NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

THOMAS FORREST BOLTON, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 18-0621 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Yavapai County

No. P1300CR201300942

The Honorable Tina R. Ainley, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Yavapai County Attorney’s Office, Prescott

By Dana E. Owens

Counsel for Respondent

Thomas Forrest Bolton, Kingman

Petitioner

FILED 3-26-2019
STATE v. BOLTON

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge James P. Beene and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Thomas Bolton petitions for review from the denial of his 

petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) filed pursuant to Arizona Rule of 

Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 32.1. Having considered the petition, we 

grant review but deny relief.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Following a jury trial, Bolton was convicted of one count of 

sexual assault (victim A.F.), one count of kidnapping (victim A.F.), and two 

counts of selling or furnishing spirituous liquor to underage persons 

(victims A.F. and J.B.). The jury also found two aggravating factors, and 

the superior court sentenced Bolton to an aggregate term of 14 years’ 

imprisonment. 

¶3 As part of his Anders appeal, Bolton filed a pro per 

supplemental brief, arguing (1) he was improperly forced to wear a 

restraining device during trial; (2) the State failed to disclose that a key 

witness had received favorable treatment in exchange for his testimony; (3) 

DNA evidence should have been precluded due to improper collection, 

testing, and chain of custody; (4) emotional harm is an inherent element of 

sexual assault and the superior court could not use it as an aggravating 

factor; and (5) his former attorney improperly failed to oppose preclusion 

of A.F.’s prior sexual conduct and present a witness Bolton requested. State 

v. Bolton, 1 CA-CR 15-0432, 2016 WL 6081752, at *1, ¶ 2 (Ariz. App. Oct. 18, 

2016) (mem. decision). We vacated one of the counts of furnishing 

spirituous liquor to a minor as to A.F., which the State conceded lacked 

sufficient evidence, but affirmed the other convictions. Id. at *2, ¶ 9. 

Although we resolved Bolton’s first four claims, finding they lacked merit, 

we concluded his fifth argument amounted to a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, reviewable in a Rule 32 proceeding only. Id. at *2–3, 

¶¶ 10–18.
STATE v. BOLTON

Decision of the Court

3

¶4 Bolton then timely filed a PCR. Proceeding pro per, he 

asserted that both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective, the 

prosecutor engaged in misconduct, and the superior court committed 

numerous trial errors. The court denied the PCR, and this petition for 

review followed. 

DISCUSSION

¶5 Absent an abuse of discretion or error of law, we will not 

disturb a superior court’s ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief. 

State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19 (2012). Bolton bears the burden of 

showing the court abused its discretion. See State v. Poblete, 227 Ariz. 537, 

538, ¶ 1 (App. 2011).

¶6 Rule 32.2(a) precludes relief for a defendant on any ground 

“(1) still raisable on direct appeal . . . or in a post-trial motion . . . (2) finally 

adjudicated on the merits in an appeal or in any previous collateral 

proceeding; or (3) waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral 

proceeding.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a). However, a Rule 32 proceeding 

provides the sole vehicle to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

State ex rel. Thomas v. Rayes, 214 Ariz. 411, 415, ¶ 20 (2007). Bolton’s other 

claims that were, or should have been, raised in a direct appeal, are 

therefore precluded.

1

¶7 We accordingly limit our review to Bolton’s argument that his 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) present a third-party 

culpability defense that A.F.’s boyfriend, J.B., sexually assaulted her; (2) 

challenge the victims’ credibility; (3) object to the admission of A.F.’s 

testimony regarding prior sexual abuse; (4) request suppression of evidence 

seized pursuant to a search warrant; (5) oppose the preclusion of A.F.’s 

prior sexual history; and (6) present the testimony of a defense witness. We 

also review Bolton’s contention that his appellate counsel was ineffective 

by failing to recuse himself based on his supervisory relationship to trial 

counsel and to raise any claims on direct appeal. 

 

1 Because Bolton contested both the State’s use of a stun belt restraint 

and its procedures for collecting, testing, and maintaining evidence in his 

direct appeal, supra ¶ 3, the Rule precludes relief on those grounds. 

Similarly, Bolton’s failure to raise issues of prosecutorial misconduct and 

trial court error in his direct appeal means the Rule also precludes him from 

obtaining relief on those grounds.
STATE v. BOLTON

Decision of the Court

4

¶8 A defendant’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim

must satisfy the two-pronged test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668 (1984). State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 397 (1985). A colorable “actual 

ineffectiveness” claim shows both that counsel’s performance failed to meet 

objectively reasonable standards and that this failure prejudiced the 

defense. Id. at 397–98. We begin with the “strong presumption” that 

counsel’s actions “might be considered sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 698 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). “To 

overcome this presumption,” a petitioner must show that “counsel’s 

decisions were not tactical in nature, but instead were the result of 

‘ineptitude, inexperience or lack of preparation.’” State v. Denz, 232 Ariz. 

