also filed a motion for

summary judgment but the trial court did not rule on that motion. During oral argument, the

trial court noted that any cause of action against Canopy or Maintenance Hot Line is

predicated on the existence of a cause of action against Skokie and Rosen. Therefore,

because the court ruled that Skokie and Rosen were entitled to judgment as a matter of law

against Tamara, the court reasoned that the issue of Canopy’s motion for summary judgment

was moot and need not be decided. Tamara filed a motion for reconsideration on August 10,

2010. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration on November 18, 2010. Tamara

then filed a timely notice of appeal on December 17, 2010, pursuant to Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 303(a)(1) (eff. June 4, 2008). Therefore, we are able to consider Tamara’s

arguments on appeal.

¶ 10 When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, the standard of review is de novo.

Ragan v. Columbia Mutual InsuranceCo., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 349, 701 N.E.2d 493, 496 (1998).

The reviewing court must construe the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party and will reverse an order granting summary judgment if it determines that a genuine

issue of material fact exists. Schulenburg v. Rexnord, Inc., 254 Ill. App. 3d 445, 449, 627

N.E.2d 16, 19 (1993).

¶ 11 We first examine Tamara’s argument that the trial court erred in ruling that the Act

barred her negligence claim against Skokie and Rosen. The Act contains two relevant parts,

which state:

“§ 1. It is declared to be the public policy of this State that owners and others residing

in residential units be encouraged to clean the sidewalks abutting their residences of

snow and ice. The General Assembly, therefore, determines that it is undesirable for any

person to be found liable for damages due to his or her efforts in the removal of snow or

ice from such sidewalks, except for acts which amount to clear wrongdoing, as described

in Section 2 of this Act.” 745 ILCS 75/1 (West 2008).

“§ 2. Any owner, lessor, occupant or other person in charge of any residential

property, or any agent of or other person engaged by any such party, who removes or

attempts to remove snow or ice from sidewalks abutting the property shall not be liable

for any personal injuries allegedly caused by the snowy or icy condition of the sidewalk

resulting from his or her acts or omissions unless the alleged misconduct was willful or

wanton.” 745 ILCS 75/2 (West 2008).

Issues of statutory construction are subject to de novo review. In re Estate of Dierkes, 191

Ill. 2d 326, 330, 730 N.E.2d 1101, 1103 (2000). The court must give effect to the intent of

the legislature. Id. at 331, 730 N.E.2d at 1104. In order to do so, the court must first look at

the plain language of the statute. Id.

-5-
¶ 12 Tamara points out that the purpose of the Act is to encourage owners of residential

property to clean snow and ice off of sidewalks. Thus, she argues that the Act is designed

only to protect those owners that actually make an effort to remove snow and ice from

sidewalks. Tamara argues that Skokie and Rosen never once attempted to remove the snow

and ice mounds from the rear entrance sidewalk and therefore they do not fall under the class

of owners protected by the Act. Tamara claims that the trial court’s interpretation of the Act

would contradict the purpose and the plain language of the Act. She does not cite any cases

in support of her theory. We find this reasoning unpersuasive.

¶ 13 In this case, Skokie and Rosen had contracts with both Canopy and Maintenance Hot

Line regarding snow removal, among other services. Canopy was in charge of clearing snow

from the building’s parking lot and Maintenance Hot Line was in charge of shoveling snow

and ice off the Lee Street sidewalk. Both Canopy and Maintenance Hot Line performed their

duties pursuant to their contracts throughout the 2007-08 winter. Thus, Skokie and Rosen

were making a conscious effort to clear snow and ice from their premises in order to make

the building more accessible for residents and invitees. Section 2 of the Act states “[a]ny

owner *** shall not be liable for any personal injuries allegedly caused by the snowy or icy

condition of the sidewalk resulting from his or her acts or omissions unless the alleged

conduct [is] willful or wanton.” (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 75/2 (West 2008). Although

Tamara argues in opposition, we find that Skokie and Rosen’s failure to remove the snow

and ice mounds from the rear entrance sidewalk is an omission in their overall snow removal

efforts.

