Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-CR-127 | December 15, 2015 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Lisa M. Johnson

Brownsburg, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Walter Havvard,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

December 15, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1503-CR-127

Appeal from the Marion County 

Superior Court

The Honorable Shatrese M. 

Flowers, Judge

The Honorable Peggy R. Hart, 

Commissioner

Trial Court Cause No.

49G20-1006-FA-048517

Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-CR-127 | December 15, 2015 Page 2 of 10

[1] Walter Havvard (“Havvard”) appeals his conviction, after a jury trial, for 

dealing in cocaine as a Class A felony.

1

 Havvard argues that there was 

insufficient evidence proving that he constructively possessed cocaine. In 

addition, he claims that the search warrant in his case was invalid and that the 

trial court committed fundamental error in allowing certain testimony. 

Concluding that sufficient evidence supported his conviction, that he failed to 

preserve his challenge to the search warrant for appeal, and that no 

fundamental error occurred, we affirm Havvard’s conviction.

[2] We affirm.

Issues

1. Whether sufficient evidence supports Havvard’s conviction.

2. Whether Havvard preserved his challenge to the search warrant for 

appeal.

3. Whether the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence.

Facts

[3] On June 18, 2010, narcotics detectives with the Indianapolis Metropolitan 

Police Department served a search warrant at 427 West Bernard Street. A 

court issued the search warrant on June 17 after detectives had conducted two 

controlled buys at the house within the prior week. Havvard was the only 

person in the house when the officers served the warrant. Detective James 

 

1

IND. CODE § 35-48-4-1(a)(2). We note that effective July 1, 2014, the legislature enacted a new dealing in 

cocaine statute and that Class A felony dealing in cocaine, in this instance, is now a Level 2 felony. Because 

Havvard committed his crimes in 2010, we will apply the statute in effect at that time.
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Fiscus (“Detective Fiscus”) read Havvard a copy of the search warrant and 

advised him of his Miranda rights.

[4] Detectives searched the kitchen and found two plastic baggies on a shelf in a 

cabinet. One of the baggies contained 7.6922 grams of cocaine, and the other 

contained 4.4152 grams of cocaine. Another baggie in the kitchen contained 

.3941 grams of cocaine. In a cabinet next to the kitchen sink, detectives located 

two Pyrex measuring cups containing cocaine residue. Havvard’s fingerprint 

was found on the measuring cups. The detectives also found over 400 grams of 

marijuana, an assault rifle, digital scales, and approximately $200 in cash. 

[5] On June 23, 2010, the State charged Havvard with Class A felony dealing in 

cocaine, Class A felony possession of cocaine, Class C felony possession of 

cocaine and a firearm, Class B felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a 

serious violent felon, Class D felony dealing in marijuana, and Class D felony 

possession of marijuana. On June 7, 2011, the State alleged that Havvard was 

an habitual offender. On November 6, 2013, Havvard filed a motion to 

suppress, which the trial court denied on November 14, 2013.

[6] On February 11, 2014, the State added a charge of Class A felony conspiracy to 

commit dealing in cocaine and amended the possession of cocaine charge to a 

Class C felony. Havvard’s first trial was held on May 20-21, 2014 and resulted 

in a mistrial because the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict. Havvard’s 

second trial was held on November 18-19, 2014.
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[7] During the second trial, Detective Ryan Clark (“Detective Clark”), testified as 

an expert witness and explained to the jury how the evidence recovered at 427 

Bernard was indicative of someone dealing drugs. In addition, Detective Fiscus 

testified that after reading the search warrant and being advised of his Miranda 

rights, Havvard stated that he did not want to talk to the detective and that, “He 

didn’t live there.” (Tr. 425). Havvard did not object to either detectives’ 

testimony. The jury convicted Havvard as charged. 

[8] At sentencing, the State dismissed all of the charges except for the dealing in 

cocaine charge and the habitual offender enhancement. The trial court entered 

judgment of conviction on the dealing charge and sentenced Havvard to thirty 

(30) years executed. The trial court also enhanced Havvard’s sentence for

dealing cocaine by an additional thirty (30) years for being an habitual offender, 

for an aggregate sentence of sixty (60) years executed. Havvard now appeals.

