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S. HRG. 113–479 

THE AUTHORIZATION OF USE 

OF FORCE IN SYRIA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: 

http://www.fdsys.gpo.gov 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from New Jersey ......................................... 4 

Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Secretary of Defense .............................................. 11 

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 13 

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Secretary of State ................................................. 6 

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey .............................. 1 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Secretary of State 

John Kerry from Senator John Barrasso ........................................................... 64 

Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Secretary of Defense 

Chuck Hagel from Senator John Barrasso ........................................................ 66 

(III)

(1) 

THE AUTHORIZATION OF USE 

OF FORCE IN SYRIA 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:38 p.m., in Room 

SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez, 

chairman of the committee, presiding. 

PRESENT. Senators Menendez [presiding], Boxer, Cardin, 

Shaheen, Coons, Durbin, Udall, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Corker, 

Risch, Rubio, Johnson, Flake, McCain, Barrasso, and Paul. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee will come to order. 

Let me first say that—neither actions of approval or disapproval 

from the audience. We welcome you to be here on this important 

occasion, but we welcome you to be observers of this important occasion. And the chair will not tolerate actions that are in violation 

of the committee rules. 

Let me welcome Secretary Kerry back to the committee that he 

chaired, Secretary Hagel on a committee that he served on, and the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey, to the 

committee. 

We convene this hearing, as we have convened many before, to 

make one of the most difficult decisions we are asked and tasked 

to make—the authorization of the use of American military power. 

This time in Syria to respond to the horrific chemical attack of August 21st that took the lives of 1,429 Syrians, including at least 

426 children. 

The images of that day are sickening, and in my view, the world 

cannot ignore the inhumanity and the horror of this act. I do not 

take our responsibility to authorize military force lightly or make 

such decisions easily. I voted against the war in Iraq and strongly 

have supported a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. But 

today, I support the President’s decision to use military force in the 

face of this horrific crime against humanity. 

Yes, there are risks to action, but the consequences of inaction 

are greater and graver still: Further humanitarian disaster in 

Syria, regional instability, the loss of American credibility around 

the world, an emboldened Iran and North Korea, and a disintegration of international law. 

2 

This decision will be one of the most difficult any of us will be 

asked to make, but it is our role as representatives of the American 

people to make it, to put aside political differences and personal 

ideologies, to forget partisanship and preconceptions, to forget the 

polls, the politics, and even personal consequences. It is a moment 

for a profile in courage and to do what one knows is right. 

It is our responsibility to evaluate the facts, assess the intelligence we have, and then debate the wisdom and scope of a military response fully and publicly, understanding its geopolitical 

ramifications and fully aware of the consequences. At the end of 

the day, each of us will decide whether to vote for or against a resolution for military action based on our assessments of the facts and 

our conscience. 

The decision rests with us. It is not political. It is a policy decision that must be based, I believe, on what we believe is in the national security interests of the United States. 

To be clear, the authorization we will ultimately seek is for focused action with a clear understanding that American troops will 

not be on the ground in combat, and the language before us is but 

a starting point. 

The President has decided to ask Congress for our support. Now 

the eyes of the world are upon us. The decision we make, the resolution we present to the Senate, and the votes we take will reverberate around the world. 

Our friends and allies await our decision, as does the despot in 

Pyongyang, the ayatollahs of terror in Tehran, and terrorist groups 

wherever they may be. What we do in the face of the chemical attack by the Assad regime against innocent civilians will send a signal to the world that such weapons in violation of international law 

cannot be used with impunity. 

The question is, will we send a message that the United States 

will not tolerate the use of chemical weapons anywhere in the 

world, by anyone, for any reason? Will we, in the name of all that 

is human and decent, authorize the use of American military power 

against the inexcusable, indiscriminate, and immoral use of chemical weapons? Or will we stand down? 

What message do we send the world when such a crime goes 

unpunished? Will those who have these weapons use them again? 

Will they use them more widely and kill more children? Will they 

use them against our allies, against our troops or embassies? Or 

will they give them or sell them to terrorists who would use them 

against us here at home? 

Are we willing to watch a slaughter just because the patrons of 

that slaughter are willing to use their veto at the United Nations 

to allow it to happen so their beneficiary can stay in power? And 

are we so tired of war that we are willing to silence our conscience 

and accept the consequences that will inevitably flow from that silence to our national interests? 

We will hear the arguments and the options presented to us 

today, and we will look at the facts as we know them according to 

the declassified assessment released last Friday that Secretary 

Kerry has so passionately presented to the Nation. According to 

that assessment, we know with high confidence from the intelVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:45 Nov 21, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION\2013 ISSUE HE
3 

ligence community that the Syrian government carried out a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbs on August 21st. 

We know that the Assad regime has stockpiled chemical agents, 

including mustard, sarin, and VX gas, and has thousands of munitions capable of delivering them. We know that President Bashar 

al-Assad makes the decisions when it comes to the regime’s stockpile of chemical agents and that personnel involved in the program 

are carefully vetted to ensure loyalty to the regime and the security 

of the program. 

We have evidence that chemical weapons have been used on a 

smaller scale against the opposition on several other occasions in 

the past year, including in the Damascus suburbs, that sarin gas 

has been used on some of those occasions and that it was not the 

opposition that used it. 

We know that chemical weapons personnel from the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center, subordinate to the regime’s 

Ministry of Defense, were operating in the Damascus suburb of 

Adra from Sunday, August 18th until early in the morning on 

Wednesday, August 21st near an area the regime uses to mix 

chemical weapons, including sarin. 

And human intelligence as well as signal and geospatial intelligence have shown regime activity in the preparation of chemicals 

prior to the attack, including the distribution and use of gas masks. 

We have multiple streams of intelligence that show the regime 

launched a rocket attack against the Damascus suburbs in the 

early hours of August 21st, and satellite corroboration that the attacks were launched from a regime-controlled area and struck 

neighborhoods where the chemical attacks reportedly occurred, 

clearly tying the pieces together. That is what we know in terms 

of who deployed these weapons. 

More evidence is available, and we will be looking at all of the 

classified information in a closed session of the committee tomorrow that more clearly establishes the use of chemical weapons by 

the regime, the military responses available to us, and the results 

we expect from those responses. 

But as of now, in my view, there is a preponderance of evidence 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Assad’s forces willfully targeted civilians with chemical weapons. Having said that, at the end of the 

day, the chemical weapons attack against innocent civilians in 

Syria is an indirect attack on America’s security, with broader implications for the region and the world. 

If chemical weapons can be used with impunity in violation of a 

Geneva protocol crafted by the League of Nations and signed by the 

United States in 1925—in fact, signed by Syria itself in 1968—they 

can be used without fear of reprisal anywhere, by anyone. And in 

my view, such heinous and immoral violations of decency demand 

a clear and unambiguous response. 

We are at a crossroads moment. A precedent will be set either 

for the unfettered and unpunished use of chemical weapons, or a 

precedent will be set for the deterrence of the use of such weapons 

through the limited use of military force that sends a message that 

the world will not stand down. 

We will either send a message to Syria, Iran, North Korea, 

Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, and any other nonstate actors that the world 

4 

will not tolerate the senseless use of chemical weapons by anyone, 

or we will choose to stand silent in the face of horrific human suffering. 

We need to consider the consequences of not acting. Our silence 

would be a message to the Ayatollah that America and the world 

are not serious about stopping their march to acquiring nuclear 

weapons. Israel would no longer believe that we have their back 

and would be hard pressed to restrain itself. 

Our silence would embolden Kim Jong-un, who has a large chemical weapons cache, and would send a message that we are not serious about protecting South Korea and the region from nuclear or 

chemical weapons, and would embolden Hezbollah and Hamas to 

redouble their efforts to acquire chemical weapons, and they might 

succeed. 

Clearly, at the end of the day, our national security is at stake. 

I want to thank our distinguished witnesses who will present the 

facts as they know them. We will evaluate them, debate a resolution, and at the end of the day, each of us will decide whether to 

send a message to the world that there are lines we cannot cross 

as civilized human beings or stand silent and risk new threats. 

Let me say before I turn to Senator Corker for his opening statement, the President is asking for an authorization for the use of 

limited force. It is not his intention or ours to involve ourselves 

fully in Syria’s civil war. 

What is before us is a request, and I quote, ‘‘to prevent or deter 

the use or proliferation of chemical or biological weapons within, to, 

or from Syria and to protect the United States and its allies and 

partners against the threat posed by such weapons.’’ 

This is not a declaration of war, but a declaration of our values 

to the world. A declaration that says we are willing to use our military power when necessary against anyone who dares turn such 

heinous weapons on innocent civilians anywhere in the world. 

We know the facts. We will hear the arguments. We will have 

the debate, and then it will be up to each of us to search our conscience and make a decision on behalf of the American people. I 

trust that we can achieve that in a bipartisan way. 

I have been working with Senator Corker as we move toward a 

resolution, but I hope we will get broad bipartisan support. And before I turn to him, I just want to acknowledge the presence, and 

we are thrilled to see her here today, of Teresa Heinz Kerry to join 

us in this momentous occasion. I am glad to see you so well and 

being here with us. 

And with that, Senator Corker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your comments 

and the time that we spent together recently. 

And I want to thank our witnesses for being here not only for 

their service to our country in their current capacity, but in their 

service in every way for many, many years. I thank you for being 

here. 

Today, you are beginning the formal request of asking each of us 

to make the most important decision many of us will make during 

5 

our tenure in the United States Senate. And I know that everybody 

here on the dais and those who are not take that decision very seriously. 

I have noticed a distinct sense of humility as we have gone about 

the various questions, conference calls, the earlier meetings we 

have had today and previously this week, and I know that every 

member here knows that whether they decide to support an authorization for the use of military force or not, they are making a 

decision about our country’s national interests. And I know that everybody is going to be taking that decision very, very seriously. 

One of the issues that many members will have is the fact that 

should we support an authorization for the use of military force— 

and I think that everyone here knows that I am very generally inclined to do so and am working closely with Senator Menendez for 

something that will be a starting point for this committee’s discussions, and I know each member will have input and will have the 

opportunity to put thier imprint on what it is that we end up deciding to vote upon—but one of the problems that members have, and 

I think this hearing and tomorrow’s hearing is important to answer, is while we make policy, you implement policy. And the implementation of this is very, very important, and I think there have 

been mixed signals about what that implementation actually is 

going to mean and the effect it is going to have on the country that 

we are involved in. 

I want to say that I was just in the region, as I know many people have been, and I am still totally dismayed by the lack of support we are giving to the vetted moderate opposition. We publicly 

stated what that support is going to be, even though it is being carried out in a covert way. 

But it is to some degree humiliating to be in a refugee camp 

when our policy has been that we are going to train, we are going 

to equip, we are going to give humanitarian aid to the vetted opposition, and yet when you sit down with the people who are coalescing around this, like General Idris and others, very little of that 

has occurred. 

So I know today’s focus is going to be largely on the issue of 

chemical warfare, and I know that the case has to be made, and 

I know that each of us has had the opportunity to hear that case, 

to see the intelligence, to understand on what basis these claims 

have been made. And my guess is that most everyone here fully believes that chemical weapons have been used on civilians to a large 

degree. 

So I know that case is going to be made to the American people 

today, as you are making it to us. But it is my hope that a big part 

of what you are going to do here today, and I know we talked about 

this earlier this morning at the White House, but is to make a case 

as to why Syria is important to our national interests, why Syria 

matters to the region, why it is important for us to carry out this 

stated strategy, and how we are going to continue to carry out that 

stated strategy. 

One of the things that I do not want to see in this authorization 

is after - if it is authorized and force takes place-I want to see us, 

I want to see us continue to carry out the strategy that has been 

6 

stated, and that is building the capacity of the vetted moderate opposition. So I would like to have you address that. 

I would like to have you today also address how this use of military force supports that strategy, how it is going to affect the region in the aftermath. 

So I thank you for being here today. I know a big part of what 

we are discussing today is the effect that our decisions will have 

on the credibility of the United States of America. I know that people in the region are watching. I know that we have been hesitant 

to move on with many of the activities that we have stated we are 

going to be carrying out. 

So, today, I hope that each of you will bring clarity to this. I 

know we are going to talk about chemical warfare, but I hope you 

will give us even more clarity about our opposition strengthening, 

about how this is going to affect us overall, and I hope we will all 

leave here today with a clear understanding of how this strategy 

is going to be carried out. 

I thank you, and I look forward to your testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Kerry. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, SECRETARY OF STATE, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, Ranking Member Corker, thank you very, very much for 

having us here today. We look forward to this opportunity to be 

able to share with you President Obama’s vision with respect to not 

just this action but, as Senator Corker has inquired appropriately, 

about Syria itself and the course of action in the Middle East. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for welcoming Teresa. This is her first 

public event since early July. So we are all happy she is here. 

As we convene for this debate, it is not an exaggeration to say 

to you—all of you, my former colleagues—that the world is watching not just to see what we decide, but it is watching to see how 

we make this decision, whether in a dangerous world we can still 

make our Government speak with one voice. They want to know if 

America will rise to this moment and make a difference. 

And the question of whether to authorize our Nation to take military action is, as you have said, Mr. Chairman, and you have 

echoed, Mr. Ranking Member, this is obviously one of the most important decisions, one of the most important responsibilities of this 

committee or of any Senator in the course of a career. 

The President and the administration appreciate that you have 

returned quickly to the Nation’s capital to address it and that you 

are appropriately beginning a process of focusing with great care 

and great precision, which is the only way to approach the potential use of military power. 

Ranking Member Corker, I know that you want to discuss, as 

you said, why Syria matters to our national security and our strategic interests beyond the compelling humanitarian reasons, and I 

look forward, with Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, to laying 

that out here this afternoon. 

But first, it is important to explain to the American people why 

we are here. It is important for people who may not have caught 

every component of the news over the course of the Labor Day 

7 

weekend to join us, all of us, in focusing in on what is at stake 

here. That is why the President of the United States made the decision as he did, contrary to what many people thought he would 

do, of asking the Congress to join in this decision. We are stronger 

as a Nation when we do that. 

So we are here because against multiple warnings from the 

President of the United States, from the Congress, from our friends 

and allies around the world, and even from Russia and Iran, the 

Assad regime, and only undeniably the Assad regime, unleashed an 

outrageous chemical attack against its own citizens. We are here 

because a dictator and his family’s personal enterprise, in their lust 

to hold onto power, were willing to infect the air of Damascus with 

a poison that killed innocent mothers, and fathers, and hundreds 

of their children, their lives all snuffed out by gas in the early 

morning of August 21st. 

Now, some people here and there amazingly have questioned the 

evidence of this assault on conscience. I repeat here again today 

that only the most willful desire to avoid reality can assert that 

this did not occur as described, or that the regime did not do it. 

It did happen, and the Assad regime did it. 

Now, I remember Iraq. Secretary Hagel remembers Iraq. General 

Dempsey especially remembers Iraq. But Secretary Hagel and I 

and many of you sitting on the dais remember Iraq in a special 

way because we were here for that vote. We voted. And so we are 

especially sensitive, Chuck and I, to never again asking any member to take a vote on faulty intelligence. 

And that is why our intelligence community has scrubbed and rescrubbed the evidence. We have declassified unprecedented 

amounts of information, and we ask the American people and the 

rest of the world to judge that information. We can tell you beyond 

any reasonable doubt that our evidence proves the Assad regime 

prepared for this attack, issued instructions to prepare for this attack and warned its own forces to use gas masks. And we have 

physical evidence of where the rockets came from and when. Not 

one rocket landed in regime-controlled territory, not one. All of 

them landed in opposition-controlled or contested territory. 

We have a map, physical evidence, showing every geographical 

point of impact, and that is concrete. Within minutes of the attack—90 I think to be precise, maybe slightly shorter—the social 

media exploded with horrific images of the damage that had been 

caused, men and women, the elderly, and children sprawled on a 

hospital floor with no wounds, no blood, but all dead. Those scenes 

of human chaos and desperation were not contrived. They were 

real. No one could contrive such a scene. 

We are certain that none of the opposition has the weapons or 

capacity to affect a strike of this scale, particularly from the heart 

of regime territory. Just think about it in logical terms, common 

sense. With high confidence, our intelligence community tells us 

that after the strike, the regime issued orders to stop, and then 

fretted openly, we know, about the possibility of U.N. inspectors 

discovering evidence. 

So then, they began to systematically try to destroy it, contrary 

to my discussion with their foreign minister, who said we have 

nothing to hide. I said, if you have nothing to hide, then let the 

8 

inspectors in today and let it be unrestricted. It was not. They did 

not. It took four days of shelling before they finally allowed them 

in under a constrained pre-arranged structure. And we now have 

learned that the hair and blood samples from first responders in 

East Damascus has tested positive for signatures of sarin. 

So, my colleagues, we know what happened. For all the lawyers, 

for all the former prosecutors, for all those who have sat on a jury, 

I can tell you that we know these things beyond the reasonable 

doubt that is the standard by which we send people to jail for the 

rest of their lives. 

So we are here because of what happened two weeks ago, but we 

are also here because of what happened nearly a century ago in the 

darkest moments of World War I and after the horror of gas warfare when the vast majority of the world came together to declare 

in no uncertain terms that chemical weapons crossed the line of 

conscience, and they must be banned from use forever. Over the 

years that followed, over 180 countries, including Iran, Iraq, and 

Russia, agreed, and they joined the Chemical Weapons Convention. 

Even countries with whom we agree on little agreed on that conviction. 

Now, some have tried to suggest that the debate we are having 

today is about President Obama’s red line. I could not more forcefully state that is just plain and simply wrong. This debate is about 

the world’s red line. It is about humanity’s red line. And it is a red 

line that anyone with a conscience ought to draw. 

This debate is also about Congress’ own red line. You, the United 

States Congress, agreed to the Chemical Weapons Convention. You, 

the United States Congress, passed the Syria Accountability Act, 

which says Syria’s chemical weapons ‘‘threaten the security of the 

Middle East and the national security interests of the United 

States.’’ You, the Congress, have spoken out about grave consequences if Assad, in particular, used chemical weapons. So I say 

to you, Senator Corker, that is one of the reasons why Syria is important. 

And as we debate and the world watches, as you decide and the 

world wonders, not whether Assad’s regime executed the worst 

chemical weapons attack of the 21st century. That fact, I think, is 

now beyond question. The world wonders whether the United 

States of America will consent through silence to standing aside 

while this kind of brutality is allowed to happen without consequence. 

In the nearly 100 years since the first global commitment against 

chemical weapons, only two tyrants dared to cross the world’s 

brightest line. Now Bashar al-Assad has become the third. And I 

think all of you know that history holds nothing but infamy for 

those criminals, and history reserves also very little sympathy for 

their enablers. So the reality is the gravity of this moment. That 

is the importance of the decision that this Congress faces and that 

the world is waiting to learn about in these next days. 

Now, Ranking Member Corker asked a central question: Why 

should Americans care beyond what I have just said, which ought 

to be enough in the judgment of the President and this administration. Well, it is clear that in addition to what I have just mentioned 

about the Syria Accountability Act and the threat to the Middle 

9 

East, we cannot overlook the impact of chemical weapons and the 

danger that they pose to a particularly volatile area of the world 

in which we have been deeply invested for years because we have 

great friends there. We have allies there. We have deep interests 

there. 

Since President Obama’s policy is that Assad must go, it is not 

insignificant that to deprive Assad of the capacity to use chemical 

weapons, or to degrade the capacity to use those chemical weapons, 

actually deprives him of a lethal weapon in this ongoing civil war, 

and that has an impact. That can help to stabilize the region ultimately. 

In addition, we have other important strategic national security 

interests, not just in the prevention of the proliferation of chemical 

weapons, but to avoid the creation of a safe haven in Syria or a 

base of operations for extremists to use these weapons against our 

friends. All of us know that the extremes of both sides are there 

waiting in the wings, working and pushing and fighting. They 

would be desperate to get their hands on these materials. And the 

fact is that if nothing happens to begin to change the equation or 

the current calculation, that area can become even more so an area 

of ungoverned space where those extremists threaten even the 

United States and, more immediately, if they get their hands on 

their weapons, allies and friends of ours, like Jordan, or Israel, or 

Lebanon, or others. 