¶ 14 Tamara also argues that summary judgment should not have been granted because the

snow and ice mounds were unnatural accumulations and Skokie and Rosen breached their

duty to remedy the dangerous conditions. In support of her argument, Tamara cites many

cases that discuss the liability imposed on property owners under common law when they

create unnatural accumulations that result in injuries. She also cites cases that discuss a

property owner’s common law duty to remedy self-created unnatural accumulations and

unreasonablydangerous conditions. However, Tamara fails to recognize that the Act provides

an exception to the common law duty that would otherwise be imposed. Section 2 of the Act

provides immunity for owners of residential property regarding negligent acts or omissions

in attempting to remove ice and snow from sidewalks. 745 ILCS 75/2 (West 2008). “Where,

under the common law, an owner or snow-removal contractor may have been liable for such

injuries where the injuries were the result of an unnatural accumulation of snow and ice

created or aggravated by the owner or snow-removal contractor, theyare now immune unless

their conduct was willful or wanton.” Gallagher v. Union Square Condominium

Homeowner’s Ass’n, 397 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1043, 922 N.E.2d 120, 1207 (2010). Therefore,

it is irrelevant whether the snow and ice mounds on the rear entrance sidewalk were an

unnatural accumulation. Thus, the Act applies to Skokie and Rosen.

¶ 15 Tamara contends that even if the Act does apply to Skokie and Rosen in this case, they

should be held liable for her injuries because their conduct was willful and wanton. Tamara

argues that Skokie and Rosen had actual and constructive knowledge of the snow and ice

mounds, and showed reckless disregard for Tamara’s safetybyfailing to remove the mounds.

Willful and wanton conduct has been defined as “a course of action which shows actual or

-6-
deliberate intent to harm or which, if the course of action is not intentional, shows an utter

indifference to or conscious disregard for a person’s own safety or the safety or property of

others.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kurczak v. Cornwell, 359 Ill. App. 3d 1051,

1060, 835 N.E.2d 452, 460 (2005) (quoting Pfister v. Shusta, 167 Ill. 2d 417, 421, 657

N.E.2d 1013 (1995)). Tamara points out that willful and wanton conduct can also mean “the

failure, after gaining actual or constructive notice of an impending danger, to exercise

ordinary care to prevent harm to others, when that danger poses an unreasonable risk of

harm.” Sullivan v. City of Hillsboro, 303 Ill. App. 3d 650, 655, 707 N.E.2d 1273, 1277

(1999).

¶ 16 In Sullivan, the plaintiff was injured by striking his leg on a submerged pipe in a lake that

was 30 feet from the shore. See generally Sullivan, 303 Ill. App. 3d 650, 707 N.E.2d 1273.

The plaintiff was able to survive a motion for summaryjudgment by alleging that the city had

actual or constructive knowledge of the latent hazard, that the city council had considered

the hazard at council meetings but failed to remove the hazard, and that the plaintiff had no

knowledge of the hazard. Id. at 655, 707 N.E.2d at 1277. In this case, the trial court found

that Tamara presented no evidence that suggested willful andwanton conduct. We agreewith

that finding. Tamara does not present any facts that show that the owners considered the

snow and ice mounds to be dangerous in this case. Further, Tamara did not show that there

were any complaints made about the snow and ice mounds, or any other injuries as a result

of the snow and ice mounds. Tamara attempts to reference the Chad Paul declaration in her

statement of facts and as an appendix to her brief in order to establish Skokie and Rosen’s

knowledge of the snow and ice mounds. However, we refuse to consider the declaration

because the trial court did not consider the declaration in making its ruling. A trial court is

not required to consider evidentiary material submitted for the first time with a motion for

reconsideration after an order granting summary judgment has been entered. Landers v.

Equity Property & Development, 321 Ill. App. 3d 57, 65-66 (2001). Further, a reviewing

court will not supplement the record on appeal with the documents attached to the appellant’s

brief on appeal as an appendix, where there is no stipulation between the parties to

supplement the record and there was no motion in the reviewing court to supplement the

record with the material. McCarty v. Weatherford, 362 Ill. App. 3d 308, 311 (2005). Skokie

and Rosen’s failure to remove the snow and ice mounds from the rear entrance sidewalk does

not amount to reckless disregard for Tamara’s safety. Therefore, Skokie and Rosen’s conduct

was not willful and wanton. We hold that the trial court did not err in finding that the Act

barred Tamara’s negligence claim against Skokie and Rosen.

