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© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

“It is essential to attract voter 

cooperation with the IEC on 

anti-fraud efforts. The IEC needs to 

inform the voters and candidates 

that fraud is a major offense and to 

help the IEC with its anti-fraud 

measures. In 2009 and 2010, the 

ECC and IEC disqualified more 

than one million votes because of 

fraud. This tainted even the 

legitimate winners, and damaged 

the reputation of electoral process 

and institutions. ”

May 21, 2013

An Anti-Fraud Strategy 

for Afghanistan’s 2014 Elections 

Summary

•	 On April 5, 2014, Afghans will go to the pollsto vote in what is considered the mostsignificant

election since the fall of Taliban in 2001.

•	 Lack ofsecurity has been the main challenge to Afghanistan’s electoral processsince 2005.

•	 While security will be the main challenge to the 2014 elections, the lessonsfrom previous

electionssuggest that there is an urgent need to put in place an effective anti-fraud strategy.

•	 The Independent Election Commission (IEC)should focus on mitigation measuresfor worsening security situation and an effective anti-fraud strategy. These measuresshould be widely

discussed with allstakeholders and IEC should publicly declare its commitment to implement it.

Zekria Barakzai

E-mail: zekria.barakzai@gmail.com

peaceBrieF147

Security Challenges

Lack ofsecurity has been the main challenge to Afghan electionssince 2005. In the 2009 and 2010

elections, poorsecurity wasthe main reason why millions of would-be voters did not go to the polls. 

In effect, the poorsecurity conditions enabled massive fraud to take place.1

Since then, the security situation has only gotten worse. The U.S. military surge appearsto have

broken the Taliban momentum in the South and East of the country, but these gains are fragile

and unsustainable. Furthermore, the withdrawal of international troops will leave power vacuums

around the country that are likely to be filled by Taliban and other anti-government elements. And

this will take place precisely as election preparations begin.

Afghan National Security Forces(ANSF) are now about 352,000 strong. ANSF, however, lacks critical capacitiesin terms of equipment, air power, logisticalsupport and trained manpower to counter

sophisticated insurgence attacks. Most of these have been provided by ISAF.

Maintaining security with reduced ISAF support will be the major challenge to the upcoming

presidential and provincial council elections. Security arrangements need to be in place during the

whole election process.

In the pre-election phase the security institutionsshould verify the polling center list provided by

IEC and make it clear in which centersthe security forces will be able to maintain security. Experience

from the past electionsshowsthat the assessment of polling center listsis a problematic exercise.

In particular, governmentsecurity officials often try to depict a“rosy picture”of the security situation

in the country and therefore declare an unrealistically high number of polling centers assecure, even

when they are located in the most dangerous placesin the country. Many of these became“ghost
© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

An Anti-Fraud Strategy for Afghanistan’s 2014 Elections 

page 2 • PB 147 • May 21, 2013

polling centers,”where ballots and othersensitive materials designated forthe stations were instead

used forfraud .The IEC should have its own independentsecurity assessment mechanism in place. If

there are discrepancies between its findings and those ofthe ANSF,the IEC should ultimately be the

institution to decide whetherto open polling centersin certain areas or not.

The realtest ofthe security situation will be the voterregistration process which, according to the

IEC, lastsfrom April 21 to August 21, 20132.Voterregistration centers will be established in all district

centers and in the provincial capitals.

In the pre-election phase,the other majorissue will be logisticalsupport by ANSF and ISAF to the

IEC. Forthe firsttime since 2001,the elections willtake place in the spring, which means most ofthe

logistical preparations must happen in the winterseason.This presentslogistical challenges, as most

ofthe provinces will be snow-ridden when it’stime forthe delivery of elections materials. 

Effective security coordination between IEC and ANSF is vital and also public outreach ofsecurity

preparations will have psychological effect and in turn will contribute to higherturnoutin the election

process. Specialsecurity arrangementsshould be putin place forfemale candidates who are most

vulnerable in the currentsituation in the country.