Forcing Assad to change his calculation about his ability to act 

with impunity can contribute to his realization that he cannot gas 

or shoot his way out of his predicament. And as I think you know, 

it has been the President’s primary goal to achieve a negotiated 

resolution, but you got to have parties prepared to negotiate to 

achieve that. 

Syria is also important because, quite simply, and I cannot put 

this to you more plainly than to just ask each of you to ask yourselves, if you are Assad or if you are any one of the other despots 

in that region, and the United States steps back from this moment 

together with our other allies and friends, what is the message? 

The message is that he has been granted impunity, the freedom to 

choose to use the weapons again or force us to go through this cycle 

again with who knows what outcome after once refusing it. We 

would have granted him the capacity to use these weapons against 

more people with greater levels of damage because we would have 

stood and stepped away. 

As confidently as we know what happened in Damascus, my 

friends, on August 21st, we know that Assad would read our stepping away or our silence as an invitation to use those weapons with 

impunity. And in creating impunity, we will be creating opportunity, the opportunity for other dictators and/or terrorists to pursue their own weapon of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. 

I will tell you there are some people hoping that the United 

States Congress does not vote for this very limited request the 

President has put before you. Iran is hoping you look the other 

way. Our inaction would surely give them a permission slip for 

them to at least misinterpret our intention, if not to put it to the 

test. Hezbollah is hoping that isolationism will prevail. North 

10 

Korea is hoping that ambivalence carries the day. They are all listening for our silence. 

And if we do not answer Assad today, we will erode a standard 

that has existed for those 100 years. In fact, we will erode a standard that has protected our own troops in war, and we will invite 

even more dangerous tests down the road. 

Our allies and our partners are also counting on us in this situation—the people of Israel, of Jordan, of Turkey. Each look next 

door and they see that they are one stiff breeze away from the potential of being hurt, of their civilians being killed as a consequence 

of choices Assad might make in the absence of action. They anxiously await our assurance that our word means something. They 

await the assurance that if the children lined up in un-bloodied 

burial shrouds for their own children, that we would keep the 

world’s promise. That is what they are hoping. 

So the authorization that President Obama seeks is definitely in 

our national security interests. We need to send to Syria and to the 

world, to dictators and terrorists, to allies, and to civilians alike the 

unmistakable message that when the United States of America and 

the world say ‘‘never again,’’ we do not mean sometimes, we do not 

mean somewhere. Never means never. 

So this is a vote for accountability. Norms and laws that keep the 

civilized world civil mean nothing if they are not enforced. As Justice Jackson said in his opening statement at the Nuremberg trials, 

‘‘The ultimate step in avoiding periodic wars, which are inevitable 

in a system of international lawlessness, is to make statesmen responsible to the law.’’ If the world’s worst despots see that they can 

flout with impunity prohibitions against the world’s worst weapons, 

then those prohibitions are just pieces of paper. That is what we 

mean by accountability, and that is what we mean by we cannot 

be silent. 

So let me be clear. President Obama is not asking America to go 

to war. And I say that sitting next to two men, Secretary Hagel 

and Chairman Dempsey, who know what war is. Senator McCain 

knows what war is. They know the difference between going to war 

and what President Obama is requesting now. We all agree there 

will be no American boots on the ground. The President has made 

crystal clear we have no intention of assuming responsibility for 

Syria’s civil war. He is asking only for the power to make clear, to 

make certain, that the United States means what we say, that the 

world, when we join together in a multilateral statement, mean 

what we say. He is asking for authorization to degrade and deter 

Bashar al-Assad’s capacity to use chemical weapons. 

Now, some will undoubtedly ask, and I think appropriately, what 

about the unintended consequences of action? Some fear a retaliation that leads to a larger conflict. Well, let me put it bluntly. If 

Assad is arrogant enough, and I would say foolish enough, to retaliate to the consequences of his own criminal activity, the United 

States and our allies have ample ways to make him regret that decision without going to war. Even Assad’s supporters, Russia and 

Iran, say publicly that the use of chemical weapons is unacceptable. 

Now, some will also question the extent of our responsibility. To 

them I say, when someone kills and injures hundreds of children 

11 

with a weapon the world has banned, we are all responsible. That 

is true because of treaties like the Geneva Convention and the 

Chemical Weapons Convention, and, for us, the Syria Accountability Act. But it is also true because we share a common humanity and a common decency. 

This is not the time for arm chair isolationism. This is not the 

time to be spectators to slaughter. Neither our country nor our conscience can afford the cost of silence. We have spoken up against 

unspeakable horror many times in the past. Now we must stand 

up and act, and we must protect our security, protect our values, 

and lead the world with conviction that is clear about our responsibility. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

VOICE. The American people, they do not want— 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. The committee 

will be in order. 

VOICE. We do not want to go to war. We do not want another 

war. 

The CHAIRMAN. I would ask the police to restore order. 

VOICE. Wait a minute. Nobody wants this war. Cruise missiles, 

launching cruise missiles is another war. The American people do 

not want this. 

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Hagel? 

Secretary KERRY. Can I just before—you know, the first time I 

testified before this committee when I was 27 years old, I had feelings very similar to that protestor. And I would just say that is exactly why it is so important that we are all here having this debate, talking about these things before the country. And that the 

Congress itself will act representing the American people. And I 

think we all can respect those who have a different point of view, 

and we do. 

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Hagel? 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Secretary HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Chairman Menendez, and Ranking Member Corker, members of the committee, as 

we all know, in the coming days Congress will debate how to respond to the most recent chemical weapons attack in Syria. A 

large-scale sarin gas assault perpetrated by the Syrian government 

against its own people. 

As a former Senator and member of this committee, I welcome 

this debate, and I strongly support President Obama’s decision to 

seek congressional authorization for the use of force in Syria. 

As each of us knows, committing the country to using military 

force is the most difficult decision America’s leaders can make, as 

Ranking Member Corker noted. All of those who are privileged to 

serve our Nation have a responsibility to ask tough questions before that commitment is made. The American people must be assured that their leaders are acting according to U.S. national interests, with well-defined military objectives, with an understanding 

of the risks and the consequences involved. 

12 

The President, along with his national security team, asked those 

tough questions before we concluded that the United States should 

take military action against Syria because of what the Assad regime has done. 

I want to address how we reached this decision by clarifying the 

U.S. interests at stake, our military objectives, and the risks of not 

acting at this critical juncture. 

As President Obama said, the use of chemical weapons in Syria 

is not only an assault on humanity; it is a serious threat to America’s national security interests and those of our closest allies. The 

Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons poses grave risks to our 

friends and partners along Syria’s borders, including Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, and Iraq. If Assad is prepared to use chemical weapons against his own people, we have to be concerned that 

terrorist groups like Hezbollah, which has forces in Syria supporting the Assad regime, would acquire them and would use them. 

That risk of chemical weapons proliferation poses a direct threat 

to our friends, our partners, and to U.S. personnel in the region. 

We cannot afford for Hezbollah or any terrorist group determined 

to strike the United States to have incentives to acquire or use 

chemical weapons. 

The Syrian regime’s actions risk eroding the nearly century-old 

international norm against the use of chemical weapons, which 

Secretary Kerry has noted, a norm that has helped protect the 

United States’ homeland and American forces operating across the 

globe from those terrible weapons. Weakening this norm could embolden other regimes to acquire or use chemical weapons. For example, North Korea maintains a massive stockpile of chemical 

weapons that threatens our treaty ally, the Republic of Korea, and 

the 28,000 U.S. troops stationed there. 

I have just returned from Asia where I had a very serious and 

long conversation with South Korea’s defense minister about the 

threat, the real threat that North Korea’s stockpile of chemical 

weapons presents to them. Our allies throughout the world must 

be assured that the United States will fulfill its security commitments. 

Given these threats to our national security, the United States 

must demonstrate through our actions that the use of chemical 

weapons is unacceptable. The President has made clear that our 

military objectives in Syria would be to hold the Assad regime accountable, degrade its ability to carry out these kinds of attacks, 

and deter the regime from further use of chemical weapons. 

The Department of Defense has developed military options to 

achieve these objectives, and we have positioned U.S. assets 

throughout the region to successfully execute this mission. We believe we can achieve them with a military action that would be limited in duration and scope. General Dempsey and I have assured 

the President that U.S. forces will be ready to act whenever the 

President gives the order. 

We are also working with our allies and our partners in this effort, key partners, including France, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, United 

Arab Emirates, and friends in the region have assured us of their 

strong support of U.S. action. 

13 

In defining our military objectives, we have made clear that we 

are not seeking to resolve the underlying conflict in Syria through 

direct military force. Instead, we are contemplating actions that 

are tailored to respond to the use of chemical weapons. A political 

solution created by the Syrian people is the only way to ultimately 

end the violence in Syria. And Secretary Kerry is leading international efforts to help the parties in Syria move toward a negotiated transition, a transition that means a free and inclusive 

Syria. 

We are also committed to doing more to assist the Syrian opposition, but Assad must be held accountable for using these weapons 

in defiance of the international community. 

Having defined America’s interests and our military objectives, 

we also must examine the risks and the consequences of action, as 

well as the consequences of inaction. There are always risks in taking action. The Assad regime, under increasing pressure by the 

Syrian opposition, could feel empowered to carry out even more 

devastating chemical weapons attacks without a response. Chemical weapons make no distinction between combatants and innocent 

civilians, and inflict the worst kind of indiscriminate suffering, as 

we have recently seen. 

A refusal to act would undermine the credibility of America’s 

other security commitments, including the President’s commitment 

to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The word of the 

United States must mean something. It is vital currency in foreign 

relations and international and allied commitments. 

Every witness here today—Secretary Kerry, General Dempsey, 

and myself—has served in uniform, fought in war, and seen its 

ugly realities up close, as has already been noted, Senator McCain. 

We understand that a country faces few decisions as grave as using 

military force. We are not unaware of the costs and ravages of war. 

But we also understand that America must protect its people and 

its national interests. That is our highest responsibility. 

All of us who have the privilege and responsibility of serving this 

great Nation, owe the American people, and especially those wearing the uniform of our country, vigorous debate on how America 

should respond to this horrific chemical weapons attack in Syria. 

I know everyone on this committee agrees and takes their responsibility of office just as seriously as the President and everyone sitting at this table. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Hagel follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHUCK HAGEL

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, thank you for convening this 

hearing. 

In the coming days, Congress will debate how to respond to the most recent chemical weapons attack in Syria—a large-scale, and heinous, sarin gas assault perpetrated by the Syrian government against its own people. 

As a former Senator and member of this committee, I welcome this debate and 

I strongly support President Obama’s decision to seek congressional authorization 

for the use of force in Syria. 

As each of us knows, committing the country to using military force is the most 

difficult decision America’s leaders can make. All of those who are privileged to 

serve our nation have a responsibility to ask tough questions before that commitment is made. The American people must be assured that their leaders are acting 

14 

according to U.S. national interests, with well-defined military objectives, and with 

an understanding of the risks and consequences involved. 

The President, along with his entire national security team, asked those tough 

questions before we concluded that the United States should take military action 

against Syrian regime targets. I want to address how we reached this decision by 

clarifying the U.S. interests at stake, our military objectives, and the risks of not 

acting at this critical juncture. 

As President Obama said, the use of chemical weapons in Syria is not only an 

assault on humanity—it is a serious threat to America’s national security interests 

and those of our closest allies. 

The Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons poses grave risks to our friends and 

partners along Syria’s borders—including Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq. 

If Assad is prepared to use chemical weapons against his own people, we have to 

be concerned that terrorist groups like Hezbollah, which has forces in Syria supporting the Assad regime, could acquire them. This risk of chemical weapons proliferation poses a direct threat to our friends and partners, and to U.S. personnel 

in the region. We cannot afford for Hezbollah or any terrorist group determined to 

strike the United States to have incentives to acquire or use chemical weapons. 

The Syrian regime’s actions risk eroding the nearly century-old international 

norm against the use of chemical weapons—a norm that has helped protect the 

United States homeland and American forces operating across the globe from these 

terrible weapons. Weakening this norm could embolden other regimes to acquire or 

use chemical weapons. For example, North Korea maintains a massive stockpile of 

chemical weapons that threatens our treaty ally, the Republic of Korea, and the 

28,000 U.S. troops stationed there. I have just returned from Asia, where I had a 

very serious and long conversation with South Korea’s Defense Minister about the 

threat that North Korea’s stockpile of chemical weapons presents to them. Our allies throughout the world must be assured that the United States will fulfill its security commitments. 

Given these threats to our national security, the United States must demonstrate 

through our actions that the use of chemical weapons is unacceptable. 

The President has made clear that our military objectives in Syria would be to 

hold the Assad regime accountable, degrade its ability to carry out these kinds of 

attacks, and deter the regime from further use of chemical weapons. 

The Department of Defense has developed military options to achieve these objectives, and we have positioned U.S. assets throughout the region to successfully execute this mission. We believe we can achieve them with a military action that would 

be limited in duration and scope. 

General Dempsey and I have assured the President that U.S. forces will be ready 

to act whenever the President gives the order. We are also working with our allies 

and partners in this effort. Key partners, including France, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, 

the United Arab Emirates, and other friends in the region, have assured us of their 

strong support for U.S. action. 

In defining our military objectives, we have made clear that we are not seeking 

to resolve the underlying conflict in Syria through direct military force. Instead we 

are contemplating actions that are tailored to respond to the use of chemical weapons. A political solution created by the Syrian people is the only way to ultimately 

end the violence in Syria, and Secretary Kerry is leading international efforts to 

help the parties in Syria move towards a negotiated transition. We are also committed to doing more to assist the Syrian opposition. But Assad must be held accountable for using these weapons in defiance of the international community.Having defined America’s interests and our military objectives, we also must 

examine the risks and consequences of action, as well as the consequences of inaction. 

There are always risks in taking action, but there are also risks with inaction. 

The Assad regime, under increasing pressure by the Syrian opposition, could feel 

empowered to carry out even more devastating chemical weapons attacks. Chemical 

weapons make no distinction between combatants and innocent civilians, and inflict 

the worst kind of indiscriminate suffering, as we have recently seen. 

A refusal to act would undermine the credibility of America’s other security commitments—including the President’s commitment to prevent Iran from acquiring a 

nuclear weapon. The word of the United States must mean something. It is vital 

currency in foreign relations and international and allied commitments. 

Every witness here today—Secretary Kerry, General Dempsey, and myself—has 

served in uniform, fought in war, and seen its ugly realities up close. We understand that a country faces few decisions as grave as using military force. We are 

not unaware of the costs and ravages of war. But we also understand that America 

must protect its people and its national interests. That is our highest responsibility. 

15 

All of us who have the privilege and responsibility of serving this great nation 

owe the American people, and especially those wearing the uniform of our country, 

a vigorous debate on how America should respond to the horrific chemical weapons 

attack in Syria. I know everyone on this committee agrees, and takes their responsibility of office just as seriously as the President and everyone at this table. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Secretary Hagel. And I know that 

General Dempsey is available to answer questions from the members of the committee. And in that regard, let me start of by urging 

members, tomorrow there will be an intelligence briefing for the 

committee on both the issues at hand, as well as potential military 

action. So in this setting, we are obviously somewhat constrained 

about what we might discuss with greater specificity tomorrow. 

Mr. Secretary, you make, and have made, a compelling case, and 

I think it is important, and I appreciate you reiterating the high 

degree of confidence that exists in our intelligence assessments. I 

think those are conditions precedent to be able to move forward. 

This weekend, I was at a soccer tournament, and I had a group 

of moms come up to me and say, ‘‘Senator, we saw those pictures. 

They are horrific. We cannot imagine the devastation those parents 

must feel about their children. But why us? Why us?’’ And so, I ask 

you, would you tell them that we would be more secure or less secure by the actions that are being considered, actions for which the 

President has asked for the authorization of the use of force? 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, I would say unequivocally that the 

President’s actions will make us more secure, less likely that Assad 

can use his weapons or chooses to use his weapons. And the absence of taking the action the President has asked for will, in fact, 

be far more threatening and dangerous, and potentially ultimately 

cost lives. 

The CHAIRMAN. And do you consider the consequences of inaction 

greater than the consequences of action? 

Secretary KERRY. I do. 

The CHAIRMAN. General Dempsey, what do we see as the result 

of this military campaign, in broad terms of its effect? What do we 

expect to see at the end of any authorized action; what do we think 

the results will look like? What is our expectation? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. The task I 

have been given is to develop military options to deter; that is to 

say, change the regime’s calculus about the use of chemical weapons, and degrade his ability to do so; that is to say, both activities 

directly related to chemical weapons themselves, but also to the 

means of employing them. And anything beyond that, I would prefer to speak about it in a classified setting. 

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that. Let me ask you this. In the 

process of achieving those two goals that you just outlined, would 

there not be a collateral consequence to the regime of further degrading its overall capabilities? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we received from the administration a proposed resolution for the authorization of force. And, of 

course, that is a negotiation between the Congress and the administration. Would you tell us whether you believe that a prohibition 

for having American boots on the ground is something that the administration would accept as part of a resolution? 

16 

Secretary KERRY. Mr. Chairman, it would be preferable not to, 

because there is no intention, or any plan, or any desire whatsoever, to have boots on the ground. I think the President will give 

you every assurance in the world, as am I, as is the Secretary of 

Defense, and General Dempsey. But in the event Syria imploded, 

for instance, or in the event there was a threat of a chemical weapons cache falling into the hands of al-Nusra or someone else, and 

it was clearly in the interest of our allies and all of us—the British, 

the French, and others—to prevent those weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of the worst elements—I do not want to 

take off the table an option that might or might not be available 

to the President of the United States to secure our country. So that 

was the only kind of example—it is the only thing I can think of 

that would immediately leap to mind to say, no. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if we said that there would be no troops on 

the ground for combat purposes, that clearly, I assume— 

Secretary KERRY. Well, assuming that in the going to protect 

those weapons, whether or not they have to, you know, answer a 

shot in order to be secure, I do not want to speak to that. 

The bottom line is this—can I give you the bottom line? 

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to have to work to find— 

Secretary KERRY. I am absolutely confident, Mr. Chairman, that 

it is easy, not that complicated, to work out language that will satisfy the Congress and the American people that there is no door 

open here through which someone can march in ways that the Congress does not want it to while still protecting the national security 

interests of the country. I am confident that could be worked out. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I— 

Secretary KERRY. The bottom line is, the President has no intention, and will not, and we do not want to, put American troops on 

the ground to fight this or be involved in the fighting of the civil 

war period. 

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that, and I appreciate the response 

about chemical weapons and the possibility of securing them in our 

national security interests, as well as our allies. But I do think we 

are going to have to work on language that makes it clear that this 

is an overriding issue that I think members, as well as the American people, want to know. 

Let me ask you, what—you mentioned it in your remarks. What 

do you think is the calculus of Iran, North Korea, if we fail to act? 

And what is the calculus of our allies if we fail to act? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, if we fail to act, we are going to have 

fewer allies. I think we are going to have fewer people who count 

on us—certainly in the region. We have huge doubts right now. I 

hear them. I mean, you know, I have the privilege of talking with 

many of the leaders of these countries with respect to what they 

may or may not be inclined to do. I have heard their warnings very 

clearly about what is at stake, not just for them, but for us, in the 

region. And I think that it is fair to say that our interests would 

be seriously set back in many respects if we are viewed as not capable—or willing, most important—to follow through on the things 

that we say matter to us. 

As I said earlier in my testimony, this really is not President 

Obama’s red line. The President drew a line that anyone should 

17 

draw with respect to this convention that we have signed, and 

which has been in place since the horrors of World War I. And the 

truth is that through all of World War II, through Vietnam, 

through Korea, through both Gulf wars, through Afghanistan, 

through Iraq, the combatants in those efforts have never resorted 

to this use. 

So I think that it is clear, with those prior usages that I referred 

to, that we would be opening Pandora’s box with respect to a whole 

set of dangerous consequences as a result of the United States not 

keeping its word. And it would make our life very, very difficult 

with North Korea and Iran. 

There is no question in my mind that those countries are watching, the mullahs and many others are watching what we are doing 

now with great interest. And that is why even the quality of this 

debate, and the nature of this debate, are very important. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, thank 

you for your testimony. 

