# Airmotive Engineering Corporation (AEC) Meeting with FAA and NTSB February 14, 2013 Regarding Head
- Barrel Separations On AEC631397 Cylinders

# Other Parts We Make

# Agenda

• Key Points

• Meeting Objectives

• NTSB Meeting Summary

• Situation Background

• Industry Wide Failure History

• Cylinder Safety Program Presentation

• Finite Element Analysis Presentation

• Statistical Analysis Discussion

• Consequences of Proposed NPRM

• Discussion

# Key Points

• No Fatalities, No Injuries and No Accidents

• The Design of AEC Cylinders Exceeds FAA Airworthy Standards

• The Manufacture of AEC Cylinders is Within Design Parameters

• The Operating Environment is the Cause of the Failures

• Our Cylinders Are Safe When Operated Within Legal Limits

• Field Replacement of Cylinders Causes Significant Safety Risks

• Head Barrel Separations Are an Industry Wide Issue Caused by Adverse Operating Conditions

# Meeting Objectives

• Prevent an Unwarranted Action on AEC 520 TITAN Cylinders

• Prevent Unnecessary Safety Risks Caused by Unwarranted Action

• Demonstrate That the Root Cause of Head Barrel Separations is Adverse Operating Conditions

• Establish That the Design and Manufacture of AEC Cylinders Exceeds FAA Airworthiness Standards

• There is No Basis for Removal of AEC Cylinders from the Field

# NTSB Meeting Summary

• AEC Met NTSB Members on Feb. 7 th

• They Agreed That A
- 12
- 7 Was Written Prior to Testing Results Indicating Root Cause as Operating Conditions

• The NTSB Agreed That There Have Been No Fatalities as a Result of a Head Barrel Separation of a New Titan 520 Cylinder

• They Agreed That Removal of AEC Cylinders from the Field Prior to TBO Was Unwarranted

• They Agreed The Scope of A
- 12
- 7 Should Be Reduced

• The NTSB Suggested the Best Path to Reducing the Scope of A
- 12
- 7 is for the FAA to Propose It

# Situation Background

• Cylinder Characteristics

− Approximately 80% Related to Piston Engine Parts of SDRs Relate to Cylinders

– Exposed To Severe Temperature Cycles Even When Operated Within Limits

– Sub Zero Starting Environment To Exposure To More Than 3000 ° F Combustion Temperatures

– High Combustion Pressures – Up To 1000 PSI Peak Pressures

– Air Cooled

– Has A Joint Between Aluminum Head And Steel Barrel

– FAA
- PMA Certificated Replacement Parts Must Be Technically Equivalent to the TC Part

# Situation Background

• FAA SDR Lists More Than 1200 Head -ToBarrel Separations For Continental Manufactured Cylinders

• FAA and AEC Data Show Less Than 40 AEC New TITAN 520 Cylinder Head -ToBarrel Separations

# Situation Background Graph 1 OEM And AEC 520 Cylinder Failure History

# Situation Background

• No New AEC TITAN 520 Cylinder Manufactured After June 2008 Has Experienced a Head Barrel Separation

• No Head Barrel Separations on New AEC TITAN 520 Cylinders Have Been Reported Since August 2011

# Situation Background

• AEC’s Experience with Head Barrel Separations:

− ZERO Fatalities with New 520 TITANS

− No Injuries with New 520 TITANS

− No Accidents with New 520 TITANS

− Head to Barrel Separations:

• Result in Approximately 20% Loss of Power

• Allows Sufficient Power to Safely Land

# Cylinder Safety Program Presentation

• AEC Accomplished Extensive Root Cause Tests And Analysis Since Publication of A
- 12 -7

− Testing Recommended by NTSB

− Root Cause Identified as Out Of Limits Operation

− Validates Cylinders Safe When Operated Legally

− Presented To NTSB Lab And Engineering Personnel with a Positive Response

# Agenda

• Key Points

• Meeting Objectives

• NTSB Meeting Summary

• Situation Background

• Industry Wide Failure History

• Cylinder Safety Program Presentation

• Finite Element Analysis Presentation

• Statistical Analysis Discussion

• Consequences of Proposed NPRM

• Discussion

# Finite Element Analysis

• AEC Contracted Don Gillespie from Delta G Design to Perform Finite Element Analysis of the Head to Barrel Interface

• Varied Thread Interferences Were Modeled to Correlate Engine Test Data

• Delta G Design Will Now Present Their Presentation

# Agenda

• Key Points

• Meeting Objectives

• NTSB Meeting Summary

• Situation Background

• Industry Wide Failure History

• Cylinder Safety Program Presentation

• Finite Element Analysis Presentation

• Statistical Analysis Discussion

• Consequences of Proposed NPRM

• Discussion

# Statistical Analysis

• Predictions vs. Actual from Dr. Don Kenton’s Report 2013
- 02 -1

**0 5**  **10 15**  **20 25**  **30 35** 

Group Post 6-2 Group 6-2

# Consequences of Proposed NPRM

• Because It Does Not Consider the Root Cause of Operating Conditions:

– Will Cause An Unwarranted Burden On GA Public (Approximately 10,000 Aircraft)

– Field Removal and Replacement of a Large Number of Safe Cylinders Will Result in Unnecessary Accidents

– The Root Cause of Adverse Operating Conditions Will Continue Unaddressed

# Key Points

• No Fatalities, No Injuries and No Accidents

• The Design of AEC Cylinders Exceeds FAA Airworthy Standards

• The Manufacture of AEC Cylinders is Within Design Parameters

• The Operating Environment is the Cause of the Failures

• Our Cylinders Are Safe When Operated Within Legal Limits

• Field Replacement of Cylinders Causes Significant Safety Risks

• Head Barrel Separations Are an Industry Wide Issue Caused by Adverse Operating Conditions

# Meeting Objectives

• Prevent an Unwarranted Action on AEC 520 TITAN Cylinders

• Prevent Unnecessary Safety Risks Caused by Unwarranted Action

• Demonstrate That the Root Cause of Head Barrel Separations is Adverse Operating Conditions

• Establish That the Design and Manufacture of AEC Cylinders Exceeds FAA Airworthiness Standards

• There is No Basis for Removal of AEC Cylinders from the Field

# AEC/FAA/NTSB Dialog

• Discussion