NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 20a0147n.06

No. 19-3186

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JUSTIN MCKNIGHT,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 

OHIO

BEFORE: GRIFFIN, WHITE, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. Justin McKnight appeals his 135-month sentence for child pornography 

offenses. As set forth below, we AFFIRM McKnight’s sentence.

McKnight pleaded guilty to an indictment charging him with receipt and distribution of 

visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2252(a)(2), and possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). 

McKnight’s presentence report set forth a base offense level of 22, see USSG § 2G2.2(a)(2), with 

the following enhancements: a 2-level increase for material involving a prepubescent minor or a 

minor who had not attained the age of 12 years, see USSG § 2G2.2(b)(2); a 4-level increase for 

material portraying the sexual abuse or exploitation of an infant or toddler, see USSG 

§ 2G2.2(b)(4); a 2-level increase for the use of a computer or an interactive computer service, see 

USSG § 2G2.2(b)(6); and a 5-level increase for an offense involving more than 600 images, see 

USSG § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D). After a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, see USSG 
No. 19-3186, United States v. McKnight

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§ 3E1.1, McKnight’s total offense level became 32, which, along with his criminal history 

category of II, corresponded to a guidelines range of 135 to 168 months of imprisonment. 

McKnight did not object to the presentence report’s guidelines calculation, which the district court 

adopted. Determining that a within-guidelines sentence was appropriate, the district court 

sentenced McKnight to 135 months of imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. 

In this timely appeal, McKnight argues that the district court failed to conduct a meaningful 

analysis of his personal history and characteristics and the nature and circumstances of his offenses

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We review criminal sentences for procedural and substantive 

reasonableness under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Battaglia, 624 

F.3d 348, 350 (6th Cir. 2010). Although McKnight does not specify the nature of his challenge to 

his sentence, he raises a claim of procedural error. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 

(2007). A sentencing explanation satisfies the requirements of procedural reasonableness if the 

sentencing judge “set[s] forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the 

parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking 

authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). When the district court imposes a 

within-guidelines sentence, as in this case, “the question is whether ‘[t]he record makes clear that 

the sentencing judge listened to each argument,’ ‘considered the supporting evidence,’ was ‘fully 

aware’ of the defendant’s circumstances and took ‘them into account’ in sentencing him.” United 

States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 358). 

Because McKnight failed to object to the adequacy of the district court’s analysis when given the 

opportunity to do so at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, we review for plain error. Id. at 

385–86. 

McKnight has not shown any error, let alone plain error, in the district court’s analysis of 

the relevant § 3553(a) factors and explanation of the chosen sentence. McKnight contends that 
No. 19-3186, United States v. McKnight

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the district court failed to conduct a meaningful evaluation of certain circumstances, including his 

insight into his offenses, his expressions of remorse, his deletion of images of child pornography 

from his electronic devices, his limited criminal history, the absence of any psychologically based 

sex-offender evaluation or testing, his above-average level of education, his substantial family 

support, and his successful drug and alcohol treatment. At the outset of the sentencing hearing, 

the district court referenced McKnight’s presentence report and his sentencing memorandum, 

which addressed these issues. The district court questioned McKnight about his child pornography 

offenses and about his successful recovery from his heroin addiction, which the district court 

characterized as “pretty impressive.” Before announcing the chosen sentence, the district court 

stated:

I take into consideration everything that you’ve done up until the time of your arrest 

and then everything that you’ve done since your arrest. And some of the things you 

have done since your arrest have been positive. You have a wonderful support 

group of people who are here and wrote letters on your behalf. You’ve seemed to 

have taken complete and full responsibility for your conduct, so I’m going to give 

you credit for all of that.

The district court concluded that a sentence at the bottom of the guidelines range was appropriate. 

The record reflects that the district court considered McKnight’s history and characteristics and 

the nature and circumstances of his offenses and adequately explained the 135-month sentence.

McKnight’s brief can be construed as also raising a substantive reasonableness challenge 

to his sentence—that the district court placed too much weight on the guidelines. See United States 

v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir.) (holding that a claim that a sentence is substantively 

unreasonable is “a complaint that the court placed too much weight on some of the § 3553(a) 

factors and too little on others in sentencing the individual”), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 264 (2018). 

We apply a rebuttable presumption of substantive reasonableness to McKnight’s within-guidelines 

sentence. See Vonner, 516 F.3d at 389. 
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McKnight raises various arguments about USSG § 2G2.2, the sentencing guideline 

applicable to child pornography offenses.1 McKnight first argues that the guideline is “not the 

product of extended research” by the sentencing commission and is “not based upon hard scientific 

examination and conclusions.” We have repeatedly rejected the argument that “§ 2G2.2’s 

purported lack of empirical grounding makes it unfit for deference.” United States v. Cunningham, 

669 F.3d 723, 733 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing cases); see United States v. Lynde, 926 F.3d 275, 280 

(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 326 (2019). McKnight also asserts that there is an “overarching 

trend” of district courts imposing sentences below the guidelines range in child pornography cases. 

But “the fact that a district court may disagree with a Guideline for policy reasons and may reject 

the Guidelines range because of that disagreement does not mean that the court must disagree with 

that Guideline or that it must reject the Guidelines range if it disagrees.” United States v. Brooks, 

628 F.3d 791, 800 (6th Cir. 2011). McKnight notes that he received a 5-level enhancement because 

his offense involved 600 or more images and that video clips are considered to have 75 images, 

see USSG § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D) cmt. n.6(B)(ii); however, he fails to raise any specific objection to the 

75-images-per-video ratio. McKnight next contends that the 4-level enhancement for material 

portraying “sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence” under USSG 

§ 2G2.2(b)(4)(A) is overly broad. But McKnight received the 4-level enhancement for material 

portraying “sexual abuse or exploitation of an infant or toddler” under USSG § 2G2.2(b)(4)(B), 

not for material portraying sadistic or masochistic conduct. Finally, McKnight argues that the 2-

level enhancement for use of a computer or an interactive computer service under USSG 

§ 2G2.2(b)(6) “has become virtually automatic”, an argument that we have repeatedly rejected. 

1The government contends that McKnight waived his arguments related to the applicability 

of these enhancements. At most, McKnight argues these points in a cursory fashion. And he did 

not file a reply brief to respond to the government’s arguments. But even though he arguably 

waived consideration of these claims, they fail under plain error review anyway. 
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See United States v. Walters, 775 F.3d 778, 786–87 (6th Cir. 2015) (rejecting “arguments that the 

computer enhancement should not be used simply because it is applied frequently”). The district 

court’s application of USSG § 2G2.2 did not render McKnight’s sentence substantively 

unreasonable. See Lynde, 926 F.3d at 279–82. 

The district court considered the guidelines range along with the other relevant § 3553(a) 

factors and imposed a sentence at the bottom of the guidelines range. McKnight has not overcome 

the presumption that his within-guidelines sentence was substantively reasonable. 

For these reasons, we AFFIRM McKnight’s sentence.