I want to first thank you for bringing this to Congress. I think 

our foreign policy through the years has been far too focused on the 

administration. I do not think Congress has played the role that it 

should play in foreign policy, and I want to thank you for bringing 

it here and giving us the opportunity to have this debate in advance. 

I want to focus a little bit on our strategy with the vetted opposition. I do not know how anybody—as a matter of fact, I know of 

no one—who has been to the area and spent time with opposition 

that is not incredibly dismayed by the lack of progress that is occurring there. I know there is a lot of capacity that has to be built. 

I know there are interagency discussions about whether we should 

move to industrial-strength training, move away from the kind of 

activities that are taking place now to build capacity more quickly. 

And I just would like, for whichever one of you wants to respond, 

to talk with us, those of us who have been to the region, who do 

believe that Syria is important, who are watching what is happening in Iraq as this sectarian issue moves there. It is moving 

into Lebanon. It is moving; it is certainly destabilizing Jordan. 

Why have we been so slow, so inept in so many ways at helping 

build capacity of this opposition that we have said publicly that we 

support? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Senator, it is a worthy and important 

question. 

I have had a number of different meetings with the opposition 

over the course of the months now, since I came in, in February, 

beginning with a meeting in Rome, and subsequently in Istanbul, 

and in Amman, Jordan. And the opposition, one has to remember 

that as little as a year ago there was no great clarity as to the 

structure of that opposition or even who they were, and they certainly had had no experience in this kind of an endeavor. 

Over the course of that year, they have evolved, I would say, significantly. Are they where they need to be? Not completely, but 

they have changed markedly over the course of the last few 

months. 

18 

At our insistence—and when I say ‘‘our’’ insistence, the insistence of all of their supporters, the so-called ‘‘London 11’’—they 

reached out and expanded significantly their base within Syria. 

They elected new leadership. They brought in a much broader base 

of Syrian representation including women, including minorities, 

Christians, others. And so, they have built up a much more competent leadership. 

Senator CORKER. If I could, I have only got a few minutes. 

Secretary KERRY. Okay. 

Senator CORKER. I am very aware of all those things. What I am 

unaware of is why it is so slow in actually helping them with lethal 

support? Why has that been so slow? 

Secretary KERRY. I think, Senator, we need to have that discussion tomorrow in classified session. We can talk about some components of that. Suffice it to say that it is increasing significantly. I 

want General Dempsey to speak to this, maybe Secretary Hagel as 

well. It has increased in its competency. I think it has made leaps 

and bounds over the course of the last few months. 

Secretary Hagel, do you, or General, do you want to? 

Secretary HAGEL. I would only add that it was June of this year 

that the President made the decision to support lethal assistance 

to the opposition. As you all know, we have been very supportive 

with hundreds of millions of dollars of nonlethal assistance. 

The vetting process, as Secretary Kerry noted, has been significant, but I will ask General Dempsey if he wants to add anything. 

But we, the Department of Defense, have not been directly involved 

in this. This is, as you know, a covert action and as Secretary 

Kerry noted, to go into much more detail would require a closed or 

classified hearing. 

General Dempsey? 

Senator CORKER. As he is answering that, if he could be fairly 

brief. Is there anything about the authorization that you are asking 

that in any way takes away from our stated strategy of empowering the vetted opposition to have the capacity over time to joinin with a transition government as we have stated from the beginning? Is there anything about this authorization that in any way 

supplements that? 

General DEMPSEY. To your question about the opposition, moderate opposition, the path to the resolution of the Syrian conflict is 

through a developed, capable, moderate opposition, and we know 

how to do that. 

Secondly, there is nothing in this resolution that would limit 

what we are doing now, but we are very focused on the response 

to the chemical weapons. I think that subsequent to that, we would 

probably return to have a discussion about what we might do with 

the moderate opposition in a more overt way. 

Senator CORKER. So, you know, I am very sympathetic to the 

issue of chemical warfare, and very sympathetic to what this 

means for U.S. credibility, and I am very sympathetic to the fact 

that people are watching in the region, and this will have an impact. 

But I want to say, I am not sympathetic regarding the lack of 

effort that has taken place, in my opinion, on the ground as it relates to the vetted opposition. And I hope the end state, that you 

19 

imagine here, is something that—while it will be proportional and 

will be surgical—is something that enhances the strategy that we 

have already laid in place. And I hope you will answer that yes or 

no, at this time. 

General DEMPSEY. The answer to whether I support additional 

support for the moderate opposition is yes. 

Senator CORKER. And this authorization will support those activities in addition to responding to the weapons of mass destruction? 

General DEMPSEY. I do not know how the resolution will evolve, 

but I support those— 

Senator CORKER. But what you are seeking. What is it you are 

seeking? 

General DEMPSEY. I cannot answer that, what we are seeking. 

Secretary KERRY. The action, if it is authorized, the answer is, 

as I said in my opening comments, that a consequence of degrading 

his chemical capacity inevitably will also have a downstream impact on his military capacity. 

Senator CORKER. And is this only, this authorization, is only 

about weapons of mass destruction? 

Secretary KERRY. That is correct. This authorization is a limited, 

targeted effort to focus on deterring and degrading the chemical 

weapons capacity of the Assad regime. 

Senator CORKER. Is that against any other enemies other than 

the Assad regime? 

Secretary KERRY. No, Senator. 

Senator CORKER. Is it to be utilized in any other country except 

inside Syria? 

Secretary KERRY. No, Senator. 

Senator CORKER. I will say that, in response to your answer to 

Senator Menendez, I did not find that a very appropriate response 

regarding boots on the ground. And I do want to say that that is 

an important element to me, and I hope that as we together work 

through this, we work through something that is much clearer 

than the answer that you gave. 

While we all feel the actions by the Assad regime are reprehensible, I do not think there are any of us here that are willing to 

support the possibility of having combat boots on the ground. 

Secretary KERRY. Well— 

Senator CORKER. And I do hope as we move through this, the administration can be very clear in that regard. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, let me be very clear now, because I do 

not want anything coming out of this hearing that leaves any door 

open to any possibility. So let’s shut that door now as tight as we 

can. 

All I did was raise a hypothetical question about some possibility, and I am thinking out loud about how to protect America’s 

interests. But if you want to know whether there is any, you know, 

the answer is whatever prohibition clarifies it to Congress and the 

American people, there will not be American boots on the ground 

with respect to the civil war. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Boxer. 

20 

Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman and Senator Corker, thank you so 

much for holding this hearing on a vote of conscience. And I ask 

unanimous consent that my full statement be entered into the 

record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Boxer follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

Mr. Chairman and Senator Corker-thank you for holding this hearing on a vote 

of conscience in reaction to Syria’s use of chemical weapons against its own people. 

The images of children gasping for air and young bodies lined up row by row 

should shock the conscience of the world. 

Failure to act could give license to the Syrian President to use these weapons 

again and send a terrible signal to other brutal regimes like North Korea, which 

possesses a chemical weapons stockpile. 

Since I came to the Senate I voted against the 2003 Iraq War, but I did vote for 

the use of force against Osama bin Laden in 2001. I did vote to support military 

missile and air strikes against Serbia in 1999, but I opposed the military surge in 

Afghanistan in 2009. 

I approach this Syria issue in the same way that I approached those—with a 

heavy heart and an independent mind. 

I have heard some of my colleagues compare President Obama’s position on Syria 

to the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. 

This is a false comparison. 

In Iraq, the Bush administration was trying to prove the existence of an active 

weapons of mass destruction program in a country where such a program did not 

exist. 

Here, we know that Assad has stockpiles of chemical weapons. 

In Iraq, the Bush administration was preparing to invade and occupy a country 

with well over 100,000 U.S. troops. 

In this case, the President has been clear: No ground invasion. No occupation. No 

comparison between Iraq and Syria. 

So why should we take targeted action against Syria? 

Because allowing the continued use of chemical weapons to go unanswered makes 

it more likely that terrorists could obtain and use them on America or our allies, 

including Israel. And it makes it more likely that Iran will view us as a paper tiger 

when it comes to their nuclear program. 

In 1997, the Senate supported a ban on chemical weapons by a vote of 74-26. 

I voted to approve the Chemical Weapons Convention because chemical weapons 

have no place in the civilized world and some behavior must be out of bounds. 

Shouldn’t an overwhelming vote like this mean something? Shouldn’t the Senate 

stand behind its words and actions? 

In 2003, we passed the Syria Accountability Act by a vote of 89-4—legislation that 

I introduced which states that Syria’s ‘‘acquisition of weapons of mass destruction 

. . . threatens the security of the Middle East and the national security interests of 

the United States.’’ 

Shouldn’t an overwhelming vote like this mean something? Shouldn’t the Senate 

stand behind its words and actions? 

Not only has our President drawn a red line on the use of chemical weapons, so 

did the Senate with the passage of the Syria Accountability Act and ratification of 

the Chemical Weapons Convention. 

I know there is tremendous reluctance to get involved in another military effort 

and sometimes the easiest thing to do when others suffer is to walk away. Well, 

I don’t believe we should close our eyes to this clear violation of long-standing international norms. I believe America’s morality, America’s reputation, and America’s 

credibility are on the line. 

I applaud President Obama for coming to Congress and will support a targeted 

response to Syria’s unspeakable deeds to gas its own people to death. 

Senator BOXER. So I am going to make a brief statement because 

a lot of people have been asking me how I view this, including my 

own constituents. And then I will ask some questions about the 

intel, if I can. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for showing us those images of children because even though it is really hard to look at, we have to 

21 

look at it. Children gasping for air, young bodies lined up in a row 

should shock the world. 

And the failure to act, I think, gives license to the Syrian President to use these weapons again. And it sends a terrible signal to 

other brutal regimes, like North Korea. And can I thank you, Secretary Hagel, for bringing up the issue of North Korea in your 

opening statement, and you, Secretary Kerry, for bringing it up? I 

mean, how many of us have been there to the line where we see 

thousands of our troops standing there, just a stone’s throw away 

from North Korea? We need to think about it. Maybe because I am 

from California, I tend to look at Asia, but this is very serious. We 

see that danger up close when we go to that line. 

Now, since I came to the Senate, I voted against the Iraq war, 

but I did vote for the use of force against Osama bin Laden. I voted 

to support air strikes against Serbia, but I vocally opposed the military surge in Afghanistan. So I approach this Syria issue in the 

same way I approached those: With a very heavy heart and a very 

independent mind. 

I have heard some of my colleagues compare President Obama’s 

position on Syria to the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, and I 

thank Secretary Kerry for discussing this because I believe it is a 

totally false comparison. And I know it has been mentioned before; 

you drew that line again. 

In Iraq, the Bush administration prepared to invade and occupy 

a country with well over 100,000 U.S. troops. In this case, the 

President has been clear: no ground invasion. No occupation. We 

will have that in our resolution. 

So why should we take any targeted action against Syria? Not 

only is it important to keep North Korea in mind, but also allowing 

the continued use of chemical weapons to go unanswered, makes 

it much more likely that we will see them used again in Syria, and 

we will see them used maybe elsewhere. And terrorists could obtain those chemical weapons and use them on America, or our allies, or our troops. Use them, for example, against Israel and other 

friends. It makes it more likely—and this is key—that Iran will 

view us as a paper tiger when it comes to their nuclear program, 

and that is dangerous, not only for us and our friends, but for the 

world. 

Now, in 1997, the Senate supported a ban on chemical weapons 

by a vote of 74 to 26. Should not an overwhelming vote like that 

mean something? Should not the Senate stand behind its words 

and actions? And then, in 2003, we passed the Syria Accountability 

Act by a vote of 89 to 4. I wrote that bill with Senator Santorum. 

We had a huge vote in favor of it. This is what it says, ‘‘acquisition 

of weapons of mass destruction . . . threatens the security of the 

Middle East and the national security interests of the United 

States.’’ Should not an overwhelming vote like that meant something? Should not the Senate stand behind its words and its actions? 

So, I believe, as Secretary Kerry said, and I will reiterate it, that 

not only has our President drawn a line, a red line, on the use of 

chemical weapons, and not only has the world done so, but we, in 

the Senate, we did so. 

22 

Now, I know there is tremendous reluctance to get involved in 

another military effort. And sometimes the easiest thing to do is to 

walk away. Well, I believe we cannot close our eyes to this clear 

violation of longstanding international norms. I believe America’s 

morality, America’s reputation, and America’s credibility are on the 

line. 

I applaud this administration and our President for coming to 

Congress. I applaud those who asked him to come to Congress. It 

is the right thing to do, and I will support a targeted effort, but 

not a blank check, to respond to Syria’s unspeakable deeds to gas 

its own people to death. 

Now, my question involves the intel here, and I do not know how 

much you can give us, so I am going to try to make this pretty 

broad, so you can answer it, and whomever feels most comfortable. 

A lot of people are fearful, because of what happened in Iraq, 

that there might be some disagreement between the intelligence 

agencies, and we have a lot of intelligence agencies, 17 in all. I do 

not know how many were involved in this, whether it was four, or 

six, or eight. I do not know whether you can disclose that. 

But my question is: Was there any argument about this fact, that 

they agree that there is high confidence that these weapons were 

used by the Assad regime? Was there any debate? I mean, there 

was debate. Was there any dissension between the various agencies? 

Secretary KERRY. The intelligence community, represented by 

DNI Clapper, has released a public document, unclassified, available for all to see, in which they make their judgment with high 

confidence that the facts are as they have set forth. So, I think that 

speaks for itself. 

Senator BOXER. Well, I am going to press just a little bit harder 

here, John, Mr. Secretary, if I can. 

Out of all the different agencies, because I remember in Iraq, 

sure, eventually the word came down, everyone agreed, but then 

we found out there was disagreement. 

To your knowledge, did they all come to the same conclusion, the 

various intelligence agencies? 

Secretary KERRY. To my knowledge, I have no knowledge of any 

agency that was a dissenter, or anybody who had an alternative 

theory. And I do know, I think it is safe to say, that they had a 

whole team that ran a scenario to try to test their theory, to see 

if there was any possibility they could come up with an alternative 

view as to who might have done it. And the answer is: They could 

not. 

Senator BOXER. Okay. Last question on intel and Russia. I 

read—and I do not know if this is true or false, but I read in one 

of the publications today that members of the Russian parliament 

were going to come here to lobby our colleagues, to tell our colleagues, that there is no such intelligence, that there is no proof. 

I, myself, met with the Russian Ambassador several times on this 

matter, and I knew right away, a long time ago, they were going 

to do nothing to help us. 

But what are they clinging to here? How could they make that 

case given what you have said? 

23 

Secretary KERRY. I, honestly, I do not know. I mean, there is no 

way for me to hang my hat on what it is. I think that—I have had 

personal conversations with the foreign minister. They make an argument to some effect that we do not have evidence, and that the 

opposition did it. No matter what you show, that is the argument 

they take. Now, as to why they do that or what the rationale is, 

I am not going to speculate. 

The President, as you know, is leaving this evening to go to St. 

Petersburg for the summit. He will have ample opportunity to hear 

firsthand from President Putin, and I am confident they will have 

a discussion about it. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary KERRY. Could I just say? I want to add, though. I think 

it is important for us not to get into an unnecessary struggle over 

some of this with the Russians for a lot of reasons. 

The Russians are working with us and cooperating on this effort 

to try to make a negotiated process work. And I think they are serious about trying to find the way forward with that, number one. 

Number two, on major issues like START, North Korea, Iran, the 

Russians are cooperating. So I think, you know, we have to sort of 

deal with this thoughtfully, and let us hope that the summit might 

produce some change of heart as the President makes the evidence 

available to President Putin. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator. 

Senator RISCH. Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me say that I have 

seen the pictures of what happened, and I have been seeing pictures for 14 months or more; 2 years, I guess, of what is going on 

over there. You cannot have an ounce of compassion in you and not 

be moved tremendously by what is happening there. It is awful. It 

is horrendous. 

There has been almost 100,000 people killed there, and we all 

know, I guess, in an unclassified setting, we can say that these 

people have used gas on multiple occasions, but the deaths have 

only been in the hundreds and not in the thousands. But all of this 

is moving, and there is no question about it. 

Nonetheless, I am reluctant. If this was one American, if this 

was an attack against any American, against any American interest, this would be a no-brainer for me. But I am reluctant at this 

point, and part of it stems from where this is going to go as to the 

limit we are going to put on it. 

Secretary Kerry, you said you have met with your counterpart 

from Russia. First of all, you say they are cooperating with us on 

all major issues. I view this as a major issue, and I do not view 

them as cooperating with us. They are printing their currency. 

They are providing them with information. They are providing 

them with technology. They have provided them with a tremendous 

amount of military power. 

And so, the question I have is: What is your counterpart telling 

you as to what they are going to do when, and if, America pulls 

the trigger? 

24 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, look, I understand anybody’s reluctance about this. But again, I would ask you to confront the greater 

reality of what happens if we do not do something. I mean, if you 

think it is bad today what they are doing, just think about what 

happens if they confirm their suspicion that the United States is 

not going to do anything. 

One of the reasons Assad has been using these materials is because they have, up until now, made the calculation that the 

West—writ large, and the United States particularly—are not 

going to do anything about it. Impunity is already working to kill 

a lot of people, and to make things more dangerous, and I guarantee you that is in their assessment. 

So if we make it worse by not being willing to do something, 

those terrible images you see are going to be worse. But worse than 

that, our interests will be setback: Israel will be at greater risk. 

Jordan will be at greater risk. The longer that this conflict goes on, 

and particularly with Assad’s ability to be able to use chemical 

weapons, the more you will see the humanitarian crisis grow. 

We are already the largest contributor, thanks to the generosity 

of the American people and the willingness of Congress to move. 

We are already the largest contributor to refugee camps in the borders, and many of you have been to them. Do you want to see them 

grow? Do you want to see Jordan, which is already fragile? 

Senator RISCH. Of course, not. 

Secretary KERRY. Many of you have met with the King. You 

know King Abdullah’s judgment is that he is at-risk because of 

what is happening. So I believe the best way to curb that and reduce the threat is by acting. 

Senator RISCH. And I do not disagree with anything you said, but 

let us take that, and try to expand on that. 

We need the credibility, there is no question about it, but are we 

really going to be giving them credibility? If we go in with a limited 

strike, and the day after, or the week after, or the month after, 

Assad crawls out of his rat hole and says, ‘‘Look. I stood up to the 

strongest power on the face of this earth, and I won. And so, now 

it is business as usual here.’’ 

And he may say, ‘‘And by the way, I am not going to use chemical weapons anymore because I do not like what just happened, 

but I am going to continue to use conventional weapons.’’ And we 

are going to go on with business as usual, and the refugees are 

going to continue, and the thousands are going to be killed. And 

our allies are going to say, ‘‘What is the matter with you, United 

States? You said you would do something about this. You did a limited strike, but you did not finish Assad off and the problem is just 

as bad as it was.’’ 

What does that do to our credibility? You know, that concerns 

me. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Senator, let me speak to that. It is a good 

question. 

First of all, I think General Dempsey will tell you, Assad may 

be able to crawl out of the hole and say, ‘‘Look, I survived.’’ But 

there is no way that with reality, and other assessments, he is 

going to be able to say he is better off. 

25 

There is no question that—whatever choices are made by the 

President—that Assad, and his military effort, will not be better 

off, number one. And the opposition will know that, and the people 

in Syria will know that. 

Already today, just with the threat that action may be taken, defections have gone up, and people in Syria are reconsidering whether Assad is a long-term bet. 

Moreover, General Dempsey has made it clear, and Secretary 

Hagel has made it clear, and the President has made it clear, that 

there will be additional support to the opposition, which is only 

now in its third month of receiving the overt support—or about to 

receive, in fairness, as Senator McCain and others know—there are 

things that have not gotten there yet. But that process is in place 

and that will increase. So I believe— 

Senator RISCH. My time is almost up, Secretary. 

I really want to get a handle on this. I think all of us feel strongly about this, and I need to be reassured on this. The other thing 

that just really troubles me about this is: What happens if this 

thing gets away from us? What happens? You have been on the 

border between Israel and Lebanon, as I have. And since the last 

war, I mean they have, Hezbollah has really beefed that up. 

What happens if they get into it with Israel? What is our response to that going to be? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I talked with Prime Minister Netanyahu 

just yesterday, and he made it pretty clear to me that Israel feels 

very confident about Israel’s ability to deal, as they have previously, with a miscalculation by Assad. 