Decision

[9] Havvard appeals his conviction for dealing in cocaine as a Class A felony. On 

appeal, he claims that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to establish that he 

constructively possessed the cocaine found in the house; (2) the search warrant 

was invalid; and (3) the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence. We 

address each of his arguments in turn.

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[10] Havvard argues that insufficient evidence supports his conviction for dealing in 

cocaine.
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When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative 

evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is 

the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess 

witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether 

it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, 

when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, 

they must consider it most favorably to the [jury’s verdict]. 

Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence 

overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The 

evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn 

from it to support the verdict. 

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

[11] To convict Havvard as charged, the State was required to prove that he 

knowingly possessed cocaine in an amount greater than three (3) grams with 

the intent to deliver said cocaine. I.C. § 35-48-4-1(a)(2); (App. 10). Havvard 

was not in actual possession of the cocaine found in the house. Thus, the State 

was required to prove that Havvard constructively possessed the cocaine. 

Evidence of constructive possession is sufficient where the State proves that the 

defendant had the intent and capability to maintain dominion and control over 

the contraband. Hardister v. State, 849 N.E.2d 563, 573 (Ind. 2006). 

[12] The intent element of constructive possession is shown if the State demonstrates 

the defendant’s knowledge of the presence of the contraband. Goliday v. State, 

708 N.E.2d 4, 6 (Ind. 1999). A defendant’s knowledge may be inferred from 

either the exclusive dominion and control over the premise containing the 
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contraband, or if the control is non-exclusive, evidence of additional 

circumstances pointing to the defendant’s knowledge of the presence of 

contraband. Id. These additional circumstances may include: (1) incriminating 

statements by the defendant; (2) attempted flight or furtive gestures; (3) a drug 

manufacturing setting; (4) proximity of the defendant to the drugs; (5) drugs in 

plain view; and (6) location of the drugs in close proximity to items owned by 

the defendant. Hardister, 849 N.E.2d at 574. The capability element of 

constructive possession is met when the State shows that the defendant is able 

to reduce the controlled substance to the defendant’s personal possession. 

Goliday, 708 N.E.2d at 6. 

[13] Here, the baggies containing cocaine, the Pyrex measuring cup containing

cocaine residue, and the digital scale support a reasonable inference that the 

house was a drug manufacturing setting. In addition, Havvard was the only 

person in the house, and his fingerprint was on one of the measuring cups. 

Thus, there is a reasonable inference that he knew the cocaine was present in 

the house and had the intent possess it. Accordingly, sufficient evidence 

supports Havvard’s constructive possession of the cocaine, and in turn, his 

dealing in cocaine conviction.

2. Search Warrant

[14] Next, Havvard argues that the search warrant used in his case was invalid 

because the affidavit supporting the warrant did not establish probable cause to 

search the house. However, Havvard did not preserve this argument for appeal.
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[15] When dealing with evidence alleged to have been illegally seized, a 

contemporaneous objection at the time the evidence is introduced at trial is 

required to preserve the issue for appeal, regardless of whether a motion to 

suppress was filed. Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010). The 

purpose of this rule is to allow the trial judge to consider the issue in light of any 

fresh developments and also to correct errors. Jackson v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1146, 

1152 (Ind. 2000). Here, Havvard did not object when the search warrant or any 

other evidence was introduced at trial. Rather, he affirmatively stated that he 

had no objection. Accordingly, Havvard waived his ability to challenge the 

search warrant on appeal. See, e.g., Brown, 929 N.E.2d at 207 (holding that the 

defendant was not allowed to challenge admissibility of evidence on appeal

where he affirmatively stated he had no objection to evidence offered at trial). 

