United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

___________________________

No. 22-2054

___________________________ 

Darrell I. Bolden

 Petitioner - Appellee

v.

David Vandergriff

 Respondent - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

____________ 

Submitted: January 10, 2023

Filed: June 1, 2023

____________ 

Before KELLY, ERICKSON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

____________

ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.

A Missouri trial court declined to permit Darrell Bolden to represent himself. 

After conviction at trial, an unsuccessful direct appeal, and an unsuccessful attempt 

to collaterally attack his convictions in state court, Bolden filed a petition under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254 in federal court. The district court granted Bolden’s petition, finding 

Bolden had unequivocally invoked his right of self-representation and the Missouri 
-2- 

trial court failed to conduct a proper hearing under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 

806 (1975). We reverse. 

I. BACKGROUND

In November 2013, the Missouri state court consolidated five separate 

indictments into a single case. Bolden faced eleven felony counts as a persistent 

felony offender. He was convicted of three counts of first-degree robbery, one count 

of attempted first-degree robbery, and three counts of armed criminal action. The 

trial court sentenced Bolden to concurrent life sentences on the robbery counts plus 

25 years on the armed criminal action counts.

During pretrial proceedings, Bolden requested to proceed pro se. On May 2, 

2013, the court held a hearing, during which Bolden asserted, as a Moor, he was 

unable to be represented by counsel. In response, the court told Bolden that it needed 

to ensure he was making an informed decision and set the matter for a later hearing.

On July 10, 2013, the court took up Bolden’s request to represent himself, 

explaining to Bolden that a request to proceed pro se must be unequivocal. While 

Bolden had expressed a desire to have all the witnesses deposed, the court informed

Bolden that conditional requests are not permitted. The court advised Bolden that if 

he represented himself, there would be no funds available for Bolden to take 

depositions or conduct an investigation and all motions would be Bolden’s 

responsibility. Bolden expressed frustration that his previously-filed speedy trial 

motions had been denied and stated that he did not want counsel to represent him. 

He told the court that if his speedy trial requests had been honored, then he would 

have wanted counsel. The court informed Bolden that he faced up to life in prison

and advised Bolden that proceeding pro se would be a “big” and “horrible” mistake. 

The court made plain to Bolden that he would only get one chance at a trial and trial 

would not take place more quickly if he proceeded pro se. When Bolden persisted 

in his request to represent himself and continued demanding a speedy trial, the court 

directed Bolden to read thoroughly the form on waiving counsel and then Bolden 
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would be brought back before the court. In the meantime, trials of other pro se 

defendants were scheduled to take place, and the court believed the results in those 

cases might impact Bolden’s decision. Over Bolden’s objection, the court deferred 

ruling on Bolden’s request to give Bolden time to reconsider his decision.

Three weeks later, the court held another hearing. Rather than conduct 

another inquiry, the court ruled Bolden could not proceed pro se because his waiver 

of the right to counsel was conditional, as Bolden continued to be interested in 

deposing witnesses and counsel had indicated there were motions to be filed. Bolden 

proceeded to trial with the assistance of counsel.

Following the convictions, Bolden appealed the denial of his request to 

proceed pro se. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning Bolden’s 

request to represent himself “was conditional and neither unequivocal nor knowing 

and intelligent.” The appellate court found Bolden had stated he wanted counsel if 

the court granted his speedy trial motions. The court also found Bolden wanted 

counsel to depose witnesses, even after learning counsel could assist with this task 

only if he did not proceed pro se. Finally, the court found that while the trial “court

implored Bolden to read and consider a standard form advising defendants of the 

hazards of self-representation, . . . Bolden refused to read it and told the court that 

he didn’t want an opportunity to think about the implications of his decision.”

The district court granted Bolden’s § 2254 petition, finding the Missouri Court 

of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in determining 

Bolden had not been deprived of his right to self-representation because Bolden’s 

assertion of the right was unequivocal, and the Missouri trial court erroneously failed

to conduct a proper Faretta hearing. The state appeals, asserting the district court 

failed to give appropriate deference to the state court’s decision. 
-4- 

II. DISCUSSION

We generally review a district court’s findings of fact for clear error, and its 

conclusions of law de novo. Franklin v. Hawley, 879 F.3d 307, 311 (8th Cir. 2018) 

(citation omitted). However, § 2254 limits the scope of our review. Under § 2254, 

“a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be 

correct” and a petitioner has the burden to rebut this presumption by clear and 

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). “Issues of fact are basic, primary, or 

historical facts: facts in the sense of a recital of external events and the credibility of 

their narrators.” Finch v. Payne, 983 F.3d 973, 980 (8th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). In 

contrast, determinations regarding “mixed questions of fact and law, which require 

the application of a legal standard to the historical-fact determinations” are not 

factual determinations and are not entitled to a presumption of correctness. Id.

(quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 n.6 (1963)). 

Under § 2254, a petitioner is entitled to relief if, among other things, the state 

adjudication involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, 

as determined by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Under 

this standard, a petitioner is entitled to relief if the state court unreasonably applied 

the appropriate legal principle to the facts of the case. Finch, 983 F.3d at 979. To 

satisfy this standard, the state court’s adjudication must be objectively unreasonable, 

“such that fairminded jurists could not disagree about the proper resolution.” Smith 

v. Titus, 958 F.3d 687, 691 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). “The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in 

reaching outcomes in case by case determinations.” Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 653

(citation omitted). 

 

While the Supreme Court has not thoroughly detailed the contours of the right 

to self-representation, it is clearly established that a defendant’s invocation of the 

right to self-representation must be clear, unequivocal, knowing, and intelligent. See
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Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835-36 (citation omitted).

1

 Here, the Missouri Court of Appeals 

made two pertinent factual findings. First, the court found Bolden would accept 

representation only if the trial court granted his motions for a speedy trial. Second, 

the court found Bolden indicated he wanted witnesses to be deposed. Because these 

findings involve no application of law, they are findings based on facts “in the sense 

of a recital of external events and the credibility of” Bolden rather than findings 

based on mixed questions of fact and law. See Finch 983 F.3d at 980 (citation 

omitted). We must presume these factual findings are correct unless Bolden 

demonstrates otherwise. The district court erred by failing to apply this framework. 

Bolden has not demonstrated either factual finding is unsupported in the 

record or unreasonable. While Bolden suggests his request to proceed pro se was 

unconditional, the record shows that he continued to demand a speedy trial and 

desired counsel if the court honored his speedy trial demands, even after the court 

definitively denied his motions. Bolden’s other assertion that he never said he 

wanted counsel to depose witnesses conflicts with the record, which reflects Bolden 

repeatedly expressing a desire to depose witnesses, even after the court informed 

him counsel could not do so if Bolden proceeded pro se. 

Given the state court’s factual findings, the Missouri Court of Appeals did not 

unreasonably apply Supreme Court jurisprudence in finding Bolden was not

unequivocal in his request to proceed pro se. Bolden conditioned his selfrepresentation request on his speedy trial motions being denied, and wanted counsel 

to depose witnesses even after being informed counsel could not do so if he was pro 

se. From these facts, a court could reasonably conclude Bolden’s waiver of the right 

to counsel was not unequivocal. We need not address Bolden’s remaining claim

regarding whether his waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and intelligent.

1

The Supreme Court has also never stated that a special hearing must be 

convened to decide whether a defendant’s waiver is knowing, unequivocal, 

voluntary, and intelligent. Even if such a hearing is required, the trial court’s 

proceedings and inquiries of Bolden were sufficient to satisfy any hearing 

requirement under Faretta and its progeny.
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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court and 

remand for entry of judgment in favor of the state. 

KELLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

As I read the record, the Missouri Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the 

denial of Bolden’s requests for self-representation involved an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law to the facts of the case. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(1) (providing that a petitioner shall be entitled to relief if the state-court 

decision “involved an unreasonable application of[] clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 

U.S. 362, 407–08 (2000) (explaining that a state-court decision unreasonably applies 

federal law if it “correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it 

unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case”). 

 “The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made 

for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense.” 

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819. To invoke the right to self-representation, a defendant must 

“clearly and unequivocally declare[] to the trial judge that he want[s] to represent 

himself and d[oes] not want counsel.” Id. at 835. 

The court rests its conclusion that Bolden did not sufficiently invoke his right 

to self-representation on two factual findings made by the Missouri Court of 

Appeals, namely, that Bolden agreed to representation only if the trial court granted 

his motions for a speedy trial, and that Bolden indicated he wanted witnesses to be 

deposed. But this recitation of the facts is incomplete. Rather than focusing on a 

few statements in isolation, the court must consider the entire trial-court record in 

context. See Finch, 983 F.3d at 980 (noting “the relevant historical facts” of a case 

include “court transcripts and filings”). 
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I start with the hearing on July 10, 2013. After denying Bolden’s previouslyfiled speedy trial motions, the Missouri trial court told Bolden that the only issue to 

be addressed at the hearing was “whether or not you want to represent yourself or if 

you want [your appointed counsel] to represent you.” At one point, the trial court 

asked Bolden, “Now it’s my understanding that you are asking [your counsel] to 

take some depositions for you; is that true?” Bolden responded, “Yes.” The court 

inquired again, “That you want some of the alleged witnesses to the alleged offenses 

deposed; is that true?” Bolden affirmed, “I want all witnesses.” The trial court told 

Bolden that an attorney could assist him with deposing witnesses, but cautioned 

Bolden, “I think you would be making a horrible, horrible mistake if you decided to 

represent yourself alone, because if I agree or enter an order that you are going to 

represent yourself pro se, you will represent yourself pro se.” Bolden was unmoved. 