And the rest of the community—the Turks, the Jordanians, the 

Emirates, the Saudis, the Qataris, the United States, France, others—all have a capacity. 

So as I said in my statement, you all have to make a calculation 

here just as Assad does. If he is foolish enough to respond to the 

world’s enforcement against his criminal activity, if he does, he will 

invite something far worse, and I believe, something absolutely 

unsustainable for him. Now, that does not mean the United States 

of America is going to war. As I said in my comments, there are 

plenty of options here. 

Senator RISCH. Well, we do know— 

Secretary KERRY. Let me finish; one other comment because it is 

important to the earlier question. Russia does not have an ideological commitment here. This is a geopolitical, transactional commitment. And our indications are, in many regards, that that is the 

way they view it. There may be more weapons to sell as a result 

of weapons sold, but it is not going to elicit some kind of major confrontation. Now, let me go further. 

They have condemned the use of chemical weapons; the Russians 

have. The Iranians have. And as the proof of the use becomes even 

clearer in the course of this debate, I think it is going to be very 

difficult for Iran or Russia to decide against all of that evidence 

that there is something worth defending here. 

So this is the kind of calculation you have to make, but I would 

measure that against the calculation of what happens if we do not 

respond. If we do not respond, we are going to be back here asking 

you to respond to some greater confrontation with greater potential 

26 

for damage and danger because somebody miscalculated as a result 

of believing the United States is not good for what it says. And that 

will invite much greater danger to the American people, much 

greater risk for our armed forces, and conceivably, much greater 

chances of a genuine kind of conflagration that we do not want to 

see. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up. Thank 

you, Secretary. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, let me thank all of you for being here, but 

also thank you very much for your service. And Mr. Chairman and 

Senator Corker, I thank you very much for arranging this hearing. 

It is very clear, the type of conduct that President Assad has 

done in Syria, his actions have created a humanitarian crisis, and 

now he has escalated to the use of chemical weapons. The evidence 

has been presented, and it is clear that we have to respond, and 

a military response is justified. So I support your efforts. 

And, Mr. Secretary, the way that you have described it is what 

I think we need to do. We have to have a tailored mission that 

deals with degrading and deterring the use of chemical weapons. 

We need to have it focused on that mission. It has got to be done 

in a way that protects civilians the best that we can. And it has 

got to be of very limited duration. 

But I just want to come back to the point that the Chairman 

raised and your own comments, where you say we should shut that 

door as tightly as possible when dealing with putting our troops on 

the ground in Syria. 

I have read the resolution that you presented to us. I think it is 

broader than what you have stated as the President’s intentions on 

the mission, and I understand that. And I understand the President’s strong desire to keep the mission very tight. And it certainly 

does not close the door on the introduction of ground troops. 

I have also heard your comments about the unexpected, something could happen. I would just point out that the President, as 

Commander-in-Chief, has the authority, the inherent authority, to 

act in urgent situations where time requires that action. And I 

would suggest that as you have come to Congress for this authorization, if circumstances change and there is time to come to Congress, you will have the opportunity to come back to Congress and 

seek our participation. We are a separate branch of government, as 

you recall. 

So I just want to urge you in the strongest possible terms to 

work with our leadership to draft a resolution that is as tight as 

we can make it to allow you to carry out the mission that you have 

defined here today. So that we can go back and tell the American 

people that we, in Congress, are supporting your action, but are not 

leaving open the door for the introduction of American troops into 

Syria. 

I want to talk a little bit about the specific military operations, 

and I am going to leave most of this for tomorrow in our discussions. Have you put into that equation the fact that obviously Syria 

is aware that we are contemplating military action and therefore 

may try to change the equation during this period of time to make 

27 

it more difficult for us to carry out that mission? Has that been 

brought into your planning stages? 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, Senator, it has. And time works both 

ways. You recall about a week and a half ago there was a significant leak of military planning that caused the regime to react. So, 

time works both ways. We have some pretty significant intelligence 

capabilities, and we continue to refine our targets. 

Senator CARDIN. Both of you have indicated your concern about 

American military involvement in Syria, that it could draw us into 

an internal conflict. Are you also putting into your plans ways to 

prevent America being drawn into the internal conflict in Syria? 

Secretary HAGEL. Senator, we are. As I noted in my opening 

statement, we have taken great care and much time in looking at 

all of not only the options to present to the President but the contingencies that may be a consequence of the President selecting one 

of those options, including what you have just noted. It is imperfect, as I said, and I think everyone recognizes there is always risk. 

We have tried to minimize that risk in every way we can in every 

presentation we have made to the President. The President has insisted on that, minimal collateral damage across the board. 

So, yes, we have taken a lot of time to focus exactly on your 

point. 

Senator CARDIN. Secretary Kerry, you point out that if we don’t 

act, we are liable to lose some friends. And I want to point out that 

we have a direct interest here. We not only have humanitarian reasons to respond to the use of chemical weapons, we have a direct 

American interest in that region, and we have Americans that are 

in that region that are at risk if additional chemicals are used. So, 

I see a direct connection to U.S. interests. 

You say we might lose some friends if we don’t act. Why don’t 

we have more participation in the U.S. military response in addition to just support? It seems to me that America will be in the 

lead, but it does not seem like we have a growing list of countries 

that are actively joining us in the military operation. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, first of all, there is no definitive list at 

this point in time because the President has not made the decision 

as to specifically which set of choices he is going to operate on. 

Secondly, as many countries as we could conceivably need to be 

able to be helpful in a limited operation have volunteered to be 

helpful, and they stand ready to take part in any specific operation, 

and we are very comfortable with that. 

But the bottom line in many ways remains that we are talking 

about very specific kinds of capacities that in some cases only the 

United States of America possesses. And so that remains open. It 

is a process that will evolve as this debate evolves and as the President makes his decisions and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military present him with the various options, and those will probably 

evolve as you mentioned. People may make adjustments in Syria, 

and I can assure the Syrians that General Dempsey and his people 

are making adjustments as they go along. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, I would hope we would have stronger 

international participation. Is there a consideration of a role for 

NATO to play here, considering that one of NATO’s partners, Turkey, is on the direct front line? Is that being considered? 

28 

Secretary KERRY. Well, as you say, is it being considered, everything is being considered, and all of these things are being evaluated. Discussions are taking place. I will be meeting on Saturday 

in Vilnius with the European ministers. I know this topic will come 

up, and most of them, they are all members of NATO, or most of 

them are, not all of them. So we will have some discussions when 

we are there. 

But at the moment, this is a limited operation with the scope of 

support that the President makes a judgment that we ought to 

have. We will have very broad—we have already very broad—we 

have had some 53 nations or countries and organizations acknowledge that chemical weapons were used here and have condemned 

it publicly. Thirty-one nations have stated publicly that the Assad 

regime is responsible, and I think we are at about 34 countries 

have indicated that if the allegations are true, that they would support some form of action against Syria. 

So there is a very broad coalition that is growing of people who 

believe we ought to take action against Syria, but the question is 

whether or not it makes sense. For whatever number to be part of 

it is a decision that our military and the President have to make 

as we go along here. 

Senator CARDIN. I will reserve the rest of the questions for the 

closed session. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Rubio? 

[Audience Disruption.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will sit down or I will have the 

officer remove you. 

The police will make sure that the committee is in order. 

Senator Rubio? 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me begin by answering a fundamental question that I get 

asked a lot as we discuss this very important issue, and that is 

why we even care about what is happening in Syria. I want to 

make very clear my belief that I think reflects the belief of most 

of the members of this committee, and that is that what happens 

in Syria is a vital national interest to the United States and to our 

national security for reasons that have already been outlined. 

The Syrian relationship with Iran is very significant. It is a key 

part of their ambitions to be the regional power, the dominant regional power. In fact, the Iranians love to brag that Syria gives 

them a border with Israel. 

Number two, Assad is an anti-American supporter of terrorism. 

He is a supporter of Hamas. He is a supporter of Hezbollah. And, 

by the way, he is a supporter of Al Qaeda in Iraq, the same Al 

Qaeda in Iraq that is responsible for the death and maiming of 

countless brave young men and women who served our country in 

uniform. 

It is also of interest to us because of the instability that this is 

creating in Syria, instability that is allowing portions of Syria to 

quickly become kind of what Afghanistan was before 9/11, the premier operational space for global jihadists from abroad to come 

train and fight and plan attacks in the future. And now, added to 

that is this chemical attack, which undermines the post-World War 

29 

II world order which basically said that these things are unacceptable. 

And allies that look at the United States and our capabilities of 

living up to our security promises are all at risk now as a result 

of all of this. 

This is why Syria and what is happening in Syria matters to our 

national interest, why it is so clearly tied to a critical national security interest to the United States. 

By the way, most, if not all of this was true two years ago when 

I joined other voices on this committee and in the Senate and beyond that advocated that at that time, when Assad was on the 

ropes, that the United States should engage in trying to identify 

moderate elements and equip them so that they became the predominant rebel force in Syria and not others. 

But that didn’t happen. Instead, the choice was made to lead 

from behind. The choice was made to watch as this thing unfolded. 

Others advocated that we should just mind our own business, and 

what we are seeing here now is proof and an example that when 

America ignores these problems, these problems don’t ignore us, 

that we can ignore them, but eventually they grow and they come 

to visit us at our doorstep, and now we are faced with what we 

have. 

In fact, Secretary Kerry, a moment ago you said that one of the 

calculations that Assad used in deciding to use chemical weapons 

was that the U.S. wouldn’t do anything about it. I understand perhaps why he made that calculation because, yes, this was a horrible incident where a thousand people died, but before this incident 100,000 people had died, snipers were used to pick off civilians, women were raped—they were going to these villages and 

carrying this out, and nothing happened. So, of course he reached 

that calculation. 

So this is a reminder of what happens when we ignore the world, 

when we look inward sometimes and we ignore these problems. 

They only get worse and more difficult to solve, and that is the 

mess that we have here right now. We are left with options, all of 

which are less than ideal, and I want to walk through the three 

that have been presented to us by different voices and then ask 

specifically about the one the President is considering. 

The first option is to decide to help Syrians remove Assad and 

replace him with a more moderate government. I think that is the 

ideal outcome, but it has its own complications. Today, the rebel 

forces on the ground are not just the moderate rebels. There are 

non-moderate rebels. There are jihadists that now control major 

portions of the country, and other parts of the country are intermingled with these rebel forces, creating a real prospect that after 

the fall of Assad a new civil war could be triggered, one that could 

involve sectarian violence, massacres of minorities, et cetera. So 

this comes with its own set of complications. 

The other, which some voices have advocated, is doing nothing, 

but that would guarantee the following outcome, an emboldened 

Assad, an emboldened Iran, increased instability in the country because portions of that country will still be ungoverned, and it will 

also send a message to the world that there is no red line that they 

should fear crossing. So Iran will move forward toward nuclear 

30 

weapons. North Korea can act crazier, if that is even possible. Our 

allies in South Korea and Japan may start to doubt their security 

arrangements with us. Israel may decide it needs to strike Iran 

unilaterally. Iran will move toward the bomb, which, by the way, 

won’t just be an Iranian bomb. It will be a Turkish bomb as well, 

and a Saudi bomb, and maybe even an Egyptian bomb one day. 

The third is the action the President is asking us to consider, 

what he termed—not me—what he called a shot across the bow, a 

military strike of limited duration and scope that has three goals, 

as I understand it, that have been outlined here today. 

Goal number one is to hold Assad accountable. Goal number two 

is to deter this behavior in the future. And goal number three is 

to degrade Assad’s capacity to carry out these attacks in the future. 

This is what the President wants us to authorize, a limited strike 

that would accomplish these three things. 

The questions that I have, quite frankly, I am a bit skeptical that 

what the President is asking for will provide the support needed 

to achieve these objectives, and that these objectives are even realistic at this point. 

So, here is my first question. I think I will ask this of General 

Dempsey. The calculation that Assad has made is that the reason 

why he is using these chemical weapons is because he is afraid 

that if he doesn’t, he could lose this war, be overthrown and killed. 

That is the calculation that he has made. That is why he used 

these chemical weapons. He wants to beat the rebels. 

Can we structure an attack that tips that calculation where he 

will basically decide that he would rather risk being overrun by 

rebels than risk a limited attack from the U.S. if he uses these 

chemical weapons? He has to decide, I will use chemical weapons 

and take on a limited U.S. attack in the future, or I will risk being 

overrun by the rebels. 

How are we going to unbalance that and lead him to calculate 

that he is better off risking losing to the rebels? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, Senator, I think it may be even more insidious than that. He has reached a point where he now thinks of 

chemical weapons as just another weapon in his arsenal, and that 

is the part that makes this so very dangerous. And I think that as 

I have provided advice on what targets may be appropriate, I certainly want to degrade his capabilities coming out of this. I want 

to come out of it stronger than we go into it. 

Senator RUBIO. That leads me to my second question. How confident are you, and how confident can you express to this committee that you are, that we can in fact put in place a military plan 

that is limited in scope and duration that can effectively degrade 

Assad’s capability to carry out future chemical attacks? 

General DEMPSEY. I am confident in the capabilities we can bring 

to bear to deter and degrade, and it won’t surprise you to know 

that we will have not only an initial target set but subsequent target sets should they become necessary. 

Senator RUBIO. And this question is probably for Secretary 

Kerry, and I think this was asked earlier but I think it is important to elaborate on it. One of the concerns that I have, and I have 

heard others express, is that Assad could take three, five, six days 

of strikes, maybe longer, maybe shorter, and emerge from that sayVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:45 Nov 21, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION\2013 ISSUE HE
31 

ing I have faced down the United States and I have held onto 

power and survived, and at that point be further emboldened both 

domestically and perhaps even abroad. 

Have we taken that into account? I understand your argument 

that inaction would be worse, but have we taken into account what 

the implications could be of an Assad that could weather a limited 

strike and what that could mean for the long-term prospects of the 

conflict? 

Secretary KERRY. Yes, we absolutely have. For certain, we have 

taken that into account. He will weather. I mean, he will weather. 

The President is asking for a limited authority to degrade his current capacity and to deter him from using it again. He is not asking for permission from the Congress to go destroy the entire regime or to do a much more extensive kind of thing. That is not 

what he is asking. 

So he will be able to stand up, and no doubt he will try to claim 

that somehow this is something positive for him. But I think General Dempsey has made it clear, and I think we believe deeply, as 

do others who are knowledgeable about this in the region, that 

there is no way that it will, in fact, be beneficial for him, that it 

will not translate for him on the ground, that the defections that 

are taking place now and other things that will happen will further 

degrade his capacity to prosecute going forward. 

And I want to emphasize something. I want to come back to it 

because I don’t want anybody misinterpreting this from earlier. 

This authorization does not contemplate and should not have any 

allowance for any troops on the ground. I just want to make that 

absolutely clear. What I was doing was hypothesizing about a potential that might occur at some point in time but not in this authorization, in no way. Let me be crystal clear, there is no problem 

in our having the language that has zero capacity for American 

troops on the ground within the authorization the President is asking for. I don’t want anybody in the media or elsewhere to misinterpret that coming out of here, as I said earlier. I repeat it again 

now. That is important. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. And I can assure you, that will be 

in the resolution. 

Secretary KERRY. Good. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shaheen? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. I agree that we 

should not turn our back on such a blatant violation of international norms with respect to the use of chemical weapons, and 

that if we stand quietly by while a tyrant like Assad uses chemical 

weapons on his own people, that we will be giving carte blanche 

to any dictator anywhere in the world to develop and use chemical 

weapons. 

I think the question now, as we have all said, is how we respond 

specifically. How do we best send a message that it is completely 

unacceptable to develop, much less use, these types of weapons, 

and how do we do that without inadvertently spreading the conflict 

beyond the borders of Syria? That is really the question that we 

have today. 

32 

We have heard that we want to deter the future use of chemical 

weapons, but according to the President and from your testimony 

today, we don’t want to tip the scales on the ground. So how do 

we ensure that we can do that without spreading the conflict 

throughout the region, and how do we hit Assad hard enough so 

that we deter his future use of chemical weapons and yet don’t affect the military outcome on the ground? 

Secretary KERRY. General, do you want to address just the military piece, and I will take the other piece? 

General DEMPSEY. Sure. I think the language about not using 

American military power to tip the scale would be our direct action. 

In other words, this resolution is not asking for permission for the 

President to be able to use the United States Armed Forces to overthrow the regime. 

On the other hand, back to the earlier questions about developing a moderate regime that has capabilities to be a stabilizing 

force inside of Syria, that is the path. Our military action in this 

case is very focused on the chemical weapons but will have the 

added benefit of degrading, and it will also have the added benefit 

of supporting the diplomatic track. 

And with that, let me turn it over to the secretary. 

Secretary KERRY. Senator Shaheen, the President has made it 

very, very clear that the policy of this administration—and sometimes people have said, have questioned precisely what it is, and 

I will tell you precisely what it is. The President is asking for the 

Congress to take steps that will specifically deter and degrade 

Assad’s capacity to use chemical weapons. He is not asking the 

Congress for authorization to become whole-hog involved in Syria’s 

civil war to try to change the regime through military action. This 

is a targeted action to deal with the problem of chemical weapons. 

But, there is a separate track which the President has already 

committed the administration and the country to, which is that 

Assad must go, that he has lost all moral authority or capacity to 

ever govern Syria, and he is pursuing that, the President is pursuing that track by helping the opposition, by now having made the 

decision to lethally arm that opposition by upgrading the efforts of 

the opposition to be able to fight the fight, not the United States, 

the opposition, and to be able to come to a negotiated settlement 

because the President is convinced, as I think everybody is, that 

there is no military solution, that ultimately you want to get to Geneva, you want a negotiated settlement, and under the terms of 

Geneva One, there is an agreement which the Russians have 

signed on to which calls for a transition government to be created 

with the mutual consent of the current regime and the opposition, 

and that transition government will establish the rules of the road 

for the Syrian people to choose their new government. 

There is no way possible that by mutual consent Assad is going 

to be part of that future. The Russians have agreed that that is, 

in fact, Geneva One, and the purpose of the Geneva Two meeting 

is to implement Geneva One. 

Now, it is complicated, obviously. How do you get there? And 

that is part of this struggle. But the President is convinced that as 

the support to the opposition increases, there is a much greater 

33 

likelihood that you will wind up ultimately with a negotiated settlement. 

The alternative is that you stand back and do nothing and Syria, 

in fact, implodes, becomes an enclave state. There are huge 

ungoverned spaces. Al Nusra, Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, others become 

more of a threat to our friends in the region, and the region becomes much more of a sectarian conflagration. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, you made a number of 

statements throughout the spring cautioning against intervention 

in the conflict in Syria. Why do you feel at this point that it is appropriate for us to take action? What has changed? 

Secretary HAGEL. Senator, thank you. I will let General Dempsey 

respond for himself. 

Well, first, very clear intelligence and evidence that the Assad regime used chemical weapons on its own people. So, we are dealing 

with a new set of realities based on facts. And I think it is at least 

my opinion that that needs to be addressed, that needs to be dealt 

with for the reasons I have noted, I have said in public and also 

addressed in my statement, and I think what Secretary Kerry and 

General Dempsey have said, and obviously what the President has 

said. So that is the most specific reason. The dynamics have 

changed. 

One additional point in regard to your question on this as to your 

previous question. If, in fact, the President is given the authorization from Congress to go forward, and as he has already said, he 

believes he has within his constitutional power as commander-inchief to act as well, and he has given his reasons, which we all support, why he came to the Congress, there are parallel actions that 

would work along with whatever action the President would take, 

which Secretary Kerry has noted: Opposition strength, defections 

within the Syrian government and military, and other consequences. 

And this is about getting to an end game. That end game is a 

diplomatic settlement. It is driving this toward what the President 

believes is the only way out of this, if for no other reason than 

what Secretary Kerry has noted: We do not want to see the country 

of Syria disintegrate and result in ungoverned space because the 

consequences would be devastating for our partners, for our allies, 

and for the entire Middle East. At that point we would all have to 

respond in some way. 

So I would just add that onto answering your last question. 

General DEMPSEY. Chairman, may I? I will make it brief. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. 

General DEMPSEY. But in response to your question about, let’s 

say, the past year, over the past year we have provided a full range 

of options, and my advice on those options was based on my assessment of their linkage to our national security interests and whether they would be effective. On this issue—that is, the use of chemical weapons—I find a clear linkage to our national security interests, and we will find a way to make our use of force effective. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you all. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson? 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

34 

I am trying to reconcile the two tracks of goals we have here: 

military action and a negotiated settlement. Secretary Hagel, you 

said we are not seeking to resolve the underlying conflict in Syria. 

Isn’t that exactly what we’re trying to do? Why aren’t we trying to 

resolve that? 

Secretary HAGEL. I was referring in my statement to the authorization to use military force. That specifically is not why we have 

come to the Congress, why the President asked for the Congress’ 

support. As he has said, the authorization is for a very specific and 

focused military action. 

Senator JOHNSON. But our stated goal really is to remove Assad 

and move toward a negotiated settlement. Why wouldn’t we use 

this opportunity, the military action, to move toward that goal? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, that is one option, if those options would 

range from an invasion or a lot of military options on the table. 

The President has said that this resolution is about a limited authorization for a limited exercise. The goal of removing Assad from 

office, as the President has stated, is still the policy of this administration. 

Senator JOHNSON. General Dempsey, how confident are you that 

you can calibrate, tailor, and fine-tune military action that doesn’t 

have spillover effects so that we keep it to the limited stated goal 

of degrading and deterring? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, the task was to do just that, to deter 

and degrade, and to be limited in focus and scope and duration. I 

mean, that is the task I’ve been given and the task I have—- 

Senator JOHNSON. Yes, but how can you calibrate that? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, we can calibrate it on our side. There is 

always the risk of escalation on the other, but they have significantly limited capabilities to do so, and most of the intelligence informs us—we could talk about that in a closed session. 

Senator JOHNSON. What planning is being undertaken right now 

in case this does spin out of control? We were talking about the potential for boots on the ground. 

Secretary Kerry, I am very glad to hear you are bringing into the 

equation what I think is our number one national security interest, 

and that is those chemical weapons falling into the hands of Al 

Qaeda elements or possibly even Hezbollah. What commitment do 

we have long term to make sure that doesn’t happen? If you have 

a very limited resolution here, how do we know that we will prevent that from happening? 

Secretary KERRY. Senator Johnson, this is this moment in time, 

and as the President said, he is asking for a limited military response, recognizing that neither he nor most of America want to be 

dragged into a civil war in Syria. 

Senator JOHNSON. But our goal is to get rid of Assad. 

Secretary KERRY. Our goal is to help the opposition. You have to 

look overall. The President—and I think all of us agree—I mean, 

can you imagine Assad running Syria? Can you imagine this man 

who has gassed his people remaining in power. 

Senator JOHNSON. Again, I am trying to reconcile why, if we are 

going to go in there militarily, if we’re going to strike, why wouldn’t 

we try to do some kind of knockout punch? Is it because we simply 

35 

have no faith that there is anybody on the ground, the rebels, to 

take— 

Secretary KERRY. No. No, absolutely not. 

Senator JOHNSON. Or is it not ready for regime change? Is that 

the problem? 

Secretary KERRY. No, Senator, that is not the reason. The reason 

is that the President is listening to the American people and has 

made a policy decision, and in addition, that is not something that 

the United States of America needs to engage in or ought to engage 

in. That is a much broader operation. 

Senator JOHNSON. But it is a stated goal. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, yes, it is. It is, Senator. Is the Congress 

of the United States ready to pay for 30 days of 30,000 airstrikes, 

and is there a legal justification for doing that? You could run 

through a whole series of different questions here that are very serious about what you are talking about. 

Senator JOHNSON. What do we know about the opposition? Have 

we been tracking them for the last two years? I mean, it seems 

like—and this is more of an impression I have as opposed to any 

exact knowledge—initially the opposition was maybe more Western 

leaning, more moderate, more democratic, and as time has gone by, 

it has degraded and become more infiltrated by Al Qaeda. Is that 

basically true, or to what extent has that happened? 

Secretary KERRY. No. That is actually basically not true. It is basically incorrect. The opposition has increasingly become more defined by its moderation, more defined by the breadth of its membership, and more defined by its adherence to a democratic process 

and to an all-inclusive, minority-protecting constitution which will 

be broad-based and secular with respect to the future of Syria. 

That is very critical. 

Senator JOHNSON. Secretary Hagel, do you— 

Secretary KERRY. Let me just finish one other point about the opposition. It is my understanding, because I talked to the president 

of the opposition yesterday, he is in Germany now. He is meeting 

with the German Parliament. He is coming to Great Britain. He 

will be meeting with Parliament in Great Britain. He is prepared 

to come here as soon as those meetings are over in order to meet 

with you, and you can have an opportunity to talk to President 

Jarber and meet with the opposition, have a much better sense of 

who they are. 

Senator JOHNSON. We appreciate that. Secretary Hagel, do you 

have a feel for the number of members of the opposition? How 

large is their force? 

Secretary HAGEL. I don’t know the numbers. Our intelligence 

communities have estimates of those numbers. But I think, as Secretary Kerry said, the momentum has shifted in the opinion of our 

intelligence community and others who are close to the situation. 

Senator JOHNSON. I’m kind of a numbers guy. General Dempsey, 

do you know the force strength of the rebel forces? 

General DEMPSEY. I don’t have them committed to memory, Senator. 

Senator JOHNSON. But we have them. I can give— 

General DEMPSEY. Yeah, the intelligence community has that 

available. We’ll make it available tomorrow. 

36 

Senator JOHNSON. Do you also have a pretty good feel for how 

many really would be considered moderate versus the elements of 

Al Qaeda? 

General DEMPSEY. I have seen documents that lay that out. 

Senator JOHNSON. How do we know that Hezbollah—because 

they’ve been so cooperative with the Assad regime—doesn’t already 

have access to chemical weapons? Do we have any feel for that at 

all? 

Secretary KERRY. I think we need to talk about that in our classified session. But let me just say to you that in terms of the opposition numbers, you see ranges up to 80-90,000, 100,000 in total opposition. You see ranges from—well, I don’t want to go into all the 

numbers, but in the tens of thousands in terms of operative, active 

combatants. I’ve seen some recent data on the numbers of the extremists now this or there actually lower than former expectations. 

I would also say to you, Syria historically has been secular. And 

the vast majority of Syrians, I believe, want to remain secular. It’s 

our judgment that, and the judgment of our good friends who actually know a lot of this in many ways better than we do because it’s 

their region, their neighborhood. I’m talking about the Saudis, the 

Emiratis, the Qataris, the Turks, and the Jordanians. They all believe that if you could have a fairly rapid transition, the secular 

component of Syria will reemerge and you will isolate— 

Senator JOHNSON. Very good. That tends to argue for a more robust response. 

Final question: You said this is the world’s red line; I agree. So 

in the intervening time period before we potentially act here, how 

many additional countries will be supportive of this action? What 

support do we have right now, and what is your goal? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, our goal is to have as broad a coalition 

and support of what we might do as is possible. We’re on working 

that right now. But the military and the President are going to 

have to decide how many they actually want to have take part in 

the action. As I said, we already have more partners ready to do 

something kinetic than the military feels, under this particular operation, we need to effect that. 

Now, obviously, we want them to participate because we want it 

to be a broad coalition. But the final numbers will have to be decided by the President and by the specific operation that he defines, together with you in the authorization. 

Senator JOHNSON. I look forward to tomorrow’s briefing; thanks. 

Secretary KERRY. Thank you, Senator. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coons. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Chairman Menendez. I’d like to 

thank Secretaries Kerry and Hagel and Chairman Dempsey for 

your service to our nation and for your testimony in front of us 

today. I think the authorization of the use of force, I think the commitment of Americans’ military strength is one of the most important issues that we will ever debate in this Congress, and I’m 

grateful for the opportunity to have this conversation today. 

As Secretary Kerry said in his opening testimony, not just what 

we decide, but how we decide it will send a very important message 

around the world that this Congress can still function in a nonpartisan way in the interest of the people of the United States. 

37 

As I’ve listened to Delawareans in recent days, I think they reflect a nation that is weary of war and that is weary of inadvertently repeating some of the challenges of our engagement in Iraq. 

I have heard specific and pointed concerns that we not rush into 

action based on uneven or inaccurate intelligence, that we not be 

drawn into a civil war we don’t fully understand or where we can’t 

quite discern the good guys from the bad guys, and, more than anything, that we not commit to an open-ended participation, a direct 

military invasion and an occupation of a country and a part of the 

world that is often confounding and is full of competing priorities. 

Having reviewed the intelligence this morning in a classified 

briefing, having participated in a number of briefings from you and 

folks leading in your agencies and departments, I am persuaded 

that this is not that circumstance, that the intelligence is solid, 

that we have in this instance a clear violation of a longstanding 

global red line against the use of chemical weapons, as you’ve stated, something embedded in America’s statutes and in our treaty 

commitments, something that is a truly global standard. 

My view, as I’ve watched both the images on TV that were presented at the beginning of this hearing, and as I’ve spoken to family and friends and neighbors at home, is that we face a real risk 

here if we do not act, that this is an instance where one of the 

world’s worst dictators has steadily ratcheted up an ascending crescendo of death in his own nation. 

He began with thugs, police, and the military taking on peaceful 

demonstrators; graduated to snipers killing innocent civilians; has 

used helicopters and jet fighters against his own people; has deployed cluster bombs and Scud missiles. I think over the last 2 

years, there is no doubt that Bashar al-Assad and his regime is 

willing to go to any lengths to stay in power. 

So the challenge now, for those of us who seek an appropriate 

path forward, is to make sure that we craft an authorization for 

the use of military force that responds to Americans’ legitimate 

concerns, but still allows the administration to act in a decisive and 

timely way to both deter and punish the Assad regime for what 

they’ve done. 

So I have a few questions for you, if I might, first to General 

Dempsey. And I know we’ve spoken to this before, but I think it 

is worth repeating. 

How do we strike the right balance between military action that 

is too insignificant to actually effectively deter or degrade Assad’s 

capabilities and one that is so decisive and overwhelming that it 

reaches beyond the scope of an authorization and becomes actually 

a regime-change effort? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, Senator, I’ll assure you I won’t recommend an option or a set of targets that won’t effectively deter 

and degrade. That’s the task I’ve been given. And that now we’ll 

continue to refine that, not just based on intelligence, but based on 

the resolution that comes out of this committee. 

Senator COONS. And could you, in your view, accomplish that 

mission with an authorization that is limited in scope in terms of 

duration and scope, as has been discussed with Secretary Kerry, in 

terms of not introducing U.S. troops on the ground? 

38 

General DEMPSEY. Well, it won’t surprise you to know that, as 

the military leader responsible for this, the broader the resolution, 

the less limiting, the better off I will be in crafting a set of options. 

But I completely defer to the Secretary of State to give me what 

I need to do that. 

Senator COONS. Well, if I might, then, to Secretary Kerry, because our goal here is to not pass or even consider an authorization 

that is so narrow that it prevents any effective message to be sent 

here, as you said, I think in a compelling way, in your opening 

statement. 

Our actions here are not just meant to deter Assad, but to send 

a strong message to Pyongyang, to Tehran, to non-state actors 

around the world who might use chemical weapons or might seek 

nuclear weapons. How do we craft an authorization? How do we 

take actions that are effective here in deterring other countries 

that are watching our decisiveness and our action in this instance? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I think the language that the administration submitted with respect to the military action necessary to degrade and deter and prevent the use of chemical weapons, specifically, is very targeted. 

But, as I’ve said several times now, and will repeat again, I know 

the administration has zero intention of putting troops on the 

ground. And within the confines of this authorization I’m confident 

we’d have zero problems including some kind of prohibition if that 

makes you comfortable. 

I would not urge an excessively pinpointed, congressionally mandated, set of targets. And I think in the course of the classified 

briefings, the intelligence community and the military community 

will make it very clear to you why that’s not advisable. The general 

needs some latitude here to be able to make sure he can accomplish his task. 

But I think the broad confines and constraints of this particular 

operation are not hard for us to arrive at in agreement. I’m confident we’ll do it very quickly. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. One of my other concerns, Mr. Secretary, is the flood of refugees and their impact on the region. In 

a visit in January to a Syrian refugee camp in Jordan, I was moved 

both by the humanitarian situation they’re facing and by the very 

real impact that this is having on our regional allies, on Jordan, 

on Turkey, the destabilizing impact on Lebanon, and of course, the 

real impact it’s potentially going to have on our close ally, Israel. 

I was encouraged to hear there was a successful missile defense 

system test earlier today. Secretary Hagel, what steps are we taking to ensure that our allies in this immediate area, Turkey and 

Jordan and Israel, are able to defend themselves from a potential 

response by the Assad regime? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, Senator, first, Jordan, you know we have 

Patriot missile defense batteries in Jordan. And we also are working very closely with the Israelis. You know they have a very sophisticated Iron Dome and aerial system, missile defense system. 

We are in constant coordination with all the allies in the region. 

And as you may know, General Dempsey was just in Jordan for a 

commanders’ meeting, which included all the senior military from 

39 

the neighboring countries and our partners. So, we are closely connected with and assisting our allies on this and other issues. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. Last question, Secretary Kerry, if I 

might. I am interested in our having a follow-on conversation about 

how this specific strike and this specific authorization that you’re 

seeking can also lead to a broader strategy, a strategy for support 

engagement with the opposition that will lead to the diplomatic 

resolution of the Syrian civil war that you’ve spoken about repeatedly. 

I don’t think these are mutually exclusive. I do think it’s possible 

for us to take action that reinforces a global red line against chemical weapons use, but to still continue to strengthen and broaden 

our engagement with the opposition in a way that moves toward 

a post-Assad Syria that is sustainable and secure. And I’d look forward to your input with us in our next hearing on that topic. 

Secretary KERRY. Absolutely, Senator. I look forward to it, too. 

What I’d like to do is get the whole committee, maybe, to come 

down to the department and we could, you know, have this discussion in that confine as a committee also. And I think that might 

be helpful, in addition to what we do in the classified briefing tomorrow. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Secretary KERRY. Mr. Chairman, if that—if you want to do that, 

I’m happy to do that follow-up. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Flake. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for 

your testimony. And I want to thank you, particularly the State 

Department, for making information available with regard to 

unclassifying certain information. And also for the classified hearings that have taken place with regard to the chemical attack. I 

think that one would have to suspend disbelief, as you mentioned, 

to assume that the regime was not in charge of this. 

Secretary Kerry, in your initial testimony, you asked us to ask 

ourselves what Assad’s calculation would be if we failed to act. I 

think that’s an appropriate question. But I think it is appropriate 

for us to ask you, or the administration, what is the calculation of 

Assad right now, when rather than after we have proof that he did 

engage and what he engaged in, that we’re waiting for congressional authorization? 

I think one would have to suspend disbelief to assume that we 

wouldn’t be better off attacking those targets right now, or a week 

ago, than waiting three weeks for Congress to take action. And just 

drawing some parallel to the conflict in Libya, I think the President’s statement was, before we went ahead and engaged in combat 

there, or at least along with NATO, the President said, ‘‘I refuse 

to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves to take action’’ 

and did so without congressional authorization under the War Powers Resolution. And we had some dispute when he came back. But 

initially, we went ahead. 

Here, we have evidence that chemical weapons were used. And 

how can we assure or tell our constituents that this isn’t political, 

when we come, when you come, when the administration comes to 

the Congress to ask for authorization to take action that the President clearly has said he has authority to take? 

40 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Senator Flake, it’s somewhat surprising 

to me that a member of Congress, particularly one of the Foreign 

Relations Committee, is going to question the President fulfilling 

the vision of the founding fathers when they wrote the Constitution 

and divided power in foreign policy to have the President come 

here and honor the original intent of the founding fathers in ways 

that do not do anything to detract from the mission itself. 

Now, General Dempsey will tell you that he advised the President of the United States that not only was there not a deterioration in this mission by waiting; there might even be some advantages. And so, in fact, we’re not losing anything by waiting. And 

I personally believe there are advantages, because we have time to 

work with our friends in the international community, because we 

have time to make the case to the American people and share with 

them the evidence that we have shared with you in the last days, 

because we have an opportunity to be able to build greater support. 

And as the general has said, we can adjust to any changes or 

shifts that they make in that time. This does not in any way deteriorate the fundamental mission of degrading and deterring the use 

of chemical weapons. 

Now, if at any moment Assad were foolish enough to believe that 

this period of waiting is somehow an invitation to do more of his 

criminal activity, I can assure you that the President of the United 

States, and I think you all, would probably speed up your process 

and/or the President would respond immediately. 

This is working. There are defections taking place. There’s great 

uncertainty in Syria. We are building support, a greater understanding. And I would far rather be playing our hand than his at 

this point in time. 

So I don’t think we’re losing anything. I think the President 

made a courageous decision to take the time to build the strength 

that makes America stronger by acting in unity with the United 

States Congress. 

Senator FLAKE. Well, if I may, I can certainly understand if that 

is a secondary goal or the primary goal that will, in this intervening time, it causes our allies to get with us. It causes Russia 

to put the pressure on maybe the Assad regime to get back to the 

table, peace talks, something like that, that’s great. But purely in 

terms of military strategy, and I don’t have a military background, 

but I would have to suspend disbelief, and I think all of us would, 

to assume that we’re better off in a couple of weeks doing what 

we’re planning to do, what we will authorize the administration to 

do. 

General Dempsey, is there evidence that the Assad regime is 

right now moving some of the targets that can be moved or surrounding targets with civilians or others to make it more difficult 

to give effect to our strategy? 

General DEMPSEY. Yeah, thanks, Senator. First, I do want to— 

for interest of clarity here, what I actually said to the President is 

the following: ‘‘The military resources we have in place can remain 

in place. And when you ask us to strike, we will make those strikes 

effective.’’ 

In other sessions in the principals’ committee, not with the President—the President, we talked about some targets becoming more 

41 

accessible than they were before. But to your question, there are, 

in fact, there is evidence, of course, that the regime is reacting not 

only to the delay, but also they were reacting before that to the 

very unfortunate leak of military planning. So this is a very dynamic situation. 

Senator FLAKE. Secretary Hagel, you seem eager to jump in. 

Secretary HAGEL. I was just going to add something that you 

added, Senator: And that is the international community. In addition to what the President has already noted, a nation is always 

stronger when it is together, when the President gets the Congress 

and the American people with him at the beginning; but also, we’re 

stronger when many of the members of the international community are with us on this, I think the President feels pretty strongly 

that would be also an important part of whatever decision he might 

make. 

And it doesn’t end with whatever military option the President 

decides to go with, as we have all heard. That’s all the more important; we would want the international community with us. 

Senator FLAKE. Secretary Kerry, what will happen if the Congress says no and does not authorize this strike or this use of force? 

What will the President do? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I can’t tell you what the President’s going 

to do because he hasn’t told me. But the President, as you know, 

retains the authority, always has the authority, had the authority 

to strike before coming to Congress. And that doesn’t change. 

But I’ll tell you what will happen, where it matters. In 

Pyongyang, in Tehran, in Damascus, folks will stand up and celebrate. And in a lot of other capitals in parts of the world, people 

will scratch their heads and sign a condolence for the loss of America’s willingness to stand up and make itself felt where it makes 

a difference to the world. 

I think it would be an enormous setback to America’s capacity 

and to our vision in the world, and certainly to the role of leadership that we play. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Durbin. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On Saturday, I was 

standing with a group of friends, watching the television screen 

with the announcement that any minute the President would make 

a statement. And I turned to them and said, ‘‘I’ll bet the missiles 

were launched and shot off hours ago, and we’ll hear about it now.’’ 

And to my surprise, of course, the President came forward and 

said, ‘‘I have that authority. I’ve made that decision. But I’m going 

to respect our constitutional democracy and give the Congress—the 

American people through Congress—a voice in this decision.’’ 

From where I was standing, that was good news, because for as 

long as I’ve been in Congress, House and Senate, I’ve argued about 

that congressional responsibility. Some presidents have respected 

it; some have not. Most of the time, Congress, in writing or in 

speeches, insists on being respected and being given this authority 

and then starts shaking when it’s given, because it calls on us to 

be part of historic life-and-death decisions. 