¶ 17 We next examine Tamara’s argument that the trial court erred in finding that Skokie and

Rosen did not violate the Skokie municipal ordinances and that the ordinances are

inapplicable in this case. “Municipal ordinances are interpreted under the rules governing

statutoryinterpretation.” DTCT, Inc. v. City of ChicagoDepartment of Revenue, 407 Ill. App.

3d 945, 949, 944 N.E.2d 449, 453 (2011). The interpretation of an ordinance is a question

of law and the reviewing court applies the de novo standard of review. Id. at 948, 944 N.E.2d

at 452. The court must give effect to the intent of the municipality by first interpreting the

plain language of the ordinance. Id. at 949, 944 N.E.2d at 449. The reviewing court will not

resort to extrinsic aids of construction if the language is clear and unambiguous. Id.

-7-
¶ 18 There are multiple provisions in the Skokie Code of Ordinances that are at issue in this

case. The Skokie obstructions ordinance states:

“Sec. 90-49. Obstructions Generally.

It shall be unlawful for any person to erect or maintain any obstruction in any street,

sidewalk, alley or public way so as to impede or prevent the free and unrestricted

movement of vehicular or pedestrian traffic, except as is permitted by this article or any

other ordinance of the Village.” Skokie Code of Ordinances § 90-49 (2002).

The Skokie snow removal and disposal ordinance states:

“Sec. 90-51. Snow removal and disposal.

It shall be unlawful for any person to throw, dump or deposit an accumulation of

snow or ice upon any public way. All persons in control of property located in any

business zoned district fronting or abutting paved sidewalks shall remove the snow and

ice from the portions so abutting or, if the snow and ice is too hard for removal, shall

cover it with abrasive materials within 24 hours after a snowfall or freezing

precipitation.” Skokie Code of Ordinances § 90-51 (2002).

The Skokie Code of Ordinances defines the term “public way” as:

“Sec. 106-31. Definitions.

***

Public way means any sidewalk, alley street or other public thoroughfare open to the

use of the public, as a matter of right, for purposes of travel.” Skokie Code of Ordinances

§ 106-31 (2002).

The Skokie Code of Ordinances defines the term “sidewalk” as:

“Sec. 90-31. Definitions.

***

Sidewalk means that portion of a street that is intended for pedestrian travel and is

situated between the curblines or the lateral outside lines of the street and the adjacent

property lines, except that portion thereof defined in this section as a parkway, carriage

walk, service walk or driveway.” Skokie Code of Ordinances § 90-31 (2002).

The Skokie Code of Ordinances defines the term “service walk” as:

“Sec. 90-31. Definitions.

***

Service walk means that portion of the street which is intended for pedestrian travel

to and from the sidewalk to the adjacent property or to and from the street to the

sidewalk.” Skokie Code of Ordinances § 90-31 (2002).

¶ 19 Both parties make arguments regarding the waythis court should interpret the provisions

mentioned above; however, we use the plain language of each ordinance to guide our

interpretation. For the purpose of clarity, we will discuss the Skokie snow removal and

disposal ordinance first. As previously discussed, the trial court found that the rear entrance

sidewalk was located entirely on Skokie and Rosen’s property and could not be considered

a “public way.” Thus, the trial court found that the snow removal and disposal ordinance was

-8-
inapplicable in this case. We agree with this reasoning and find the plain language of the

definitions provision to be instructive. According to the Skokie Code of Ordinances, in order

for an area to be considered a “public way” it must be “open to the use of the public, as a

matter of right, for purposes of travel.” (Emphasis added.) Skokie Code of Ordinances § 06-

31 (2002). In this case, the rear entrance sidewalk is property that is wholly owned by Skokie

and Rosen. The public has no right to travel on this property. Tamara argues that the lack of

signs, barriers or gates between the rear entrance sidewalk and Lee Street sidewalk made it

clear that the owners intended the rear entrance sidewalk to be for the public’s unlimited use.

However, it was completely within Skokie and Rosen’s right to put up a gate or other barrier

between their property and the Lee Street sidewalk if they wanted. The fact that they chose

not to do so does not change the designation of their property from private to public. The rear

entrance sidewalk remains private property regardless of its open appearance, and the public

does not have a right to use it. The rear entrance sidewalk is not a “public way.” Therefore,

the Snow Removal and Disposal ordinance is inapplicable in this case.

¶ 20 Tamara further argues that the Skokie Obstructions ordinance applies in this case because

the rear entrance sidewalk meets the definition of “sidewalk” as prescribed by the Skokie

Code of Ordinances. Skokie and Rosen argue that the rear entrance sidewalk actually meets

the definition of a “service walk” as prescribed by the Skokie Code of Ordinances. We agree

with Skokie and Rosen’s interpretation and look to the plain language of the definitions

provisions for guidance. Section 90-31 defines a “sidewalk” as the portion of the street

between the curblines and adjacent property lines, excluding parkways, carriage walks,

service walks or driveways. Skokie Code of Ordinances § 90-31 (2002). In this case, the rear

entrance sidewalk is not in between the curblines and the adjacent property lines. It is entirely

on the property belonging to Skokie and Rosen. In order for the rear entrance sidewalk to be

considered a “sidewalk” for the purposes of the Skokie Code of Ordinances, it would have

to be outside the private property line. The rear entrance sidewalk clearly fails to meet this

definition.

¶ 21 On the other hand, section 90-31 defines a “service walk” as “that portion of the street

which is intended for pedestrian travel to and from the sidewalk to the adjacent property or

to and from the street to the sidewalk.” (Emphasis added.) Skokie Code of Ordinances § 90-

31 (2002). The phrase “to and from” means that the definition applies to areas that reach

from the sidewalk to the adjacent property, and areas that reach to the sidewalk from the

adjacent property. In this case, the rear entrance sidewalk clearly reaches from Skokie and

Rosen’s property to the Lee Street sidewalk. Therefore, it would be considered a “service

walk” by definition in the Skokie Code of Ordinances. We note the possibility for confusion

as the walkway identified as the “rear entrance sidewalk” is often referred to as a “sidewalk.”

However, this does not change its designation for the purposes of the Skokie Code of

Ordinances. The Skokie Obstructions ordinance only imposes liability on persons that erect

or maintain obstructions on streets, sidewalks, alleys, or public ways. Skokie Code of

Ordinances § 90-49 (2002). Further, section 90-31 specifically excludes service walks from

its definition of “sidewalk.” Therefore, the Skokie Obstructions ordinance is inapplicable in

this case. We hold that the trial court did not err in finding that the Skokie municipal

ordinances were inapplicable in this case and that Skokie and Rosen did not violate the

-9-
ordinances.

¶ 22 Tamara also argues that the trial court erred in finding that the Act preempted the Skokie

municipal ordinances. Although Tamara presents a coherent and persuasive argument, it is

immaterial because we have already decided that the Skokie municipal ordinances do not

apply in this case and were not violated. Because the Skokie municipal ordinances are

inapplicable in this case, there is no conflict to resolve between the ordinances and the Act.

Therefore, this argument has no effect on the resolution of this case and we do not consider

it. The parties also make arguments regarding whether Canopy and Maintenance Hot Line

were agents of Skokie and Rosen. Skokie and Rosen argue that Canopy and Maintenance Hot

Line were not their agents and, therefore, they cannot be held liable for the actions of Canopy

and Maintenance Hot Line. Tamara argues that Canopy and Maintenance Hot Line were

agents of Skokie and Rosen. Also, Tamara argues that even if there was no agency

relationship, Skokie and Rosen could be liable for Canopy and Maintenance Hot Line’s

actions through their relationship as independent contractors. This issue is also immaterial

because we have already decided that Skokie and Rosen are immune from liability under the

Act. Likewise, this issue has no effect on the outcome of this case and will not be considered.

¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

¶ 24 Affirmed.

-10-