He told the court, “If I was allowed my speedy trial, yes, I was going to have 

[counsel] help me. Since you are not going to honor my speedy trial, I don’t want 

counsel. I’m just going [pro se] because I’m a Moor.”2

The trial court persisted in its attempt to sway Bolden, telling him in part, “[I]f 

you kept [your counsel] as your lawyer[,] [h]e can set up the depositions. He can 

make sure you’ve got your discovery. He can do the things that you request within 

reason, and we can move this [case] along.” Bolden responded, “I understand that, 

but . . . a lawyer cannot represent a Moor.” The prosecutor urged the trial court to 

make clear that “if [Bolden] does not have the public defender[,] he is not able to 

use [the public defender’s] offices for depositions or anything like that.” The court 

obliged and informed Bolden, “So if you want [counsel] to depose these people, if 

you want [counsel] to file motions to suppress, if you want . . . evidence or 

2

Bolden’s use of “Moor” may refer to a member of the Moorish Science 

Temple of America, an established religious organization whose practices are drawn 

from Islam, or may instead refer to a follower of the Moorish sovereign citizen 

movement, which promotes anti-government beliefs. See Moorish Science Temple 

of America, Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Moorish-ScienceTemple-of-America (last updated Apr. 10, 2023); Michael Crowell, Univ. of N.C. 

Sch. of Gov’t, A Quick Guide to Sovereign Citizens 3–4 (Nov. 2015), 

https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/default/files/reports/aojb1504.pdf. 
-8- 

statements, that is not an unequivocal request to act pro se. When I say you’re pro 

se, you will never see [your counsel] again.” Bolden was not persuaded, saying, 

“I’m going to represent myself. . . . Since I can’t have a speedy trial, I’m just going 

to represent myself.” The trial court did not rule on Bolden’s request for selfrepresentation. Instead, it told Bolden, “I’ll bring you back next week. We’ll talk 

about it.” 

The next hearing was on July 31, 2013. Without giving Bolden a chance to 

speak, the trial court denied his request to represent himself. The court determined 

that it was in Bolden’s and the court’s “best interest” for Bolden to retain his 

appointed counsel because Bolden faced five “very serious charges” and “up to life 

in prison” if convicted. The court also explained that Bolden’s case involved 

complex legal issues, and if Bolden were to represent himself, he “would not have 

the resources” to “depose all of the victims of the alleged offenses,” whereas 

Bolden’s appointed counsel would have the ability to “depose those individuals.” 

The relevant historical facts do not end there. A week later, Bolden filed a 

“motion to remove counsel,” explaining that he had “no confidence in the lawyers 

provided” to him and would “not accept any public defender.” Bolden requested 

that the trial court allow him to proceed pro se “from this day forward.” And on 

August 20, 2013, Bolden renewed his request to represent himself by filing another 

“motion to remove counsel.” There is no record of a ruling on either motion, and 

Bolden’s case proceeded to trial a few months later with his appointed attorney.3

 

3

To the extent this court now finds that Bolden “continued to demand a speedy 

trial and desired counsel if the court honored his speedy trial demands, even after 

the court definitively denied his motions,” I respectfully disagree. Bolden was 

willing to accept court-appointed counsel if he received a speedy trial. But after his 

motions for a speedy trial were “definitively denied,” at no time did Bolden 

condition his self-representation requests on receiving a speedy trial. To the extent 

this court also finds that “Bolden repeatedly expressed a desire to depose witnesses, 

even after the court informed him counsel could not do so if Bolden proceeded pro 

se,” I believe that this statement, too, is unsupported by the full record. 
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Bolden’s assertions of his right to self-representation were clear and 

unequivocal. Bolden insisted, orally and in writing, and with plain and unambiguous 

language, that he wished to represent himself at trial. Cf. Hamilton v. Groose, 28 

F.3d 859, 862 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that the petitioner’s request to represent 

himself was equivocal where he used ambiguous language and told the trial judge 

that he was “not very serious about wanting to represent” himself and that he was 

“not asking to proceed pro se totally”). Bolden’s assertion of his right to selfrepresentation was also unconditional. True, he said that he would accept the 

assistance of counsel if the trial court granted his speedy trial motions. But once

these motions were denied, Bolden asserted in unqualified terms that he wished to 

represent himself. Although Bolden stated he wanted to depose witnesses, it was 

the trial court, not Bolden, who linked Bolden’s desire to take depositions to his

request to represent himself. And once the trial court informed Bolden that he would 

“never see” his counsel again if he proceeded pro se, Bolden no longer said anything 

about deposing witnesses. Instead, he reaffirmed in clear terms that he wished to 

represent himself.