42 

It’s one of the toughest calls we’ll ever make as members of Congress, but I salute the President for respecting the Constitution 

and giving us that responsibility. And I think the turnout today, 

on short notice in the midst of a break, on this committee, Mr. 

Chairman, and Ranking Member Corker, is an indication we’re 

taking this seriously and solemnly. 

I’ll also note to Senator Kerry and also to Secretary Kerry and 

Secretary Hagel, we all served together some 12 years ago and 

faced similar awesome, historic decisions related to Iraq and Afghanistan. We saw those differently in some respects. But I voted 

against the Iraqi resolution and going to war in that country, and 

felt that the events that transpired afterwards gave me some justification for my vote. 

But I voted for the war in Afghanistan, believing that it was a 

clear response to 9/11. We were going after those responsible for 

killing 3,000 innocent Americans. And we were going to make them 

pay a price. I still believe that was the right thing to do. 

But I didn’t know at the time that I voted for that authorization 

for use of military force I was voting for the longest war in the history of the United States and an authority to several presidents to 

do things that no one ever could have envisioned at that moment 

in history. 

So, Secretary Kerry and Secretary Hagel, I take this very seriously. I understand this President. I understand his values. But I 

take it very seriously that the language be as precise as possible 

when it comes to this whole question of expanding this mission into 

something much larger, something that would engage us in a new 

level of warfare or a new authority for this President or a future 

president. 

So I hope that we can have your word and assurance that we can 

work together in a bipartisan fashion to craft this in a way that 

it carefully achieves our goal, but does not expand authority anywhere beyond what is necessary. 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, thank you. Very important statement, 

and you not only have my word that it will not do that, but we will 

work with you very, very closely, with the White House, in shaping 

this resolution. There’s no hidden agenda. There’s no subterfuge. 

There’s no surrogate strategy here. There’s one objective, and that 

objective is to make sure we live up to our obligations of upholding 

the norm with respect to international behavior on the use of chemical weapons, and that is what the President is seeking in this authorization. 

Senator DURBIN. Let me speak to the issue of chemical weapons. 

I don’t know if General Dempsey or Secretary Hagel or perhaps 

Secretary Kerry is the appropriate person, but the French have 

done an assessment of what they believe the Syrians have in terms 

of their chemical weapons arsenal. 

General Dempsey, are you familiar with it? 

General DEMPSEY. I’m not familiar with the French assessment. 

I’m familiar with our own. 

Senator DURBIN. Well, let me ask. We have it here, a copy of it 

here. And it’s been published. And we have talked a lot about sarin 

gas and other nerve agents. And what we hear from this report, 

and I’d ask you if it’s close to what your assessment is, the Syrians 

43 

have more than 1,000 tons of chemical agents and precursor chemicals, several hundred tons of sarin, representing the bulk of their 

arsenal. 

It’s also been speculated that they have the missile capability of 

delivering these chemical weapons in Israel, portions of Turkey, 

Jordan, Iraq, and beyond. 

What is your assessment of their potential when it comes to the 

delivery and the capacity, when it comes to the amount, of chemical agents they have available? 

General DEMPSEY. Our assessment very closely matches the 

French assessment. 

Senator DURBIN. I guess my question to you, Mr. Secretary, Secretary Kerry, is, in light of the vulnerability of these countries, 

what has been the response of the Arab and Muslim world to this? 

I mean, you’ve listed four or five who have stepped forward to say 

they support our efforts. It would seem that if this danger in the 

region is so profound, that we would have even greater support. 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, I think this is something I’d be 

happier discussing in greater detail with you in the closed session. 

There are obviously some countries for which public statements are 

more complicated than others. And I think we should talk about 

that at the other session. 

Senator DURBIN. Fair enough. 

General Dempsey, we saw these photographs earlier, these 

heartbreaking photographs. Page 3 of the Washington Post this 

morning, an ad by a group supporting the President’s effort, has a 

photograph that’s riveted in my mind, as a father and grandfather, 

of the children on the floor in shrouds, victims of this chemical 

agent gas attack. 

What the administration is asking us for is military authority to 

launch additional attacks. What have you been charged with in 

terms of the issue of collateral damage from those attacks as it 

would affect innocent people and civilians in the nation of Syria? 

General DEMPSEY. Senator, the guidance that we’ve received on 

targeting is to maintain a collateral damage estimate of low. And 

I’d just briefly, on how we come up with our assessments of collateral damage, it’s based on how much we know about a target 

through intelligence, its proximity to civilian structures, and weapons effects as we decide what weapon to weaponeer against it. 

And a collateral damage estimate of low means just that, that we 

will keep collateral damage lower than a certain number, which I 

would rather share with you in a classified setting. 

That doesn’t mean, by the way, that we would have the same 

constraint, if you will, in what damage could be done to regime personnel. So that’s a separate issue, although even in that case I 

could probably tell you some more things in the classified setting. 

Senator DURBIN. I look forward to that. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses. And may I say, John, it’s very good to see Teresa here with 

you in good health and good spirits. And thank you. So, Teresa, I 

apologize for what I’m about to do to John. 

44 

Secretary KERRY. Man, there’s a setup. 

Senator MCCAIN. John, when you tell the enemy you’re going to 

attack them—I’m not going to take any time on this. You tell the 

enemy you’re going to attack them, they are obviously going to disperse and try to make it harder. I’m looking right here at an AP 

story report. Syria is said to be hiding weapons and moving troops. 

There’s even open-source reporting that they may be moving some 

of their assets into the Russian naval base. 

But let’s not get—I mean, it’s ridiculous to think that it’s not 

wise from a pure military standpoint not to warn the enemy that 

you’re going to attack. 

Secretary Hagel, in the Wall Street Journal today, we read the 

following: ‘‘Pentagon planners were instructed not to offer strike 

options that could help drive Mr. Assad from power: ‘The big concern is the wrong groups in the opposition would be able to take 

advantage of it,’ a senior military officer said.’’ 

Is there any truth to that, Secretary Hagel? 

Secretary HAGEL. Senator, as I’ve said, the President asked us 

for a range of options, and we provided him a range of options. 

Senator MCCAIN. I am asking if there is any truth to the Wall 

Street Journal article. 

Secretary HAGEL. Our options were not limited to any— 

Senator MCCAIN. I would just ask if there is any truth to the 

story that is in the Wall Street Journal article. 

Secretary HAGEL. No. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. Secretary Kerry, in the same Wall 

Street Journal article, ‘‘The delay in providing arms to the opposition in part reflects a broader U.S. approach rarely discussed publicly, but that underpins its decision making. According to former 

and current U.S. officials, the current administration does not want 

to tip the balance in favor of the opposition for fear the outcome 

may be even worse for U.S. interests than the current stalemate.’’ 

Is that story accurate? 

Secretary KERRY. No. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

Secretary KERRY. And by the way, can I add something, Senator? 

On the warning issue, I do not disagree with you about warning. 

In fact, the general would not disagree with you either. And we are 

all— 

Senator MCCAIN. But the general said it would be just as easy— 

Secretary KERRY. No, no. We are deeply— 

Senator MCCAIN. Let us not get into that one. 

Secretary KERRY. John, all I want to say to you is that there 

were leaks, which are the bane of everybody’s existence. And the 

fact is that the newspapers began to carry stories about a strike 

and targeting well before any decisions were made. And that began 

a process of moving. 

So now, there is at least— 

Senator MCCAIN. Okay, I got it. I really would like to move onto 

some more important questions if you do not mind. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I thought all your questions were important, John. 

[Laughter.] 

45 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, John. That is good. I will try to remember that. 

The President said today that the purpose of the military action 

in Syria is not just to respond to Assad’s use of chemical weapons, 

but to degrade his military capabilities as part of a broader strategy to change the momentum on the ground, and, as the President 

said, ‘‘allow Syria ultimately to free itself.’’ Do you agree with that 

assessment, John? 

Secretary KERRY. I said up front—I have said several times here, 

there will automatically, as a result of degrading his ability for 

chemical weapons, there will be downstream impact which will 

have an impact on his military capacity. 

Senator MCCAIN. And to allow— 

Secretary KERRY. So I agree with the President. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. General Dempsey, do you agree 

with that statement of the President? 

General DEMPSEY. I agree. I have never been told to change the 

momentum. I have been told to degrade capability. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you think, General, that without a change 

in momentum that Syria ultimately could free itself, Secretary 

Hagel? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, Senator, I think they all are connected. 

Degrading military capability, as you know, is a pretty significant 

part of momentum shifts. 

Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Kerry—John—over the weekend, the 

Wall Street Journal ran an important op-ed by Dr. Elizabeth 

O’Bagy—I hope you saw it—a Syria analyst at the Institute for the 

Study of War, who has spent a great deal of time inside Syria, including just this month. And I want to read her assessment of the 

situation on the ground, and I quote the story: 

‘‘The conventional wisdom holds that the extremist elements are 

completely mixed in with the more moderate rebel groups. This is 

not the case. Moderates and extremists wield control over a distinct 

territory. Contrary to many media accounts, the war in Syria is not 

being waged entirely or even predominantly by dangerous Islamists 

and Al-Qaeda diehards. The Jihadists pouring into Syria from 

countries like Iraq and Lebanon are not flocking to the front lines. 

Instead they are concentrating their efforts on consolidating control 

in the northern rebel-held areas of the country. 

‘‘Moderate opposition forces, a collection of groups known as the 

Free Syrian Army, continue to lead the fight against the Syrian regime. While traveling with some of these Free Syrian Army battalions, I have watched them defend Alawi and Christian villages 

from government forces and extremist groups. They have demonstrated a willingness to submit to civilian authority, working 

closely with local administrative councils, and they have struggled 

to ensure that their fight against Assad will pave the way for a 

flourishing civil society.’’ 

John, do you agree with Dr. O’Bagy’s assessment of the opposition? 

Secretary KERRY. I agree with most of that. They have changed 

significantly. They have improved. And I said earlier, the fundamentals of Syria are secular, and I believe will stay that way. 

46 

Senator MCCAIN. And I think it is very important to point out 

again, as you just said, it is a secular state. They would reject radical Islamists, and they, in some cases, in the areas of which they 

have control, the people are demonstrating against them is the information I have. 

So when we see these commentators say, well, we do not know 

which side will win, we do not know who the bad guys are, if you 

agree with this assessment, we certainly know who the bad guys 

are. Is that correct? 

Secretary KERRY. I believe we do, for the most part. 

Senator MCCAIN. For the most part. 

Secretary KERRY. There are some worse than al-Nusra, and they 

tend to be, most of them, in the northern area and the east. 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you. And again, I would like to ask you 

again, can you assure the committee that the administration does 

not see a protracted stalemate and conflict in Syria as somehow a 

good thing or a goal of U.S. policy? 

Secretary KERRY. The goal of U.S. policy is not a stalemate. The 

goal is a negotiated solution which results in the departure of 

Assad and the free choice of the Syrian people for their future. 

Senator MCCAIN. And finally, I would like to ask again, if we reject this resolution, does it not send a serious, as you already said, 

a seriously bad message to our friends and allies alike, encourages 

our enemies, and would dispirit our friends, particularly those 

fighting in Syria, but not only here, but around the world? 

Secretary KERRY. Senator McCain, I have gotten to know my 

counterparts in the Mideast particularly well because of the number of crises and initiatives that we have had to deal with in that 

region. And I cannot emphasize enough how much they are looking 

us to now, making judgments about us for the long term, and how 

critical the choice we make here will be, not just to this question 

of Syria, but to the support we may or may not anticipate in the 

Middle East peace process, to the future of Egypt, to the transformation of the Middle East, to the stability of the region, and 

other interests that we have. 

There is no way to separate one thing from all of the rest. Relationships are relationships, and they are integrated. And that is 

why this is so important. 

Senator MCCAIN. But I would also emphasize, if it is the wrong 

kind of resolution, it can do just as much damage, in my view. I 

thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Udall? 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. Thank you very much. And I thank 

all the witnesses for their testimony and for their service here 

today. And I also want to thank Chairman Menendez for the way 

he has conducted this hearing. 

Like everyone here, I deplore what Bashar al-Assad has done to 

his own people by attacking them with chemical weapons. Assad 

has committed an atrocious crime so heinous that international law 

singles it out as an assault deserving of international action. 

But let there be no mistake. I fully agree his horrific acts deserve 

an international response. But what should that response be? That 

47 

is why we are here today, to ask that question and many others. 

And I hope this hearing will do more than just rubber stamp a decision that has already been made by this administration. I have 

grave concerns about what the administration is asking of us, of 

our military, and of the American people. 

Here is the situation as I see it. With limited international support, we are being told the United States must retaliate for the use 

of chemical weapons with a surgical bombing campaign of our own. 

We are being told that we are bombing in order to send a message. 

But what message are we sending? To the international community, we are saying once again the United States will be the world’s 

policeman. You break a law, and the United States will step in. 

We are on shaky international legal foundations with this potential strike, and we need to know whether we have exhausted all 

diplomatic and economic sanction options to affect Syria’s behavior. 

We need to increase our attention on the source of Assad’s ability 

to continue to ruthlessly kill his own people, and that is support 

from nations, including Russia and China, who are cynically trying 

to hold the moral high ground. Assad would not be able to maintain his grip on power if he were not being supported from outside. 

The full force of international outrage should come down on those 

nations that are refusing to allow the U.N. to act and find a solution. 

And finally, I see this potential bombing campaign as a potential 

next step toward full-fledged war. We have been here before. The 

Iraq War began as an international effort to kick Saddam Hussein 

out of Kuwait, and then years of a no fly zone and air strikes to 

prevent Saddam from threatening his neighbors or reconstituting 

his arsenal of chemical weapons. And as we all know, this limited 

military action eventually led to what is one of the biggest blunders 

in U.S. foreign policy, a war that I voted against. Many who voted 

for it came to regret that vote. 

Americans are understandably weary. After the fiasco of Iraq 

and over a decade of war, how can this administration make a 

guarantee that our military actions will be limited? How can we 

guarantee that one surgical strike will have any impact other than 

to tighten the vice grip Assad has on his power, or allow rebels allied with Al-Qaeda to gain a stronger foothold in Syria? 

I take our role extremely seriously here, like many of the other 

Senators have said, and I will hear the President and his team out. 

The President made the right decision to pursue an authorization 

for the use of military force. I hope these hearings will give the 

American people the answers they deserve, but there are troubling 

questions that need to be answered. 

And, Secretary Kerry, I want to start with you. You have assured 

the American people—I watched your national television performances that the U.S. action will not include, and I think you have 

said this here today, will not include the use of ground troops, that 

it will be limited in nature to deter Assad and others from using 

weapon of mass destruction. Yet the draft authorization of force 

proposed by the administration states that it would allow the 

President to use the armed forces, and I quote here, ‘‘as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in connection with the use 

48 

of chemical weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in the 

conflict with Syria.’’ 

Now, this is a very open-ended proposal with no specific limits 

on types of forces that would be used, with no limit on their duration. Why was it proposed in a way that it conflicts with these 

statements of no ground troops? And what kind of language, Secretary Kerry, or the precise language are you willing to back in 

terms of showing the American people that we really mean what 

we say in terms of no boots on the ground? 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, all good questions, and I will respond 

to all of them. But I want to address sort of the suspicion and concern that you have, which is appropriate. I think everybody understands that Iraq left a lot of folks reeling for some period of time, 

so it is appropriate to ask the questions you have asked. But please 

let me try to emphasize, this is not sending a message per se. This 

is having an effect, an impact. This is taking action to achieve 

something more than just a message. It is to degrade his current 

capacity. It will make it harder for him to do that in the future, 

and it will also facilitate our ability to hold him accountable in the 

future if he does, and he will know that. So this will affect his calculation. That is number one. That is not just a message. 

Senator UDALL. Secretary Kerry, by degrading his capacity, do 

you not, in fact, make him weaker and make the people out there, 

like al-Nusra, and Al-Qaeda, and these other extremist forces, 

stronger? And this is what I want General Dempsey to talk about 

in a little bit, too. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, I am happy— 

Senator UDALL. Could you answer that? Could you answer that? 

Secretary KERRY. I am happy— 

Senator UDALL. By degrading him, you make these extremist 

forces stronger, do you not? 

Secretary KERRY. No, I do not believe you do. As a matter of fact, 

I think you actually make the opposition stronger, and the opposition is getting stronger by the day now. And I think General Idris 

would tell you that, that he is not sitting around. His daily concern 

is not the opposition but Assad and what Assad is doing with his 

scuds, with his airplanes, with his tanks, with his artillery to the 

people of Syria. 

But I think it is important also to look at this because you raised 

the question of does this not make the United States the policeman 

of the world. No. It makes the United States a multilateral partner 

in an effort that the world, 184 nations strong, has accepted the 

responsibility for. And if the United States, which has the greatest 

capacity to do that, does not help lead that effort, then shame on 

us. Then we are not standing up to our multilateral, and humanitarian, and strategic interests. 

Now that said— 

Senator UDALL. Can I stop you, Secretary Kerry, just on that 

one— 

Secretary KERRY. Any time. 

Senator UDALL [continuing]. Because if you are talking about 

multilateral efforts, what we are talking about is the world being 

able—this is a breach of a treaty. And the world put within the 

United Nations that enforcement mechanism, and what we have 

49 

done here with Russia and China holding up the ability of the U.N. 

to act, we have just turned aside as a result of that— 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Senator, with all due respect— 

Senator UDALL. We should be standing up—we should be standing up and making sure that they are condemned, those countries 

that are not allowing us to move forward to find a solution where 

the solution should reside. So I just— 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Senator, I do not disagree that we should 

be finding a solution where it resides. But the fact is that just a 

few weeks ago—just a few weeks ago—at the U.N., we sought a 

condemnation of a chemical attack without blame, without citing 

Assad, without saying who was responsible, simply a condemnation 

of a chemical attack. And the Russians blocked it. 

Senator UDALL. Right. 

Secretary KERRY. So we have no illusions. Yes, is the U.N. Security Council having difficulties at this moment performing its functions? Yes. Does that mean the United States of America and the 

rest of the world that thinks we ought to act should shrink from 

it? No. And that is really what is at test here. 

I would urge you—you said how do we know it will not result in 

X, or Y, or Z happening if we do not do it. Let me ask you. It is 

not a question of what will happen if we do not do it. It is a certainty. Are you going to be comfortable if Assad, as a result of the 

United States not doing anything, then gases his people yet again, 

and the world says, why did the United States not act? 

History is full of opportunity of moments where someone did not 

stand up and act when it made a difference. And whether you go 

back to World War II, or you look at a ship that was turned from 

the coast of Florida and everybody on it lost their lives subsequently, to German gas, those are the things that make a difference. And that is what is at stake here. 

And I would say to you, you know, these are troubling questions. 

It is a guarantee that if the United States does not act together 

with other countries, we know what Assad will do. That is a guarantee. I cannot tell you what is guaranteed that some country will 

do if we do act, but I know what will happen if we do not. And I 

am pretty darn clear that a lot of things that people think will happen will not happen if the United States acts. It will, in fact, have 

enforced this international standard with respect to the use of 

chemical weapons. 

And if the multilateral institution set up to do it, the Security 

Council, is being blocked and will not do it, that does not mean we 

should turn our backs and say there is nothing we can do. That is 

not the case. And we did it in Bosnia, and it made a difference. We 

saved countless numbers of lives, and I believe, the President of 

the United States believes, we can do that now. 

Senator UDALL. Well, I do not believe that we should have given 

up so easily on using the United Nations— 

Secretary KERRY. We have not given up— 

Senator UDALL. Yes, we have. We have not taken Russia to task. 

We have not taken China to task. And that is what we should be 

pointing out at this point. 

The CHAIRMAN. The time— 

Senator UDALL. Well, I mean— 

50 

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the Senator has expired. 

Senator UDALL. I want to respectfully disagree with you, and say 

also I very much appreciate your service. I know that you are trying very, very hard to find on the diplomatic side as Secretary of 

State, a peaceful resolution. 

Thank you for your courtesy. Sorry for going over. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barrasso? 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you for being here. 

Over Labor Day weekend in Wyoming, I heard from people all 

across the State. All believe what is happening is Syria is awful, 

despicable, do have concerns about the administration and what 

the plan really is, what a strategy really is. They want to know 

what the core national security interests of the United States are 

that are at stake in Syria, what our ultimate goal of proposed military strikes is, and what happens if the strikes are not effective. 

And to that end, Mr. Chairman, what exactly is it that we are 

going to be voting on. Is it what the White House has set forward, 

and when are we going to see the specifics? I think Senator Durbin 

also asked about the narrowness or the expanse of what we will be 

voting—and would we be voting within the next 24 hours? 

The CHAIRMAN. The chair is working with the ranking member 

and others to come to an agreed upon text that we believe would 

meet the goals of achieving the ability for the administration to 

pursue the military action they have sought the Congress’ support 

for in a way that would allow them to have the maximum ability 

to succeed in that action, and by the same token, tailor it sufficiently so that this is not an open-ended engagement, and specifically not with boots on the ground, American troops on the ground. 

We are not there yet. It is our aspiration to try to get there before the end of the day, and then to look forward to the possibility 

of a markup tomorrow. We will see if we can get there, and if we 

do, we will give all members ample notice of that time. 

We start off in the morning, as I have said, with a classified 

briefing, and we will move from there. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, I appreciate you coming to Congress to seek legislative authorization for the military action. President Obama specifically asserted on Saturday that he already had authority. 

Now, when the British Parliament rejected a motion supporting 

UK participation, the prime minister specifically said that he 

would respect the will of the British people, and there would be no 

British military intervention. Where does President Obama stand 

with that now that he has come to Congress? 

Secretary KERRY. He intends to win the passage of the resolution. 

Senator BARRASSO. And on the case that he does not, is the plan 

that he— 

Secretary KERRY. Well, we are not contemplating that— 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you. 

Secretary KERRY [continuing]. Because it is too dire. 

Senator BARRASSO. We talked a little bit about the risks of 

delays. There are already reports that by delaying military action, 

that Assad is moving military assets—hardware, troops—to civilian 

51 

neighborhoods. Reports indicate that Russia plans to send an antisubmarine ship and missile cruiser to the Mediterranean in the 

next few days. 

I wonder what this means to our contingency planning and what 

this impact is going to be for our military operations. 

General DEMPSEY. There are already four Russian warships in 

the eastern Med, and if they are staying a respectful distance, I do 

not see that as a factor. 

Senator BARRASSO. Has the administration created—conducted 

perhaps a threat assessment of how Russia, how Iran, how 

Hezbollah is going to respond to a U.S.-led attack? And what response do we expect from Syria’s allies, including, you know, Russia, Iran, Hezbollah, to the military action? 

Secretary KERRY. We all agree that that would be best handled 

in a classified session. 

Senator BARRASSO. In terms of what success looks like, I think 

Senator Udall specifically, you know, said what happens if gases 

are used again. I am wondering if we do a limited strike as proposed and still Assad goes back and uses chemical weapons on his 

people. Then that engenders an entire new set of hearings, and 

how does this end? Where are we a month from now? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, as I said, Senator, there is—we are preparing several target sets, the first of which would set the conditions for follow-on assessments, and the others would be used if 

necessary. And we have not gotten to that point yet. 

What we do know is that we can degrade and disrupt his capabilities, and that should put us in a better position to make the 

kind of assessment you are talking about. 

Secretary KERRY. Let me add to that if I can, John. Senator Feinstein brought this up today at the meeting at the White House. It 

would not be sensible to pass this resolution with a view to degrading his capacity and preventing him from doing it, if he were foolish enough to do it again. The general does have follow-on the possibilities. 

And since the objective would remain the same, it would be important for Assad himself to know that you have not limited this 

to one specific moment with respect to chemical weapons. You can 

still have a limited authorization, but with respect to chemical 

weapons, it would be a huge mistake to deprive General Dempsey 

and company of their options to enforce what we are trying to 

achieve. 

Senator BARRASSO. Trying to achieve, Mr. Secretary, the negotiated departure of Assad, you keep mentioning trying to get him 

to do this from the negotiating table. It seems to me that somebody 

who will, as Senator Coons said, go to any length to stay in power 

to the point of even using chemical weapons against his people, 

that instead would he be just driven to a more serious level of determination to keep power rather than the negotiation table? 

Secretary KERRY. John, that is a very appropriate question. The 

answer is I do not believe so, and there are a number of reasons 

why I do not believe so. And most of them are best discussed, and 

I look forward to it with you in the private session. 

But there are very strong indications from a number of discussions that have taken place between countries and individuals over 

52 

the last months that Assad would not necessarily avoid making a 

different decision under certain circumstances. So I think we ought 

to leave it at that, but in the private session, I think we ought to 

dig into it. 

Senator BARRASSO. I was going to ask about the chemical weapon 

stockpiles, and maybe you want to reserve this for the discussion 

tomorrow as well in terms of steps that we could take in terms of 

command and control of the regime’s chemical weapons stockpiles 

to make sure that these things are protected in a way that could 

not continuously be used. 

Secretary KERRY. Absolutely, and I want you to know, and this 

is, again, something that ought to be done in the other session. But 

I will just say generically, that General Dempsey and his team 

have taken great pains, at the instruction of the President of the 

United States, to make certain that whatever we do does not make 

it—does not make people less safe, or potentially more exposed to 

weapons, or that those weapons would have less control and so 

forth. All of these things have entered into the calculation. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Barrasso. Just one add-on to 

my original response to you. The resolution as sent to us by the administration will not be the resolution that we will be working on, 

but it is a good opening as to what the desires are and intentions 

are. But it will not be the specific resolution we will be working off 

of. 

Senator Murphy. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Secretary Kerry, Secretary Hagel, General. Thank you very much for 

being with us and for taking so much time with us. 

We all are referencing the conversations that we have had over 

the last week. I have never frankly seen a greater level of public 

engagement on an issue since, frankly, the healthcare reform debate of 2009. And while there are certainly hardliners that have 

come to me with a resolution that we should go in or many more 

with a resolution that we should stay out, most people see both 

sides of this issue. And they frankly appreciate the fact that they 

have an American President who has taken so much time and put 

in so much thought into arriving at this decision, even if they disagree. And they frankly appreciate even more the fact that this 

President trusts them and trusts their elected representatives 

enough to bring this conversation to the United States Congress, 

albeit the fact that it may be a little messy to get from point A to 

point B. 

And so, given all of the commotion that we will hear from our 

constituents, that maybe more than anything else comes out to me 

loud and clear. 

I guess when I look at this question, I see two questions inherent 

in the one. One, we have to ask ourselves is there a moral or national security imperative. And I think you have very plainly made 

the case, as has the President, that there have been atrocities committed that we cannot let stand, and a country that has very vital 

security interests to the United States. 

But there is a second question, and that is the one that I have 

trouble with and, I think, some of my colleagues have trouble with, 

53 

and that is this. Will our action lesson the acuity of that moral 

atrocity or advance our national security interests? There both has 

to be a problem that needs to be solved and then a way solve it, 

and that is why I struggle with this. 

And frankly, I do not think the fact that I and many others 

struggle with that question means that we lack courage or that we 

are, frankly, enabling the Syrian regime. I just think it is that we 

wonder whether there is a limit to the ability of American military 

power to influence the politics on the ground in the Middle East. 

And clearly, though there is not some direct linkage between what 

happened in Iraq and what happened in Syria, it does chill the 

ability of people to believe that America’s military might can influence politics on the ground in Syria after they have watched the 

last 10 years. 

The second problem people have is this question of escalation. 

And I think one of the most important things, Secretary Kerry, 

that you said in your prepared remarks was this: You said that we 

would be prepared to respond to, as you stated, a miscalculation by 

Assad, whether it be in reprisals against his own people or attacks 

against our allies in the region. That we would be prepared to be 

respond without going to war. Now, some people will find that 

statement a little incongruous. How do you respond without going 

to war? 

And so, let me maybe ask the question this way. There are a variety of responses from Assad. He could launch another chemical 

weapons attack against his own people. He could launch a ferocious 

conventional weapons attack against his own people. He could, of 

course—he or his allies could launch attacks against our allies in 

the region. 

I do not expect you necessarily to explain exactly what the response will be today, but does this resolution that we are debating 

today give you the ability to respond to those reprisals or in any 

of those situations that I just outlined, responses within Syria 

against his own people, or responses outside of Syria against our 

allies, would you have to come back to Congress for a new authorization of force? 

Secretary KERRY. Well—excuse me. Sorry. As I think the President has made clear and as we have seen in many of these crises 

over the course certainly of my career here in the Senate, I saw 

presidents do both, and I supported some, and I opposed others. 

And on a number of occasions, presidents acted without the authorization of Congress. So there is no question but that the President 

would have the authority, and the right, and, conceivably, the imperative to respond without any other authorization if Assad were 

to attack again. 

And so, I cannot—you know, I cannot speak for the President in 

terms of what decision he would make, but he has the authority, 

and that right would be available to him. 

Now, if I can just say quickly with respect to, you know, it is absolutely appropriate to ask the question: Will this make a difference. It’s totally appropriate think about this question of escalation. But let me say something quickly about both of those. If the 

Congress decides not to do this, it is a guarantee, whether it is 

with Assad in Syria, or nuclear weapons in Iran, or nuclear weapVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:45 Nov 21, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION\2013 ISSUE HE
54 

ons in North Korea, we will have invited a for-certain confrontation, at some point in time, that will require you to make a choice 

that will be even worse, with the potential of even greater conflict. 

That I guarantee you because that is the message that will be sent. 

Now, there is a distinction between this and Iraq, and I understand all the Iraq—you know. We know we lived through that here. 

In Iraq, intelligence purported to suggest that weapon of mass destruction existed, but we did not know if they existed. And so, we 

had a massive invasion in order to try to find out if they existed, 

and we found out they did not. 

Here we have weapons of mass destruction that we not only 

know do exist, but they have been used, not once, not twice, not 

three times, but multiple times we estimate in the teens, and the 

opposition estimates more than that. And now, we have this most 

recent use of weapon of mass destruction in contravention of nearly 

100 years of a prohibition against their use. So— 

Senator MURPHY. Yeah, but I do not think that is the dispute. 

The dispute is not the correlation between intelligence. 

Secretary KERRY. But the dispute is—the dispute is over what 

you are going to do about it. 

Senator MURPHY. It is the ability of the military to be influenced— 

Secretary KERRY. No, no. 

Senator MURPHY [continuing]. The reality on the ground. 

Secretary KERRY. Chris, the dispute is what are you prepared to 

do about it? That is the dispute. If you believe that by doing nothing you are going to stand up for the norm and somehow reduce 

the threat of the use at some future time, that is your right to believe that. But I think, and the President believes deeply, and everybody at this table believes, that flies against all common sense 

and all human behavior. 

Senator MURPHY. Mr. Secretary, let me ask just a question about 

Iran because I think it is very important and a compelling narrative here. Let me just ask you this. The circumstances are very 

different, not to trivialize what has happened in Syria, but the 

stakes of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon, which could kill millions, is different than Syria killing thousands with chemical weapons, and whether or not it lessens our moral authority to make a 

different decision with respect to Iran just because on Syria we decide not to act. 

And second, I worry about this weariness that we have talked 

about within the American public, that it may ultimately make it 

harder—I am not saying it will, but it could make it harder for us 

to rally the American public with respect to a response to Iran having gone through what could be at least a slightly protracted engagement with Syria. 

And so, I just—I guess I want to challenge you for a second on 

the automatic nature of a failure to step in in Syria with respect 

to compromising our ability to respond in Iran. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, let me just make it very, very clear. The 

world decided after World War I and the horrors of gas, and the 

trenches, and the loss of an entire generation of young people in 

Europe that we were never again going to allow gas to be used in 

warfare. And so, if all of a sudden at this moment where in the 

55 

third instance it was used by Adolf Hitler to gas millions of Jews, 

it was used by Saddam Hussein in order to gas Iraqis and Iranians 

and his own people, and now it has been used by Bashar al-Assad, 

three people in all of history. 

And if the United States knowing it and knowing that we have 

drawn a line that the world has drawn with us, is unwilling to 

stand up and confront that, it is an absolute certainty that gas will 

proliferate. 

We have had sarin gas in a Tokyo subway. Do you really want 

to have a situation where that gas may be available to these 

groups if it continues to deteriorate, because Assad can use this gas 

to continue to subjugate his population that is looking for a governance that is, you know, representative, and different, and respectful of their rights? I do not know how we could live with that. 

Now, is there a difference between gas and a nuclear weapon? 

Well, I suppose it would depend on the scale, to be honest with you. 

It would depend on the scale. But the world decided that chemical, 

biological, and nuclear are the, you know, prohibited entities of 

warfare, and we as a Nation and as we as a global community have 

struggled to try to enforce that through the years. It is hard for me 

to imagine that the United States would not stand with the world 

against that. 

Now, is it going to be effective? I am convinced that what we can 

do will reduce the possibilities of more use of gas and degrade 

Assad’s capacity to use this weapon. And I think it is imperative 

for us, as I have said again and again, we all have to take that 

step. But it is significantly different from what took place in Iraq 

originally with respect to weapons that we did not know existed. 

And the two just are not similar. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Paul. 

Senator PAUL. Thank you for coming today. 

It is not often that I get to compliment the President. I can probably count the number of times, maybe on one hand, but when I 

first heard that the President was going to come to Congress, boy, 

was I pleasantly surprised and I was proud that he was my President. I did not vote for him and I still am opposed to him quite a 

few times, but I was proud that he did this. 

And I was just about to stand on my feet and clap, and give him 

a standing ovation, and then I heard, ‘‘Well, but if I lose the vote, 

I will probably go ahead and do the bombing anyway.’’ And so, it 

does concern me. I want to be proud of the President, but every 

time I am just about there, then I get worried that really he does 

not mean it. That he is going to sort of obey the Constitution if he 

wins. So I heard Secretary Kerry say, ‘‘If we win, sure. But if we 

lose,’’ what? 

I mean, make me proud today, Secretary Kerry. Stand up for us 

and say you are going to obey the Constitution and if we vote you 

down, which is unlikely, by the way. But if we do, you would go 

with what the people say through their Congress, and you would 

not go forward with a war that your Congress votes against. 

Can you give me a better answer, Secretary Kerry? 

Secretary KERRY. I cannot give you a different answer than the 

one I gave you. I do not know what the President’s decision is, but 

I will tell you this. It ought to make you proud because he still has 

56 

the constitutional authority, and he would be in keeping with the 

Constitution. 

Senator PAUL. Well, I disagree with you there. I do not believe 

he has the constitutional authority. I think Congress has this. 

Madison was very explicit. When he wrote ‘‘The Federalist Papers,’’ he wrote, ‘‘That history supposes, or the Constitution supposes what history demonstrates that the executive is the branch 

most likely to go to war, and therefore the Constitution vested that 

power in the Congress.’’ It is explicit and runs throughout all of 

Madison’s writings. 

This power is a congressional power and it is not an executive 

power. They did not say big war or small war. They did not say 

boots on the ground, not boots on the ground. They said, ‘‘declare 

war.’’ Ask the people on the ships launching the missiles whether 

they are involved with war or not. 

If we do not say that the Constitution applies. If we do not say 

explicitly that we will abide by this vote, you are making a joke of 

us. You are making us into theater. And so, we play constitutional 

theater for the President. 

If this is real, you will abide by the verdict of Congress. You are 

probably going to win. Just go ahead and say it is real, and let us 

have a real debate in this country, and not a meaningless debate 

that, in the end, the illusion is to say, ‘‘Oh, well. We had the authority anyway. We are going to go ahead and go to war anyway.’’ 

A couple of items. 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, I assure you, there is nothing meaningless, and there is everything real— 

Senator PAUL. Only if you adhere to what we vote on. 

Secretary KERRY [continuing]. —about what is happening here. 

Senator PAUL. Only if our vote makes a difference. Only if our 

vote is binding is it meaningful. 

Secretary KERRY. And I will leave to the man who was elected 

to be President of the United States the responsibility for telling 

you what his decision is if and when that moment came. But the 

President intends to win this vote and he is not going to make 

prior announcements. 

Senator PAUL. We have had a lot of discussion about whether or 

not we are going to make the world safer with this. Somehow we 

are going to have less chemical weapons, but I think that is an 

open question, and I think it is conjecture at best. 

You can say, ‘‘Oh, well. We think Assad will be less likely to 

launch chemical weapons after this.’’ We may be able to degrade 

his capacity somewhat. You have got 1,000 tons. Are we going to 

wipe it out? Most reports I hear say we are not even probably going 

to directly bomb chemical weapons because of what might happen 

to the surrounding population. So my guess is he still will have the 

ability. 

Most people say Assad acted very illogically. Why would he release chemical weapons on his own people when it brought the 

anger and enmity of the entire world? So he is already acting irrationally or illogically. Now, we are going to deter him and he is 

going to act in a rational manner. 

I think it is equally likely that he either does it again, or he does 

not do it. I do not think you can say for certain which is better. 

57 

I do not know that we can say that by attacking them, he is not 

going to launch another chemical attack. Will the region— 

Secretary KERRY. Well— 

Senator PAUL [continuing]. Will the region, I have a few of them 

and then I will stop. 

Will the region be more stable or less stable? We all say we want 

stability in the Middle East, and stability in the Middle East is a 

national interest for our country. Will it be more stable or less stable? I frankly think there are equal arguments on both sides of 

that. 

Will Israel be more likely to suffer an attack on them, a gas attack or otherwise, or less likely? I think there is a valid argument 

for saying they will be more likely to suffer an attack if we do this. 

Will Russia be more likely or less likely to supply more arms and 

get more heavily involved in this? I think there is a valid argument 

that they may become more likely to be involved. 

Iran, more likely or less likely to be involved with this? If Iran 

gets involved, more likely or less likely that Israel launches a reprisal attack on Iran? There are all kinds of unknowns that I cannot tell you absolutely the answer and neither can you, but I think 

there is a reasonable argument that the world may be less stable 

because of this, and that it may not deter any chemical weapons 

attack. 

So what I would ask is: how are we to know? How are we to go 

home? I have not had one person come up to me and say they are 

for this war. Not one person. We get calls by the thousands. Nobody is calling in favor of this war. 

I did not meet, while I was home all month, I went to 40 cities. 

I did not have one person come up and say that they were in favor 

of going to war. Do they all agree it is a horrendous thing? Yes. 

We all agree that chemical attacks are a horrendous thing, but people are not excited about getting involved. They also do not think 

it is going to work, and they are skeptical of what will occur with 

this. 

But I would appreciate your response and try to reassure the 

rest of us, one, that the vote is meaningful and valid, that you 

would adhere to it. And also, that you are convinced that all of 

these different items will be better, not worse, by this attack. 

Secretary KERRY. Well, Senator, I would be very happy to do 

that. Will Israel be more likely to suffer an attack, or will they be 

safer? Will they be less safe? I can make it crystal clear to you that 

Israel will be less safe unless the United States takes this action. 

Iran and Hezbollah are two of the three biggest allies of Assad. 

And Iran and Hezbollah are the two single biggest enemies of 

Israel. So if Iran and Hezbollah are advantaged by the United 

States not curbing Assad’s use of chemical weapons, there is a 

much greater likelihood that at some point down the road, 

Hezbollah, who has been one of the principle reasons for a change 

in the situation on the ground, will have access to these weapons 

of mass destruction. And Israel will, for certain, be less secure. 

Let me just say this— 

Senator PAUL. But I would also argue that it would be more likely that Hezbollah will attack because of this attack in response. 

58 

Secretary KERRY. And Israel feels quite confident of its ability to 

deal with Hezbollah if they were to do so. You will notice that 

Israel has, on several occasions in the last year, seen fit to deal 

with threats to its security because of what is in Syria, and not 

once has Assad responded to that to date. 

I think there are a bunch of things we should talk about in a 

classified session. But let me just make it very clear to you that, 

you know, you ask these questions, ‘‘Will this or that be more likely 

to happen or not likely to happen?’’ 

If the United States of America does not do this, Senator, is it 

more or less likely that Assad does it again? Do you want to answer that question? 

Senator PAUL. I do not think it is known. I do not think— 

Secretary KERRY. Is it more or less likely that he does it again? 

Senator PAUL [continuing]. If you have the attack. I think it is 

unknown whether it is more or less likely whether you have the 

attack. 

