UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4056

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ADRIAN CHAVEZ,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, 

District Judge. (5:07-cr-00037-BO-1)

Submitted: October 10, 2012 Decided: October 15, 2012

Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Richard L. Cannon, III, CANNON LAW OFFICES, PLLC, Greenville, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Adrian Chavez appeals the district court’s order 

revoking his term of supervised release and imposing a sentence 

of thirty-six months’ imprisonment. Counsel has filed a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),

certifying that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but 

questioning whether the district court erred in imposing the 

maximum sentence and whether the district court provided Chavez 

sufficient notice regarding the upward departure from the 

Guidelines range. Chavez was given the opportunity file a pro 

se supplemental brief, but has not done so. The Government 

declined to file a response brief. We affirm. 

A district court has broad discretion to impose a 

sentence revoking a defendant’s supervised release. United 

States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). We will 

affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release 

if it is within the statutory maximum and is not “plainly 

unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 

(4th Cir. 2006). In making this determination, we first 

consider whether the sentence imposed is procedurally and 

substantively unreasonable. Id. at 438. A supervised release 

revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district 

court has considered the advisory policy statement range and the 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors applicable to supervised 
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release revocation. Id. at 438-40. “A court need not be as 

detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it 

must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still 

must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence 

imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). A sentence is substantively reasonable if the 

district court stated a proper basis for concluding the 

defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the 

statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if a sentence 

is found procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we 

“then decide whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id.

at 439. 

After review of the record, we conclude that the 

revocation sentence is both procedurally and substantively 

reasonable. The thirty-six-month sentence does not exceed the 

applicable statutory maximum. The district court sufficiently 

explained its rationale for imposing the statutory maximum 

sentence, emphasizing the dangerous nature of the weapon found 

in Chavez’s possession, the severe danger posed by Chavez to the 

community, and the fact that Chavez’s prior sentence had no 

deterrent affect on his criminal conduct. In addition, the 

district court was not required to provide Chavez advance notice 

of its consideration of a sentence above the Guidelines range, 

as Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1, which governs revocation of supervised 
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release, does not require advance notice of a potential sentence 

in excess of the Guidelines range. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record for meritorious issues and have found none. We therefore 

affirm the district court’s judgment. This court requires that 

counsel inform Chavez, in writing, of his right to petition the 

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If 

Chavez requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes 

that such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may move in 

this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s 

motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Chavez. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED