J-S61029-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 IN RE: B.K.C., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: K.D., BIRTH MOTHER No. 412 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order February 19, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at No(s): Cp-02-AP-0000140-2015
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 02, 2016 K.D. (Mother) appeals from the order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which involuntarily term inated her parental rights to her minor son, B.K.C. (born November 2011). 1 After careful review, we affirm. B.K.C. has resided with S.C. (Paternal Grandmother ) since his birth. Initially, Father and Mother also resided in the ho me with B.K.C. Allegheny County Children, Youth and Families (CYF) became in volved with B.K.C. in December 2013 when B.K.C.’s sibling was born, and b oth Mother and newborn tested positive for illegal substances. Pa ternal Grandmother was awarded custody of B.K.C. in February 2014. Mothe r and Father both have a history of drug addiction. Father regained custo dy of B.K.C. in September

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1 Father’s parental rights to B.K.C. were involuntar ily terminated at the same proceeding. Father, however, is not a party to thi s appeal.J-S61029-16

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2014, after he had become sober for a period of tim e and was living with Paternal Grandmother. Father relapsed, and custody of B.K.C. was returned to Paternal Grandmother. B.K.C. has remained in Pa ternal Grandmother’s custody since January 2015. CYF developed a family service plan (FSP) for Mothe r, which involved, among other things, cooperating with CYF, recoverin g from substance abuse, stabilizing her mental health, and maintaini ng her relationship with B.K.C. To address her addiction to heroin, Mother became i nvolved with a methadone maintenance program in August 2013. She attended an outpatient program before being incarcerated briefl y. She completed an inpatient treatment program in 2014, after which sh e relapsed. Mother entered a second inpatient program at Family Links, where she was successful enough to transition to the related outp atient program in September 2015. However, Mother was discharged fro m the program about two months later because she was unable to attend h er group sessions three times per week as required. Mother was also requir ed to appear for urine screens as part of the FSP goal to address her drug addiction. Mother consistently had negative screens from September 20 15 to December 2015. Then she had three no-shows, which the agency count ed as positive tests. While Mother was completing the inpatient program at Family Links, her visitation with B.K.C. was fairly consistent. However, following her discharge from the program, Mother has attended sch eduled visitsJ-S61029-16

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approximately half the time. Mother’s visits were reduced to once per week. Mother has occasionally visited B.K.C. at other tim es that Paternal Grandmother arranged. However, Mother has not prog ressed beyond supervised visits with B.K.C. Mother’s mental heal th treatment has consisted of one hourly session per month at the me thadone clinic since her discharge from Family Links. Mother has also been evaluated on separate occasions by two licensed psychologists, Dr. Lawson Bernstein and Dr. Neil Rosenblum. CYF filed a petition seeking to involuntarily termi nate Mother’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(2), (a)(5) and ( b) 2 of the Adoption Act 3

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2 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 provides the following: (a) General rule. — The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:

. . . (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence nec essary for his physical or mental well-being and the condi tions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or ref usal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

. . . (5) The child has been removed from the care of th e parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not (Footnote Continued Next Page)J-S61029-16

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on September 1, 2015. Following a hearing on Febru ary 19, 2016, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights to B.K.C., find ing grounds for termination existed under both subsections 2511(a)( 2) and 2511(a)(5) and that termination was in the best interests of the c hild under subsection (b). Mother filed a timely appeal, in which she raises the following issue for
our review: Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in concluding that Allegheny County Children, Y outh and Families met its burden of proving that termination of [b]irth

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably availab le to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions whic h led to the removal or placement of the child within a reas onable period of time and termination of the parental righ ts would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

. . . (b) Other considerations. — The court in terminatin g the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and wel fare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be termina ted solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequa te housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if f ound to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), th e court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the co nditions described therein which are first initiated subsequ ent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), and (b).

3 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2910.J-S61029-16

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Mother’s parental rights best serve[s] the needs an d welfare of the child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)[?] Brief of Appellant

, at 5. In a proceeding involving the involuntary terminati on of parental rights, the burden of proof is on the party seeking termina tion to establish by clear and convincing evidence the exis tence of grounds for doing so. The standard of clear and co nvincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to co me to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” It is well established that a court must e xamine the individual circumstances of each and every case and consider all explanations offered by the parent to determine if the evidence in light of the totality of the circumstances clear ly warrants termination. In re Adoption of S.M. , 816 A.2d 1117, 1122 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). As to our standard of review, “[w]e revi ew a trial court’s decision to involuntarily terminate parental rights for an a buse of discretion or error of law. Our scope of review is limited to determin ing whether the trial court’s order is supported by competent evidence. In re Adoption of G.L.L. , 124 A.3d 344, 346 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations om itted). Here, it is not contested that CYF presented suffic ient evidence of grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights to B.K.C under section 2511(a). However, as we noted in In re K.J. , 936 A.2d 1129 (Pa. Super. 2007), before granting a petition to terminate pare ntal rights under section 2511(b), a court must: carefully consider the intangible dimension of the needs and welfare of a child—the love, comfort, security, and closeness—J-S61029-16

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entailed in a parent-child relationship, as well as the tangible dimension. Continuity of relationships is also imp ortant to a child, for whom severance of close parental ties is usually extremely painful. The trial court, in considering what situation would best serve the child[]’s needs and welfare, m ust examine the status of the natural parental bond to consider whether terminating the natural parents’ rights would destr oy something in existence that is necessary and beneficial. Id. at 1134. The court must consider “whatever bonds may exist between the children and [parent], as well as the emotional effect that termination will have upon the child[.]” In re Adoption of A.C.H. , 803 A.2d 224, 229 (Pa. Super. 2002). Instantly, the record reveals that B.K.C.’s strong est relationship is with Paternal Grandmother. B.K.C. has lived in Paternal Grandmother’s home since he was born. She provides for his needs, inc luding caring for him physically and emotionally and maintaining stable l iving accommodations. However, both Dr. Bernstein and Dr. Rosenblum were of the opinion that Mother had a bond with B.K.C. despite missing visit s and not being in a position to care for B.K.C. While both psychologists agreed that a bond existe d between Mother and B.K.C based on their observations and evaluatio ns of her, they differed over how strong the bond appeared to be and whether termination of her parental rights would be in B.K.C.’s best interest. Dr. Rosenblum testified that although B.K.C. does not rely on Mother to mee t his day-to-day needs,J-S61029-16

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a subsidized permanent legal custodianship (SPLC) 4 would be optimal, since it could preserve the bond between Mother and B.K.C

. 5 See N.T. Termination Hearing, 2/19/16, at 107, 120. Dr. Bernstein indicated that “the relationship betw een grandmother and child was stable and secure and most significan t for [B.K.C] at this time in his young age in life. And to compromise that b y separating the child from his grandmother could be potentially traumatic .” Id. at 91. Dr. Bernstein also found Mother to be less engaged with B.K.C. than Dr. Rosenblum had observed. Ultimately, Dr. Bernstein stated that “[he] support[ed] the Court moving forward with the termi nation of [Mother’s] parental rights.” Id. at 75. In determining that termination of Mother’s parent al rights was in B.K.C.’s best interest, the trial court noted that it “judiciously evaluated the bond between Mother and Child and determined that t here was no indication that an emotional bond exists to the extent that th e termination of parental rights of Mother would cause Child to suffer extrem e emotional consequences.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/12/16, at 6. A.C.H. , supra ;

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4 SPLC arrangements involve custody of a dependent c hild being awarded to a custodian who is provided a financial subsidy to care for the child. Parental rights are not terminated.

5 Mother has four children with four different fathe rs. Mother’s oldest child was adopted by her parents. A maternal uncle and h is wife were awarded permanent legal custody of her two other children.J-S61029-16

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compare G.L.L. , supra at 349 (“[T]he negative impact of keeping G.L.L. i n foster care was outweighed by the permanent damage he would sustain were Mother’s parental rights terminated.”).
In G.L.L. , we upheld the ruling of the lower court that had denied involuntary termination of parental rights based up on its best-interest analysis. There, as here, “we cannot re-weigh the evidence or the credibility assessments made by the trial court.” Id. at 348. Instantly, the trial court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights is s upported by the record, including the opinion testimony provided by Dr. Ber nstein. Accordingly, we discern no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 9/2/2016