3. Admissibility of Evidence

[16] Finally, Havvard asserts that the trial court erred by allowing Detective Clark’s

improper opinion testimony and allowing Detective Fiscus to use his postMiranda silence against him. Generally, a trial court’s ruling on the 

admissibility of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Hope v. State, 

903 N.E.2d 977, 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. We will reverse a trial 

court’s decision only if it is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances of the case. Id. Even if the decision was an abuse of discretion, 

we will not reverse if the admission of evidence constituted harmless error. Id. 

[17] We note that Havvard did not object when any of the challenged testimony was 

offered. Failure to object to evidence at trial results in waiver of the issue for 
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appellate review unless admitting the evidence constituted fundamental error. 

Southward v. State, 957 N.E.2d 975, 978 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The fundamental 

error doctrine is exceedingly narrow. Id. “Fundamental error is an error that 

makes a fair trial impossible or constitutes clearly blatant violations of basic and 

elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial 

potential for harm.” Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 130 (Ind. 2009). 

[18] Regarding the improper opinion testimony, Havvard claims that Detective 

Clark offered an opinion regarding Havvard’s guilt. Indiana Evidence Rule 

704(b) provides that “[w]itnesses may not testify to opinions concerning intent, 

guilt, or innocence in a criminal case; the truth or falsity of allegations; whether 

a witness has testified truthfully; or legal conclusions.” However, we have 

stated:

a police officer or law enforcement official who is offered and 

qualified as an expert in the area of drugs, drug trade, drug 

trafficking, etc., may offer testimony as to whether particular 

facts tend to be more or less consistent with dealing in drugs. 

However, the expert may not make conclusions as to whether the 

defendant is a dealer or whether the defendant had the intent to 

deal or deliver. . . . In essence, the expert may comment on the 

facts of the case, but must refrain from making any conclusions 

as to the defendant’s intent, guilt, or innocence. 

Scisney v. State, 690 N.E.2d 342, 346 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), aff’d in relevant part, 

701 N.E.2d 847 (Ind. 1998). 

[19] Here, Detective Clark did what precedent allows him to do. That is, he 

commented on the facts of the case and stated that those facts were consistent 
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with trafficking cocaine and marijuana. Cf. Williams v. State, 48S05–1507–CR–

424, 2015 WL 6447736 at 3–4 (Ind. Oct. 26, 2015) (holding that detective’s 

testimony was inadmissible where he stated that, “there’s zero doubt in my 

mind that that was a transaction for cocaine”). Because Detective Clark made 

no specific statements declaring Havvard’s guilt, no error, let alone 

fundamental error, occurred. See, e.g., id. 

[20] Lastly, Havvard claims that the trial court allowed Detective Fiscus to use his 

post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes or as substantive evidence, 

violating Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240 (1976). In Doyle, the United 

States Supreme Court held that using a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda

silence to impeach an exculpatory story told for the first time at trial violates 

that defendant’s due process rights. Id. Doyle “rests on ‘the fundamental 

unfairness of implicitly assuring a suspect that his silence will not be used 

against him and then using his silence to impeach an explanation subsequently 

offered at trial.’” Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 291, 106 S.Ct. 634, 638 

(1986) (quoting South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 565, 103 S.Ct. 916, 923 

(1983)).

[21] Again, we find no error, let alone fundamental error, occurred. Here, Detective 

Fiscus testified that he read Havvard his Miranda rights, that Havvard told him 

that he did not want to talk to the detective, and that he did not live in the 

house. While Havvard claims that even mentioning his post-Miranda silence is 

error, we have held that “a jury’s knowledge that a defendant initially remained 

silent is not a problem when that knowledge is not used to subvert the defense 
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in Doyle fashion.” Mendenhall v. State, 963 N.E.2d 553, 565 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2012), trans. denied. 

[22] To subvert Havvard’s defense in a Doyle fashion, the State would have had to 

use his silence to impeach an explanation offered by Havvard at trial. See 

Wainwright, 474 U.S. 291. However, Havvard did not testify at trial, and he 

does not call our attention to any defense offered that the State impeached with 

his silence. Accordingly, no Doyle violation occurred, and we affirm Havvard’s 

conviction.

Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Robb, J., concur.