Secretary KERRY. It is unknown? Senator, it is not unknown. If 

the United States of America does not hold him accountable on this 

with our allies and friends, it is a guarantee Assad will do it 

again—a guarantee—and I urge you to go to the classified briefing 

and learn that. 

Second, let me just point out to you that with respect to this 

question of Americans wanting to go to war. You know, you have 

three people here who have been to war. You have John McCain 

who has been to war. There is not one of us who does not understand what going to war means, and we do not want to go to war. 

We do not believe we are going to war in the classic sense of taking American troops and America to war. The President is asking 

for the authority to do a limited action that will degrade the capacity of a tyrant who has been using chemical weapons to kill his 

own people. 

Senator PAUL. But I think by doing so, you announce it. 

Secretary KERRY. It is a limited. 

Senator Paul. You announce— 

Secretary KERRY. It is limited. 

Senator PAUL [continuing]. By doing so, you announce in advance 

that your goal is not winning. 

Secretary KERRY. But that is not— 

Senator PAUL. And I think the last 50 years of Secretaries of Defense would say if your goal is not to win, we should not be involved. 

Secretary KERRY. If people are asked, ‘‘Do you want to go to war 

in Syria?’’ of course not. Everybody, one hundred percent of Americans, will say no. We say no. We do not want to go to war in Syria 

either. It is not what we are here to ask. 

The President is not asking you to go to war. He is not asking 

you to declare war. He is not asking you to send one American 

troop to war. He is simply saying we need to take an action that 

can degrade the capacity of a man who has been willing to kill his 

own people by breaking a nearly one hundred year old prohibition, 

and will we stand up and be counted to say, ‘‘We will not do that.’’ 

That is not, I just do not consider that going to war in the classic 

sense of coming to Congress and asking for a declaration of war, 

59 

and training troops, and sending people abroad, and putting young 

Americans in harm’s way. That is not what the President is asking 

for here. 

General, do you want to speak at all to that? 

General DEMPSEY. No, not really, Secretary. Thank you for offering. 

Senator KAINE. Great. Thank you to all of you. This has been a 

good discussion. 

I want to echo what Senator Paul, Senator Durbin, and others 

have said. I very much appreciate and celebrated the President’s 

decision to bring this matter to Congress. I also believe with others 

that the Constitution reserves the power to initiate military action 

to Congress; 535 people get a vote on that. There is only one Commander-in-Chief after the vote is taken, after we do that searching 

inquiry, it is the Commander-in-Chief that has to decide how to 

execute the decided upon mission. But I applaud the President for 

doing it. 

I view it not only as a matter of constitutional law. I view it as 

reflecting a very important underlying value, and the value is this: 

We should not put service members into initiating battle, putting 

people into harm’s way if they do not have a consensus behind 

them, the American public, the political leadership behind them. To 

send young men and women into war, or into a military action, 

where they are exercising military options with a divided political 

leadership class is the worst thing we can do. 

And so, we need to come to a consensus and then execute on that 

consensus whatever it is. And it would be my hope that Congress’ 

consensus would then be what the President would do and not otherwise. 

There is a basic principle at stake. I think you stated it well. It 

is a principle of international law and American law: n o use of 

weapons of mass destruction against civilians. 

I don’t know of a higher principle of the relations of states, of the 

law of nations, of sort of international legal morality than no use 

of weapons of mass destruction against civilians, and that is the 

principle that is at stake as we wrestle with this request of the 

President on this committee. That is a principle that is very clear. 

As you said, Secretary Kerry, it is not about if the weapons of 

mass destruction exist—they exist. It is not just whether they will 

be used. They have been used. They have been used against civilians. They have been used against civilians on a massive scale, including women and children. 

And so, it is a principle that is squarely at stake. We know that 

Bashar al-Assad does not care about the principle. Contrary to 

things that you have said, we know that Vladimir Putin, until he 

shows otherwise, does not care about the principle. 

I hope Congress still cares about the principle. It is a principle 

of longstanding origin. Syria signed onto it, the Geneva Convention. The Soviet Union signed onto the Geneva Convention and 

then again, in the 1990s era, Chemical Weapons Convention as 

Russia under the leadership of the previous president, President 

Yeltsin. 

So we know that there are some who don’t care, but I hope that 

Congress shows that we do care by our action. 

60 

A couple of questions are, first, Russia. I want to associate with 

something that Senator Udall said earlier. The fact that they—we 

have not done enough to demonstrate that Russia has essentially 

become a pariah nation by being pro chemical weapons. 

It is hard to read their action and come up with any conclusion 

other than the current government of Russia is pro use of chemical 

weapons against civilians. We should make them wear being a pro 

chemical weapons nation like a rotting carcass around their neck 

in every instance we can. So that at some point, they will ask 

themselves the question, do we really want to be the nation that 

is pro use of chemical weapons against a civilian population? 

If we make that as painful as we can every day at the U.N., even 

if they are going to block it, we come back with another—we should 

make it painful every day. So that at some point, they will ask 

themselves the question, why do we want to carry this water for 

a dictator who is using chemical weapons against his own civilians? 

We haven’t done enough on that score. The fact that they are 

going to block us shouldn’t dissuade us. We should do more and 

more and more. I think that will ultimately contribute to a political 

negotiation. 

I want to ask you the question about the Syrian opposition’s position on chemical weapons. I was unclear about their position on 

chemical weapons, but I understand that the opposition may have 

made some commitments in compacts that have been negotiated, 

Mr. Secretary, that they are anti-chemical weapons, that they 

would commit to turn over chemical weapons to the international 

community either if they take control of those weapons during the 

course of this civil war or whether they are in the lead in a post 

Assad government. 

Can you talk about the opposition and their commitment to get 

rid of the stockpile of chemical weapons that is currently being 

used? 

Secretary KERRY. Yes, we have had some discussions about that, 

and I hope that when the president comes here, when President 

Jarba comes here that he will make that position clear to all of 

you. 

Senator KAINE. That would be very helpful. I think that would 

be one of the best things the opposition could do is make that plain. 

There is a little bit of a confusion. I think we can talk shorthand 

here in ways that might make it hard for Senators and certainly 

the public to follow. We are here talking about military action on 

the same time we are saying there will be no solution to the civil 

war that is not a negotiated political solution. So those can seem 

to be at odds. 

I want to state my understanding of how they fit together, and 

you tell me if I am right or wrong. If we take action, action to degrade the ability of Syria to use chemical weapons, action to degrade their ability to violate international law, it will take away a 

significant asset that they have in their battle against the opposition. 

It will level the playing field by removing the ability to use chemical weapons, and it will, therefore, increase the odds that the parties will then come to the table to try to figure out that political 

solution. Is that the connection between the military option you are 

61 

proposing and the stated end goal of a solution to the civil war only 

being—only being achieved through a political end? 

Secretary KERRY. It is the collateral connection to it. It is not the 

purpose of it, but it is a collateral connection. 

Senator KAINE. I don’t have any other questions, Mr. Chair. I 

will save them for tomorrow. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Markey? 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

Without question, there is great horror and disgust at Assad’s 

use of chemical weapons and great sympathy for the people of 

Syria, that their leader would use chemical weapons upon his own 

people and that his murderous regime is so dedicated to retaining 

power that they would use those weapons. 

At the same time in our own country, there is great concern that 

we could be invoking the law of unintended consequences as we 

talk about using our own military in Syria. Back in 2001 and 2002, 

the threat obviously was that the next attack at the United States 

could come in the form of a mushroom cloud from Iraq. And although there were inspectors on the ground for 100 days in Iraq 

who could not find it before the war started, nonetheless, that war 

began. 

And I think people are understandably apprehensive about what 

we are talking about right now because of what did precipitate that 

war in Iraq. So I continue to look forward to additional evidence 

being presented, and my hope is that we can act in a way that does 

not bog us down into the middle of a Syrian civil war. 

I think there are many people who want us in the middle of the 

Syrian civil war, many people. But I don’t think that the American 

people do. I think they are very wary of having our country,once 

again, drawn into a civil war in another country. 

The concern that I think many people have is that we don’t fully 

understand as well what the reaction of the Russians will be to this 

action. So, General, you—and I thank you, General and Secretary 

Kerry and Secretary Hagel, for your—this is a tough job, and we 

really appreciate the sensitivity and the professionalism with 

which you are handling this. 

You talked about the Russians now having four vessels in Eastern Mediterranean, but you did not seem to be that concerned 

about it. Syria is a proxy state of Russia. They provide the military 

assistance, the training to Syria. 

Are you concerned in any way that a strike by the United States 

could increase the amount of military assistance that Russia sends 

into the Syrian regime? 

General DEMPSEY. It could, Senator. I mean, they—there is some 

indication that they have assured the regime that if we destroy 

something, they can replace it. But, you know, that is not a reason 

for me to hesitate to act. 

And to your point, there are always unintended consequences of 

conflict. But as the Secretary has mentioned, we know what the 

consequences could be, probably would be, if we do not act. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary—and Teresa, you look great. You look absolutely 

fantastic here today. 

62 

It is my understanding that the U.N. chemical inspection team 

left Syria on Saturday and that U.N. Secretary Ban Ki-moon has 

directed the team to expedite the mission’s analysis of the samples 

and information it has obtained. When do we expect to obtain that 

data and the analysis made by the U.N., and when do we expect 

that information to be made public? 

Secretary KERRY. I am sorry. Which information? 

Senator MARKEY. The United Nations inspection team. 

Secretary KERRY. Senator—by the way, Mr. Chairman, I am 

looking over here at my successor in the United States Senate, and 

I don’t know if there is a new initiation process here on the committee, but I notice he doesn’t even get a nameplate. 

[Laughter.] 

Secretary KERRY. Oh, all right. I was worried about you. 

Senator MARKEY. In the House, they put it up for you. So I am 

learning what the protocol is over here. 

The CHAIRMAN. We are dealing with sequester. So you have to 

do it yourself. 

Secretary KERRY. I thought Massachusetts was on an uneven 

keel here for a minute. 

Senator, first of all, welcome to the committee and welcome to 

the Senate. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you. 

Secretary KERRY. It is good to see you here. 

With respect to the U.N. process, we are hearing somewhere, you 

know, 3 weeks, anywhere from 2 to 4 weeks, I suppose, is the 

range. But I think about 3 weeks is what we have been told. 

Senator MARKEY. So would it be wise for us to wait for that information from the United Nations in order to ensure that there is 

a signal sent to the international community as to the veracity of 

the analysis by the United States that chemical weapons have been 

used? 

Secretary KERRY. Well, let me speak to that because it is a very 

important and legitimate question. First of all, the mandate of the 

United Nations inspection team, which we have great respect for 

and we are grateful to them and to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 

for their courageous effort to go in under difficult circumstance. 

And we have obviously pushed for inspections in other circumstances. 

The distinction here is that their mandate will only allow them 

to say that a chemical weapons attack took place. They have no 

mandate to assign blame, who did it. And Secretary-General Ban 

Ki-moon has reaffirmed that this is, in fact, what they won’t do. 

They won’t assign blame. They will confirm what happened. 

Now can they provide additional information in terms of details 

and some additional evidence? The answer is yes. But will they tell 

us anything that we do not know today beyond a reasonable doubt? 

The answer is no. 

They can’t tell us because they don’t have the technical means 

or the intelligence operation or the capacity to put together what 

we have released to the world in an unclassified document. And 

when you add what we have in classified form that I obviously 

can’t go into here, we have an even more persuasive case about 

what has happened here. 

63 

Now let me add to that, if I can, just one more thing. Iran and 

Syria itself have both admitted that a chemical weapons attack 

took place. So Iran and Syria are already telling us an attack took 

place, but they’ve chosen the improbable and illogical notion that 

the opposition did it, not the regime. 

Senator MARKEY. My only suggestion would be that the United 

States declassify a higher percentage of the information that we 

have so that the American people and the international community 

can see it. And I think that would be helpful in this whole discussion, that if we declassified, I think it would actually give more assurance to the international community. 

Secretary KERRY. Senator, I understand. And I have to tell you, 

the unprecedented level of declassification already, according to the 

intel community, could possibly put at risk some sources and methods. Now one of the reasons that it was chosen to release one is 

somehow it leaked from someplace in the world, and it was already 

in several newspapers. 

So, as a result of that, it was—it was further declassified. But 

that itself is an intercept, an actual conversation now out in public 

that shows the regime acknowledging its own culpability and expressing fear about the U.N. discovering it. So there is already, it 

seems to me, a sufficient level without tempting fate on sources 

and methods. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

And Secretary Hagel, if I may just quickly, on the administration’s draft resolution, would that draft authorization allow the 

U.S. military to conduct military operations outside of Syria? 

Secretary HAGEL. No. 

Senator MARKEY. It would not. And would it allow military operations against foreign governments other than Syria? 

Secretary HAGEL. No. 

Senator MARKEY. And would it authorize military operations 

against nonstate actors? 

Secretary HAGEL. No. 

Senator MARKEY. Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Markey. 

Let me, on behalf of the committee, thank all of our distinguished witnesses. They have been testifying for in excess of 3 1/ 

2 hours, and I appreciate their information they have imparted 

with the committee. 

Let me say that I appreciate the thoughtfulness with which each 

member has come to this issue at this hearing and expressed their 

concerns and their views, and I have listened closely and understand some of those concerns. I have listened to my colleagues particularly express concern as to whether the actions we conceive 

would, in fact, deter or degrade the ability of Assad to pursue 

chemical weapons attacks in the future, and I am reminded in a 

much different context of an experience I had in my own life. 

General Dempsey is actually originally from my area, Jersey City 

and Bayonne. And I grew up in a tough neighborhood, and we had 

a bully in the neighborhood. And I was walking along the street 

one day, and he just slapped me in the face. And I went away and 

told my mom, and she said avoid him. Avoid him, just avoid him. 

64 

And a week later, I saw the bully again, and I did all my best 

to avoid him, and this time he punched me in the nose, and it was 

bloody. And I went back to her and said, you know, mom, I tried 

to avoid him. She said, well, just avoid him. 

And it wasn’t until the third time when we were by a construction site that I got a piece of wood and whacked the bully, and that 

was the end of it. I never got whacked again. 

It is not quite this, but there is a lesson to be learned. Assad has 

made a calculation now, by inching up several times, that he can 

use chemical weapons; or he believes he can use chemical weapons 

without consequence. And in doing so, there is a global message 

that, in fact, other state actors and other nonstate actors may believe they can do so as well. 

That is a critical challenge for the national security of the United 

States, and I hope members will consider that as we move toward 

final action. 

I want to advise members, I think we are close to a text on a 

resolution and so that they should consider that it is likely that we 

may very well be in a business meeting sometime after the classified hearing tomorrow morning, and we look forward to working 

with all of the members of the committee. 

Senator Corker, is there anything else? 

Senator CORKER. I think you have said it well enough. I want to 

thank the witnesses for spending this much time not only in the 

hearing, but also in advance of the hearing. 

I look forward to the classified meeting tomorrow, and I want to 

thank all the members for incredible thoughtfulness throughout all 

of this. And I appreciate everybody coming back to be a part of this 

and taking it so seriously, which I think everybody will do. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. With the thanks of the committee, this hearing 

is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 6:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO SECRETARY OF

STATE JOHN KERRY FROM SENATOR JOHN BARRASSO

Question. Is the United States required by law to use force against the government of Syria for their use of chemical weapons against their own people? Please 

provide the specific law which mandates that the United States take military action. 

Answer. No. 

Question. What is the administration’s overall strategy in Syria? 

Answer. We are committed to ending the violence in Syria and helping it become 

a stable country that will support our national security interests in the heart of the 

Middle East, including by controlling, and eventually dismantling, its chemical 

weapons stocks as well as containing and eventually removing terrorist groups from 

its soil. 

Our goal is a peaceful political transition that results in Assad’s departure and 

the establishment of a representative and legitimate government that represents 

the will of all Syrians. 

The formula for this peaceful political transition already exists—it is laid out in 

the Geneva Communique ́—and Russia, the UN, EU, Arab League, and other key 

countries support it. 

The Communique ́ calls for a transitional government chosen by the mutual consent of the Assad regime as well as the opposition. That means that both sides will 

65 

have to choose people who will protect not one side or the other, but the rights of 

all Syrians. 

The opposition supports this goal; the Assad regime does not. 

To persuade Assad to engage in serious negotiations, the United States and key 

partners are increasing the scope and scale of assistance to the moderate opposition, 

the Syrian Coalition and the Supreme Military Council, while working to stymie the 

growing influence of extremists. 

Question. How do the military strikes play into the administration’s overall policy 

on Syria and the region? 

Answer. Our objective is to deter further chemical weapons use by the regime, to 

degrade their capacity to carry out future chemical weapons attacks, and to enforce 

the international norm against chemical weapons use so that regimes like Syria, 

Iran and North Korea don’t believe that they can act with impunity. 

The indiscriminate and large-scale use of chemical weapons by the regime on August 21 violates clearly established international norms against the use of chemical 

weapons and the law of war. The international community has been engaged in a 

sustained effort to eliminate the use of chemical weapons, including in response to 

the agonizing suffering caused by those weapons during World War I. So it should 

not be surprising that leaders from around the world, including the United Nations 

Secretary General, the Arab League, and NATO, have condemned the brutal August 

21 attacks as violating these international norms. 

Countries like Turkey, Jordan and Israel feel threatened by the Syrian regime’s 

growing use of chemical weapons. The egregious Syrian behavior threatens to further destabilize this important region, and thereby threaten core U.S. security interests. 

The President stated that he has no interest in an open-ended U.S. involvement 

in Syria. As we’ve long made clear—and as the events of August 21 reinforce—it 

is imperative that we reach a comprehensive and durable political solution to the 

crisis in Syria. We do not believe there is a military solution to the conflict in Syria. 

The United States remains fully invested in the Geneva peace process, and we will 

continue working with Russia and other international partners to move toward a 

political transition based on the framework laid out in the Geneva Communique ́. The responses that the President is considering now are specifically designed to 

deter and prevent further use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime and to reduce the risk of proliferation of these weapons. 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO SECRETARY OF

DEFENSE CHUCK HAGEL FROM SENATOR JOHN BARRASSO

Use of Chemical Weapons 

Question. On August 21, 2013, the Assad regime again crossed President Obama’s 

red line resulting in the death of 1,429 civilians in Syria. What standard did the 

administration use to determine that the chemical weapons use on August 21 warrants military action while the previous use of chemical weapons did not? 

Answer. As I’ve said before, military action should be a last resort. Once we determined that chemical weapons (CW) had been previously used, the President reiterated his warning to Assad while simultaneously enhancing U.S. military support to 

the opposition. We hoped increased support to the opposition would signal to Assad 

our seriousness on this matter, and dissuade him from employing these heinous 

weapons again. Assad chose to ignore our warning and proceeded to use CW again, 

this time on a much larger scale, flaunting his disregard for international norms. 

It is imperative that we demonstrate to Assad that his use of CW will elicit a strong 

international response, one that will deter him and degrade his capabilities to employ indiscriminate weapons against his own people. 

Budget 

Question. When the Department of Defense submitted its budget request at the 

beginning of the year, it made clear that there were shortfalls in the Overseas Contingency Operations budget and even seemed to indicate there were also shortfalls 

in certain parts of the base operating budget. 

a. What is the cost estimate for the military action being proposed by President Obama? 

b. Do we have the resources available for military actions in Syria? 

c. What U.S. forces and capabilities are currently available to engage targets 

in Syria? 

d. Will a supplemental appropriation request be required? 

66 

Answer. a. The President’s guidance is that the operations in Syria be limited in 

scope, and we expect the costs to be limited as well. Costs will depend on the details 

of the operation. A reasonable range of costs is tens to hundreds of millions of dollars. I cannot be more precise at this time. 

b. While the fact that this operation comes toward the end of a difficult fiscal 

year does limit flexibility, the Department will use remaining operating funds 

to finance any incremental costs in FY 2013. We will have to determine how 

to finance any incremental FY 2014 costs after we know the status of Congressional action on our FY 2014 budget request. 

c. From an unclassified perspective, the Navy has four guided missile destroyers in the eastern Mediterranean and the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz with its 

supporting vessels in the Red Sea. However, the specific force structure depends 

on final decisions. 

d. The administration has indicated that it does not currently plan to submit 

a supplemental funding request. 

Æ