441, 444, ¶ 7 (App. 2013) (citation omitted). If trial counsel’s tactical 

decisions had a reasoned basis, simple disagreement over trial strategy 

does not suffice to establish the performance prong of Strickland. Id. To 

warrant reversal, a defendant must also show “there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different,” which, in this context, means “a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 694.

¶9 First, Bolton contends that trial counsel was ineffective by 

failing to present a third-party defense that J.B., not Bolton, sexually 

assaulted A.F. To support this claim, Bolton cites numerous police reports 

he attached to his PCR that document physical altercations J.B. had with 

family members, A.F., and others. Each incident occurred after the events 

at issue in this trial. And none of the events described in the reports relate 

to sexual assault. In fact, one report indicates the incident was precipitated 

by J.B.’s rage that Bolton had sexually assaulted A.F. At any rate, the jury 

was aware of much of this information because J.B. acknowledged at trial 

that he had been convicted of aggravated assault and domestic violence and 

was receiving mental health treatment. Bolton’s trial counsel also 

highlighted this fact during closing by inviting the jury to consider the 

possibility that J.B. was responsible for A.F.’s injuries. Given the limited 

relevance of these events, if any, it was a permissible tactical decision for 

trial counsel not to press the issue any further.

¶10 Second, Bolton argues that trial counsel was ineffective by 

failing to sufficiently challenge the credibility of J.B. and A.F. based on 

conflicting testimony. J.B. stated that Bolton gave him alcohol on the day 

of the assault, but A.F. said that Bolton’s wife provided alcohol to both J.B. 

and herself. Bolton cites our prior decision vacating his misdemeanor as to 

A.F. as proof he establishes both prongs of Strickland. But we concluded 

there was sufficient evidence to support his other convictions, including the 
STATE v. BOLTON

Decision of the Court

5

misdemeanor as to J.B. Bolton, 2016 WL 6081752, at *3, ¶ 18. Moreover, 

although the superior court decided the misdemeanor offenses, the jury 

decided the kidnapping and sexual assault charges. Furnishing the victim 

with alcohol is not an element of kidnapping or sexual assault. Ariz. Rev. 

Stat. §§ 13-1304(A)(3) (kidnapping), -1406(A) (sexual assault). Trial counsel 

was not obligated to focus on this issue because doing so might well have 

“harmed counsel’s and defendant’s credibility when meritorious matters 

were raised.” See State v. Chee, 140 Ariz. 171, 173 (App. 1984). Lastly, 

outside this detail about who provided them with alcohol, J.B. and A.F. 

generally corroborated each other’s narrative regarding the sexual assault. 

On these facts, trial counsel’s decision not to challenge the credibility of 

these witnesses further was a permissible strategic choice.

¶11 Third, Bolton contends that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failure to object to A.F.’s allegedly irrelevant and prejudicial trial testimony 

regarding her prior sexual abuse. At trial, A.F. testified that her father was 

imprisoned for molesting her as a young child and explained that her 

experience in reporting the abuse to an investigating detective was “scary” 

and “very difficult.” When questioned later about her reluctance to report 

the sexual assault and cooperate with investigators, A.F. explained she 

“didn’t want to feel like a victim again” or endure “the court process” 

because she had “already been through that.” Eventually, however, she 

relented and participated with the police investigation because she “didn’t 

want this to happen to someone else.” During the aggravation phase, A.F. 

testified about the emotional trauma she suffered from this incident, 

including nightmares and weight loss. 

¶12 Counsel’s decision not to object to this testimony is not a close 

question under Strickland. The evidence was relevant to explain A.F.’s 

initial reluctance to submit to an intrusive physical examination or provide 

a full description of the alleged sexual assault to police. Ariz. R. Evid. 401, 

402. Although an objection to A.F.’s testimony would not have been 

unreasonable, it was also well within trial counsel’s tactical discretion not 

to do so. Counsel had sensible reasons not to object to such emotional 

testimony, including to avoid drawing additional attention to A.F.’s 

sympathetic history or leaving any impression with the jury that Bolton’s 

representative was badgering A.F. on a uniquely sensitive topic. See Denz, 

232 Ariz. at 445, ¶ 11 (stating that trial counsel’s desire to avoid “unduly 

emphasiz[ing] aspects of a case” is a permissible strategic consideration). 

¶13 Moreover, most of the testimony that Bolton’s petition takes 

issue with concerned A.F.’s emotional harm and occurred during the 

aggravation phase. Bolton attacks trial counsel’s decision not to object to 
STATE v. BOLTON

Decision of the Court

6

this testimony as unreasonable because A.F.’s testimony, not based on 

scientific or medical knowledge, “provided the jury with an improper 

foundation upon which to evaluate emotional harm.” A.F.’s testimony, 

though, is the kind typically sanctioned in the aggravation phase, see State 

v. Coulter, 236 Ariz. 270, 274, 276, ¶¶ 7, 16 (App. 2014) (describing “emotion” 

as “a state of feeling” and partially relying on witness testimony of her 

nightmares to uphold an emotional harm finding (citation omitted)), and 

counsel’s decision not to object was not objectively unreasonable. 