Anti-Fraud Strategy

While security will be the main challenge to the 2014 elections,the lessonsfrom previous electionssuggestthatthere is an urgent need to putin place an effective anti-fraud strategy.Thisstrategy should be

implemented not only by the IEC, but also by candidates, government actors, observers, agents, media

and civilsociety.The strategy should be based on deterrence, detection and mitigation of fraud3. In past

elections, massive fraud was detected and millions of votes were disqualified, but asit was not deterred

the election results were considered to be tainted. 

Potential Anti-Fraud Measures for the IEC

The IEC, asthe constitutional body responsible for conducting and overseeing electionsin the

country,should consider the following anti-fraud measures:

1. Independent Assessment of Polling Center Security

The IEC needsto provide a deadline toANSF by which it mustsubmititssecurity assessment. The

deadline should be setto allow sufficienttime to move ballot papers and othersensitive materialsfrom

Kabulto the provinces. Lack of clarity on security of polling centers may lead to losing control over

ballot papers.The IEC should also conductits own security assessment of polling centers by its network

of provincial offices.The two assessmentsshould be compared before the IEC takesthe final decision

on which polling centers are deemed sufficiently secure to receive election materials.

2. Strict Control over the Chain of Custody of Sensitive Materials

As was done in 2010, allsensitive materialsshould be bar coded and tracked throughout the

processfrom Kabul to the provinces, to districts and polling centers, and back to counting centers.

3. Transparent Recruitment and Vetting of Polling Officials

Temporary staff of the IEC, in particular District Field Coordinators(DFC), play a crucial role in the

electoral process. The recruitment of DFCsshould start earlier and the processshould engage

observer groups and civilsociety organizations. Prior to assignment of DFCsto polling stations, the

list of prospective DFCsshould be widely publicized with sufficient time to allow the wider public

to submit complaints about their past performance or their current affiliation with candidates and

political parties, and have those complaints adjudicated. It willsignificantly boost trust in the process
© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

An Anti-Fraud Strategy for Afghanistan’s 2014 Elections 

page 3 • PB 147 • May 21, 2013

by candidates and votersif they have confidence in the neutrality of the IEC staffers on the ground. 

4. Fraud Mapping of the Past Elections and Internal Audit

The IEC needsto map the fraud thattook place in 2009 and 2010 elections and take additional preventive measures where it was mostrampant. Internal IEC auditorsshould be deployed to those districts

and polling centers, who willthen recommend specific measuresforthose areas.The pool ofthe IEC

internal auditorsshould be welltrained and they should not conduct auditsin areas where they live.

5. Responsible Allocation of Ballot Papers

The excessive distribution of ballot papers(in other words,too many ballots being sentto each polling

station) was a significantsource of fraud in the past.Unused ballots have often been falsely marked.

The IEC needsto make logical decisions on how many ballot papers go to each polling station.Turnout

in past elections, voterregistration data, population figure as well asthe security situation should be

carefully considered for allocation of ballot papersto the provinces, districts and polling centers.

6. Counting in the Provincial Centers

In the 2004 presidential election, counting took place in Regional Centers(of which there were

eight acrossthe country). In 2005, counting was done in provincial capitals. In 2009 and 2010, the

count took place in polling centers. The expectation wasthat observers and agents would be able

to act as a check against fraud. In the event, observers, candidate agents, and media were able to

only cover around 30-35 percent of the polling centers. Counting in the polling centers proved to

be one the main enablers of ballotstuffing and massive fraud.

To mitigate this, counting should be moved to provincial centers and be undertaken in the

presence of observers, agents, ECC and media, and preliminary resultsshould be announced at the

provincial level. This will give the IEC a chance to control the process and observers, agents and ECC

to concentrate their efforts and observe the process more effectively. It will ease the work of ECC to

decide on the spot on suspicious ballot boxes. Experience suggeststhat the risk of fraud taking place

during the transport of ballotsislessthan the risk of fraud inherent in polling station counting.

7. Anti-Fraud Public Awareness

Itis essentialto attract voter cooperation with the IEC on anti-fraud efforts.The IEC needsto inform the

voters and candidatesthatfraud is a major offense and to help the IEC with its anti-fraud measures. In

2009 and 2010,the ECC and IEC disqualified more than one million votes because of fraud.Thistainted

even the legitimate winners, and damaged the reputation of electoral process and institutions. 

Potential Measures for the Afghan Government

Besidesthe IEC, the Afghan Government must play itsrole in anti-fraud efforts. It must respect the

independence and neutrality of the IEC and state officials must refrain from interfering in favor or

against any candidate. In the past election, the Presidential Decree on Non-Interference by State

Officials wassigned, but lacked an effective mechanism forsanctionsin case of violation and had

little impact on deterring local officialsfrom interfering.4.

The IEC should put together a comprehensive framework and guidance forstate officials, in

particularsecurity personnel, to assist but not interfere in the electoral process. The framework

should define which actions ofstate officials are considered to be violations of impartiality. The IEC

should be given the authority to collect evidence of interference and propose to the president that

they be removed from their post orsubjected to prosecution by legal institutions.
© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

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An Anti-Fraud Strategy for Afghanistan’s 2014 Elections 

page 4 • PB 147 • May 21, 2013

About This Brief

In April 2014, voters in Afghanistan 

will go to the polls for the most 

important elections since the fall of 

Taliban in 2001. Given that international security forces are scheduled 

to leave country by the end of 

2014, a smooth political transition 

as result of an acceptable election 

is the cornerstone of stability 

in the country. This Peace Brief 

recommends an anti-fraud strategy 

to promote a higher voter turnout 

and a credible election process. 

The author, Zekria Barakzai, is 

the senior policy advisor with the 

High Office of Anti-Corruption of 

Afghanistan and chairman of the 

Afghanistan Association of Electoral Officials. Barakzai previously 

worked for the IEC as deputy chief 

electoral officer from 2005 through 

January 2013. 

Observers, Candidate and Political Party Agents, Civil Society, and Media

Free, fair and transparent electionsrequire effective and proactive observation and engagement of

political parties, civilsociety organizations and media. A large number of observers, candidate and

political party agents and media were accredited for 2009 and 2010 elections,5 but, as noted, left a

large number of polling centers were uncovered.

For the 2014 electionsspecial attention should be paid to the capacity and logistical requirements of observation entities. 

Conclusion

Afghanistan isin its criticalstage of preparationsfor landmark 2014 presidential elections. Given

that a comprehensive polling centerspecific voter registration was not possible, IEC should focus

on mitigation measuresfor worsening security situation and an effective anti-fraud strategy. These

measuresshould be widely discussed with allstakeholders and IEC should publicly declare its

commitment to implement it.

The success of anti-fraud strategy will depend on the independence and neutrality of the IEC,

political will in the government of Afghanistan, effective electoral observation, and engagement

political parties and civilsociety in the process. It is necessary that efforts begin now to ensure that

these elements are in place asrequired during the electoral preparations.

Notes

1.	 In the 2009 presidential election, more than 1.2 million votes and in 2010Wolesy Jirga Elections 1.3

million votes were disqualified asresult of fraud, 2009 and 2010 Election Results, www.iec.org.af

2.	 2014 Election Timeline, Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan, Oct. 31, 2012

3.	 Dr.Staffan Darnolf, IFES Anti-Fraud Project

4.	 In 2010 the President hassigned a decree on non-interference in the electoral process but no

action wastaken to prosecute those officials who violated the decree. For Example Ismail KhanMinister of Water and Energy ordered the tally officialsin the IEC to assistspecific candidates,

though his voice wasrecorded no action wastaken.

5.	 A total number (280.000)Observers, Agents, CSOs and Media Representatives were accredited in

2009 elections and this number raised to the record number of (379.000) in 2010.(www.iec.org.af)