4

 See Hamilton, 28 F.3d at 862 (acknowledging that a defendant’s 

waiver of his right to counsel may be “both conditional and unequivocal,” and 

recognizing that such a waiver would be sufficient to invoke the right to selfrepresentation under Faretta). 

4

Even if Bolden conditioned his desire for self-representation on an external 

event, I am doubtful this alone renders his request equivocal—at least on this record. 

See Finch, 983 F.3d at 977, 981 n.6 (rejecting the contention that a petitioner’s 

comments “about the availability of ‘standby counsel’” somehow “equivocate[s] his 

invocation to proceed pro se”); Carey v. Minnesota, 767 F.2d 440, 441–42 (8th Cir. 

1985) (per curiam) (noting that the defendant validly “availed himself of his 

constitutional right to self-representation” when he informed the district court, “No. 

I don’t [want to try the case myself]. I want a different attorney. But since I can’t 

have one I’ll conduct my own defense, yes”); Adams v. Carroll, 875 F.2d 1441, 1445 

(9th Cir. 1989) (stating that although the petitioner’s requests for self-representation 

were “sandwiched around a request for counsel,” this “was not evidence of 

vacillation” because each request “stemmed from one consistent position” that the 

petitioner wished to represent himself “if the only alternative was the appointment” 

of the same attorney). 
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Looking at the facts in the record and applying the relevant legal standard, I 

believe the Missouri Court of Appeals’ determination that Bolden’s waiver was 

conditional and equivocal was not merely wrong—it was objectively unreasonable. 

In other words, fair-minded jurists would have no option but to conclude that the 

Missouri court’s decision involved an unreasonable application of Faretta and its 

progeny, and thus was “so lacking in justification” that it cannot stand. Woods v. 

Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015) (cleaned up); see Finch, 983 F.3d at 980–81 

(concluding that it was “objectively unreasonable” for the Arkansas Supreme Court 

to find that the petitioner’s statements of “I want to represent myself, your Honor. 

And that’s all I’m telling you” and “I don’t want no attorney” were an “equivocal” 

invocation of the right to self-representation); Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 792–

93 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that “no reasonable person” could conclude that a 

“request for self-representation was not made” where the petitioner “filed a written 

motion to proceed pro se” and told the trial court “I would like to represent myself”

(cleaned up)). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what more Bolden could have done

to inform the court of his desire to proceed pro se. 

It is also clearly established that a trial court must conduct a “searching or 

formal inquiry” when a defendant unequivocally invokes his right to selfrepresentation. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 299 (1988); Von Moltke v. 

Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723–24 (1948) (explaining that “a judge must . . . make certain 

that an accused’s professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made

[through] a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances”). 

This inquiry—often called a Faretta hearing—is intended to ensure a defendant’s 

comprehension of such a decision. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (explaining that the 

trial court must make the defendant “aware of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and 

his choice is made with eyes open” (cleaned up)); see also Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at

723–24. 
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Here, the record reveals that the trial court did not engage in such an inquiry 

of Bolden.5

 See Shafer v. Bowersox, 329 F.3d 637, 648 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that 

the trial court failed to conduct the requisite “penetrating and comprehensive 

examination” under Faretta and Von Moltke where it “asked few questions and never 

probed beneath the surface of [the petitioner’s] declaration that he wanted to waive 

his right” to counsel). And this failure by the trial court to conduct a proper Faretta

inquiry requires the reversal of Bolden’s conviction. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 

U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984) (stating that the denial of a defendant’s right to selfrepresentation “is not amenable to ‘harmless error’ analysis”); see also Finch, 983 

F.3d at 980–81, 983 (granting the petitioner relief under § 2254 where the trial court 

failed to conduct an adequate Faretta hearing after the petitioner clearly and 

unequivocally asserted his right to self-representation); Buhl, 233 F.3d at 799–800, 

807 (same). 

Because I would affirm the district court’s judgment granting habeas relief, I 

respectfully dissent.6

______________________________

5

Indeed, the record reveals that the trial court’s stated reasons for prohibiting 

Bolden from representing himself are contrary to clearly established precedent. See

Finch, 983 F.3d at 981 (explaining that a petitioner’s “technical legal knowledge,” 

“the seriousness of the offenses,” and “the likelihood of [the defendant] getting some 

serious time” are all “invalid bases” to deny a defendant’s right to self-representation 

(cleaned up)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (a petitioner shall be entitled to relief 

if the state-court decision “was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law”). 

6

Because the trial court failed to conduct a Faretta inquiry in the first instance, 

I would not reach whether Bolden’s waiver was knowingly and intelligently made.