¶14 Fourth, Bolton argues his trial counsel was ineffective because 

he failed to move to suppress evidence seized from Bolton’s home pursuant 

to a search warrant. Specifically, Bolton contends the warrant was not 

supported by probable cause because A.F. and J.B. made inconsistent 

statements, Bolton’s wife claimed she was with him the entire evening at 

issue, and his stepdaughter stated she did not witness a sexual assault that 

night. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (defining probable cause 

to search as “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will 

be found in a particular place”). However, a reviewing court would not 

have suppressed the evidence unless officers’ reliance on that warrant was 

objectively unreasonable. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). 

Bolton contends that requirement is easily established here because other 

officers at trial testified that police initially thought there was no reason to 

search his residence because they did not expect to find evidence there. But 

what some officers believe at the beginning of a case has little relevance to 

whether later investigation reveals sufficient probable cause to support the 

issuance of a warrant or whether other officers acted in reasonable reliance 

on that warrant. By the time police obtained the warrant, both J.B. and A.F. 

had reported that J.B. walked into Bolton’s bedroom and saw him sexually 

assaulting A.F. Based on this and other evidence, there was a “fair 

probability” that evidence of a crime could be found in Bolton’s home, 

particularly for biological evidence on and around Bolton’s bed. 

¶15 Furthermore, Bolton acknowledges that, throughout trial, his 

counsel raised issues with some of the evidence obtained pursuant to the 

warrant and that, in other respects, the evidence was favorable to him “by 

reason of there being no DNA match found between A.F. and Petitioner 

from the items collected,” a fact his trial counsel seized on during closing

argument. We cannot say trial counsel’s tactical decision not to file a 

debatable motion had no reasoned basis.

¶16 Fifth, citing an affidavit attached to his PCR, Bolton asserts 

trial counsel was ineffective by failing to call William Pistole as a defense 

witness. As reflected in the affidavit, Pistole avowed that A.F. (1) made the 
STATE v. BOLTON

Decision of the Court

7

sexual assault allegations only because J.B. forced her to do so and (2) 

recanted the allegations before trial. First, we note that Pistole’s affidavit 

was notarized on September 1, 2017, more than two years after the trial in 

this case. Absent some evidence that trial counsel was aware of Pistole’s 

claims before the jury rendered its verdict, this affidavit, alone, cannot 

support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 689 (“A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort 

be made . . . to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”)

(emphasis added). Second, the reports attached to Bolton’s PCR indicate 

that J.B. and Pistole have a history of physical altercations. Even assuming 

trial counsel’s timely knowledge of Pistole’s avowals, given the reported 

antagonism between J.B. and Pistole, we cannot say that trial counsel’s 

purported decision not to call Pistole as a witness was objectively 

unreasonable.

¶17 Sixth, Bolton argues trial counsel was ineffective by failing to 

oppose the preclusion of A.F.’s sexual history. Although Bolton’s initial 

appointed trial counsel failed to challenge the State’s motion to preclude 

A.F.’s sexual history, his second trial attorney filed a motion to reconsider. 

Thus, because the undisputed evidence reflects that trial counsel challenged 

the State’s motion to preclude A.F.’s sexual history this argument also fails. 

¶18 Seventh, Bolton contends his appellate counsel should have 

recused himself because he was trial counsel’s supervisor. We agree with 

the superior court that Bolton has not established a colorable claim because 

he provides no factual basis to support his contention. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.5(d) (requiring a defendant to attach to the petition “any affidavits, 

records, or other evidence currently available to the defendant supporting 

the petition’s allegations”).

¶19 Finally, noting that this court vacated one count of furnishing 

spirituous liquor to a minor, Bolton asserts appellate counsel was 

ineffective by filing an Anders appeal. Given our conclusion that there was 

insufficient evidence to sustain Bolton’s misdemeanor conviction, Bolton, 

2016 WL 6081752, at *2, ¶ 9, Bolton’s argument might establish Strickland’s 

performance prong. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000) (stating 

that a defendant need only “show that a reasonably competent attorney 

would have found one nonfrivolous issue warranting a merits brief”). 

Although we vacated that conviction, Bolton’s argument ignores the fact 

we also concluded that his remaining convictions and sentences were 

supported by sufficient evidence and that the record did not disclose any 

nonfrivolous basis to challenge those convictions and resulting sentences. 

Bolton, 2016 WL 6081752, at *3, ¶ 18. Even if appellate counsel’s 
STATE v. BOLTON

Decision of the Court

8

performance was deficient in this aspect, Bolton has sustained no 

continuing prejudice on the convictions and sentences he attacks in his 

petition, see Smith, 528 U.S. at 285 (stating that it is petitioner’s burden to 

demonstrate prejudice by showing “a reasonable probability that, but for 

his counsel’s unreasonable failure to file a merits brief, he would have 

prevailed on his appeal”), and thus Bolton fails to establish a colorable 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

CONCLUSION

¶20 For these reasons, we grant review but deny relief.